 I welcome members to the 27th meeting in 2015 of the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee. As always, I ask members to switch off mobile phones, please. Agender item 1 is a decision on taking business in private. It's proposed that the committee takes item 7 to 12 in private. Item 7 will allow the committee to consider further the delegated powers contained in the Land Reform Scotland bill. Item 8 will enable the committee to consider further the delegated powers provisions in the Higher Education and Governance Scotland bill. Item 9 will allow the committee to consider a draft report on the community justice Scotland bill to the Justice Committee. Item 10 is for the committee to consider a draft report on the health, tobacco, nicotine and etc. in care Scotland bill to the Health and Sport Committee. Item 11 is a report on the work that the committee considered during the parliamentary year 2014-15. Item 12 will allow the committee to consider the evidence received on the Succession Scotland bill today and in previous weeks. Does the committee agree to take these items in private, please? John Finch-East, although I agree, convener, I just say about item 7, the Land Reform Scotland bill. I would like to put on the record that I'm concerned in a way that perhaps this is one of the most incomplete bills ever considered by our Parliament. There are many, many policy areas still under development, I think about five. We as a committee exist to scrutinise and we cannot do so when so much is not available for scrutiny. In several areas there are potentials to breach ECHR and therefore I'm extraordinarily concerned about this bill, fundamental weaknesses. Thank you for those observations, which we will consider when we get to item 7. With that then, we turn to agenda item 2, which is the Succession Scotland bill, and we are today receiving oral evidence from the Scottish Government in the persons of Paul Wilhous, who is the Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs. Good morning, Minister. Joe Clark is the team leader of civil reform unit, and Catherine McGregor let's solicit a constitutional on civil law. Good morning again, ladies. You have been intelligent observers of what has gone on in the past. Minister, I think that you might want to make an opening statement. I would be grateful, a very brief one, convener. I would like to thank the committee for inviting me today to give evidence on this bill. I welcome the fact that it has been recognised that this bill will make the law on succession fairer, among consistent and that such reform is perhaps overdue. The committee is well aware of the approach that we have taken in respect of this work. Progressing the law in two separate pieces of legislation and consecutively has the benefit of not causing any further delay on a set of uncontentious reforms and ensuring the level of scrutiny that the bill deserves. The advantages in this approach we feel have also been recognised by other witnesses. Taking forward two potential pieces of legislation in quick succession begs the question about consolidation, and that is certainly something that we will consider in the context of any future bill in this area. I have been very impressed by the careful questioning of the committee, which has helped to tease out a number of issues, particularly around the inclusion of a guardian within section 1 provisions, some of the jurisdictional issues, the clarity of uncertainty as it relates to the survivorship provisions and whether or not section 3 relating to the rectification of a will should be extended to home-made wills. On this latter point, I have to confess that I have been unaware of the range and extent of the DIY will market and the growth in online templates. There are also differences in the services offered by those sites and whether or not it includes a solicitor who ultimately drafts the will. It is only right, though, as the committee has highlighted, that we take account of technological changes when formulating our policy. Similarly, it has been very interesting to follow a debate around some of the terminology that I mentioned above the term uncertain. While I am clear that Lord Wheatley has helped to put the term beyond doubt, I very much agree with the sentiments expressed by the committee that legislation should not just be for the legally qualified, but that we need to sense-check things. In this regard, at least, I think that there is clarity—I hope—about uncertainty, if that is not to confuse matters, and that the concept is one that the majority of people can understand. That is why, on these particular issues and a number of other points highlighted, we are continuing to reflect on whether or not the bill requires amendment and we are open to further views on any of those issues. Finally, as a bill subject to the Scottish Law Commission procedure, I would of course be interested in the committee's views on any changes that took the provisions beyond those set-out as recommendations in the 2009 report on succession. My officials will be very pleased to take any questions. Thank you very much for that brief statement, which covers some of the areas that I am sure colleagues will want to question you on more closely. I think that you have already covered the issue of whether or not you would want to consolidate this. Certainly, that is something that we, as a committee, would want to encourage the Government to do. Generally speaking, we would want to encourage the Government to consolidate the law anyway. Can I ask therefore how you feel about the issuing of guidance? Clearly, this is an issue that is going to affect the general public as well as practitioners, and is indeed the case that every one of us should make a will. How can these changes and others be put in front of the general public so that they understand the need to act? I think that that is a very important point. As I said in my opening statement, I think that to make law as understandable as we can, you do not have to be legally qualified to understand what your rights and responsibilities are. I share the view that it is important to make provisions in the bill accessible to the public. We are therefore considering carefully how we can use our succession website and succession publications to disseminate the changes in law in an easy-to-understand way. In addition, should there be further changes to the scheme and succession in Scotland, we will consider other methods of dissemination aimed at getting the information across more widely. We will also include those changes as part of that work. I also want to draw the committee's attention to the documentation that we produce, which is called what to do after death, which could be updated and refreshed to make that current as well. That is advice that is available to members of the public in the event that they suffer a bereavement. We are also grateful for the kind offer made by the Scottish Law Commission to help to produce any guidance that may be necessary to ensure that lay people and not just legal practitioners understand the law once the bills are enforced. It is tempting to suggest, minister, that there should be a rather more important document called what to do before death. That has actually affected all of us and there are some inevitabilities in life. On that wonderful note, I wonder whether we can go to John Mason to consider section 1. Thank you, convener. I note, minister, that you did refer to guardians and section 1. That was really what I wanted to ask you about. There are provisions in Wales appointing guardians and that is included in the scope of section 1. As a committee, we have heard various arguments suggesting that, in fact, that this should not be the case. Some of those arguments have included, for example, that step-parents might have to report a resort to expensive and time-consuming court action and that it would introduce an inconsistency in the law when compared to the approach to guardianship provisions in deeds other than wills. I wonder whether you can tease out for us what the rationale was for including the provisions in guardianship under section 1. Given what you have heard in the evidence that we have had, are you still content that this is the correct approach? I am grateful that John Mason has brought this issue up because it is a very important one. We are continuing to reflect on the views that have been expressed about whether the appointment of a former spouse or civil partner as a guardian of a child should be set out as an exception to the section 1 rule. That would only be the case where one of the parents has accepted the child or children as part of the family and do not have parental rights and responsibilities already. On one hand, the Scottish Government shared the view of the Scottish Law Commission that it must be assumed on divorce that, as legal separation, sever all ties between the testator and