 Deer colleagues will start just in a few minutes. Just bear with us one more moment. Okay dear friends, it's time to start our session. This is welcome to the launch webinar of the 2021 production gap report. My name is Niklas Haagelberg. I'm the coordinator for UNEP's climate change program. I have the honour of opening this session today and also thank all the colleagues that have done a hard work for getting this report launched yesterday. Over the last 24 months there's been a heavy focus on countries putting designing and putting forward nationally determined contributions and long term strategies. What you will hear today is that we need to look deeper beyond these NDCs and long term strategies into sectoral strategies and also how countries allocate their finance so that not only our ambition, climate ambition is aligned with the Paris agreement but also what we do at the sectoral level. We also need to elevate the NDCs to a level where it guides not only the sectoral strategies but also how we put forward public funding and how we finance our work. And before I give over to our moderator Annika Plensberg, I would like to thank all the authors and Stockholm Environment Institute, IISD, E3G and all UNEP colleagues that have put in a year of effort into getting this report in front of us. So a huge thank you for all your timing, commitment and effort that you have put into this report. Annika, now I would like to hand over to you. Thank you so much Niklas and thank you all for joining. It's great to see such a big interest in this very timely and important report 2021 production gap report. Governments fossil fuel production plans remain dangerously out of sync with Paris agreements limits. And today you get the chance to learn more about the findings and we will go through the main chapters of the report with the authors. And then we would have a reflection. We're very happy to have Andrea Guerrero-Garcia here from the United Nations Secretary General's Climate Action Team who will give some reflections and thoughts about the report. And after that we will open up for questions or so please and we will use the Q&A box that you will find in the below there. You will see it where you can write your questions and we will try to address as many as we can during this time. But I won't say so much more than this. I think we'll get started and get into the content. And we'll start with chapter two of the report, looking at the actual production gap, explaining that and what it means. And we have with us one of the authors of the chapter, Pete Ericsson from Stockholm Environment Institute, a senior scientist and who worked on these topics for a long time. So I'll hand over to you, Pete, to explain the gap. Wonderful. Good morning from Seattle where it is early morning. And I'm going to tell you about chapter two that is the calculation of the production gap. So I think we can go right to the next slide. First, what is the production gap? The production gap is the discrepancy between on one hand the global levels of fossil fuel production that are implied by government's plans and projections, what they're calling for in their own government documents. So that's on one hand and on the other hand is what are the levels that are consistent with the Paris Agreement's goals. The difference between those two numbers is the production gap. And that's what we calculate. So there are two major inputs to that. And I'll tell you what each of them is. So the first is basically from the science, the levels of fossil fuel production that are consistent with 1.5 or 2 degrees C. If you followed our press reports on this, this calculation this year hasn't changed. And that's because it comes from the IPC scenarios from the special report on 1.5 degrees. Those scenarios have not been updated, at least not publicly. The AR6, the six assessment report scenarios are not yet available. So our calculation here is still based on the SR 1.5 degree scenarios. And what we do is we gather all of the scenarios for either 1.5 or 2 degrees. And we apply some additional screens, really just one essential conceptual additional screen to that. And that is that we remove the scenarios that rely on levels of negative emissions in the middle part of this century that are so high as to be probably considered to be infeasible. So that's things like bioenergy with CCS, BEX. We remove some of the scenarios that have really high levels of that, for example. And then we take the median of the results. So we don't pick any particular scenario. We take the median of the results of either that 1.5 or that 2 degree scenario set. So that's one of the data inputs. The other data inputs is what we call, and it's on the screen here as the red line, what we call the country production plans and projections pathway. And this is the level of fossil fuel production implied by government's plans and projections. So these are the government documents often done by an energy ministry that are publicly available that we could identify and that project or forecast what each country's fossil fuel production coal, oil and gas is going to be. So I'm in the United States here. That means that we look to the United States Department of Energy's annual energy outlook and their reference case. Just to the north in Canada, we would look at the Canada Energy Regulators Energy Futures Study and pick actually this year they're evolving scenario, which they hold up as their central scenario. So we do this for 15 countries and we add all up. And that is those 15 countries represent about three quarters 75% of global fossil fuel production. And so, you know, we then need to do a little bit of scaling to get up to the total based on the share that those countries represent in the total global fossil fuel production. So there's the other number, and then the difference between those two is as you can see here with the black line labeled as the production gap. There's also another line, it's sort of gold or brown, and that is the fossil fuel production implied by countries climate pledges and policies. And that comes from almost directly from the IEA's stated policy scenario. So when we do this chart like this that's all fossil fuel production, we have to add the fossil fuel together in one unit. And that unit is basically the carbon content of those fossil fuels. We could do it in different units. Another choice could be to do it in energy based units. And we do use energy based units for the individual fuels, but when we aggregate fossil fuel production together, we do it in carbon terms, since it is carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that is what causes climate change. But we are assessing production, we're not making a forecast of