 Section 7 of Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Lynn Jarrow. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential Election by Robert Mueller. Section 4. Russian Government Links to and Contacts with the Trump Campaign. Section A. Subsections 5 and 6. 5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower. On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian attorney, expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert Goldstone at the request of his then-client, Amin Agalarov, the son of Russian real estate developer Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the Crown Prosecutor of Russia offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia as part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump. Trump Jr. immediately responded that, if it's what you say, I love it, and arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls. Trump Jr. invited Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner to attend the meeting and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told Candidate Trump about an upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton without linking the meeting to Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the office found no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting or its Russian connection before it occurred. The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, but Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr. suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if Candidate Trump was elected. After the election Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump transition team did not engage. A. Setting up the June 9th meeting. I. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr. Aras Agalarov is a Russian real estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of the Russian government, including Russia's Prosecutor General Yuri Chayka. Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group, a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and that, as discussed above, Volume 1, Section 4A.1 Supra, worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow and a potential Trump-Moscow real estate project. The relationship continued over time as the parties pursued the Trump-Moscow project in 2013 through 2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016. For example, in April 2016, Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten note. Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign and passed on congratulations for winning in the primary and, according to one email drafted by Goldstone, an offer of his support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues, especially with reference to U.S.-Russian relations. On June 3, 2016, Amin Agalarov called Goldstone Amin's then publicist. Goldstone is a music and events promoter who represented Amin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until late 2016. While representing Amin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact between the Trumps and the Agalarovs, including an invitation that Trump sent to Putin to attend the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Moscow. Redacted Grand Jury Goldstone understood Redacted Grand Jury Russian political connection. Amin Agalarov indicated that the attorney was a prosecutor. Goldstone recalled that the information that might interest the Trumps involved Hillary Clinton. Redacted Grand Jury The Redacted Grand Jury Mentioned by Amin Agalarov was Natalia Veselnitskaya. From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor's Office, and she continued to perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her departure. She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax specialist who opposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison. Putin called the statute a purely political, unfriendly act, and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S. officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens. Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsev, the son of Russian businessman Peter Katsev, and for his company Previzan Holdings Limited, which was a defendant in a civil forfeiture action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky. She also appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in Moscow offering confidential information from the Prosecutor General of Russia about interactions between certain political forces in our two countries. Shortly after his June 3rd call with Amin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. The email stated, Good morning. Amin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting. The Crown Prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning, and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia, and would be very useful to your father. This is obviously very high level and sensitive information, but is part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump, helped along by Aras and Amin. What do you think is the best way to handle this information? And would you be able to speak to Amin about it directly? I can also send this info to your father via Rona, but it is ultra sensitive, so wanted to send to you first. Best Rob Goldstone. Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr. responded, emailing back. Thanks, Rob. I appreciate that. I am on the road at the moment, but perhaps I just speak to Amin first. Seems we have some time, and if it's what you say, I love it, especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back? Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Amin Aguilarov, emailing that Trump Jr. wants to speak personally on the issue. On June 6, 2016, Amin Aguilarov asked Goldstone if there was any news, and Goldstone explained that Trump Jr. was likely still travelling for the final elections, where Trump will be crowned the official nominee. On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and asked when Trump Jr. was free to talk with Amin about this Hillary info. Trump Jr. asked if they could speak now, and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Amin Aguilarov. On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Amin Aguilarov had multiple brief calls. Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Aguilarov called Ike Kavaladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York with the Trump Organization. Kavaladze is a Georgian-born, naturalized U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras Aguilarov. Kavaladze told the office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Aguilarov asked Kavaladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting, and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kavaladze, Aras Aguilarov said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kavaladze to translate. I-I, awareness of the meeting within the campaign. On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that, A mean asked that I schedule a meeting with you and the Russian government attorney, who is flying over from Moscow. Trump Jr. replied that Manafort, identified as the campaign boss, Jared Kushner and Trump Jr. would likely attend. Goldstone was surprised to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort and Kushner would attend. Kavaladze redacted grand jury, puzzled by the list of attendees, and that he checked with one of Amin Aguilarov's assistants, Roman Beniaminov, who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey negative information on Hillary Clinton. Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that. Early on June 8, Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3 o'clock PM meeting the following day with Trump Jr. Later that day, Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone, to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line FW, Russia, Clinton, Private and Confidential. Adding a note that the meeting got moved to for tomorrow at my offices. Kushner then sent his assistant a second email, informing her that the meeting with Don Jr. is 4 p.m. now. Manafort responded, See you then, P. Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the office that in the days before June 9, 2016, Trump Jr. announced a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members, that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation. Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend. Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump, Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks and, joining late, Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful. Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week. Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump's office on June 6 or 7, when Trump Jr. told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward. Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia. From the tenor of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previously discussed the meeting with his father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation. In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Trump Jr. stated that he did not inform his father about the emails or the upcoming meeting. Similarly, neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting, including Trump Jr. President Trump has stated to this office in written answers to questions that he has �no recollection of learning at the time� that his son, Manafort or Kushner, was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton. B. The events of June 9, 2016 I. Arrangements for the meeting Veselman Skia was in New York on June 9, 2016 for appellate proceedings in the Previzan Civil Forfeiture litigation. That day, Veselman Skia called Ranaak Metchen, a Soviet-born U.S. lobbyist, redacted grand jury. But when she learned that he was in New York, invited him to lunch. Akmetchen told the office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnetsky Act and had worked on the Previzan litigation. Kovalevci and Anatoly Samochornov, a Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselman Skia with Magnetsky-related lobbying, and the Previzan case also attended the lunch, redacted grand jury. Veselman Skia said she was meeting redacted grand jury and asked Akmetchen what she should tell him. According to several participants in the lunch, Veselman Skia showed Akmetchen a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers, Americans with business in Russia, and those individuals subsequently making political donations to the DNC, redacted grand jury. The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting. I. I. Conduct of the meeting. Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side. While Kovalevci, Samochornov, Akmetchen and Goldstone attended with Veselman Skia, the office spoke to every participant except Veselman Skia and Trump Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntarily interviewed by the office. Redacted grand jury. The meeting lasted approximately twenty minutes. Redacted grand jury. Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselman Skia to begin, but did not say anything about the subject of the meeting. Participants agreed that Veselman Skia stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton campaign. She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering in both the United States and Russia. Redacted grand jury. According to Akmetchen, Trump Jr. asked follow-up questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton campaign. And Veselman Skia indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States. Kovalevtsi similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton and Kushner became aggravated and asked, what are we doing here? Akmetchen then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnutsky Act and Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children. Several participants recalled that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen and there was nothing they could do at that time. Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in government. Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation, although not all of its details. At some point in the meeting, Kushner sent an eye message to Manafort stating, waste of time, followed immediately by two separate emails to assistance at Kushner companies with requests that they call him to give him an excuse to leave. Samochorov recalled that Kushner departed the meeting before it concluded. Veselman Skia recalled the same when interviewed by the press in July 2017. Veselman Skia's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselman Skia claimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton campaign when she met with Trump campaign officials. Veselman Skia's November 2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9th meeting was not to connect with the Trump campaign, but rather to have a private meeting with Donald Trump Jr., a friend of my good acquaintances son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress. In other words, Veselman Skia claimed her focus was on Congress and not the campaign. No witness, however, recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselman Skia also maintained that she attended the meeting as a lawyer of Dennis Katziff, the previously mentioned owner of Previzan Holdings, but she did not introduce herself in this capacity. In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability, credibility, or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting, if someone has information on our opponent, maybe this is something. I should hear them out. Trump Jr. further stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say. Depending on what, if any, information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration. After the June 9th meeting concluded, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr. According to Goldstone, he told Trump Jr. redacted grand jury, and told Amin Agalarov in a phone call that the meeting was about adoption. Redacted grand jury. Aras Agalarov asked Kovalevtsi to report in after the meeting. But before Kovalevtsi could call, Aras Agalarov called him. With Veselmskaya next to him, Kovalevtsi reported that the meeting had gone well. But he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was not with lawyers and they were preaching to the wrong crowd. C. Post-June 9th Events Veselmskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder as the Magnitsky Act. On November 23, 2016, Kovalevtsi emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting with Tea People and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June 9th. Kovalevtsi followed up with Goldstone stating that Mr. A., which Goldstone understood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting. Goldstone emailed the document to Ronegraf, saying that, Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team, if needed a lawyer representing the case is in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team. According to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kovalevtsi contacted him again to set up another meeting but Goldstone did not make the request. The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition team following up. Investments in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries from attorneys representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017. On approximately June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, General Counsel of the Trump Organization, about his participation in the June 9 meeting. The same day, Goldstone emailed Veselenskaya's name to Garten, identifying her as the woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from Moscow. Later in June 2017, Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and Alan Fudorfass, outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal counsel for Trump Jr. On June 27, 2017, Goldstone emailed Amin Agalarov with the subject Trump Attorneys and stated that he was interviewed by attorneys about the June 9 meeting who were concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia, which he has always denied meeting. Goldstone stressed that he did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible meeting. Amin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kavaladzee. The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Amin Agalarov, Goldstone wrote, I made sure I kept you and your father out of this story and, if contacted, I can do a dance and keep you out of it. Amin added, FBI now investigating and, I hope this favor was worth for your dad. It could blow up. On July 12, 2017, Amin Agalarov complained to Kavaladzee that his father Aras never listens to him and that their relationship with Mr. T has been thrown down the drain. The next month, Goldstone commented to Amin Agalarov about the volume of publicity. The June 9 meeting had generated, stating that his reputation was basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father insisted on even though Ike and me told him would be bad news and not to do. Goldstone added, I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father, so impainted as some mysterious link to Putin. After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Fudorfoss sent Goldstone an email with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue, which read, As the person who arranged the meeting, I can definitively state that the statements I have read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time and Don was never told Ms. Veselnytskaya's name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnytskaya mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 20-30 minutes at most. There was never any follow-up and nothing ever came out of the meeting. Redacted Grand Jury The statement drafted by Trump organization representatives was Redacted Grand Jury. He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been asked by his client in Moscow Amin Agalarov to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney Natalia Veselnytskaya, and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia, which she believed Mr. Trump Jr. might find interesting. Trump never released either statement. On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say about the June 9th meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov, an anti-Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnytskaya and the owner of Previzan, offered to pay $90,000 of Samochornov's legal fees. At Veselnytskaya's request, the organization sent Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnytskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with Veselnytskaya's. Samochornov declined, telling the office that he did not want to perjure himself. The individual who conveyed Veselnytskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnytskaya's answers, but in hindsight recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnytskaya's account. Volume 2, Section 2.gInfra, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr., and others in June and July 2017, regarding the June 9th meeting. 6. Events at the Republican National Convention Trump campaign officials met with Russian ambassador Sergei Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention. The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief and non-substantive. During the platform committee meetings immediately before the convention, J.D. Gordon, a senior campaign adviser on policy and national security, diluted a proposed amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing legal assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only appropriate assistance be provided to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the lethal assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her, the sponsor, that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine. A. Ambassador Kislyaks encounters with Senators Sessions and J.D. Gordon the week of the RNC. In July 2016, Senators Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event, a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in Cleveland, Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention, RNC or convention. Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States including Kislyak were invited to the conference. On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference. In his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with Russia. During Sessions' speech he took questions from the audience, one of which may have been asked by Kislyak. When the speech is concluded, several ambassadors lined up to greet the speakers. Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations. Sessions separately spoke with between 6 and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak. Although Sessions stated during interviews with the office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said some things about U.S.-Russia relations. Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference. Sessions ran into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food and they decided to sit at the same table to eat. They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and by Trump advisor Carter Page. As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon estimated to have been three to five minutes, during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations. B. Change to Republican Party Platform In preparation for the 2016 convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump campaign working with the Republican National Committee reviewed the 2012 convention's foreign policy platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's physicians. The campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia as the country's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U.S. relations with Russia. The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its first meeting to propose amendments. Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform, the Trump campaign could request changes and members of the Trump campaign attended committee meetings. John Mashburn, the campaign's policy director, helped oversee the campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings. He told the office that he directed campaign staff at the convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes. On July 11, 2016, Delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that included provision of armed support for Ukraine. The amendment described Russia's ongoing military aggression in Ukraine and announced support for maintaining and if warranted, increasing sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored, and for providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater coordination with NATO on defense planning. Gordon reviewed the proposed platform changes, including Denman's. Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidates say at the March 31st foreign policy meeting. Namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not want to start World War III over that region. Gordon told the office that Trump's statements on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution. On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment. Gordon and another campaign staffer, Matt Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further discussion. Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine. Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's views. According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they had to clear the language and that Gordon was talking to New York. Denman told others that she was asked by the two Trump campaign staffers to strike lethal defense weapons from the proposal, but that she refused. Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true. Gordon denied having told Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. Gordon's phone records reveal a call to Sessions' office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls directly to a number associated with Trump. And according to the president's written answers to the office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the platform amendment. Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn, a senior foreign policy adviser, and Mashburn, the campaign policy director. Denman stated that he connected with both of them. He could not recall if by phone or in person and apprised them of the language he took issue with in the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn, and that all three campaign advisers supported the alternative formulation, appropriate assistance. Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because Gordon was more familiar with the campaign's foreign policy stance. Mashburn stated that Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue, and that the campaign should not intervene. When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings, the subcommittee changed the amendment by striking the Lethal Defense Weapons Language, and replacing it with Appropriate Assistance. Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with Appropriate Assistance. The subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment, but with the term Appropriate Assistance. Gordon stated that to his recollection. This was the only change sought by the campaign. Sam Clovis, the campaign's national co-chair and chief policy adviser, stated he was surprised by the change, and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance. Mashburn stated that when he saw the word Appropriate Assistance, he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive, not to intervene. Reporting by Lynn Jarrow Reporting on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Moller. 7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with campaign officials with responsibility for the foreign policy portfolio, among them Sessions and Gordon, in the weeks after the convention. The office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination between the campaign and the Russian government. A. Ambassador Kislyak invites J. D. Gordon to breakfast at the ambassador's residence. On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States wrote to Gordon on behalf of Ambassador Kislyak, inviting Gordon to have breakfast, or tea, with the ambassador at his residence in Washington, D.C., the following week. Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation. He wrote, These days are not optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC. Hope to take a rain check for another time when things quiet down a bit. Please pass along my regards to the ambassador. The investigation did not identify evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet or met with Kislyak after this email. B. Senators Sessions' September 2016 meeting with Ambassador Kislyak. Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions' Senate office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak. At the time Sessions was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity. But Sessions' staff reported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests from ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump campaign, and his name was mentioned for potential Cabinet-level positions in a future Trump administration. On September 8, 2016, Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office. Sessions said that he believed he was doing the campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors including Kislyak. He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff, Sandra Lough, his legislative director, and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs. The meeting lasted less than thirty minutes. Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova. Kislyak offered explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet Bloc countries that border Russia. Trump recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as an interesting campaign, and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overshoots Trump had laid out during his campaign. None of the attendees though remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump campaign. During the meeting, Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with him over a meal at the ambassador's residence. Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak extended the invitation. After the meeting ended, Lough advised Sessions against accepting the one-on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an old school KGB guy. Neither Lough nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election. Sessions and Landrum recalled that, after the election, some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak. According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak to other ambassadors and the governor of Alabama. Sessions, however, was in New York on the day of the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend. The investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8 meeting. 8. Paul Manafort Paul Manafort served on the Trump campaign, including a period as campaign chairman, from March to August 2016. Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for Russian oligar oligarapaska, and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime Ukraine. Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kalimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev, and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence. Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the campaign and a longtime employee, to provide Kalimnik with updates on the Trump campaign, including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kalimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Daripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kalimnik during the campaign. Manafort also twice met Kalimnik in the United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016 in New York City. Kalimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a backdoor means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Four months later, after the presidential election, Kalimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view, which Manafort later said he shared, that the plan's success would require U.S. support to succeed. All that is required to start the process is a very minor wink or slight push from Donald Trump. The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia at the very top level. Manafort communicated with Kalimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2. December 2016, the Kalimnik email described above, January 2017, February 2017, and again in the spring of 2018. The office reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications and asked President Trump about the plan in written questions. The investigation did not uncover evidence of Manafort's passing along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the campaign or the administration. The office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Manafort's electronic communications. In some instances messages were sent using encryption applications. And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump campaign or the new administration about the peace plan, he lied to the office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings with Kalimnik. And his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge found that he had breached his cooperation agreement. The office could not reliably determine Manafort's purpose in sharing internal polling data with Kalimnik during the campaign period. Manafort redacted grand jury, did not see a downside to sharing campaign information, and told Gates that his role in the campaign would be good for business and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. As to Daripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him Daripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a disagreement, a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. These are questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kalimnik. The office could not assess what Kalimnik or others he may have given it to did with it. The office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by US media outlets at the time of the August 2nd meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on its election interference efforts. A. Paul Manafort's ties to Russia and Ukraine. Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stemmed from his consulting work for Daripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMP International LLC, DMI. Kalimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kalimnik, who speaks and writes Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Daripaska and Ukrainian oligarchs. 1. Oleg Daripaska consulting work In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Daripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin. A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Daripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on the Putin government. Gates described the work Manafort did for Daripaska as political risk insurance and explained that Daripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Daripaska had business interests. Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Daripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Daripaska as well. In 2007, Daripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners LP, Pericles, an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe. Daripaska was the sole investor. Gates stated in interviews with the office that the venture led to a deterioration of a relationship between Manafort and Daripaska, in particular when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Daripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort's business relationship with Daripaska had dried up. According to Gates, various interactions with Daripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute. As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kalimnik, and others engaged in efforts to revive the Daripaska relationship and resolve the litigation. 2. Political Consulting Work Through Daripaska, Manafort was introduced to Renat Akhmatov, a Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant. In 2005, Akhmatov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions, a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power and its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and trusted political adviser to Yanukovych during his time as president of Ukraine. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests. 3. Kalimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a long time Manafort employee. Kalimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs. Kalimnik also maintained a relationship with Daripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin, a Russian national who previously served in the Defense Atasheya office of the Russian Embassy to the United States. Manafort told the office that he did not believe Kalimnik was working as a Russian spy. The FBI, however, assesses that Kalimnik has ties to Russian intelligence. Several pieces of the office's evidence, including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-authorized search warrants, support that assessment. Kalimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Nipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union, and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992. Sam Patton, a business partner to Kalimnik, stated that Kalimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian Army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment. U.S. government visa records reveal that Kalimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997. Kalimnik worked for the International Republican Institute's IRI Moscow office, where he did translation work and general office management, from 1998 to 2005. While another official recalled the incident differently, one former associate of Kalimnik's at IRI told the FBI that Kalimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that Kalimnik had links to the Russian government. Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kalimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian government entity on a public relations project that would promote, in Western and Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea. Gates suspected that Kalimnik was a spy, a view that he shared with Manafort, Hawker, and Alexander Vanderswan, an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Redacted Investigative Technique b. Context during Paul Manafort's time with the Trump campaign 1. Paul Manafort joins the campaign Manafort served on the Trump campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March 29, 2016, the campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the campaign's convention manager. On May 19, 2016, Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief strategist. And Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the campaign, was appointed deputy campaign chairman. Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump. In early 2016, at Manafort's request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Manafort join the campaign to manage the Republican convention. Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in 1982, when Trump hired the black Manafort Stone and Kelly lobbying firm. Over the years, Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort. According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time. Manafort agreed to work on the campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported that Manafort intended, if Trump won the presidency, to remain outside the administration and monetize his relationship with the administration. 