 Good afternoon, everybody. I'm John Sorciari. I'm the director of the Wiser Diplomacy Center here at the University of Michigan, and I'm delighted to welcome you to this event on the evolving role of the United States in the Gulf region. We're pleased to be able to partner in this event with the Gulf International Forum, a leading think tank in Washington, DC, focused on the Gulf and the surrounding Middle Eastern region. And today we are joined by a stellar panel of experts on the region who are going to discuss some of the main themes happening in and around the Gulf today. We have Dr. Dania Toffer, who is the executive director of Gulf International Forum. She's an expert on the politics and political economy of the Gulf and on US Gulf relations and is widely published in both of those domains. She's also a professorial lecturer at Georgetown and previously worked at the National Defense University in Washington. We're also privileged to welcome Dr. Abbas Khadeem, who leads the Atlantic Council's Iraq Initiative. He's an expert on Iraq and an author of the book Reclaiming Iraq, The 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State. He's been a senior foreign policy fellow at Johns Hopkins Dice, a visiting faculty member at Stanford and on the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as having served at the Iraqi Embassy in Washington. We're also pleased to welcome General Anthony Zinni, a retired and highly decorated US Marine Corps general. He served as the special US envoy to Israel and the Palestinian Authority in addition to posts in Somalia, Pakistan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. And he ended his distinguished career as commander-in-chief of the US Central Command. Last but not least, to moderate today's conversation, we welcome back Ambassador Patrick Theros, former US Ambassador to Qatar, former deputy chief of mission in Jordan, as well as in the United Arab Emirates, former advisor to the commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, and also the longtime president and executive director of the US Qatar Business Council. Ambassador Theros is now a strategic advisor to Gulf International Forum and Ambassador Theros. We're very pleased to see you back at the Ford School and look forward to a great conversation. Ambassador Theros will start off by leaving a conversation with the panelists and soon it will get to your audience question that you were able to submit via YouTube. So welcome you all to the Ford School community and with that I'll turn over to Ambassador Theros. Dr. Churchari, thank you very much for having us here. My only big regret is I can't be an Ann Arbor in the town I was born in, but perhaps next year. We are here today to discuss just how will the dynamics of the American political system change American policy and what happened to the Gulf and how the Gulf states react to us. I would like to begin by asking each of our panelists to address the core question for today. How is the American role in the Gulf changing and how are the GCC states responding to the election results? General Zinni. Well I think in terms, I'll take the second part of that first. Knowing the region for the past 30 years, I think when they see a change of administration, it's more of a wait and see. I don't think they have any preformed ideas. I do think there might be some concern out there because there was some issues with the Obama administration on how they handle the Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood. So I do think they'll look very closely at the foreign policy team as it's put together to see how that's come about. Obviously things in the Gulf have changed. We see the changes in Saudi Arabia, the war in Yemen, a number of events that have taken place. Turkey's greater interest in this part of the world that probably in the last couple of years have changed the dynamics out there. Obviously the war in Syria also. So I think it's a time with some events that have occurred that have surprised people. I think the recognition of Israel by the UAE and Bahrain obviously would not have been done without Saudi Arabia is okay. I think sometimes we misinterpret that. I don't believe that was a U.S. orchestrated event. I think the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain knew what they were doing. They were trying to gain leverage over Israel to prevent maybe expansion into the settlements and also looking to gain things from the United States for it such as advanced arms and weapons systems. So that's kind of a run through very quickly and what might have changed recently and how they may be looking at the new administration coming in. Thank you, General. Dr. Khadim, Iraq still figures is one of the two most important and largest countries of all in the region. Just shortly before coming on air today, I saw an announcement that the U.S. military is expecting President Trump to order a withdrawal, partial or total, we don't know, U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. But in that context, how do you think the Gulf States view the change of administration in the United States and what do you think the U.S. will be doing? Thank you very much for having me. It's an honor to be with this distinguished panel. A couple of things. You just mentioned Iraq. Certainly Iraq is one of the places that the new administration needs to keep an eye on. Iraq, of course, when we mentioned Iraq, we also mentioned Iran. And it is whatever it goes on inside Iraq right now, mostly is a byproduct of the course of U.S. European relations. When the two countries are on a negotiation or diplomatic path, things come down in Iraq. When it is the other way around, we see more tension on a more difficult time. So, certainly, I think this piece of news is going to be significant. I don't think the administration intended it that way. But if it happens, then the Biden administration, assuming it will be the Biden administration, will have an easier time in Iraq. I think the Gulf states on Iraq, as I like to look at it, it is a Gulf state. It has a narrowing but still existing access to the Gulf. And it is simply, I think the other Gulf states, the GCC members, do look at the new administration in terms of how the new course of U.S.-Iranian relations are going to take. If the campaign promises from going back to negotiation, probably trying to get another deal with Iran or return to the old deal with some modifications, that would be very important for the Gulf states because they have counted in their rivalry with Iran on the U.S. government being a key player in the region. And it is a key player in the region. Also, looking at the outcome of the U.S.-Iranian policies or relations on Iraq, that will mean a lot to the Gulf states, as we all know the Gulf states at least since 2015-16, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE began to warm up towards Iraq. And they are trying to balance the influence they have with the influence the Iranians have. And certainly this is a very important relations especially with Saudi are becoming warmer with Iraq in a significant way. We hope that the region will benefit from a less tension if we go back to diplomacy. But still, I think we have to figure out what the new administration is going to do. I think people who analyzed or predicted what the Biden administration will be on the basis of the past record of Senator or Vice President Biden in two eras, I think they are in for some surprises because I don't believe that President-elect Biden will go back and revisit his old views. So much water went under the bridge since he held them. Dr. Cardin, thank you. I tend to agree that the past is not always the future. The though I will say my view that President-elect Biden is a man of the system and he is a man who works through the system. Dr. Daufer, could you sort of tie these all together? And particularly on the American side? Yes. So as I mentioned in our earlier private event, I think Washington has been doing some soul searching about its role in the Middle East. And frankly, the American public has, as everyone knows, has grown impatient with conflicts in the Middle East. And the U.S. interests have changed and evolved in the last decade. As I mentioned, Middle East oil has become less politically and economically relevant, albeit maintaining the oil supply is still important. Terrorism is less of an imminent threat than it once was for the U.S. And I would like to also mention, as General Linney mentioned earlier, is that