 Good morning. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I'm David Burto. I'm the director of our national security program on industry and resources here, and it's my pleasure and privilege to welcome you all this morning. I also want to welcome our viewers on the web, our viewers on C-SPAN, Pentagon, and so on. For those in the room, I'd like to remind you to turn off your cell phones and other noise makers. Those on the video again can do whatever you want. We can't hear you. And in fact, when we get to the question period, I want to remind you in the room, we're going to be using note cards and write down your questions. If you didn't bring a writing implement, let me know. We can get you one. We write a lot here. We're a think tank, but we're also a write tank. So we do a lot of writing. Those of you on the web can email me your questions at dburto at csis.org. That's D-B-E-R-T-E-A-U, burto like plateau or chateau at csis.org. And we'll use your questions depending on how good they are. It's a great privilege to have here this morning with us, General Halt Carlyle. General Carlyle is the commander of the Pacific Air Forces. He's got a long and distinguished Air Force career, graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1978. He's commanded at every level, squadron, group, wing, numbered Air Force, done a number of rough assignments, including astonishingly two as a legislative liaison with the U.S. Congress, which I would think is about the most dangerous and difficult assignments that we can give an Air Force officer these days. In addition, he's attended both Maxwell's, the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama and the National Security Management course at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. I had the privilege of running that program when then Colonel Carlyle was a star student at the Maxwell School. So we've asked him to present here this morning. Then we're going to turn it over in a dialogue with him and Dr. Michael Green. Dr. Green is our Japan Chair and the Senior Vice President of our Asia team here. And then we'll take questions from the floor and myself and Zach Cooper, our Senior Fellow for Asia. We'll also monitor these questions and feed our own as well in case you don't ask any. Although I look out at this audience, I don't think we're having trouble coming up and filling the time with questions here this morning, sir. So without any further ado, let me ask you to join me in welcoming General Hock Carlyle. Well, good morning everyone. It's great to be here. Hopefully everybody can hear okay in the back. So thanks. I appreciate the opportunity, David. Thank you very much, Michael. Thanks for having me here. I know the Chief talked here just a little while ago. I think a month or a month and a half or so ago. So I will try to, I know he covered Air Force to at large. I'm going to talk significantly about the Asia Pacific. And to be honest, I think I probably have not changed a slide. It should really say Indo-Asia Pacific. And in the Pacific AOR and certainly with Paycom, Sam Lockler and myself and all the components, we always talk Indo-Asia Pacific. The term we often use is we kind of cover from Hollywood to Bollywood and from penguins to polar bears because we have both the Arctic and the Antarctic and then of course the Alaska Coast California to the India-Pakistan border. The other thing I'd like to thank Michael and David for is asking me to present here after Must-Ask March was over. Mine was embarrassing. I openly admit that. There are pitchers. I've tried to burn them all. I haven't been successful, but we really, I did not do well. So I appreciate not having to have that when I was here. Some people haven't quite figured that out yet, David. You know, this topic, I'll do a couple things here, but I'm really looking forward to your questions. And I believe, and I truly believe the time I've spent out there and the amount of time I've spent in the Pacific, which is a greater portion of my career is, this really is the Pacific Century for the United States. It's been used before. I know Secretary Clinton said it a couple of times that it was even used in a PBS special back in the late 90s, but it really is the Asia Pacific Century for the United States. And it's for a variety of reasons. I think everybody pretty much knows them. The importance of the Asia Pacific to the future of the United States I don't think can be overstated, whether it's the economic, the trade ties, it's everything that is incorporated as part of that. Things as simple as it's simple. It's a TPP that is not necessarily simple, but Trans-Pacific Partnership. Just the size of the economies that are addressed in the Asia Pacific region. Five largest economies, obviously in the world, the United States, China, Japan, India, it's close, and then Russia. That alone speaks to the volume of importance. Also the trade, the amount of commerce that goes through there, and then the challenges we face there. So as I go through that, I'll try to cover all those things in the way that makes sense to folks, and I will try to make this work. Next slide. So as I said, what I'll do to start with, I'll kind of do a one over the AOR here, and we're not there yet. We were there. Okay, so I fly airplanes for living, and I can't work a clicker. So I'll tell you what, we'll leave it here. Hopefully we'll get to the next slide soon, but I'll kind of do one over the AOR. So some of the issues that we're dealing with, and we'll kind of start up in the Northeast Asia and work our way down, how am I doing so far? We'll work our way down to farther south and west as we go through this. So starting up in the Northeast Asia portion, certainly what's going on in Ukraine and Crimea is a challenge for us, and it's a challenge for us in the Asia Pacific as well as Europe. I had a conversation about a week and a half ago with Phil Breedlove for about two hours. He's not having a lot of fun, as you might imagine, but what Russia is doing in Ukraine and Crimea has a direct effect on what's happening in Asia Pacific. Some of the things we've seen is their long-range aviation, and the increase in that, those areas depicted in green, they've come with their long-range aviation and not the coast of California, they circumnavigated Guam, that picture there's an F-15 intercept and a bear that had flown down to Guam. The number of LRA long-range aviation patrols that have gone around the Japanese islands as well as around Korea have increased drastically and there have been a lot more on the way of ship activity as well. It's a combination of things, it's to demonstrate their capability to do it. It's to gather intel, obviously, in cases like full legal and the exercise we participate with both the Japanese and Republic of Korea. So a significant amount of increase in the activity from Russia in the Asia Pacific and we relate a lot of that to what's going on in the Ukraine. I think North Korea, everybody's pretty well versed in the things that have happened from