 Welcome, and I'm going to try. It's not easy. We saw it at the session on the central banks to move into the world of economics with Professor Thayer and Ambassador Fin. But given the very dramatic and tragic political events, of course, all the minds are concentrated on these issues. But we have to also remember that at the end of the day, the two arenas, politics and economics, are linked. And a well-functioning world economy is another way to create hope, employment, jobs, and also ease tensions, which in the end will help the cause of peace. I find it necessary to say that because I don't want the same thing to happen to this session as what happened to the central bank session. We have two of really the world's greatest specialists of trade issues. Roza Thayer and Ambassador Fin. And the session title says from the point of view of middle powers, because Korea and Canada can be defined as middle powers, maybe Turkey too. But I think we will both panelists and myself, we do want to get into also the broader issues of the world economy and trade in the world trading system. And as you know, the negotiations on the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership work successfully concluded, which doesn't mean that it's all over because it needs to be ratified, not least by the US Congress. And it will be very difficult if you get stuck there. And the TTIP trade partnership between Europe and the United States and other North American countries is not yet at that stage. It will take more time. But if these two things get put into place, I believe the framework, not only for trade, but for regulation, industrial policies will be organized in a way by default through these two treaties. I think the issue of China, of course, is very much there because it doesn't participate in either of these two negotiations. And then, of course, the issue of the rest of the world, of the smaller countries that are outside these two frameworks, is an important one for the legitimacy of the whole system and the future role of the WTO. So I think we will touch on these issues in greater depth. But I'll start with Professor Thao. Can you give us your views on where we're at with the TPP? I know it's gotten concluded. If you can say a few words on its content, there's been a lot of debate between the political left and the more business-oriented center right on the TPP. You know, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has actually taken position against it the way it was negotiated. Not very strongly, but still it seemed was, in a way, led to that by this debate. So let's start by that and by the Pacific side of things. May I cover a little bit of multilateral negotiation and then move to the mega-regionals, like the TPP? Let me start with my several observations on the recent development in the area of trade. Let me begin with the WTO's Doha round. As you all know, last year we tried very hard to ratify the agreement we made in Bali, so-called trade facilitation agreements. But the ratification by member states are quite slow, so it's not making any dynamism out of that. And also, we are supposed to prepare some work program to deliver something for remaining deep Doha round issues by the upcoming MC-10, which will be held in Nairobi next month. But that work program seemed to be incomplete, so we cannot expect much achievement from the next Nairobi MC-10 meeting either. In other words, the multilateral trading system is really in real trouble. And maybe it's now on a kind of critical crossroads. So in response to that, I think many parts of the world, they are moving for more bilateral FTAs so far, but very recently, many countries are participating in a larger kind of scale we call mega-regional trade agreements. And in Asia Pacific, TPP, and also RCEP, or China, Japan, Korea, FTA, many things are taking place. And also between Europe and the EU, Europe and the United States, they're negotiating for TTIP negotiations. But up until now, no major mega-RTA has been concluded until recently. But last month, as you already mentioned, TPP negotiations are completed. So given the very gloomy picture of the global world trading system, I welcome the news that the TPP negotiations have been completed. However, if you look at the overall participants, even though they have 12 different countries, they miss the major other more dynamic economies in East Asia. For example, Indonesia was not part of them. Thailand, the Philippines, and of course Korea is not part of them either. And China is not part of them either. So if you look at ASEAN, 10 countries, some people already suggest that TPP is dividing ASEAN into two. So some people are complaining. But since because of that fact, the gains from TPP, economic gains, could be limited. So in other words, sooner or later, after they finish the ratification of the TPP remands by the members, maybe they should open the door to additional members. Maybe Korea will try to join TPP with other countries. Maybe. Can I ask you, why has Korea not been part of the TPP? Just very briefly, because it's an interesting thing. I mean, Korea is one of the most dynamic economies in the world. Based on policy priority at that time, 2012, I was serving trade minister at that time. We didn't really consider that very seriously because Japan was not participating. We are still doing implementation of KOROS FTA, which is a big event. And also, we just began the negotiation with China. But anyway, we see TPP positively. But since we have already had bilateral FTA with already 10 participating TPP participating countries, 10. So only exception was Japan and Mexico. So we are not in a very hurry kind of situation. So that's why. But we want to join in the future. In any case, so we hope that TPP can be expanded. It's too early to say that