maintaining the free flow of goods and waterways is also important. But really that and the only other lingering major strategic concern is non-proliferation. And for the last decade, policymakers have discussed different options, whether it's retrenchment, reduction of forces, or complete withdrawal, which are all centered on stepping back from the region. And this discussion has been ongoing since Obama's era. Regardless of the decline in strategic interests, I still think that the Gulf remains a linchpin to U.S. foreign policy in the region. And when reviewing the changes in U.S. priorities as it continues to the Gulf, looking at the different strategic documents, whether it's the National Military Strategy or the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy with all forms similar, what one clearly a trend that stands out is priorities and resource allocations are changing and have shifted from perspective, from the perspective of the U.S. And the U.S. approach has changed over the last decade. Everything points in that direction. So I think overall the messaging from the U.S. side is to promote U.S., the U.S.'s interests are interests without indefinite U.S. involvement. So that's a careful balancing act. Basically a strategy of empowering partner nations with the support of the U.S. while maintaining less direct involvement. And I've heard the generals talk about the why-with-and-who approach to dealing with the region. And really what you can see is that the U.S. has maintained its basing infrastructure in the Gulf and that hasn't changed. The number of bases has relatively remained the same over the past few years. And these are permanent architectures. So the U.S. really has been walking in conclusion, finally I'm getting to my conclusion, has been walking a fine line that has displayed restraint without retrenchment. And both Trump and Biden agree on one thing, a drawdown of U.S. troops, but there's really no definition of how that will work. And regardless, I think, and I strongly believe that the Gulf continues to be the lynchpin of U.S., the U.S.'s very architecture in the Middle East, no matter what policy they go forward with. Dr. Daffer, I'm sorry, I lost you. Are you finished, I think? Yes. Yeah, thank you. Sorry, my apologies for that. We are unique as a country, a democratic country, where we hold elections in one month and the power transfers two and a half months later. In that time, the president remains still president. He still has all the authorities appointed. I know I remember very well that our first intervention in Somalia happened as Bush 41 was in his transition, and then he took a very major step. So I'd like to ask each of our panelists, beginning of General Zinni, any thoughts, ideas, predictions on what will happen in the interim, in the interregnum until January 20th? Well, the news today was concerning and that President Trump is indicating he might order the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and Iraq. I think that would be a disaster. I think we have to be very careful about how we do things like that. It could encourage the Taliban. It could encourage Iran and others to become more adventurous with some sort of precipitous movement. It's also dangerous for our troops themselves and very disruptive with some of the programs we have ongoing with Afghan forces and Iraqi forces. We have training programs. We have equipment and base operations that we work cooperatively with them and have to be maintained. In the past, I went through the Somalia business, as you mentioned, Patrick, and I can tell you that although President Bush made that decision after he had lost the election, there was a lot of work with the Clinton transition team understanding what he had done and what he was trying to do. Basically, he did it for humanitarian reasons. The Clinton administration publicly said they accepted that and were willing to take it on. Obviously here, we don't have that kind of seamless transition, which is necessary in things like this. So I think we have to be very careful with what we're doing. Our military presence out there, as Dania mentioned, is pretty well established. We actually ratcheted up because of the wars out there, but there is a fundamental basic structure out there. Mainly, it's built around headquarters and preposition equipment, training, and that sort of thing. Eventually, you can withdraw combat forces if things and tensions reduce, but I think we'll always have a military presence to solidify our relationship, military to military, out in the region with our allies. Dr. Kotham, Iraq must be particularly concerned, positively or negatively, on the prospect of the withdrawal of American forces. Now, we don't know if he intends to order a complete withdrawal. We'll leave the residual force. He has threatened to close the embassy. So your views on where this could go, Dr. Kotham. Well, thank you for this question. I see the general's comment on the impact of withdrawal of troops, especially when they are needed in both Iraq and Afghanistan for many purposes, but also there are other considerations in the case of Iraq, because these troops have become the focus of conflict, especially between Iran and the United States. Certainly, Iran is doing this through its own proxies or fighting groups that are loyal to it. There are three kinds of troops in Iraq that we can really, if we were to dissect this whole situation and nuance it, the troops that are there to protect U.S. interests, such as the embassy and other places and consulates, et cetera. And then there are the troops that are part of the training of Iraq. Iraq purchased a lot of weapons from the United States. And there are troops that are there for training purposes and also other training of capacity building for Iraqi forces. And then there are the troops that went after June 2014 to fight ISIS. There is a consensus almost of Iraq that they have no problem with the first two categories, but the third number or group of U.S. troops that are the point of dispute. And I believe the situation here is, of course, the Iranian and also some Iraqis who objected to their presence is because of the statements that were made either by President Trump or by other U.S. officials. I think that will not be the case with the upcoming administration, but by all means, the U.S. presence in Iraq, military, and civilian, diplomatic, et cetera, also the aid is huge in Iraq. And it's absolutely vital for the Iraq to fight terrorism, to also build on keep capacity. But also we have to face it that the presence of U.S. troops is a problematic issue, especially in light of the unanimous vote of the Iraqi Council of Representatives that called on the government to negotiate a withdrawal. So a partial withdrawal of troops will be, I think, a good way to meet for both countries on a common ground and diffuse a situation that escalated unnecessarily back in November and last year and January this year. And I think that we remain probably vigilant on how this relation proceeds without losing the potential of what robust bilateral Iraqi U.S. relations can accomplish for both sides, and especially for Iraq. Iraq actually needs U.S. more than the U.S. needs Iraq, definitely. But still it is a mutual and a bilateral interest. Thank you, Dr. Kadab. Dr. Duffer, a lot of us had talked and speculated that one of the things that President Trump might do is begin or accelerate the withdrawal of American forces from the region. That's one shoe that fell. Are there any other shoes that might fall between now and January 20th? You had mentioned earlier something about some sort of magical solution to the internal Gulf crisis. Yes. Well, there are other shoes, if you will. Well, I'll give an overview. So one thing that I'm certain of is that Trump will continue trying to maintain dominance of the new cycle. He's famous for that, and he'll keep insisting that he's the winner of this election. But as for the Gulf and the broader Middle East, I think he will work towards solidifying his legacy, which is centered on aggressions with Iran, Arab normalization with Israel, and the reduction of the military presence in the Gulf region. I expect he will unquestionably continue his maximum pressure policy, and he will be bent on making a return to the bothy PoA as difficult as possible for the Biden administration. So I would not discount him flooding Iran with more solution. A big question that I heard from different people is about whether there will be some sort of war with