emissions per se, we're making an assessment of what fossil fuel production countries are planning on and we're denominating that in carbon terms. Okay, so what do we find? Next slide please. Okay, so like we found in the last time in previous reports, governments are still planning on producing more than double the fossil fuels in 2030, then would be consistent with 1.5 degrees and about 45% more than would be consistent with two degrees. There's pause and sort of reflect on that for a moment. But one way to interpret what this means is that countries have not yet done the work of translating what their climate pledges mean for fossil fuel markets and then from there, what those changes to markets would mean for their own fossil fuel production plants. This is kind of true in two senses really. You know, countries haven't yet aligned their fossil fuel production targets with 1.5 or two degrees. That's the headline finding as you see here. But there's sort of a subtler point too, and it's that they haven't aligned their fossil fuel productions, even with the fairly modest concrete steps that they have taken to reduce their emissions. And that's the comparison of the red and the goldish line. So this means in a sense that this latter difference means each country thinks that they will be able to out-compete other countries to produce those final barrels of oil, for example. Speaking of oil, let's go to the next slide. So the overall production gap is very interesting, but what I find most useful about our analysis is the gap by fuel here. And that's because coal, oil and gas have distinct markets and uses. And when you look at these results by fuel and in physical and energy units here that the energy ministries and national governments use themselves, in my mind that can start to become a bit more actionable. And if governments or other actors can use this type of information, these low-carbon pathways for coal, oil and gas, to begin aligning their own fossil fuel production outlooks with climate limits. Encourage you to go into the details in the report on this, but I'm going to keep moving because there's another, to the next slide, there's another really important thing that we did this year for the first time. There's some sensitivity and robustness analysis of our results. We tested our findings against different mitigation pathways, not just the median of the IPCC scenarios, but we used the illustrative scenarios that are in the SR 1.5-degree report to look at different possible outcomes. And this can be useful because it's possible that individual scenarios are more plausible than those sort of median franken scenarios that we use as the basis. So difficult to do this section justice in a short presentation. I really encourage you to look at the report. The main finding is that even under the implosibly high levels of negative emissions that are in, as you see here, the P4 scenario in this chart on the left, there's still a production gap, right? So even if you're wildly optimistic about carbon dioxide removal, CDR like the P4 scenario is, fossil fuel use and production still needs to start declining now. And a related finding is that because even our median results include a large amount of CDR, right? We filtered out some of the most egregious scenarios including P4, we filtered out. But even though our median results still include a large amount of CDR, or sorry, because they still included a large amount of CDR, our findings on the production gap are conservative in the sense that if CDR doesn't develop it at scale, the production gap would be even larger and governments need to take a precautionary approach to the, well, if governments take a precautionary approach to the negative emissions, they should wind down fossil fuel production even faster than our central findings would suggest. So lastly, a point about methane, because lots of talk about fossil fuel production focuses on making fossil fuels less polluting at the production side, and that's often about methane. In this lower right chart on the screen, all of the illustrative IPCC scenarios that we looked at already build in massive sort of extraordinary reductions in methane release. And that means that more aggressive efforts to make fossil fuel production less polluting are not a substitute for winding down fossil fuel production and use, because none of those scenarios leave any methane reduction opportunities on the table, efforts to make fossil fuel production less polluting are critical, but those don't replace the need to get off fossil fuels. That's chapter two. Thank you. Thank you very much, Pete. And just before we hand over to go to chapter three, I would just also like to say that mention that this is the third edition of the production gap, the first report came out in 2019. And I should also mention the partners of course behind the report. It's modeled after the emission gap reports, and it's produced by United Nations Environment Program, Stockholm Environment Institute, International Institute for Sustainable Development, ODI and E3G, and there has been over 40 researchers involved in the report. So it's a lot of work that have been put into this report. But having said that, I will hand over to one of the other authors who has written the chapter three about government support and policies for fossil fuel production. And Lucille Dufour, Senior Policy Advisor at International Institute for Sustainable Development. I'll hand over to you. Thanks a lot, Annika. And yes, let me present the chapter three, which is about government support. And in this chapter, we really look at how public support influences the production gap. We review two main things. The first one is the way in which COVID-19 pandemic has shaped public support for fossil fuels. And the second one is really the mixed trends and signals that we can see in terms of shifting public support away from fossil fuel production. We look at two main type of mechanisms in the chapter. The first one are really national mechanisms, including COVID-19 national response, pre-existing fossil fuel subsidies, and also support channels through state-owned enterprises. And we also look at multilateral and bilateral finance. And I will go into these two types of main key supports in my next slide and explain the key findings that we find. So next slide, please. Thanks. So let's start with the national support mechanisms. And here obviously the first thing that we really wanted to look into in the report is the COVID-19 response provided by governments since the beginning of the pandemic. We have analyzed a lot of different tracking initiatives that look at the recovery responses and the way they impact the environment and climate. And we have found that