 ac ydych chi'n gweithio'r company yng Nghymru hongkong S.A.R. Rwy'n fawr i'n gweithio. Mary Elker Pangestu, profesor o'r economiaid yng Nghymru o Indonesia. Rwy'n fawr i'n gweithio. Timothy Stratford, partner yng Nghymru yw Covington ac Birling, ac rwy'n fawr i'n gweithio'n gweithio. Rwy'n fawr i'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. And lastly, Yi Sichiao, Deputy Director General for the World Trade Organization. Thank you very much for being with us. So let me start off, if I might, just by throwing out a very open question to our panel. We have a truce, but we don't have a comprehensive agreement. After the G20 meeting, is there still hope that we can actually move beyond this gwnaeth cymaint y gwahanol am ddweud, ac rydym am fod yn ymwem i'w drwy Cyfwyr strafford yn y cyfanswyr. Nawr mae'r cyfanswyr yn maen i gael at y cyfanswyr? Mae i gallwn amff jamb o Gymraeg Trifloean Llywodraeth Cymru a fyddim yn ddiwedd fel y cyfrifysgwyr. Rydyn ni'n gwybeithio berthynas ar y cyfrifysgwyr yma, ac mae'n gweithio'r rhwng yn gwahbwyng ar y cyfrifysgwyr. Mae'n tympas ar gyfer gwael gydych yn dweud sefydlu cerdd Witch. ydy'r wasb o'r ddweud ar gyfer ar y cyfnodau i'r wneud ar y dyfodol, felly mae'n gofyn yn ei wneud yn ddweud i'r ddweud, ac rydyn ni'n gweithio'r tarif yn ffordd ar gyfer y timeau, ac mae'n gweithio'r bwysig, a'n gweithio yng nghaeniatau arall yn y lluniau'r lleidio yn yr ystafell, gan oed o ddweud yn ddifwgol, ac mae'n gweithio'r sgwp chi'n ddarparu a'r ddweud yn ddweud, i ddim yn gallu'r ddweud yn ddweud, The trade issues are being discussed so this makes things quite complicated and we think it will be a challenge for the two governments to reach agreement, although we're still optimistic that they will. The security issue and the trade issue appears to have been merged through the process of these discussions over the last year or so. Given your background as a Trade Representative for the US government, do you think that has been a mistake?olaeth mor hwn yn dyfodol y ddatblygu am amser ond gan y bwrdd yn dweud o'r wathfyrdd. Felly, bob oes hyfforddiant a bod yn iawn hefyd felly am yr oedd ddod o'r ddyfodol o'r przypol rywbwysig i ddweud o'r dweud, yn y dweud o'r drafod. Mae'r dweud gan ddwyain a ddweud o ddweud ar allanfyrdd yn gyfreidio pa wrth, rhai cais rhai ar y cyfans golyg, rhai arwadau ar y cyfanswyr, o'r ddedigio yn gwahanol y gwaith yn ymddangosu'r gwaith sydd gyda'r gwaith. Felly rindwch i'n meddwl i'n meddwl i adreu'r cydnodau. Rwy'n mynd i ddweudio'r ddweudio i'r ddweudio'r gwaith, ac yn galw i ddweudio, fel gyda'r cymhiliad arall, ac mae'n ddweudio'r ddweudio'r ddweudio'r cydnodau. Mae'r cydnodau yn ddweudio ar y gwaith i ddweudio'r ddweudio'r gwaith o'r salwch ar y llyniad briseun o'r ffrwng gymhwytaf a'r ffrwng gymhwytaf ar y gallu staff iawn. Professor Pengestu, rwy'n meddyl. Rwy'n meddyl ar y llyniad yw'r ysgrifartau os ymgyrch? Rwy'n meddyl argywell. Yn bod i ddim三 oedd ati ddim wedi chael. Ond mae'n deithas ar y llyniad yw'r wahanol, y dylai wahanol ar gyfer y trewyn, is not just about the tariffs and the deficit. It goes deeper than that. It goes into the perception of unfair trade practices, intellectual property, technology issue. So there's a lot of issues there that I'm not sure can be resolved anytime soon. So I think it needs not just postponement and another set of negotiations which may in the end be unsatisfactory because that's what happened before. There wasn't enough on the table from the US side to satisfy that you're actually going to change all these policies. So I'm off the view as a sort of a, you know, when two elephants fight, countries like Indonesia, you know, watching, we don't want to be trampled, but we need to be agile, right? So for us, dealing with the trade tensions and these issues which are also of concern to us, it's better to do it in a multilateral way rather than actually it's more unilateral and bilateral. In fact, it's more unilateral and we are facing also pressures from the US in a unilateral way to change some of our policies and the instrument uses tariffs as well. For us, it's actually the withdrawal of the GSP. So I think that's a very unfair world for small countries and we would love to see, we would like to see these issues be addressed in a multilateral way where we can also be participants to whatever new rules is going to come out there. You talked about Indonesia's position in this. There has been a view from some market participants that actually China's loss in this trade route could be Indonesia's gain or Malaysia's gain or Vietnam's gain. Why do you not agree with that thesis? Surely you should be happy to see these two elephants fighting. Yes, it's going to be agile because you know what? Yes, I think it's a short term gain. I think what will happen is that businesses are going to diversify their risk and sourcing and so on and so forth. And we will be one of the beneficiaries. Vietnam has actually been the main beneficiary. Guess who was mentioned specifically by President Trump in the G20 Vietnam because they actually experienced a 28% increase in their exports because the relocation and the diversification has already happened. So it's a double-edged sword if you like. There's opportunity but there's also threat that you're going to be next. And we are not China, right? We have to face the US in a very unilateral way. I don't think it's a very equal position. So for us it's better that we go back to a more rules-based and more and more certainty in the way we do trade. But in the short term what we do need to do is diversify and relocation and diversification is going to happen. But hopefully we could do it in a regional way so that there's more regional economic integration that happens at the same time. And just one final question. The Trans-Pacific Partnership as was with the United States sitting out sent a message about countries that were willing to deepen their integration regardless of the US position. Are you