because they didn't finish the ratification either. And let me say one more thing about the background. You know, G20 meeting was held in Anataliya, Turkey last week. If you look at the declaration, there are two paragraphs on trade. But most in a rhetoric kind of situation, not much serious or substantial statement was made in G20 meeting. However, there's one noticeable agreement. Leaders agree that trade ministers of G20 countries will meet regularly. And also, they allow them to establish some kind of working groups, supporting working groups for trade. In other words, we discussed this in the morning. G20 is a more non-binding kind of organization. But still, we have a very high level communication mechanism specifically on trade. So far, G20 issues are dominated by finance, more finance ministers. But I think it's a welcome news so that we can communicate with Geneva and also G20 participating countries. Let me just stop here. Thank you very much. That's those very good comments and very much to the point. Let me just share with you that I was in Geneva yesterday. And everybody was talking about, anybody I talked to was talking about Ambassador Jonathan and his very strong support for good trade policies at the WTO and worldwide. So anyway, really, I did hear it from so many people yesterday. And it was good because we're good old friends. Tell me, Jonathan, from your point of view, how do you see the whole trade scene? But before that, maybe, and say if you agree or not, or if I'm exaggerating, that trade is now much more about regulation than it is about tariffs. I think tariffs are still there. There are a topic in many sectors. But a lot of the trade negotiations are about how regulation can be harmonized regionally among countries worldwide. And a lot of the debate is about the power of the corporations versus the power of wider society in regulation as well as in arbitration mechanisms, I think. So I hope you will say a few words on that. Let me also add one more thing. It is very important for world growth that the trade engine works. And it has slowed down. I mean, part of the, now whether it's a cause or an effect or both, one can debate, of course. But we see for the first time in decades that world trade growth is actually has trouble keeping up even with the low GDP growth that we're having. So there's something special going on which we need to address. Jonathan? At Camel, you've added a whole bunch of questions into a short introduction. So let me see if I can address as many of them as possible in a short time. You're quite right to note that attention has shifted from the border to beyond the border. And the analogy is often used of a sea full of tariffs. And for the vast majority of the time since the creation of the post-war trading system under what was then the GATT, we've been lowering and draining that sea of the tariffs as barriers to the free flow of goods. Only when the water has become low enough have we seen just how massive the souls and rocks of non-tariff barriers are that still impede the free flow of goods. So you're quite right to say attention is shifting because the tariff in most all industrial commodities is increasingly irrelevant as a competitive factor. We still have some peaks. Agriculture is a glaring exception because we all have farmers with loud voices as Korea can attest to. But overall, you're right. We're looking now and the challenge of the trading system is to smooth the way, in effect, from the producer directly to the consumer and all the barriers along the way, not just at the border but throughout the stream of commerce. That's one dimension. What has changed, I think, more fundamentally, however, and the economists have led us through the analysis, is the advent of supply chains. In effect, the latest numbers from UNCTAD tell us that pretty close to 50% of all trade in the world is between affiliated entities. Now, that doesn't mean multinationals. It means, in effect, the constellation of firms working around a large firm. They're suppliers who are reliable, who have the long-term contracts to provide the inputs or the intermediate goods. So you're witnessing a constellation of trade, if I can put it that way, around large enterprises. That doesn't mean northern multinationals at all because we're also seeing a remarkable growth in the presence and trade share of multinational enterprises from more advanced emerging economies as well. So supply chains change the nature of trade. And it points you towards the increasing importance of looking at trade together with investment. Take your typical auto manufacturer that has global capacity. While the United States might prefer it all as sold to the world from Detroit and Japan might prefer it all comes from Tokyo, we know that the manufacturers set up manufacturing in various reasons. And when they look at the regions they're going to try and assess, well, is my next plant going to be in Thailand or the Philippines to serve Southeast Asia? And they're gonna look at what are their access to inputs in addition to labor force, taxation, normal corporate factors. They're going to assess the trade relationship because as Pascal and me once put it, we're in a world of made in the world. You will have seen the Asian Development Bank study that dissected an iPod when it arrives in North America. It shows up as a $200 Chinese import. You dismantle it. 37% of the value is actually German, another 20% Japanese, another 20% Korean, and Chinese value added is 4%. We don't measure the import content of componentry. So our whole negotiating approach is quite distorted and not taking account of supply chains. The other significant result of that is what the Swedish Board of Trade has coined as the serviceification of trade. We haven't really come to grips with the reality that for every sale of a piece of hard, tangible goods, there are a number of affiliated services. You needed a transporter to get your goods to market. You probably needed a lawyer and an accountant to have your sales contract organized well. A number of intermediaries. Your economy is benefiting much more than just the value of the good when you sell it. Your service providers are actually benefiting as well. Former Chief Economist of the WTO, Patrick Lo, did a study on the sale of a loaf of bread in Hong Kong. 70% of the final price paid by the consumer for that loaf of bread goes to services. Not to the wheat, not to the packaging, but rather the transportation. You said what the percent? 