these different tracking initiatives have findings that are broadly aligned. And that stressed the fact that actually there is still a huge mismatch between governments' commitments to build back better and the policies that have been adopted in terms of COVID-19 response since the beginning of the pandemic. Now if we really want to focus on energy consuming and producing sectors, the data from the energy policy tracker shows us that since the beginning of the pandemic, government have provided more public funds for fossil fuel than clean energy through the COVID-19 response. If we take the G20 for instance, countries have provided more than 300 billion dollars for fossil fuel intensive activities since the beginning of the pandemic. And obviously it creates huge risks of looking economies into high carbon pathways for the decades to come. What we've seen as well is that we have seen a slight greening of policies at the end of 2020. And this is what you can see on the chart on the right hand of the slide. This is the green area. However, this greening has been insufficient to tip the balance from fossil to clean. And you can see also on the chart that actually fossil fuel spending still represent a majority of spending overall in terms of COVID-19 response. So here's still a lot of progress to make to align this recovery with the shift away from supporting fossil fuels. The chapter three also look at pre-existing fossil fuel subsidies and we look specifically in fossil fuel subsidies that supports the production of fossil fuels. And here we find that these type of supports are on the rise. We've reached about 53 billion dollars in 2019 according to the OECD. And it's obviously in sharp contrast with commitments that have been taken by groups of countries such as the G7 and the G20. Next slide please. Thanks. So let's turn to state-owned enterprises now. And we look specifically at this kind of companies because they have a big influence on the evolution of the production gap. And this is for two key reasons. The first one is that the national coal oil and gas companies control more than half of current global fossil fuel production. And the second reason is that when it comes to national oil companies, they account for 40% of total investments in oil and gas worldwide. So we have a bunch of support here being channeled through state-owned enterprises. And what we find in the report is that there could be some opportunities to shift these supports in state-owned enterprises. And this could be done, for instance, by the fact that governments are able to be orient or could be able to be orient some of the strategic orientations and activities of these companies. And also one of the key opportunities for SOEs is that they have easy access to finance. However, what we find as well is that at the moment challenges are still more prominent when it comes to shifting support to SOEs away from fossil production. And actually this type of companies have still the least comprehensive plans in terms of widening down production. And they're also planning to invest when it comes to national oil company more than two trillions into oil and gas in the next decade. So we can see here that there is a huge risk that this kind of companies will be key contributors to the production gap in the following years. Next slide please. So what we're going to do now is turn to international public finance, which is the last part of the chapter. And we really focus on multilateral and bilateral finance. We first look at the scale of finance and well, the overall picture is quite concerning because since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, we've seen that public finance institutions have provided more than $294 billion to fossil fuels overseas. So that's the overall picture. However, when we look a bit more specifically into support to fossil fuel production through extraction, transportation and processing, we see that there are early signals that could show an improvement because this type of finance has decreased significantly since 2017. And you can see it on the chart on the left. What the chart doesn't show though is that there is uneven support between coal, oil and gas. And while we have seen a decrease in coal finance and that should continue given the latest commitments, for instance from China and the G7, there has been an increase, a steady increase in gas finance, which could create a dash for gas in the global south in the coming years. Next slide, please. Last point that I wanted to mention on the chapter is that we also looked into the exclusion policies that have been adopted by some of the multilateral development banks and development finance institutions. And the good news here is that there are a growing number of these kind of institutions that have adopted exclusion for the production of fossil fuels. However, these MDVs and DFI's are still not representing a majority of assets in all the MDVs and DFI's that we analysed. So it means that there is still a huge room of improvement. And when it comes to other type of public finance institutions, for instance, export credit agencies, there is even more progress to be made to really take into consideration the kind of exclusion policies that would be necessary. So in a nutshell, really mixed trends in that chapter about support, we see some positive early signals coming from international public finance, but these efforts and early signals need to be deepened to align with the Paris Agreement goals. And most generally, when we look at both national and international support, we really see that a much more faster and profound change is needed to really enable a managed phase out of public finance and fossil fuel production. Thank you so much, Lucille, for that presentation. And we'll move into chapter four. And this year's report profiles 15 countries that are presented in chapter four, fossil fuel production and policies in key countries. And I hand over to Miguel Munoz Cabre, a senior scientist at Stockholm Environment Institute to give you some insights into these countries. Thank you, Annika. So this chapter is for those of you so far we have heard from Lucille and from Peter. We have heard about the global view. Now we're going to go into the national approach. Next slide, please. So this chapter is for those of you who are interested in one or more particular countries. So one of the contents of the report is we have produced these country profiles for 15 specific countries in major fossil fuel producing countries. And these profiles, they provide an overview of their climate ambitions, of their fossil fuel production plans and views on policies. We also have like an introductory section where we provide some data such as