 Welcome to Mapping Fortlines, a show by NewsClick where we look at major geopolitical developments across the world. Now, this week has been full of a lot of such key developments. Recently, top U.S. and Chinese officials met in Ankara, Jalaskar. And the tone of the discussions indicated really that there was a lot of differences clearly between these two sites. And we're going to be talking about this meeting as well as the larger implications for the Pacific region, for South Asia, etc. We have with us Prabir Purkastar. Prabir, thank you so much for joining us. So, first of all, let's take a look at the anchorage discussion because it was a lot, there's been a lot of commentary about how unusual it was considering how more such meetings are full of diplomatic niceties, because both sides making very strong statements, of course. So, what do you want to maybe first take us through what is the implication of these discussions? Well, you know, what is going to emerge out of this discussion is something we cannot predict. Clearly, the fact that these two sides met in spite of the pyrotechnics that took place right at the beginning, but both sides talked about the differences and very openly. The question is the fact they met, I think we have to say is a positive step because under Trump's administration, it was really no communication whatsoever that seems to be taking place. At least there is a meeting. Now, what that meeting portends? Something that needs to be worked on between the two sides. But it is, I think, not out of the bounds to say that both sides feel that it would be better if they can discuss some of these issues, not just have sanctions against each other, which is what the United States has been doing. Even before the meeting, they had sanctions, I think, on 24, yeah, 24 officials and so on. So, the U.S. continuation of the sanctions regime on countries that disagree with still continues. Now, I think there are two things that we need to register, which is the larger geopolitical issue that you are raising. One is the U.S. talk about a rule-based international order. Now, you know, there is already a treaty-based international order. It comes from various treaties, the global powers have signed, the countries have signed, and in that, the United Nations and its Security Council is what supposedly sets the rules. Now, when you talk about a rule-based international order, it is really not security council that you are talking about, but supposedly some rules with some countries will decide is the rule-based international order. So, this whole talk about a rule-based international order really begs the question, who sets the rules? And in the U.S. formulation, obviously a few NATO countries are going to set the rules and this is, again, going back to what I would call the new colonial or the colonial era, where the quote-unquote Western powers, essentially the colonial powers and which the United States was a colonial part, particularly when it comes to the Monroe Doctrine and what it said about Latin America was clearly something which is a part of its very, very much its colonial enterprise, except apart from having colonies in Philippines and so on. So, if you take that, it is a framing back to the colonial regime times, where the international order was defined by a few Western powers. So, I think that's really the fall of Soviet Union post-1990s, the sole hegemon, the United States setting what the international rule should be. So, in the 20s today, when that hegemonic power of the U.S. has weakened, there is a multipolar world which is developing. In that to talk about international order still seems to be the belief that this can continue and I think that's an important issue that the global order has to see and talk about. The second is, of course, the formulation of the Indo-Pacific itself. And this has been going on for some time when the Obama administration talked about pivot to Asia. But when you talk about the pivot to Asia, you're still talking about the land mass of Asia, when the population live. When you talk about the Indo-Pacific, you're really talking about the oceans. And this is the Pacific Ocean and here you have the Indian Ocean. Now, this, why would you talk about Indo-Pacific if you're really referring to the people of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia, which is what the people live. That's where human beings live. So, why would you talk about the Indo-Pacific? And here again, we must go to the colonial framing of the world, where you control the oceans. And by controlling the oceans and the seas, you control the land mass. And if you look at the United States, United States has looked upon itself really as a continuation of the maritime powers which the colonial powers were. And controlling the world has been largely a matter of being able to move very quickly, its troops to any part of the world. And in this, the bases make a difference. And of course, the, basically the naval forces of the United States make a difference, essentially the aircraft carriers and so on, which are really floating militarized islands, so to say. And this is why when you talk of geo-strategies, it's really the maritime forces' disposition that the United States is looking on. And that's why you keep on referring to the Indo-Pacific. Now, you know, Southeast Asia is really the Indian Ocean. You have, of course, Africa, you have Australia, Southeast Asia, all of it the part of the Indian Ocean. And then you come to the Pacific Ocean. Now, Pacific Ocean, till now, has meant really East Asia and the United States. And if you look at the United States, you can see the Alaska is where the meeting takes place. It's really between East Asia and North America because we see the marketer projection of the map. We don't see this view of the world. We forget that East Asia is actually much closer to the United States than, say, Southeast Asia or South Asia is. This is something we tend to forget. So East