seeing clear evidence that this 12-month-old spat is leading to deeper integration in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia with China, China and Southeast Asia with Russia and other parts of the world? Is that happening? Yes, I think so and I say kudos to Japan for taking over the leadership on TPP. It's called CPTPP, quite a mouthful, right? But continuing that and in ASEAN we are continuing our RCEP which is 10 ASEAN countries and 6 of the East Asian countries. And at the same time we are doing mega regionals with EU. Vietnam just signed an FTA with EU, Indonesia's negotiating, hopefully completed next year. And I think EU Mercersure just got signed so I think you will see the insurance policy in this world of uncertainty is to continue opening up regionally. Charles Lee, let's get your opinions. You sit there in Hong Kong waiting for companies to come to you to IPO. They are running through that process because they see a future, they see a bright future for their businesses. Has that future been somewhat dimmed by this ongoing trade dispute and how do you read the truth? I think the implication of the trade war is going to be so much broader than whatever impact it may have on our business, particularly in the listing business. So I think from our perspective we really look at this in the broader scheme that this is the conflict that is lying in the coming. We all know it. It's just the one, it needs to get resolved. It's almost like a two runners are running. When the second runner was quite a big distance away, you don't really worry too much. But now the second runner is quite close and the first runner somehow something is being unfairly done. His use probably is different. He probably eats some Chinese medicine that make him run faster. Whatever is the reason, the first runner no longer feel comfortable that this is actually inevitable is going to happen, that the second is to become first. So this either you can run much faster so that you can create the distance again or you have to find a way to slow the other guy down, particularly if you believe the other guy is being unfair in whatever perception that you have. So I think we are watching this. I think maybe we are hopeful they can do multilaterally. I don't think it's going to happen. America knows that this is the only moment in history that they can do something about it. The one thing that I don't quite understand and I don't quite see for sure is what America really wanted. Or which American wanted what. I think in terms of three levels. If you think about trade, this is all money issue. Anything that can be settled in money for the Chinese is not a big deal. We can sort it out, right? So from a trade perspective, we strike a deal. The second level is more behavior change that America wanted China to change. This and that, intellectual property. This is almost sometimes like China need to stop drinking and smoking. That's harder because smoking for a while and drinking for a while, we all do. But I think in the longest terms, the Chinese could rationalize that smoking and drinking is not great to your health and probably is a good idea to stop at some point. But give me a time. I can't quit overnight. And also trying to do it in a way that is respectful. You can't put a smoke detector in my house and insist on coming in and check to see whether I smoke after dinner or not. I think that is the behavior change that need to, you know, if that's what the American wanted. I think there is a possibility of a deal, but it's going to be painful. It's going to be negotiated. It's going to be patient. But ultimately probably something will work out. But if American wanted number three, that you have to go to church, your children has to be educated in a particular way. You can't stop, you have to stop eating Chinese food. And that, it will never happen, right? Let's just face it. It will never happen. So the issue here is which American wanted. Wall Street wanted something. Hollywood wanted something. Silicon Valley wanted something. Bible Belt want something. Rust Belt want something. Agricultural States want something. So if China, but I think if China reform and opens, eventually everybody just focus on number one, maybe a little bit number three. Nobody would talk about number three. And number two, but nobody would talk about number three. But the problem is if China does not accelerate and continue to open and reform, that will unite all the different factions of the United States. And then number three is always going to be on the table. And number two is always going to be on the table. It will make things a lot harder. But either way, this is going to be a long, long process before it's over. The one, I mean this is one of the few issues as we listen to the early stages of the democratic hustings. This is one of the few issues that actually President Trump won't be criticised on because you find widespread support among Democrats for action on trade with China. Now I know democracies can be messy and you've talked about many constituencies that have different opinions and want different things from China. The fact that this is now a bipartisan issue in the United States means the reality is it's not going away. And issues of IP and market access and market dumping will continue to come up as long as this is not resolved. Yeah, I agree. But I think at the end of the day, both sides is going to want, you know, China would like to continue the way it is until it takes the time and pace to fix its own issues. That's not going to happen. America is going to press a lot harder. America would want it everything. Hopefully you'll go to church too, right? But I think in the end the real question is what sort of pains are you willing to take in order to achieve what? So that's really the two, you know, pain, gain. What this two that you wanted and each group is going to want some level of different pain and different gain. So there will be pain involved? Yes. It just depends who's prepared to take it. Mae sory o'r ddono o stage ddyn beth yw'r grwp? Ia san, ddod ddysgu ne? