 So, it's my pleasure to introduce Björn Jespersson of the University of Utrecht. He's working in what we invited him for, because we're just on the topic of high-ranking nationality, which has been discussed very often in this seminar. But he has a special approach to it, which is a very promising approach that is quite different from all or no classical logic approaches, namely the Czech approach, one could say, inspired by Tiki, the transparent intentional semantics logic. So, I assume that your talk also will be in that framework, so it's great to have a real specialist of that specific approach among us and to invite the lesson that you are philosophy of language in particular. Thank you. So, the first half of this talk will be general philosophy of language. So, I'll talk about a cluster of cases which have been used or abused to make a case for hyper-intimidality. There is a case to be made for hyper-intimidality, but we have to tweak those cases. And this may be a negative. The positive bit is that I show by means of till what to do. Till is all about transparent intentional logic till. It's all about fine-grading, but today I'll be making a case for coarse-grading. There are limiting cases where we exactly do not want to fine-grade, because if we fine-grade, we are fine-grading due to syntax and or pragmatics, but we should fine-grade only due to semantics. And of course, presupposing a particular notion of semantics here, a rather narrow notion of semantics, think of church, think of Frege, a recording from der Gedanke, and this is in the spirit of der Gedanke. What, if you take a piece of language, what are all the things that do not contribute to the Gedanke? Go, go, go, go. So, you have to win the core, the logical core. And I'm on the same, busy with the same, concerned with the same project today. So, the, yeah, it works. So, just to bring up the speed, there is a class of cases where you seem to be dealing with synonyms from natural language. We know synonyms in natural languages, who knows, right? But we can always make a stipulation. If these two concepts, if these two predicts are synonyms, then something follows. I cannot tell you if any pair of consonants or predicants would have you are actually synonyms. Relative to particular language, I wouldn't know. That's for the field linguist to decide. Or make a conditional statement. If. And if synonyms would be then. So, start of cases are. Woodchuck, groundhog, whistle pick, furs, gores, cougar, and puma. The, I'll be saying some things about the majority of you. I think it's flawed. Drawing distinctions that shouldn't be drawn. So, looking at syntactic distinctions and drawing semantic distinctions that shouldn't be drawn. That's the majority of you. I'll be defending what I call the minority of you. And we all sat with it with the underdog, right? Of course, this is a common problem. I think we can all agree about this. F and G are properties. If F and G have the same properties, then this little agent here may not know that they are identical. You know that every property is symmetrical. That doesn't entail that you know for each property that it is symmetrical. Because that property may not be within your repertoire. Maybe upside your linguistic and epistemic horizon. This is true, I think. The majority of you says we can have cases where F and G are the same property. And yet he believes, A believes it's an agent that somebody has a method. And the same agent fills the belief that the same agent has a property. To me, that's inconsistent. But it is almost as a datum in much elliptic philosophy of language. That if this is a common dog, this is a woodchuck. Then you can believe that Arnold is a woodchuck. And he fills the belief that the same animal is a whistleblaker. And then lots of arguments are forgiven. Typically the term on programatics, it would be misleading to attribute a certain view. A certain attitude, right? Not just a sentence that you would agree to now. An attitude to be where you use the permanent and G at the expense of. Or they would point to historical or causal factors. You have to interact with, when you acquire the predicate, if you're in historical or causal contact with things that are presented to you as Fs. On other Gs, therefore, you can have an attitude about Fs. And have the same attitude about Gs. Despite this current. To me, that's inconsistent. So what I'm saying is, it's a necessary condition for the identity of F and G. That the attitude that B is an F is identical to the attitude that we use in G. If we don't have an identity of attitudes here, we don't have an identity of properties there. Which, of course, is a condition that Mr. Dereckondition applies in the face of the majority of you. So let me find a claim from the consequence. And have a set, whether being intentional or hyperintentionally. But any fine grain, any measure of calibration, any integration of intentions or hyperintention that we find here, will be carried through to the end of the secret. So this imposes a condition of the integration of practice. But the way I identify it, I think in... I have a small question for your application. You say that it's inconsistent. You say that something is inconsistent. What is inconsistent in belief or the statement itself? It's an attribution, that it's an inconsistent attribution. Okay, not just a consistent belief, but also the attribution that's inconsistent. Yes, yes, yes. Thank you. And it becomes important to distinguish between the attribute and the attribution. Because we have an attribute and an attribution. Yeah, sure. So any fine grain over here, the level of attribution is carried through to the intercedent, where we are opposing conditions of integration. Properties, the way I understand them, are what possible semantics in SDI. Plus we have terminal factors. So an empirical proctival individual is... Which is non-trivial. It's just a function for worlds to function from times to a set. Where a set is a characteristic function. So I'm not making a plea for hyper-intentionally-individuated properties here. This is Ripley. This is taken from a paper where he compares two approaches to fine grain. Circumstantialist, where you have circumstances of evolution. Well, including impossible worlds. But where you skew any sort of structure. Or structural positions that involve some sort of structured meaning. And he tries to come up Ripley with a case where... A cluster of cases where the structuralist fails to draw up the stations that should be drawn at which the circumstances can draw. Be that as it may. I'm not talking about structures versus circumstances here. This is the context. This is an example where we need to draw a distinction. And what I'm going to say is no, you don't want to draw that distinction. There's another distinction you do want to draw. So, Tama, from my fears that all wood sharks are wood sharks. Which is already very funny if you think about it. Why would you be afraid of what I'm going to tell you? Tama fears that all wood sharks are wood sharks. And then he says, this is the wrong prediction. So the wrong theory, the coarse-grained theory, must predict the one or two, I mean the true to the other or false to the other. So they're