their spouse or civil partner. It was not the testator's intention for them to be appointed as the guardian of the child unless they have made express provision in their will under section 1.3. That, in our view, provides a more equitable outcome, which is more likely to be in line with the testator's wishes. Having said that we have acknowledged the concerns raised in evidence to the committee that, as the appointment of a guardian can be made not only in a will but in a separate documentation that there is a risk of treating guardians differently according to what documentation has appointed them. We are continuing to think very carefully about the equity of this approach and whether, in these circumstances, the remedy of an application to the court for guardianship is proportionate. I appreciate the significance of the issue, but step parents or civil partners or others who have been in a situation in which they have had a role with a child and that we need to continue to reflect on those matters and consider whether we need to make any changes to the bill. I appreciate your comments. There is just a feeling that families are becoming more complex these days and step parents are quite a regular feature now. I do not think that it is that exceptional that something like this could turn up. I recognise that in my own family indeed, so it is certainly a common feature of society today and we need to reflect the modern society that we live in. I take that on board that point. What about the fact that there are other deeds that affect guardianship? Is this, in fact, the right bill to bring all of this into? We certainly think that the bill is making some important and largely technical adjustments that bring it into line with current experience within society. As to whether it is the best vehicle, we are looking at a more fundamental succession in a separate consultation as the member is aware. We have opportunities to look again at issues in the near future, but I believe that the measures that are in here are proportionate and are largely uncontentious. We will take forward the law succession in the interim, and we will withstand any subsequent succession bill as well. Our committee has heard mixed views about what point section 1 should take effect from arguments in both sides have made reference to what is more consistent with the broader framework of private international law and what is more challenging in practical terms for practitioners to deal with. Can you explain what process the Government went through in order to formulate its approach as set out in section 1? Is this in respect to specifically the domicile issue that Mr Scott is referring to? The Scottish Law Commission was of the view that, in order to provide an appropriate link with Scotland, the rule should apply where the testator dies domiciled in Scotland, regardless of where the divorce, dissolution or annulment took place. As long as it is recognised in Scotland, we agree with the view of the Scottish Law Commission in that respect. The rationale for the approach is that the provision relates to the law succession and that, therefore, makes better sense for domicile at death to be the determining factor. I note that the committee has taken evidence on this point and received a mix of responses. We were encouraged that both Professor Crawford and other specialists in private international law agreed that the domicile at death was preferable, and they helpfully pointed out the link to subsection 5 and the requirement for the divorce to have taken place within the United Kingdom or otherwise to be recognised in Scotland. We consider that the combined effect of a divorce recognised in Scotland and the person who is domiciled in Scotland at the point of death is a sensible rule that provides the necessary connection to Scotland and is consistent with the treatment of succession law generally. Therefore, we believe that the least convener provides consistency, and hence that is the rationale for the approach that we have taken on this issue. So you are not persuaded in any way by trust bars arguments for an alternative approach in that regard? Well, we would continue to listen to the views of the committee. Clearly, if the committee has strong view that counters the position that we have taken today and that of Professor Cruthers and Professor Crawford, we will listen to that view. However, as it stands, we believe that this is the correct approach that can be around in Mr Scott. Thank you for putting the Government's view on the record. Clearly, we will shortly be reflecting on the totality of the evidence and if we feel that we need to impress something else on you, we will say so. Could we now turn to the courts power to rectify the world with Richard? Thank you, convener. Good morning, minister. A number of witnesses have argued for both the reasons of principle and for practical reasons too that the current scope of sections 3 to 4 of the bill should be expanded to include wills, prepared by the test data themselves, including those prepared using online forms or software packages. I understand from your opening comments that you have become more aware of some of the great variety of these yourselves. Do I take from your earlier comments that you have accepted the case made for the expansion or the scope of these provisions, or what are your views on that, minister? I think that it is an important issue that Mr Baker raises. I believe that we have reflected on the views expressed by others to the committee, and I was, as Mr Baker highlighted, quite surprised at the range of options that people have available to them, in particular in relation to online templates. We have looked at a variety of websites, some of which involve a solicitor preparing a will, some of which involve responding to a questionnaire from which a will is drawn up by a will writing company and others were a template that is simply completed and printed with no third-party intervention, as such. We think that, as many of those who have appeared before the committee have said, evidence of something lost in translation between the test data and the person preparing the will is the key to this provision. Subsections 3, 1, B and D set that out, and the test data instructs what they want included in the will. Someone else prepares the will based on those instructions, and the court is satisfied that the will fails to give effect to those instructions. If there is a breakdown in communication, in a sense, it is dealing with those provisions. Some online wills would therefore be included where the above criteria are met, so if there was some dubiety as to how it would have been interpreted, were test data draws up their own will themselves, whether on paper or online, the provision would not apply, and we are content that the right outcome and the provision itself is clear on that point because there is no possibility of misinterpretation if the person has filled the will in themselves, in a sense. In terms of whether software could be considered as constituting a third party, we will continue to reflect on that point, convener. It is one that brings us firmly into the 21st century in terms of our need to think on those issues, but we think that it is unlikely that it would be the case at this point. The important fact here is the involvement of another person other than their test data, and we would, of course, be happy to add something to the explanatory notes to confirm the position if the committee feels that need to clarify it. That might well be helpful, convener, so the key issue is that there is another person at the end of the process. That is my understanding. Stuart McMillan might have a question on this point. I just wondered if I may convene to explore the nature of the other person that you are seeking to catch. It seemed, on the basis of evidence that the committee has had, that the legal professional of the view that it should be somebody who has failed to exercise the professional standards in an appropriate way. In other words, the other person that might be caught by this provision is somebody who—I am not sure that those words were used, but I will use them—who is legally qualified. Is that the way that the Government is currently seeing it? That is the first part of my question. I think that, to date—I will stand corrected by Gill and Catherine if this is incorrect—to date, in the framing of the legislation, we have not thought in those terms that the presence of someone else, if you like, to verify that the person's intent was different from what ultimately was being exercised in the will. I suppose that that is the key issue here, whether they are legally trained or not, that there is someone there to say, well, actually, I do not believe that that is what the person intended and, therefore, it is potentially possible to argue for a revocation of the provisions if they were inaccurately delivered. I