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? WTO de? You want some level of pain? The list even I'm talking, but we are very happy to hear that both US and China agreed to come back to negotiating a table, to continue their negotiation. the big players like US and China can come back to the multilateral trading system to resolve their own distrusts. And secondly, a lot of smaller economies are also affected by this trade war, and the current economic situation in the world does not look good. The uncertainty reduced the confidence of investments, Are the global supply chains very much disrupted, so we hope the uncertainty can be reduced with the progress of their bilateral. And meanwhile, finally, we hope their bilateral, even they can reach a deal can be WTO consistent. Otherwise, the whole system will be jeopardized. Rwy'n hoffi'r WTO can move forward to more liberalisation rather than move back to managed trade. My understanding is that the WTO has played no role in the negotiations that have taken place between these two parties. What then does that mean for the future of the WTO if you've been excluded from the world's two largest economies negotiating their relationship? I think the WTO is a rule-based system and our role is if some members or a member finds that their interest, their business opportunities are jeopardised by other trading partners and their practice are WTO inconsistent. They should come to the WTO to raise their concern, to challenge or to address it through dispute settlement. So that is the role of WTO. So in the future, if bilateral deal is reached, then some other members are not happy, they can raise the challenges. Then WTO members will make their judgement whether the deal is consistent with multilateral rules or not. Let me just ask the panellist to take a vote and maybe I'd be interested in the audience's view on this as well. Could I just ask you a very open question? Could you put your hand up if you think that we will have a comprehensive trade agreement by the end of this year, before the end of this year? Could you put your hand up? Between the United States and China, will there be a resolution? Will we move from truce to deal over the course of the next six months? Could you put your hand up panellist if you believe it will happen? Well, I think that's a resounding vote. That's an unfair question for us. Well, it's a matter of your opinion. I don't think it's an unfair question at all. Can I ask our audience perhaps, could you put your hands up if you think there will be a resolution of this trade dispute over the next six months, before we get into 2020? Could you put your hand up please? There you go. I see about three hands. OK. Well, what don't I ask the question the other way round. Put your hand up if you don't think there will be a trade agreement before 2020. Vote now. OK. Thank you very much. This is a useful exercise because we'll be able to go back to this video over and over again. To either prove you very right or very wrong. Can I move on? Mr Stratford, your job effectively now is to advise companies that want to come to China, foreign companies, that want to come to China how to do it, or Chinese companies that want to go elsewhere how to do it. The question that a lot of people in this room are struggling with at the moment, if they run a business, is what does this mean for me? And how do I make my company more resilient and how do I follow through on those plans if I have them? We're going to get free advice here from a lawyer, so listen up. What advice would you give both sides in that story, the Chinese companies that want to go elsewhere and the foreign companies that want to come to China whilst this debate is still raging? So I think companies have to do a scenario planning. They have to look at different scenarios that might unfold over the next six months, year, three years, and they need to think about how that affects their current business plan and what they can do to mitigate the risks. The risks are not going to go away anytime soon based on the consensus view of people in this room. So you have to say, OK, what's likely to happen and how is that going to affect our business? In our American Chamber of Commerce we did a survey a month ago and 40% of the members, these are companies that are here in China doing business, 40% said they are either moving manufacturing out of China or they are considering to do so. And that's an example of the kind of things that people have to be thinking about. If you sell high technology, then you have to say, what kinds of enhanced export control regulations is the Department of Commerce in the U.S. going to come out with in the next few months? And is that going to affect what I can sell to China or is it going to affect what Chinese companies can buy in the U.S.? So we have to look at the different scenarios and companies have to mitigate the risk. And in some cases that's going to mean people are going to move their manufacturing both out of China and out of the U.S. so that they're not subject to tariffs imposed by either country. Let me just pick up on that and ask you a question about the cost side of the ledger then. Is it inevitable that costs will only go up for businesses as they seek ways of making supply chains more resilient? I think in the short run that will be true because people have their existing supply chains based on calculations of low cost and reliability and so on. So people are going to have to move to a result that at least initially will not be optimal. There's another risk that companies in both countries have as well. American companies are concerned that the Chinese government will find other ways to show their displeasure at things that the U.S. government does. And so there are different types of retaliation that can take place, audits, inability to