 Welcome to you and to everyone here today. Dr Cook is the State Secretary for Financial Market Policy and European Policy at the German Federal Ministry of Finance. We've had the four W's here in Ireland in recent days. Today the minister's speech has four T's, timely, targeted, temporary and transformational. The German Strategy for Recovery in the EU, the title of his talk today. At a time when Germany holds the EU Council presidency, his remarks will be particularly interesting as we face into an autumn of great uncertainty. A brief note on York's background. He has held his current role since 2018. Prior to his appointment as State Secretary, he had a distinguished career in the private sector working with Goldman Sachs in a variety of senior roles. He holds a PhD in Finance from the University of Chicago and a Masters in Public Administration for the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and a Masters in Economics from the Pantheon Sorbonne University in Paris. Both his initial address and the Q&A session will be on the record. You can submit your questions in comments via the Q&A function on Zoom, which you'll see at the bottom of your screen. And we would ask you to identify both yourself and your affiliation in the written question. That would be most helpful. And also please feel free to tweet to your heart's content at the handle hashtag IIEA. And with that, could I hand over to Dr. Cookies? Yes, hello, and apologies that this doesn't work better and that I have to do this on phone instead of video, but I think we're trying in parallel to join by Zoom. Maybe during the presentation I'll be able to get in. Anyways, I think we got off to a quite quick start in the presidency and are trying to extend that quick start. We obviously in July had a big moment with the Recovery Fund and we've worked quite intensively over the summer to implement the Recovery Fund and the own resources decision, the MSF, and to make sure that with all of these instruments we participate in the recovery of the European Union and make sure that Europe embarks on a recovery path. We've had very constructive discussions and are on a good path, I would say, to discussing with the Member States, the European Parliament, the Commission, and everyone involved a path that will allow us to basically implement the summit conclusions of the 750 billion facility into practical legislative work over the course of the next month, so that hopefully early in the year the first funds will start flowing and in that sense I think that would be very positive and a good signal to markets and to the European community. That is something that we're trying to work on at the moment. I just joined by video. Is that in my visible now on video? Yes, you are. Okay, so in essence the first priority obviously for the next few months during our presidency will be to implement the RFD-owned resources decision, the MSF and all of the legislative work that is connected to it. Apart from that we have three big pillars of priority pertaining to capital markets union, banking union, and the digital union. Under the capital markets union, I think we've seen some very good progress. We got a report from the next EU group last year which was commissioned by the Finance Ministers of Germany, France, and the Netherlands. We just received the high level forum report with 120 pages of very insightful ideas, very practical ideas that go into a lot of detail how to improve the European capital markets in terms of financial reporting, market making, issuance of equity, deepening markets for European securities, and going into a lot of these areas that are important for the functioning of our markets and of course a lot into custody and settlement, post trade. So in essence it's really a very good and well-balanced package. We see the ideas and the process on a deepening of the anti-money laundering rule as also extremely important both for capital markets and banking union. And we are strongly in favor of moving from a directive to a uniform regulation on AML because we have seen in many cases that the lack of uniformity and application of AML rules is quite negative and has the adverse impact on the stringency with which we can impose AML rules. We are also in favor and will continue to work on setting up a supervisory authority on AML that will work across the EU. So I think that's also an important aspect. And a further important project both for CMU and banking union is of course sustainable finance. I think it's a hugely important and since the last few months we've been becoming much more of a mainstream topic of sustainable finance and ESG. So we will continue to work on the taxonomy to make sure that Europe is the world leader in presenting a framework for green and sustainable investing. I think that can be a very big competitive advantage that Europe can have. So in that sense we're very optimistic that both the CMU directly and a lot of the projects that will indirectly strengthen CMU will make progress in the next few months under our presidency. And on banking union, the echo pin had a very good discussion and the Europe group had a very good discussion apologies on Friday in Berlin and we are keen to revive the debate that has solved a little bit over the last few months due to the priority focus on COVID recovery and resilience measures. We are picking up the discussion we've already started our working groups under the presidency in the echo pin framework. So in that sense we are moving ahead on all pillars namely deeper integration, mobility of capital and liquidity, risk reduction, integration in terms of thinking about how deposit insurance can support the framework and as I said continued risk reduction both in terms of reducing the bank sovereign nexus and continuing to work on reducing non-performing loans. So those are very important projects and we're looking to move ahead as the Europe group president from Ireland has said he's also working on under his Europe group presidency on getting the ESM reform moving including the implementation of the backstop to the single resolution fund that would obviously also be a project that would massively help the