take the point on board. I may be asked, if I may convene her, with your consent, to bring in Joe Clark on this point, just if there is anything that she wishes to add. The minister is absolutely right. We do not have a view that it need to be a legally qualified person. It could be a lay person. I think that it is lost in translation and whether there is evidence that would show that something did not translate as the two-stater wished. I will come back to Stewart's point about the real question. If I have heard you are right, what you are suggesting is the important bit, which is that there is a person who might stand up in court and give some evidence rather than a person who wrote something down and provided some advice and was ascribe. The evidence may not be the person. It may be that there is a draft piece of paper that shows one thing and then a final will that shows something different, but it may well be a person. I am now going to make things dramatically more complicated, because, in other parts—and we will come to discuss this—we talk about heritable property that is not within Scotland. Of course, if we turn that the other way around, there will be heritable property in Scotland, where the will that is seeking to affect its disposition was instructed and is being primarily considered by a jurisdiction outwith Scotland. I wonder how that works, because it will be Scots law and possibly the Scots courts, who ultimately interpret a non-Scotish will in relation to heritable property. How does the same issue touch on it? In particular, the example that I had in my mind is that, just as the writers of the signet have a tradition, in places such as India, where literacy levels are comparatively low, most villages will have a writer who has a public stall on the high street for their literate. I wonder how we deal with any challenge to the translation between the testator's intention and what has ended up in the bitter pepper will be dealt with in relation to heritable property in Scotland, where the will has been constructed in another jurisdiction. Or am I making this so complicated that it is an unreasonable question? Of course it is not an unreasonable question, but it would just work as it does at the moment, where someone might challenge a will and live in a foreign jurisdiction. Catherine will correct me, but the law, as it stands, will operate in the same way as it does and will continue to do so. Whatever jurisdictional standards apply, it will continue to apply. So, just to be clear then, and perhaps to close it off, that what is in this bill and what the Government might do to the bill will not remove other rectification approaches that are not covered by the bill but are covered by existing law, in particular by case law. I wonder if we go back to Richard, in whose hands—John, is this specifically on this cake? Yes, okay. Forgive me, and I'm possibly asking not an ill-advised question, it wouldn't be the first time. Is there a change in emphasis from what you said before Stuart Stevenson's last question about the weight that you're giving to the intent of a testator? Is there a change in emphasis on that? It just seems that you said that there's a piece of—if there are previous writings or something. Is that as it currently is? Or is there a change in emphasis there? I believe that if there was that, that would currently apply with the existing law. I think that we're dealing with the provisions in relation to the new technology that's available where potentially a will could be generated in the absence of a third party that may be entirely technologically driven through the software. There's no one had any intervention to be able to understand what the intent of the testator was in framing their will versus a situation where there is some other human involvement, where someone is possibly able to testify to the extent that they were sure that the testator meant something different from what was ultimately put into the will if there's maybe a fault in the software and a provision is dropped when someone actually submits it, and that's not spotted by a testator when they submit it. Potentially, I'm a hypothetical example that they may be able to say, well, actually, I know that person intended to have a provision in there and could prove it, perhaps, because they'd seen the draft notes of the person who's using to fill in the template, but I think I could maybe just confirm through Joe Clark, if I may convene out the position regarding the other writings, is similar to the current position. Yes, it is. Indeed, some of the examples that the Scottish Law Commission used in their report referred to a draft document not being picked up when it was typed up, so there's no change in position there. Well, thank you very much. If we could turn to Richard. Thank you, convener. I understand that you've given us some consideration, minister, but I think it's fair to say that there was a mix of evidence to committee on this point. Some gave evidence, including Professor Paisley of the University of Odin, about some risks and dangers of expanding the provisions of section 304 of the bill, particularly in terms of increasing number of challenges by disappointed beneficiaries on that basis. Obviously, it's something that you're given consideration, so I just wanted to know how you weighed up those arguments. Yes, and this is something that applies to the home-made wills as well. I believe that in terms of that provision, the Scottish Law Commission was persuaded by the argument that it would be very difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to satisfy a court of the need to rectify a home-made will. I guess that some issues apply in relation to online as well, but I recommend that it only relates to a will prepared by someone other than the testator. We certainly agreed that the power to rectify a will should be confined to cases where the will has been prepared by someone other than the testator, where a comparison can be made through the present, maybe, of someone or documentation between the testator's instructions and the will itself to prove that there's a discrepancy between what was intended and what was ultimately delivered. Without that, we do fear—I suspect that this is where Mr Baker is also fearful—that it's foreseeable that an entitled person may seek to raise actions disputing the terms of a will purely on the basis that they do not benefit under the will. It would be difficult to deal with that in that situation. Thank you. Finally—it's not finally an ultimate question from me, convener—in terms of how you're achieving the policy objectives that you laid out and you provided clarity there on the scope of sections 3 to 4, you said that you're going to amend the explanatory notes. Does that require change in legislation as well? Is there some uncertainty at committee in terms of achieving that policy intention after amend sections 3 to 4, or whether it's already captured there? It's going to be a question of more details in the explanatory notes. At the risk of being corrected by my colleagues, I don't believe that we need to amend the legislation to provide a change to the explanatory notes, but I'll just check that that's correct with my colleagues. Section 4, one of the bill provides that an application for rectification must be made within the period of six months following the grant of confirmation or, in any other case, from a date or the test data's death with the court having discretion to extend the time limit. A number of witnesses, Minister, argue that the time limit associated with sections 3 to 4 should run from the date of death and not from the date of confirmation and various alternative lengths of time limit that have been proposed to the committee. Given the weight of evidence that we've received on the topic, ask Minister if you're minded to reconsider the bill's approach on the matter. I would say that the response to Mr Maker's very fair point is that the basic policy is that applications for rectification should be made within a reasonable time. The six-month period was drawn from recommendation 51 of the Scottish Law Commission report. We do note, however, that the trust bar has raised concerns in the written evidence that, if the confirmation does not take place for a number of years, this may result in an application for rectification taking place after a period of six months, and others have agreed with that position that Mr Baker has indicated. The opposite view has also been set out by Elise Scobie on the basis that a will only becomes a public document on confirmation unless a solicitor voluntarily registers the will on death. We were encouraged by the view from Professor Paisley that we're an executor or other individual who willfully cause a delay in confirmation. Those would likely be circumstances in which the courts may extend the time limit on cause shown. On the basis that the court has the power