a true condition in the probability. This is the wrong prediction. Suppose Tama is familiar with both wood sharks and wood snakes. Familiar with both F's and G's. But this ensures that they are the same kind of critters. I'll be maybe a little bit faster about this than they are. Because this is an NF or what does it pick up? There. He's known for similarities though. And he has his suspicions. Suppose from the time when Tama knows he's allergic to whistle picks and knows that he's just a bit of a wood shark. In this scenario, two is likely true while one is also certainly false. But suppose you're playing around with this. Assume that two is true. The premise that anything that is a wood shark is a whistle pick and whatever is a whistle pick is a wood shark. Then you infer what? Well, one amounts to a theory that is a wood metatology. Be true. So what happens to two? That's got to go to. Because then two is, again, it says nothing other than that Tama is afraid that certain photography be true. So what is the distinction that we are being asked to draw? What is the suspicion that Tama has? This passage is one that is often quoted in series of hypertension. It's a clear case where we obviously need to find brain. I'm not so adamant at all. That doesn't mean, however, that we should go ahead and say that it's fine if the relation of fears is a possible proposition, because that's just a necessary proposition. And then we couldn't distinguish between Tama fear and the normal wood sharks on wood sharks and Tama fear and the normal natural numbers on natural numbers. And that's the distinction we're going to draw. So we agree that two things happening here, coarse-graining is being prepared against fine-graining, good old-fashioned, possible semantics versus this, that and the other, theory of having tension in relation. So we're estimating the logical effect of substituting one predicate for the other within when that predicate is impeded, within an attitude to transcription. So the Georgia view is that the apparent link between the two is that the effect of such that only a high potential theory will suffice for a problem analysis of 1 and 2. No. The apparent logic is that what one would mainly expect, the fact is that substitution is invalid rather than that. No. Substitution. Absolutely invalid. In my book. The thing is that F and G would substitute for isn't wood shark is a whistle-taker. I just said notational barriers. That's the assumption that there are synonyms. That's what we're starting with. We're assuming that there are synonyms. So there are just notational barriers there, and we have a case of semantic redundancy. We have two different terms that do exactly the same and then the job modeling is just fat, which we treat. But there's a category of limiting cases that do demand high potential analysis, and that's the thing I've just brought up. Suppose F and G are two distinct properties, fearing that it's one thing to fear that woodpeckers and woodpeckers, another thing is to fear that wood sharks are in charge. A third thing is to fear that natural interest and actual numbers. Don't go dread the day when it turns out that natural numbers are high. There's something to fear. So we need to look at the companies here. So when energy and distinct properties, we need to go high potential. When the predicates, the terms are notational variance, but are semantically indistinguishable, then we can substitute for it. So this is the core of what I'm hoping to... This is really... This is what I suggest, the rewrite I suggest, because I want to bring out the confusion between... not confusion, the blend, the legitimate blend of predicates and properties. So take this here. Because there's something, apparently, that there's some days that we have to... Tell me, both this and that. So apparently he's familiar with two different things. He's noticed the similarities between two different things. I guess his suspicions that there's some confluence. Apparently he learns something empirical while learning that the woodchart that they tell is implicit. So this is what I wish to write. Suppose now I'm familiar with both the word woodchart and the word listening, but isn't sure that they have the same meaning or they know the same kind of trigger. So what am I doing here? I'm attributing linguistic competence to the agent. That's what I'm doing. There's nothing wrong with this taxonomy of rodents. It's his career of English that is formal. He's noticed the similarities between the animals that go by woodchart and those that go by listening. He's got two files. Animals that I know as woodcharts and also know as whistleblakes. So we have the two nests that we were on there after. Any nests is suspicions. So those two files, the things are found under. F, the things are found under G. Could be merged. Suppose a child of ours is allergic to the animals called whistleblakes. A nose that is just forbidden by the woodchart. It's interesting for him to work with his friends. So we have paid, this rewrite pays full respect to the data for that. We're going to go up here. But this requires a sharp distinction between preference and properties. And what happens here is basically we're confusing use and mention of preference. That's my analysis. So people are taught here. We learn Zolzer, just to warn the animals. Presuppose that an attribution of an attitude to a rodent pay attention, could pay attention to the choice of predicate as well. Because a particular predicate comes with a particular history of acquisition for the attribution. I'll agree to that pragmatically. Pragmatically it could be very effective if it elicits us to use one predicate rather than another. He would never say that. He doesn't know that term. He says it's misleading. But is it semantically correct? Yes, absolutely. On the assumption of tsunami. So what is the granularity of the answer? I think the finish was on the right track here. And I knew it was comfortable. So in order to favor color with preference, I picked a quotation in one of the three official images. So four words for a horse. Four words for a horse. I think that's the right attitude here. Again, who knows if there are synonyms. Synonyms is hard to combine in that language within the same language. It's easy if you cross languages and pick two of those for instance. In the paper version I have Vienna, Bideni, Bean, Beech. Four different names for the same thing. And there's no redundancy across languages because if you call one word, then one word languages will lose their name for the other. So redundancy, that's a semantic redundancy. That's relative to one word. All the fluff goes in the denominator. So a lot of things are synonyms. It's pragmatic. It's rhetoric. It's stylistic variation. I think playing a big step for the right conversion here. But this is national language. So it's a mess. So take poetry. I think that the bar goes up in poetry. And so I'm sort of turning into an article in English and I understood the core. The English has this to say that even if you have a sheen or a monster, then they're truthfully synonyms. They don't intend to purpose. But not with embedded in poetry. So it's not just this. This is from The Rite of the Native