extraction based CO2 emissions and indicators such as their rank in production and their share of global production for the different fossil fuels, as well as their dependence on economic capacity for transition. Next slide, please. So one of the key findings of this chapter and chapter three but also the report along with the gap is that, like Pete said, most oil and gas producer countries are planning on increasing production up to 2030 and beyond some, and several major coal producing countries are also planning to increase production or to keep production. In this chart, we juxtaposed on one sign to the left, you can see their pledges for the national, the net zero pledges that countries have made. So we find that seven of the 15 major fossil fuel producing countries have pledges for net zero emissions. And on the right side of the table, we show how these pledges do not yet translate into any meaningful plan for reducing oil and gas production. And in the case of coal, many of them are still planning on maintaining or increasing. Now these numbers that you see on the right, these arrows, they represent the increase by 2030 relative to 2019 production levels. So for each country profiles, we do have much more detailed information. Next slide, please. So for each country. Okay, so for each country, we have provided a detailed graph showing both the historical production that the blue line in the graph. And then the projections of the plans as found in their official documents national documents. This is a summary of all the charts for all the countries. I'm not intending to go in detail or to even have you be able to see it in detail, but it's more so you know that what we have in there. So these are very detailed, a lot of work went into this. And in some cases the projections are more than one, which is reflected here with different and all the information can be found in the profiles next slide please. So what is in the profile so we have the data on their production plans very detailed for each single profile here as an example. We have much more and these profiles are really packed with information so I really invite you if you're interested in a particular country or more I really invite you to look them, because they're so much. So the first thing we consider. So the first section we look at the announced climate ambitions, and this is mostly reflecting what is in the country and this is nationally determined contributions, but as well if they have that means that zero net zero pledges or other climate commitments. We take those commitments of face value we do not analyze what they mean or whether they are ambitious or not. In the next section each country profile we have what are the government views on fossil food production going for moving forward and we take this either from from policies that state that or from official statements from head of state or the relevant ministers. The next section details the plans and projections and basically where what are the sources and where do we take the information that is reflected in the graphs that showed you before. We also have a section quite a quite detail on policies as our government support for fossil food production. And here we include subsidies, but we also include other forms of financial support the covert recovery packages policy exemptions specific policies and other measures, and this is very specific to each country. And this year we include for the first time two new sections and one of them is what are the policies and discourses towards managed wind down fossil food production that countries may have. And the other one, similarly, but not equally is what policies and discourses supporting a just and equitable transition away from fossil food production. And so when we highlight the just and equitable dimension in the other way, we highlight the managed transition. And what we're looking here is what are what do countries have in place and across the board the findings is that countries do not have much yet fossil food production countries. But we, we expect and we hope that as a transition this guys team this section will have more in the future. So this is in a nutshell what we have in the country profiles in chapter four. As I said, they're really, really dense information so I look forward to the Q&A or if you have any other specific questions, we'd be very happy to discuss and I give it back to you and thank you. Thank you very much, Miguel. And we'll move into then chapter five and that's the last chapter that we will present here today. And it's about the critical role of transparency in addressing the production gap. And I'm really happy to invite Harry van Asselt from the University of Eastern Finland, professor of climate law and policy. So Harry, please tell us about the importance of the transparency. Right, thank you. And again, good morning, good afternoon and good evening everyone wherever you are. And so indeed I'm going to be talking briefly about transparency. And in the area of transparency is this saying that goes around which is now maybe about 100 years old, that sunshine is the best disinfectant. And I think that saying also holds true in the context of fossil fuel production. Next slide, please. So why should we care about transparency? There are several reasons and this is of course well known for those who have studied transparency in other issue areas. At the national level, transparency can improve climate and energy policymaking by helping policymakers to better understand the scope of the problem, like the environmental, the social impacts of a problem. But also by encouraging more inclusive and more participatory decision making and ultimately strengthening the means of holding governments as well as in this case companies to account. Moreover transparency can highlight inconsistencies between countries climate policies as well as its other policies that stimulate fossil fuel production, which of course is very important in the context of the production gap. Now at international level transparency can also allow for the identification of who's doing what, who's lagging behind and who actually may need support in the transition. So transparency can further facilitate learning between countries, the sharing of best practices, and ultimately it can help to build trust and foster international cooperation. And this is why one of our key conclusions is that verifiable and comparable information on fossil fuel production, as well as on the support provided the place a very important role, a crucial role in helping to address the production gap. Next slide, please. Now the importance of transparency, which I tried to highlight just now in the context of fossil fuel production is reflected by