 My name is Barry Kalfour and I'm very pleased to welcome you to this IIA webinar on Pandemonium Europe's COVID response. And this is my first webinar as the incoming director of research at the IIA. I'm thrilled to be taking up this role and I'm looking forward to interacting with many of you over the months and years ahead. We're delighted to be joined today by Luc Van Midler, a professor at Leiden University, who will speak to us today on the subject of COVID-19 pandemic and what it means for Europe. Professor Van Midler or Luc, as he's told us to call him, will speak to us for about 20 minutes, maybe a little more, and then we'll go to questions and answers with the audience. I'll introduce Luc and his topic in a moment. You'll be able to join the discussion during the meeting using the Q&A function on Zoom and I encourage you all to do so. Please feel free to send questions in throughout the session as they occur to you and we'll come to as many of them as possible. When asking a question, please remember to state your name and your affiliation if you have one and if you feel that it's relevant. A reminder today as well that today's presentation and questions and answers are both on the record. Please also feel free to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIA. I'll now formally introduce Luc, Professor Van Midler, and hand over to him then. So Luc Van Midler is the Professor of Foundations and Practice of the European Union and its institutions at Leiden University, and one of the world's foremost experts on European politics. He's a member of the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs and Chair of its Commission on European Integration, as well as an unpaid Special Advisor to European Commission Vice President, Franz Timmermans. He writes a column, and indeed he writes prolifically, and a column on European International Affairs with the Dutch newspaper NRC Handersblad. And as the author of several books, including Politicide, 1999, The Passage to Europe in 2009, Alarms and Excursions Improvising Politics in the European Stage in 2019, and indeed his latest work which you'll see over Luc's right shoulder. Pandemonium Saving Europe with Agenda Publishing 2021, which Luc will refer to today. Professor Van Midler, Luc, thank you again very much for being with us and the floor is yours. Well, thank you, Barry, for this kind introduction and to the IIA for this really nice invitation to speak, even if it's over Zoom, it's a pleasure to be with you. I was in your offices, I think, three years ago for another event, which was also book related at the time. But I know very well that around your institute it is a really vibrant community of people interested in and engaged and experienced in European and international affairs so very pleased to be able to address this audience. And indeed the new book, Pandemonium Saving Europe, is a kind of sequel to some extent to the book I discussed with some of you three years ago, Alarms and Excursions. That one was on Europe's decade of crisis from the Eurozone to migration and Brexit and Trump and Russia as well, I'm afraid, ready back then. And this book in a way takes up the story of Europe's response to COVID. So it's only one crisis, it's a shorter book therefore it's, and it also offers a kind of synthesis of some of my previous ideas, including from from the passage to Europe. And maybe I do take the opportunity here to thank my translator, Liz Wotze, I've originally written the book in Dutch, but like my previous work, it has been beautifully translated by by her we work hand in hand. Normally I don't always mention this but I know in Ireland you are if I may say so a nation of keen readers of books. So, and I know you attach importance to style and pace, which is something dear to my heart as well that say as an altar, which is what I feel at heart. So what I want to do in indeed in the next 20 minutes or so as, as Barry suggested, is to address three points first, give you a kind of overall take of the books claims, and what it does. Then I want to take up as points two and three to more focused points one related to public opinion, and the role public opinion played in this specific crisis. And as a final point, the geopolitical dimension of this crisis, and that will also allow me to say a few words on situation of Ireland to the extent I dare venturing there but but but but I think it would be nice to to close there and to open also the discussion with all of you to which I'm very much looking, looking forward. So first therefore on what does the book bring and why indeed a book on on this crisis. And a fascination fascination with these moments of of turmoil is is not by by some kind of of pessimism or voyeurism or whatever, but it is my conviction that as a political analyst, you can really learn a lot of a political body. These are moments of truth, after all, just like in in private life, you may sometimes get to know your, your friends better at a moment of trouble, the same is true in a way in public life. And you also get to know forces weaknesses and strengths of of political bodies during crisis. In a way, the starting point for me for for writing pandemonium was the very sharp incredible contrast between the outbreak of the covert pandemic, February let's say 2020 very bleak moment for all our nations but also for the European Union as a whole contrast between that moment, bitter moment, and the relatively robust