 Okay welcome back everyone for the the second session this morning and this morning we've got we're really blessed with a couple of really excellent speakers and I think this is really an opportunity to move past the South China Sea is wonderfully interesting as the you know the disputes in the South China Sea might be and and think more broadly about in Chinese naval strategy and strategic thinking about the Indo-Pacific as a whole and this session this morning we'll be getting some Chinese perspectives on that and later this afternoon with Abhijit Singh we'll get an Indian counterpoint to that but this morning we're blessed to to have Professor Yoji from Macau University and before he went to Macau he was I think that's for some years at the University of New South Wales and has strong links with Australia but I think one of the the great things about Professor Yoji's work is that it he's able to surpass a lot of the rhetoric that we see in talking about Chinese naval thinking and give us a very clear and articulate picture of the evolution of Chinese naval thinking and then after Professor Yoji makes his presentation we've got Dr. Jianjian from ADFA who will give some thoughts as a counterpoint to Professor Yoji's presentation so I'd like me to welcome Professor Yoji please. Thank you David thank you Laurie for your very kind invitation for me to attend this very important event I lived here for six years doing my master and a PhD so each time I come back I feel really nostalgic maybe the number of my return trips is exhausting as we are moving towards the age of retirement but anyway this is the place I remember most fondly and solidly I will begin my speech with two questions to myself the first one does China have a Indo-Pacific strategy now I put it emerging into Pacific strategy but I would say that there is an emerging two ocean naval strategy by the Chinese people's Liberation Army at the military level it is basically there but still not finally approved by the political leadership so it is not really official yet but if we do recognize the central elements of the two ocean strategy naval strategy it could be interpreted as a kind of Indo-Pacific strategy because the focus the naval focus has been shifted I wouldn't say shifted has been added another dimension from the West Pacific now to the Indian Ocean we talked about it during the tea break that the short-term concern especially political concern is of course South China Sea Taiwan issues but long-term concern is of course in the Indian Ocean the reason is that you know China is kind of confident or more confident that eventually they would have things under control in the South China Sea or in the Pacific or in the Taiwan Street but it is very very difficult and long long term for them to have anything under control in the Indian Ocean so this is a word David mentioned the vulnerability vulnerability will last and when you have something under control your worry is less intensified but when something you know you cannot you know go beyond goes beyond your concern that you plan first you plan early so this is still at the planning stage and the planning is both in terms of strategic design and more importantly capability building so that leads to my second question does strategy matter I think I was the first one to publish the Chinese blue water strategy in the West my paper was published by the Pacific Review in 1991 the Chinese blue water strategy now between 1991 to 2011 numerous people asked me what do you mean by Chinese blue water power is there a blue water power associated with Chinese Navy so I can't answer only after 2011 now this is no longer beyond doubt that China does have a naval capability that can be described as a blue water power so it takes a long time for strategy to be substantiated into the power play or military employment of that strategy through power building through capability building therefore strategy does matter it points to the direction maybe a long-term evolutionary trend but eventually at the point they will lead the people towards that direction and end it up maybe now this is probably the year one for our Indo-Pacific concept debate at AU but when we come back in 2036 now probably now it is already a reality rather than a conceptual debate or conceptual design so we see you know a long-term trend and that trend for the Chinese is inevitable to happen because you know one belt one road the economic interests see slack security challenges all point to the direction of Indian Ocean okay so with these are just finished my introduction maybe a little bit too long but my next point is the connection between the let me say in terms of Sino-Indian relations between the land border disputes and the Indian Ocean access for the Chinese to get there now this linkage can be defined that land border disputes with India still in your top priority and the Indian Ocean access is very often subject to that kind of concern now in my book I sorry I seemingly say you know put my flare on the table not as required requested by the publisher polity press not in that book I put this one point to war scenario that is it is relatively clear that there would be prospects of a major maritime confrontation in the eastern and eastern South China Sea basically along the Chinese Eastern flank and when that happens the Chinese strategic designers especially military strategist think of the Qing reaction from the land borders for a long time they think about land border dispute with India as a top threat but today the top level threat has been the along the Sino-North Korean border rather than Sino-Indian border but still this is a strategic challenge that China has very little means to answer if there is some major conflict that breaks out from the Chinese perspective they have to deploy a defensive defense posture along the land borders for several reasons the first the in the superiority of India army with the Chinese is already five to one in manpower this is mountainous region is very difficult for the Chinese to launch offensive and most importantly maybe seven times more expensive to deploy a soldier in the Tibet then in the eastern part of the country so all these factors