Iran. I believe going to war would be an affront to Trump's base, who are adamantly opposed to endless wars, and currently his most ardent supporters. They were here in Washington this weekend. Furthermore, there is little legislative support for such an endeavor. Trump, as I said, will continue his maximum pressure campaign, and probably take credit if a better deal is negotiated by a Biden administration. Iran is also hedging its bets, and surely would avoid dragging itself into a war when it has this golden opportunity in its hand to negotiate with the next administration. As for last minute pushes for normalization with Israel, I think that ship has sailed. I guess for this administration, I suppose any country that intends to normalize relations with Israel will wait it out so they can maximize their returns with the next administration. I have, as you have mentioned, Ambassador Theoros, have read that security advisors of Trump have mentioned that within the next 70 days, they're going to push to solve the Gulf crisis. They're saying that it's really important for counting Iran, which I think is a good point. But also, they said that it would elevate the chances of normalization with Israel. That's a very curious statement and something that we would have to watch for. In regards to reduction of the US military presence in the Middle East, well, obviously it's plausible, and now it's even more plausible that he will withdraw from troops, as we've read in the news, about Iraq and Afghanistan. But I also wouldn't forget northeastern Syria, and I don't know what he's going to do about the embassy in Iraq, but I think Abbas can say more about that. I also think that Trump may continue to push for the allocation of favors to the GCC states with an eye on future business opportunities once he leaves the office. He has approved the F-35, which we know that's related to normalization with Israel. He tried to push the sale. We'll see what happens with Congress and moving that sale forward, although we know that that's a very confusing quest if you're trying to follow the issue. He also designated Qatar as a non-NATO ally, which I think Kuwait and Bahrain are already considered non-NATO allies. We saw how he awarded the late Amir, the Legion merit, the special award. I think these are some examples of Trump granting favors to the GCC states, and I wouldn't be surprised if we don't see more of that. That's it. I find it difficult to think of what sort of incentives he could give the UAE to make up with Qatar. This is not something that is easily bought this way. Transitioning from what's going to happen between now and January 20th to when President Biden walks into the Oval Office, he's going to have a lot of things on his mind on doing executive orders and so forth, but at some point some really big issues are going to come up that pertain directly to the Gulf. Your view, again, General Zinni, if you prioritize those issues, which one need he address first? Well, I think the number one question is going to be what will the relationship with Iran be? Whether that's taken on first or not, that's a different story, but I think everyone's going to be looking to see if there will be an attempt to reinstate the nuclear deal. I think that the Biden administration, obviously going back to the Obama administration, realizes that that can't be a one off. The reason it got so much criticism and in effect failed in the end was because there was no follow-up on other issues. So I think if they were to re-engage, you're going to see some sort of condition set that it must lead to something else besides just the nuclear aspects of the deal. I think you will see a clamor from the Gulf state saying that that relationship with Iran and the discussions in dialogue have to include them. I heard a lot of concerns last time that the 6 plus 1 did not include them and they felt as loyal allies who stuck their head above the parapet and faced off against Iran at our insistence were left high and dry with the deal. So there's going to have to be some interest in which way do they play into this. The other thing I would say is we have tried mightily to create some sort of coalition, formalized coalition in the Gulf. The latest in the Trump administration was the Middle East Strategic Alliance, MESA. And I think there may be, and that's always been, regardless of whether it's Democrat or Republican administration, that's always been as long as I can remember back 35 years. That's been something we have been trying to do. And I would think that they may try to pursue that again to look at some sort of relationship. The MESA had four pillars to it, energy, the economy, diplomacy and security. Whether they follow up on that, that was basically an interagency approach and whether there'll be interest in the Biden administration to push on that even further. But I think that'll be another priority out there eventually. Dr. Khadim, clearly Iraq again sits at the apex of this. It's the keystone to the Gulf, at least physically on a map. What you think is going to be the biggest issue facing the president, and how does it impact on the Gulf? I believe that one of the main issues the president will face is his past record on the Iraqis' perceptions of what President Biden would be. Because for Iraqis that we talk to every day, President Biden's name is associated with his old proposal that there would be an excessive decentralization in the country. Iraqis call it Biden's plan to divide Iraq. And that would be important, I think, to bring Iraqis to be supportive of the government warming up to the US administration would be one thing. So he needs really to reveal what his current position on Iraq and US-Iraqi relations, whether he will continue this policy of two Iraqis Baghdad and Arbil or deal with Iraq as one Iraq. I think this has been one of the bad glitches in US-Iraqi relations on US foreign policy towards Iraq. That's another thing. I believe that one of the issues that will be taken, and this is a nonpartisan issue, is the combat of terrorism. Iraq is one of the main two theaters of combating terrorism in the region with Syria. So that would be important. And also I believe that there will be the question of how to help Iraqi government balance its relations and obligations, territorial geopolitical obligations and its regional politics. The Iraqi government, at least since the government of Prime Minister Haider Labadi took over in 2014, tried to maintain a policy of neutrality. And it is very hard to be neutral in a place where everybody demands that he would be either with them or against them. So one way to balance Iraqi relations is to have really healthy relations with the Gulf, the Arab side of the Gulf, and also Iran is a reality and they have to have relations that are again healthy relations, not relations where Iran has this level of influence that it maintains now. And the US being an enabler of this, that is very important. So these are the issues. I don't see Iraq being part of the equation of the normalization or peace agreements, name them whatever you like on with Israel. Iraq has made its policy clear that they are part of the long dead Arab initiative that King Abdullah once put forward. Israel is never going to take it. And the Arabs probably are going to stick by it. And then, you know, so Iraq and under the current situation of normalization ala Bahrain, UAE or Sudan or some other country would not would be the last to sign. It will never sign. Okay, that's solid, a very convincing argument, Dr. Qaeda. Dr. Duffer, we've run through two rather difficult decisions facing the new administration. One of the questions that has always intrigued me is this question of benign neglect. President Biden is going to be swamped. This is going to be an incredibly difficult transition. Will it, do you think that these important decisions will be front and center in his office? Or will they be delegated to whoever the Secretary of State is or the Assistant Secretary for the region? And what else is there that he might need to address? Myself, unfortunately, you know, the US has a lot to deal with at home. And so it is no coincidence that at the last debate between Trump and Biden, the Middle East wasn't mentioned. If you look at the Democrats platform, it's a long report, but you know, the Middle East is all the way at the bottom. So that is true that priorities have shifted to be more inward focused for the US. As General Zinni mentioned, Iran is a true question. And one that