response, pretty soon as of the summer of 2020. Now, I'm, I have no doubt you will have very, very sharp memories of these early stages of the crisis locally. So in a way experience it here from Brussels, where I'm sticking very locally. I mean there's a window there on one end of the street. There's a hospital on the other end of the street. There's a church where a lot of bells were told in those days and a lot of ambulances coming by as well so so it was a very local experience but very soon I was also drawn into this common European experience and to just briefly remind you of that bleak moment of February 2020 this this this were the moment when we got footage from rumors from hellish scenes in hospitals in northern Italy and Lombardy, where, according to rumors people were dying in the corridors, the moment when they asked for help to its European neighbors to Brussels and where no help came comparable stories from from Spain and other member states. Borders were closing which for some people in the US is very traumatic and pretty soon and almost without surprise. There were stories of imminent economic disaster mass layoffs, maybe the euro would come on the pressure, etc. So, as of late March 2020 people already started predicting the end of the EU or of the eurozone, as in previous cases, most notably the eurozone crisis to some extent migration crisis as well there was a, again a chorus of profits of doom, predicting the end of the EU. A very bleak moment bitter approaches among member states as well because there was this lack of solidarity, public opinion very disappointed, and therefore, it is rather remarkable. So, quickly, the situation turned around, you could see and feel things moving from from Easter 2020 April, May and by summer 2020 to very big almost revolutionary decisions of a joint response had been taken by EU leaders in close cooperation with the Commission. The first one was related to public health, and it was a decision to jointly procure the vaccine. This was June 2020. This was very unexpected. Because at the start of the crisis, the story in and around Brussels was that the EU had no competence in the field of public health so this was a very horrible suffering and a human tragedy for many many people but unfortunately this was more or less the official line of the EU could not act in the field of public health. And here we were for five months later the EU itself the Commission of President von der Leyen was going to procure the vaccine for 450 million EU citizens in a way it was going to provide the light at the end of the tunnel so that that was a remarkable turnaround. And formidable decision obviously was taken in the summer of in July 2020 decision in principle at the time to establish a Corona recovery fund, what took some 36 months to work that out that allowed in legislative detail and but meanwhile as we are now again half after these funds have been started to to be dispersed to member states, and it was in that decision that Germany in particular, the Federal Republic crossed two big red lines in the German Monetary Debate, because Chancellor Merkel accepted to the idea that the Commission would raise money on the markets. So it kind of Euro bonds, which were completely taboo during the Eurozone crisis and about which she Merkel had said that something like that would not happen in her lifetime. Probably she meant in her political lifetime, but nevertheless, it was crossing a red line. And also second red line these the money as you know will be distributed almost without conditions so it was these were grants and loans, and that really sounded a little bit like the transfer union the Germans never wanted. So that was my starting point, very bleak outset and remarkable response resilience dynamism, how can we, how can we explain that. How can we explain such a thing. Yes, there's two types of, of answer I will offer here. And one, and that's still let's say part of the general take of the book is to say well, this crisis is is one in a series. It's not the first very difficult period, the European Union is going through, and you collectively learned from previous crises. Well, I don't want to get too detailed here but but but for those of you are familiar with with the with the Eurozone and economic financial operations. They will remember that that the response of this crisis could also draw on the institutions that have been built a decade ago. When I worked for European Council President Herman van Rompuy in the years 2010 2014. These were the, the old two hectic and dramatic years of the Eurozone crisis I remember in the early days. Van Rompuy, a former Belgian budget minister and prime minister was often complaining that in Europe for the euro there was an empty toolkit. And he as a politician he won some some tools whatever a hammer and there was nothing in the toolkit and 10 years on. There was an is a European stability mechanism, which has been used even if there was some political drawbacks to that as well in the central bank, which needed two years almost in your crisis before it finally acted decisively just took a few weeks here to to step in and to take this crisis and so do I will do examples. So, in a way and in this crisis that that is one of my thesis. The European Union continues its overall transformation or metamorphosis from a set of institutions, originally built to to construct a market to build a market, and to do what I call rules politics