to waive the time limit on cause shown, we think that the bill provisions give effect to the SOC recommendation of the rectification occurring within a reasonable time. It's worth remembering that the bill contains two potential starting points. I think that Mr Baker alluded to this, where confirmation is required, it's the date of confirmation and where it is not required, it's the date of death. For small estates, the time limit will be six months from death, subject to the court's power to waive that. I hope that that clarifies the Government's position on the issue, but I recognise that it's something that's not had a consensus. That clarifies the Government's position, and we'll go away and reflect on how we see that. I think that we then turn to John Mason on protection of third parties. The area of protection for third parties acquiring property is dealt with in sections 3, 4 and 19. Trust Bar has raised a question about that. They are arguing that there is a deficiency because there is only really partial protection offered to third parties acquiring property that might be prejudiced by a subsequent rectification. Their suggestion is that it would be better to apply sections 8 and 9 of the law reform miscellaneous provisions Scotland Act 1985 to Wales. I think that on the grounds that that would offer better protection, and there already is a lot of case law around that legislation, therefore it wouldn't be better to extend it into this area rather than doing something completely new. I just wonder if you have any thoughts about that. I do indeed, convener, and I'm grateful to Mr Mason for raising that point. A beneficiary under the will as executed is obliged under the law of unjustified enrichment to restore any bequest or the value of the bequest to the executor if he or she is not a beneficiary under the will as rectified. The aim of the measure is to ensure that the rightful beneficiary receives the property that they were entitled to and the need to protect that person's rights outweys any property rights of the beneficiary who was not entitled to receive the bequest. Trust Bar did submit that, as Mr Mason indicated, that section 9 of the law reform miscellaneous provisions Scotland Act 1985, because protection to third parties and a court may only rectify a will where the interests of a person to whom this section applies would not be adversely affected to a material extent by the rectification, and no similar protection exists under sections 3 and 4 of the bill. However, we are of the view that the bill provides adequate protection to third parties who are lying a will which is subsequently rectified. Section 3 expressly protects a third party who derives title from a beneficiary under a will that is subsequently rectified. In addition to that, the rectification is at the discretion of the court who will have regard to the rights of all those affected. Section 19 of the bill to which section 3 and 4 expressly provides third party protection. In the example provided by Trust Bar and Oral evidence last week, their concern was in respect of a person who acquired a loan for the value of the property that they were going to inherit, as it is put, and subsequently the will was rectified. As you yourself noted last week, convener, if this was a loan in contemplation of inheritance, there would be no protection against the asset, and this section does not reply. If it was after party B had acquired the title, B would be protected by section 19, 2B of the legislation. We believe that we covered the angle in terms of third party protection. I hope that that puts on record something that addresses Mr Mason's concerns. Could I just pursue that? Forgive me if I've understood it correctly. If I inherit a significant amount of money and I've actually received that inheritance from a will, which is going to be rectified and take that away, if I then set up in business in such a way as to tie up that money, which I'm then required to give back, that leaves me in trouble and my creditors around me in trouble. I haven't acquired it for value, but I have acquired it under the estate, and all sorts of packs of cards fall down because I've got to give the money back, but I've no longer got the money that I've disbursed it into a business. Is that the intention? If I may, I think that I'd probably like to reflect with colleagues on that particular example and make sure that I'm not giving a misinstruction to the committee or ill-advised response in line with Mr Scott. If I can just double-check. Perhaps a fight for me, I think, is not a misbeking addition if I bring in Catherine McGregor on this point. Please do. Yes. Sorry, if I could just confirm, is this in respect of the point where if somebody incurs debt in advance of inheritance or an assumption that they're going to inherit and then subsequently do not inherit it as a result of rectification? No, I'm thinking with you entirely on that argument, which I think we articulated last week. I'm on the situation where I have inherited it. I've actually been given my 100,000 pounds or whatever it is, but the court is going to rectify that will and I'm going to have to give my 100,000 pounds back, which I didn't otherwise have, and I've now disbursed that into a business. Not a specific asset that I can sell, but just genuinely into the working capital of whatever. That leaves, as I say, a complete pack of cards, which is going to have to fall down and there's no way I can actually raise the money. Is that the intention? That's not the intention, and certainly I had understood that section 19 would give protection to that individual and subsequently their creditors, but certainly I would like to reflect on that point and we can maybe write to committee subsequently. Sorry, my concern is that I've not given value for what I've received. I've just received it as a benefit, as a gift to me, and those around me will have given some value, but it could in the commercial world be pretty tenuous value and not just be a bit of a mortgage or whatever, which we could clearly identify. I don't think that's necessarily an unreasonable example. No, no, but it's a fair point and we'll look to see if there's any unintended consequences in terms of that particular scenario. Right, thank you very much. Does that complete John? That's fine, thank you. So I think we're then going back to John Scott on retrospective effect. Thank you very much, convener. In oral evidence, officials from the Government clarified that section 5 is intended to apply only in respect of world's revolt after commencement. Furthermore, the Government intends that section 8 will apply to documents executed on or after commencement. Trussbarr has said that it is happy with this subject that Government's intentions appearing on the face of the bill. Is the Government minded to amend the bill to reflect that? That's just to say put those intentions on the face of the bill. It's a fair question that Mr Scott raises. We will deal with the application and provisions as part of the commencement order and the commission proposed that ministers should appoint a single day for the commencement of the more extensive bill attached to its report on the basis that it formed a package that cannot sense to be broken down into smaller parts for commencement at different times. That's setting out a delegated powers memorandum. The Scottish Government considers it likely that it will also take view that provisions should be commenced as a whole. However, it considers that it is preferable to ensure its flexibility in commencement powers in case it transpires as any need for staggered commencement. That also allows for the possibility that there could be amendments made to the bill during its parliamentary passage, which might impact on approaches to commencement. On section 8 specifically of the bill implementing recommendation 60 of the SLC report, the application of the bill provisions will be dealt with in the commencement order. I hope that that reassures the member. It's not the policy intention for the section to have retrospective effect. It's the policy intention for the section to only apply to wills executed after the commencement date. Otherwise, testators wills may not have the effect that they intended at the time of drafting the will. That would require testators to amend their wills, which would be costly. Hence, the approach will take to putting the application of the provisions in terms of the commencement order and to set out the timing. I am moving now to section 6.2 of the bill, which allows the testator to state in his or her will that section 6 should not apply. Trust Bar has made a specific point relating to section 6.2 of the bill, saying that it needs to be revised to give greater clarity about the effect of a legacy of the residue in certain circumstances. What is the minister's view on Trust Bar's suggestions? We certainly looked at the issue of