banking union and we are working very closely between the Europe group and echo pin presidency to move that ahead. Then a very important point for us as the third pillar is the digital union. We have four big legislative acts coming up from the commission ranging from stable coins and cryptocurrencies to service provision in the digital finance space to the question of how innovative payment providers are treated. We think all of these elements to make Europe and the EU a single market for digital finance for FinTech is also something that is hugely important in promoting the innovative power which is also which is always a question of getting scale quickly and I think the Europe simply can't afford to be a fragmented market of 27 individual member states for digital finance business model whereas competitors that are starting up in the US or China or other regions immediately have access to a much much bigger much more uniform consumer market. So in essence I think Europe has a lot of homework to do if we want to compete in the digital space we're quite innovative in a lot of areas for example Europe has an excellent instant payment system through the European Central Bank which is why we also support the ECB's initiative on the European Payments Initiative and we'll also work with them to see which kind of legislative support that needs in that sense we've already been in discussions with the commission on that so I think that's my attempt at a whirlwind tour of the presidency in 15 minutes and I hope I've given a reasonable overview but happy to go into much more detail on the individual topics upon request. Thank you and it certainly was a whirlwind in fact it was such a whirlwind by missed out on the points. On the digital package you mentioned in the digital union issue you mentioned four aspects related to cryptocurrencies digital finance payments providers and the final one. Well I mean the topics are quite broad and we have a few legislative proposals coming up gradually so it's not clear yet whether all four of them will actually make it during our presidency but to go into more detail the first one will be the legislative proposal on cross-sectional financial services operational and cyber resilience so that will deal a lot with operational questions with registration requirements penetration testing requirements for cloud service providers and everything that has to do with cyber resiliency especially with more of the operational aspects of setting up like a European cloud provider what are the access rules the second rule set will be on crypto assets and stable points, I think that one is pretty clear what's the European answer to Libra the third pillar will be the digital finance strategy which will be a further evolution of the fintech action plan which was published in March 2018 and the last fourth pillar is the retail payment strategy which will deal more with these innovative payments providers so we are expecting legislative or thematic proposal by the commission within our presidency and we'll work hard on advancing that then through the member states maybe on the digital I could start off with one that's a little controversial I suppose the Irish position and German position will be different on digital taxation the taxing of the large online companies the union address this morning the president global agreement was not reached by the end of the next year that he believes Europe should move ahead on that given the differences of views amongst the member states how do you see that issue on digital taxation progressing well I think the discussion and echo fit on Saturday and I would say definitely showed a very strong shared view that we will try together to get a global agreement within the framework of the OECD negotiations on minimum taxation on digital taxation and all of these items but there was also a broad agreement that if that fails then we don't have a choice but to think about European that sense I do hope that we can come to terms and find an agreement there of course it will be a difficult discussion no question but I am optimistic that what we agreed on namely first let's make an attempt at the global level if that fails we'll do something at the European level could be a consensus item then depending on how the global discussion goes towards the end of the year thank you so you're welcome to as to the audience please put in your questions via the Q&A function there just going back to going in reverse order through some of your remarks looking at the banking union piece six months into the COVID crash how would your evaluation of the strength of the European banking system how would you evaluate it well I mean so far we've had a very good resilience of the banking system we think that the reaction to the last financial crisis has shown to be quite good because the build up of capital and the resilience of capital the constant stress testing of balance sheets has led to a much more resilient banking system and I think the main reasons why we are in a much much better shape than we could be is that across the eurozone what usually happens in a recession as deep as the one we're witnessing right now is a massive credit crunch I mean there's a classic the classic causality chain of RWAs increasing because of liquidity lines being drawn defaults increasing leading to reduction in capital downgrades, rating migration adversely leading to increased capital requirements and that then in the second round leading to restriction on new lending and all of that has that causality chain at least in the last consequence has not happened right I mean credit across the eurozone is actually expanding and that of course has a lot to do with the European response that in the vast majority of member states guarantee schemes were launched to assure the continued flow of credit to the real economy so both the increase in capital the response of European supervisors by in single individual cases relieving some of the capital buffers that we built for example counter cyclical buffers also gave some flexibility and then at least the policy response also gave confidence the banks to continue lending so I think that has