put together the defensive defense posture will be dominating the Chinese India strategic planning I think the Indian Ocean concern is subject basically to that kind of strategic calculation this is a first 1.5 scenario the next 1.5 scenario maybe less likely but it is still a kind of prospect that is if the land border dispute worsened that will trigger or stimulate the Indians to go a big way on its eastward expansion strategy to move into the South China Sea or even beyond to the South South China Sea the Chinese have to be prepared for such a scenario and the premise mentioned the relationship between the Indian strategic thinking on the South China Sea patrol earlier I think that is quite logical and makes a lot of sense to me however now if the land border dispute worsened between China and India would Indian be still that kind of constrained I just doubt it I think Indians will take advantage of the South China Sea dispute in a more vigorous way that it is currently the case so generally along the land borders it is defensive defense posture PRA posture and along the Indian oceans along the eastern cold flank or east on the South China Sea now if we risk level of simplicity is kind of defensive offense or even offensive defense because moving into the Indian Ocean is strategic leap forward and more importantly in the combat gear so it is more combat more offensive oriented over the time when the Chinese Navy does have the capability to do that second the linkage between the naval strategy in the contest of in the ocean come on and overall Chinese naval strategy so generally we we to make things easier for you to understand the way you are you three metaphors or what we call the one point one zone under one line one point is of course the top priority in terms of hierarchical order of the military planning of course that is Taiwan Street with the new government pro independence government in Taiwan I think the Chinese have been you know concerned more about the immediate and immediate term development in Taiwan Street more vigorously than previous years so one of the reasons why the Chinese were in such a hurry to build those islands in the South China Sea was that you know after the regime change in Taipei there would be virtually no possibility no time for any kind of projects reclaimed reclaiming project to take place in the South China Sea so this is a really subtle and very risky policy adopted by Xi Jinping that this is basically now or never so they did it and they did it quite successfully in the way always define define in my research on the Australian position between the United States and China I use this word have the cake and eat it too so don't know offend or don't pick the side too much that to annoy your security guarantor and your meal ticket provider now what now of course this is exaggerating way to describe the things but if we can have the cake and eat it too now for Xi Jinping he did it all these kind of projects in the South China Sea on the one hand on other China did not you know hurt Sino-US relationship Sino-Azien relationship by a big you know big big wave so I think he has got it in such a way but price is also very high there's no doubt about that so here we see this eastward expansion basically aimed to break the so-called the two island chains the purpose is to enlarge the defensive depth along the Chinese Eastern flank where the major capital cities industrial centers are located the tourist south we call the intermediate zone that is basically related to Chinese domestic politics and sovereignty claims of course it also expand the Chinese defense depth southward over 1,000 five 1,500 kilometers for example the air defense has been extended towards the sparklies that provide a lot much larger shorter air defense shorter for the Chinese high man part territory then to the east now this is the Indian Ocean now this has to be done it has to be done in a way because the political requirement and strategic demand from this one-belt wide-road concept that is politically necessary for the military to follow the top of the civilian leaders but more specific most basically this is about the slug operations slug safety that is crucial to the Chinese new concept military concept called the frontier defense frontier defense means you know you protect the every expansion of your security interests rather than territory boundaries now here is associated with a very concept of Chinese Navy which defines itself as a regional Navy which means that the overwhelming activities are in the region but the region where the very word region is not a geostrategic it's not a geological term it is related to the expanding threats source of stress and the economic expansion of the Chinese you know enterprises and commercial interests though I use this word we call this a reverse of the Mahayani's to see power concept that is during the Mahayani era you know the gunboat went to the area first and the commercial ship follow now in Chinese case the commercial ship went first then the the warship just come to protect them this is a kind of secrecy development but something quite new in our naval development in naval the next one is a evolutionary process as I mentioned earlier it is not one year one decade one belt one road is a long-term strategic planning and not a just an economic design now just from my perspective if the concept eventually materializes all the smaller economies along road and belt will be sucked into a big magnetic stone now that creates a tremendous amount of a symmetrical economic dependence on the Chinese market so that is the most important thing about belt and road concept not an economic design in the first place rationality is very simple you know when the Americans cannot address the earth symmetrical economic dependence of the region the Chinese economy all its security measures and efforts could not achieve is full their full effect as simple as that so this the Navy has taken this kind of mission and the responsibility in its own hand to make sure that the one belt one road concept to be materialized not in full there's never the Chinese never believed that they could fully realize one belt one road initiative