 Okay, everyone. So a really big welcome to all of you who've made it. It's really exciting to see a full house here for this event today and a double welcome to those of you who've come and haven't been able to get a chair and either sitting on the stairs or standing. We really appreciate your enthusiasm to be here. So that's fantastic. And we obviously set this event up with only well less than a week's notice so it's fantastic that you've all managed to set aside time in your schedules to come out for what is really a very important discussion that we're going to have here today which is the legal aspects and the legal perspective on the war in Ukraine. So I'm your moderator. My name is Ben Gama. I'm not the moderator who's in the in the information that's Bob van Solingen who went to the effort of setting all of this up but unfortunately isn't able to make it here so I'm here as a last minute replacement but we wish Bob all the best. I'm not an expert at all. I'm a PhD student in business and human rights. I'm not an expert on Ukraine. I don't know very much about international criminal law or migrant law or all the bodies of law that we're going to discuss here today. So I'm equally enthusiastic to hear what our experts are going to tell us about the Ukrainian conflict and its ramifications from a legal perspective. But I was thinking today before I came to moderate that this is more than just answering, you know, legal questions about Ukraine this is more than just a legal lecture because over the last week of course we've seen some really shocking scenes that are, you know, and we've got a lot of noise coming from the media, a lot of events happening it's really hard to keep up to date with what's going on, and it's really difficult to contextualize what's happening from Ukraine from, you know, this perspective from a perspective that goes back before last Thursday it feels like we're in a whole new situation with this crisis in Ukraine. And I think amongst all of that kind of crisis thinking we have at the moment or the emotions, or the kind of speculation what's going to happen next what should we do the call for actions we have is really important that we have a kind of session like this where we can kind of take a step and try and find an arm, an eye in the heart of that storm, and reflect on this, and use an appeal to international law, international law is very flawed, but it gives us a framework that is existed before last Thursday before whatever reaction we've had from the media from your uncle or from your aunt or whoever it is, we have this framework of principles that goes on before last Thursday that we can rely on to try and filter through that noise and make sense of what is going on in Ukraine now to contextualize what's happening now and what tons of what's happened before to talk about really what's happening now from a legal perspective but also to try and embed what's happening now and what will happen next to try and think about this calmly. So that's without further ado, I think that's how I'm going to introduce our participants here in terms of what happened before, what's happening now, and what's happening next. So our first speaker today is Villa carry is the assistant professor at public law and governance here at Tilburg University. They teach history and theory and international law, and they're going to discuss it from the use of force lens, which those of you who studied some international law will be aware of, and they're going to contextualize what's happening now in Ukraine in terms of from a historical perspective right in terms of what's happened before. And then we have as our second speaker Professor Connie Reichen, who's live with us today who's a professor in human trafficking and globalization. She's at the Department of Criminal Law and she's going to be looking at it from the perspective of migration law. She's going to be telling us what's the current situation is with the refugees, what we can currently do what is currently happening in response to the Ukrainian crisis. And then finally we have the future what what what should happen next, well then we have Alice fans lead act, who's our third and final speaker is also at the Department of Criminal Law. She's going to take a criminal international criminal perspective, and she's going to discuss how we can hold those responsible for this conflict accountable, it's not a disaster where this is a man made situation. And so what will that what will accountability look like, is that even possible, is that possible to conceptualize of at the moment. We're going to discuss some house rules before we move on so first of all each speaker is going to have between five and 10 minutes to present their views on this, and it's going to be followed up with a question and answer session and tend to try and hold the speakers to 10 minutes to make sure we have as much time for questions as answers as possible. This is obviously a very emotive topic right now some of you may be personally affected by this conflict you may have friends or family or colleagues who've been affected by this conflict. So if you feel that you need to leave the room or to accuse yourself in some manner, please feel free to stand up and leave right look after your mental health. First of all, when you do ask questions at the end, please try and do so if you get emotional that's understandable but please try to do so in this neutral manner as possible to ask legal questions and be aware that we're recording this right we're recording the entire session so any question you ask will be recorded and it will be uploaded by the session at the end. So, without further ado, I'm going to introduce our first speaker who's with us online. If we can bring up for the carry. Hello, thank you very much. Can you hear me. I presume you can. Okay, very good. Thank you for inviting me to speak here. It's a difficult situation, and I don't quite know how to start a speech in the middle of such dramatic events, except to say that I wish to offer the people in Ukraine, all my support and goodwill and I wish them the best of luck in these events. I have been invited to say something about events in Ukraine in the light of international law and use of force, and the history of international law and I want to start off by saying something important that many of you already know. International law is not a static automatic system of rules that gives us a clear answer to the situation at all circumstances, but rather international law is part of the events themselves as they unfold. And I say international law is a language of power, all parties where the states politicians scholars non governmental actors and vote this language of power to express certain views about the conflict. It's not an attack or a peacekeeping mission. Is this a violation of sovereignty or humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide. International law is the language through which all parties and participants involved and express their views. However, despite