how section 6 will operate, perhaps if there is competing residual legacy. Where the specified legacy was a child, niece or nephew of the testator—their common law rule, forgive me, using the Latin. Conditiosi in Ciutis, Sine Libres, decessarate operates so as to prefer the descendants of that child, niece or nephew over an alternative legacy specified in the will or legacy under legacy of residue or in testacy. Under section 6, which places the rule in a statutory footing with some departures, an alternative legacy will be favoured over the descendants of the child, niece or nephew. Those descendants will, however, be preferred over residual legacy. We note, as Mr Scott has done, Trust Bar's evidence here, where he made the point, as has been identified, that the residue clause should be neutral and should not wait against the testator's deceased son or daughter so that that was destined for them to go to the grandchildren. We do not believe, as any evidence suggests, that there would be more cases being dealt with in the courts or any greater uncertainty. However, we are taking on board the comments made by Trust Bar last weekend, and we will give the matter further consideration as we approach stage 2 to see if we have to make any necessary amendments to address that. I wonder in pursuit of that, minister, whether you could comment on the comment to which I think came from Trust Bar that maybe section 6.1A should read a will identify as a beneficiary rather than names as a beneficiary. We had some brief discussion about the use of names. Convener, we certainly are. That is something that one of the issues that we are reflecting on in advance of stage 2. We do think that it was a fair point that was raised in evidence, and we will come back perhaps to the committee in writing on our view on that. Thank you. If we could now turn to John Mason on survivorship, please. Yes, convener. Sections 9, 10, 11 deal with survivorship, and I have two questions. The first is a general question. Professors Carothers and Crawford suggested that there are quite a lot of policy issues in here, and should they therefore really be included in this bill, which is not meant to be a particularly controversial bill? I just wonder whether you feel that they had a point when they said that. I recognise the complexity of the issues that Mr Mason refers to. We are of the view that this is certainly a matter that is capable of being considered under the SSC bill criteria and therefore within the context of this bill. Those recommendations met the criteria that we applied when deciding what should form the basis of this consultation. That is that they are not inextricably linked to the fundamental reform that is contained in part 2 and 3 of the SSC report, and they will therefore work with the law as it stands today and will apply equally to any new scheme of succession that may be introduced at some point in the future. That is only one of a number of policy issues that are contained in the bill, however. We are not of the view that is shared by response to our consultation that this particular policy issue is controversial. Obviously, we would welcome the committee's view on the issue if the committee feels strongly on it, but we believe that this is something that is not inextricably linked to the more substantive potential reforms that are subject to the separate consultation. Therefore, we believe that it is possible to deliver it through this bill and within the spirit of the SSC bill process. I think that Professor Paisley was supporting the bill in that that the bill should perhaps address the situation in which a family perishes together and the estate ends up falling to the crown rather than to other relatives. I think that the suggestion was made that nobody in their right mind would want the money to go to the crown and that however remote a relative was or whatever most people would prefer that, have you got any thoughts on that? I just have to be careful at this point, don't I? Well, we were persuaded that this is a matter that would benefit from further consideration. The key would be in how a rule might be framed. Currently, where an estate is in test date, the estate will fall to be held by the crown if there are no children, parents, siblings, spouse or civil partner, uncles or aunts, grandparents, brothers and sisters of grandparents or other ancestors. That is quite a lengthy list. It is worth noting, though, that the rule will apply in only a very small number of cases. Therefore, the number of cases falling into intensity, we believe, will be tiny. I think that what we need to understand is what happens to states that fall to the crown. They are firstly investigated by the national ultimus high-race unit, and then passed to the Queens and Lord Treasurer's Remembrance, or QLTR, perhaps a neater acronym. I will resort to using QLTR to administer the estate, paying any debts etc. At that point, those estates are then advertised on the website as having fallen to the crown, but we understand that, in fact, the great majority will subsequently be paid to blood relatives, so relatively few end up in the situation, ultimately, where the assets are retained by the crown. I am noting Mr Scott's point, and I am representing the crown in this respect, but clearly it would be desirable if assets could go to the family members that perhaps the person who died without a will would have hoped that their assets would have gone to family members. A further point for consideration is that a change of this nature, if it could be robustly and clearly framed, would develop or extend the commission recommendation, which might create attention in terms of remaining within the criteria for a commission stroke delegated powers and law reform committee bill. We have thought very carefully about what we could sensibly put through your own committee and reasonably put through your own committee without causing concern about lack of consultation on fundamental changes. That might not be the final word on that particular issue if it troubles us as a parliament in the future. Certainly, I would recognise that if the committee feels strongly on behalf of Parliament that further action is needed, I would look to see that, but we believe that the bill as drafted is sound in terms of the spirit of the process that we are currently engaged in with the committee, but it also gives effect to a reasonable provision. We are certainly persuaded that it is a matter of benefit from further consideration. If the committee has particularly strong views on it, we would welcome those. I think that we turn to uncertainty in the capable hands of Mr Stevenson. Thank you, convener. Minister, in your opening remarks, you referred to your Lord Weekly putting the meaning of uncertainty in this context beyond doubt. Trust Bar in particular highlighted that it would enhance the certainty if the matter of uncertainty being determined by the balance of probabilities were to be incorporated in the face of the bill. Are the Government on yourself minded to think further on that? It is a very important issue, and hence there has been some time devoted to discussing it. We certainly, in terms of the bill, provide expressly that the timing of death is uncertain when it cannot be established on the balance of probabilities of one side and the other. We do not consider any changes necessary, as no one is. It would appear to suggest that the provisions as drafted do not work legally. They do align with the approach that was taken in both the 1964 act and the Scottish Law Commission's draft bill. We believe that a very clear explanation of what uncertain means is given in the explanatory notes, and we refer to paragraph 36 specifically. The reader of the bill therefore gets the answer without resorting to the case itself. It is not always possible or desirable for legislation to state everything expressly to do so, can risk undermining the interaction between legislation and the background law in which it operates. Trust Bar made this point himself by pointing out that it is unnecessary to refer to the balance of probabilities. Mr Stevenson referred to that. Using those words might give rise to questions about the absence of a corresponding approach elsewhere in the bill in relation to questions of the evidential standard that is required to provide a legal proposition—a proof of a legal proposition, I should say. I believe that Professor Cruthers said in her own evidence that it is not always desirable to put into legislative form a rule that already operates effectively at common law. Aligning with the approach that was taken in the 1964 act ought to guarantee the same legal result, we believe, and changing the wording might introduce a new room for legal argument, for example, established by whom what does cannot mean being examples of where there might be an uncertainty created. We believe that it is consistent with the 1964 