the nuclear test, the threat of another nuclear test, what they're doing at Pyong Ry now, what they've done with restarting all their reactors, what they've done with their missile program, the KNO8, the intercontinental ballistic missile they're trying to develop, their launches, missile launches and space launches, the execution of Jang Song-Tek and that entire family in the purge within that government. Obviously, I will tell you that talking to Skaap Skaaparadi and Sam Locklear and I and all the components, that string for tension in the Korean Peninsula is truly as tight as it's ever been and it appears to be getting worse to us and to continue to be more and more of a challenge for us. As we work down, obviously, there's a couple things that have happened in the East China Sea. One is the East China Sea A-Disk declared by China. There's a challenge with that for three main reasons for the United States and our friends and partners in the region. The first challenge, obviously, is it was done with no consultation of any of the nations in close proximity. They didn't talk to Japanese. They didn't talk to the Republic of Korea. They didn't talk to anybody. They just developed it. So that was the first thing. The second thing was the rules to operate within that A-Disk do not follow international law. They don't follow IKO. There's rules that are not consistent with international norms. And finally, as part of their declaration of that A-Disk, there was an undefined threat. Basically, it says you follow our rules and you do what we tell you to do within that A-Disk. We have the right to use special defensive measures. Nobody's defined that, but that is laying out there. So the East China Sea and the declaration of that A-Disk is a challenge. You also have the potential for either a Yellow Sea A-Disk and a South China Sea A-Disk, which we imagine they're thinking about or maybe in the future at some point. But again, we've been very open with us and our allies talking about how that is not a good idea and that they need to do. If they're going to do anything like that, it has to be in consultation with their neighbors and other countries. Senkakus, there is a point also in that A-Disk where all three A-Dises overlap. I think most folks know that there's a triangle where the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China A-Disk all overlap. Underneath that is Sakaka Rock, which is a disputed territory between China and the Republic of Korea. We have the Senkakus, which is disputed between China, Japan, and Taiwan. Obviously all those little starbursts down there, all the different territorial disputes. Nine dashed line in the potential for South China Sea A-Disk is something we think about just about every day. The number of territorial disputes starting from the Kurau Islands all the way through the Spratlys and Paracels, down to South Lanconia Shoals, through a reef, you can read about all those challenges with respect to the disputed territory and how they're being solved. What the United States continually says, and we say in PAKOM, is that any of those disputes need to be solved in a peaceful manner under international laws, international rules, and through a peaceful resolution. The assertive and aggressive behavior of nations we do not believe is the acceptable way to solve those, and we continually reiterate that. Again, you can go through all the disputed areas as we walk down there. There's also the new Hainan Fisheries Law that basically takes about 2 million square kilometers in the South China Sea and applies a Hainan Fisheries Law to it, which means that any fisheries that come into there into international waters have to get clearance through the Hainan Fisheries Regulatory Commission again at his outside, what is an accepted, normal rule of law in international practice. The other challenges we face in the AOR include counter piracy. We have a fairly successful to date move in Straits of Malacca with multi-nation support out of Singapore, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United States. We have cut down drastically the number of piracy attacks within the Straits of Malacca, but they still exist and that's still an ongoing challenge. There's unrest in Bangladesh, which everyone's aware of. There's emergence of Burma and Burma Slash Myanmar and what that's going to look like as they continue to make progress as a stable nation and of course the political turmoil that exists in Thailand today between the potential for Prime Minister Ying Luk being removed potentially just her or her entire cabinet based on what the Constitutional Court says. On top of that, as I mentioned earlier the tyranny of distance, the terms we like to use in the Pacific is you can fit every land mass in the planet in the Pacific Ocean and still have room left over for the North American continent and other African continent. It's 17% of the land mass of the world with just about 60% of the world's population, which is a challenge in and of itself. On top of that, you have the Ring of Fire. It's called that for a reason. It's not a question as if there will be another natural disaster, it's rather when and where and our ability to respond to those, whether it's in Japan like the East Japan earthquake and tsunami or typhoon Haiyan and the Philippines or earthquakes or Indonesia wherever that occurs. And I guess at the end of this what I tell you I've walked through the AOR is that we have learned and we believe in the United States and certainly in Paycom that as we face these challenges that we are more required to be closer with our allies and partners. In other words as we face sequestration and budget reductions we face this number of challenges and the importance of this part of the world to the future of the United States. In fact, we need to be closer and closer to our allies and partners and friends in the region. We need to engage more. We need to be more forward presence as we continue through this. This is going to be a long briefing if we have to wait for all these slides. I have no idea how to make it go to the next slide. Okay, so the next slide is one that has several engagements that we are participating in and I think it goes to the point of the term again something we often use as a statement that virtual presence is actual absence. We've got to be forward in the AOR. We've got to engage last year or this year in fiscal year of 14 about 400 different engagements in the Asia Pacific region. Excuse me Indo-Asia Pacific region and everything we are doing there. The other thing that the U.S. soil depict you can probably see it up there but if you draw a line from Alaska down to Anderson over to Hawaii back up to Alaska commonly referred to by us as a strategic triangle it basically it's U.S. soil that projects into the Pacific that allows us to do power projection engagement and everything we need to do is we project that into the Pacific region. We also obviously have permanent bases in Japan and Korea and then we engage throughout the rest