 Prologue and Question 1 of Summa Theologica-Paris Prima Initial Questions. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica-Paris Prima Initial Questions. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Prologue. Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct beginners, according to the apostle, as unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat. We purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments, partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject matter, but according as the plan of the book might require or the occasion of the argument offer, partly too because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers. Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try by God's help to set forth whatever is included in this sacred science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow. Question one, the nature and extent of sacred doctrine. To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this, there are ten points of inquiry, whether it is necessary, whether it is a science, whether it is one or many, whether it is speculative or practical, how it is compared with other sciences, whether it is the same as wisdom, whether God is its subject matter, whether it is a matter of argument, whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes, and whether the sacred scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses. First article, whether besides philosophy any further doctrine is required. Objection one, it seems that besides philosophical science we have no need of any further knowledge, for man should not seek to know what is above reason, seek not the things that are too high for thee, but whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science, therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous. Objection two, further knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, say what is true and all that is is true, but everything that is is treated of in philosophical science, even God himself, so that there is a part of philosophy called theology or the divine science as Aristotle has proved. Therefore besides philosophical science there is no need of any further knowledge. On the contrary, it is written, all scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct injustice. Now scripture inspired of God is no part of philosophical science which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge that is inspired of God. I answer that it was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly indeed, because man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason. The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee. But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation because the truth about God such as reason could discover would only be known by a few, and that after a long time and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation which is in God depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason there should be a sacred science learned through revelation. Reply to Objection 1. Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless once they are revealed by God they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues. For many things are shown to the above the understanding of man. And in this the sacred science consists. Reply to Objection 2. Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion that the earth for instance is round, the astronomer by means of mathematics that is abstracting from matter, but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science so far as they can be known by natural reason may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy. Second article, whether sacred doctrine is a science. Objection 1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science for every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of fate which are not self-evident since their truth is not admitted by all. For all men have not faith. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. Objection 2. Further, no science deals with individual facts but this sacred science treats of individual facts such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. On the contrary, Augustine says to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened. But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science. I answer that sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science. Thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and the blessed. Hence just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God. Reply to Objection 1, the principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science. As such we have said are the principles of sacred doctrine. Reply to Objection 2, individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine not because it is concerned with them principally but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives as in moral sciences and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based has come down to us. Objection 1, it seems that sacred doctrine is not one science for according to the philosopher that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects but the creator and the creature both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects therefore sacred doctrine is not one science. Objection 2, further in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and human morality but these belong to separate philosophical sciences therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science on the contrary holy scripture speaks of it as one science wisdom gave him the knowledge of holy things I answer that sacred doctrine is one science the unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object not indeed in its material aspect but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object for example man as stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored and color is the formal object of sight therefore because sacred scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science reply to objection one sacred doctrine does not treat of god and creatures equally but of god primarily and of creatures only so far as they are referable to god as their beginning or end hence the unity of this science is not impaired reply to objection two nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality as the object of the common sense is whatever affects the senses including therefore whatever is visible or audible hence the common sense although one faculty extends to all the objects of the five senses similarly objects which are the subject matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated up by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation so that in this way sacred doctrine bears as it were the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple yet extends to everything fourth article whether sacred doctrine is a practical science objection one it seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the philosopher but sacred doctrine is ordained to action be ye doers of the word and not hearers only therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science objection two further sacred doctrine is divided into the old law but law implies a moral science which is a practical science therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science on the contrary every practical science is concerned with human operations as moral science is concerned with human acts and architecture with buildings but sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God whose handiwork is especially man therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science I answer that sacred doctrine being one extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect namely so far as they can be known through divine revelation hence although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both as God by one and the same science knows both himself and his works still it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts though it does treat even of these latter in as much as man remain by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss this is sufficient answer to the objections fifth article whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences objection one it seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude but other sciences the principles of which cannot be doubted seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine for its principles namely articles of faith can be doubted therefore other sciences seem to be nobler objection two further