American. This is not just about preserving me. The poem is about preserving rhythm and flow and imagery. Perhaps a sheen is more just than a monster is what I know. So that's also why poetry is not. So this is all the cases I'm asking. That's the more critique cases we're talking about. What is Neville and Beth Teller? I want a medical report. I don't want poetry. So that's the kind of variation. Oh, work towards till now. I'm carrying you the definitions. I won't present the definitions. Tell you what the notation means, what it does. We need three levels. So we have the hyperintentional level. We have the intentional level. That's what we know from popular ceramics. And we have the extension level. The extensions that we talked about today are the ones that we obtain by taking an intention, then extension by set, which means to go to a particular world at a particular time, you get the extension of that intention, at least to the period of existence. So all the strawberries in this world at this moment. So Wuczak, the subscript here, that's a set of Wuczaks. So here is the intention. This intention has been presented by a hyperintention. It works tough now. And let me just show the beings right away. When we do our fight, we, well, for instance, take an example like Fortnight versus Two Weeks. Then you bump up against the purpose of analysis. Do we have ceremony or not? No, the economic structures are different. But we have a notion of procedural osomorphism, which of course sounds like ceremony, asomorphism like a church, or essentially asomorphism as a current. I mean, it would be very fragile if we would be seeing this in a more park. So procedural osomorphism says these two structures are distinctive structures, but their structures are semantically different. If F and G are not cases like less Sephora versus less Two Weeks, but our case is like, is a woodchuck? Is a guinea pig? When there's no semantic, when there's no syntactic structure that we need to work with, which is atoms, legumes. If that's what we're looking at, we don't have to bother about procedural osomorphism, when we're not semantically relevant to differences in structure, because it's just one structure. Because we're looking at structure atoms. The structure, so we have a second, but the structures, which are just one unit. I'll explain how that works, but that's exactly why we don't draw distinctions between woodchucks and individual objects. Because there is one up here. So we have four key structures. Structures for us are procedures. They line things up, and then they tell you what to do with it. So here's an operation. Here's an operand. Apply this operation to this operand, and I'll give you an object of this multiple type, which may then be an argument for another operation. So you have this multiple flowchart. So it's all a matter of functional application, functional interaction. So these two complex procedures meet some input to work on. So we have two feet of procedures, which are atomic. There are variables and multiculturalization. And variables are not terms. Variables are one step. Procedures which present, produce, an object relevant to the sequence. Total function. The counterpart of a variable called trivialization and the linguistic counterpart would be a constant. But you understand that while procedures are not realistic, they are abstract multiple operands. We're trying to make sense of what Fringy thought was to say. The trivialization. I could trivialize the randomness. What do you need to do then? This is a fully typed universe. Let it be a Yotar object, an individual. One of you would call an E object. If I set up type, Yotar object, an individual, and I trivialize it with Yotar. What is that procedure? That procedure says reach, figuratively speaking, reach into the type of Yotar object. That's what we need the type of Yotar. And extract a specific object from that. Quite a huge domain of objects in there. Namely, whether I haven't told you anything descriptive about it. There's nothing descriptive about virtualization. So I could trivialize Pi. It would be very unwise to do that. Because I want to extract Pi. But the theory allows that. So you need some force of the wisdom and discretion as to what you trivialize. Let's assume we are comfortable isolating the property of being a chunk. Let's assume we are comfortable isolating, extracting, identifying, demanding. So we can trivialize that. So now we're trivializing property of being a whistle big. This composition says that the identity relation obtains between what this trivialization and this trivialization. And this says, well, the other argument of this relation is what this trivialization produces between this trivialization. So I'm saying that the trivialization of this property is a vertical to the procedure for identifying this property. So I'm saying there's just one procedure and there's just one hyperintention. That's what that means. So right at this point, I cast aside any pretension and I'm going to draw hyperintention with distinctions. There's just one hyperintention. That's what that means. So if I quote this convention, this trivialization of this property, well, then I can actually see the trivialization of whistle big. That's one to me. I don't need two different terms for the same procedure. If I read this here, then I change the time of the identity relation. I'm saying that this is a function that takes two properties to a truth value, a truth value with true one if this property is that property. So this conversation says, look at what this trivialization, internalized it's name is property, look at this trivialization and I'll type the identity relation such that I'm saying that this property produces such-and-such, yes, it will produce such-and-such. Which again is a very uninteresting limiting case because I have one procedure producing the same thing. It's just that I have two pieces of notation for that. Listenation and listenation. This reflects the fact that I have two terms and I have some numbers. So the first one, how do I go again? Tell my fears that all won't shock and won't shock. So how do you analyze that? What do you need to come up with? Is it predication? Or is it... It doesn't matter for all purposes. This is predication. Whenever you see a lambda bound one of the time variables, you're probably into it. This is explicit intentionalization because we need to abstract over values of such variables because we have lots of times to scatter times. This whole thing here is a closure a procedure of functional abstraction. This whole thing here, this closure produces a possible procession. Because it isolates lots of times, which is true that Tama is a building in the population of a few hundred individuals such that they are related by the hearing relation to and this is the key thing relate Tama to a possible procession. And we'll have an example later on where that is just don't want it here because we want to distinguish between feelings of one pecker and the fear of the other. So we don't want to relate Tama to a necessary proposition. We want to relate Tama to a procedure that is taught to produce the necessary. If we interpret the colonized predication then Tama's fear is that