get licenses, inability to bring lawsuits or delays all around the board, investigations. And Chinese companies are afraid that some of the things they had originally planned to do in China wouldn't be as in the United States won't be as easily approved by the U.S. government either. So there's a whole range of possible effects that could come. And if you're a third country, you have to see how you're dealing with the United States, how you're dealing with China, and how you might be caught up in this. Maybe you're supplying to China for a product that's going to the states that will be subjected to a tariff. So it's a very complicated set of relationships that has to be assessed. Charles Lee, could you weigh in on this? Are you having those conversations already with companies that you're talking to? Yeah, I think that companies who...anything that can easily be moved on the margins are already happening. Anything that can happen that does not evolve a large part of the supply chain that you can independently move, people already begin to think about it. But anything that is deeply wedded into a very complicated global supply chain, it's very hard to move because you can't move independently. You have to really coordinate it with the entire parts of the overall supply chain. But the key here is not what the company wanted to do. The key here is that we are dealing with, for the first time as an industry, a governmental institutional way of the old way is breaking down. Now we are ruling everything by Twitter's now. So the companies have to really wake up every day, look at the Twitter. I think CNBC is no longer really the first thing they look, right? I think that they will be looking at Twitter's first. The 60 million follower, many of them are companies that are looking for policy guidance in the morning. So I think that obviously Twitter can change every other couple of weeks. So therefore there is also going to be a significant development of people's expectations because people have to develop some reliable way of being able to rely on policy. So if you keep on doing this, the government will do that. If you keep on doing that, the government will do that. Then you can start to really develop internal processes to cope with it. Today a lot of people are going to be talking about change. They need to really think about Plan B. Most of the Plan B are in the boardroom. I don't really think any of the real big Plan B is being executed. But the longer this uncertainty lingers, the more likely people will begin to put more serious efforts into the Plan B. Ambassador Yi, I've heard a lot in the interviews that we've been doing while we're here about Chinese companies now trying to find domestic substitutes or ways of perhaps cultivating industries that are less well developed than in other parts of the world to bring them up to a point where they could become viable substitutes. In particular, that was around questions on the chip sector this morning. But can I ask you is that process now of domestic substitution here in China inevitable because the one thing that I think has come out of this trade dispute that may not be repaired is the loss of trust between these two countries. So is it inevitable that China pursues this road towards domestic substitution? Well, from WTO point of view, our role is we have to make sure that both US and China abide by our rules. So we will not make any judgment on specific company or specific trade practice of those companies. But personally I think all the business needs some certainty, needs stability. So if the future bilateral agreement can provide that kind of certainty then not only Chinese companies but also US companies will benefit from that kind of outcome. But we care only about multilateral rules. You look like you want to come in on the back of that. Is that something that you would actively advise businesses to think about? I think this comes back to the question we were discussing earlier on about trade policy and national security. President Xi has said for three years that China should become self-sufficient in semiconductors. It's hard to argue with him when he can see the vulnerability to important Chinese companies of the US possibly cutting off supplies of key semiconductors. So it's hard to say that he shouldn't be doing that. On the other hand, if that means devoting large state resources to develop self-sufficiency then that goes against the principle of comparative advantage that the WTO is based on. And so you see a real contradiction between trade policy and national security. And that's part of the deeper challenge that we have to come to grips with and that it's not going to be easy to resolve. Can I comment on that? I think what worries us seeing the two elephants fight on the technology side is that what if we have to make a choice between two technologies. There's a bit of worry that you're going to have two technology zones that emerge and then that's really going to be very costly. And for countries like for instance Indonesia, 60% of our infrastructure is already Huawei. What if we are asked with pressure as well to say okay, you can't use that or otherwise something is going to happen to you. So I think this is really worrying and that's beyond the WTO rules. That's something that's not ruled yet. It's not governed yet. And I think that's another worry and that will really cause a lot of pain everywhere. And the domestic policy you were saying it pushes countries to try to build domestic capacity and that's a hardening of that position. And what's happening in China and in the US on that is sort of being influencing the policy makers in other countries as well. So then you're really affecting the supply chain in a major way. Is it as the economist on our panel, is it inevitable that a lower glide path for global growth is the outcome of persistent trade dispute between these two large powers? I think so. I think it's definitely the biggest downside risk