it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher as music depends upon arithmetic but sacred doctrine does in a sense depend for Jerome observes in his epistle to Magnus that the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers that they'll know us not what more to admire in them their profane or addition or their scriptural learning therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences on the contrary other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one the wisdom center maids to invite to the tower I answer that since this sciences partly speculative and partly practical it transcends all others speculative and practical now one speculative sciences said to be nobler than another either by reason of its greater certitude or by reason of the higher worth of its subject matter in both these respects science surpasses other speculative sciences in point of greater certitude because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason which can air whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge which cannot be misled in point of the higher worth of its subject matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason while other sciences consider only those things which are within reasons grasp of the practical sciences that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose as political science is nobler than military science for the good of the army is directed to the good of the state but the purpose of this science so far as it is practical is eternal bliss to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed and so it is clear that from every standpoint it is nobler than other sciences reply objection one it may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths but to the weakness of our human intelligence yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things as is said in day Animalibus reply to objection two this science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences not as though it stood in need of them but only in to make its teaching clearer for it accepts its principles not from other sciences but immediately from God by revelation therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher but makes use of them as of the lesser and as handmaidens even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials as political of military science that it thus uses them as not due to its own defect or insufficiency but to the defect of our intelligence which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason from which proceed the other sciences to that which is above reason such as are the teachings of this science sixth article whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom objection one it seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom for no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom seeing that the wise man directs and is not directed but this doctrine borrows its principles therefore this science is not wisdom objection to further it is part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences hence it is called the chief of sciences as is clear in ethics but this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences therefore it is not the same as wisdom objection three further this doctrine is acquired by study whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom on the contrary it is written this is your wisdom and understanding in the site of nations I answer that this doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom not merely in any one order but absolutely for since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order thus in the order of building he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones as a wise architect I have laid the foundation again in the order of all human life the prudent man is called wise in as much as he directs his axe to a fitting end wisdom is prudence to a man therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe namely God is most of all called wise and wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things as Augustine says but sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause not only so far as he can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew him that which is known of God is manifest in them but also as far as he is known to himself alone and revealed to others and sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom replied to objection one sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge but from the divine knowledge through which as through the highest wisdom all our knowledge is set in order replied to objection two the principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved or are proved by natural reason through some other science but the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences but only to judge of them whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false destroying councils and every height that exalted itself against the knowledge of God reply to objection three since judgment appertains to wisdom the two fold manner of judging produces a two fold wisdom a man may judge in one way by inclination as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it hence it is the virtuous man as we read who is the measure and rule of human acts in another way by knowledge just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts though he had not the virtue the first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost the spiritual man judges all things and Dionysius says Herotheus is taught not by mere learning but by experience of divine things the second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study though its principles are obtained by revelation seventh article whether God is the object of this science objection one it seems that God is not the object of this science for in every science the nature of its object is presupposed but this science cannot presuppose the essence of God for Damascene says it is impossible to define the essence of God therefore God is not the object of this science objection to further whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science but in holy writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God but concerning many other things such as creatures and human morality therefore God is not the object of this science on the contrary the object of the science is that of which it principally treats but in this science the treatment is mainly about God for it is called theology as treating of God therefore God is the object of this science I answer that God is the object of this science the relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object now properly speaking the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored and colored things are the proper objects of sight but in sacred scripture all things are treated of under the aspect of God either because they are God himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science this is clear also from the principles of this science namely the articles of faith for faith is about God the object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles some however looking to what is treated of in this science and not to the aspect under which it is treated have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God that is either things and signs or the works of salvation or the whole Christ as the head and members of all these things in truth we treat in this science but so far as they have reference to God reply to objection one although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God nevertheless in this science we make use of his effects either of nature or of grace in place of a definition in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effects by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause reply to objection to whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to him 8th article whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument objection one it seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument for Ambrose says put arguments aside where fate is sought but in this doctrine fate especially is sought but these things are written that you may believe therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument objection to further if it is a matter of argument the argument is either from authority or from reason if it is from authority it seems unbefitting its dignity for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof but if it is from reason this is unbefitting its end because according to Gregory