the fact that there are already quite a number of initiatives that have emerged in the past decades that try to shine a light on various aspects related to fossil fuel production, or the government support provided to fossil fuels. They include initiatives by international organizations such as the OECD, the International Energy Agency, and dedicated initiatives for the extractive sectors. We can think of the extractive industries transparency initiative or publish what you pay initiative focus on financial support. So we have various trackers including the relatively recent energy policy tracker, as well as ultimately a number of industry led initiatives. So through these initiatives we know now that the growing amount of information is becoming available, but there's still a better need for better or bigger need for better information, more comprehensive information to allow us to come with a more robust assessment of what exactly is the production gap, as well as very importantly the options for closing the production gap. As most initiatives that I mentioned that are pictured here, and ultimately do not cover the climate dimensions of fossil fuel production. In addition to what I already mentioned the relevant information that may be out there is spread across various initiatives. It's often not standardized or comparable and country coverage may not always be complete. And ultimately a number of these initiatives are largely voluntary. So overall the bigger point is that it's very challenging to assess progress on aligning fossil fuel production with climate goals, and also ultimately to identify the needs for just an orderly transition away from fossil fuels. Next slide please. So what can we do about the lack of transparency and maybe more specifically and more precisely what can governments do about the lack of transparency. As a first step in our chapter we suggest that government should disclose their fossil fuel production plans and their policies in the national energy and climate plans. Now perhaps the most important or the most well-known national energy and climate plans will be the nationally determined contributions that are submitted under the Paris Agreement, as well as the long term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies or LT leds that parties are also asked to or required to submit. So these NDCs and the LT leds provide a very clear opportunity in our view for parties to the Paris Agreement to communicate the relevant information on fossil fuel production plans and policies to other countries as well as other stakeholders. Now what you see here in this figure is that to some extent this may already be happening by a number of countries. But the figure on the rights that you see here it includes dimensions of fossil fuel productions in these documents or in the NDCs and in the LT leds. However at the same time it should be noted that many of these references are to continued or even increased productions. And also the countries that have indicated that they will adopt measures to wind down fossil fuel production are not yet the major fossil fuel producers. So there's some important notes to be added to that figure. Now in addition to information about fossil fuel production plans there's also an opportunity for governments to disclose information on their fossil fuel production infrastructure. And here it's useful to note and to say that they can already build on a number of existing initiatives, such as the Global Energy Monitor, which are tracking such infrastructure across the world. So again there's ample opportunity to move forward here. Next slide please. Now in addition to the disclosure of fossil fuel production plans and policies, which is in our view of crucial importance, governments should also strengthen transparency in at least two other areas, which we discuss briefly in our chapter. And the first of these is the improved reporting of public financial support provided to fossil fuels, linking back to what Lucille was talking about earlier. So this includes information on the financial support channel through public financial institutions such as the multilateral development banks or export credit agencies, but also the fiscal support that countries provide through fossil fuel production subsidies. Also in this area we see that some progress has been made in terms of collecting information and government reporting, but at the same time there are still important gaps. Ideally here we argue that public finance institutions would share the total amounts of finance desaggregated by fossil fuels, by production stage and ultimately also by type of financing mechanism. Then the other area in where we see governments playing a role is by the mandatory for the mandatory disclosure of information by fossil fuel companies, which would in this case also include state-owned enterprises. And here progress has already been made through initiatives such as the task force climate-related financial disclosures, but governments can go beyond that and require companies to disclose their spending, to disclose their project plans, their greenhouse gas emissions and ultimately their overall climate-related financial risk that they're running. Now governments can take all of the actions that we've been talking about on their own, but at the same time there are also important opportunities for international cooperation in this area. And one way would be for governments to start working together through existing intergovernmental forums. And here I already gave the example of using NDCs, the nationally determined contributions or the long-term low emission development plans for communicating information on production plans. But we can also look at other intergovernmental forums such as the Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs. And here we know for example that countries are already being asked to report on fossil fuel subsidies under SDG targets 12.C. And also here reporting can still improve. But then in addition to these intergovernmental forums, governments can also work through multi-stakeholder initiatives in the sector. And the EITI, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, is probably one of the best examples of this, where action on climate change could also be scaled up. But then lastly, and in addition to maybe some of the other options that governments have, is that governments can consider the creation of a dedicated intergovernmental transparency arrangement that focuses specifically on bringing together information to help address the fossil fuel production gap in a harmonized and standardized manner. And that's all for Chapter 5 from me. So back over to you, Erica. Thank you very much, Haro. And thank you all for