all of this international law as a language is of crucial importance in the aftermath of this conflict, it will make a world of difference, whether the attack was an attack of aggression, an actor or aggression. Excuse me an act of aggression or a peacekeeping operation, whether the bombing of civilians was acceptable due to military necessity, or whether it was a violation of international humanitarian law. So right now what I can offer you here is my interpretation about how I've seen the events unfold. It's all happening very fast. I try to be brief and simple to the point. Let me just start by stating the obvious the question about the legality of this use of force itself. According to article two four of the charge of the United Nations, all states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This rule enshrines the general ban on the use of force in international law. The only two exceptions to this case. This rule are a collective intervention with the permission of the United Nations Security Council. There are six to seven of the charter, as well as every state inherent right to self defense enshrined in the UN charter article 51. As you probably know, the Russian Federation has no Security Council authorization for its attack. In fact, a week ago the UN Security Council voted in a draft resolution to stop the war. The resolution was voted 11 for one against and three abstention, the one vote against was the veto vote of the Russian Federation itself. In contrast only yesterday, the UN General Assembly in a process called uniting for peace grant gave a resolution on the aggression against Ukraine in which the General Assembly condemned the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, it reaffirmed that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal. It deployed in the strongest term the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of article two four of the charter and demanded that the Russian Federation immediately sees its use of force against Ukraine, and refrain from any other unlawful threat or use of force against any member state. This vote was 141 in support and five against, and there is no veto in this vote. Consequently, although there is no conclusive Security Council resolution the public international opinion among the United Nations seems quite clear. In this war, the Russian Federation has been named the aggressor, and Ukraine is a victim, and since entitled to individual or collective self defense. Now, second, I've been asked to say something about the Russian justifications for these events and broader speaking, I see two sets of categories of justifications. First, there is the broad historical grievance about Russia's lost superpower standing this justification is outlined quite clearly in President Putin's 5000 word historical essay from summer 2021. And in his public speeches this February, as he has ordered the different phases of his offensive. The moral theme here is that President Putin speaks of a greater Russian nation which under the bellicose Russians and the Malo Russians and the Belarusians, which united these, these different branches of Russians as he saw, saw them. So, these people correspond to the people living in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. And then describes how the Bolsheviks had made a historical mistake by creating the Soviet Union as a union of sovereign republics, and how these Soviet republics were then allowed to establish their independence in 1991. In Putin's words, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a great geopolitical disaster in which Russia was robbed of its territory by these newly independent states. This historical narrative is not brand new. The reference to a geopolitical disaster is from his public speech in 2005 in a speech in Munich in 2007. He criticized the existing international security infrastructure as a Western hegemony. He used a company the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the occupation of Crimea in 2014. This historical revisionist view runs against the formal legal sovereignty of Ukraine, and the principle of non intervention and sovereign equality. The nationally recognized sovereignty of Ukraine is quite clear and uncontroversial. Ukraine first declared its independence in 1917 was, but was later made out of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Ukraine has been a member state of the United Nations since 1945. In the 19th of November 1990, Russia and Ukraine signed a treaty recognizing each other as sovereign states and obligating themselves to abstain from actions that could harm the state sovereignty of the other party. In 1991 Ukraine voted for independence from the USSR with more than 90% of the votes in favor. The United Nations recognized Ukraine in its public address on the 2nd of December 1991. Some six days later Ukraine, Russia and Belarus signed the agreement for the Commonwealth of Independent States in which they mutually declared to abolish the Soviet Union and restate each other's sovereignty. And by the end of 1992 more than 120 foreign states had formally and diplomatically recognized Ukraine's sovereign statehood. So there are no exceptions and weaknesses or backdoors to dispute sovereignty and sovereign equality of Ukraine among nations. So in this regard, President Putin's historical demands have no solid legal basis. The second track of justifications is more precise, and it appears in the speeches of the Russian diplomats especially in the UN Security Council. On the 28th of February, the Russian delegate to the United United Nations stated to the General Assembly as follows. One of this operation is protection of people who have been victimized and exposed to genocide by the Kiev regime for past eight years. To ensure this, we will seek demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine and criminal prosecution for those who committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians, including citizens of the Russian Federation. These accusations are severe. There do does not seem to be any real evidence of a genocide or genocidal actions by Ukraine in the Donbass area. Now, this particular question about genocide is perhaps about to be investigated in greater detail. On the 26th of February, Ukraine filed an application at the International Court of Justice to institute proceedings against the Russian Federation on these allegations of genocide. That case is based on the UN genocide convention to which both Russia and Ukraine are parties. In its application, Ukraine explains that the Russian Federation has attacked Ukraine on the grounds of a false accusation of genocide. It demands that these accusations be investigated and proven wrong and that the Russian attack be stopped and declared illegal. For immediate relief, Ukraine has also demanded that the court order Russian Federation to halt their attack as a provisional measure for the duration of the case. The initial hearings on the case will be held next week at the Hague. So you can see