act that the approach is taken, and we hope that the explanatory notes have set out clearly what is intended in paragraph 36. In essence, minister, the standard of proof that prevails in civil courts is on balance of probabilities, and, therefore, that being the norm catches the cases that are before us in this bill. I believe that Mr Stevenson is correct, but I would stand corrected if my colleagues—no, I believe that, so that is correct. Trisbar and the Law Society also, in looking at sections 9 and 10, suggest that one should not trump the other that there may be circumstances in which both prevail. In particular, section 10.4 rules out 10.1.b when people die simultaneously or where the order of death is uncertain. It seems to me that the effect of 9 and 10 taken together is to tip wills into intestacy, where it is asserted that the will could probably be used to determine who might inherit beyond the primary people who might inherit. Are you minded to think about the interoperation of 9 and 10 in the light of the remarks that have been made in evidence to the committee so far? As ever, I will continue to reflect on those matters, and I will be keen to see the committee's detailed comments on that issue. For the record, we have listened carefully to those who have offered a view on section 10.4, including the view that it does not add anything to the bill, and it may, as Mr Stevenson indicated, or perceived to result in more cases of intestacy. It may be worth setting out, again, for the record that the intended purpose of section 10.4 is to achieve the desired policy in a situation when a test date or dies in the common calamity with one or other or more people. The policy intention is that each deceased person is to be treated as having failed to survive the other. That would have the effect that the property is not to be divided equally among their estates, as would be the case in the absence of subsection 4. However, we will give some further consideration to that point, as I say, and whether any amendment is needed. If the committee is able to give a view as to where it believes based on the evidence presented, I will certainly take that into consideration. I have set out today what our intent is in relation to section 10.4 in the situation where the deceased person is to be treated as having failed to survive the other. While it is not for me to anticipate what the committee may say, there seems to be a tension between section 10.1b and section 10.4. As a layperson, I am certainly unable to reconcile. We would want, convener, the law to be understandable and, clearly, if there is uncertainty, we will reflect on that in terms of the evidence that has been presented by the committee. That is a very fair point. The law needs to be understandable. If you need a degree in logic, as it were, to work out how on earth this is going to work when you are looking at your own family's affairs, then something has gone wrong somewhere, yes. I agree with you. It is logic and metaphysics, but I suspect that this tip is rather into the metaphysics rather than the logic. The Scottish Law Commission originally wanted to put it on a statutory footing rather than simply tweak a certain aspect of it. Does the minister think that putting it on a statutory footing rather than simply giving the courts 100% discretion, which is currently denied them, is still something that you are considering? That is a very fair question. In the 1990 report, the Scottish Law Commission recommended that the common law forfeiture should be placed on a statutory footing and, at the same time, the Parasite Act should be repealed. However, in its 2009 report, the Scottish Law Commission had shifted its position and decided not to recommend placing the common law forfeiture on a statutory footing because it was perceived that forfeiture is rare in practice. Having provision for forfeiture in the common law has not created any difficulties to date, at least. We currently share the view of the Scottish Law Commission and note that witnesses in general appreciate—not everybody may be in agreement, but in general are content with this approach. Professor Paisley suggested that the 1982 Forfeiture Act was one of the quote, terrible, one of the worst pieces of legislation ever passed by the Westminster Parliament. I think that he was seeking to make a point, perhaps, rather than—he suggested that the traditional common law, personal unworthiness that is in Scots law, is a better sense of judging who might, sensibly, by the courts be excluded from inheriting after particular circumstances. Just as a footnote, of course, the Parasite Act by no means covers all the circumstances, so I suspect that deleting it from the canon of law is not unreasonable. Again, I think that this is a very reasonable point that Mr Stevens is making. We are aware of the overall evidence on this matter. The personal unworthiness rule that Mr Stevenson referred to is considered in consultative memorandum number 71 1986, in part 2, especially at paragraphs 2 to 214. The common law is also mentioned in part 7 of the 1990 report, for instance at the end of paragraph 7.5, where examples are given of situations that might be useful. The approach of the 2009 report leaves the common law to deal with situations that are not covered by the Forfeiture Act 1982. I take Mr Stevenson's comments about the 1982 act. I will not add to them in terms of the position today, but there were no recommendations made in respect of personal unworthiness in the Scottish Law Commission's reports. We are therefore giving the application of this section to the personal unworthiness rule some consideration ourselves, and it is something that we perhaps could return to with the committee in due course. Thank you. It suggests that there are quite a few things that you might be coming back on, but that is what we are about. John. Can I just welcome that? I think that Professor Paisley raised a very unphosial point in terms of personal unworthiness. I am sure that we as a committee would want to be reassured that you have in every way considered every aspect of what he said in terms of personal unworthiness, but I am reassured by what you say. Thank you for that comment. I think that that concludes Forfeiture. I think that we are back to John Scott on protection of executives, please, in section 18. Thank you very much. In section 18 of protection for trustees and executives, there is for the first time an explicit duty on executives and trustees to make reasonable inquiries relating to possible beneficiaries. It is very clear to the committee that advertising is not part of the practitioner's current practice. Are you going to offer any guidance to practitioners who might be concerned about the potential implications of this apparent new duty in section 18? This is something that we have considered in terms of evidence provided that there is no requirement to advertise for beneficiaries in section 18, as Mr Scott indicates. It remains to be seen how the duty to make reasonable inquiries would operate in practice. The Scottish Law Commission noted in its 1990 report that the requirement on trustees and executives to make such inquiries as are reasonably necessary in the circumstances would represent, at most, a slight change in the law. On this basis, reasonable inquiries would appear to be commonly understood term. The Scottish Law Commission considered whether an express duty to advertise was appropriate, but were content that the general duty to make reasonable inquiries was sufficient. It went on to further advise that an express duty to advertise would give undue prominence to that method of pursuing inquiries. We are therefore of the view that the wording in section 18 and a quote after such inquiries as any reasonable and prudent trustee would have made in the circumstances of the case is sufficient for the purposes of the section and does not require to be defined. Ultimately, what is deemed to be reasonable will fall to be determined by the courts. We understand that it was raised in evidence by Ms Gobi that you get into a different ballgame, I believe, as a term that was used when people go or have come from abroad. In respect to this, we feel that the current wording provides sufficient flexibility to make reasonable inquiries in different circumstances. We are content with the provisions as they stand, but, as always, we will listen to the views of the committee on this matter. I hope that that has addressed Mr Scott's question. It has certainly addressed it, but, as you say, it turns on the word what is reasonable and what are reasonable inquiries likely to be. We are disappointed if it was for the courts only to decide. Of course, reasonable has many uses in law and Scott's law. I do not really know what I have to say, but I am just slightly worried that it is perhaps still not sufficiently exact. Could you extend that? You have commented, Minister, that