70. 70. 70. So what that suggests is national interest and business interests are, could you please get us a set of rules that better facilitates our ability to invest, attract and use local suppliers and connect our sale of goods with the obtaining of services. The WTO framework for negotiations that we've had in the Doha Development Round since 2002 is an effective framework that we inherited from the Uruguay Round that was first developed in the mid 1980s and is a leftover agenda. We haven't had fresh thinking in Geneva as to how to approach the realities of how business is done today pretty well for 30 years. That's an underlying motivation for a TPP type negotiation that says among like-minded who sort of get it on supply chains, who are competing for that next automobile plant on either side of the Pacific, can we modernize the rules in a manner that facilitates trade among us. In some ways the TPP is to the WTO Doha Round today, what NAFTA was to the Uruguay Round, a catalyst, a demonstration to the rest of the world that there is a path forward that can be done, largely building on existing rules. So there's no incompatibility and I would discourage people from framing it as regionalism versus multilateralism. We leapfrog each other, they reinforce each other and these new regional agreements can and should show the way. I'll finish up on this just by suggesting that in some ways TPP if you go through the text may be one of the last of the familiar type of trade agreements. The kinds of rules, the table of contents would look very familiar to a trade expert. There is some incremental improvement on some of the rules on non-tariff barriers and standard. There is obviously a significant step forward on investment but it's largely anchored in familiar existing disciplines. TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, if successful may be the first significant agreement of a new generation because by both sides' commitment they do want to deal with regulatory convergence and standards so that you can have goods move and people move and services move under the principle of tested once and accepted everywhere. Will they succeed? It's a different kind of negotiation. It doesn't belong to the trade experts anymore. It belongs to all those domestic ministries and agencies and laboratories whose mandate has nothing to do with trade. They're told your job is to make sure people are safe or that products are safe. Bringing them to a trade table is a new and difficult experiment. It's aggravated further by the advent of what people shorthand as what are called private standards. We have, for example, thanks to public awareness growing and unfortunate tragedies such as the textile factory or assembly building in Bangladesh, Rana Plaza. We have consumers demanding a certification of fair labor conditions and the manufacturer of this or that good. Well, is there any agreed international standard at the International Labor Organization? No. Is there any trade related government certified standard? No. Are there a dozen different NGO and industry driven standards? Yes. Does that actually facilitate trade to have that multiplicity of private standards? No. So we're gonna have to come to grips with that even as between the United States and Europe. One final point, if I may, just to springboard into a more provocative area having listened to this morning's panels and started with John Lipsky's observations. I'm often fond of saying we as bureaucrats, even if ambassadors are actually, if you know the laws of physics, we're actually inert objects because we don't move unless there's an external force applied to us. Who are the external forces, the people doing business? And what is it that business wants? They want to make the pie bigger, both for themselves and they realize, I think, those who are carrying corporate responsibility that by doing so they're creating jobs, they're contributing to the growth of a middle class in emerging markets and so on. Trade alone doesn't do that. All the free trade in the world is not gonna give you sustainable economic growth, particularly in emerging markets unless it's accompanied by an investment in the kind of enabling environment one needs to do business. That starts with goods, all the monetary policy and the financial sector that works, but it means regulatory transparency and predictability that is responsive to how people do business. The real challenge, if we get beyond some of these arcane issues, is to connect what we're trying to do in a trade agenda with what the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN family and bilateral donors are trying to do to create and build domestic capacity and structural reform to make trade the enhancer and the magnifier of growth that it can be. Full circle back to your initial observation. There's a big debate as you noted between economists who would say the slowdown in trade is actually cyclical, let's face it, Europe is sluggish in its recovery, China is deliberately trying to shift to domestic demand. Those who say, well actually it's structural because of what I described