partially yeah this is already good enough so how to do it for the Chinese Navy South China Sea now it is projected to achieve a kind of a sea control apart from American involvement that is with the the regional navies that is relatively easy to achieve but in the long tours along the long road to the Indian Ocean it has to be carry a better group's job but that has to take at least 10 years from today that the first battle groups would become fully operational against another major naval power so there's a long way from now to the end of decade when the second indigenous carrier is operational initially but generally speaking now this naval planning based on carrier battle groups in a practical carrier or the means to move into the area in the Indian Ocean of Yang my output a lot of criticism on this kind of planning I described it as a bigger strategic blunder that Chinese military has ever made I'm myself a summer submarine school advocacy advocate Peter just a few just like the the person raises question in the previous section that you know this carrier idea is so obsolete it is very vulnerable it cannot survive in extended the sea battles with a pinpoint missiles and the long-range you know airstrike capabilities so in a way carrier is a peacetime toy it cannot be used in major sea battles however if it gives the Chinese leadership a level of comfort just like they just do it there's nobody there's there's nobody who can stop them but the issue is that now from my perspective you you can do all the things with carrier battle groups and one condition you have to survive now from my perspective the public can survive one week two weeks or probably no more but but anyway so this is a this requires additional arrangements for example we call the chain of the basis we don't have any further I find the Chinese are concerned the jibouti is just the point of logistic supply has nothing to do with the military base naval base in the first place and they will seek a few more and what are maybe too far away in terms of protecting Chinese socks and the way we when we talk about Chinese socks we talk about 13,000 miles and in different directions just think about how many carrier battle groups you need to to to protect all these socks and each carrier battle group is a huge drainage so from my perspective you know I use this we call the reverse deterrence that is it is very difficult for you to protect your own socks that's fine but it's not easier for you to disrupt your enemy's socks no that that that job can be done much much easier more effectively by submarines now here I think this is Chinese we call the capability deficits submarines the majority of the submarines in Chinese naval arsenal convention conventional submarines are we call the shallow water submarines they don't perform well they cannot perform well in the ocean you know someday I just read the Chinese submarine got to you know got to Sri Lanka and Pakistan so what kind of summary it was it turned out to be I was briefed by somebody it was a soon class submarine soon come soon come out soon class submarine is a convention submarine a little bit bigger than kilo submarine I think yes it's fine to get there it's a different matter to engage in combat missions so there are two different concepts so eventually you have to have nuclear attack submarines now you know if you have too many carriers you don't have much money left okay so finally and it's a from midterm from immediate future to midterm such conclusions in the ocean as a long-term planning target that is the undoubt anymore but in the immediate future let's say five years generally it is for the Chinese Navy is a expiry it is a period of exploration it is a period of knowing better the climate the the ocean bad situations storm and those kind of very essential elements that you need to plan your combat in the high seas then that is followed by creating some presence limited presence in the first place then gradually to create a chain of presence it is different from the chain of what you call the pearl string of pearls as a different thing is more combat oriented but what I'm saying here is a more force showing flags for creating presence rather than for combat purposes so that these two the difference between these two concepts are is very very crucial so this act this is basically what I term as access then to build the Indian Ocean United Fleet carrier centered I think that will as I mentioned earlier the the initial capability to engage in warfare with major powers in 10 years from today with the United States I don't know probably never but the Chinese plan is to build a Navy about half or two-thirds of American naval strength I think once that happens the story would be different okay I finished here I think to me some of the fascinating things that professor you talks about is the debates in China between those advocating basically a sea control strategy as against those debating advocating a sea denial strategy and that's a I think debates which have been you know gone on forever among naval strategists and maybe we can come back to that a little bit later but first if I'd like to introduce Dr. Xing Xiang to say some to have some comments on professor Yo's paper thank you thank you very much very pleased to be here thanks David for inviting me to this very important timely conference because much of the policy and academic discussion on regional security issues focused too much on US China rivalry and I think it's time for us to talk about China and India so it's a tough job to comment on professor you's paper and as we all know that professor you nobody know the Chinese military more than professor you in this southern hemisphere and so what I'm going to do is that I just say quickly say something which I found disturbing from professor you's paper and then I will try to challenge you some of the strategy he presented I do not want to challenge you professor you but I just want to challenge you the strategy and he presented the as China's emerging into Pacifica strategy okay some of the disturbing funding presented in professor you's paper is that I think the paper and I recommend everybody to read the paper because