the presentation of the report and we'll soon have the Q&A. But first I will turn to Andrea García from the United Nations Secretary General's Climate Action Team. And who has, who is an expert on climate change and energy transition and has an extensive experience working with development countries, governments with international organization and also climate negotiations under the UNFCCC. So what would you say, listening to this and taking part of the results here of the research, what are your thoughts and reflections, what relevance does this report have on the international scene and also for developing countries? Thank you, Annika. And thank you for this opportunity. I'd like to thank the authors and all the scientists behind this report and the science that it's based on. I do think this report is crucial. It shows the incompatibility between countries fossil fuel extraction plans and the mitigation goals science tells us we must achieve. It's also a different type of report and we've seen a lot of reports come out recently. It lends a different perspective. So the UNFCCC mostly takes into account where fossil fuels are burnt, where they're consumed, and it doesn't take into account that much, where they're produced. And this report fills in that gap in information and it shows us a disparity from our global plans, what we need to achieve, what all governments said we should achieve in the Paris Agreement of global temperature rise limiting with what plans that countries are having in fossil fuel production. If you combine this with the IEA report, for example, and its analysis, its conclusions that we should not be looking at oil and gas expansion from now on. If you combine it with the well-known science and the SG's calls for coal phase out by 2030 for developed countries, 2040 for developing countries. If you take all that together, you start to see a very comprehensive picture of where we should go and that we're not there. And also, of course, UNGAP report released recently as well. So in this particular case, what we're seeing is that developing countries and developed countries that are fossil fuel producers are planning for expansion that is incompatible with all of those collective goals. It makes me think a bit of a company in the 90s planning its expansion on the production of floppy disks or film photography. And for the millennials trying to ask themselves what a floppy disk is, my answer is exactly. We can't just rely on selling and our economies growing on something that is going to be unsellable in the future. So for developing countries in particular, whose economies are over reliant on the production and export of fossil fuels, I think this needs to be a wake up call. And it needs to prompt very serious strategic discussions within governments of the future that they're planning for their people, for their labor forces that are dependent on fossil fuel production for their regions, because many times it's whole regions that are very dependent on the production of fossil fuels. On the other hand, if they take this warning signs, if they take these market signs and they have these strategic discussions, I think there is time now to plan for a just transition, plan for economic diversification, plan for what sectors will bring the opportunities for these new generations to work on something different, something that does have a future. And I think that's a crucial discussion that needs to be happening in governments right now. And the other discussion is how do we support these developing countries that are fossil fuel producers to have those discussions to diversify their economies, because they can't do it alone. They're already, these developing countries that we're talking about are already facing extreme economic impacts of price volatility in the fossil fuels ASL, COVID recovery efforts. They are in many cases very much affected already by impacts of climate change and will be continued to be affected by them. So developed countries need to start supporting those efforts very urgently as well. And so I want to just leave those two calls, if you will, in people's minds, one of governments needing to have these discussions of economic diversification just transition and to the support that developing countries need for this and further path forward. Thank you. Thank you very much, Andrea, for that reflection and also, as you said, it's a wake up call for governments to have this discussion based on this and also bringing in the developing countries perspective. And I'm looking now at the Q&A and there is a question about looking at it, there is a lot of people around the world, millions of people who don't have electricity access and that they have, there is a need for low cost energy. And it's vital for many for their development in low income countries. And can anyone comment on this on the investment gap for low carbon energy sources and the wider implications for fossil fuel dependent developing economies. So we'll start off with that question and maybe you, Mikael, can start. Sorry, I think I'm going to let Lucille start on this one. Thank you. Lucille? Then I'll start and Mikael you can add if you want. So I'm not sure if we've got figures on the investment gap, we've got some figures from the UNDP on, you know, the finance needed to provide universal energy access and we're between 400 and 600 billion dollars per year by 2030. So we can see that the finance requirements are huge and obviously it includes both public and private finance. So all this money doesn't need to come from public sources of finance. But I think what this question underlines is really the urgent need to shift actually the public finance away from fossil fuels and into clean energy. I was saying in my presentation that there was a steep increase in gas, public finance for gas, international public finance for gas in the past years. And actually this is the type of finance that received the most international public finance in the period 2017 to 2019. And even like four times as much finance than wind and solar. So you see that here there is some kind of an even engagement of public actors in fossil fuels versus clean energy. So this shift needs to happen much, much, much more quickly. And the good news is that actually the clean alternatives in the global soils are almost already all competitive in terms of the energy uses compared to fossil fuels. So this is the good news. However, it will obviously require a lot more effort from public finance actors. And in the context of fossil fuel dependent developing economies, then it also meets it is also means investing quite heavily not only into clean energy deployment grid infrastructure etc. But also into just transition to make sure