fate has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument on the contrary the scripture says that a bishop should embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers I answer that as other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles which are the articles of faith but from them it goes on to prove something else as the apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection however it is to be born in mind in regard to the philosophical sciences that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them but leave this to a higher science whereas the highest of them namely metaphysics can dispute with one who denies its principles if only the opponent will make some concession but if he concede nothing it can have no dispute with him though it can answer his objections hence sacred scripture since it has no science above itself can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation thus we can argue with heretics from texts in holy writ and against those who deny one article of faith we can argue from another if our opponent believes nothing of fate of divine revelation there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning but only of answering his objections if he has any against faith since faith rests upon infallible truth and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations but are difficulties that can be answered reply to objection one although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith nevertheless this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths reply to objection to this doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority in as much as its principles are obtained by revelation thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest but sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason not indeed to prove faith for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity hence the apostle says bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ and sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus as some also of your own poet said for we are also his offspring nevertheless sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments but properly uses the authority of the canonical scriptures as an incontrovertible proof and the authority of the doctors of the church as one that may be properly used yet merely as probable for our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books and not on the revelations of any such there are made to other doctors hence Augustine says only those books of scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not aired in any way in writing them but other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true merely on account of their having so thought and written whatever may have been their holiness and learning ninth article whether holy scripture should use metaphors objection one it seems that holy scripture should not use metaphors for that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to be fit this science which holds the highest place of all but to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry the least of all the sciences therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes objection to further this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear and so reward is held out to those who manifest it they that explain me shall have life everlasting but by such similitudes truth is obscured therefore to put forward divine truth by likening them to corporeal things does not be fit this science objection three further the higher creatures are the nearer they approach to the divine likeness if therefore any creature be taken to God this representation not chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures and not from the lower if this is often found in scriptures on the contrary it is written I have multiplied visions and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets but to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors therefore this sacred science may use metaphors I answer that it is befitting holy writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things for God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects because all our knowledge originates in a sense and some holy writ spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things this is what Dionysius says we cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils it is also befitting holy writ which is proposed to all without distinction of persons to the wise and to the reader that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it replied to objection one poetry makes use of metaphors to produce of representation for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations but sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful reply to objection two the ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled as Dionysius says and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made to rest in the metaphors but raises them to the knowledge of truths and through those to whom the revelation has been made others may receive instruction in these matters hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of scripture in other parts are taught more openly the very hiding of truth in figures is useful for exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious according to the words give not that which is holy to dogs replied to objection three as Dionysius says it is more fitting that divine truth should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies and this for three reasons firstly because thereby men's minds are the better reserved from error for then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies secondly because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life for what he is not is clear to us than what he thinks therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of him thirdly because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy tenth article whether in scripture a word may have several senses objection one it seems that in holy writ a word cannot have several senses historical or literal allegorical tropological or moral and anecdogical for many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument it's no argument but only fallacies can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions but holy writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word objection two further augustin says that the Old Testament has a four-fold division as to history etiology analogy and allegory now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of holy writ according to the four different senses mentioned above objection three further besides these senses there is the parabolical which is not one of these four on the contrary Gregory says holy writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science because in one and the same sentence while it describes a fact it reveals a mystery I answer that the author of holy writ is God in whose power it is to signify his meaning not by words only as man also can do but also by things themselves so whereas in every other science things are signified by words this science has the property that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense the historical or literal that signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense which is based on the literal and presupposes it now this spiritual sense has a three-fold division for as the apostle says the old law is a figure of the new law and Dionysia says the new law itself is a figure of future glory again in the new law whatever our head has done is a type of what we ought to do therefore so far as the things of the old law signify the things of the new law there is the allegorical sense so far as the things done in Christ or so far as the things which signify Christ are types of what we ought to do there is the moral sense but so far as we signify what relates to eternal glory there is the allegorical sense hence the literal sense is that which the author intends and since the author of holy writ is God who by one act comprehends all things by his intellect it is not unfitting as Augustine says if even according to the literal sense one word in holy writ should have several senses reply to objection one the multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things thus in holy writ no confusion results for all the senses are founded on one the literal from which alone can any argument be drawn and not from those intended in allegory as Augustine says nevertheless nothing of