right now because of the uncertainty. I think everybody outlined the uncertainty very well. I think the uncertainty is causing a lot of delay or delayed investment decision or as you were saying we have to wait till the next morning to know what the Twitter is going to say. I mean I've spoken to a lot of some of our Indonesian business people who have actually diversified their investment and they were already thinking of going to the US. And then they said oh wait a minute, wait a minute they haven't actually decided to impose the tariff so we better wait. And then now they have to wait again and how long do you wait or do you just take the risk and invest. So these are going to be very costly and at the end of the day it's consumers who are going to pay. And maybe that's the potential game changer is if the US economy actually starts to decline because of many of these trade issues and the consumers start protesting. There are some estimates out there for instance Peterson is estimating that if they actually put tariffs on all those products, an American consumer will pay $2200 more per year for their consumption. So that's going to hurt right? So maybe that's the game changer that will change the way we are going to deal with these issues. As an Indonesian is there not a little part of you that feels quite pleased that America is taking China on on some of these issues. Because let's face it not everybody has welcomed the Chinese approach to doing business around the world. Your near neighbors in Malaysia I think are having some issues at the moment. I wouldn't say it as an Indonesian probably more as an economist. I'm for rules based I'm for transparency and I think businesses are also for greater transparency. More fairer rules, less distortions, less role for state-owned companies and subsidies. I think we have that issue in Indonesia as well as a policy reform issue. But I would say that we would prefer for that to be dealt with in the WTO rules setting world rather than unilaterally by one country to another country. Well you brought us very neatly then to the last part of my panel discussion which is really what the future is going to look like now for the multilateral trading system or the way that we have traditionally thought about these WTO rules being set. It's dead isn't it? The Americans have buried it. No. Is it still the most useful and relevant way to resolve disputes between countries? I think so. I think our plan A is for the Americans to come back and agree on resolving the issue with the panel judges on the dispute settlement. The plan B we have always have to have a plan B. Then you just have, you change the name of the WTO to ITO, International Trade Organization. So the US can step out until they're ready to come back in in other words on dispute settlement. And you can actually do that. There are ways to do it. So you have to have a plan B. Let's not let them bring down the whole house for the rest of us. That's just on dispute settlement. But I think on all the other issues on the WTO, there are many issues there. But I think some of the new issues such as subsidies, actually industrial subsidies made it into the G20. But you also need to deal with agriculture subsidies. That can only be dealt with multilaterally. If you can't do it all the countries, then the approach is plurilateral. So not all the countries have to agree. Only those are who are ready. But those who are not ready need to be in the room to be in the negotiations to know what's going on so that they're also involved in the rule setting. The same thing is happening with e-commerce. As you know, there's a plurilateral agreement on e-commerce that's already in the works in the WTO. And if you're not ready to sign on, you can still observe so that you're not out of the picture in terms of setting the rules that's going to affect you. So that's one way. And probably the last thing I would add before I think you need to hear from our ambassador at the end there. I think the other thing is the big issue out there, which is also a US-China issue, is for developing countries to do more. And this is a big issue because developing countries, you have least developed countries, you have more developed countries, you have emerging economies. So emerging economies are expected to do more, to give more in the negotiations. And I think that's also another issue that we have to deal with if we're going to make WTO more relevant. Timothy Stratford, do you agree with that? Well, let me repeat a conversation I have with friends of mine who are EU trade officials, Japanese trade officials and trade officials from other countries. They say, we completely agree with the United States on the list of concerns you have about China's economic policies. But we're very worried with the tariffs you've gone outside the WTO system. This is very threatening and we're worried. And I say, I share your concerns. What do you think the United States should do differently? And they say, well, you should have more negotiations and dialogues with China. And I say, well, we tried that for 18 years and we didn't solve the problem. Why do you think it would solve the problem now when it hasn't solved the problem before? And then there's an awkward silence. And then they say, well, at least you've gotten the attention of the Chinese government. And we hope that something good comes of this. And I think that's where we are right now. I think we have to hope that these difficult issues will be solved by the two governments. And then we also have to hope that they'll be multilateralized again under the WTO system. I certainly agree that a multilateral system is a far better way to deal with these issues. But it seems that the WTO and the existing mechanisms just didn't get the job done. Hopefully, we can get the job done and get back into the system. And that's, I think, probably all of us are hopeful for that result at this point. Ambassador Yi, where does the WTO go from