this termination produces the hyper-propositions that is that all updates that are instead of woodsharks and any world of time where Tama is his fear is that Tama is another one of these. It's a silly fear, but that's the example. Read the cover of this, I didn't say and this one little thing we can easily reduce to this here. So Tama fears actualization of a truth level. This conversation is a truth level. This is time to do a truth level. We certainly cannot have an attitude towards a truth level but you can have an attitude towards a procedure whose property is a truth level. So Tama fears that in formal terms Tama fears that this logical hyper-propositions produces the truth. The fears of this property is an input to this property. And here we need to be hyper-intentional. That's clear. That's what I'm saying. The example is a nice diagnosis of the reason why we need to be hyper-intentional. We need to go hyper-intentional but not for the reason that it states but for the reason it does state. This I've already talked about so we need to distinguish between the theory this and that and the other thing. Tama fears that all numbers are ours. We can do this in any of three ways. We have a third option because we can introduce if you like. There's none. Nothing numbers as a ground point. That's nothing to worry about. So these are three different ways of making sense of Tama's fear that all numbers are ours. And again, we need to be hyper-intentional here because if not Tama's would be ready to fear to what this utilization produces. They may be truselary because we're just very talking about all differences. They are what we're making sense of now. So the quality of our takes is set to truth. But again, Tama doesn't fear truth. So I make an argument why we need to be hyper. I've shared you how to invigorate between the different complements that we need. I also promised that sometimes it's actually fine to discern and confirm the hyper-intentional level to be insensual. Country to what really is said. This example was intended to show that the prediction made by standard compulsive management was wrong. Not always. Not always. Tama fears that some will shock some questions. That means that he's afraid that a certain's superior state of affairs should obtain. It doesn't matter how that superior state of affairs is presented to Tama. In any such case just relate people to a possible world proposition which is just a subset of often space. Spice like the times. So again we this closure produces an empirical truth condition which is satisfied in the world of Tama where Tama is one of those who fear that there's an intersection between woodchirks and poisonous beasts. He doesn't care how any set of poisonous animals is presented to him. He doesn't care how this particular road is presented to him. Of course this is an interpreter who picks this appropriate for the attribution. And just will pick any other of perfectly semantically indistinguishable from woodchirks. Because all we want to do is to name a property. And we're not interested in how that property is presented. Either straight away by means of a translation reach into the set of all the purposes of the dimensions and extract the property of the woodchirk. Or in a roundabout way the way forward life is a true period. So fear is a different life. It's a relation in intention between an individual and a possible proposition. So again, this is a case where I'm a variant of a purpose trainer or a case where the simple possible theory is just right. It's funny for me to be saying this then because I'm always saying up there on the road saying the potential solution is insufficient and need to go hyper intentional. And the need to stay between this cluster of procedural hyper intentions. But not when dealing with synonyms. So what have I let me read this to you. While I can follow believing that woodchirks are woodchirks is what in the same belief as believing that woodchirks are mr. best. However delicately we mitigate the belief content by indication of dismissing any sort of sententialism or inscriptions. This explains why I'm disquadifying this cluster of legs of data as something that a viable process of logic must accommodate. So I've written this data by the right. A distinction that applies to predicates has been misapplied to properties less strong in distinction that should not be in law. Pairs of synonyms cannot serve to motivate hyperintention for stations. That's the negative message. But I've also pointed out a conversion that believing that woodchirks are woodchirks is not the same belief as believing that natural numbers are natural numbers. So this is of course the reason why we need to go hyper. So the belief contents of these two are co-intentional being the necessary proposition. But they are a far cry for being co-hyperintentional. Co-hyperintentionality for us is procedures more. The reason for co-hyperintention is that two distinct hyper propositions both have the same proposition. So we have convergence of two different procedures in the same product. Two distinct hybrid intentions that produce the same result. In this case an empirical condition. The probability. The reason for co-hyperintention is that the standard statement of the converter reduces the amount of pairs of accelerants. So we shouldn't be comparing woodchirks with whistle pick. We should be comparing rock ball with natural rock. So pair to motivate hyperintentionals. This explains why we speak of a misdiagnosis of co-hyperintentionality. So yeah. Okay thanks a lot Bjorn. First, like I said I'm also very interested in hyperintentionality. I'm always curious about the details for humans who are going hyperintentional and also very curious about the limits of hyperintentionality. Usually people that are doing hyperintentionality are eager to show that there are hyperintentional distinctions. So it's important to know when we need to be co-hyperintentional and when we need to be co-hyperintentional. Yes. So I'm complicated with you in terms of motivation and but I will let it as a characteristic question because I have a characteristic question because I'm skeptical about the dealing of short examples. I totally see why you want to go there. But okay so the first time so if you take the you disambiguate it two ways of the story behind the example by Ripley and you and I agree that in the Was that the rewrite? No, no. The one where you mention the use versus mention confusion. So Ripley provides a bit of context exactly this is this one. And I agree with you that the story first one is ambiguous and I agree that if I want to be careful about mentioning the use the second one is the right way to understand. Yes. I think it conveys basically the same information except that the second one the second one conveys the intended information that the information that the first one intends to convey except it's more precise. Yeah, that was the purpose. Okay, good. So we agree that this is a a good, this is a possible context. Okay. And then my question for you is if we make clear that this is a context we are considering do you agree with the so the evaluation of the sentence is natural language? Tama fears that which acts are which acts false. Tama