earlier. If you're investing and you're actually better off using local suppliers than bringing in your foreign components, you're not doing as much trade, but you're doing just as much business, you're creating just as many jobs and maybe it's actually better that we're seeing growth and investment even if at the expense of exports as a contribution to GDP. Thank you very much Jonathan. I think you managed in, I don't know, 10 minutes or whatever to cover a lot of ground and I think this is the critical ground. But since there's jet lag and after lunch kind of tiredness among many of the participants, I'm going to try to be extra provocative and really try to say a few questions that will hopefully fire everybody up in the controversial nature of some of these issues. And I'm not on one side or another, I'm just trying to get the discussion going. But I repeat, it's significant that Hillary Clinton, whom we just heard was strengthening her candidacy is very, one never knows, but has a very good chance of becoming the next president of the United States, is taking saying no to the TPP. It could be a campaign issue then whatever, but I think it's significant and there's some dynamic behind it. Let me just say a few things and then ask Professor Thao to react. For example, you mentioned regulatory convergence and certainty in some sense, okay? And of course, I fully agree. I mean, if you want to invest, you cannot have a situation where the country you've invested in, all of a sudden two years later decides to change the whole regulatory system. That will be a constraint on international investment and God knows we need international investment to spur growth. It was one of the big conclusion of the Australia G20 that a pro-growth investment push is very important. In infrastructure where we have huge needs, again the regulatory framework will be extremely important. And yet, Joe Stiglitz for example, latched on to the issue of smoking. And if a country had decided to become more health conscious and take a stronger stand against smoking and tries to change the regulatory framework, will it be hampered by the fact that the US Tobacco Company said, hey, this is violating regulatory consistency and regulatory foresight. I'm just, you know, how does one react to that? I think the TPP actually moved in a certain direction on that and dropped some of the so-called objectionable parts that seem to be under discussion, although one never quite knows because the discussions are not public. The other point I want to raise, and it's very much, I think, in line with the spirit of this conference, Thierry has always said, Thierry de Montréal, you know, we must somehow get to global economic governance, global governance and also economic governance. But trade is the only, usually the only tool one has to have some kind of influence on another country, short of invading it. There's a trade agreement and the WTO, in some sense, through its adjudication mechanism, legal mechanism that were followed, in some ways was the most successful international organization because it really, there was international law under the WTO, much more than under, say, the IMF. But on the other hand, who is profiting from all, I mean, who is going to profit from the TTIP? And we think that a larger market creates more competition, normally, as economists. Makes, seems to make sense. But there's, at the same time, there's something in global technology and globalization that seems to create greater size, giants. If I'm not mistaken, the last merger among the two biggest beer manufacturers, I mean, beer is a fairly harmless product, I would say, but anyway, we're not talking pharmaceuticals here. But, you know, 60% of something like that of all beer or more than 65% of all beer sold in the world will be sold by one multinational enterprise. Now, if we remember our microeconomics textbooks, that's not very good for competition. So I'm just kind of saying, you know, can we really stand behind the trade agreements as freer trade, more harmonized regulation, as progress in international governance, or should we worry about the strong corporate interests and lobbyists that are behind the scenes and negotiations? Who protects the consumers, the citizens, the, every one of us as individuals, against a framework that may in the end work, maybe in favor of some more investment and maybe more growth, but a distribution of the results of that growth that accrues to the most powerful and to the wealthiest? What's that? Well, you cannot, you don't have to go that far. I mean, the benefits of trade liberalization, Korea has many, many different FTAs, including very big FTAs with the United States and EU, but our consumers are complaining because we are not getting much benefits. The reason is we have a distribution sector is not very competitive. We have many different layers so that each layer will take the kind of premium or whatever the economy profits, so we are not getting any benefits. So when you mention the giant companies emerging together or even in the domestic economy, you have that kind of system, that's why we want to emphasize competition policy, but the competition policy based on consumer side is not very much being processed. They only talk about who is gaining from the producer's point of view, and also we don't have any global competition policy which will govern this kind of merge or things like that. Maybe United States want to apply that domestic anti-monopoly law to other cases, but in any case, the regulatory convergence, you said that, but it'll be awfully difficult. If you talk about the tobacco, but let's talk about the regulatory standard for safety of the parts of the automobile. We have two different standards, European standard, US standard, so Korean companies is having