of Asia and we're moving more and more to the south and southwest as we engage more and more in Asia. You've heard some of the things that have happened recently. We're doing a force posture initiatives engagement with Australia where we get a rotational presence error. We're also we just sign the enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines we have presence in Singapore that we operate out of. We have a continuous engagement with Thailand and we're continuing to do that and one other thing I tell you is it's places not bases we're not building any more bases in the Pacific. We won't build any more bases in the Pacific but we will have a rotational presence. Back in the late great days of the Cold War we had a program called Checkered Flag where we would take stateside based units and we'd rotate them into Europe about every 18 months to two years. We are trying to do that and we're becoming successful in doing that in the Asia Pacific. About every 18 months to two years we intend to have just about every unit in Kona as if we can rotate through somewhere in the Pacific and obviously these are just an example of some of the places we're doing that. Red Flag Alaska, Red Flag Nellis are the high-end exercises. We also have Cope North trilateral exercise with the Japanese and the Australians of the United States. We also include a humanitarian assistance disaster response in that exercise. The Koreans participate in last year. The Filipinos are going to participate in that. New Zealand's going to participate in that once growing. We are continuing those exercise and we move farther west. Cobra Gold is the largest multi-service exercise the United States conducts. It's in Thailand with many nations. RIMPAC is about to happen out in Hawaii. I think 26 nations are going to participate in that to include the People's Republic of China. We'll participate in RIMPAC in July of this year and then Cope Taufan with Indonesia. We do Cope India with the Indians and we continue to move out. So the exercise right now to date we've done about 185 for this year, fiscal year and we have about 200 left as we move on. Next slide. So this slide worked well done. You might get promoted now. You're doing good. Thanks. So I won't spend a lot of time on this but this is what we call in PACAF, we call it the 3x5, the PACAF strategy. If you look at the far right of that slide, the objectives that our national command authorities give us, what Admiral Lockler expects me to do for him is be ready to do all those things. Contingency ops, free access to international environments both air and maritime, stability, prosperity and security in the region deter aggression and when called upon respond to defend United States interests and our allies. We use those five lines of operation as a senior airman in the Pacific. I kind of wear four hats on the joint force air component commander which means everything that flies within the Pacific theater is under the JFAC or the joint force air component commander. I also have the role of the area air defense commander which means 52% of the world's surface is unresponsible for defending as an area air defense commander which is one of our biggest challenges you might imagine. Space control authority and air space control authority. So those five lines going across those five lines of operation as we call them or lose are the five things that I have to be able to do every day in order to meet what the national command authorities and what Admiral Lockler expects me to do. Theater security cooperation is just what you would expect. It's engagement, it's phase zero it's building partnerships, building relationships, it's all those things you do to maintain access, maintain good relations and maintain the ability to interoperate with our friends, partners and allies. Integrated air and missile defense goes directly to the area air defense commander role and I will tell you it's one that bothers me every day. The largest missile arsenals in the world are Russia, China and North Korea in that order and most of them are pointed at either us or our friends and allies and so our ability to defend against a potential missile attack is one that is hugely a challenge and you can see that when you look at what North Korea does even today with respect to their growing missile arsenal. Power projection is exactly that. It's our ability to do global vigilance, global reach and global power anywhere in the world and my ability to do it in that 52% of the world's surface is to get whatever kind of asset I need in place in hours not days to be able to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to be able to provide mobility humanitarian assistance, disaster response and if called upon to put power projection capability into that theater in the way of global power. Agile flexible C2 is the other challenge I think I think about just about every day for the last decade and a half the United States hasn't really had to worry about command and control of our forces. If you look at what we've done in Iraq and Afghanistan everything more than about 80 feet off the ground we've owned and we've been able to do anything we want unfortunately in my AOR that's not the case. We'll be contested in a variety of ways. We'll be contested just for the start by the paucity of assets that exist in that theater. There are no comm satellites that exist in the Asia Pacific region is paltry compared to anywhere else in the world yet on top of that cyber attacks denied communications contested denied integrated environments and the ability to command and control. So how do you do flexible command and control? How do you go from centralized command to distributed control where you go down to nodes to control the forces that you have in the field and then how do you then do decentralized execution to meet the commander's intent and stay inside the decision loop of your adversary or potential adversary that you can operate faster than he can. And then finally the last line of operations are incredible airmen. 