to a political body, able to deal with crisis with certain events, and to engage in what I call events politics. So you, you go from rules politics to still doing that, because the market remains very important we'll come back to that, but also doing and able to do events politics. Now I could very quickly break that down in a few differences to for those of you are perhaps less familiar with with this overall view. I mean one key difference obviously is the element of time and of speed. So we're talking about making rules for the internal market. It's a matter of negotiations, slow, careful patient negotiations between member states, institutions, stakeholders, etc, where it can take years between the start of a legislative proposal and and the day it will finally end in the Union's official journal up to seven years. When we talk about crisis politics. It can be in some instances were just a matter of two three days for you to come up with response going back to the euro crisis again. On the weekend in May 2010 when you had 72 hours to find 750 billion euros somehow in a series of frantic phone calls and emergency summit on the Friday evening. A legislative proposal done by the Commission on the Sunday for the first time in history of the Commission before the markets were opening on in Asia on Monday morning. And that during the migration crisis as well. So completely different time that different experience and perception of the public as well. Whereas internal market is can be pretty boring stuff very important obviously a lot of financial projects for those who are in it. The companies or NGOs, etc. But rather far away for for citizens, whereas in in the crisis big crisis there. And sometimes about a lot of money, tax pay is money about austerity measures. Sovereignty and identity, think about migration membership of the you, Brexit. And then there's a huge news day after day and and and I know in Ireland as well, Brexit of course resonates, particularly perhaps more as it's all that was far away than than the migration crisis and so has has zero zone crisis over a decade ago. Now as a result of both the dimension of speed and public expectations. I think you can also see a change of cost. That is to say that alongside the traditional Brussels casting of commissioners and ministers in their various councils and MEPs in crisis politics, you also see heads of state of government entering the stage. Chairman, Chancellor, French President, our T shock, the Prime Minister, etc. They collectively take a lot of these important decisions and some of the interaction you also saw during the pandemic interaction between European Council leaders and commission from the line in particular. So that is one answer. Coming back to that, why the union was able to react relatively quickly to the pandemic because of learning experiences in between and because the union is no longer the same as it was back in 2005 or 2007 at the very first economic and financial crisis. Now there's a second factor and this brings me to the. Also to the second point of what I, what I promise to you, that is the role of public opinion. I'll try to be relatively brief about that so we have a bit more time for the for the geopolitical dimension but but I do think, and I bury if you want I can expand more during the Q&A but I do think there was a really unique feature of the pandemic and of the COVID crisis. And that is that it was a public call for action, which stirred the political response so it was almost a bottom up thing there was this public outcry from Italy, Spain, France and elsewhere beginning that Europe somehow had to act. Even if I guess in minds of people was not necessarily, necessarily clear who would that be institutionally and all that but this crisis was so overwhelming. It was clearly also nobody's fault. It took place against the backdrop of, of, of big global forces early on already you could see China and positioning, etc. That people wanted Europe to act. And there were sort of was this this call for action, and it was also heated in particular by Chancellor Merkel, who heard that call, and who decided and I think that this this is really decisive that because of the nature, the unique nature of this crisis of public health, the human suffering, the dimension of life and death, even Germany, in particular, could not afford to again play the rule of the Scrooge of the Plop, or the master of discipline and austerity and that Germany had to step in and that was one of the key moments in this whole crisis and as a result, I think the, the power configuration in the European Union in particular in the economic and financial affairs has dramatically changed. And I think maybe just going one last time briefly back to the financial crisis. Because of crisis there was clearly it was top down measures, the decisions that were taken be it on reforms or austerity or solidarity. They were asked for by economic experts by central bankers and government leaders took these decisions against their will and they had to almost push them through very reluctant parliaments and public opinions. That is new, and that I think really accelerated the political action is public opinion dimension. Now let me spend to conclude a little time on on the geopolitical dimension because that is, in my view the other really fascinating novelty of this crisis. The Europeans during the Europeans as a whole and not just your as in you related the people