fears that which acts are true. Do you agree with that with that as a speaker of English, you deny that? They this is a very simple question. Yes. Well, the implications perhaps are but no, it's one of the same thing that is being phrased in two slightly different ways. Okay. That's what I would expect you to answer. Yes. But the reason why I ask this question in this way is that so one way to phrase it in a slightly more political way but it's just like so when you say that your treatment of this example this I will see it as dictionary related to like linguistic intuitions that make perhaps all the people can tell me whether I am just like in my world but I guess what Ripley has in mind I shared the intuition that out of the blue in that kind of context it turns along tells me the story of Tama and one gave me those two attributions of fear and I say yes, but at first point is false in that context and the second one is true in that context so linguistic as a reasonably complete not perfectly complete, as reasonably from Tronkistan's speaker of English I know the word fear words I kind of know how fear attribution works that's what I want to say and if you want to so if someone comes to me and say no really the second one should be should be false too because that's not what he really is I know that Tama was the first name I thought of Tama but it seems like a revisionary proposal I thought that it's more like a methodological question so I thought you were telling me that I don't speak English correctly or you are providing semantics for a revised English not for a natural English yeah I don't know I'm not telling English speakers the native enough to drop redundant predicates what I'm saying is if these two different predicates are synonymous is there any semantic difference distinction we can draw because that's is there any differential difference we can point to when we use this rather than the other no and here and then the return is well look it's simply a rule of fact that one attribution is right on the one and the other one is no that is off is that believing that ifs and ifs that doesn't do any justice to Tama's beliefs because you're making a mockery of it as I was very happy to do but Tama is afraid of what's ontology I thought he was afraid of rotors no he's afraid of tautologies that's the problem of this particular tautology so that makes a mockery whereas the attribution that he fears that SRGs is right on the money because that is describes correctly what is going on that will be the rejoining of it it's simply a rule of fact and then I say no given synonymity fear that SRGs is open to the same mockery so what exactly is is becoming very lucid so apparently the choice of f and g rather f and f is crucial and what I said in the longer paper version is that what always happens is that descriptive material that is not present in the an assembly just look at two different predicates gets smuggled in such that it can be used in the analysis and I think if you don't about methodology this is where the action is because Tishi would rise from the debt and put me in my sleep if I were to do that where you evoke descriptive material anything at all in the analysis was already present in the NSM so we do not have in articulated constituents or factors if anything you want to use in the analysis has to be reported at the level of the NSM whereas if you go out to the cab over here use hysterical hysterical historical causal change or precision theory at all then in the analysis the withdrawal material that wasn't declared at the level of the NSM we can do that that is why that implication was so important because the context by this is a necessary relation for the properties in some things the names so the so there is the whole thing about the past and transparency you are going to put a dark box so let's see what is in that box because this is an attitude context and the standard view is that terms that are embedded in attitude context distributions of descriptions and attitudes in gender opaque context so the this makes it funny so you can sneak in this may be intentional, sneak in factors descriptive material that would be undeclared in a transparent context fail suddenly there was a presentation involved that there wouldn't have emerged in a transparent context till this goes through universal transparency that's also why our analysis of simple concepts where you are not even getting is more complicated that's why for us it's more complicated that's in the same ASB so if in a opaque context so-called opaque, in an attitude context you want to distinguish between the descriptive material descriptive material associated with F very good if not entirely identical with the descriptive material associated with G then that has to be explicit also for simple contexts non-invent contexts so the previous version discussed this but I didn't do that today there is a clash between opacity-friendly and transparency fiddishistic approaches but it points down to whether or not the analysis can draw on material which isn't explicitly which isn't explicit for me I'm assuming I answer for this clarification so I see why you are drawn to this evaluation of the example if I were in misguided I would say that so when I was doing the issue of methodology I was thinking of the idea that we have reason to be clear verdicts that have reason to be clear on cases and as a sementicist or as a sementicist but one way to go would be to account for the for the intuitions by saying they are not purely sementic intuitions maybe they have pragmatic components but what we need to do is to account for the data so this is part of the data and here which is how we create the context and for me it looks like this is true this is false and so if you come and say what happens here really which have a certain methodical constraint that they are not sementic intuitions therefore it has to be false also yes and if I have a data first constraint then the conclusion I draw is well maybe the theory is not adequate or it's not explicit enough to capture but I mean because I think that it's partly methodical issue in the sense that we have different priorities and then which disagree because we don't have the same priorities but that's actually where the action is I guess it is but if you like aggressive about this position or what we're working for is that I'm being dismissive yes strictly there was an archie you're smarter than me but these are not data I would not build a theory around these data I would dismiss them as data it's the same thing as group games coming along necessary in the story of no absolutely totally not these are not data there was a high effect belonging to a particular theory that's what they are I didn't argue for that I just I think it's a view it's a legitimate view that we should not take like into that face value all the time I mean my visions I mean like judgments about cases so but I think if you wanted to convince me in this particular case you would need to tell me a story maybe you're not interested in telling me this story but at least you should provide me a story for why it looks like it's okay yeah and if you don't provide me this story I think there's practical theory