really worked quite well and has made us resilient of course we're not home free I mean quite a lot of the measures that were taken in the member states have delayed the moment of truth in terms of corporate insolvencies so in that sense we will only know let's say this time next year whether we really withstood the test so I think it's definitely too early to give any sort of all faith all clear signal a general observation from here and I wonder if it's similar in Germany many people in the insolvencies have been surprised how slowly things have moved clearly there are many businesses at any time there are businesses that go out of business it's just a normal process of a market economy but there seems to have been not the upsurging insolvencies that one might have expected with such a big economic contraction are we to some extent in an artificial phase at the moment where we're looking at a wave of corporate insolvencies and more MPLs as real effects of the loss of wealth generation that happened take effect well I mean first of all I think it was a very rational response by governments to respond because in a way the nature of this crisis is so brutal both on the demand of the supply side especially in the sectors most involved that there was a new and novel policy response was required and the suspension of insolvency regimes in some member states I mean Germany did that very very quickly and very early on was simply a requirement because otherwise a insolvency regime that is built for a normal sort of normal recession that we all know how it works and that doesn't lead to this immediate stop of demand for some sectors simply wouldn't have worked so in that sense I think it would have been as artificial to leave the standard rules and regulations as now it's somewhat artificial of course to have the continuation of the insolvency regime suspensions and what we're doing is gradual reintroduction and I think that's absolutely the right way of doing it that we gradually reintroduce the normal rules but we tend to err on the side of caution to be more with reintroducing the rules because as we've seen second waves do happen leading again to demand contractions supply contractions and restrictions so I think it's very economical to also leave these rules operational for a bit longer and could I just pick up on that state under state aids issue the suspension of state aids be it for the financial sector or more widely I know that's outside your immediate brief but do you see the experience we've had in the COVID pandemic of the suspension of state aids changing European attitudes towards competition I think it's been noted that for example Germany has shifted closer to the French position on creating European champions and ensuring that European competition policy does not hinder the creation of European companies that are big enough to challenge American and Chinese companies to change the way that European companies are changing the way that they are managing their talk so in short is the state aids framework going to be permanently changed by what we've experienced no I think we have to differentiate I mean there's on the one side a very legitimate industrial policy debate which has been ongoing before we have to be in terms of industrial policy to make sure that we are competitive that we make sure that we leverage the strength of the European market and that we remain a strong global economy as Europe so I think that's a very legitimate and a discussion that continues but that has been ongoing much longer than the current crisis the other aspect which I think is legitimate is the question of adaption of the competition rules and the state aid rule to the current environment and I think we've all been very grateful to the European Commission A for responding massively massively quickly and efficiently to come up with the temporary framework and we've had endless and hour long discussions with the commission on that that has been extremely constructive we got our first approval for help for affected corporates in March so the commission made sure that money can flow extremely quickly they've worked 24-7 since March essentially you don't want to know to which times of night over Easter for example we negotiated a free file in parallel with the commission and got all of them through on time for the money to flow on a huge number of areas from credit insurance to individual corporates to sector who in essence only have good things to say about the work of the commission on this topic they've been extremely efficient and pragmatic just a further follow up if I may on that there have been concerns in smaller member states and member states that don't have as much fiscal capacity as perhaps Germany does that the capacity to help firms subsidized firms through the worst of this crisis will lead to an unlevel playing field across the single market and that those peripheral countries that as I say don't have that fiscal wherewithal will be further hindered do you see that's a risk for the single market no that's precisely as you know everything happens during the wee hours of the night in Europe and we literally spent three days on the 7th 8th and 9th of April negotiating a package that ended up being a 540 billion package of which 200 billion goes to the European investment bank for a guarantee program to provide state guarantees or EIB triple A guarantees to SME lending SME investing in part larger corporate investing across the European Union in particular benefiting or intended to benefit those member states that don't have large promotional bank systems or the fiscal capacity so I think that head on because I think the concern that you have is spot on absolutely the worst thing that can happen is an asymmetric response we saw that after the financial crisis but I do think we've avoided that because already in April we negotiated a big big package and the EIB is now fully operational for these programs so in that sense we've really done what we can and of course the fiscal response which was at the national level very uniform but now at the European level also very uniform and big also gives credit and confidence to Marcus that