the SLC thought that this might, if it was anything, be a slight change, but that is roughly what you said. I am just wondering if we are intending to change the law, should we not be explicit about what that slight change is? Those who knew what the law was are in a good place. Those who have to guess take advice, but if we do not know what the slight change is, then we are all in a hole. I will reflect on that point, convener, in response to clearly Mr Scott is concerned about the scope for misinterpretation. We can perhaps reflect on that as to whether that could be dealt with in either an exploratory notes or tightened up in terms of the bill itself, but we can come back to the committee on that point if I may. I could want to make before I bring Stevenson, of course, that we around this table represent the normal citizen of Scotland who might well find him or herself as an executor in a trustee without knowing the first thing, possibly quite literally unexpectedly, and always is a bit of a shock. Those people, of whom we may be some, need to have good advice without going to lawyers about what they reasonably need to do, so I think that this is an area where we aren't considering what the law says to lawyers. How does the ordinary man and woman confronted with this problem? I can certainly convener or accept that that is a reasonable position that you, Mr Scott, have taken. We need to make sure that those who do find themselves in a situation where we shouldn't forget that they are probably fairly distressed about the loss of a loved one and that the last thing on earth they need is confusion about what should or should not be done. If there are ways in which we can provide greater clarity on the point of view of the benefit of the executor as to what steps they might want to take to make sure that the appropriate advertisement was made, we will look at that and come back to the committee. I just wanted to put it to the minister that what constitute reasonable inquiries will likely change over time as certain kinds of inquiries become more practical, and indeed 20 years ago, when much less information was available to the ordinary citizen. I just give an example that three or four years ago, in a Christmas debate, we identified that there was a missing cousin in our family. I was able in 30 minutes to identify where they stayed, who they had married, the names of the children, the telephone number that they could be contacted at, and provide a photograph of their house to the member of the family who raised the subject. Where as 20 years ago it would be beyond contemplation to even initiate such an inquiry, and therefore we should be very careful, I'm sure, minister, to allow the courts the discretion to decide at the time what might be reasonable, because we can't anticipate what to be reasonable, and it might, without seeking to put your hand too far up your back, be useful if the Government were perhaps in one of the debates on the bill to express something along those lines, and if that is the Government's view of what reasonable inquiries might constitute. That's a very fair comment that Mr Stevenson has made. I think that we have to recognise that this legislation when it's dealing with something as fundamental as a loss of accession is going to be perhaps not for forever, but it's going to be for a period of time to establish legal position, and therefore it will have to take account of perhaps new possibilities. I'm just surprised that Mr Stevenson didn't mention he'd already canvassed that missing cousin as a further step taken in the 13 minutes, because I know how efficient Mr Stevenson is in that respect, but it just goes to show in the modern era how much easier it is to identify individuals, perhaps it would have been prior to the internet being established and online data sources being proliferating as time goes by. It's a very helpful example that Mr Stevenson has raised and a very serious issue that we need to reflect on to make sure that the law will withstand future change. If I might extend it and forgive me perhaps seeking the last word on this, I would merely make the point that we can't, I'm sure, and wouldn't want to take away the court's discretion to interpret the law. That's what they do, but at the end of the day the man and the woman we represent doesn't want to go anywhere near a court. There may be a balance to be struck where we keep the flexibility that Mr Stevenson has very helpfully identified that we should flag up at the same time as providing as much support as we can to those who find themselves in a situation where they are acting as an executor to understand their responsibilities and, importantly, to give them some guidance as to how to go about their duties, if that's possible. I think that we then return to the CO2 on private international law, is that right? Possibly in John Scott. Very much. Possibly. Sorry, have I jumped? 17. Is there a question about that? Sorry, I've done 17. I would have thought we'd dealt with that. I would have thought we were over the page. I will deal with international law. Thank you. Thank you. Yes. In the evidence, in particular, Professors Carothers and Crawford have suggested that the issue of domicile is not fully resolved in what's before us, in particular in relation to the distinction between movable and heritable property, where it would be useful if the Government were able to confirm that it's not the intention to insert Scottish jurisdiction over heritable property beyond our jurisdiction, where there is a local set of rules that will determine the inheritance. That might be a good starting point. And whether you might wish to make the bill clearer in that respect? I certainly will try and do my best, but I may on this point, because I know it's a fairly technical one, I may bring in my colleagues just to supplement my response to Mr Stevenson. Certainly, I know there have been points made in relation to a potential jurisdictional gap, and we're not of the view that there is one, although we do note the comments, particularly from Professor Carothers, in respect of this matter. The bill provisions apply only where the test date or die domiciled in Scotland, and recommendation 50 is implemented as far as it relates to the provisions in this bill. The policy intent is that it should only be possible to apply for rectification of a will if the test date or die domiciled in Scotland. That is reflected in the draft SOC bill, section 271. Recommendation 50 has been applied to the extent that it relates to the provisions around rectifying a will in sections 3 and 4, to which recommendation 48 restricts application to domicile, but on the point about moveable and heritable property specifically, if I may bring in my colleague Catherine MacGregor on that point. It was intended that, as a number of the people that come in evidence have said, private internationalism is a fairly complex matter. The way that the Scottish Government has dealt with it in this bill is that it is considered on a section by section basis. Therefore, in respect of heritable property, in relation to section 1, where the lost site raised the comment of whether it should extend it to herit property, and that wasn't our intention, but we have had discussions with the lost site and continue to do so in respect of that. As the minister mentioned, in respect of sections 3 and 4, the rectification was limited. I think that that was a particular point that Professor Cruthers made in respect of the jurisdictional gap and why we hadn't extended the application there to moveable property. The reason was that recommendation 48 of the SOC report, which was specifically referred to those sections, only applied that to domicile in respect of heritable property. Let me just be clear. In relation to some in domicile in Scotland—it's been determined under Scott's law—where the will has been written in another jurisdiction and relates to heritable property in the jurisdiction in which the will was written, are we saying that the Scott's process can rectify the disposition of the heritable property in that foreign jurisdiction, subject to any overriding local laws that might prevail? I'll defer to Catherine, but I think that that would be the case. I was going to confirm that. That's my understanding that wouldn't apply to the foreign movable property or heritable property referred to there. So that is basically the general principle of international law as it exists? Yes. Well, that's fine. Okay. Right, okay. If that deals with that, then I think gifts in contemplation of death section 20. We're back to John Scott, please. Professor Paisley, also supported by Professor Crellars and Trussbar, took issue with the drafting of section 20. Professor Paisley's memory described it as logically incoherent. Does the minister wish to comment on the drafting of this provision? Do you share his views or not? Perhaps I can