here? I mean, it's 25 years since the Uruguay round and any significant change in the rules. I think as we've heard from Mr Stratford, there's a great deal of frustration about the perceived lack of reform and adjustment to keep up with the way that China has grown and other countries have developed and shifted. How do we make this work if the two largest countries at the moment are not interested in hearing from the WTO? I think we need to do first, we need to update multilateral rules. I agree with you that the major trade reform of multilateral rules took place 25 years ago. But WTO did make some progress on issues like trade facilitation, ITA expansion and now they are negotiating on fisheries subsidies, e-commerce, domestic regulations of services. So I guess our members realize that now it's time for them to act. But, meanwhile, we have to understand that you cannot do major global reforms out of WTO. So that's why we encourage all our members, including the big guys, to have dialogue, to take serious action on reform and that's what we are seeing today in Geneva. I mean, our members are very seriously engaged, although they have not reached consensus or agreement yet, but they are very seriously discussing those issues. So we are hopeful that at the end, probably next year when we have next ministerial meeting in Kazakhstan, we will see some positive deliverables that may address part of concerns of what we are discussing today. In your opinion is it possible to persuade the United States to engage in that process as long as President Trump is President Trump? I'm not in the position to make that kind of comment, but we believe that it's in the US interest to continue to support the multilateral system and stay in the system to pursue their own national interest. I truly believe that. The pessimists would obviously point back to the 1930s and talk about the dangers of not having a cooperative trading system going forward. How seriously, Charles Lee, do you think we should take those warnings? I have greater confidence in US and China working out their own respective problems than the WTO's future. Because I think over the last 20 years, going back to almost like use this as a bicycle race, American first, Europe, China, Japan, and there is a very big imperative then to keep the order. And because America is safely ahead, everybody is behind, Americans breaking the wind, everybody take the benefit. Meanwhile, the rules need to be set so that people don't trip over each other and don't do stupid funny games behind. So WTO maintain perfect order for that bike team to keep on going along the mountains road. Today, Americans seem sensing China right behind. And it seems to believe that if you do not stop China today, it's just going to pass. Meanwhile, you start to see the bike is being specially designed and then there might be something that the suspect is giving its advantages. And maybe the biker is again drinking some Chinese medicine, whatever is the reason that he wanted to. I felt that this is no longer working anymore. Europe and Japan was enjoying China breaking the wind a little bit, but not happy about certain probably unfair advantages that they think China may have. But today, America's priority is no longer about taking this whole biker team onto the top of the mountain. It's actually about China imminently potentially passing it, whether that's really accurate or not remain to be seen. But that's really so that America is trying to really do this maneuver to see that we can squeeze and slow down. So, therefore, we will all get slowed down no matter what we want it. We will get slowed down as long as America felt that threat and does not feel that there is a safe distance. But the issue here is that American today is no longer one America, the two America. One America, they used to all take the benefit. Ordinary folks take all the cheap goods from China and if you go to any American household, even at the lowest income, they got everything they need. But today they felt that the whole system is such that all the benefit is going to the richer America. So the internal American conflict is now projected itself almost collectively onto China. So until that is resolved, so even if this thing get resolved, the lower part of America may no longer be happy. Because they just felt that even if a deal works out, even if we go back to old happy days, Wall Street is still taking too much, Silicon Valley is still taking too much. So, therefore, we still have to have all these fighters you can see in the democratic debates. So that ultimately is going to be the backdrop between what Americans would do or not do with China. And China is only on the receiving end of this cards game. China have a bunch of cards, but the Americans have the cards, the Americans are the one who is playing. We just have to, just whatever the cards comes out, we just have to play our own cards. And there's not a whole lot you can do about it. I suspect that's a view that will be very popular with a lot of people in this room. But doesn't it ignore the enormous trade imbalance that the two countries run with each other, doesn't it? Ignore the similarity between products that we see that are not legally copyrighted? I think I can't speak for the Chinese government. I'm Hong Kong little Hong Kong, right? But I think China realized that money wise, we probably owe Americans some money. Let's figure out how much. And two, we probably should not be drinking and smoking and we could stop, but let's talk. But the problem is you want more than that. Well, business advice and health advice at the same time. Sorry, that's one. You should not just focus on the imbalance in goods. You've got to put services in there. If you put services in there, the US actually has a surplus with many of us. You've made your point very well. Thank you very much for squeezing that in. I have been told by the organizers though I need to get some audience questions in. So