there will be a much more symmetric response and of course the ECB's action has stabilized that and has helped that along also very well On loan guarantees Germany has been very strong on loan guarantees for companies do you have concerns about that we in Ireland have bad experience on loan guarantees during the financial crisis in 2008 significant guarantees were given to financial institutions and many people feel that was a bad mistake do you have concerns about loan guarantees for private businesses I mean of course in the construction of our program we paid a huge amount of attention to potential issues that we learned were done poorly during the financial crisis and as in Ireland also in Germany the taxpayers paid a huge huge bill for the bailing out of the banking system we deliberately constructed our loan programs to be completely different and I think the first huge difference of course is the financial crisis programs went mainly to a very small concentrated number of banks our lending program in Germany for example goes to 82,000 corporates so that's the number of corporates that we've addressed so far so yes of course we have risk and if like the current recession lasts for years and years then of course this credit risk that the government is taking lending to 82,000 corporates will materialize and will lose money but on the other side we structured the transactions in a way that if we go back to normal in a reasonable time frame the state can actually recover those credit losses that it will inevitably suffer because some of the 82,000 will go into insolvency of course just statistically through the interest participation from those who are able to repay so we have paid a huge amount of attention to learning from what went wrong and I do hope that the bill that the taxpayer pays will be much much smaller than much much smaller than what was in the financial crisis it won't be zero I'm not naive I think the reason why the government went in is because there wasn't a private market lending at market terms so in that sense I think it's very normal that this is not a for-profit operation but the economic benefits of these programs I think is much much larger than the fiscal cost will end up being Okay good, final one of the banking union, deposit insurance common deposit insurance for the eurozone where are we on that? I think it's part of the package and I think in isolation deposit insurance leads to nothing if we only did deposit insurance and nothing else then we wouldn't be a much better banking union than we already have because we also need integration steps in particular if we remain as fragmented and segmented in terms of capital and liquidity between member states then just introducing a deposit insurance will have absolutely no or absolutely minuscule effect relative to the relative to the efforts required so in that sense I think if and only if we agree on a big package and a very ambitious package that should include steps toward deposit insurance as a safeguard for those member states who host big banking corporates I think that's a very plausible request absolutely understood and that's the decision of the German finance ministry by the way not yet common agreement within the government I have to say that as a disclaimer but we do think in the finance ministry and have written a paper in November 19 that deposit insurance can be a useful component if the other aspects namely risk reduction and further integration steps on the capital and liquidity movement are also taken then it can be a very plausible step in the right direction good let's shift over to capital markets union you mentioned that Europe has an opportunity to become a world leader in green sustainable investment my colleague Luca Callahan White notes today that Germany will issue or has issued a 12 billion sovereign agreement but he asks this question any analysts have commented that one of the most significant challenges facing the green bond market is that of greenwashing or conveying a false impression about environmental credentials are there ways to prevent that is that a concern that you and your ministry have yeah I mean I think it's the prime concern for the green bond market because it's a young and pastly growing market so in that sense as always with things like that if investors have the impression that what's written on the bond is not what's inside the bonds and that there is sort of a lack of transparency then the market will lose credibility so in that sense when we did our green bond issuance we paid very very careful attention that all aspects of the green bond standards are fulfilled we're very careful to implement all aspects of the green bond standards and I think that's very important of course one of the big debates in the sovereign green bond market is always the big question of what green expenditures are you financing and due to the fact that parliament's control of expenditure expenditures I don't think anyone can come up with a smarter idea than the idea to benchmark the when you're doing a 2020 green bond the volume that you're refinancing to the 29 actual expenditures because in terms of if you're issuing a green bond in February 2020 you don't have a clear number yet on how much you're actually going to spend on green and obviously I have no idea what the parliament is going to approve you in green expenditures for 2021 so in that sense the fact that Iqma agreed that the 20 that sort of the back one year backward looking even allows a bit longer but we took as our benchmark one year backward looking that is a very reasonable idea it allows you to be very clear in what you're financing and allows full transparency and given the functionality of travel of green expenditures at the moment with clear expansion the fact that we had 12 billion of eligible expenditures for 11 billion of expected issuance also shows you that investors can have confidence that we're actually spending the money on green that we're raising in the green bond markets Interesting, very interesting you ANL anti-money laundering was something you mentioned quite a bit in the discussion of the ANU your preference for the ministry you mentioned