on the European continent, let's put it very broadly experienced a new and completely unexpected vulnerability. In terms of public health, because a crisis like this a infectious disease. It's simply not supposed to happen on the European continent. This was, let's say for far away Asia for Africa. Think of SARS or Ebola that was not supposed to happen in our welfare, modern states, etc. So it was a moment of vulnerability but not only in terms of public health. It was also geopolitically. It was a moment, what I call in the book of geopolitical loneliness of solitude. Europeans felt alone. On the one hand, we saw early on China coming in with its by now famous mask and vaccine diplomacy when Italy asked help to its European partners late February 2020 I mentioned this non help came. It was the Chinese Red Cross, which landed a plane full of medical material on an airport around Rome. And not a Milan which was the center of the crisis and the stressing even the diplomatic importance of this action. So China in a way has entered the public awareness as a as a geopolitical actor of the Europeans of obviously in crowds like the ones we announced here among foreign and the European policy expert, China had been there. But for the public at large, I would say China is now an actor. But it was also looking at the other side of the globe, the United States, which was less engaged or to put it less diplomatically, which was nowhere to be seen. And which was as your own fintano tool put it in a memorable color, which was an object of pity. For the first time probably in the in the history of the US. The US was an object of pity in particular, at the moment when President Trump recommended his citizens to to to take some bleach to cure, or to be better protected against the virus and dozens of Americans went to the hospital after they had searched under their own sinks for for some some ad hoc medication. Now, as a result of that moment of of geopolitical loneliness. In a way you lead us to the third big decision. The vaccines and the government recovery fund was less concrete, maybe then those two but still conceptually very important, they endorsed the concept of strategic autonomy. This is October 2020 European Council for the first time. This concept of strategic autonomy or strategic sovereignty as it is now called in the German coalition government agreement was endorsed until then it had always encountered a lot of resistance. In particular, by defense ministers because it was considered to be anti American implicitly or anti NATO. But now as a result of of the pandemic in a way this this concept has been taken from the pure security defense field into economic policy economic security industrial policy, more widely. Of course the pharmaceutical vulnerability the lack of mouth masks in Europe was the immediate cause of this change, but it's going much farther than that. And indeed it will have ramifications for for EU economic policy, much more widely and may even challenge the EU's traditional open stance on World Trade and open stands which I know is cherished by Ireland. And also if I may say so by my own country, the Netherlands, even if I'm speaking to you from from Brussels, obviously I follow closely what's happening in and run the Hague. Now, briefly, it's good to remind ourselves that this strategic autonomous decision or this concept was not the only one being put forward at the same time. Because the two other great economic powers in the world, China and the US took more or less simultaneously same conclusion. The Chinese President Xi Jinping developed from May 2020 as well, the concept of dual circulation which is more or less the same thing making a difference between the, the domestic market for China and the market with the rest of the world where state help in a way state support for enterprise but also then candidate Joe Biden in July 2020 made exactly the same analysis as part of his election campaign that the United States needed to be more resilient in terms of supply change and he promised to take action and he has done sense. So, and of course, this is not just a pandemic this is taking place against the global backdrop of the US China rivalry, where not just pharmaceutical material but a lot of industrial production is, is, is part of, of a global fight on supremacy, be it semiconductors or rare earth or 5G, etc. And so, when we look at the, at the EU more particularly it's therefore important to realize that this is, this is a wider global movement, almost of economic and industrial reorientation which will get all kinds of policy consequences in the in the Brussels system but these forces, they will remain with us. The pandemic has accelerated them, maybe brought them to light some extent. But they will remain with us. And therefore, it is not. It's not just about the European Union post Brexit. I'm not saying that here, but it is almost about the European Union after the end of Pax Americana, or at least after a global multilateral etc order which has been with us since 1945 so the rupture or the is is much more fundamental. So please, it's 230 berries so we'll stop here, but what I will offer an answer to some of your questions I hope is a comparison between Ireland and the Netherlands in this respect which which may be instructive for you and how to relate to these changes but but at this point I, I don't want to speak too long so please over to you and to the federal audience.