that affected communities and workers are not impacted too much. Thank you. Oh sorry, and may I add to this. So Katie's question also was the energy access. And I just want to emphasize energy access, it's a shame that we are well into the 21st century and there's still these levels of lack of energy access it is a crucial problem that needs to be resolved. Now having said that, it is a fallacy to say that more cheap electricity is from fossil fuels is needed to provide electrification. We all know and I have been doing projects in southern Africa development community and other places with low electrification rates. We all know that when new coal power plants come online, they go to the productive centers to the cities they don't go to the rural dispersed areas where these energy access needs so that's a fallacy argument I just want to call it for what this. And then the other part of the argument which is really cheap electricity and the assumption that coal is a cheap electricity while there's this counterargument that some developing countries are too poor to a four coal because coal is already in multiple places not the cheapest technology, but not only that the risk of financial losses because of stranded assets in the next decade not not in the far future or not this decade is too great for countries to bear. I just want to put that on the table, because we keep hearing this argument and this argument is an argument that is used because of the of the trajectory, the past trajectory that was powered by fossil fuels. This means to recognize and that many developing countries developed countries developed upon the backs of fossil fuels but that trajectory is no longer available for those developing countries that want to develop coal. That doesn't exist. It is fair and fair. I'm not going into the fairness of it, but it is not a path that is no longer available. Thank you. Thank you, Mikael. And we have another question here asking one of the key tools and the demand side is pricing greenhouse gas emission. What are the key tools on the supply side besides targets and reporting. And to you Pete, Pete, maybe you can start. Sure. Thanks for that question. I think one of the meta points of the production gap report is that maybe the supply side and the demand side are not that different, you know reducing supply reduces consumption reducing demand reduces consumption and they're intimately related and, you know, reducing demand is one of the best ways to reduce production and it also has the effect of reducing prices, which can have other benefits but, you know, there are specific actions that can be taken on the supply side as well and we discuss several of those in the report. It was last year's report or two years ago we had a typology where we really, you know, clearly laid out sort of a typology of supply side actions. Maybe somebody can, you know, add more of that in the chat if possible but, you know, the biggest one is simply to plan for fossil fuel production, you know, at the government level, make it a priority to set those expectations with industry that fossil fuel production is going to be winding down rather than to continue to, as in the government plans that we review, continue to boost those industries and maintain the illusion that, you know, each country can supply that last barrel of oil, for example. But of course there are individual policies and tools that can be applied as well and some, you know, easy examples of those are removing fossil fuel subsidies. This is something, fossil fuel producer subsidies, something that many governments have already committed to do and where those subsidies specifically to fossil fuel production can speed up and accelerate investments in new production that are simply not needed if we're going to meet Paris goals. Another is to focus on the new, the licensing process, the permitting process for new oil, gas and coal extraction facilities and infrastructure. So, you know, considering climate in those decisions would often mean not, not going forward with investments in those new, in those new fields so those are a couple of examples, thanks. Thank you very much, Pete. I'll take another question here and it's for Harro, it's about the transparency. And it says it's not explicit in defining mandatory disclosure by fossil fuel companies of exposure to climate related financial risk to include disclosure of climate related litigation and legal liability, as well as reputation and risk related to cooperation involvement in climate disinformation campaigns and anti climate, climate lobbying. Do you consider such disclosures essential? Right. First of all, thank you, Kathy for that. That's a very good question. You're right. We do not go into too much detail spelling out what climate related financial risks we're talking about in our chapter. Mainly for space reasons, but also because we want to keep the focus largely on what governance should be doing. At the same time, you raise an important questions like well if we are talking about climate related financial risk for companies, what risks are we talking about. I think to answer your basic question is such disclosure essential. I think my answer would first be from the shareholder perspective absolutely. This is the type of information that if you're putting your money into a company, that's exactly what you want to know. So in that sense, disclosure of such information to at least the shareholders is crucial. Then the next question, would it then also be crucial to disclose that information under a mandatory reporting system to governments? Basically making it open not just to your shareholders, but also to governments and potentially to wider public. Here I guess one could also make the argument that yes, also that is quite essential. Given that, well first of all, you can actually disclose information about for example what you refer to the disinformation campaigns, which is of course very important to know for the wider public to basically see whether they still have faith in a particular company. But likewise also for investors in a company or people or governments that may be interested in supporting a company or not. For them it can also be quite important to have that information readily available. So I guess my qualified answer is that absolutely for shareholders this is crucial information for governments in terms of mandatory reporting. Most likely it should be included as well. Thank you very much Haro. There are other questions here about instruments. I'll put that to maybe you, Lucille first. Can instruments such as the EU's border tax adjustment impact on changing the trajectory of expanding fossil fuel production? Could that be a tool? That's a broad question and