is great it's perfect or it's supposed to do nothing more nothing less but still it would be even better if it would be like articulated to something else with your pragmatic theory maybe an error theory I don't know what explains why we feel compelled to that judgment because I assume we both feel compelled to that judgment that's a second example if we if we why therapeutic remarks because that would be asking for why is it that we draw on why is it that we feel compelled exactly exactly the the story of technical sketching is it's used mention confusion and the rewrite is supposed to bring that out and if that doesn't solve it I don't know what what because I think it's very simply a clash of methodologies basically a clash between full on fragrance with full transparency versus theories where there's no sharp distinction between syntax semantics and pragmatics because that opens the objection that I'm presposing a very sharp distinction between the three and this is natural language semantics isn't that always completely entangled with the pragmatic factors when you learn the term building up a file where you file all if if they know the things you have a different file over there for the gene to know the things and it didn't occur to to merge these two files even it was just in a way redundant bookkeeping if that doesn't look good so stay in opposition this is our take on it it works on its own premises yeah I think the tricky bit is also the very assumption of synonym in the natural language because there are such cases verbose I still build up a framework that evolves around the natural language predicates it's just we never have any data to work on so that would be a future exercise but there are these clusters that do come up Cooper and Puma and C is that they're often used to motivate the introduction of hyperintensive state chips and in this case they're very finite because there's no syntactic there's a difference in syntactic structure to play I'm fine with the comparison analysis that's real stuff but what's the what's this thanks a lot this is here if I may just ask the smoker and then I so your response to the for someone who is really data free I second sentence the second sentence is the F and G so basically you deny that the fear attribution is true but you say well there's a similar fear attribution that would need to be phrased metallic mystically so she's very so you deny the fear attribution like she fears that X equals D or SRD because that's again just you say it but I think to say something to people like intuitions but actually there is a very close fear attribution which is a metallic mystic which is she fears that whatever is denoted by F is denoted by F is denoted by G and then you say this one is true absolutely and so the reason why we feel compelled to access is because we make a confusion and in natural language we are so pure by nature so that's really the story so you answer the guys who say well I have to be regenerated no I'm not that very different I just need to disambiguate the example to and I think this is a I have a more friendly to that view to that way of presenting actually the argument I think is more powerful towards that thank you also the days we are addicted but suppose we we use a direct convention would shocks are such that time up fears that they are poisonous that's a different example it is but why is it's because the the way of denoting this property is outside Thomas horizon if there was a a synthetic compound that was that was at least by means of analysis again by four two weeks related to to watch out then I think we will be free to use that compound four nights are such that time of use that they last forever periods of two weeks are such that time of use that they last forever fine although till we also do I have a proposition if you direct we still need to be delicate but the is here so so why exactly would any intuition that is a favor of Britain's example for flat simply because between these two predicates would be material so that should also give pose to someone who's sold on Britain's example I think we now have to I have to manipulate a lot of questions any sort of discomfort or any lingering thoughts or anything to do with children it's trustworthy but but I have a could you return to one of your first slide when you saw the assumption of the general view the majority view it's all I I really understood why you defend the minority view and you show a semantic but I didn't see well that you said it's garbage it's bad data why the majority view this way to formalize it is fundamentally wrong of course when I end up your point of view I think okay but do you have some I'm making a very strong claim that this is inconsistent yeah consistent in what sense that if you make this attribution with this assumption here you're you cannot go on to create this here this here this whole thing here is just an indication of this yeah but these are attitude are you talking about properties are you talking about predicates no no no no if you're a consensus of the scriptures then this is this is fine my objection only works if you don't it's intentional but really it's also not it doesn't come from it's intentional at all so it's not the predicate that matters the choice of this term other than that term it's what sort of clings to to this term but not to that term what exactly is that and these historical or course of theories then theories of precision have this sort of tool I acquired this predicate that's where I wouldn't try this to me I acquired this other predicate these other circumstances I acquired this word whistle picks and I haven't worked my files I have my suspicions but I haven't done it yet so it's enlightening for me to tell that the woodchuck because that's how I would phrase it but bit me is a whistle pick and I know the whistle picks the things I know as whistle picks are voices bit of inference ah okay I have a problem I need to see a doctor there's also how what Jacob is also picks up on this example as well he's he's one of the most popular doctors and he says well Tama learns something and if in the case of FF ah he's not ordinary to see a doctor in the case of FG he is not able to see a doctor so those are data these are put forward as data that we need to build a theory around and I have just on a current football player saying no ah the way Jacob puts it there are no data to accommodate there is because of EMP stream there's nothing going on there is something that we can learn but it's free incorrectly what we can learn is nothing to do with a tuxedo not to do robes but about language so my claim is that Tama is statistically incompetent that's his predicament incompetent because there is a pair of synonyms of synonyms that he hasn't internalized internalized that's again what you said that's the part there is the same thing I so I'm not in a circle here the common ground is that F and G are synonyms because if it's not there's nothing to discuss what are the implications of that the story I'm not a philosopher of language the story is that these are synonyms and we assume that Tama learned something learned something so it's not just he's confused and suddenly he has a flash learned something