45,000 airmen that exist in the Pacific theater I will tell you the greatest asset this nation has. If you want to gain faith in America or America's youth just walk out to the flight lines, the shops, the offices, they're incredible and they will dazzle you every day. My job in life is make sure they're taking care of and everything I can do to make sure them and their families are taken care of and that's the final kind of operation that we have in Pacific. On the left hand side is the ways that we go about doing that. So expand engagement again is just that it's kind of the heart of theater security cooperation. It's our ability to engage it's forward presence, it's key leader engagements, it's training exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, interoperability it's ability to do all those things. In time of sequestration increase in combat capability is hard so how do you do that? It means that every single dollar you spend you have to make sure that it is the dollar that's going to give you the most capability because you may not have another dollar to spend. Today I believe that we have more mission than we have money, manpower, or time and it's going to stay that way as I see it for the foreseeable future. So our ability to focus our efforts to get the most out of everything we're doing with our airmen and with our money and with the time that we invest has got to be to give us a greatest capability. And then finally the integration warfighter integration is for the Air Force, it's airspace and cyber and how do we integrate those three across all of them? It is across the joint force, how do we do air sea battle how do we do integrated air and missile defense, how do we take the advantage of the stealth type platforms like submarines and F-22s and F-35s and combine them with higher visibility platforms and get the most combat capable we can possibly get and it's integration amongst us and our allies. When the Australians buy with their buying the P-8 Triton the F-35 as well as they've also announced that they're going to buy 58 F-35s, the Japanese are going to buy them, so how do you integrate with those partners and then how do you bring the lower capability partners, the Philippines to the greatest capability you can integrate and operate with them at the same time. Next slide. So I know, we'll get to questions here shortly, I'll go through these fairly quickly. I know watching people's travel photos is not everybody's greatest time, you probably don't want to do this, but I'll go through just a couple of pictures of some things we've done and I think it's indicative of the engagements that we're doing in the Asia-Pacific. This is General Welsh and myself, we visited China back in the fall of this year. It's the first Chief of Staff visit to China for 15 years, 1998 was the last time and that's the chief sitting in a J-10. It was a great engagement it was enlightening, it was constructive, it was substantive, it was enlightening. I've been in China in 2009 and I hadn't been back since, so four years later and I will tell you folks, I was dazzled by the change. It was amazing, if there's any doubt in anybody's mind that China is on the rise, there shouldn't be because it definitely is and it was obvious in the way they conducted themselves and we got to see a lot of their military operations and just in the cities we visited writ large. There's also a level of confidence and I think probably an extremely high level of confidence by the PRC, their military and their civilian leadership. We did have a chance to meet both General Ma, the head of the Air Force and Vice Central Military Commission, one of the vices of the Central Military Commission, the former Chief of the Air Force, General Shu, so it was a very substantive visit. I think at the end of the day we all walked away saying that the military forces of China and the United States have the opportunity to operate significantly more in close proximity to each other in the future and that will only grow over time. The opportunity for miscalculation is great and our ability to deal with that, to deal with those frictions, we must and can do a better job of managing that friction because the potential is there for something bad to happen and we don't want something like another P3 in the Heinen Island incident that happened before. So it was a great visit. We got to visit many places, got to see quite a bit of their equipment, spent a lot of time with their military and again it was obvious that the nation is doing exceedingly well. Next slide. Obviously Australia is our close partner. We fought side by side with the Australian since World War I and we still are today. It is an amazing relationship again just if you look at what their interoperability was and their procuring for their nation, their ability to operate. Benny Binskin has just been named. He's an airman as the new chief of defense force for Australia and Jeff Brown has been extended for years. They're chief of the air force. That's all great news for the United States, both great folks and a great relationship with the United States. I went to the air power symposium. This is the air power symposium we went to. It was fantastic. Many nations were represented there, all of our allies and many of our friends and partners throughout the region. It was incredibly valuable. A picture on the lower right hand corner is kind of a neat story. Those are a set of twins from a guy named Flight Officer Mobsby. He was an Australian RAF pilot that flew with the 90th squadron, the U.S. squadron, B-26s out of Papua New Guinea. In World War II he was killed in a very dangerous flight. The rest of the flight got silver stars. He did not. His family kept up the petition for that and I was able to award the silver star to his two daughters. They never met their father. They don't remember him. They were born about six months after he deployed. Pretty neat story. But the relationship with Australia is the strongest it's ever been and growing stronger all the time. Next slide. Got to go to Vietnam. Went to Hanoi, Da Nang and then Saigon slash Ho Chi Minh City. They still call it Saigon by the way. They don't call it Ho Chi Minh City very often. But they use both names interchangeably. It was a great visit. I will tell you that General Hoa, the Chief Staff of their Air Force, very open and welcoming. The entire country was. They were noticeably appreciative of our efforts to engage with them. There are legal ramifications. There's things we have to watch by law with what we can do with the Vietnamese. There's many areas where we can grow that relationship. It was incredibly productive. We are looking at a couple of things using some of the mobility assets and flying through Da Nang. There's some training environments that we're looking at potentially being able to help them with. That picture on the right is a Pacific Angel. We do those four or five times a year. We've done them in Vietnam in 2009, 10, 12 and 13. Pacific Angels are events where we take doctors and dentists, veterinarians, engineering capability and we go to a place that needs some help. We do huge medical engagement. We do engineering engagement and probably as valuable as we bring in the host nation's military and government officials to increase their visibility with their own population. So it's very valuable and has a positive response. Thailand, obviously another of our treaty allies. Five of seven treaty allies the United States have are in the Asia Pacific region, Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, Thailand. This is the end of Cope Tiger. It's a trilateral exercise with Singapore, the United States and Thailand. Again, hugely successful. It's been going on since 1994. We also have a very big one that I mentioned earlier and that's Cope North with the Japanese and Australians in Anderson. Next slide. And finally, this is the Pacific Air Chief Symposium. We had 14 Pacific Air Chiefs that met me in Hawaii. Then we traveled throughout the United