it's presented very clearly and informative analysis of China PLA is into emerging into Pacifica naval strategy and that strategy I think conformed a number of long-standing speculation outside China about Beijing's strategic ambition and when the country's power and interest growing strongly and firstly the his paper conformed speculation that China is seeking naval present primacy in the into Pacifica region and that is a characterized by China's emerging into Pacifica Navy strategy which is defined by expanding naval activity in the into Pacifica region developing a career-centric force structure and seeking and to establish overseas military base and shift from sea denial to stage the sea control strategy that are the point made by professor you in his paper and China currently shifted its previously sea denial strategy to a stage the sea control and from a sea control of near sea to intermediate sea with that is South China Sea and the fa sea that is brought into Pacifica region so that is the concerning because that will lead to and the word professor you said the into Pacifica region will become battleground between US and China so that's the first thing which I found disturbing and the second thing is that I found is that the South China Sea is a very important part in China's emerging into Pacifica naval strategy and so if you read the professor's newspaper you will find that China's land reclamation and activity in the South China Sea especially in Spratland has strategic purpose and it's become very important part of China to develop that so-called professor you just said one point one room and one line which is and to develop emerging land around the China strategic sea line of communication and from China you know the coast to the into Pacifica region so in that case if if that is true then only one who hope that China will move back it's a certain behavior in South China Sea will be disappointed and because not only that's a territorial issue but South China Sea is especially those artificial island in the Spratland become important military base for China's emerging into Pacifica Navy strategy so the third disturbing concern is that which you concluded by the professor you in his paper is that and China's growing and ambitious and into Pacifica Navy activity and the strategy will lead to strategic rivalry not only with US but perhaps with India as well so that's a three disturbing issues I found from his paper and I do not disagree with those funding but now I think with this funding that is if that is true then that is quite serious for regional stability and so what I want to ask professor you on a number of question and which I think that related to the emerging strategy so the first question is that I want to professor you to tell us is that the emerging into Pacifica Naval strategy a well-considered strategy based on rational calculation of China's national interest or it is based on deeply followed assumption and calculation about a China's strategic need and I asked this question partly because the professor you already mentioned that his opposition about that China's development of Korea-centric Navy and that is a vulnerable to attack in end of the major battles with another major sea power but still despite of his opposition China still move towards that direction to develop Korea-centric Navy so is that a wise move on the part of China or it is driven by something which is actually against China's own national interest the question is actually I raise that question based on the bigger academic and policy conduct raised in the by a well-known American scholar Robert base about China's recent move towards the Bluewater Navy and there is a debate about why the that a move is actually driven by a miscalculation about China's national interest and by domestic nationalist sentiment which is a Bluewater Navy symbol of greater power because according to some people in this debate that China is actually essentially continental power and if the face a strategic pressure from the land border and from the sea and as a land based continental power historically no such power can achieve naval primacy and like the previous example of Germany and so and the professor you already provide some evidence for this is that 1.5 war scenario and a land dispute create generated war with the India and maritime war with somebody else and if that happens it might not be a 1.5 war it might be a two-war so would China be able to meet the challenge to fight the two war and the one land war and the one maritime war with two major power at same time so if not then what actually driven China's Bluewater strategy and even with all the obvious vulnerability mentioned by professor you and mentioned in the debate about the some of the disadvantage for China to develop you know Bluewater Navy the other problem which I want to challenge to China's Indo-Pacific Navy strategy is it's something which I call the myth of the protecting sea land of strategic communication and David in his presentation and professor you in his presentation and all made the point that China's intention and one of the key driver for China to develop Bluewater Navy is to protect its sea land of communication and that is a vulnerable to US blockade in a major war but that issue is actually needed to be put into perspective and firstly and the US will be very unlikely according to you know the reason why you know a researched analysis on this from the US Navy will call it US will be very unlikely to blockade the sea land of communication unless there is a major war between China and the US but what will cause a major war between China and the United States and the people can name it and Taiwan and does that China already without the sea control and the ability to protect a sea land communication already developed sufficient deterrence capability to the United States and so what else could make China and the US fight a major war and not a small clash that is South China Sea but why is that the South China Sea will cause China and the US into a major war it is because China's Navy expansion want to counter that area for the sake to protect its sea land of communication so protecting sea land