2. Paul Manafort's campaign period contacts. Immediately upon joining the campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review, separate Memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmatov, Serhii Lyovochkin, and Boris Kalisnikov. The last three being Ukrainian oligarchs, who were senior opposition bloc officials. The Memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed the Memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kalimnik for translation and dissemination. Manafort later followed up with Kalimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing, on April 11, 2016, to ask whether Kalimnik had shown our friends the media covers of his new role. Kalimnik replied, absolutely, every article. Manafort further asked, how do we use to get whole? Has OVD, Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska, operation seen? Kalimnik wrote back the same day, yes, I have been sending everything to Victor Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy, who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD. It's reported that Manafort said that being hired on the campaign would be good for business and increased the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine. Gates also explained to the office that Manafort thought his role on the campaign could help confirm that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska as discussed further below so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort. Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the campaign or administration might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well. Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what if anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska. Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send Kalimnik campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kalimnik in turn could share it with Ukrainian oligarchs. Gates understood that the information would also be shared with Deripaska, redacted grand jury. Gates reported to the office that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information, but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafort's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trump campaign ended. Gates said that Manafort's instruction included sending internal polling data prepared for the Trump campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio. Fabrizio had worked with Manafort for years and was brought into the campaign by Manafort. Gates stated that, in accordance with Manafort's instruction, he periodically sent Kalimnik polling data via WhatsApp. Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. Gates further told the office that, after Manafort left the campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kalimnik polling data less frequently and that the data he sent was more probably available information and less internal data. Gates' account about polling data is consistent, redacted grand jury. With multiple emails that Kalimnik sent to U.S. Associates and Press Contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016, those emails referenced internal polling, described the status of the Trump campaign and Manafort's role in it, and assessed Trump's prospects for victory. Manafort did not acknowledge instructing Gates to send Kalimnik internal data, redacted grand jury. The office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Daripaska and that are consistent with Gates' account. For example, in response to a July 7, 2016 email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort's failed Daripaska-backed investment, Manafort asked Kalimnik whether there had been any movement on this issue with our friend. Gates stated that our friend likely referred to Daripaska, and Manafort told the office that the issue and our biggest interest, as stated below, was a solution to the Daripaska-Parakley's issue. Kalimnik replied, I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest. Our friend Boyarkin said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his boss, Daripaska's mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be resolved, and we will get back to the original relationship with V's boss, Daripaska. Eight minutes later Manafort replied that Kalimnik should tell Boyarkin's boss a reference to Daripaska that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate. Manafort has alleged to the office that he was willing to brief Daripaska only on public campaign matters, and gave an example why Trump selected Mike Pence as the vice presidential running mate. Manafort said he never gave Daripaska a briefing. Manafort noted that if Trump won, Daripaska would want to use Manafort to advance whatever interest Daripaska had in the United States and elsewhere. Three, Paul Manafort's two campaign period meetings with Konstantin Kalimnik in the United States. Manafort twice met with Kalimnik in person during the campaign period, once in May and again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7th, 2016 in New York City, in the days leading to the meeting. Kalimnik had been working to gather information about the political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former party of region's official Yuri Boyko had recently taken to Moscow, a trip that likely included meetings between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials. Kalimnik then traveled to Washington D.C. on or about May 5th, 2016, while in Washington Kalimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State Department employees. Late on the evening of May 6th, Gates arranged for Kalimnik to take a 3 a.m. train to meet Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7th. According to Manafort, during the meeting, he and Kalimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kalimnik on the Trump campaign, expecting Kalimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere. Manafort stated that opposition bloc members recognized Manafort's position on the campaign was an opportunity, but Kalimnik did not ask for anything. Kalimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base for the opposition bloc. Kalimnik returned to Washington D.C. right after the meeting with Manafort. Manafort met with Kalimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August 2nd, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28th, 2016, Kalimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow. The next day, Kalimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day. In an email with a subject line, Black Caviar, Kalimnik wrote, I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest Black Caviar jar several years ago. We spent about five hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. It has to do about the future of his country and is quite interesting. Manafort identified the guy who gave you your biggest Black Caviar jar as Yanukovych. He explained that in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of Black Caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to $40,000. Manafort's identification of Yanukovych as the guy who gave you your biggest Black Caviar jar is consistent with Kalimnik being in Moscow, where Yanukovych resided. When Kalimnik wrote, I met today with the guy and with a December 2016 email in which Kalimnik referred to Yanukovych as BG, redacted, grand jury. Manafort replied to Kalimnik's July 29th email, Tuesday, August 2nd is best, Tuesday or Wednesday in NYC. Three days later, on July 31st, 2016, Kalimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow and on that same day wrote to Manafort that he needed about two hours for their meeting because it is a long caviar story to tell. Kalimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2nd at 7.30pm and he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night. Documentary evidence, including flight, phone and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged confirms the dinner took place as planned on August 2nd. As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates, who arrived late to the dinner, differ in certain respects, but