States. It's General Welsh is the host of it and I get to escort him throughout the United States. Incredibly valuable. Again, 14 Air Chiefs from throughout the region. The picture in the upper right hand corner is at the USS Arizona. Down on the lower left is the Boneyard in Davis-Montham and then F-35 at Eglin. Tremendous engagement. Tremendous opportunity to spend time with these Air Chiefs. Hear their problems and spend time with them. And I think at the end of this what I would tell everyone and kind of the thesis or the basis of this whole talk is, as we face problems, budgetary problems that we have and we see sequestration of those things, in fact our relationship with our friends and partners and allies has got to get closer. We have to pull them closer and get greater understanding of each other's challenges and issues and become more and more interoperable and integrate our forces closer and closer as we move forward. Next slide. So the takeaways I'll leave you with and then be more than happy and I look forward to answering your questions. The rebalance in the Pacific, it's alive and well. I think, I know people talk about is it actually happening and during sequestration did it happen? Yeah, it happened. I think the amount of engagement we're doing has gone up drastically. It is the effort the emphasis, whether it's the President's trip, Secretary Hagel, Secretary Kerry, it's Admiral Locklear and his moves throughout the AOR. It is certainly an active and the rebalance is fully engaged. We were slowed down by sequestration. Frankly, I will tell you in 13 we had to cancel some exercises that cost us terribly. We had to cancel the exercise in which the red flag, Nellis that the Indians were going to participate in and that was a devastating blow to me. I will tell you and it was something that we regret still but we have made it up. They're going to participate in FY15 and so we're continuing. I think we've managed it as best we could and as we went into 14 we were able to go back to kind of the full engagement scenario and the full engagement setup. We had to shrink footprint a little bit just because of the reduction in budget. Overall I think it's going well. The key to this whole thing is relationships. It's about building those relationships. When we talk theater, security cooperation, it's all of that. It's from subject matter expert exchange to key later engagement to exercises on the grand scale to smaller exercises to everything we can do. So with that next slide I think that's it. That's questions and I appreciate your attention. I told David before this that I hope that I finish speaking before you finish listening. I hope that worked out for you and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much. So while they're moving the podium back if you have written questions raise your card up. We've got staff. Actually it's probably the guys moving the podium but as soon as they're finished moving the podium they'll come pick up your questions and get them up to us and with that I'll turn it over to Dr. Green. Thank you General and thank you all for your patience with our technology. We will be posting the general slides on the CSIS website www.csis.org. That was a very robust and busy. Or too long. No, no, no, robust and busy and concise agenda for engagement and it prompted me to ask at first if I could a broad question about the culture of the Air Force and the philosophy of the Air Force because historically in my view the Air Force has sometimes sent mixed signals. In the 90s you had this idea of elegant presence. When I was in the NSC there was the idea of deep strike. So at times historically it seems like the Air Force has approached forward presence and engagement a little more with a little more distance than some of the other services but what you're describing is quite different so I wonder if you could put it in some historical context for where you see the Air Force overall as it thinks about the Pacific. Yeah, I'd be more than happy to. So I'll kind of go to my history and what I grew up with and then where I see it today is kind of what I mentioned with the checkered flag mentality. When I was there's some of us in here that were part of our Air Force during the late great days of the Cold War but we, Holloman, I station at Langley and we rotated through Europe continuously and it was called checkered flag. It was to figure out where your forward operating location was and what would happen when the great full of gap war occurred and how we'd respond to that and air power was a key component to that obviously. Well the Pacific is kind of, we're taking that same kind of model in some ways in that it's more about engagement, it's more about security and stability and it's more about forward presence and goes to that actual presence not virtual presence so no more places I mean no more bases but more places so our ability to go operate out of pick a couple of places in the Philippines Cubie Point or Clark, our ability to go operate out of Taiwan, Singapore and Singapore, our ability to operate out of Karat in Thailand. It's that rotational presence and I think you'll see we know Europe, the dry down in Europe I believe that's as small as it could possibly go. I don't think you can get any smaller. The Middle East there will be presence there for a long time, forward presence there for a long time certainly as we see it in the foreseeable future at the main bases that we're operating out today out of the Middle East and in Asia, it's the same thing. I think our presence there, the bases we have will maintain the newest technology as they have so far the newest stuff when it shows up it goes to the Pacific. Those bases will stay at the robust state that they're at now, I believe they will and certainly in the foreseeable future and then we'll continue that rotational presence and we do it today with theater security packages and continuous bomber presence, we'll do the same thing in the future. So you'll see the expeditionary air force is one that we post 1991, we've been working continuously, we've had some hiccups whether it hasn't always gone exactly like it should but the expeditionary air force and our ability to get out of town and get someplace rapidly and operate there is one that we're continuing to expand on and it's certainly viable in the Asia Pacific and part of that is tyranny of distance alone. I love my Navy brethren, they do incredibly great things for us but they travel in days that we travel in hours so when you're talking about that size AOR you have to be there rapidly and the ability to respond to hours makes a difference. Let me try to put a little fuel in that inner service rivalry and note that Admiral Greenert at the western Pacific Naval Symposium with his colleagues reached what could be a significant agreement on how to handle unintended or unexpected incidents at sea. The PLA Navy announced that it doesn't cover the east and south China seas for the ink was dry but still that was a pretty impressive outcome