of communication itself not become a cause of major war rather than something you know as a consequences of need you know of a major war so in that case then the to develop that ability to protect sea land of communication which actually if we follow some saying and it's resemble to something like committing suicide for the fear of death and cause you want to protect something which is vulnerable in the war but the effort to prepare might cause the war itself so that is the first thing the second thing there are better ways even if there is a possibility to protect the sea land of communication but there are better ways for China to deal with that risk and which is less costly and more effective that is through land overland pipeline China has already done this through Central Asia through this one belt one road initiative which is one belt the Chinese view the Chinese intention to build a port in the Guadal and in Burma etc they already started to build those land-based pipeline for energy and gas to award the so-called Malacca dilemma and that both can help China to reduce the risk and also reduce the suspicions of India and the United States and reduce the chance for confrontation but why does China chose to develop this very ambitious sea control oriented the Indo-Pacific naval strategy even if with so many vulnerability which is pointed out by Professor Yu's paper so firstly I want to ask Professor Yu is that the strategy based on a yearly considered or actually it's a wise strategy secondly if there is so many problems about the Korea centric for structure why does China still want to do it and so and my second question is that in I just want to give all this I just want professor you and to give us a reveal that China of course face tremendous challenge to achieve this is the so-called the Indo-Pacific emerging naval strategy so I would like to know that within the if we take into account domestic external challenge and what are the biggest challenge in your view that faced by China to make that strategy succeed so I will stop here thank you dr. Xiang I think you raise some really excellent questions that push this whole discussion along and I'd like to invite professor you to respond you can you can stay there and we'll fold this into the remainder of the Q&A yeah thank you Zhang Jian for your excellent questions which I cannot answer effectively or confidently our strategy I forgot the name the American General says the professional the amateur talks about strategy and the professional talks about logistics I'm amateur so it's easier it's easier and even care this doesn't matter whether you are careless or not to talk about strategy it will happen it may not happen it may disappear next year or whatever for political reasons but what I'm trying to say here is that there is a mentality as a sense from the PR a writings that now you talk about slot safety slot warfare slot safety issue is basic central US relationship issue I think on this particular point Obama is right he says that China is taking free ride on American protection of nine ground waterways globally I think the free ride we call public goods provided by the United States that benefit the Chinese enormously in the last 30 years the the issue of the problem is that the Chinese war planners do not trust this kind of US protection of global waterways can last forever and someday what if Americans blockade the Chinese ceilings of communications now I we do some research on air sea battle concept Australians are required to blockade the South to Chinese southern route of sea trade we did some calculation that we find out the the number of ships that the Australian Navy have to intercept or blockade is much bigger from the from Australian shipping companies and from the Chinese shipping companies that is to say that if things go that bad the global economy everyone will be badly affected it it will be the last thing Americans are trying to do but if you come to this conclusion that the Sino-US military confrontation is inevitable now it is quite natural for naval planners to think about you know this kind of prospect of naval blockade against each other now for the United States is the cheapest way to battle China for the Chinese way for the Chinese thinking it is a very vulnerable point for them to do it therefore all these are behind those kind of military build up naval build up for the scenario that one day Americans will turn up turn their back on us now we have to have capabilities to protect ourselves so when we talk about this selective sea control capabilities beyond the South China Sea you know as I mentioned earlier I'm amateur so I can talk about strategy but why you talk about the real battlefield the combat situation you need to calculate you know the warships missiles aircraft I think this needs a lot of simulation exercises you know that is something beyond me but here from my perspective the at least Malacca Street is one of the place the Chinese have to do something about it like selective sea control at least the selective CD now outcome and but general speaking we are in a very exciting period the crowd the world is developing so fast and so then dramatically you know we can go this way have a central US military confrontation that all everything we said today with everything we have said that they will make sense and we can continue to go the other way that cooperation you know takes the presence take the more you know important position then geostrategic strife then we'll have different story yeah thank you and in thinking about this question of whether perhaps China is or if China were to pursue a strategy of sea control in the Indian Ocean whether or not that's a mistake I'm reminded by some comments from the Pentagon in the 1980s about the jostling between the United States and the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean and when when when asked about this the senior Pentagon official responded he thought it was a great thing because it was distracting the Soviet Navy from the main game and essentially you know that the more Soviet naval ships were in the Indian Ocean the better because they would be away from the real real centers of action