difficulties in making these parts for this company, for this part for that reason, but if you want to merge this standard together, merge to which standard? It's a huge task. That's why Ambassador Fried mentioned that regulatory harmonization, regulatory convergence is a very important issue, but can we get there? It's another issue. It's even more difficult to have, but they're more difficult than having a trade agreement. That's my initial comment to your issue. Candidate Clinton's stand, any? Well, if you apply very simple political economy, you have a clear answer. Right now, you don't have to welcome this TPP. I mean, by saying that this has some problems which can invite more support for campaign. And President Obama, who was a candidate running campaign around 2008, 2007, he mentioned that the Korea US FTA has a fundamental flaws, so they can get all the votes from Detroit. So right now, Mr. Clinton just said that we have some problems. It's much better politically than truly support the TPP. That's how I understand. Well, I was going to recall that Bill Clinton, in coming to office, asked, did not support the NAFTA until there was added a certain set of understandings on labor and on the environment and side agreements when he subsequently became a great champion for free trade both regionally and multilaterally. So there may be some parallel there. Look, again, in a different way, I'm trying to say the same thing. We tend, in light of the WTO's success, in dispute settlement, in enforcing a code of rules within a limited universe to put too much weight on the WTO as the solution to everything. You take tobacco, where the issue has to do with public health measures versus the trademark of intellectual property that tobacco manufacturers put on their boxes of cigarettes. That's really at its root not an issue that trade negotiators really sorted out. That's the intellectual property community at the World Intellectual Property Organization and your international framework for patents, trademarks, and copyrights. What's the relationship between the free flow of goods and free competition between producers, at least, that the WTO sets out on the one hand, the internationally agreed codes of intellectual property at WIPO and whatever the World Health Organization and someone else has to say about tobacco and public health. And maybe, in the future, a warning on a beer label, which you said is harmless. I would hope not. This has to do with, in effect, communication both at the national and international level between those dealing with which organization has jurisdiction over what. All of our food safety is not set out as a result of trade people saying all food should flow freely. The food and agriculture organization that wonderfully named Codex Alimentarius, the International Organization of Epizuotics actually sets out the standards of what kind of beef is safe, when do you have the right to close the border to BSE, and so on. Those standards, in effect, then are incorporated back into a WTO context. So for Mr. Stiglitz and some of the activists who quote him, their aim is not very good because they want to target the WTO whereas really what they're debating is whether these international organizations and the domestic regulators relating to them are using sound science or not. Some would argue, to heck with science, it's whatever my social choice is. I don't like GMOs, whether they're safe or unsafe. Others would say, come on, the only international basis for dealing with these kinds of things is what the best science has to say. And if you have a choice of measures to meet what science says, choose the one that's less trade restrictive as long as you can be assured it achieves the same result. Finally, vis-a-vis the multinational, so let me fully endorse what Tyho says. Again, the WTO originally, or the GATT before it, was designed to smooth frictions at the border and to put the foreign producer on a level playing field, so-called national treatment, with the domestic competitor. That's all. It didn't make any decision about big or small. And it said among foreign producers, if you're also a member, most favored nation treatment, all your foreign competitors should be treated alike. Once you're into the market, you're talking about conditions of competition for the consumer. That's never been the purview of trade disciplines. That belongs to competition and antitrust law. Many of us, Canada included, sought to add competition to the universe of rules that might come under a WTO umbrella at the start of the Doha round or even before. Aung Tad, for many decades before, wanted to have the world talk about restrictive business practices. We've only gotten as far as soft law, an informal but very large network anchored at the OECD, called the International Competition Network, which now has about 70 antitrust and competition agencies developed and developing, with an exchange of best practices, with a model competition law that is now being implemented in more and more countries, but nobody's quite ready to turn that into treaty form. So a large merger is still gonna have to apply and go through much to the delight of the lawyers, 19 or 20 or 40 different merger applications and reviews. So all of which is to say, I think the questions you pose are perfectly legitimate and do have to do with social choice and do have to do with public choice, but also have to do with the global governance questions we've been talking about all day, which go well beyond the WTO. How do we align that very circumscribed universe that we designed the trading system to deal with with the other international efforts that we've made fairly successful to standardize and to protect and to promote the consumer and the safety and the social interests? Thank you very much. I think