for the western naval symposium. For the Pacific Air Chiefs and as you look at your engagement what kind of confidence building measures could you foresee coming out of these kinds of discussions particularly since as you noted in the east China sea we're talking seconds in the air not minutes days or hours as we would with Coast Guards or Navy. Well there's a couple things and I think part of it is and this is part of the reason we're in China is that interaction and it was a constructive visit and in many ways I think the PRC is very open to some of these discussions but when you look at what happens in the aid is today and whether it's not LRA from the nations or it's scrambled in response by the PRC you know there's cases where we have many airplanes in close proximity. There was a point last year up off the peninsula off the Korean Peninsula where we had air forces from North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the United States and they were all within close proximity and fortunately the only people that knew who everybody was was us and part of that's that sharing information sharing. We're trying to work on that to increase that information sharing so that we have a common picture that's one way that we can start addressing some of that is try to continue to work on that common picture and the information sharing with respect to what's going on and then confidence building maneuvers is engagement interoperability the potential for hotlines which is some of the ones that have been talked about it's notification for something out of the ordinary or exercises things that's going to happen so all of those are things we're working on to increase the understanding because there is a high potential for miscalculation and that's one of the things that is very concerning to us. Good thank you. You posed the question in your presentation how do we integrate with our allies and partners particularly as high end partners like Japan and Australia are integrating F-35, high end partners are doing missile defense, these are more expensive the depot maintenance is more complicated and expensive interoperability and links are more important so you posed the question I wanted to throw it back at you and ask how do we or how do you foresee integrating these different alliances of partnerships recognizing their political sensitivities these are all bilateral alliances but the capabilities are becoming networked or should be networked. Well I think one thing we're working hard on is going from bilateral to multilateral so that's part of it we had the red flags where we'll get multiple nations and in recent past last year we had very successful red flag where we had the Republic of Korea and Japan were both there the Republic of Korea deployed fighters off of the peninsula for an exercise for the first time in their history hugely successful as a matter of fact we had all three command and control platforms operating together which is unheard of presenting the picture so very successful in that respect I think the equipment interoperability is one that in some cases is a challenge we're getting better at that I think some of the most recent announcements from some nations and the kind of equipment they're going to procure that makes it easier I think it's the symposiums we get a lot of understanding and also some of the information passing in the exercises for how you can it's great to talk about it but actually exercise and go out and try to do it and we do that in Cope Tiger with Thailand and Singapore we do it in Cope North with Japan and Australia we do it in Max Thunder with the Republic of Korea in the Korean Peninsula we do it we've had some integrated air and missile defense exercise with the Japanese where we've looked at that interoperability and that information sharing so it's it's a continuous process you never finish you have to keep working at it I think that's probably you can never say we're interoperable that doesn't exist you always have to work at it and continue to do it but I think some of the things we're doing with respect to engagements key leader engagements exercises war games we're getting better and better at it as we go forward we uh if I can engage in a brief moment of self advertising we have a project here at CSIS across our defense security and regional programs looking at what John Hammery calls federated defense and knowing when the technology is more complicated when you have countries like Japan relaxing their sort of out of date export control rules countries like Australia and India interested in doing more with Japan and with Korea and other that you have an opportunity there to get more deterrence for your money and jointness interoperability combined capabilities are our deterrence and our thought is it even expands beyond that to confidence building when you start focusing on interoperability as you said do we have some card questions ready the questions have been pouring in so including those from viewers on the web so I'm going to merge a few together into a multiple set if you will the first actually there's a whole series of questions about China and your comments about how rapidly they've moved forward and how we engage with them etc but their questions sort of tend to fall down are they really an expansionist power or in fact are they sticking with as a regional guard their flank sort of thing what do you look for in terms of the signals because clearly we have to prepare for either way what do you look for in terms of signals they say and including for instance what would be a response to the creation of a second ADIZ over the South China Sea that's not the whole point of the question it's really the broader what do you look for from expansionist tendencies versus cooperative tendencies well I think there's a couple things that I talked about first of all there is if you look at the declaration of the East China Sea ADIZ you look at the development of their aircraft carrier CV-16 you look at their mission action some of the exercises they've done that have gone significantly farther out to what they call the second island chain the first island chain obviously being the closer in with the second island chain out farther so and they've continued to expand their ability to operate farther and farther away so we see that all the time same thing in the South China Sea with their ability to operate farther and farther south I think the territorial disputes and the way that they're being handled is one that is that we have concern over I think the nine dashed line the ability to solve that in a peaceful manner within international on international norms that's one that clearly we think about we haven't really seen and I'm not a lawyer so I won't make any comments but the legal basis for their nine dashed line I'm not sure that a lot of people understand where their legal basis is or if it exists there so with respect to that there is a look that China is continuing to move to be able to solve those disputed islands so