to move towards E-regulation rather than directive because of uneven application has that become more serious that issue around uneven application divergence of the effect of directives across the member states I don't think it's become particularly more more concerning than it always has but we've just seen another series of of weakest link debates I'll give you a good example during the last round of MLD implementation member states are allowed to impose identification requirements for buying gold and they can choose what from which amount they start requiring these identification and of course if you know like country A which neighbors country B and Schengen requires identification starting from 2000 euros and next door neighbor country B only requires identification from 10,000 then guess what the money launder is going to do so it makes no sense on a rule like that in a Schengen room where everyone can move from between countries with no controls to have different caps or different amounts starting from which you have to identify yourself when you're buying physical gold simply makes no sense because you're inviting arbitrage if you have it differently it's the weakest link so in that sense and there's dozens of these examples I'm just picking that one because it's so illustrative of the problem of the directive versus regulation debate okay good good that's very clear let's move from the micro to the macro Mark Dempsey who's a former EU policy advisor at the British financial regulator asks can you speak a little about governance of member state spending of the recovery funds and he notes in particular an article in the Italian media that noted some of the money was being allocated to the purchase of fighter jets is there you know is there a concern that the recovery fund may go to more let's say spending items that might be controversial in other member states I know this was a particular concern of the Dutch and three other countries around the time of the discussion do you have thoughts on that question yeah no I mean the governance is very very clear on that right I mean the process is very clear at the summit conclusions level and is being now implemented into actual detailed legislation and the rules are very clear I mean the recovery and resilience fund expenditures have to meet criteria that will be governed by the commission reviewing them the European finance committee reviewing them a so-called cometology process of the member states reviewing them there's even an emergency break that will allow a single country to ask for review at the head of state level and so there are so many emergency breaks and mechanisms involved that will assure that the goal of spending these according to national plans that meet the European semester country specific recommendation framework that we are very optimistic that this money will be spent in growth enhancing ways and there will always be individual cases of someone finding some program you know but I think for really the bulk of the expenditure it's going to go exactly where it needs to go namely growth enhancing measures my colleague Andrew Gilmour asks how should we interpret the recent softening of the German stance on debt mutualization is it simply a one-off crisis-driven or is it indicative of a broader shift in German EU policy in other words is transfer union on the agenda well first of all this is not transfer union right I think that's the it's very clear we are not talking about joint and several debts in the 750 billion program and I think that's that is very important it's common debt but it's peri-pasu debt right and that is a huge huge and politically very important difference that that was also agreed on in unanimity so I think that that clearly shows you that this is not a complete reversal of the German position and so in that sense I think that's that's also a very very good good path towards achieving consensus in German parliament and making sure that this passes and in other parliaments of course as well so I think there is no no shift in view here what concerns the question of the the program in and of itself and the novelty of it of course it's novel yes but it's novel for a good reason right I mean we've never faced such a deep recession in Europe even after the financial crisis we didn't and also I think we have to learn lessons from the response to the financial crisis the response to the financial crisis was massive the financial expansion in those countries that have fiscal space and fiscal contraction in part even austerity programs in those that didn't which led to asymmetry number one asymmetry number two was then guided by the fact that the severity of the credit cycle was worse in some countries than others and again in a very unfavorable asymmetric way and see the European Union didn't have a very substantial common fiscal response either and left all the hard work to the ECB which led to a huge number of problems that go back to the core root of the issue in Europe that we have a monetary union but not a fiscal union so in that sense if you think about the analysis of mistakes that we made after the financial crisis I think it's only plausible that we agreed to a very strong and as symmetric as we can get fiscal response for the EU after this crisis with regards in your the title of your presentation is timely targeted temporary and transformational timely and transformational you mentioned that the funds would begin to flow at the beginning of next year and over a period of time is that fast enough first question and secondly will it be transformational and I note that the European Central Bank has already purchased more than 750 billion in asset purchases under its pandemic program so in that context is the recovery fund big enough to be transformational well I mean 750 billion is a lot of money so I would say it's hopefully big enough no but seriously I do think if you compare to the size of GDP across the EU of course it is a very substantial amount and if you're also adding it to all of the fiscal measures that have been taken at national level I think it shows you very clearly that the overall fiscal response of the European Union