here an opportunity to investigate the allegations of genocide in a non-armed, perfectly civil manner through the International Court of Justice and the violence and the destruction are absolutely not necessary, not justified in any manner whatsoever with regard to these allegations. I believe that covers my five to 10 minutes. I thank you for your time and I'll pass the floor to the next speaker. Thank you very much. Thank you, Villa. Thank you very much. And I'm going to pass on to our second speaker, Professor Konir Aikin, who's going to discuss this from the perspective of migrant law. And also good to know that there is so much interest for this topic. Before I dive into the nitty gritty of the migration law, I would like to share with you some anecdotes. My colleague or our colleague Maria Shedrova, who is from Ukraine, was also supposed to be here, but at this very moment, she's actually overwhelmed with all kinds of requests for advice and support from Ukrainian family, friends, and she's now actually evolving into the spokespersons of the Dutch diaspora of the Ukrainian. My colleague Lukash, where is Lukash? Oh, here, oh, sorry, you're really in front of me. And Lukash and I tried to support Maria with also the legal stuff and to see where we can help and to also identify the difficulties and identify the burdens for the Ukrainians who come in this way. So over the last couple of days, the questions were raised like, okay, do we have, if we stay with a Dutch family, do we have access to medical health, for instance, do we get allowance, do we need to apply for asylum? Are we allowed to stay here in the country? What is best if they stranded in Poland after crossing the border? Where can they go? Are they allowed to move? If they have registered, did they apply for asylum? Was it necessary to apply for asylum? All these kind of questions are people are in people's mind when after fleeing Ukraine. So what is the answer to those questions? Well, let's try to see whether we can, in this web of rules, whether we can find some threats and some clarity. So up until now, there's only two, there's two options for Ukrainians to remain in the European Union. So the first one is, well, they can stay here because they have a visa-free travel to the European Union, which means that they can stay for at least 90 days in the European Union. In the Netherlands, we have extended that period to 180 days, but they do not have access to services or medical care unless they provide it for themselves. So that is not taken care of by the government. So that is their responsibility. And that is all based on the association agreement, and those who are maybe a bit older, it's only five years ago, but then you probably remember that there was a big outcry on whether or not to sign that association agreement, especially in the Netherlands, there was also fierce discussions, and there was even a referendum on that. And that is a first option. The second option is to come and apply for asylum. And then, of course, the food accommodation, medical services are all taken care of. Now, what is being done in the Netherlands is that there is a decision and a return moratorium for the moment of six months, which means that there will not be taken a decision now on asylum applications from people from Ukrainian and people will also not be returned from Ukraine to Ukrainian, which of course is really, really logical. Also people who were already in the asylum procedure and were, for instance, rejected, they are of course not returned because that would be a viable. First of all, it would be very inhumane, of course, but it would also be a violation of international law and especially the principle of non reform. So, so these are the two options, but what if you want to stay with family or friends. So for instance, those people from the Ukraine who have fled in 2014 after the annexation of the Krim, it is estimated that in the whole of the European Union, almost half of them stayed with family friends and found their own accommodation. So, and it's actually now also expected that at least a big group among the Ukrainian refugees prefers to live with friends and families and find that find accommodation there. So how are the rules then, but what if they need medical care, for instance, is there are they taken care of these are questions with all a lot of regulations, as you can imagine here in the Netherlands but that is, that is what we have tried to find out. And what is important is actually that there is now being discussed a new option, and that is the temporary protection, and that is actually a very promising option. Based on a directive of 2001, and that it that direction came into existence after we saw the refugees from the Yugoslavian war on the European territory so that was the first time since Second World War that within the European Union we were actually confronted with huge numbers of, of refugees. So then there was a directive adopted for future situations, if such a mass influx again occurs on the European territory, then we would have already this directive in place, it has been implemented in all the member states so we only had to activate that mechanism. This mechanism, maybe surprisingly was not activated in 2015, and we also had a mass influx of especially Syrian refugees. And now this is and so it let actually a dormant existence now the first time that it's that is going to be discussed. Now what is the goal of this is the goals of this directive are that there is immediate protection so you don't have to wait in an asylum procedure there is immediate protection for those to whom it applies. Okay, there's also a jointly mechanism and management of those who are this place so there is a real cooperation between the member states of the European Union something that we haven't seen actually before also not during the Syrian crisis in 2015. And it is also to prevent the overburden of the asylum systems in the member states. So as I mentioned it had has had a dormant life until now so now we try to activate it. How is it activated well first then needs to be a proposal of the European Commission, and that proposal is actually was launched. Yesterday by the Commission and it's this document it's public you can find it easily on the website of the European Commission if you're interested. And then, then, secondly, it needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers, and these are the justice and home affairs ministers, and they are actually negotiating this document right now. And after this, this event at five, 10 minutes past five, there you can stream, actually, the, the negotiation and today at six o'clock, there is a press release, and hopefully that is, they are going to adopt the document. It's a unified majority procedure so that means, even if, if a couple of states do not agree, then it still can be adopted. I had somewhere I had the link. I forgot it. Okay, there was a link but it's it's on the council you can, you can stream the, the press release. To whom, for whom