Asia, the US has allies. It is Japan, it is South Korea, it is Taiwan. So there are East Asia. They're engaged militarily both on the side of Japan and the side of South Korea. And of course, North Korea is one of their immediate targets. But if you look at the larger picture, you have Guam as a naval base. You have Hawaii further down closer to the US. And you have a number of small islands, Micronesian islands and so on, which the United States control. And when you come to the allies, of course, you have South Korea and you have Japan. So there is a military projection that the United States has made after the Second World War, of course, after the Korean War particularly, where they have regularly military exercises with South Korean forces, their involvement with Japan, and containment of the Soviet Union earlier, and of course, China. So this has been a much older strategy. So why is the Sigwe to Indo-Pacific? And here, the issue really is not so much South Asia because South Asia's borders with China land borders. Even if the United States wants to play a role over there, it's a very minor role it can play at the both supplying information from the satellites and so on. And that's something which is not really going to be critical in the northern border of India. So that's really not where it is coming from. And I think the real issue is Southeast Asia, what is the ASEAN countries, where Australia wants to have a play, Japan wants to have a play, and of course, the United States as the inheritor of the colonial mantle in this period. Let's not forget. The Philippines was a quasi colony. Vietnam, of course, they fought a war after the French left over there. They also had a military coup in Indonesia which massacred communists in very large numbers over there. The Malaysian, if you look at the Malaysian issue, you will realize the British fought a war against the communists over there, the left. And they left Malaysia with the communists virtually decimated over there. This is where the Vietnam policies, which the United States used later on, was actually birthed in Southeast Asia. Of course, it has origins which go away much further back in Algeria and so on by the French. But this is where the policies were developed, which later on the United States uses in Vietnam. So these are all areas where United States has a neocolonial sway, as does Australia over some parts of the islands over there. So they are essentially looking at ASEAN, which is 700 million people. If you take the economy of ASEAN, it's bigger than India. If you put all the countries together, and it's an economic power, its economic power is growing. So this is where the United States wants to have a play and is not able to have a play right now because it doesn't have any really allies in that region. All the ASEAN countries don't want to be stepping in between the United States and China. The fact that the RCEP has been signed, the trade agreement has been signed, this was again trans-specific agreement was there, the TPP with the United States stepped away from and that left the ASEAN with essentially no counterbalance to the economic strength of China. And they know they need the Chinese economically. And that's true for Japan as well. That's true for South Korea as well. So they don't want to be really a part of a strategic alliance against the United States, except for Japan and South Korea who already are aligned and of course Taiwan, which is, as you know, part of PRC officially, politically, but nevertheless as an independent entity. So you can see the United States using all of these levers as well as India to try and see whether they can at least keep the ASEAN in play. And I think that's where the real, the interpretation of the Indo-Pacifics to be seen, not in terms of the oceans, but in terms of what needs to be done, how to really have a play in the ASEAN countries. And if you see the Quad statement, it doesn't talk militarily too much. It does talk about the law of the seas, the United Nations Convention on the Law of Seas and how that should be also observed with of course the international order, the law-based international order. There is a rule-based international order and it's also interesting because the rule-based is not the law-based order because in the U.S. has not signed the uncloss which it's courts. When it courts the United Nations Convention on Law of Seas, it is not a treaty that the United States has signed. So therefore that is why they have to add the rider that this has to be seen as a part of the rule-based international order because that's where they claim their observance of, not the uncloss, but of the rule-based order. So if you look at all of that, their vaccines become important because none of the Southeast Asian countries, the ASEAN countries really wants to have military alliance with the United States to find China, the South China Seas. Let's look at the map simply. South China Sea is here and the United States is over there, long distance away. So how they're going to ensure the passage of ships in this region is left, everybody understands much better than the countries themselves. They don't really want U.S. now to step into these areas and particularly given the economic relationship that is developing. So the vaccine diplomacy therefore is playing a role essentially because the United States is not able to or willing to, not able is not the right word, is not willing to provide vaccines to anybody in the world. They're sitting on 10 million doses of AstraZeneca vaccine more in the pipeline. They don't want to share it, except now they've said some doses will go to Mexico and Canada, nobody else. So they're not even willing to give vital equipment or products that the vaccine manufacturers need. For instance, in India to supply to the rest of the world because they have now got the Korean War Act which was created at that time to say that our needs first. So the whole principle of it is that we will supply our market