actually I felt that has really been put on the backbone, Berner, but is really important is Yemen and the Yemen War. And Yemen is suffering from an unthinkable humanitarian catastrophe. And Biden has stated that he will end the support for the war. There's plenty he can do, even if he has a Republican majority Senate, which is the likely case. So to take a step back, the US has taken some measures to decrease the support for the Yemen War. It's no longer fueling Arab coalition jets. There are no boots on the ground involved in physical acts of war between the Houthis and the Arab coalition and Yemeni forces on the ground. However, there are more options on the table that Biden can carry out, and we'll see what he ends up doing. With an issuance of an executive order, Biden could end US intelligence sharing with the Saudi coalition and logistical support and spare parts transfers that keep Saudi war planes in the air. Another option is to have the State Department put a stop on all arms sales to Saudi Arabia, placing certain criteria to allow their sales. Additionally, he can use his leverage as a president of one of the most powerful countries in the world to put pressure on other nations, supporting the Saudi coalition like France, the United Kingdom and Canada, and get them to follow suit in pushing a drawdown to this war. Biden could also restore humanitarian assistance to the northern part of Yemen. There are many options, and he could choose a couple or not the other, but there's still a lot that he can do. A curious case is to watch what will happen between Biden and Saudi Arabia. I know there's been discussions about a push to punish Saudi Arabia on the side of the Democrats, and there is a clear sense of tension there. Saudi Arabia has accrued a basket of hot button issues that has roused Democrats. The war in Yemen is one. The Jamal Khashoggi affair is another one. The Trump administration's overt support for Saudi Arabia through all of these affairs is another one. So collectively, all of these factors have made Saudi a partisan affair. Now, do I think Saudi will survive with Biden? Yes. If history is a sign of how Saudi U.S. relations work, then I suspect that a Biden administration will find a way to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, and it is noteworthy to mention that Saudi is really an important strategic partner to the U.S., unless let's not discount that. But it will be interesting to see how he deals with Saudi. Thank you. We're talking a lot about what are the decision points for the Biden administration or what President Trump do. Let's sort of go to the other side of the pond on this one. What actions will the big players in the Gulf themselves take? What would be Iran's strategy with the U.S.? How would Iran position itself to deal with the incoming Biden administration? Dr. Khadim has suffered a lot under the Trump administration, and its policy of running the clock worked. They were hoping that President Trump would not get another term. It seems that they are getting this wish, and that means basically they are spared another four years of either or surrender one of the two things. It's very tough for Iran. But I would not believe that Iran is going to go easy with the Biden administration. The hardliners are emboldened now more than ever, including the supreme leader himself and the exit of the United States from the deal has given the hardliners all the evidence they need to show the domestic audience and probably even beyond their borders that deals don't mean anything. Partners don't want to honor them. And deep down, they don't want to say we don't want to make a deal. But clearly they have the pretext at least to go tough. So I believe for a while they will push for the United States to return to the deal as is without conditions. And this is very hard, of course, for two reasons. One of them is that the deal has, I mean, we already wasted four years of reaping any benefits from the deal itself. And it's time to expire on certain provisions of it, our opponents are looming. So the deal itself is not going to serve for the future or long future. The other issue here is that there will be the Biden administration. I don't believe that the Biden administration would just jump on right away because that will give its opponents all the ammunition they need to attack them as being weak on Iran and all of that. And I believe that we will see a resistance from both sides, the United States and Iran. So that's that. I believe that the Iranians will continue their policy of working through the corridor Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and establishing their regional interest and influence. The relation with Saudi Arabia and with the rest of the Gulf, it is going Iran's way right now because the division of the GCC has been one of the best things that happened to the Iranians. And I believe that it should be a priority for the Biden administration to try to repair these relations among the three GCCs right now, or maybe even four GCCs. There is Qatar on one side, that is Bahrain, Saudi, and UAE, and there is either Kuwait on Iran or Kuwait and Iran. So it's two entities. But clearly, this is a bad situation for the other side of the Gulf. Iran is enjoying it. Because of it, of course, you have good relations that are established within the GCC to Iran. And there are even this unified front that used to be there is no longer. So that's what we expect. I believe that Iran's influence inside Iraq will continue to increase right now and in the near future. And there are, again, it depends on how crafty and resourceful and creative the Biden administration will be to give the Iranians an incentive to go back to where the Obama administration was going on the same trajectory, but without giving in to all Iran's demands, Iran should not feel or even be a tri-infant with this change in the U.S. administrations. It should be seen as a responsibility for Iran to get its act together and avoid a lost opportunity. And they lost already too many opportunities to end the problem that Iran has been posing in the world for about 40 years now. Fascinating. General Zinni, Dr. Cotten came up with a lot of what Iran should do. Along the same lines, what is Iran likely to do? How do you think Iran's worldview affects what they should do? And actually, and within that, how does the regime see itself surviving? Well, I think, you know, one would hope that Iran sees this as an opportunity to maybe change the dialogue and change the atmosphere in the region. And to begin to approach a Biden administration openly with some sort of willingness to look at what's in it for them if they were to become more cooperative with others in the region, less aggressive in their support for the things that destabilize the region, it could be an opportunity. Given the regime in Iran, it may be hard to see that right now. It's hard to look for the right moderates in there that might be willing to approach this. I think that you certainly would probably see from a Biden side a willingness to open that kind of dialogue. They're going to feel since obviously many of them were part of the Obama administration that their fingers were burned on the last deal because nothing went beyond the deal. In other words, although they were complying with the nuclear deal, they certainly were up to other things that allowed for even domestic criticism of the deal back here and eventually what killed it. So there's going to be a lot of caution from the Biden administration. But I think an openness to hear where Iran wants to take this relationship, I would also say, because I think this was brought out very effectively by our other speakers here, there's the relationships from one side of the Gulf to the other have changed a bit in more recent times. There's certain members of the Gulf Cooperation Council that certainly have lines into Iran and they may be of some sort of assistance in working with Iran and helping look at what kinds of incentives may be out there for them to moderate their actions too. So I've become more convinced that the relationship with Iran is going to be probably a priority issue. And I certainly realize there are many others out there that can affect this region. It's very prone to being destabilized on a moment's notice. But I think that may be the big one that will have to be resolved in some fashion, or at least it will be worked on. I would say one other thing. We know, as I think Donnie pointed out, the Biden administration is