that part of it is concerning with respect to what they're doing on the same hand their engagement is they are participating in RIMPAC this year they just had the western naval symposium they've just so they are engaging and I think the issue for us is our ability and they talk about it with the type of relationship the United States and the PRC has and that is that an existing world power and a rising power and how do you operate together and solve disputes in a peaceful manner under international on international norms so I think there are indications that they are continuing to try to solve those in an aggressive assertive way so we would not agree with some of the things they've done in relation to both Malaysia and the Philippines would be disconcerting and we think that's the wrong way to go and then there's other cases where they're engaged and things are handled in a more appropriate way so I think it's it's kind of the national strategy with China which I'm not sure I mean that's a I'm not sure how you would answer if the two United States national strategies with respect to the PRC so there is a there is kind of a case where we're looking at both sides of that challenge is that there is some kind of movement to territorial game. I'm going to again merge a number of questions together and you can take them as you wish. One is Dr. Green referred to a lot of bilateral engagements as well and most of your examples were sort of bilateral in their description but there's probably a way to defense in other ways and opportunity for trilateral, multilateral operations as well so one is how are you and Pacific Air Force thinking at a multilateral level or trilateral level. The second is as you surveyed the region there's one big country that you didn't mention at all now technically it's not inside your AOR but it's got an awful long Pacific boundary that of course is Russia so talk a little bit about how you calculate Russia into your thinking as well. Yeah I think maybe I didn't talk about it enough but our going from bilateral to multilateral is we're doing we're working very hard on that. Cope North is one at Anderson right now it's Japanese Australians in the U.S. on the HADR portion the humanitarian assistance disaster response the Koreans are now the Republic of Korea is now participating New Zealand's participating we'll probably have the Philippines participate next year. Cope Tiger is Singapore, Thailand and the United States as I mentioned Red Flag Alaska we had the Republic of Korea and the United States and Australia there as well as us Red Flag Nellis we're having significant larger exercises so Pitch Black we're going to participate with Australia and Pitch Black with F-15E's and there are going to be folks from many nations there I think to include Singapore and Thailand and Indonesia I believe so we're working very hard on the multilateral and the Federated Defense and you've heard General Wells talk about it as we face the challenges we face in the future we have to pull our friends closer and rely more on that ability to operate together and to do things together so I think we're making good positive response on that. The second question was I talked about the long range aviation and what they're doing there they are becoming increasingly active in the Pacific and they do have a long as a matter of fact it's not an RAOR but it is because we think about it all the time we have forces in Alaska the closest point of approach between the United States and Russia and how we operate up there with our Alaska Norad region and what we're doing as they continue to expand into the Asia Pacific there are things that are concerning with respect to how they operate and how transparent they are with other nations in the vicinity Japan's doing some engagement and I think they have some positive momentum but it's something that we basically consider the Russia I mean we deal with it as part of our area of responsibility just because that Pacific boundary they are there there are concerns and I will tell you that what's happening in the Ukraine today is causing some significant concerns into Asia Pacific How do you respond to those concerns? You know I think it's twofold one is there's the very aggressive act by the Russia on the Crimean what they're doing in eastern Ukraine for many nations that have real disputes are internal unrest I mean PRC being one they have unrest challenges they face in Xinjiang in Tibet in Taiwan so in some ways that's disconcerting to them because of internal unrest and then in other ways quote unquote the ability to take what they believe is rightfully theirs in some method other than under international law then that's something that's concerning together in the spectrum I think the belief in what Ed Milakler and all of us do is spend more and more time reassuring allies that cooperative defense our ability to operate together our ability to build security and stability is really dependent upon how well we work together and how well we engage as teammates as we go forward so predominantly when we respond it's we'll be we're here we've always been here we'll continue to be here and we'll continue to operate with you and work together as partners you mentioned the getting the exercises back on track after some hiccups as a result of sequestration in fiscal year 13 historically one of the big lessons that comes out of exercises is lessons about logistics and no theater faces logistics challenges like you do in the Pacific so what are your big concerns about logistics what roles can our allies and partners play in helping the logistics and then what happens if things like the lower number of the fit up come to pass and we don't have KC10 so that just complicates things even further yeah I mean the lesson of logistics is not lost on anybody in my opinion and certainly nobody in the Air Force because the ability to supply the forward force to engage is one that you have to have logistics trained to be able to support that and the biggest concern for me obviously is attorney distance is one of them and the other part of it is command and control of those logistics capability because you know those networks potentially can be degraded denied disrupted and deceived and so our ability to operate the command and control of logistics and then have the ability to move it forward part of it is that interoperability with our friends partners and allies and how we potentially position things one of the things as a result of the enhanced defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines is to put humanitarian distance disaster response supplies forward which you know that's a nature made disaster that has the same problems if you remember during the great east Japan earthquake and tsunami calm was shut off to the Korean Peninsula because of the fiber that was broken so that can happen for a variety of reasons it can happen by ill intent or it can happen by natural disaster so command and control of that the logistics chain and how you do that again