we'll try to get some questions or comments from the floor. Maybe add one more. I like to add one more thing. It seems like in many areas, economic globalization is facing new barriers in a sense. There's been progress. There was tremendous progress on trade in terms of the euro zone by the creation of the euro. And I think, I can't remember who said it was, I think it was, I can't remember now in the session this morning about, it was an incredible achievement, but we're reaching new barriers. I mean, if you want to go further with globalization, there has to be more harmonization and competition regulation. Otherwise we're stuck. If we want to have monetary cooperation succeed, it has to acquire new instruments to succeed. And I think that's why we're really at a very crucial moment where in fact, if we don't go forward, we may actually be pushed backward, I believe. But anyway, any questions? And I'll take maybe a few. And if not, I may even ask some friends to make a few statements. I see John there, for example. Want to entice him to ask or make a comment. The microphone. One on the right does welcome. Yes. Thank you. Just to clarify, especially what Jonathan was saying, on TTIP, the idea exactly is to harmonize standards, right, between the US and Europe with the notion that that would be extremely powerful in terms of promoting a global harmonization of the standards that are included. I know there's a big discussion of the scope of what would, what will be covered in TTIP, for example, would that include financial sector or not include financial sector, et cetera. What I was left wondering clearly, your assessment on not just the difficulties, or for both of you, not just the difficulties, but the likelihood of real progress being made and the likelihood that the corporations and others that you suggested have to get behind these negotiations to make them succeed, not just bureaucrats, your assessment of real progress in the next couple of years. And I have the gentleman over here, the microphone here, we'll take it to a tree and then. Richard Cooper, Harvard University, and I'd really like to comment on a remark by our moderator, Camel, rather than the. I recognize, you know I recognize. Rather than the speakers, he talked about the importance of reducing uncertainty for businesses in order to, he made the absolutely valid point that international investment has joined trade as one of the main economic integrators of the world economy these days, and it's hard to separate those two. And then talked about the uncertainties facing investment. The simple fact is, as we discovered at lunch and in many ways, we live in a world of uncertainty. There's no way of removing the uncertainties for business. There are political uncertainties. Of course, the major uncertainty for business is business itself, innovation by competitors, which you haven't, you're behind on if you're in a particular business. So what we're talking about here is uncertainty created by government regulation, and that leaves to isolate that particular source of uncertainty in a world of uncertainty is suspect. And it leaves the suspicion that business wants to use this device, and I'm talking not only about TPP but TTIP, also there are important differences between those two, I think, that this really is a way to reduce, put pressure on for less regulation. And I think that's what many people are objecting to. And I think we ought to face it straightforwardly. There are regulations, and Minister Bark mentioned auto safety issues, where for historical reasons, everyone's concerned with auto safety, but for historical reasons, they've been different in different countries, and particularly transatlantically, and there's no conceptual reason not to harmonize those. There are all kinds of practical reasons that it'll take time and so forth, but there's no conceptual reason not to harmonize those, but that's fundamentally different from saying we shouldn't have new health and safety regulations, for example, as science advances. The businesses who are selling existing products may not like them, but it seems to me we should not even hint at creating a regime in which such new regulations are not possible or are rejected. And I think that's the objection to what's the technical term, ISDN, anyway, the arbitration clauses in that, and we have a few cases unhappily where businesses have gone around national regulations. One was in Canada, one in Australia. We have a few cases, they each have their own technical details, where businesses have essentially overruled local decisions by invoking the ISDN clause and asking for arbitration and compensation. And I think that's a potentially serious problem which a trade specialist, and I'm constitutionally a free trader, need to recognize in any democratic society. Thank you very much, Professor Kubert. I think these were really excellent and comments that illuminated even more, I think what both of you said. Anybody else? Yes? Thanks very much. Sean and Clarem, I want to, in one sense, misuse the panel because it relates to this larger issue of global governance which we've referred to four or five times in the context of a putative objective of increasing the range, the spread and the depth of globalization. And I think there may be an underlying challenge in this whole regard that I think it's worthwhile getting one's head around. The first thing is that we have a curious situation which we're all aware of where democratic accountability to the extent that it exists exists at national levels but the vast majority of challenges that we talk about in these particular contexts require collective action at transnational levels. We can't solve them at domestic levels and hence globalization becomes a convenient catch word for this larger space and we