going to have a lot on its plate. Our relationships with China, the domestic issues we have, the COVID-19, the economy, everything else. But we have to remember that I think people in the region are going to look very closely at Biden's foreign policy team. Because obviously they work these issues. There will be others that will work those other issues. Any U.S. administration has to be able to walk in true gum at the same time. So the makeup of that foreign policy team, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and those that are in policy positions beneath them, are going to say a lot to the region about which way we're going and how we might engage. So that's something they will watch very closely. Dr. Dhofer, all this we've talked about, how Iran might not respond to an opening to reinstate the JCPOA. As we've said many times earlier, there is not a single unified Gulf Arab view perception of Iran and the future. Assuming that some progress is made towards restarting the JCPOA or a dialogue begins between the United States and Iran, what sort of reaction should we expect from the Gulf States? Either just what sort of reaction should we expect from the Gulf States? Well, I think they've already begun their responses. I think the UAE and Bahrain's normalization can partly be viewed as a preliminary response to a negotiated JCPOA. The UAE has been really undergoing the normalization process with Israel from as far back as 2015. And I remember, because I was around the National Defense University and we had close dealings with the UAE at the time, and the discussions started to shift about their view of Israel and the Palestinian issue. On top of that, if you stand and listen closely to the academic circles back then, there were many surveys going on to the soliciting what the public opinion is about Israel, especially the youth, have they changed their opinion? So I think this has been going on for a while since 2015. Qatar and Oman I think will remain very flexible and as General Zinni rightly pointed out, they will likely offer mediation efforts between the US and Iran. And so I think that's one and I think actually Oman will come to the limelight more so than it did under the Trump administration. And I think Oman is probably pleased to see that Biden has won because they were kind of in the back burner in this administration, the Trump administration. I said I might be wrong, but the signals I'm reading from Riyadh is that normalization with Israel is a strong possibility for Saudi Arabia, especially if Mohammed bin Salman takes the throne. They've been flirting with the idea. The rhetoric of Mohammed bin Salman early on during his public appearances, you saw there should make peace or shut up kind of articles that were released years ago. Also the statements of Prince Bandar bin Sultan that indicates that Saudi will consider its strategic interests above everything. They do sympathize with the Palestinian cause, but strategic interests are very important. This really is reminiscent of the UAE's pre-normalization days. So you might, I don't know, there's a good chance it could happen, but I don't think it's going to happen in the next 100 days or so. I want to make a crucial point. And I think General Zinnick pushed on this one that the US should really include regional partners in the JCPA negotiation. I think that would really assist in mitigating some of the tensions in the region. And if that's one of the US policy goals in the region, then I think that would be important. Although I think it would make the negotiation a little bit tougher because the GCC states are going to push on regional ambitions of Iran and what not. And Iran may not be very pleased to see that. So those are kind of my perspectives. I must say in the course of my entire career in the Middle East and particularly in the Gulf, the JCPOA was only the last example of the United States proceeding without consulting with its allies. Virtually every consultation that I ever participated in over the 30 odd years that I was in the region would be that the United States would decide what it wants to do and then hold consultations and in almost every case the consultation is this is what I've decided to do. Let's go along with it. So you wonder if we can just get out of that habit sometimes. And I think this is where probably Iraq sees that because Iraq's a different sort of country. So does Iraq take American advice? You know, Iraq has a lot of its own problems. Would it take American advice with regard to the JCPOA and other issues involving its relationship with Iran? Dr. Kahnem? You're muted. Okay, great. Iraq was supportive of the Iran deal and we know that even they hosted part of the negotiations when there was a run up for concluding the deal. They do like nothing more than helping the United States and Iran reconcile their differences because that reflects directly in a positive way on Iraq. So I don't believe that the United States needs to do a lot of convincing in Iraq when it comes to negotiating with Iran, reaching any conclusions or any any deals that is that is welcomed in Iraq. In fact, encouraged on the Iraqis in their own way. They said that they were ready to facilitate any talks. They even signaled and said in fact emphatically that they were willing to act as mediators between Iran and the Arab States because now they have that good relations. Anything on any calming on the tensions in the region, it fits directly in Iraq's interest. So this is the one ally that the United States needs not to worry about when they negotiate with the Iranians. The more negotiations, the happier Iraqis are. There is also, I want to mention in addition to what General Zinni and Dr. Daper just mentioned, there are two elections to watch in the region, the Iranian election. And also there is a possible Iraqi election that will happen in 2021 as an early election or the regularly scheduled election in 2022. And these are going to be changing the political scene in two key countries in the region during the Biden administration's term. And these are things to watch for because both of them could be game changers in terms of who gets to be brought by the electorate to rule these two countries. Iran is probably, there is a continuity with the supreme leaders, but even that, we don't know. I always mentioned that the supreme leader is 80, he's ill and he probably will be departing the scene. But definitely these two elections are to be put into the calculation and more than the continuity in the Gulf states where pretty much we are having similar government and political system. Yes, there might be a big change if Mohamed bin Salman takes the throne in the future. But other states, I mean, we saw the transition in Kuwait after the death of Amir, not eventful change, also in Oman when we had recently the death of Sultan Abousan, these are two key countries in the region in terms of the role of their leadership and how important they are. But I think with Saudi it's going to be different if there is a change because the Saudi royal family is not on the same page on what the interests are as in Saudi and Kuwait and in Oman. So yeah, there is a lot of that, I think. But back again to the deal, I believe the Iraqis will be happy if diplomacy takes lead again. Thank you. Staying on the subject of Iraq, Iraq we should remember is the one country in the Gulf that is intimately engaged with the rest of the Arab world. It has fought wars, is the only country in the Gulf that has directly become involved in a war with Israel. It is the only country in the Gulf that has had armed clashes with, fought a war with Iran. It has had real differences with Syria and with Turkey. We now see a complete overhaul of relationships in the area. Russia is becoming more active. General Zinni, where do you see the rest of the Arab world impacting on Iraq and on the Gulf region in general right now? Events in the rest of the Arab world and in Turkey? Well, I think one of the curses for the region is too much interest from outside. I think what we're beginning to see obviously is Turkey may have shifted away from Europe, probably in frustration in their attempts to join the European Union and really strained the NATO relationship, and maybe see their future is better in Central Asia and in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Of course, we saw what happened with the Russians coming in to Syria. Chinese have a different approach, not so much in terms of military, although there's been a little bit