I think agility and that's why we talk about agile flexible command and control that's also we have to talk about agile flexible logistics and our ability to put stuff in the right place and interoperability with friends and partners is part of that our closest allies certainly our treaty partners as well as other nations in the AOR but Australia Japan Korea Singapore Thailand some of those are very close and our ability to operate the logistics with their aid and as we work as a team that's going to be part of the solution but command and control is one of the things that I think about most when it comes to logistics you're raising of the Philippines agreement that was announced last week brings into question some of the broader issues of dispersal as a tactic and heartening as a preparation if you will I think you've referred to that in the past as resiliency you know how do you describe your thoughts on resiliency and how your strategy on resiliency works with engagement as well as with with planning I think it's their hand in hand resiliency and our engagement our access is part of that discussion the basic premise obviously is that if you have a few number with a large concentration of capability those become vulnerabilities so in the past if you had a huge amount of force at Anderson and huge amount of force at Kadena those two that becomes a vulnerability so the ability to disperse and move forces throughout the theater if required for whatever case you're responding to gives you more flexibility it also removes some of those vulnerabilities of large concentrations tremendously large concentrations small area now there's a balance there as well because every place you are you have to also be able to support logistically and defend so the resiliency is the ability to move things to multiple locations while at the same time being able to defend them and support them logistically and that's a balance that so it's you don't you know put one airplane at 72, one single airplane at 72 different locations so you have three squadrons of airplanes but you probably don't put 180 at one place necessarily either so it's that ability to move them out and it is the resiliency pieces there's a passive defense which is that ability to move out it's hardening it's runway repair it's fuel storage and then it's also your ability to move stuff and support that can I ask you while we're piling the hard problems on can I ask you generally say something about cyber and space how does a regional component commander develop strategies and operational concepts and so forth for what is you know two problems space and cyber that don't really know boundaries where attribution can be hard in the cyber case there's a lot of it about what you do with allies and partners can you say a bit more about how in a regional context you deal with these sort of problems that no-no boundaries and they're in different domains and some of it is developing over time one is cybercom and what General Alexander did and Major General Williams and those folks in presenting what's called the cyber command and control model for the department of defense as it interacts with other departments within the US government so there's it is a complex man made domain that we have to figure out how to operate and if you talk cyber there's the ability to support your own networks there's ability to defend yourself and then there's offensive either soft kill or hard kill kinetic or non kinetic type of attacks you can do in the cyber domain so all of that is overlaid by authorities you have and don't have so when when Sam Locklear sits down with his what's called cyber pack the pacific cyber element and the cyber support element CSEs that operate within each one of those components then we start building our ability to predominantly defend our own capability our own command and control capability which includes to some extent reaching out getting out beyond our boundaries to see what's out there before it gets to our boundaries so it's defensive but it has some offensive mindset to it in a way at least in trying to figure out what's out there and then our ability to deny potential adversary his ability to use that and that is cases which within which are within the authority of a co-com combatant command and ones that are not and then there's active cyber that you're going to go out and take out other portions and how you operate that it's incredibly difficult as a nation for us to figure that out and certainly as a combatant command I will tell you that in my opinion on the international front working with allies and partners it becomes an order of magnitude more difficult because of authorities in some of our closest allies we you know and there's very few of those in the five eyes for example we are working those issues but it is the cyber discussion is a huge challenge. You mentioned also shortages in ISR and although I don't think you used the word shortages but challenges in ISR capability if you will what are you doing across there and in particular what role does global hawks play in both the U.S. and Japan and how's that going? Well it's going well the global hawk is the assets doing great it's moving to Masawa at the end of this month and at the end of May and it's going to operate out of Masawa to get out of the typhoon belt for the summertime and we think we'll probably get 60 70 percent greater utilization by moving and operating out of Masawa. There's other nations that are interested either buying them or looking for them and obviously the Australians just announced that they're going to buy the Triton, the BAMs or the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance equivalent of that. It's a key component but the rivet joints are a key component. The JSTAR is a key component. The U2 in fact is a key component of that. So it's I will tell you across the board and certainly with Sam Locklear and the Pacific Command if they had one more dollar to spend they would go out and buy more ISR. If we get relief in anywhere they'll go and buy more ISR because that's the thing they feel like they have the least of. We are getting better at using all the capability we have. We have a JSTAR in the Pacific for the first time for the entire year this year. PH are in theater now which is fantastic. P3 and EP3 and to include the LSRS. All of those capabilities are being integrated. We're doing some great work with our ability to use multiple platforms together on what we call cross queuing. So we're getting better at it and we're trying to take advantage of every little piece we have but we never have enough. You have a heck of a job. You're trying to understand where technology is going and marry that to a region where a lot of us who spend a lot of time in the region are trying to figure out where the region is going. But it sounds like a comprehensive strategy. We wish you the best of luck and very much appreciate your joining us here today. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks Michael. Thanks Kyle.