so new information that is efficient in a certain sense and you're saying that he or she I don't know Tama learned that he or she was confused about distinguished as far as so it's a semantic picture that turns and it seems that the majority view it's something a little bit different that he or she learned the way I see it Tama does learn something which is that this predicate are synonyms oh, I didn't know that it's if you compare two languages knowing within the same language you can take two different languages and evading for the capital of Vietnam we told that the Czech name for for Vietnam is Beach and the Italian name is Vienna that's very nice this is something about Vienna something about Italian and Czech and Hungarian that's what he learns nothing to do with the taxonomy of Romans or anything I'm going to go back to Cripkin again and I speak with a fair role of the of the of the forum, I used to be a Cripkin not it's supposed to be an empirical insight that empirical insight empirical insight that Boris Johnson is an excellent example it's supposed to be a piece of empirical knowledge that you internalize Boris Johnson is an excellent example of that exactly so so that's very precious so you know how the it's not no it's fine this is the one that Cripkin says so Boris Johnson identity self-identity I mean Boris Johnson that's how he's known when he is talking to the Daily Mail and he's having a fair role in this the explanation of that the fair role that's his actual I mean he this is Boris Johnson the name he uses which is fine it's just an extraction a fragment of his full name we can go down well with the Daily Mail but he's not known in private as Boris but he really has that name no this is true okay interesting so we learned these things that we didn't know but why is it that we learned because this is like there are no quotes here so to me all this individual is an individual to this individual what is the individual who possibly would be theoretical to Boris Johnson they were named one so this here is just the this triviality and we don't have a problem with doing the unboxing of that one so this is a total triviality because again this is a necessary this necessity is a necessary in the cessation of this that it is a necessary condition for this to be true so whether this be true there's nothing in character about this that's our take so but cryptics end up not thinking well I learned this name on these editions so what is it like for me to to be told this here love quotes love quotes whereas again my rewrite would be ah I have learned that this problem name this other problem name code in fact there's what happens to call them synonyms absolutely just the people like this, people like that fine any funny stuff about time off here in this but not then goes by the board there's no room for that this is how I so now I see better what is the incompetence that you were referring to so my incompetence everybody's incompetence here my one reason to know is that you had a question sir anything at all, you shoot and I have one thing I'm actually quite convinced that how much you're making I mean there's some natural language just some pragmatically phenomena that you should disambiguate the fear that you should find it's just like not very accurately phrased and then unusual circumstances like also corrected pragmatic measures and get actually the right reading and the one that you worry about language so I so I would not say that some of the fears that groundhogs or arousal things is in itself false or like absurd thing like the thing with groundhogs or groundhogs but that it's I mean it has to be disambiguated and sometimes if you correctly disambiguate the context and you will actually find that this is a purely perfectly right intuition to have but that was not my that was not my question and that is not what really says no no no so I think I'm on your side just that I would be a bit more tolerant for the data I accept the data it's a pragmatic thing to be said for it yes that was not my question but what I was a bit troubled by is the distinction you mentioned two kinds of fear attribute attribution the other one was groundhogs or arousal he fears that groundhogs are arousal and there it should be a different sort of and I don't I mean it shouldn't be why this would be purely intentional I mean it doesn't make sense everything is poisonous yes but clearly it's not that it must be like this I'm saying there is a room for this there's a room for this quarter analysis there is a room for quarter analysis when it comes to fear than yes or no why fear in this there's an intersection between this and that we could vibrate it we could vibrate it but it would be theoretical overcombing because there's nothing to be gained from if the way you understand Thomas fear is that she's afraid that he is afraid that a certain state of affairs that he founds himself in a certain in a world which is in that particular and he doesn't care how that how that empirical state of affairs has been generated is presented but it seems to me that in this example he might do because like as I said things are poisonous to some extent like very likely so and like that the wood shark is an animal I don't know it seems like the mode of presentation plays a role if you really want to make sense of such sentences like Walter is poisonous it doesn't mean like scientists say such things to shock a lot of people it doesn't mean the same thing it doesn't just mean like there's the poisonous objects and the Walter objects and there is an intersection something like that or it's a subset one a subset of the other it seems to be something much more rich yeah and that seems to be that is lost that is lost so this this analysis is offered for like I mentioned to you a name to show that there is room supposed to run there's room for this analysis it doesn't make a fool of like fear isn't so much fear that the necessary proposition is true that doesn't mean that doesn't mean that it's superior to a a fine-grained description a lot of neons that we might detect here is lost down here some of the things you'll just stick with it towards if you want to so if you detect those neons you have to be careful and you have to go to the analysis which means I must go hyper-intentional in my analysis here and that in my well-being that comes from the story so this is true this is just a set of affairs however is presented because fear depends on you don't fear some boys and you do fear some other boys I get the point just to keep it short these two shows there is room for that analysis supposed to run so it's counter-trap rip is an adaptation there is no room for it no there is room for it since I'm curious about this kind of case which may or may not be for example the view I stated in the first slide so think about it because you can evaluate properties intentionally and if you are generous about what properties there are you might accept that there is a property of being F and there is a property of being F or being F and J absolutely those are co-intentional properties they are true they hold exactly the same and because then one property mentions so to speak as a component, as J as a component so they are