holy scripture perishes on account of this since nothing necessary to fate is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the scripture in its literal sense reply to objection two these three history etiology analogy are grouped under the literal sense for it is called history as Augustine expounds whenever anything is simply related it is called etiology when its cause is assigned as when our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives namely on account of the hardness of men's hearts it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another of these four allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses thus Hugh of St. Victor includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense laying down three senses only the historical the allegorical and the topological reply to objection three the parabolical sense is contained in the literal for by words things are signified properly and figuratively nor is the figure itself but that which is figured the literal sense when scripture speaks of God's arm the literal sense is not that God has such a member but only what is signified by this member namely operative power hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of holy writ the end of question one question two of the summa theologica pars prima initial questions by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the english dominican province question two the existence of God this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy summa theologica pars prima initial questions by st. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers the existence of God because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God not only as he is in himself but also as he is the beginning of things and their last end and especially of rational creatures as is clear from what has already been said therefore in our endeavor to expound this science we shall treat first of God second of the rational creatures we will advance towards God third of Christ who as man is our way to God in treating of God there will be a threefold vision for we shall consider first whatever concerns the divine essence second whatever concerns the distinctions of persons and third whatever concerns the procession of creatures from him concerning the divine essence we must consider first whether God exists second the manner of his existence or rather what is not the manner of his existence and third whatever concerns his operations namely his knowledge will power concerning the first there are three points of inquiry whether the proposition God exists is self evident whether it is demonstrable and whether God exists first article whether the existence of God is self evident objection one it seems that the existence of God is self evident now those things are said to be self evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us as we can see in regard to first principles but as damasin says the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all therefore the existence of God is self evident further those things are said to be self evident which are known as soon as the terms are known which the philosopher says is true of the first principles of demonstration thus when the nature of a whole and of a part is known it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part but as soon as the signification of the word God is understood it is at once seen that God exists for by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived but that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally therefore since as soon as the word God is understood it exists mentally it also follows that it exists actually therefore the proposition God exists is self evident objection three further the existence of truth is self evident for whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist and if truth does not exist then the proposition truth does not exist is true and if there is anything true there must be truth but God is truth itself I am the way the truth and the life therefore God exists is self evident contrary no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self evident as the philosopher states concerning the first principles of demonstration but the opposite of the proposition God is can be mentally admitted the fool said in his heart there is no God therefore that God exists is not self evident I answer that a thing can be self evident in either of two ways self evident in itself though not to us on the other self evident in itself and to us a proposition is self evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject as man is an animal for animal is contained in the essence of man if therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all the proposition will be self evident as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of such as being and non being whole and part and such like if however there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown the proposition will be self evident in itself but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition therefore it happens as Boethius says that there are some mental concepts self evident only to the learned as that incorporeal substances are not in space therefore I say that this proposition God exists of itself is self evident for the predicate is the same as the subject because God is his own existence as will be hereafter shown now because we do not know the essence of God the proposition is not self evident to us but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us though less known in their nature namely by effects reply to objection one to know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature in as much as God is man's beatitude man naturally desires happiness and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him this however is not to know absolutely that God exists just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching even though it is Peter who is approaching for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness is in riches and others in pleasures and others in something else reply to objection two perhaps not everyone who hears this word God understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought seeing that some have believed God to be a body yet granted that everyone understands that by this word God is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought nevertheless it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually but only that it exists mentally now nor can it be argued that it actually exists unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought and this is precisely not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist reply to objection three the existence of truth in general is self evident but the existence of a primal truth is not self evident to us second article whether it can be demonstrated that God exists objection one it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated for it is an article of faith that God exists but what is of faith cannot be demonstrated because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge whereas faith is of the unseen therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists objection two further the essence is the middle term of demonstration but we cannot know in what God's essence consists but solely in what it does not consist as Damascene says therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists objection three further if the existence of God were demonstrated this could only be from his effects but his effects are not proportionate to him since he is infinite and his effects are finite and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion therefore since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated on the contrary the apostle says the invisible things of him are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made but this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists I answer that demonstration can be made in two ways one is through the cause and is called a priori and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely the other is through the effect and is called a demonstration opposite to the ori and this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us when an effect is better known to us than its cause from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause and from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated so long as its effects are better known to us because since every effect depends upon its cause if the effect exists the cause