of that, but they've shown great interest and as a terminal for their Belt and Road efforts. One of the things that always concerned me is all this diverse outside interest and projection into the region made it very difficult for the region to resolve its own issues or to create some sort of cooperative, cohesive regional approach to the issues. Unfortunately, I think that's going to continue in many ways. Iraq is a good example of that because it is emerging now. We'll see where it goes. I think, as Abbas pointed out, it has an election which I think is going to be significant coming up next year. It's trying to hold itself together. It obviously has internal issues that it has to deal with and bringing together Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Kaldian, Assyrian, Christian. It's quite a mixed bag in there. A lot of work has to be done to heal some things that went on before that exacerbated those internal relationship. It probably needs some space and time and support to get those things done more than it needs intervention in telling it how to do its business coming up. I think this is a region that probably needs some breathing space, but isn't going to get it for external and internal reasons coming up. I think here, the United States may play an important role in trying to assist in this, because we are one of the outside influencers in all this, too. But the more we can do the less intentions, the more that we can do to broker maybe agreements and somehow help resolve things like the cutter issue and what's going on in Israel now. I do think that the recognition of Israel was done specifically because America's role as a broker that said the final status issues will be resolved through negotiations was taken off the table by Trump. We basically said there are no final status issues. Jerusalem is the capital. There is no right to return. The borders are whatever Net Yahu wants to make them. I think the recognition of Israel may have been a measure to stop some of that and at least gain some leverage to prevent, say, further expansion of settlements, uncontained in any way, and was a good measure and a good step on that perspective. But I think all of this needs to be somehow brought to the different tables that we need for discussions of disputes and outside interests and lessening tensions and looking at how support for the region is constructed, how military cooperation is done, but there's so many issues external and internal. And again, it may be a great opportunity, but it is going to be very complicated no longer. Thank you. Speaking of intractable issues, it has now been three years and counting since the Quartet broke relations with Qatar. And we just heard that there is some talk among experts that somehow President Trump would like to pull the rabbit out of the hat and settle this issue. If he settles the issue, then my next question is Moot, in the more likely circumstance that he won't settle the Qatar dispute with its neighbors. Do you really think that we care? I mean, is it really that important or have we just worked our way through it? Dr. Dhofer? Yes. Okay. So definitely, I think it would be great to have that rabbit pulled out of the hat. I think having a united front in the GCC is an issue that I believe has been overlooked. It really goes back to the question of establishing a regional order. In the absence of capable institutions of regulating interactions among the Gulf countries, you can expect more conflict to ensue. In the current context, none of the GCC states have the leverage to get the other one to submit to their will while their strategic interests diverge to the extent that there will likely be continued tensions among them. So that's sort of a dilemma. And I think a failure in the US policy, in my opinion, is the fixation on bilateral relations without enough emphasis, I believe, on multilateral relations. In regards to the Gulf, the GCC is one institution that can be valuable for US interests. And I think General Zinni, he discussed the elusive quest of establishing the Arab NATO or MISA, which was another missed opportunity for regional cooperation and for US interests, to be frank. Washington has strong ties with all of the GCC states, and the rift between them is really a threat to the containment of Iran. Also, tensions have been escalated with an ambitious Turkey, steadily expanding its interest in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East. And Turkey was now welcomed into the Gulf with open arms. Additionally, regional conflicts are, when you look at regional conflicts in the region, they're intertwined within the GCC division. And the Gulf rift has really become embedded into the broader Middle East crisis and has deepened regional fault lines. I look at the Libyan conflict, Syria, Yemen, I mean, these are all prime examples. Therefore, I think resolving the Gulf crisis is a linchpin to addressing conflict in the Middle East. And I do think that a Biden administration should offer more priority to that. We still don't know what he's going to do. I imagine he's going to pursue diplomacy and resolving the conflict. I know he hasn't talked about it much during his campaigning, but we all know that probably most Americans are not really concerned with the United GCC. So that's probably the reason why he didn't mention it. Thank you. General Zinni, you were in charge of the last effort by the United States government to bring this all to a happy conclusion. Are you a betting man? What are the odds that Trump can actually do something between now and the end of the year? And what would it take? Well, let me tell you, I think it's first important to understand what this dispute is about. First of all, despite what you would hear in the region, it's not just about the 13 demands that are on the table. It's not just about Al Jazeera and all this other stuff. There is some deep-rooted historic animosity that is at the base of a lot of this. Having said that, in my mind, this all could be resolved very quickly. If there was a coming to the table unconditionally, and I think only the U.S. president can probably push that issue, I think it could be resolved. It may be a need to put some incentives on the table. It may be a need to get some understanding about certain issues that do rub each of the parties the wrong way. I'm amazed that it's gone on this long. One of the reasons it's gone on this long is, frankly, because we didn't push at the highest levels to get this resolved. Fine to send me out, but the first question I get is, are you speaking for the president? Is the president going to push this? Is there going to demand everybody come to Camp David and sit down at the table and get this resolved and bang on the table? It's absent that they're going to push this as long as they can. I think one part of the effort of the quartet is to see how much pain they could inflict on Qatar. Qatar managed to get by. That kind of has gone by the wayside. I will tell you that it's up to probably Saudi Arabia and UAE, the leadership in those two countries. Bahrain is along for the ride. I would say the Egyptians are in this because of one issue and that's the Muslim Brotherhood and probably are pushed into this because of the support they get from Saudi Arabia and UAE. They want to be on that side. Like I said, if the president pushed on this and it would probably take personal involvement to some level, it could be resolved fairly quickly. I don't think the issues as they're stated are that great that they can't be overcome. Thank you. There has been one conflict going on in the region. It's been going on now for a number of years and it is perhaps one of the greatest human tragedies on the face of the earth so far and no one's talking about it very much. Yemenis are dying by the thousands of starvation of dysentery and getting killed. Early on, we talked a bit about what tools would be available to President Biden to bring the war to a halt. Starting with perhaps General Zinni, would there be an interest? Can we bring the war to a halt? How could we bring the war to a halt and why would we, aside from the humanitarian considerations which haven't always bothered us in the past? Well, first of all, I think the humanitarian, as has been mentioned before by Danya and others, this is catastrophic. I think that we haven't shown the degree of involvement that could possibly push the peace talks further. The UN under Martin Griffith has tried mightily to get the two sides to the table. I think going