so that's a sort of an interesting analogy so if I could ask if anyone has some questions ah Qing Dong Yuan University of Sydney this is a comment rather than question maybe a question as well is the comment is that I think we tend to a little bit over exaggerate the the situation in for instance for between the United States and China over their conflict and rivalry over South China Sea where if you read the recent report about the White House is often trying to interject some caution into the the Pekong you know sort of what what kind of statement or the actual behavior even for freedom of navigation you know it's very very limited in numbers and very carefully managed so I think there's if there's a gap between what the reality or the actual governments are thinking and doing because this is a serious matter you know it's easy to get into conflict between two nuclear powers I mean how do you get out so so you don't want to get into that kind of situation so that's one one point second one is related to Indian Ocean and China's expanding presence to the Indian Ocean I mean if you look at China's economic development over the last 20 30 years this is a international foreign trade dependent GDP 40% of its GDP is through realized through foreign trade right so 45% of the foreign trade is import and I have that these raw material resources are all you and all of that and then 80% through Indian Ocean maritime shipment of course China is worried about this ceiling of communication so there's a tendency of talking about maritime capabilities naval capacities escorting but I think still there's a long way for Chinese Navy to realize a full capacity to do escort control fighting any potential server opponents in the Indian Ocean so now it's a very very limited capacity so here I think there are ample opportunities instead of being worried about all these you know rivalry and arms race because I could imagine as you mentioned the vulnerability let's imagine China removed vulnerability what that means for India for all the rest right it would mean half hundreds of Chinese ships all year round you know that creates serious security dilemma so there need to be better communication and consultation to develop some coordination so at least you you know remove or control any miscalculation and to turn it's a more sort of win-win or at least you know manage those conflictual aspect because at the end of the day as I mentioned the 40% of Chinese foreign trade a large percentage will go to the United States go to Europe go to Japan and go to South Korea and some of the also go to India Dr. you thank you very much for your presentation it's fascinating Dr. Malcolm Davis Australian Strategic Policy Institute we're looking today obviously at Chinese Indian strategic dynamics through a naval lens but I don't think you can totally look at it purely through a naval lens in a period where the PLA is moving determinedly to achieve integrated joint operations as alongside information is Asian so I wanted to get your thoughts on how the PLA Air Force and the PLA rocket forces would play a role in Chinese strategy for the Indian Ocean given the sort of long-range conventional ballistic missile capers that the PLA rocket forces are starting to develop and the future long-range airstrike capers for the PLA Air Force and also could you comment on the strategic support forces in terms of space and cyberspace and how they would play a role in contributing to Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean thank you Do you want to have a group of? No no let's do it by one. That's a very very important question I'm dealing with the naval aspect of it but my research goes way beyond that we talk about the reach out but another concept is we call combat reach that is not about your the capability of your ship sailing through certain areas but you engage in serious combat in those regions now this in Chinese we calculated by strategic air cover so the comp if the air cover cannot reach certain area you only have the ordinary you call freedom of navigation sales rather than combat operations so the type yeah you are right so that is one of the reason why the Chinese have been developing those long-range strategic aircraft things for example the straight sorry the Y-20 so that will change the combat situation in Sino-India land borders because the reinforcement can be flowing very very fast and the Chinese is you know I think is quite successful in developing strategic bombers that was announced by Chinese Air Commander Ma Xiao Tian just a few weeks ago so the laboratory design the laboratory tests of those materials that that phase has been over so pretty soon you will see the the first trial of the strategic bomber that stealth long-range and have large payroll so when this happens you know together we see full combat capacity or capability of carrier battle groups and together with the two new services you mentioned the strategic support forces which is which aggregates the Chinese Internet for the electronic force the space force so this could provide the information in interconnectivity the real-time battlefield situation or only why all these things are available can we talk about like Dr. Yuan's mentioned the so called the full-fledged naval engagement in the Indian Ocean so this is a long long way to go but I agree with both Professor John, Professor Yuan that you know it is not a priority because the Sino-Indian border disputes are under control and neither side want to escalate to the point of war and the slog is a simple we call the hypothetical threat rather real threat that will be the case for a long long time to come so these theory planners they go a long way than the reality that is needed that this is my worry I'm not worried about the worry Zhang Jian and Yuan Jindo mentioned earlier I'm worried about why you should be quiet you should be silent that you talk too loud you know like alarm everybody else in the region. Dr. Zhang, do you want to say? I do not think China currently already had a clear integrated strategy by using Navy strategic supporting force and the record you know Army plus Air Force but I would say if there is you know fighting combat scenario