must pre-exist hence the existence of God in so far as it is not self evident to us can be demonstrated from those of his effects which are known to us reply to objection one the existence of God and other like truths about God which can be known by natural reason are not articles of faith but are preambles to the articles for faith presupposes natural knowledge even as grace presupposes nature and perfection supposes something that can be perfected nevertheless there is nothing to prevent a man who cannot grasp a proof accepting as a matter of faith something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated reply to objection two when the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the causes existence this is especially the case in regard to God because in order to prove the existence of anything it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word and not its essence for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence now the names given to God are derived from his effects consequently in demonstrating the existence of God from his effects we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word God reply to objection three from effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated we can demonstrate the existence of God from his effects though from them we cannot perfectly know God as he is in his essence third article whether God exists objection one it seems that God does not exist because if one of two contraries be infinite the other would be altogether destroyed but the word God means that he is infinite goodness for God existed there would be no evil discoverable but there is evil in the world therefore God does not exist objection two further it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many but it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles supposing God did not exist can be reduced to one principle which is nature and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason or will therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence on the contrary it is said in the person of God I am who am I answer that the existence of God can be proved in five ways the first and more manifest way is the argument from motion it is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion whereas a thing moves in as much as it is in act for motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality but nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality thus that which is actually hot as fire makes wood which is potentially hot to be actually hot and thereby moves and changes it now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect but only in different respects for what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot but it is simultaneously potentially cold it is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing both mover and moved that is that it should move itself therefore whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another if that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion then this also must be put in motion by another and that by another again but this cannot go on to infinity because then there would be no first mover and consequently other mover seeing that subsequent movers move only in as much as they are put in motion by the first mover as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover put in motion by no other and this everyone understands to be God the second way is from the nature of the efficient cause in the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes there is no case known neither is it indeed possible in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself for so it would be prior to itself which is impossible now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity because in all efficient causes following an order the first is the cause of the intermediate cause and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause whether the intermediate cause be several or only one now to take away the cause is to take away the effect therefore if there be no first cause among efficient causes there would be no ultimate nor any intermediate cause but if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity there will be no first cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect nor any intermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause to which everyone gives the name of God. The third way is taken from possibility and necessity and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be since they are found to be generated and to corrupt and consequently they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore if everything is possible not to be then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true even now there would be nothing in existence because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore if at any one time nothing was in existence it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist and thus even now nothing would be in existence which is absurd. Therefore not all beings are merely possible but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another as has already been proved in regard to efficient cause. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity and not receiving it from another but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good true noble and the like. But more and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest. So that there is something which is truest something best something noblest and consequently something which is utter most being for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being as it is written in the metaphysics. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus as fire which is the maximum heat is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all being the cause of their being goodness and every other perfection and this we call God. The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence such as natural bodies act for an end and this is evident from their acting always or nearly always in the same way so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously but designedly do they achieve their end now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end and this being we call God replied to objection one as Augustine says since God is the highest good he would not allow any evil to exist in his works unless his omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God that he should allow evil to exist and out of it produce good replied to objection two since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God as to its first cause so also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will since these can change or fail for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle as was shown in the body of the article. The end of question two. Question three of Summa Theologica Paris Prima initial questions this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this recording is by Jim Ruddy. Summa Theologica Paris Prima initial questions by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question three of the simplicity of God when the existence of a thing has been ascertained remains the further question of the manner of its existence in order that we may know its essence now because we cannot know what God is but rather what he is not we have no means for considering how God is but rather how he is not therefore we must consider first how he is not second how he is known by us and third how he is named now it can be shown how God is not by denying him whatever is opposed to the idea of him for example composition motion and the like therefore first we must discuss his simplicity whereby we deny composition in him and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else we shall discuss second his perfection third his infinity fourth his immutability and fifth his unity concerning his simplicity there are eight points of inquiry whether God is a body whether he is composed of matter and form whether in him there is composition of quiddity essence or nature and subject whether he is composed of essence and existence whether he is composed of genus and difference whether he is composed of subject and accident whether he is in any way composite or wholly simple and whether he enters into composition with other things first article whether God is a body objection one it seems that God is a body for a body is that which has the three dimensions but holy scripture tributes the three dimensions to God for it is written he is higher than heaven and what