put your hand up if you'd like to ask a question here. Can I get a microphone down here? One of these young ladies, the lady with glasses. She seems quite forcefully keen to ask a question. Could you tell us your name and who you represent? I'm Qing Ting. I'm from 21st century business hero. I'm journalist. My question goes to Mr E. Have you seen any positive signs to solve the problem of the appellate court with regard to WTO? And I also want to know, is WTO already preparing for some contingency plan just in case that we cannot find any solutions by the end of this year? And I also want to ask Madam from Indonesia because Malaysian Prime Minister said he is open to leaving India out of the RCEP negotiation. So are you aware of the Indonesian government's stance toward this issue? Thank you. Thank you very much for the questions. Let's see if we can get through those. Well, it's a very important issue and the biggest concern by maybe the most urgent concern by all members because by the end of the year in a few months if there's no agreement reached then the appellate body will stop functioning. That's a big concern and WTO will lose its tooth. But meanwhile as mentioned by Marie that members are discussing plan B although it's too early to see what kind of plan but they are discussing it. So I guess the best scenarios, I mean all members can reach agreement but in the worst case we will, I mean all members will not allow the dispute settlement system die completely. So that's the issue. And then the second question, I don't... You already answered it, plan B. I think you've covered it off, Professor, on India. For those of you who don't know what this is all about, it's about the negotiations that have been going on for six years now. The ASEAN plus one FTAs have been wanting to be consolidated as 10 plus six. That includes India, China, Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. And yes India has, one of the issues has been that India has been one of the difficult negotiating partners let's say to be very polite about it. And we are, this is the crucial year because the target is hopefully to complete negotiations this year because it's very important as I was saying earlier to send a signal to the world that despite all the uncertainties this region is continuing to open up. Now whether you want to leave out India or not, that's not for me. I'm no longer a trade minister or a trade negotiator but I think it's not unprecedented in ASEAN. We do have an ASEAN minus X kind of formula and it doesn't mean that we are leaving India out. It just means that if you can't get the agreement totally, you can step out until you can come back in to join. It's kind of the way we describe the pluriatrol but I'm not sure it's going to go that way. I think everybody is working very hard. I think right now one of the last ministerial will be in Beijing in early August so that's kind of the crucial turning point there. And I think I know that a lot of effort is being put to make sure that India can still come on board. Okay, let's get another question. There's a lady in the middle here. Can we get a microphone? There's a lady in the middle here who's got her hand up. If you can give us your name and where you're from. I'm a CEO of Development Reimagined. We're talking about world trade here and there is one region which has made major strides recently to increase trade. That's the African region and in particular through the agreement of the African free trade area which came into force at the end of May. I just wondered is there an opportunity for US China G20 to do something and even the WTO to reorient itself around that progress. Data released by my firm just last week, the G20 imports just 3% of its products from African countries. That is something that really needs to be changed if we're going to see the future of sustainable jobs in Africa. Thank you very much. Ambassador, maybe we can bring that question to you. Well, WTO is very friendly to developing countries, African countries and we try to facilitate a lot of programs to help African countries increase their exports. We are happy to hear the progress on their regional integration and we believe that it can be a stepping stone for the further multilateral progress. Now this week in WTO there is a comprehensive aid for trade review and the main topic is how to facilitate or help African countries to develop their own economies through trade. So I think we are doing our best but meanwhile I believe that the G20 and the major economies also should adopt more positive policy to increase their imports from Africa. Anybody else want to comment on this? Otherwise I'll go out to another question. There's a hand up just here. Thank you. Bojo from IHS market. Thanks for the host early survey in the room. It's obviously there's consensus in this room. There wasn't a conclusion by 2019. Given the sessions look beyond the China-US trade war I'm very curious of the panelist view on beyond 2019. So where do you see the China-US relationship including the trade war will go in 2020 and beyond. There are certain views that said once U.S. going into the election years and the dynamic could be very different and I'm very appreciated your take on this particular subject. Okay that's great. I think that's one for you. How does the U.S. election change the approach from the United States if at all? There are various possibilities of course. One possibility is that the government of China might decide that it would be easier to deal with another president and want to see the results of the election before they conclude a deal with President Trump. That's one possibility. Although I agree that whether you have a Democrat or a Republican in the White House the U.S. will never go back to looking at China quite the way they did before. So it's going to continue to be difficult. A new president might take a different approach that China might find easier to reach agreement. On the U.S. side