back to what we talked about with Iran, that could be one of the things that we bring to the table too, to any kind of improved relationship with Iran to begin a dialogue on Yemen. And of course, I think we can bring that sort of pressure on Saudi Arabia. I mean, UAE is already withdrawn from the war. It's not very popular on the streets. It is creating a greater division in our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Frankly, I think there are many people in the region that want to find a way out of this. It's going to take cooperation with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the UAE, and I think the Houthis and others on the ground to make this work. But we ought to push behind the UN effort and support the mediation process here to try to get everybody to the table and also help provide more of the humanitarian aid that's necessary before this thing truly becomes a disaster of monumental proportions. Turning to some questions. We have about 15 minutes left in the session. Some questions from the audience, some particularly interesting ones. In particular, one very large question hanging out there, which we have not addressed very much at all. What pushed the UAE and later Bahrain to seek the normalization with Israel? Was it an American initiative? Was it an initiative that originated with the Emirates? Dr. Daufer? Yes. I think it originated with the Emirates, in my opinion. They saw what happened under the Obama administration and they said, you know what? We need to hedge our bets and figure out another solution for how we're going to secure ourselves and our interests in the region. Israel and the UAE definitely align on the issue of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Also, I think the UAE is a forward-looking country. It wants to get its hands on the most advanced technologies and it saw the opportunity to get a lot of trade of technical know-how and whatnot from Israel with regards to cyber issues, monitoring, intelligence. Also, I believe that Israel does help any state in Washington. We all know that Israel has a strong lobbying body here. I think that Israel has kind of given the UAE, has mentored the UAE, how to address Washington. The UAE has been very successful at that. I think there are a lot of benefits associated with it. I don't think it was just an affair related to Trump, although he wants to take full credit for it. I think we saw this ongoing. Bahrain has really been one of the most open countries with Israel historically. I think it was not really a surprise that Bahrain normalized relations. Although I would note that Saudi probably gave Bahrain the green light to normalize, the UAE has tremendous domestic political influence in Bahrain. It has brought out so many important economic issues in Bahrain. Even like the business elites have been challenged by the UAE in Bahrain, that is one factor. Even the late prime minister who just passed away had a lot of tensions with the UAE because he was very influential in the business community. Bahrain is undergoing some difficult financial issues. The UAE, when they give aid to any country, they have strings attached to it. I do think that also had an influence on Bahrain's normalization with Israel. That's very interesting. The idea that this was more of a UAE initiative makes sense in many ways. General Zinni, on the same subject, what prompted the UAE? Then suddenly at the end of the discussion, we have the Abraham Accords. Yesterday, I believe, or two days ago, the administration made the formal notification of the F-35 to be sold to the UAE, made the formal notification to Congress. Do you think this was truly a quid pro quo, something that was added in at the end that the Israelis liked this idea? There certainly been some noises floated by the transition team as it came together that they're not terribly happy with this sale. General Zinni? Well, first of all, I completely agree with Dania that this was a UAE initiative. I think for several reasons. One, it improved an already great relationship they have with the United States. It also, as I said before, gained them some leverage on Israel. Israel was now unchecked, given Trump's recognition of Jerusalem and basically given the green light to Netanyahu on settlements. Now, with recognition from two states, this means that there's something at risk should Netanyahu try to acquire more settlements or do something that further impacts the Palestinians. Also, it gave them leverage to ask for the quality of F-35s. Now, remember one thing, and I'll speak only from a military perspective now. UAE's been one of our closest allies. It has been with us in Somalia when we asked in the first Gulf War when we asked. They were there in Afghanistan when we were there. They're there with us in Syria. They have a very competent military. They get called the little sparta in terms of their military capability and their ability to handle the technology. So there is a military sort of positive understanding as to why you might want to give an ally that's that strong and shows up the kind of capabilities it has. So that moment allowed them to capitalize on this also. Also realize the UAE has done a great deal to move forward on secularization, the role of women and other things that we have promoted beyond just security interest in the Gulf and would like to see elsewhere in the Middle East. I think in the case of Bahrain, they would never have done it without the Saudis okay. And I would also go as far as perhaps the Saudis encourage them to do it as sort of a stalking horse before they might recognize it. And I think that was to gain maybe a reaction from their own populations to see how it would go and how it would play out. So going back to something Dania said, maybe not in the first 100 days, but you might be seeing Saudi now having agreed okay sort of the UAE, but definitely Bahrain to do this, that they're lining up to do the same thing too. Thank you. Question that was raised briefly earlier by Dr. Khadim, which I think is important, China. China is the world's other major power. It is probably the only real peer competitor we have in economic terms and it is close to being the only peer competitor we have in military strategic terms. We just by way of introduction to the question, last year the forum had the good fortune of taking part in several events with the University of Beijing, which has a Center for Gulf Studies. And the Chinese concern that we heard at the time was a desire not to get caught up in the same sort of Cold War that the West the United States had with the Soviet Union all those years that they would like to work out some sort of modus vivendi. It's not coming home in the Gulf. As we noted earlier, China has expressed an interest in pursuing the construction of El Faw Port, which a South Korean company had abandoned. Will the US respond? What is the US's view of what the Chinese are doing in Iraq? Is this positive? Is it building stability in the region or is it a foothold by an adversary that we would like to prevent from taking place? Well, I do think some of the state's ports are very important, especially the UAE. There's a clicking noise, I think everyone uses their microphone. The Chinese are trying to gain a strategic foothold with regard to ports. And so is the UAE. I think if the US were to try to engage on that kind of divergence, like press on Chinese interests on ports and how that diverges from UAE's interest in ports, it could kind of have an assist the UAE in this process while securing US interest. It would kind of help the US's overall strategic goals with countering Chinese influence in the Gulf. And I think the GCC's relations primarily with China are commercial. And so I think the US needs to be more strategic about dealing with these commercial issues. I know that oil relations have really shifted to the East and Chinese are investing vertically in the hydrocarbon industry. I think the US still needs to make sure that it maintains investments in that, although the US does produce oil at home, it's still beneficial for US companies. And it still keeps US ahead of China in the GCC. Dr. General Zinni, do you see the Chinese offer to build a file port as a strategic challenge to the United States, something that might help US interests in the region? I think it might be an economic challenge. I completely agree with Dania that we are way behind the power curve on understanding commercial interests in the region and how to promote them. That's never been something