will thou do he is deeper than hell and how will found know the measure of him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea therefore God is a body objection to further everything that has figure is a body since figure is a quality of quantity but God seems to have figure for it is written let us make man to our image and likeness now a figure is called an image according to the text who being the brightness of his glory in the figure that is the image of his substance therefore God is a body objection three further whatever has corporeal parts is a body now scripture attributes corporeal parts to God has thou an arm like God and the eyes of the Lord are upon the just and the right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength therefore God is a body objection for further posture belongs only to bodies but something which supposes posture a set of God in the scriptures I saw the Lord sitting and he standeth up to judge therefore God is a body objection five further only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term where from or where to but in the scripture God is spoken of as a local term where to according to the words come ye to him and be enlightened and as a term where from all they that depart from thee shall be written in the earth therefore God is a body on the contrary it is written in the gospel of st. John God is a spirit I answer that it is absolutely true that God is not a body and this can be shown in three ways first because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion as is evident from induction now it has been already proved that God is the first mover and is himself unmoved therefore it is clear that God is not a body secondly because the first being must of necessity be in act and in no way in potentiality for although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality the potentiality is prior in time to actuality nevertheless absolutely speaking actuality is prior to potentiality for whatever is in potency can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality now it has been already proved that God is the first being it is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality but everybody is in potentiality because the continuous as such is divisible to infinity it is therefore impossible that God should be a body thirdly because God is the most noble of beings now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings for a body must be either animate or inanimate and an animate body is manifestly no blur than any inanimate body but an animate body is not animate precisely as body otherwise all bodies would be animate therefore its animation depends upon some other thing as our body depends for its animation on the soul hence that by which a body becomes animated must be no blur than the body therefore it is impossible that God should be a body reply to objection one as we have said above holy writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things now when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity it implies his virtual quantity thus by depth it signifies his power of knowing hidden things by height the transcendence of his excelling power by length the duration of his existence and by breath his act of love for all or as says Dionysius by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of his essence by length the procession of his all pervading power by breath his over spreading all things in as much as all things lie under his protection reply to objection to man is said to be after the image of God not as regards his body but as regards that whereby he excels other animals hence when it is said let us make man to our image and likeness it is added and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence hence it is according to his intelligence and reason which are incorporeal that man is said to be according to the image of God reply to objection three corporeal parts are attributed to God in scripture on account of his actions and this is owing to a certain parallel for instance the act of the eye is to see hence the eye attributed to God signifies his power of seeing intellectually not sensibly and so on with the other parts replied to objection four whatever pertains to posture also is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel he has spoken of a sitting on account of his unchangeableness and dominion and as standing on account of his power of overcoming whatever withstands him reply to objection five we draw near to God by no corporeal steps since he is everywhere but by the affections of our soul and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from him thus to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion second article whether God is composed of matter and form objection one it seems that God is composed of matter and form for whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form since the soul is the form of the body but scripture attributes a soul to God for it is mentioned in Hebrews where God says but my just man liveth by faith but if he withdraw himself he shall not please my soul therefore God is composed of matter and form objection two further anger and joy and the like our passions of the composite but these are attributed to God in scripture the Lord was exceeding angry with his people therefore God is composed of matter and form objection three further matter is the principle of individuation but God seems to be individual for he cannot be predicated of many therefore he is composed of matter and form on the contrary whatever is composed of matter and form is not a body for defensive quantity is the first property of matter but God is not a body as proved in the preceding article therefore he is not composed of matter and form i answer that it is impossible that matter should exist in God first because matter is in potentiality but we have shown that God is pure act without any potentiality and so it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form secondly because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form therefore its goodness is participated in as much as matter participates the form now the first good and the best namely God is not a participated good because the essential good is prior to the participated good hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form thirdly because every agent acts by its form hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form now God is the first agent since he is the first deficient cause he is therefore of his essence a form and not composed of matter and form reply to objection one a soul is attributed to God because his acts resemble the acts of a soul for that we will anything is due to our soul hence what is pleasing to his will is said to be pleasing to his soul reply to objection two anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect thus because to punish is properly the act of an angry man God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as his anger reply to objection three forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject although form of itself unless something else prevents it can be received by many but that form which cannot be received in matter but is self-subsisting is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject and such a form is God hence it does not follow that matter exists in God third article whether God is the same as his essence or nature objection one it seems that God is not the same as his essence or nature for nothing can be in itself but the substance or nature of God that is the Godhead is said to be in God therefore it seems that God is not the same as his essence or nature objection two further the effect is assimilated to its cause for every agent produces its like but in created things the suppositum is not identical with its nature for a man is not the same as his humanity therefore God is not the same as his Godhead on the contrary it is said of God that he is life itself and not only that he is a living thing I am the way the truth and the life now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and the living thing therefore God is his very Godhead I answer that God is the same as his essence or nature to understand this it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species as humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man for it is by this that man is man and it is this that humanity signifies namely that whereby man is man now individual matter with all the individualizing accidents is not included in the definition of