first and because Pfizer needs supply, so therefore their privilege by Pfizer supplies over anything that comes to AstraZeneca or to Biological E, which is the one which is going to produce the other vaccine, which is their Johnson and Johnson's vaccine. So which is also something that's going to be produced in India. So what you see is therefore to, can we put AstraZeneca vaccine with Serum Institute of India at play and then supply to ASEAN countries, Southeast Asia so that at least there is a competition to China and Russia, because let's face it, China is willing to share vaccines while it is carrying on vaccination in China. It is not taking the position we'll vaccinate entire Chinese population first, then only we'll give it to others. They are sending vaccines all over the world. I think about 40, 50 countries are taking Chinese vaccines, probably more. And similarly, Russians vaccine, the Sputnik 5 vaccine from Gamalaya Institute is also now being given to 40, 50 countries in the world. So clearly there is a huge demand for vaccines. The world is not able to meet right now. And given the fact that Serum Institute is the biggest vaccine maker in the world, followed by again there are four or five of them which are quite large in India. India is going to be a vaccine player. So that is why you see the Quad Declaration mentioned vaccines because while the military issues may be there, the point is the world is facing a pandemic and if the United States is not able to or willing to help anybody, it wants India to play that role. And that is why the segue from in the Pacific, rule-based order to finally vaccines. This is really a part of the larger vaccine nationalism of the United States coupled with the vaccine war against Russia and China that we are seeing. And I think the Indian declaration, of course India has also been willing to supply vaccines to others while continuing its own vaccine drive. I think India has not fitted in with the military part of containment of China. It sees very clearly that there is not much to be gained from the oceans on that, but it is willing to play footsie on this issue with the United States and its larger geo-strategic vision of containing China with at least the vaccine drive. And it is true that Indian vaccines are the largest amount in the world today. 60% of the world's vaccines come from India. So therefore it is a big player. So can they play that role? Will that mean keeping Russia and China out of ASEAN? I don't think so. I think it will be seen by most countries as complementary. They're gonna take vaccines from whoever can give them. And I would say that's only sensible approach in the world that you can have. And the fact that you're trying to run down each other's vaccines. And now you see the war of words between the Western European, the European Union and UK as well about AstraZeneca's vaccine. How is it good? Not good. In fact, the AstraZeneca's vaccine has taken a bit of a knock in Europe. All of this also is fueling the European, shall we say, vaccine nationalism in Europe. And you can see that between playing between UK and the European Union. As well the fact that the European Union has supplied vaccines to the United States but it is not able to get anything in return. So I think all of these are going to play up in the coming days. And I think the real issue is we have to remember we are fighting a pandemic. We have to fight the pandemic as humanity and we have to fight it together. The way the United States is strategizing using vaccines as an instrument of global domination as well as protecting itself without having any consideration for the needs of others, including the fact that this is a very integrated supply chain. The world needs goods to move from one part of the world to another. No country by itself can have the whole supply chain. So the fact that they're not willing to talk about it I think is very interesting, very important. And I think it shows the kind of US exceptionalism vision that they have, that they by themselves will decide everything. And I must say the last part on this is the fact that you have the countries like India and South Africa along with huge number of developing countries have raised the issue in WTO. There is idle vaccine production in the world. It can be hard as to producing vaccines the world needs but it needs then the WTO, the trips agreement to be weakened temporarily so that any country can use its idling vaccine production for producing vaccines of any kind. And that knowledge should be shared among countries so that this can be done. You know, Sanofi's vaccine failed but they have idle production capacity in Europe. They can't use it at the moment. So like this, these are the things that one needs to do urgently instead of focusing on this kind of sterile vaccine nationalism vaccine war and talk about the Indo-Pacific and not talking about the people. I think that's the key takeaway from this that we still have the focus today on how to play what I would consider a zero sum game that their benefit is my loss, my benefit is their loss instead of at the moment considering that humanity's fight today is against the pandemic, against the virus. And the longer you delay it, the more the risk to every country is and as long the pandemic stays, the economy is not going to grow. You're not going to be able to address issues of poverty, issues which are really what everybody is facing. And I think that is the unfortunate takeaway from this. The vision of the United States is still on geo-strategic competition. Even facing a pandemic, they're not willing to lower this part of their vision to address what is the common problem of humanity against the virus. And I think that's the unfortunate takeaway that that situation hasn't changed and that both the court statement and what we saw in Anchorage seems to bear this out. Absolutely. Thank you so much Praveen for talking to us. That's all we have time for today. Keep watching NewsClick.