is quite massive does the money flow quickly enough it never does after the recession but I do think the fact that the member states saw very early on in the process namely beginning of April that there will be a common European response they also were able in their national responses to the crisis to act much more decisively because they knew that in the worst case Europe would be there for them and the fact that then in July we had another commitment to a strong response with the ability to some of the fiscal measures taken now also means that even if the money doesn't flow explicitly next year implicitly in terms of relieving financing conditions you can see that it already has a front-loading effect and if you see how European sovereign spreads have evolved you know A from the ECB response on the 18th of March until the 21st of July with a big contraction and then further contraction since the agreement on a fiscal package in July you can really see that this effect of front-loading and confidence from markets to sovereigns which allow the sovereigns even though European money flows yet to effectively already utilize some of the benefits from the agreement shows that it's definitely had a huge effective relief for the European Union just following up on that in terms of the use of the European Central Bank's balance sheet there's clearly been a massive and a sudden expansion of the balance sheet and that has been as you say very important for calming sovereign bond markets and credit markets as well are there risks with this strategy and how concerned are you in Germany with the use of asset purchases on such a scale by the central bank I will not answer that question because it is a very long and firm tradition of German government policy not to comment on the completely independent monetary policy of the European Central Bank that is absolutely fine fully understood we have one, I'm just going to finish on a general question about how you see the recovery evolving but we've won quite detail on cryptocurrencies an area that I know nothing about to be very honest with you the question is do you have any thoughts on the European Commission's draft proposal on the regulation of crypto assets and its possible implications for European monetary policy now that is a tough question yeah and unfortunately I can't answer it not because I can't answer it in terms of content but because the proposal for some unknown reason leaked and it is not official I could tell you something if it were official but given that it's not official I do want to at this stage not make any comments but as the commission has announced it will make public pronouncements on this topic soon so in that sense that will be the point in time then to start a discussion however it is a very good and established tradition in the European Union that the presidency stays quite neutral on these things during its presidency and again fully understood so let's conclude on the but one thing I mean maybe as a very important because we have made some pronouncements I mean one of the things that we have to take into account and that we will take into account is the issue of European sovereignty we can't allow stablecoin or crypto providers to enter into European consumer markets in a non-regulated way from third countries without respecting the denomination in Euro without granting secure access to collateral if a product is marketed as a stablecoin it needs to have a stablecoin inside including full recourse by consumers to collateral and things like that okay thank you for that and just in the final minutes maybe just get your perspective on the shape of the recovery in Germany as you see it from Berlin and indeed for the wider European economy clearly there has been an asymmetric effect of the pandemic economically as well as from a health perspective across the EU so any thoughts you might have on how you feel the recovery is moving in Germany when for example output might return to pre-pandemic levels and any thoughts on the asymmetric nature of the economic shock yeah I mean okay let's go from the V from the top of the V to the bottom and that has been painful of course but the good news is it's been much much less painful than we feared in March it's been less painful than we feared in April so in that sense we've been constantly revising the predictions that we had sort of close to double digit negative at the beginning currently we're at sort of a government projection of minus five eight for the year so in that sense we've seen much more much less adverse impact on the downslope of the V the counterfactual to that is that also on the upslope of the V it's not been a pretty V at all I mean my six year old is learning to write at the moment and it looks a little bit like a sort of scribbled V which is somewhere you know like the upslope is definitely not as steep as the downslope and I think that corresponds to the experience in many member states that very likely the increase in GDP in 21 will not fully compensate the downturn in 20 for Germany we're expecting to be back to pre-crisis level in Q1 22 so we're expecting after minus five eight this year plus four four ish next year and then to sort of in the first or maybe second quarter of next year then to be flat again so in that sense for the Eurozone I think that takes a bit longer but you know somewhere 22 we will have recovered so it'll roughly take let's call it 18 months to recover the loss from the current 12 month period so in that sense yes it is asymmetric but on the other side it's not horrible asymmetric so that we think with the fiscal response we may actually see an improvement to that if we achieve the 750 billion funds flowing quicker maybe we recover quicker and on that optimistic note we've come to the end of our hour long slot State Secretary thank you so much for joining us I think as you said it really was a whirlwind you covered an enormous amount of ground very clearly very good information I'm sure our members got took much from your talk today so thank you for joining us and we look forward perhaps to welcome you in person in maybe in 2022 when we've all fully recovered many thanks thank you