the species for this particular flesh these bones this blackness or whiteness etc are not included in the definition of a man therefore this flesh these bones and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter are not included in humanity and yet they are included in the thing which is man hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter on the other hand and things not composed of matter and form in which individualization is not due to individual matter that is to say to this matter the very forms being individualized of themselves it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting suppositum therefore suppositum and nature in them are identified since god then is not composed of matter and form he must be his own godhead his own life and whatever else is thus predicated of him replied to objection one we can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge therefore and speaking of god we use concrete nouns to signify his subsistence because with us only those things subsist which are composite and we use abstract nouns to signify his simplicity and saying therefore that godhead or life or the like are in god we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands but not that there is any composition in god replied to objection two the effects of god do not imitate him perfectly but only as far as they are able and the imitation is here defective precisely because what is simple and one can only be represented by diverse things consequently composition is accidental to them and therefore in them suppositum is not the same as nature fourth article whether essence and existence are the same in god objection one it seems that essence and existence are not the same in god for if it be so then the divine being has nothing added to it now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things therefore it follows that god is being in general which can be predicated of everything but this is false for men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood therefore god's existence is not his essence objection two further we can know whether god exists as said above but we cannot know what he is therefore god's existence is not the same as his essence that is as his quiddity or nature on the contrary hillary says in god existence is not an accidental quality but subsisting truth therefore what subsists in god is his existence i answer that god is not only his own essence as shown in the preceding article but also his own existence this may be shown in several ways first whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence like a property that necessarily accompanies the species as the faculty of laughing as proper to a man and is caused by the constituent principles of the species or by some exterior agent as heat is caused in water by fire therefore if the existence of a thing differs from its existence this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence if its existence is caused therefore that thing whose existence differs from its essence must have its existence caused by another but this cannot be true of god because we call god the first efficient cause therefore it is impossible that in god his existence should differ from his essence secondly existence is that which makes every form or nature actual for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual only because they are spoken of as existing therefore existence must be compared to essence if the latter is a distinct reality as actuality to potentiality therefore since in god there is no potentiality as shown above it follows that in him essence does not differ from existence therefore his essence is his existence thirdly because just as that which has fire but is not itself fire is on fire by participation so that which has existence but is not existence is a being by participation but god is his own essence as shown above if therefore he is not his own existence he will be not essential but participated being he will not therefore be the first being which is absurd therefore god is his own existence and not merely his own essence replied to objection one a thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds either its essence precludes any addition thus for example it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it in as much as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it thus the genus animal is without reason because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason but neither is it to lack reason and so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense reply to objection to to be can mean either of two things it may mean the act of essence or it may mean the composition of a proposition affected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject taking to be in the first sense we cannot understand god's existence nor his essence but only in the second sense we know that this proposition which we form about god when we say god is is true and this we know from his effects fifth article whether god is contained in a genus objection one it seems that god is contained in a genus for a substance as a being that subsists of itself but this is especially true of god therefore god is in a genus of substance objection two further nothing can be measured say by something of its own genus as length is measured by length and numbers by number but god is the measure of all substances as the commentator shows therefore god is in the genus of substance on the contrary in the mind genus is prior to what it contains but nothing is prior to god either really or mentally therefore god is not in any genus i answer that a thing can be in a genus in two ways either absolutely and properly as a species contained under a genus or as being reducible to it as principles and privations for example a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity as its principles well blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit but in neither way is god in a genus that he cannot be a species of any genus maybe shown in three ways first because a species is constituted of genus and difference now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived is always related to that from which the genus is derived as actuality is related to potentiality for animal is derived from sensitive nature by concretion as it were for that is animal which has a sensitive nature rational being on the other hand is derived from intellectual nature because that is rational which has an intellectual nature and intelligence is compared to sense as actuality is to potentiality the same argument holds good in other things hence since in god actuality is not added to potentiality it is impossible that he should be in any genus as a species secondly since the existence of god is his essence if god were in any genus he would be in the genus being because since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing but the philosopher has shown that being cannot be a genus for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence now no difference can exist distinct from being for non-being cannot be a difference it follows then that god is not in a genus thirdly because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential but they differ in their existence for the existence of man and of horse is not the same as also of this man and that man thus in every member of a genus existence and quiddity that is essence must differ but in god they do not differ as shown in the preceding article therefore it is plain that god is not in a genus as if he were a species from this it is also plain that he has no genus nor difference nor can there be any definition of him nor save through his effects a demonstration of him for a definition is from genus indifference and the mean of a demonstration is a definition that god is not in a genus as reducible to it as its principle is clear from this that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus as a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone and unity of discontinuous quantity but god is the principle of all being therefore he is not contained in any genus as its principle replied to objection one the word substance signifies not only what exists of itself for existence cannot of itself be a genus as shown in the body of the article but it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way namely of existing of itself this existence however is not its essence thus it is clear that god is not in the genus of substance replied to objection two this objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured now god is not a measure proportionate to anything still he is called the measure of all things in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles him sixth article whether in god there are any accidents objection one it seems that there are accidents in god for substance cannot be an accident as Aristotle says therefore that which is an accident and one cannot in another be a substance thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire because it is an accident in other things but wisdom virtue and the like which are accidents in us are attributes of god therefore in god there are accidents objection two further in every genus there is a first principle but there are many genera of accidents if therefore the primal members of these genera are not in god there will be many primal beings other than god which is absurd on the contrary every accident is in a subject but god cannot be a subject for no simple form can be a subject as Boethius says therefore in god there cannot be any accident I answer that from all we have said it is clear that there can be no accident in god first because the subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents but there can be no potentiality in god as was shown secondly because god is his own existence and as Boethius says although every essence may have something super added to it this cannot apply to absolute being thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it as whiteness nevertheless absolute heat can't have nothing else than heat thirdly because what is essential is prior to what is accidental when as god is absolute primal being there can be in him nothing accidental neither can he have any essential accidents as the capability of laughing is an essential accident to man because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject now there can be nothing caused in god since he is the first cause hence it follows that there is no accident in god reply to objection one virtue and wisdom are not predicated of god and of us univocally hence it does not follow that there are accidents in god as there are in us reply to objection two some since substance is prior to its accidents the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior although god is not first as if contained in the genus of substance yet he is first in respect to all being outside of every genus seventh article whether god is all together simple objection one it seems that god is not all together simple for whatever is from god must imitate him thus from the first being are all beings and from the first good is all good but in the things which god has made nothing is all together simple therefore neither is god all together simple objection to further whatever is best must be attributed to god but with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple thus chemical compounds are better than simple elements and animals than parts that compose them therefore it cannot be said that god is all together simple on the contrary agustin says god is truly an absolutely simple i answer that the absolute simplicity of god may be shown in many ways first from the previous articles of this question for there is neither composition of quantitative parts and gods since he is not a body nor composition of matter and form nor does his nature differ from his suppositum nor his essence from his existence neither neither in neither is there in him composition of genus indifference nor of subject and accident therefore it is clear that god is no wise composite but is all together simple secondly because every composite is posterior to its component parts and is dependent on them but god is the first being as shown above thirdly because every composite has a cause for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite but god is uncaused as shown above since he is the first efficient cause fourthly because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality but this does not apply to god for either one of the parts actuates another or at least all the parts are potential to the whole fifthly because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts and this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts where no part of a man is a man nor any of the parts of the foot a foot but in holes made up of similar parts although something which is predicated of the whole may be said of a part as a part of the air is air and a part of water water nevertheless certain things are predictable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of its parts for instance of the whole volume of water is two cubits no part of it can be two cubits thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself but even if this could be said of whatever has a form namely that it has something which is not it itself as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white nevertheless in the form itself there is nothing besides itself and so since god is absolute form or rather absolute being he can in no way be composite hillary implies this argument when he says god who is strength is not made up of things that are weak nor is he who is light composed of things that are dim reply to objection one whatever is from god imitates him as caused things imitate the first cause but it is of the essence of the thing to be in some sort composite because at least its existence differs from its essence as will be shown here after reply to objection two with us composite things are better than simple things because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing but in many things but the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing eighth article whether god enters into the composition of other things objection one it seems that god enters into the composition of other things for Dionysius says the being of all things is that which is above being the godhead but the being of all things enters into the composition of everything therefore god enters into the composition of other things objection two further god is a form form. For Augustine says that the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form. But a form is part of a compound, therefore God is part of some compound. Objection 3. Further, whatever things exist in no way differing from each other are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition of things, therefore also does God. Both of the minor, whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite, but God and primary matter are all together simple, therefore they know why they differ from each other. On the contrary, Dionysius says there can be no touching him, that is, God, nor any other union with him by mingling part with part. Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the philosopher says. I answer that on this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world soul, as is clear from Augustine. This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things. And this was the theory of the Amoritians. The third error is that of David of Dinat, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth, since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing cause, but only specifically, for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause, for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts, for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand and fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings, not even matter nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound, for matter is merely potential. And potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality as is clear from the foregoing. While a form which is part of a compound is a participated form, and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being. Reply to Objection 1, the Godhead is called the being of all things as their efficient and exemplar cause, not as being their essence. Reply to Objection 2, the word is an exemplar form, but not a form that is part of a compound. Reply to Objection 3, simple things do not differ by added differences, for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational. Which differences however do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence to be quite accurate it is better to say that they are not different but diverse. Hence according to the philosopher things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something. Therefore strictly speaking primary matter and God do not differ but are by their very being diverse, hence it does not follow they are the same. The End of Question 3