and the other kind of service well in the maritime domain and the other forces will be largely used to distract and to you know the the adversaries focus or attention rather than to become integrated force and fighting together so that's I would say China will start the cyber attack and use strategic you know supporting forces to do various things and but rather I do not think currently they have very clearly made the integrated strategy focus on and that see control of that and if I could just use my position to ask a quick follow-up question to Professor Yeo to what extent do you think that the PLA Air Force has the same broad vision that the PLA Navy may have so is the PLA Air Force making the same plans about creating basing access in the Indian Ocean region as the PLA Navy might it may be the simple answer is that there's no question that the Air Force can reach almost every part of South China Sea but if it involves another major power in the Indian Ocean it requires a strategic air base or naval base along the Indian Ocean region I think Guadalupe would be one of the choices they can look to and a number of other places they are looking into it at the moment you cannot even if you have the strategic bomber like B-2 or B-52 without the forward military base in the Indian Ocean region is still very very difficult for strategic missions to be carried out technical missions could be okay but strategic missions are out of question Yoshi's on ishii from the embassy of Japan professor I found your of these very interesting I have a question about what we should see as markers in the future should your theory prove to be maybe 10 years down the line we think in retrospect that you're right or you're wrong but for example one example is whether ADIZ will be introduced in South China Sea is one marker that we all have in back of our minds right now perhaps but I was wondering based on your theory what sort of markers we should be looking out for in 10 years time for example are there any things new ideas or concepts that could be introduced along the lines or is there something we should be looking around for the marker straights or maybe when the base meeting what are I mean is this in Pakistan right I think but I'm Pakistan so I was wondering if there any markers for us to be thinking about when when we reflect on your theory do you mean Malacca Street no just in general like I can't really think of yeah the reason why I ask this is it's hard for me it's hard for me to think of like land reclamation in that Indian Ocean or ADIZ in the Indian Ocean that sounds really too far-fetched but there'll probably be more things that are more easily understood and tangible things that that you have in mind I think China is vulnerable if Malacca Street is blocked or other major waterways are blockade against Chinese shipment but the Chinese do have options as a major military power as I mentioned earlier that we call the reverse deterrence you block us you know especially for Japanese ships can you go through your normal sea lanes back to your ports I doubt it I think the Chinese will do something to blockade other countries sea lanes of communications elsewhere if not in the Malacca Street so that that will be the world war I think no country is wanting that I think Jin Dong and Professor Zhang also mentioned I think no Japanese want to see such things happen the problem is however you know once probably most are most of my friends I communicate in the United States are the military people defense DOD people so they see you know the strategic debate in the US elites whether China is competitor pure we call pure competitor or stakeholder it's over they point to the direction that China is depicted as a peer competitor then Americans are doing those kind of preparations for the worst scenarios so the Chinese so do the Chinese no this is the problem for us is that you know including Australia including South Korea and those American allies that you know when they have come to this point that eventually I do not totally agree to UN professor UN's relatively optimistic evaluation maybe you read those are especially small I read the defense planners more then there is a big gap in between them that you stimulate the Chinese no Admiral Harris said we can fight tonight I think time you still stimulate the Chinese Chinese try to respond to the threat by building up military capabilities on the one hand then you tell the Chinese will not fight against you militarily so this is a fundamental question whether it is better to have American continue to provide the public goods of protecting nine ground waterways in the ocean or you let the Chinese have their own capabilities to protect themselves of their slugs now we do not have answer because there's a lot of tricky area in between American want to see now once we turn our back on you you have no chance to respond though the Chinese think oh if they do such such of things we have to respond you know there's a security dilemma yeah I think for the AD is a in South China Sea I do not think China had intention and a need and then in at least for in your near future added to declare AD is a because the situation when China declare AD is a East China Sea and South China Sea is very different so many people see China's declaration as a provocative move and also China many people currently see China assertiveness was a cause for the regional instability and in both South China and East China Sea but in Chinese view actually they see this as a so-called strategy of deterrence through assertiveness what does that mean is that they want to deter the other party from provocation by shooting stronger assertiveness so when China become tougher they hope that they can deter the other party which are in dispute with China stop provocative behavior and from the Chinese view so in that case AD is a in East China Sea happened in the city in the context of escalating China Japan dispute over the disputed island so for China to stop that escalation is to accelerate and that sounds like counter counter counterintuitive and by shooting tougher than the other party they want to stop the other so in that case for the AD I they declared and the