is this decision then, who can profit from it, and what services does it entail. There's three categories of people that fall under this temporary protection. Of course it's Ukrainian nation nationals, but also third country nationals and stateless people who are legally residing in the Ukraine, and the family members of those categories. There are people who left the Ukraine after the 24th of February of this year, following the military invasion of Russia, and that is quite a serious limitation so imagine that you were a student studying at Tilberk University for instance, for half a year. You just started in the first in the second semester. So you left Ukraine before. And so that means in principle that you do not qualify for this temporary protection. But it does also mean that for instance people who are in the asylum procedure or who were asylum seekers in the Ukraine can also profit from this temporary protection. And that is very important because we see now in the media that there is also a lot of discrimination that people are not allowed to leave the Ukraine. So this is what they are actually covered by by this temporary protection mechanism. Now what type of services so they get a residence permit they get to work. They can work also as a self employed person. They also are allowed accommodation, social welfare subsistances and education for for minors. So that is quite elaborate, especially access to the labor market that is not easily provided also not for asylum seekers in the current procedure, they have to wait for for half a year before they get access to to the labor market so they get it immediately. Well it applies for it applies for one year in the first place but it can be extended each time with six months up to two years and even if the situation is not has not improved and is still so dangerous that people cannot be returned, then again the commission can ask the council to renew that period so that can continue afterwards as well. So that is what we mean with temporary protection. It's also dependent on the implementation on the national level how it is adopted how it is implemented exactly. But these are actually the provisions that are in the directive. So the model document so to say, of 2021, and they cannot derogate from from that. Now what the Commission also has issued is guidelines on the border procedures and especially after the lining up of people who want to leave the Ukraine. So it is recommended to the neighboring countries to be a bit more creative and lenient in the border procedures and there's also well it's the Schengen border code that applies here actually. But also in the Schengen border code, there are provisions to be more lenient at the border so for instance you can bring people from the border region to another place where you do the registration. There are some forms of the administrative and burden at the at the border, you can actually establish emergency entry points, etc. But this is a recommendation. And so it's up to the member states and especially of course the neighboring member states whether they want to imply that. At the moment, there had a new figure from UNHCR is that over a million people have now left the Ukrainian Ukraine. Well, Lucas and I were just in a call where we were informed that there were so far in the Netherlands. There are 50 Ukrainians that have knocked on the door in Tegapel where is the place where you apply for asylum. But of course we know that there's many more that are already here in the Netherlands and and actually they. They are waiting for this temporary residence protection, the provision to be adopted because that will help them a lot. And that's my final point that I wanted to bring to your attention. And that is the broader context, because it is only a couple of months ago that people were also standing at the border with Poland, but then from Belarus, and we're actually rejected at the border, which was also illegal. At that moment, Poland was applauded for pushing back the migrants at the borders of the European Union, and to be so strong in protecting the borders, and now Poland is applauded for welcoming the Ukrainian refugees. So there is really, really a big difference between how people are treated. And that is also from a scientific perspective, it's quite interesting. So what does lead to this different treatment. So there are many critical scholars who say well that who already before this, the war in Ukraine were very critical on the more racial, postcolonial and Islamophobic policies in the migration policies or practices in migration policies. And it's really a question whether this is one of the examples or expressions in another way that this is also happening. And so it's good that we that we find solidarity, it's good that the European Union moves at this moment that there is solidarity amongst the EU member states I'm very happy and I was also very much ashamed that that did not happen in 2015 for instance. But at least it happens now but it also raises new questions which I do not have an answer to, but are good for our reflections. And I think I want to leave it with that and of course, thank you so much for your attention. Thank you so much for that. And, and finally our final speaker, looking at this from a criminal law perspective how can state leaders be held accountable, we have Alice Fensley, thank you. Sorry, it's just one slide with a lot of law. It's one slide, I promise. So thank you all for coming. It's really encouraging to see so many students today. It shows that you are aware of the watershed. That's happening. That's happened. And the historical nature of what happened last week on Thursday morning. It's really, really good to exchange thoughts with you and I really do encourage you to ask questions when we have time. My heart is with Ukrainian nationals, if they are here in the room, but also Russian nationals. I think there's a lot of discontent on that side of the story as well. I do very much regard this as Putin's war and his cronies. I do not think there's wide and broad support in the country, certainly those, not those amongst those who have access to independent media. So, I want to say a few things about the future if you like the future of what happens to those who are responsible for these crimes. And I'll be talking a little bit about the International Criminal Court about the powers it has, but also about the powers it does not have, and I'm afraid there's a fair bit of those as well. The invasion of Ukraine that happened last Thursday can be discussed from a number of perspectives and I think Vile already started out talking about the violation of international law, violation of sovereignty, Invading another state is indeed a breach of Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter of United Nations, and that when it is done in a manifest way is also an international crime. It's the crime of aggression. It used to be called the crime against peace in Nuremberg but it's developed over the years into the crime of