have developed a whole series of instruments to enable us to address those issues on a larger scale. The second thing is that the moment that we liberalized capital flows, perhaps unintentionally, we liberalized the location of manufacturing employment and subsequently services delivery because the moment you can invest anywhere, then self-evidently you're going to invest in the locations where you can earn the highest return on capital and under those circumstances, jobs move in a whole variety of different areas as a consequence of the fact that capital moves and that has social and political costs once again in national environments and as a consequence, you get a whole series of protectionist responses based on perfectly rational circumstances. The third issue around all of this is that and perhaps the quickest way of dealing with it is simply to use the cliche of the global village. If one thinks of how a village functions, broadly speaking, the range of the society and the range of the economy are commensurate with one another. So all the polity has to do is to balance the workings of the economy and the village in such a way that everyone in the society is happy. The truth is, however, globally, when you extrapolate that metaphor, it fails and it fails because we have created a highly integrated global economy preeminently as a consequence of technological capability, integrated financial systems and long supply chains, but of course the society that constitutes the global population is hugely fractured. They have different interests, different values, different mindsets, different perspectives and our polity, the instruments that we employ for purposes of global governance is completely inadequate to the task of squaring the circle between the workings of a global economy and a domestic, sorry, and a fractured society. So how does one think to advance the prospects of economic globalization in circumstances where these levels of asymmetry are already widespread and manifest, I think, on multiple levels? Thank you very much. One last very quick, please. We're running out of time. Carl Kaiser, Harvard University. Ambassador Fried said this is the new one. The TTIP is something totally new, very different. And precisely because of that, it will have resistance as we have never encountered it before because coordination or harmonization of regulation goes straight into the heart of politics, culture. And when you look at the reaction in Europe, the opponents have been very successful in forging very strange coalitions but very effective coalitions. For example, there was a big rally in Berlin the other day, almost 200,000 people, in which a group managed to get all kinds of people that have nothing to do with trade, to oppose and to get together, anti-establishment, all kinds of strange people who joined. So in other words, we are in a different area. The trade negotiators have to become more political. The politicians have to leave the area of just arranging technical questions. They have to face the very central questions of politics. And I feel they're not doing very well at the moment. One, and two, we need a lot of time and we should not be too impatient because it's a new arrangement. It needs much more time to deal with the political questions as we have never seen them before. Thank you very much. I think I'll go in the reverse order and what I suggest, but whatever you like. I mean, each one of you can take about two, three minutes, about three minutes maybe. But what, I mean, we faced the global governance question. I'm partly the culprit in the sense of having broadened maybe the topic too much. But if there were one or two or three things that you think could be done that are feasible in the whole area of trade as well as regulation, what would they be? What are the next one or two useful steps? Both of you, I start with Jonathan in reverse order. Well, I'm not gonna quite frame it in the way you've put the question because I'm very proud to say that in Canada, 20 years after NAFTA, joining the TPP, every public opinion poll has about 70 to 75% public support and endorsement for free trade. Why? Because the government and business and engaged citizenry, including the academic and public policy community, have patiently and consistently educated the public that your wellbeing actually depends on participating in the global economy. We're a country of only 35 million people and we're still in the top 10, top 15 traders in the world. 40% of our GDP and that's not being a member of the EU flows from imports and exports to our economy. So yes, engagement, education, that virtually everyone's connected, you know? If I'm just sewing together some fabric that I ship down the road and the fellow down the road makes it into a band who then ships it to the next town and it becomes a seat belt and it goes from there to the larger center and enters into a car. He's 10 steps away from being an exporter but he's actually an exporter. So how do you get across that everyone's connected in this supply chain world becomes key? Equally so on standards. There's nobody, including business who's seeking to lower standards anywhere. The predictability is frankly pretty basic concepts of transparency and a rational basis for regulation. That's what we did at the borders, our trade facilitation, that's what these mutual recognition agreements are meant to do. You want to know that the little UE sticker on a toaster made in Europe is just as safe to plug into your socket as a UL sticker in the United States. That doesn't raise fundamental, sovereign social concerns if we walk people through it. You both agree and John implicitly in his question that that's gonna take some time in part because the toaster inspectors are gonna have to spend six months going through every