slightly distinct which is different from the Munchak yes and so but when you put them in attitudes I suppose people like when you play with them and these properties evaluate them differently so if I say that I believe that everything is F or that this thing is F and or I believe that this thing is F or it's F and J maybe I don't know how many views about J, I don't know what they are taking views over them so I put the first belief and the second it seems like reasonable to me and this is I think it's it's okay that so it's not exactly exactly what you mean and to keep it short take it from me, we can easily accommodate that because that's just the next reason for going higher okay so this interpretation of this property is another high level interpretation of the same property here's another one for you play along just to perform a question do you believe that anything that doesn't kill you makes you stronger no I don't we'll go through it we will discharge that assumption later but human being please say yes just just finish it for a second okay do you believe that whatever doesn't make you stronger kills you no so you just drew a hybridization distinction which by the way is also a way to to show why you just play this city okay or this I didn't get that everything that does kill you makes you stronger so if something doesn't make you stronger kills you that's a conflict without running of course of course or another one that comes any other logic just to wrap things up it gives the viewers one that always first tunes completely off when we do some manipulation so especially alpha proposition variable and I'll always take a better one so we know how to prove things so is this true no it's good so the pharology has uses a paper it's you're obliged to drive a one person to hospital so either you are obliged to drive a one person to hospital or you're obliged to to drive a one person to hospital and be driving one driving so so some examples for you to go hybrid your point is both about properties and voltage but that is not an argument for going for hybrid properties it's it's an argument for going for hybrid obsessions but this is very easy for us if you have a structural approach because then there are two different structures one is more involved than the other can you go back please to the statement which one should the very first minority view for you yes so if you are intentional it's about properties when I put the equal sign between example sign yes for anywhere I mean I would take the country example as a country example for the minority so if you have an a, f and on the other side you think that exactly the same structure f or f and g you are like an equal sign because it's intentionally I did the structure is the matter but still it seems like if you take the example of your students they could do the first one but they don't need the other so it looks like it's a counter example to the way the minority view is stated like that with those equal signs I know I'm sure that by still can deal with that it's just a point about having this way of phrasing the minority view perhaps the minority view it's a job this is using very simple rotation for you there's anything to do because these are the these are not nothing but it's it's an approximation because this is what we've followed those people it was a very important question I didn't really get why there is a distinction between saying that believing that good checks are good checks and all that and I was thinking so the situation is we are trying to see what are down those beliefs and we could have in the meta language we could have in the meta language the same word for good checks and whistle peaks used for us in the meta language we know they are the same so when we describe what she's believing it's something like she's trying to discover whether A's are A's because that's our only term for these animals although it has to however we could also have the same we could have we could consider another more simplified meta language with all the ontologies having ontology and then in that case could we say something similar as she's trying to discover at ontology because it's exactly the same as any other term so it's just our distinction between the ontologies I mean in a simple logic what we teach students is just one ontology it's just phrased in many different ways but that logic would be too primitive to draw the distinction which I think should be drawn because there is difference in subject matter I think this is the card on the plate there is a distinction in subject matter between numbers and that distinction is lost if there is just one ontology where any finesse has been relegated to the meta to the meta language because we're not analyzing anything from meta language in the public language which is what I'm doing on the object linguistic level of all times I think if I'm going to write I think this situation describing is trying to take logic and it's version they try to do actually two projects on this and there you would be finding to say A believes a necessary false it's just there there's just one but believing something in truth to this being involved in something something truth to this being simple or something complicated that would mean we're used to this uniform analysis then the way to restore some finesse to say in the meta language we is saying the trucks on the woodchucks or we're saying that something very complicated in the meta language five people could understand but this is basically sort of sneaking intentions in through the back door how did A arrive at Folsom via this thing here where we have the form of woodchucks and then this very complicated method statement over here again again we have tout the unique tautology which is that the necessary proposition well this one can be denoted in endlessly many ways so that's some intentionism again which was very popular first it was kind of was flirting with it and one of you was flirting with it Stormling has been flirting with it I think it's remainder for it but you get to draw tons of distinctions that you shouldn't draw because you have a sort of accidental use of this term around that term it's a notation but does that affect what we believe in the meta language it gets far too delicate but what I've been saying today applies only to non-critical contexts as soon as you throw in anything or mixed-critical reports then all bits are off all bits are off Tom Huckle figures that wood shocks are poisonous so in the example we were using the terms as in the meta language as we are reporting what he's believing independently of how he uses the words yes because the perspective is the chosen words is a triptus not a triptus responsibility and the triptus is being absolutely fair as long as the non-linguistic perspective is preserved so Tama believes that 7 plus 5 x12 is not the same as Tama and 5 plus 7 is 12 for instance Tama always blocks when he needs to process the sum of two numbers where the first one is larger than the second one just blocks can do it but it's presupposed that the sequence between two numbers is kept through to the logical analysis so it's all a pair first 7 then 5 because that's a different pair from first 5 then 7