aggression and it isn't the statute of the ICC and this is what acts of aggression are. And it was created by a person who is in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a state. It is a crime. So, I think apart from sub paragraph C, all of these acts have been committed by Russian forces. So looking at those who could maybe find themselves one day in the dock for this crime, it has to be a person who is in control which is first of all the head of state which would be Putin and his military leadership. It's not a crime that an individual soldier can be prosecuted for. It's definitely a leadership crime. The ICC will not have jurisdiction to try Putin or his cronies for this particular crime, at least not at the moment because it requires a separate declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC, not just by non member states, but also by member states it's a special category of crime in that sense if you exceed you are a member of the ICC you accept this jurisdiction for war crimes crimes against humanity, genocide, but not necessarily for aggression that requires a separate declaration. Well that's of course far fetched in the case of Russia but also Ukraine, which is not a member neither of them are members of the ICC. We're not going to get there, unless in the future, we have a regime change, a radical one, and we could have maybe the situation being referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Then the ICC would have a jurisdiction to look into aggression, or they might exceed to the ICC itself. Again, this is to the future and I don't see this happening in the near future. So let's look at the other crimes. What about war crimes? What about crimes against humanity? And here there is a prospect of actually prosecuting individuals for such crimes. And that is because Ukraine, although it's not a member, it has accepted by declaration separately the jurisdiction of the ICC, and it did it in 2014. So after the invasion of Crimea, and eastern part of Ukraine, it decided to accept the declaration, have a declaration, have the ICC prosecutor look into these crimes and that's what happened in December 2020 so six years after having declared this, the prosecutor, the previous prosecutor Fatul Bensouda, said that she had sufficient evidence pointing into, yes, the possibility of a preliminary investigation into Ukraine. And as you may have seen in the news, or for those who are interested in the ICC on Monday, the current, the present ICC prosecutor has declared that he will indeed go ahead and do this and open an investigation. He has been followed up by 39 states, referring the situation to the ICC. Now that's important, because also the prosecutor could have just decided after accepting that he will look into these crimes. He can do it himself, we call this proprio moto in Latin. And that would have though required him to go before a judge for a panel to first get the formal approval of that and that normally takes about four months so that would have delayed that further. Now, with a referral of states, and they all joined up together this was clearly coordinated. He can go and do this immediately he doesn't have to wait for the judges to approve his opening of the investigation as it were. So, um, he will look into war crimes, and we're then talking about serious violations of international humanitarian law, IHL, the laws of war as it used to be called, seek to regulate the conduct of war and protect civilians and prisoners of war during armed conflict. Russian troops have reached major cities and they've been increasing reports of strikes and civilian objects, apartment buildings, schools, kindergarten, hospitals, oil and electricity facilities, vital infrastructure, vital to civilians. With the fighting now moving deeper into cities and Russian forces becoming probably more frustrated by Ukrainian resistance, the harm to civilians could become much greater. And I mean it changes by our almost, and it is really, I think a grim prospect that we're looking at. These are war crimes targeting civilians, especially when they are deliberate attacks on civilians. Sometimes there's not it's not so clear a civilian object can be also a military object when it's got dual use and we see that sometimes in asymmetrical warfare in cities that civilian objects are used for military storing military equipment, etc. It can be a lawful target, but we've not seen this really and I don't think that attacking in the gardens and hospitals can be regarded as such as these seem to me to point towards war crimes. Also disproportionate attacks on civilian objects can be war crimes. We are not talking about this horrible word collateral damage that is something that is accepted in wartime, but that indicates that it wasn't the primary object to kill civilians right. And when it's excessive it is always a war crime. So, these are definitely indications of war crimes and people are assembling now gathering evidence of these crimes on mobile phones dash cam cameras, traffic light cameras. It's all being brought together. There's been indications that there's a use of indiscriminate indiscriminate weapons cluster bombs, vacuum bombs, thermal barrack bombs, that's the other word for it. These are weapons that are prohibited by what we call the Hague war that deals with methods of means of warfare. And when certain methods are basically uncapable to distinguish between civilians and military targets then they are indiscriminate and prohibited per se. The problem with cluster bombs is that there is a treaty banning them, but neither Ukraine, neither Russia are members to it. And it's not currently prohibited under customary international law that seems to be the general rule but the thing when you use them, and they seem to have been using them in certain cities in the south. It's because they are indiscriminate and leave, you know, so many casualties they tend to by using them cause conduct that is a war crime. There's also been. Oh yeah the other thing I wanted to add and this is this is an interesting one I came across it today is that also what you can find with a perfidious means so waging war in ways that deceive the enemy can also be a war crime. I've heard about Ukrainian civilians, throwing Molotov cocktails or preparing them and want to throw them to Russian force that can be a war crime if you don't distinguish yourself clearly from the opponent. And if you participate in armed conflict as a civilian not being a military combatant that can be war crime so that's also on the other side something thought I'd point out. Thank you. What about those. There. This is probably I mean I don't know currently what's happening and I don't think there's enough evidence of that currently. These are widespread or systematic attacks on civilian population, and they generally reveal systemic state policy okay. And I think with regard to what happened in Crimea we could argue that those are crimes against humanity and certainly what the prosecutor seems to think of the ICC in gathering