would be done well and the Chinese are mastering exceptionally well. If you think about this, the security of the Gulf region is more important to maybe the rest of the world than the United States from practical terms like energy and economics. But it's in our interest since we have a globalized economy and that it is protected. But who's protected it? I mean, basically, since the Brits left in the 1970s, we have assumed the security role in the Gulf. We haven't always done it well. We haven't always done it with the best strategic design possible in doing it. The Chinese have had an advantage in this in that there's not a Chinese soldier there on the ground. And yet their interests have been protected and they've been able to understand how to project power globally without doing it through military force. They do it through economic and commercial strength. And going back to Danny's point again, we have never really mastered that. Our strong point in terms of global influence has been militarily primarily. And that is a mistake. I think all of us that have served in government, whether it's in military uniform or in a three-piece suit in the State Department, agree that we need to have a balanced approach to the world. Diplomatic, economic, cultural, we need a balanced approach in terms of influence. And we've been two one-sided on the military. And the Chinese are figuring out how to do it without investing in a globalized military projected all over the world. And this is an example of it and it will challenge our influence there. I would say one thing. There was a prime minister in the region, and I won't name him. Everybody will know him right away, that when I first took over at CENTCOM, he said to me, the image of an American in this part of the world is a soldier in full combat gear. The image of someone like from China is a businessman. It's someone that has commercial interests, that wants to talk about the economy. And he said, you need to change that image. And I think that was good advice. Dr. Khadim, since it's your country and your port, Al Faw, does Iraq welcome Chinese investment or just any investment at all? Or how would you see this? Well, Al Faw has become a political and geopolitical question. There is this competition with Kuwait. Kuwait built a port and the Iraqis want to build their own port. And the question is, all of these ports, how is it going to be utilized? And then, of course, this is one part of it. The other part is the issue of money. The Iraqis don't have the cash to build anything. So they need to have investment rather than any other way. But Chinese and Iraq are more than just Al Faw. During the last days of Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mehdi's government, he went in September 2019 to China and announced a $500 billion deal. And something that appealed to some Iraqis, at least, called oil for reconstruction. Now, Iraqis had oil for food, oil for corruption. But it was a nice change that you would have oil for reconstruction. One thing about the Chinese that makes them appeal to the Iraqis is that it is not complicated with China. The Chinese come to the table with the government official, the company that does the work on the bank, that will give them money. All of them belong to the same entity. And they sign together on the dotted lines with the U.S. good luck trying to do that. So also the Chinese are well known to have done work fast and done that. Iraqis depleted the U.S. for a number of years from 2003 all the way to 2011. They did not leave any record or anything on the ground of any reconstruction. They did a lot of combating terrorism, security issues. But they did not build anything other than some works on the oil industry in a limited way, the electricity. And both of these, the oil was fine because 93% of Iraqi budget is dependent on oil. So the Iraqis take care of that. But the electricity is a failure, to be honest. And there is nothing else. So the Iraqis say maybe if we bring people like the Chinese or others, the other problem is that the Chinese will send their own companies. Western countries normally when they go there, they take the contract and give it to a subcontractor who's an Iraqi. And that's why we had projects that were done four times on paper and nothing on the ground because it was all the money was stolen once twice, three times. Because the U.S. has nothing more or companies or even some Western companies because of security issues. They are just contractors who are best at getting the contract but not doing the work. They just give it to a subcontractor. The third part I think with the Chinese that give them a little bit of a head start, a big head start is that they don't have problems with kickbacks and other things. Western corporations normally there are laws that govern them and they could go to jail if they give rights, etc. That's why you see there is some part of that. The Chinese-Iraqi agreement has been politicized during Adil Abdul Mahdi's government time. Then after the protest it was halted. Now under the Caldney government they just are saying that it is on. They have never cancelled it and it is going to go forward including not just that file but also there is a talk about a full-scale reconstruction. The Iraqi reconstruction bill from ISIS and non-ISIS related goes up to 150 billion dollars and the Chinese would love to be part of that in that sense. I don't know. We did build something. We spent three billion dollars I think building the biggest embassy that's ever been built any place. That I forgot. We've come to the end of our time. This has been a wonderful discussion. I hope our audience has, I'm sure our audience has enjoyed it, learned something from it. I'm going to go around the table one last time if you could say take a minute or so to say what's the most important thing that you expect to happen good or bad in 2021 in the first year of the Biden administration. General Zinni. Well like I said before I think although it's a very complicated and confused environment that lends itself to opportunity. I think if we're constructive we think strategically about the region. We build partnerships out there. There could be opportunities for us to change the dynamics in the region or contribute to it. Dr. Daffer. Well the three big issues that are on my mind is I think having an agreement with Iran would help the region overall and assist with conflict and that's probably a very obvious answer. The Yemen war I wish that would that's probably I guess personally one that I sympathize with a lot and really hope to see a solution from Biden since he promised that at least he would stop US support for the war and as I mentioned why I think resolving the GCC rift is really important because I think it would have a domino effect in other areas of conflict throughout the region. Dr. Kadeb. I'm a historian so I don't do predictions. I like to look at things that are very sure you know what happened and you talk about it but if I have to I agree with both excellent predictions that were made by Dr. Daffer and by General Zinni but I believe that we will have a better relations between Iraq and the United States and I think this is something that has to happen if we were to get the region stabilized. Iraq is very important for the US and I believe that the Iraqi American strategic dialogue will take off on a better trajectory. Well thank you all very much. This has been a fascinating discussion. I would like to thank Dr. Charchari for all that the University of Michigan has done talking about the last question to the University of Michigan. The other thing that you might be able to insert into your curriculum there is how do we change American foreign policy so it is done by diplomats rather than soldiers and now I just close off. Thank you all very much. Dr. Charchari. Thank you. Well that's a good advertisement for our Wiser Diplomacy Center and of course we're very grateful to all of you for sharing your insights here on a dynamic region of enduring importance to the US and therefore also the new administration. Dr. Daffer, Dr. Kadeb, General Zinni, Ambassador Theros, thank you so much for your contributions today. Audience thank you for participating. Stay tuned. We have another panel of experts coming up after the Thanksgiving break from the American Academy of Diplomacy. Also looking at what's next for US foreign policy and so we appreciate your time. Have a wonderful night. Thank you very much. Thank you and have a good night. Stay safe.