their versions of events went assessed alongside available documentary evidence and what Kalimnik told Business Associate Sam Patton indicate that at least three principal topics were discussed. First, Manafort and Kalimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas. And having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian president ousted in 2014 elected to head that republic. That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a backdoor means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kalimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2nd meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan. Manafort also initially told the office that he had said to Kalimnik that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kalimnik asking Manafort to reconsider the plan after their August 2nd meeting. Manafort said, redacted grand jury, that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych's sending years later an urgent request when Yanukovych needed him. When confronted with an email written by Kalimnik on or about December 8th, 2016 however, Manafort acknowledged Kalimnik raised the peace plan again in that email. Manafort ultimately acknowledged Kalimnik also raised the peace plan in January and February 2017 meetings with Manafort, redacted grand jury. Second, Manafort briefed Kalimnik on the state of the Trump campaign and Manafort's plan to win the election. That briefing encompassed the campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of battleground states which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. Manafort did not refer explicitly to battleground states in his telling of the August 2nd discussion, redacted grand jury. Third, according to Gates and what Kalimnik told Patton, Manafort and Kalimnik discussed two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. This consisted of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the opposition bloc owed to Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment. After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kalimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kalimnik. Manafort resigned from the Trump campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kalimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to offer advice to various campaign officials through the November election. Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump. And some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the campaign make the case against Clinton as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment and that WikiLeaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials, and DNC members. Later, in an November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled, Securing the Victory, Manafort stated that he was really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory and that he was concerned the Clinton campaign would respond to a loss by moving immediately to discredit the Trump victory and claim voter fraud and cyber fraud including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results. Trump was elected president on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an administration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the outside and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity in relationship with Trump and the incoming administration. Manafort appeared to follow that plan as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail. Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Yorgi Oganov. Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian embassy in the United States, was a senior executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska. Manafort initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit. Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit. In particular, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kalimnik suggest that Kalimnik and Boyarkin, not Manafort's council, had arranged the meeting between Manafort and Oganov. Kalimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be not about money or Pericles, but instead about recreating the old friendship, ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska, and talking about global politics. Manafort also replied by text that he needs this finished before January 20th, which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles before the inauguration. On January 15th, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafort emailed KT McFarland, who was at that time designated to be deputy national security adviser, and was formally appointed to that position on January 20th, 2017. Manafort's January 15th email to McFarland stated, I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month. Manafort's told the office that the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month. Either way, McFarland, who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry, appears not to have responded to Manafort. Manafort told the office that around the time of the presidential inauguration in January, he met with Kalimnik and Ukrainian oligarch, Sir Heliovochkin, at the Western Hotel in Alexandria, Virginia. During this meeting, Kalimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace plan that he enrolled at the August 2nd meeting, and in a detailed December 8th, 2016 message found in Kalimnik's DMP email account. In that December 8th email, which Manafort acknowledged having read, Kalimnik wrote, All that is required to start the process is a very minor wink or slight push from DT, an apparent reference to President-elect Trump, and a decision to authorize you to be a special representative and manage this process. Kalimnik assured Manafort, with that authority, he could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia. Yanukovych guarantees your reception at the very top level, and that DT could have peace in Ukraine, basically, within a few months after inauguration. As noted above, redacted grand jury, and statements to the office, Manafort sought to qualify his engagement on and support for the plan. Redacted grand jury. On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kalimnik in Madrid, where Kalimnik had flown from Moscow. In his first two interviews with the office, Manafort denied meeting with Kalimnik on his Madrid trip, and then, after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kalimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him, recognized that he had met him in Madrid. Manafort said that Kalimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called black ledger payments to Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine's National Anti-Corruption Bureau. Redacted grand jury. Manafort remained in contact with Kalimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018. Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the office and the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kalimnik, and worked with Kalimnik to formulate the polling questions. The primers sent to the pollsters specifically called for the United States and President Trump to support the autonomous Republic of Donbass with Yanukovych as Prime Minister. And a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbass. The poll was not solely about Donbass. It also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election. The office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump campaign or the Trump administration. Kalimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the executive branch, for example, U.S. Department of State, into the summer of 2018, and of Section 8, recording by Lynn Jarrow.