the evidence. And this is large scale deportations of civilians are forcible transferring Ukrainians out of the Crimea, leaving ethnic Russians behind that seems to indicate to that type of crime which generally is regarded as a more serious crime than war crimes. So, what about the challenges to actually bringing people to justice because there are many. I indicate already with aggression that's almost a non starter but also with these crimes it will be quite difficult to actually bring these people to justice because the ICC does not have a police force it's completely dependent on state corporation corporation by NGOs, people you know, who are willing to cooperate in gathering evidence, etc, because it can't do itself it doesn't have a lot of money. Interesting thing on Monday the prosecutor was one of the first things he said I need money. You have to give me money in staff. And I think there is now more of a support for the ICC for a long time. It was a bit of a weak institution, and that's an understatement. But now with everything that's happening around us and it being so close to us. There seems to be certainly amongst EU members, a lot of support for the ICC prosecutor and I can imagine them actually giving him more money to do this. We will not see the leadership of Russia in a docket anytime soon. And even if there is enough evidence as I said because of the lack of a corporation will be difficult to get them to the Hague. Although I don't know if you've seen this on social media all these wonderful signposts in Ukraine where they cancelled out the names to the cities but said the Hague. It's not going to happen very soon. But if only, you know, we can prevent these people from traveling because we've got 123 countries that have signed up to the ICC. And as soon as they step onto the territory of these countries these people will be arrested. So that in itself maybe is something that could happen. This is a long game. So we had dictator Alba share of Sudan who was forever on an indictment listed by the ICC to be arrested and and tried. And that took a long time but he now is going to be tried so there's definitely, you know, a prospect it would require political change in Russia for sure. In the meantime, and this is remarkable again, worlds upside down at the moment. We can spread the news that the ICC prosecutors looking into these crimes but also that domestic states have powers to try lower level people. So all those states have signed up to the ICC have a duty to try these people themselves right and through what we call universal jurisdiction which is a power that gives them the power to try anyone who's committed international crimes even though they've got, you know, a different nationality and they've committed crimes abroad. We can try these people. And the Netherlands even has universal jurisdiction with regard to aggression, which is really interesting. But to spread the word is important and that's when I go back to what a crazy thing is happening this morning I heard on the radio that Lindsey Graham I don't know if you know him he's a Republican staunch Trump supporter. He was saying in in Parliament that Russia should be Russian soldiers should really think twice before they would drop a bomb or do whatever they they're ordered to do because they might find themselves in the Hague. Well, you know, it was only a few years ago that the prosecutor of the ICC was banned by the US and all had our assets frozen in the US, and it was all those, you know, Trumpian anti ICC rhetoric that that dominated the airwaves and look now what we have. I mean it's all changed in just a matter of 10 days. We can do something with with messaging and the lower level people in particular they tend to show up at borders in domestic, domestic states, etc. So what am I going to leave you with. I'm just going to leave you with this idea that international justice is a long game, but we have patients. And in the meantime, funds are being cobbled together to get an investigative mechanism together. So we've got some of those already for Syria and also for Myanmar and for ISIS in Iraq mechanism to store evidence to preserve evidence to bring it all together. Not just for international courts in the future to rely on that evidence, but also for domestic courts to, you know, use that source in their domestic prosecution so there is hope, but we have to be patient. Thank you so much. Okay, so now we're going to move on to the questions and answer session if you'd like to take your steam positions here since the right. Okay, so we're going to answer open up the floor to questions and answers I think I'm going to take three questions at a time so can anyone put their hand up if they want to ask a question. Yes. Okay, thank you very much. So the first question if I understand correctly is the way that this is being portrayed is that this is a direct threat this warning is a direct threat to the international order, but we've seen similar illegal invasions in the past in Iraq, and in other countries. And so, is this not a continuance of what we've seen before. Is there anything about this conflict that makes this conflict special compared to those previous conflicts. I think that's the first question. So the second question is in the past when we've had conflicts like this, particularly before the ICC was set up in Rwanda and in Falka Yugoslavia, we set up ad hoc tribunals to deal with that situation. Is there a possibility in the light of this situation in Ukraine of setting up a new ad hoc tribunal to deal with it if the ICC can't. And a third question please. Yes. I think that question is clear. It's, it's basically, how do we enforce international law. We've seen that the US is able to avoid international law. Russia is a powerful state. We have no central government, no central police force. How do we ensure that international law is enforced against Russia so I think if I may divide the questions, I think the first, the first, I think a lot of them are for you against international law. So I think Alice should take the lead and if the rest of you want to jump in with points you have either Villa or Connie, and please do so. So, with regard to the first question, what's so different about this one, and why are we suddenly all kicking into gear and actually getting our act together and why not with regard to Afghanistan I mean, only a year ago not even be abandoned that place. One of the things, well, maybe you can say something about EU, because I think there's there's something there as well about, you know, the fact that it's within Europe. But I think there's another thing we should point out and that's the 1994 Budapest conventions anyone heard of that. Yeah, that was a political agreement. So, basically, the end of the Cold War, the agreement to get nuclear weapons out of Ukraine, and in exchange for that, the UK, United States would not guarantee but assure security I think that was the word they use because guarantee that they would have probably had to have to now step in and, you know, help them out in much more aligned ways. So, and I also know that personally Biden has been always really interested in Ukraine. He wanted when Obama was still a president he was very keen to get Ukraine as a special part of his portfolio as Minister of State. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs. And I think they saw it very much as a bulwark to really democratize vis-a-vis Russia's, you know, as a neighbor and being part of the European Union or Europe in a democratic and free way. So I think there's a lot of politics there and certainly I mean the UK, I think Boris Johnson was recently also quizzed about this like what about the Budapest. Did you see this journalist who really aggressively and very emotionally and, you know, rightly so asked him about why you're here in Poland and why, you know, you're afraid you're not in Ukraine. She reminded him of that commitment they made. And but it was politically very cleverly drafted. And I think there's, I think we all feel, I mean I certainly feel a frustration that we can't do more and we really feel that we need to stand up. For what's happening and the egregious way of which this is all came about. And I have to say Putin is also an easy person to see as a devil. I hope I don't, I'm not. How do you say that. Yeah. Anyway, I think I think most of you will agree with that. Anyway, I'll pass on to you more about Europe and Ukraine. Yeah, so what makes this conflict different. And it's absolutely true. There has been, well, very recently, also the war in Ethiopia, for instance, so there's there's lots of places where there's also war going on. But up until now, also the war in Ukraine has been neglected for a very long time. I think there's, there's a couple of reasons why it's different. Indeed, it's within the territory of Europe. So that's why also the European countries are now feel directly affected. There is also a more cultural link. Yeah, so we also the similarity that we have with the Ukraine makes us feel, okay, well, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's us. And what also makes a very big difference is I think that that Russia is is here the the aggressor it's one of the main players in the world so that makes that makes also a difference. And of course, also the nuclear threat that's so there is, I think a couple of reasons that makes it really different and also why this upheaval is also justified. Do you like to jump in? Okay, well, perhaps I'll chip in as well. I think the first question has been sort of discussed maybe I would like to add to that. It is true that there have been events of regarding the use of force that have been playing with the flexibility of international legal principles and terms and languages. And also from the West in the past such as I think Iraq had been mentioned there, and it is true that these difficulties of explaining these acts and some of the arguments that have been presented on all sides they do have a legacy they do cast a shadow in the use of international more, more broadly. But still, it is quite clear that the international community concerns considers this event quite egregiously different from from what we have seen recently. We heard some comments already I think we could also add the fact that the conflict in the Ukraine has been there for a while and Russia's activities on this longer time scale they involve essentially taking control of territories from from other states and these permanent areas of sovereign territory, and there's something there that truly hits at the foundations of the international legal order. It's, you know war as a means of acquiring lawful results or legal results that was abolished already before the United Nations in 1928. In the 1930s there has been a fairly common reference to the principle of non recognition of any status or situation that has been achieved through our lawful use of force. Perhaps this also refers to the third question about how to enforce international law. I think here's where we should refer to the sanctions that have been laid in place. The sanctions are, as we know, often a very slow weapon or an enforced mechanism, but they do start from the, they have their origins in the question of how to react to violations of international law if violent attacks and war is abolished or prohibited. And economic sanctions are part of the package of how to deal with these situations. And even though they are often a slow response a slow mechanism, they're nevertheless important. They do impose costs on unlawful behavior, a bit like the confiscation of proceeds of a crime. They make sure that crime doesn't pay the similar logic here of trying to increase the cost of the violations of international law. Also, sanctions, of course, they convey a strong condemnation of activities taken. And then finally they are also, they can also be connected to this general non recognition of the results and achievements of these condemned means. And I think your question has kind of been addressed and your question has been addressed, but the ad hoc tribunal. Yeah, sorry. And very briefly, because I gave you a hard time in having to repeat your question. So what happened was with the US, of course, was that the ICC did have jurisdiction because it happened, the crimes, the alleged crimes were in Afghanistan and Afghanistan is a member of the ICC. So basically that's why they started bullying the ICC freezing assets, making it impossible for people to travel. The Russia doesn't even have to bully because it's not, you know, there's no jurisdiction. So in that sense, doesn't have to resort to that way of treating ICC and its functionaries, but good point. And it also shows that the ICC can be quite a weak institution. To be honest, the ad hoc tribunal. Yes. So that's an interesting one, isn't it? It's been proposed by a number of people and Philip Sands, one of them very famous Professor of International Law. He had this idea of aggression court mainly because the ICC does not have jurisdiction with regard to aggression. And I can't really imagine how that would work. I mean, I can see it happening in terms of it being set up, but it's not going to be done by the Security Council, of course, which is what we saw with the Rwanda Tribunal, the Yugoslav Tribunal. And so it would have to be countries that themselves have jurisdiction over aggression and then it can be derived from them and then they can set it up, but that's going to be an institution that's going to be relatively weak. And there'll be no Russian actually in the doc again. So you'll have in absentia proceedings maybe, which for those of you are really into international criminal law, we have a tribunal in the Hague, the Lebanon Tribunal, which is a bit like that. And it's not been a great success where we have defence lawyers who never speak to clients and who present a case. It's all a bit strange, but it is an idea. So people are thinking about it. Yeah. Great. I'd like to collect another three questions. You have a question at the front