President Trump will probably be looking at how the economy is doing. So far I think that he has seen delaying and showing that he's tough on China to be a winning political strategy. We have to see if maybe as he gets closer to the election if an agreement might give him a sort of boost that he would be looking for. So I think the election will play into it and there are various variables that might come to play but I think it will have an impact. Would you put any way at all on Charles Lee's analysis that this is about America fearful of being overtaken in the race for global power supremacy? If that is the case we're in this for a long time. Well I do think that we're in this for a long time but again you have to separate trade policy and national security concerns. I think the trade policy issues are valid and they need to be sorted out and those are neutral as to which country happens to have the best technology in any particular industry sector. Whether or not you're concerned about the cyclist behind you over passing you is more of a consideration of geopolitical factors. And I think that is going to be a factor and that's one of the reasons that separating out economics and national security is going to be difficult. Anybody else want to weigh in on this Ambassador? Give us your view. I know you're at the WTO but perhaps you could reflect a Chinese view on this. Well our position is as long as the biggest economies continue to commit to multilateral or based multilateral rule based system then we are happy. And I cannot make judgment whether the bilateral relationship will go back to honeymoon or it will get worse. I also think I think US election is a very big you know at least temperature resetter whether or not it's ultimately going to change the structure. Not hard to say but at least will change the dynamics of the conversation. But I think another very big thing which is more invisible but deeper is the rest respective pains that both countries will have to eventually experience. And how that pain how deep that pain is going to be how soon that pain arrives how spread out that pain can be felt by the different part of the population in both countries. That will ultimately feed back to the system because of the last 20 years. If you think China is dumping into the US on trade you could also see US is dumping capital into China because China is the best place. Where returns you know on your capital invested and you know you can never get anywhere where you can get that kind of ROEs. So therefore capital dumped here goods are dumped there both take huge benefit and has becoming the most convenient outlet of our domestic problems. And that sustained two countries until today. Obviously the gains from those dumping are not spread out equally in the respective communities and societies. And those underlying disparities and you know will now start to feed its way into it when this convenient outlet no longer available and you have to suck in the pain. And then depending on who is bearing the blunt of that pain and whether or not that segment of the respective society can feed that back into the system and the back into the policy that force the two countries to somehow adopt policy differently. That will be something that I think will be the biggest future game changer. I think it depends on as I said earlier what happens to the US economy apart from the election. If the US economy starts to show signs of slowing down then I think that's maybe a more positive sign of a deal coming through. And I think the second issue on the Chinese side what we have heard is that what's happening with the hard pressure from the US is the hardening of the position of the more nationalist compared to the reformist which will then also slow down the type of reforms that China needs to do to be able to satisfy the US. So I think it's very iffy what happens in 2020 but I would say that some of the issues can be solved unilaterally or bilaterally but a number of the issues need to be solved in a more multilateral way something like industrial subsidies. So whether or not we make progress and have a positive outcome also depends on what happens on some of the other issues which are outside of the bilateral negotiations. Timothy Stratford you want to come back in? I think it's going to take some time for these things to settle out and hopefully it's not a process of seeing which side is experiencing the most pain. I think both sides are going to experience pain because we're moving into suboptimal territory and I think if both sides are suffering pain then they'll be willing to sit back and say okay our initial solutions to the problems are not getting the best results for either country. Can we move a little bit closer towards a better result and that might have to do with how much does the US allow to be sold with Huawei instead of a complete ban. How do you take steps closer towards a more optimal economic relationship which will spill over into other aspects of the relationship as well. So I think that both countries will have the sense to do that. I don't think we're going to go to a worst case scenario and stay there. But I think it's going to take some time because the political processes in our countries and it takes time to make decisions, see the impact and then to make some adjustment. So I think we're moving into a process that might take three or four years but I'm more optimistic on the midterm that both governments and both countries will move into a better position. Okay well thank you very much everybody for coming along to our panel. I'd like to wrap it up at this point. I'd like to wrap it up at this point but come along next year. We'll have another go at getting you in. But they are very keen for me to wrap up on time here so let's do that now and if I could ask you to thank our panellists for their contributions. That was great. Thank you. Thank you. That was exciting. Thank you. I love your comparisons to the Twitter.