put it in the terms that this wording is to make it clear that the abolition of the donation mortis causa as a distinct legal does not prevent an individual from making a gift subject to the same conditions in similar circumstances. That is in contemplation of death. The only change in the law is that the conditions are no longer automatic. The evidence provided to the committee appears, we believe, to overlook the distinction between, on the first hand, abolition of the special form of gift called the donation mortis causa, and secondly, a gift made by someone in contemplation of his or her death with express conditions other than in that special form. Section 51, 2 of the commission bill, was included so as to resolve any doubt that might arise on the abolition of the custody mode of gift known as a donation mortis causa, about the ability of people to make gifts subject to conditions in the sort of circumstances in which the customary mode of gift might previously be deployed. Take a breath after that. Having said that, the words of the question were not part of the SLC bill, and we will therefore further reflect on the concerns raised in evidence and whether this section requires to be amended at stage 2. It is one that we will perhaps come back to that, along with the other points that have been raised earlier. I will come back to the committee as to whether we believe that an amendment that is required to address the concerns that Mr Scott has directed me to look at. Is it drafted the way it is because you do not put inverted commas in statutes? If we were writing that in normal English, then donating mortis causa or whatever would be inverted commas? I believe that that is correct, but I will check with colleagues. It is really a matter for the draftsman, but I think that that would be the case. Or it would be italitised or something. Yes, it is italitised, but I guess that is the way we write law. It is italitised in my notes, convener, so I believe that would be the case. Okay, if that is the problem, so be it. I was going to move on to ancillary powers, but do colleagues have any other substantial questions on anything else at the moment? Right, just wondering if I could pick up the minister on a basic point, which is exercising us in general as a committee, that this statute, like pretty much every other one has ancillary provisions in section 285 happens to be it. It is drafted in terms that are not the same as other statutes, and it is entirely unclear to us on every occasion why they are in different forms, presumably because somebody thought they were supposed to have different meanings, but it usually seems unclear what those might be. Do you have any comment on these particular ancillary powers, and do you take the point that maybe we could do with the standard set of words unless there really is a need for another one? Well, certainly on the latter point, I will certainly take that away and discuss with colleagues as to whether there is a standard form of words that might make the life of committees easier in this respect. I appreciate the point that the convener makes. In terms of the rationale for having ancillary powers in relation to the bill, we note from the committee report that you accept in principle that ancillary powers provision is appropriate to this bill. Just to stress that we very much would highlight that any such powers would be exercised using affirmative procedure, and obviously the Parliament will have its chance to scrutinise in detail those provisions and ensure that they are robust and deliver the intent, the policy intent. So I hope that that gives comfort to the committee that the Parliament will not miss its chance to point any flaws in provisions that come forward. But we do believe that it is a proportionate approach here and it would avoid the necessity to use primary legislation to deliver the intent of the bill. Indeed. Thank you very much. I think that that concludes our questions. Can I thank you very much for your attendance? This has been a very challenging and interesting experience. We'll have to go and reflect on all the evidence. Thank you very much. Thank you. I'll briefly suspend to enable. Thank you very much, folk, to please. Thank you. We now turn to agenda item 3, which is instruments subject to the affirmative procedure. No points have been raised by our legal advisers on the environmental regulation enforcement measures Scotland Order 2015 draft, nor on the criminal justice and licensing Scotland Act 2010 supplementary provision order 2015 draft, nor on the private rented housing panel landlord application Scotland regulations 2015 draft. Here's the committee content with these instruments, please. Thank you. Gender item 4 is instrument subject to negative procedure. The tuberculosis-inspecified animal Scotland Order 2015 SSI 2015 327. This instrument contains a minor drafting error. Article 21 contains an OTO's definition of authorised veterinary inspector. The order refers in various places to a veterinary inspector only. Does the committee agree to draw the order to the attention of the Parliament on the general reporting ground in respect of a minor drafting error? Does the committee agree to note and accept that the Scottish Government is undertaken to remove the OTO's definition by amendment in due course? The illegal aid miscellaneous amendment Scotland regulations 2015 SSI 2015 337. This instrument fails to observe the requirements of section 282 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform Scotland Act 2010. The instrument was laid before the Parliament on 17 December and came into force on 22 September. The requirement to leave a minimum of 28 days between laying and coming into force has therefore not been complied with. Scottish Government has explained that the amendments to legal aid provision introduced by the instrument were required to be enforced as at 22 September, when various provisions of the Court Reform Scotland Act 2014 come into force. The amendments seek to ensure that legal aid provision will operate effectively in respect of, amongst other things, the new sheriff appeal court established by that act. The committee will also note that the Scottish Government has proposed to make amendments to existing legal aid provision via an affirmative instrument, which was laid before the Parliament on 9 June and was considered by the committee at its meeting on 23 June. The drafting instrument was withdrawn on 17 September, following concerns raised by the Justice Committee at its meetings on 8 and 15 September. The instrument before the committee today was laid before the Parliament on 17 September and makes substantially the same amendments as those proposed in the earlier draft affirmative instrument, but with specific changes to those proposed amendments which seek to address the concerns raised by the Justice Committee. Does the committee agree to draw the instrument to the attention of the Parliament on reporting ground J, as there has been a failure to observe the requirements for section 28.2 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform Scotland Act 2010? Does the committee agree to accept the Scottish Government's explanation for the failure to observe these requirements? No points have been raised by our legal advisers on the national health service payments and remission of charges, miscellaneous amendments, Scotland regulations 2015, SSI 2015-333, nor a mental health tribunal for Scotland on practice and procedure number two, amendment rules 2015, SSI 2015-334. Is the committee content with those instruments, please? Agender item 5, instruments not subject to any parliamentary procedure, no points have been raised by our legal advisers on the Criminal Justice and Licensing Scotland Act 2010, commencement number 13 and the Courts Reform Scotland Act 2014, commencement number four, order 2015, SSI 2015-336. Are we content with this instrument, please? Thank you. Agender item 6, the Human Trafficking and Exploitation Scotland Bill. The purpose of this item is to consider the delegated powers provisions in the bill as amended at stage 2. The stage 3 debate for this bill will take place on Thursday 1 October. The committee should therefore agree its conclusions today so that they can be captured in a report prior to the debate. Members will have noted that the Scottish Government has provided a supplementary delegated powers memorandum and will have seen the briefing paper for the committee. It is proposed that members may wish to find all your amended delegated powers acceptable. Do you members have any comments? Does the committee agree to report that it is content with the provisions in the bill which have been amended at stage 2 to insert or substantially alter provisions conferring powers to make subordinate legislation or other delegated powers? We do. Thank you very much to that complete item 6, and I now move this meeting into private.