here, a question at the back, and a question from you. So we'll start with you. Thank you. So for the recording. So trans people coming from Ukraine from other situations where they haven't got their gender recognised because of fear and the difficulties in Ukraine of doing so. So trans people are going to have difficulty because their identification is not going to marry with their status and how is that going to affect them with claiming asylum in Europe or in the Netherlands. The question at the back there please. Sorry, it was the one behind you if that's okay. Sorry. So the question is about what about Ukrainians and and Russians abroad. How is this affecting them. So you have seen this a lot in the UK. Ukrainians being asked if they're going to go back home to fight. And, and, and all sorts of questions like that that are simply alleged at large of them because of their status as Ukrainian, and also Russians being asked presumably to apologise for the kinds of Russian aggression or who are facing sanctions when they had no involvement in the decisions of Russia in terms of aggression. So I think that questions is the second question probably for Connie and then the third question from you. Clarification are you asking the potential for the International Criminal Court to try Putin or domestic courts to try Putin. Okay, fantastic. Okay, so the third question is, we have head of state immunity Putin benefits from that. How does that head of state immunity affects his chances of trial in the ICC or domestic courts and has there been a change of attitude towards head of state immunity in the last few years that might open up the door to trying Putin. So we have two questions on migrant law which I think Connie can answer and the other speakers can jump in on the third question relates to the kind of aggression head of state immunity Alice can answer and I think also villa can jump in at any point if he thinks he wants to add anything to these questions. Thank you Ben. Thank you also for the questions. Well the first question is not necessarily a migration law question but it's a well recognized problem that that your gender cannot be changed unless you follow very strict and also very humiliating sometimes humiliating procedures. There's also quite some case law from the European Court of Human Rights especially on article eight on this I'm sure you're familiar with it but probably the rest is not. But it is also a violation of your, of your privacy involved there sometimes you have to provide for your medical dossier, your medical file, for instance before that can be recognized so and so that is a really serious burden for many people for many transgenders who wants to change their gender on their documents. And, and that of course creates problems, all the time. So if you need your documents if you want to register or somewhere, regardless of the war regardless of whether you leave the country and now it is also so affecting this group in in the Ukraine. So, yeah, that will. It will create problems at the border. I think they have a stronger protection in the European Union. So there, there is a stronger protection of transgenders there also with a fundamental rights charter. So, while throwing away your, your passport is, but that's, that would not be a good advice, I think, but yeah, it is, it really is a challenge there. It's a complete answer, of course, but this is a clear recognition and also contextualization of this problem. And the second question on Russian and Ukrainian students. Because there is, but I know from indeed from from my colleague Maria and also her family what what problems they are facing and I think US students are from Russia and Ukraine are facing similar problems as well. And it is important that so I explained the limitation that it is for people who left the Ukrainian after the 24th of February, due to the invasion. There is a possibility in the directive to on the national level to extend that so that would be a plea to extend actually the temporary protection if adopted. So I expect it will be adopted but it's not adopted yet, unless something happened in the meantime. So there is some advice would be to actually to claim and to ask the government in the country where you are in to extend the scope of of that protection to also people who left the Ukraine before. So that is, but also, of course, the Russian students well you have if you have your student visa you're still in the European Union you're quite, you're quite safe if that is all all arranged. And I assume if you don't want to fight and you do not go back but that's everyone's individual choice. Okay. So with regard to the question about immunity. Good question. So with regard to the prosecution before a domestic court. There is immunity. This is basically following what the International Court of Justice has said and it has been criticized that ruling but basically it holds and I think states are quite happy with it so all those members states to the ICC you have to prosecute international crimes within their borders irrespective of nationality or territorial jurisdiction, they will not touch any leader because they will all have in there. In their laws that there's immunity and they will respect that following that ruling of the ICJ international courts don't have that restriction with regard to incumbent leaders. I mean, as soon as people step down so say put in thrown out and he survives, and he lives a life somewhere and he's then prosecuted before domestic court yes then they do have power but as long as as he's in, you know, in that position he won't be he can claim immunity. ICC has issued quite a controversial ruling I have to say the appeals chamber so it's law now that there is no immunity for for heads of states, even if these are not members of the ICC. And it's quite far fetched and they develop they see it as a rule of customary law that's developed since Nuremberg that leaders, you know that there's no immunity for leaders for those cries because these are serious violations of of the Nuremberg ominous norms of very hardcore customer international law norms so he couldn't claim it there, I would think, although there is still some controversy amongst public international lawyers they don't like this ruling, looking sideways to you. And maybe to fill a, but so there is some some debate still but the ICC seems adamant that they shouldn't shouldn't apply. And I'm thinking then particularly about a referral to the ICC by someone who has the power to refer to this like a Security Council or something. Okay. Okay. So we're, we're five minutes over to you already so I'm going to ask you, do you have anything to add to that in relation to any of those questions. No thanks I think those questions were very well answered. Well thank you. Thank you so much everyone for attending. Thank you very much to our fabulous speakers to the fellow. Thank you to you for all and for all attending of course and thank you to the studio generale for arranging this and to Tilburg Law School.