 Section 65 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 65 The Capture of Petersburg, Meeting President Lincoln in Petersburg, The Capture of Richmond, Pursuing the Enemy, Visit to Sheridan and Meade General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the third, and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry, which was flying thick and fast there. As we would occasionally look around the corner, we could see the streets and the Appomattox Bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate Army. I did not have artillery brought up because I was sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit. At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon. Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed entrenchment into which he would throw himself, when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there, that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond and falling back into this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were together. I had already given orders for the movement up to south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee, but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have been to put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibilities of reinforcement. It would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. Such is one of the rooses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road. Accordingly, my object was to secure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that, if Lee was going that way, we would follow him. My reply was that we did not want to follow him. We wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he, Meade, believed him to be in at that time. I wanted nothing better than when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between the two rivers. All we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. That we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. I had held most of the command aloof from the entrenchments, so as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that Lee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphrey's core. Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond during the day of the condition of affairs and told him it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night if he could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch. The congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the second. At night, Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Courthouse, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road in the morning. Parks's Corps, followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to Berksis Station and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a five feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the four feet eight and one half inches gauge. Consequently, the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relayed so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. Mr. Lincoln was at city point at the time and had been for some days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing only while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so, and then I would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose and bidding us Godspeed remained there to hear the result. The next morning, after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me while I would await his arrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morning so that after the National Army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there except my staff officers and possibly a small escort of cavalry. We had selected the piazza of a deserted house and occupied it until the President arrived. About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was, do you know, General, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this? Our movements having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all my movements and the objects I had in view. He remained for some days near City Point and I communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a fixed time to cooperate in the destruction of Lee's army. I told him that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The Western armies had been in the mains successful until they had conquered all the territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond asking admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be even upon the field operating against Richmond and Lee the credit would be given to them for the capture by politicians and noncombatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead to disagreeable bickering between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in some of their debates. Western members might be throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. Mr. Lincoln said, he saw that now, but had never thought of it before because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from, so the work was done. The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss would be the loss of the cause. Every energy therefore was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. Everything else would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position no matter what territory was rested from the south in another quarter. I never expected any such bickering, as I have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections, and fortunately there has been none between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. When our conversation was at an end, Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while I and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance, up to this time I had not received the report of the capture of Richmond. Soon after I left President Lincoln, I received a dispatch from General Wiesel, which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the third, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter confusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government had left for the people to gather up. The city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation, the people had been led to believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg. Wiesel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army. There being still a great many men and even officers in the town. The city was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by someone connected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. Be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames and used every effort to extinguish them. The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into Petersburg and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads and pushed along up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over. I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the command which halted at Sutherland Station about nine miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object. But the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the roads so that it was impossible to get on. Then again our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. This caused further delay. General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into Bibwak and trying to get up some rations for them and clearing out the road so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphries, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them up through the night, but the army of the Potomac officers and men were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them, so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek and driven them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to cross. On the morning of the fourth I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing army and that they were to meet him at Farmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go farther west. By the way of Farmville I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon the road between Berksville and Jettersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place, and he thought Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly for Jettersville by two roads. After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on the Danville road, I immediately ordered Mead to make a forced march with the army of the Potomac and to send Parks's Corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad to fall in the rear of the army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. Our troops took possession of Jettersville and in the telegraph office they found a dispatch from Lee ordering 200,000 rations from Danville. The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Berksville and had it forwarded from there. In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached Danville and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. At this time Merritt and McKenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the Potomac was marching on and the Appomattox River and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. Lee entrenched himself at Amelia Courthouse and also his advance north of Jettersville and sent his troops out to collect forage. The country was very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered a great deal. Many of them were picked up by our men and many others never returned to the army of Northern Virginia. Griffin's corps was entrenched across the railroad south of Jettersville and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered me to up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. Mead, always prompt and obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphries moved at two and right at three o'clock in the morning without rations, as I have said, the wagons being far in the rear. I stayed that night at Wilson Station on the south side railroad. On the morning of the fifth I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Mead was making and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no other objective than the Confederate armies and I was anxious to close the thing up at once. On the fifth I marched again with Ords Command until within about ten miles of Berksville where I stopped to let his army pass. I then received from Sheridan the following dispatch. The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Courthouse and on this side of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. We can capture the army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Berksville yesterday and six miles beyond on the Danville Road last night. General Lee is at Amelia Courthouse in person. They are out of rations or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towards Berksville yesterday when we intercepted them at this point. It now became a life in death struggle with Lee to get south to his provisions. Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards Farmville, moved Davies' brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies found the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. He also captured five pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies and they came to his relief in time. A sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. Mead himself reached Jethersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphrey's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops as they came up at Mead's request, the latter still being very sick. He extended two divisions of his corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps and one division to the right. The cavalry by this time had also come up and they were put still further off to the left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given the enemy would get away, but Mead prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. At this junction Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man with a note from himself saying that he wished I was there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Courthouse April 5th and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. I received a second message from Sheridan on the fifth in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. This was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper and wrapped up in tinfoil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tinfoil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth to it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received. I gave ordered directions to continue his march to Berksville and there entrench himself for the night and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and Farmville. I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry going directly through the woods to join Meade's army. The distance was about 16 miles but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. However, we got to the outpost about ten o'clock in the evening and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted into where Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation for some little time. Sheridan explained to me what he thought Lee was trying to do and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. We then together visited Meade reaching his headquarters about midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy, we wanted to get ahead of him and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape and besides that I had no doubt that Lee was moving right then. Meade changed his orders at once. They were now given for an advance on Amelia Courthouse at an early hour in the morning as the army then lay, that is, the infantry being across the railroad most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. End of Section 65, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at joclev.com. Section 66 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 66. Battle of Sailors Creek, Engagement at Farmville, Correspondence with General Lee, Sheridan intercepts the enemy. The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the southwest from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad Bridge and then trends northwesterly. Sailors Creek, an insignificant stream running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jettersville. Near the High Bridge, the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing continues on the south side of it. The roads coming up from the southeast to Farmville cross the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the left. Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Courthouse, availed himself of all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. In this way, he came very near succeeding and getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia Courthouse soon encountered them. There was a good deal of fighting before Sailors Creek was reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued in which we captured many prisoners and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little engagements, as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. The armies finally met on Sailors Creek when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery, and cavalry were all brought into action. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing was also very much more rapid because the enemy commenced his retreat westward, and in firing, as he retreated, had to turn around every time he fired. The enemy's loss was very heavy as well and killed and wounded as in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the sixth, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. When the move towards Amelia Courthouse had commenced that morning, I ordered Wright's Corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army to take the place of griffons, and ordered the latter, at the same time, to move by and place itself on the right. The object of this movement was to get the sixth Corps, Wright's, next to the cavalry with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the Valley of Virginia. The sixth Corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between Berksville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the sixth, he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Berksville Station, and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had started, Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Reed, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen to overtake him and bring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. Reed, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off and Washburn confronting, apparently, the advance of Lee's army. Reed drew his men up into a line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge. This little band made several charges, of course, unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. Colonel Reed fell mortally wounded and then Washburn, and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder then surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to entrench, so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army. This stoppage of Lee's column, no doubt, saved to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon-road bridge near the high bridge and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his core and drove away the rear guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being entrenched. Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day and in a very hazardous position, he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss but was not assaulted in return. Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's courthouse, along with the fifth corps, Griffin's, oared falling in between Griffin and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmville, they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point. But our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in, again, running the trains off so that we did not get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north side of the Appomattox to join Lee and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry forwarded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve Humphreys arriving there that night. I had stopped the night before at Berksville Junction. Our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there and Ord's command was extended from that point towards Farmville. Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginia and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got across the James River, he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was lost, and they had no right to claim anything. He said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped he would. I rode in to Farmville on the seventh, arriving there early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade was back towards the high bridge and Humphreys confronting Lee as before stated. After having gone into Bivwack at Prince Edward's courthouse, Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox and determined to start at once and capture them, and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact together with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day as follows. Headquarters, armies of the United States, 5 p.m. April 7, 1865. General R. E. Lee, commanding Confederate State's army, the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself, the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate State's army known as the Army of Northern Virginia, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows. April 7, 1865. General, I have received your note of this day, though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia. I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutenant General, U.S. Grant, commanding armies of the United States. This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows. April 8, 1865. General R. E. Lee, commanding Confederate State's army, your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I would accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received. In reply, I would say that, peace being my great desire there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging, definitely, the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when I came out, I found a Confederate colonel there who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said that when he came along past home he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would not be molested. That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee's force by this crumbling process. Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of what they had been fighting for years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. Straggling had entirely ceased and every man was now a rival for the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox Station, which is about five miles southwest of the courthouse, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got there the night of the eighth and succeeded partially, but some of the trainmen had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer. The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the ninth, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near. The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. Custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards Farmville and the fight continued. So far only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps and the army of the James confronting them. A sharp engagement ensued but Lee quickly set up a white flag. Section 67 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Chapter 67. Negotiations at Appomattox. Interview with Lee at McLean's house. The Terms of Surrender. Lee's Surrender. Interview with Lee after the Surrender. On the 8th I had followed the army of the Potomac and Rear of Lee. I was suffering very severely with a sick headache and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard-plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck hoping to be cured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. But it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows. Headquarters, armies of the U.S. April 9, 1865. General R. E. Lee, commanding Confederate States Army. Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for 10 a.m. today could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed, not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc., U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two or three miles from Appomattox Courthouse at the time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in this way moving towards Appomattox Courthouse and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to Me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army and ask for a suspension of hostilities until I could be communicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of Northern Virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. They, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with Me in that time, if possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with Me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to Me. April 9, 1865. General, I received your note of this morning on the picket line whether I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose, R. E. Lee General, Lieutenant General, U. S. Grant, commanding U. S. Armies. When the officer reached Me, I was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured. I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on. April 9, 1865. General R. E. Lee commanding Confederate States Armies. Your note of this date is but this moment 11.50 a.m. received. In consequence of My having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg Road to the Farmville and Lynchburg Road, I am at this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to Me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet Me. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General. I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate Army nearby. They were very much excited and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away. They said they believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now and Lee was moving to join him and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about the good faith of Lee and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean at Appomattox Courthouse with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers awaiting my arrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill on a portion of which was an apple orchard beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation effect. As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces. Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. General Babcock of my staff reported to me that when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. The story had no other foundation than that. Like many other stories it would be very good if it was only true. I had known General Lee in the old army and had served with him in the Mexican war, but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally remember him distinctly because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in the Mexican war. When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place and consequently was in rough garb. I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, and or a soldier's blouse for a coat with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found General Lee. We greeted each other and, after shaking hands, took our seats. I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of much dignity, with an impassable face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come or felt sad over the result and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings they were entirely concealed from my observation, but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause. Though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia. At all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high, and a faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards. We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army, and I told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly. But from the difference in our rank and years, there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages, I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our meeting. After the conversation had run on in this style for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our meeting and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter. Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. This continued for some little time when General Lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, Secretary on my staff, for writing materials and commenced writing out the following terms. Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, April 19, 1865. General R. E. Lee Commanding Confederate States Armies. General, in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the Eighth Instance, I proposed to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to it, roles of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate, the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority, so long as they observe their paroles and the laws enforced where they may reside. Very respectfully, U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. When I put my pen to the paper, I did not know the first word that I should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly so that there could be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects which were important to them, but of no value to us. Also, that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. He appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed, or if he had a point to make against them, he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the United States, still maintaining by implication that we were two countries, that in their army the cavalrymen and artilleryists owned their own horses. And he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told him that as the terms were written they would not, that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. He then, after reading over the terms a second time remarked that that was clear. I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle of the war. I sincerely hope so. And I said further, I took it, that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United States did not want them, and I would, therefore, instruct the officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops, to let every man of the Confederate army, who claimed to own a horse or mule, take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. He then sat down and wrote out the following letter. Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865. General, I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the Eighth Instance, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutenant General, U.S. Grant. While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union Generals present were several Lee presented to General Lee. The much-talked-of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it, is the purist romance. The word sword, or sidearms, was not mentioned by either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation and it did not occur to me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for one of food and that they were without forage, that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I told him certainly and asked for how many men he wanted rations. His answer was about twenty-five thousand and I authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station two or three miles away where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. Generals Gibbon, Griffin, and Merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their homes. General Lee, leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. Lee and I then separated as cordially as we had met. He returning to his own lines and all went into Bivouac for the night at Appomattox. Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows. Headquarters Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, April 9, 1865, 4.30 PM. Honorable E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. When news of the surrender first reached our lines, our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exalt over their downfall. I determined to return to Washington at once with a view of putting a stop to the purchase of supplies and what I now deemed other useless outlay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought I would like to see General Lee again, so next morning I rode out beyond our lines, towards his headquarters preceded by a bugler and a staff officer carrying a white flag. Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South was a big country, and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. He expressed it, as is earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life, but he could not foretell the result. I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise a surrender of all the armies, I had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. But Lee said that he could not do that without consulting the President first. I knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. They went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. When Lee and I separated, he went back to his lines, and I returned to the house of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both armies came in great numbers and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this way, I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for Brooksville Junction, up to which point the railroad had, by this time, been repaired. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger, personal memoirs of U.S. Grant, by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 68. Morale of the two armies. Relative conditions of the North and South. President Lincoln visits Richmond. Arrival at Washington. President Lincoln's assassination. President Johnson's policy. After the fall of Petersburg and when the armies of the Potomac and the James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. There was no more struggling, no more rear guards. The men who in former times had been falling back were now, as I have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first time in four weary years, they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. On the other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the Battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Lee finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It was probably this lighter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made north and south that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March 29 and the date of surrender, 19,132 Confederates to say nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded, and missing during the series of desperate conflicts marked his headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the number of canon, including those at Appomattox to have been 689 between the dates named. There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of Union troops engaged, and belittling their own. Northern riders have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen who were thoroughly loyal to the Union speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve, four being colored slaves, noncombatants. I will add to their argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. But the south had rebelled against the national government. It was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole south was a military camp. The occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. Conscription was resorted too early and embraced every male from the age of 18 to 45, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. The old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the noncombatants, one third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex and almost without regard to age. Children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe. They were not much older when they began to hold the plow. The four million of colored noncombatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. The arts of peace were carried on in the north. Towns and cities grew during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop and in the field. In the south, no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. The press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. In the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. The furnace was in blast. The shops were filled with workmen. The fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. In the north, the press was free up to the point of open treason. The citizen could entertain his views and express them. Troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army, being released by outside force, armed and set large to destroy by fire our northern cities. Plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. The copper disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued as the Union sentiment was in the south than we were as the battle was fought. As I have said, the whole south was a military camp. The colored people, four million in number, were submissive and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. The cause was popular and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. The conscription took all of them. Before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. It would have been an offense directly after the war and perhaps it would be now to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the Confederate army. He would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did not. During eighteen sixty-two and eighteen sixty-three John H. Morgan, a partisan officer of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. The army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north from which all supplies had to come to the front. Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. These guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. Morgan was footloose and could operate where, his information always correct, led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. During the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded, and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. He destroyed many millions of property in addition. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. Forest, an abler soldier, operated farther west and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies or were on leave, sick in hospital, or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. Then again large forces were employed where no Confederate army confronted them. I deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and entrenchment occupied by the enemy. While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond in company with Admiral Porter and on board his flagship. He found the people of that city in great consternation. The leading citizens, among the people who had remained at home surrounding him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weetzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital. The President sent for him and on his arrival a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote an order in about these words which I quote from memory. General Weetzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the Confederate armies. Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. This call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the legislature of Virginia, but the body which called itself the legislature of Virginia. Mr. Stanton saw the call, as published in the northern papers the very next issue, and took the liberty of countermanding the order, authorizing any meeting of the legislature or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer the spot than he was. This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who never questioned his own authority and who always did in wartime what he wanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist, but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. In this latter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. The Constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861 through 1865. While it did not authorize rebellion, it made no provision against it. Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defense and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution was, therefore, in abeyance for the time being, so far as it, in any way, affected the progress and termination of the war. Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not restricted by constitutional provisions or any other except the acts of their Congress which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the South was then fighting. It would be a hard case when one-third of a nation united in rebellion against the national authority is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of ensuring the permanency of the Confederation of the States. After I left General Lee at Appamatic Station, I went with my staff and a few others directly to Berksville Station on my way to Washington. The road from Berksville back, having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off to track frequently and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible, I took a dispatch boat thence to Washington City. While in Washington, I was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs, communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. But, by the fourteenth, I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. I replied to the President's verbal invitation to the effect that if we were in the city, we would take great pleasure in accompanying them, but that I was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during the day, I should do so. I did get through and started by the evening train on the fourteenth, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre. At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad Street. Passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again. When I reached the ferry on the east side of the city of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival there, and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate return. It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. I knew also the feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversations against the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel and make them unwilling citizens, and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. I felt that Reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington City, but Mrs. Grant was with me. It was after midnight and Burlington was but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in Washington when I left there had been turned to grief. The city was in reality a city of mourning. I have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is, that I was right. I believed the South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness of feeling. His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, treason is a crime and must be made odious, was repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get some assurance of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. He uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, for wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides, and the Southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the Northern people, whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln I believe the great majority of the Northern people and the soldiers unanimously would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. They believed, I have no doubt as I did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest policy. The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the Union and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonist and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time were in favor of Negro suffrage. They supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the Negro, but that there would be a time of probation in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred. But Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. This was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. The Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson having gone to their side, and with a compact South and such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. Thus, Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly Republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. There being a solid South on one side that was in accord with the political party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the Negro in all his ignorance. In this work I shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of the Southern people to their own interests, as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement. End of Section 68, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock Arkansas Jim at jocclev.com