electrical standard to say are they a match? And if not, can we change them and so on? And it's gonna be bottoms up and it's gonna be product by product and sector by sector because the auto people will be at a different table than the chemical people and so on. So it will be painstaking but that's a benefit in disguise because we get to educate ourselves and communities. That's a reassurance that your social choices are not at stake. As I tried to say earlier, what we're trying to do on behalf of society is to say you make your choice. Then turn to the experts and science to say how do you best enforce it and if you do it, do it in a nondiscriminatory way. It's not much more complicated than that. On the governance issue more generally, as I tried to say and maybe too quickly at the start, what this is all about is actually set out by very recently the sustainable development goals. What we're talking about by 2030 is that everyone has an economy that grows in a manner that is sustained economically, sustainable socially and sustainable environmentally. And if you dig down, number 17 says trade is a means to an end, not an end in itself. And trade follows investment, as you say, more than the other way around these days. We've been maybe too successful on the capital side. Trade is catching up to that. We're getting investment diversion and investment relocation because the investor will say, oh, you're part of this free trade area, that's a better place to invest. So we are distorting the decisions. We need to connect in effect those who are doing the trade rules with those who are doing the investment rules with, let me finish on this, what I might call the enabling sectors. Any society that wants to move out of agriculture into further along the supply chain, there's certain sectors that are the backbone for everything else that goes on in the economy. You need to generate energy, renewable or traditional. So you have to invest, this is your infrastructure. You need telecommunications and internet, wired or wireless. So there's a massive soft connectivity and infrastructure that's needed. You need the financial sector to actually intermediate and you need transport. And now that might belong in aviation over with the Chicago Convention or the maritime organization for shipping and so on, but you need to look at in a comprehensive way, have I given this economy the tools, not just for multinationals to come in but for my indigenous business to grow into connecting either to my neighborhood or more globally. We don't connect, we don't sit down between the WTO, the Bretton Woods and the panoply of UN agencies and regional organizations to say, let's do a comprehensive diagnostic of what it takes to put this country on a sustainable footing and can we coordinate and sequence in a manner that reassures the population, in a manner that gives the government the capacity to regulate and to listen to social choices domestically in doing so. What's needed is not the UN of everything but at least almost a central table for any recipient country or region. We've made sputtering attempts at that in the past, that needs to be renewed. It used to happen when Kamal was at the World Bank but then Turkey stole him and we've taken step backwards since. First of all, we already have six minutes, you know. Everybody has been a little late. Okay, I want to very brief two points I want to make. One is why people don't expect regulatory harmonization or convergence negotiation will be difficult because if you invite regulators rather than trade negotiators, they will talk to each other. But for what? For their own regulatory system, not for the beneficiaries like consumers or whatever. So the people or business people even don't trust this kind of government regulation anyway. If you, even though you switched the players from trade negotiator to regulators, so we don't give them any confidence in the negotiations. Second one is why so much resistance for against the TTIP or anything else? In our teacher international trade for many, many years, the benefits out of this trade liberalization or regulatory harmonization is quite big. But if you divide this game with the whole population, each person don't get any real feeling about the game. Then it's easy to listen to other people. This will not give you any help and this is not very good for this group, you know, that kind of thing. Then you cannot mobilize even beneficiaries into one voice. So it's really difficult. Ambassador Freed said you have to educate them, give more information, more SNS kind of efforts. That's the only thing we can do, but more and more the per citizen, gain per citizen is so small, it's quite asymmetric with other parties. So that's why we cannot get the convincing regulation negotiations or whatever, that's how we understand. All right, well, thank you very much. We've had really, I think, two panelists who have all their lives. Roy Zetow and Minister Tau and Ambassador Freed really worked, you know, on the broad picture, but also on the nuts and bolts of getting things done. And I think it's good to remember that of course we need the broad picture, we need the slogans, we need, you know, the big phrases, but unless we have real specialists and people who know really what they're talking about work together globally on the various dimensions of which trade and the wider field now of regulation is one, but also other fields. I think the same goes for many of the political things we discussed this morning, the same will go for the migration issue. Unless we have real leaders who are at the same time are people of substance, we won't make much progress. So we've had these two great people of substance, I think, this afternoon. And thank you very much. Thank you all for being here. Thank you. Thank you.