other thing it seems to me and professor you know more much more about the day he finally wrote on this and the other thing for me is that a declaration that AD I say at that time is also for domestic political consideration and tough on Japan is always very good and for the Chinese leader so but in the East China Sea China also take that strategy of deterrence through assertiveness and China quite assertive in recent years and China feel regardless of Eastern view China feel it works it stopped the other climate country taking provocative behavior like a few years ago and no land reclamation by Vietnam no land reclamation by any other country in the South China Sea since China started we can do faster larger better so if you want to do this well they did this first and the second thing is that so so in that case when the South China Sea situation currently really went to this table there was no need for AD I say and so I do not think a China and also there was no domestic or political gain and by declaring AD I say now so so that's right just a little bit I think professor John is right in on this particular point but I like to add a little bit details a little bit detail the information I think the idea that will be declared in the South China Sea but not in the sparklies in the past under territorial disputes but in the non-disputed area we call the Hainan Island where the Chinese strategic nuclear submarine base when where the Chinese strategic space launching base are located because the the very foundation a purpose for ADRZ is to provide more early warning time for your air defense this is this is not really about a solvent a claim now in the sparklies China have China hasn't even declared that we call the base boundary base points and the base lines how could you declare ADRZ without this kind of fundamental you know necessary data so this this is a basic thing yeah I guess my questions are pretty simple or simplistic one really clearly we're going through a period of major power balance change in the world and it's therefore completely understandable that various parties will be adopting hedging strategies and that's what we've been hearing a deal about this morning but when you look at it logically and strategically and I'm aware of the history of antipathy between India and China or China and India and I'm trying to bring the conversation back to the China India question why wouldn't China and India seek to come to some kind of better accommodation because for both of them they require economic stability economic growth they both have different vulnerabilities we seem to be premissing our whole conversation today and and it happens in the media and elsewhere on this idea of competition and therefore leading to some kind of conflict but why isn't another type of scenario possible or am I just being overly simplistic thank you okay thanks from Lee why don't we be friends I'm sorry I don't make to me to make fun because it does obviously make a lot of sense and I'd like to hear comments from our panel about that yes yes thank you thank you very much professor Yuji and Zhang my question is that in what roles if any do the North Koreans and Pakistanis have to have a play in China's naval strategy there's a lot of emphasis given to China's relations with its partners in with its neighboring countries and literal states in the South China Sea and potential flashpoints that may emerge because of those relation those countries that may have relate alliance relationships with the United States if that were to be flipped around China to some extent has a I wouldn't go so far saying an alliance but it has a partnership with Pakistan and probably a closer relationship with North Korea so do these countries feature in its calculus as it seeks out to pursue its naval strategy thank you yeah the first question from the gentleman I think the Sino-Indian cooperation China is very happy to see that happen China is even happy to tell the Indians that we want to pay for it to happen for example let us let our ship go through it peacefully now we can pay you in other forms for example investing more in your country infrastructure manufacturing industries and so on so forth just let us go now this is a this is a this is a mutual benefit it's a shared ground for cooperation is there the problem is really about land dispute sometimes they prevent a lot of things from happening and of course history like 1962 war Dalai Lama issue now these kind of we cause conflicts of structure structure conflicts of interest they are there that prevent a lot of things from happening but the Chinese do the Chinese to have a lot of caution not to let me say make Indians unhappy in the sense I to answer your question young gentleman's question no Pakistan reads to the Chinese many times during the Hu Jintao presidency that please come to Guada and build a military base there Chinese refuse numerous times no no why we refuse largely to care about Indians concern India does if China does have a strategic base there you know what the Indians will think about it you know so but since I evolving no what Hu Jintao refused to do may may not mean that Xi Jinping will follow the seal but the Chinese do care the Chinese does care I do care and do concern about India you know in a way China does have some level of sensitivity Dr. Zheng did you not agree yes okay well thank you I think we'll break there just add a couple of little thoughts in about China's strategy in naval strategy in Indian Ocean and that's also to the question the realist realism of that strategy and I think you touched on that the thinking back when was the last major lock protection campaign in in history and that was probably the battle of the Atlantic in the 1940s when we had much much shorter sea lanes between the two probably the two of the biggest world powers both of which were applying a significant proportion of their national power to protect those sea lanes and they only were just able to and so one raises that I think that reinforces your point about really how realistic would it ever be for China to assume to attempt a sea control strategy in the Indian Ocean which involved protection of its entire sea lanes