I will not go into details of the technicalities on that one. It can be an interesting tool and trade can basically provide good adjustment tools to incentivise countries to take more measures both on the demand side and on the production side. The question obviously for the border adjustment tax and for all the other tools is how these kind of tools are designed and whether they support additional regulations both in the regions where they are put in place and in other countries. So I think that this is the key questions that we should ask ourselves when talking about the EU's border tax adjustment. And you know whether there are the right conditions that are put in place so that it has the right incentives especially in the biggest lodges for fossil fuel producing countries. I don't know if anyone else wants to add to this. Sure thanks Lucille. I just want to add this is maybe an area that future reports can elaborate on. In this report in the production gap report we do not look at how demand policies affect production. So this is basically you're saying the EU border tax that's the demand policy but we also have other examples like China's announcement not to fund power plants abroad or Indonesia's main utility pledging to go net zero. So we have not looked at how demand policies affect production and this is an area where we would like to work more in future editions. Thank you. Thank you Mikael for that clarification and also Haru Haru I think you had a comment as well. Yeah well I think Lucille and Mikael covered the most important points already. In the sense that what the EU is proposing their carbon border adjustment mechanism is indeed not aimed at fossil fuel production as such but it may have impacts down the line. So again it's the demand side policy that may have an implications in fossil fuel production or on fossil fuel production in certain countries in certain regions. But I would expect that impacts to be relatively limited at this stage. A much more direct way of tackling fossil fuel production but also a much more controversial way of tackling fossil fuel production would be by trade restrictions on fossil fuel products. So if the EU would for example ban LNG coming from the United States which again is not going to happen anytime soon. But that would of course be a much more direct way of tackling fossil fuel production. So in that sense that would in my view fall under the suite of measures that we can call supplies and climate policies. But again before we look into these types of policies and their feasibility and legality etc. It's also important to keep in mind what Mikael already said is that demand side policies may also ultimately have these hopefully wanted effects on fossil fuel production. Thank you very much for that as well. And we got one question also about carbon removals and the potential that are used in the in the report are equivalent to the upper level of the sustainable ranges that can be found in the scientific literature. What are the hypothesis for carbon capture. And I'll turn to Pete carbon capture in your presentation. Thanks for that and just to clarify the potential for BEX that we add in. We used essentially climate action trackers assessment which was in turn based on IPCC assessment we went into the primary literature there to confirm nonetheless we put a limit on five billion tons five gigatons of CO2 removal. Per year in mid century which we defined as between 2040 and 2060. So we excluded scenarios that that basically had more than five gigatons of BEX in the mid century and that had more than 3.6 I think billion tons gigatons of a four station over that same time period. We didn't we looked. First of all neither climate extra nor IPCC to our knowledge has summarized literature on upper limits for CC us or DAC and when we looked back being director capture when we looked we didn't yet see any of that ourselves nor did we necessarily want to get into putting additional or other screens on besides what previous authors had done so I mean it's a valid question. I think there's some new literature out and you know just in the last few weeks actually the attempts to get at some of these upper level limits for for that but we didn't apply that nor frankly do the IPCC models that we relied on have all that much director capture. In them that the the they generally use much more backs at least so far or they use backs as sort of a general stand in for all negative emissions technologies so it's a bit it's a bit tough to to get you know to specific prescriptive about what what is and isn't possible in that regard. Thank you Pete. But we have a question here I mean there is a lot of engagement of course among people around the world when it comes to climate and and we got a question here. What what the best policies are for everyday citizens to push for with God with regards to the transition transition away from fossil fuels. What role could central banks play in the transition for example. And I see Michael maybe you will would like to start with this. Thanks Annika, and these release two questions. So, I'll take them both actually so on the first one. What are the best parts for everyday citizens, I think it's important to acknowledge that fossil fuel production is driven is a structural issue and is driven top down not bottom up. So, everyday citizens actions are like what you do on a day to day basis are not going to make much of a difference. No so what can citizens do. If you live in a country, and we have to much here different political reality that if you live in a country where you have influence over your government because you can either vote or protest or do any other means that you have influence, you can use this influence to government to take this issue seriously. If you have decision power of a over acquisition of capital goods that consume fossil fuels, be it a car or something, you can also make your choice to go for the non fossil fuel production. As our non fossil fuel consuming so affect the demand of the production, which in turn will eventually affect demand, but it's important to recognize the structural issue and we need top down approaches so political pressure is the most effective in this regard, as well as economic pressure. But I would like specifically on the second one right so what's roll central banks complain the transition. And I mean the obvious answer is regulation, but what kind of regulation we're talking about. So central banks regulate financial abilities and from all the financial entities what do they have to have in terms to charge their financial responsibilities well do the same for carbon. So how do you translate the carbon liabilities into financial liabilities require all the financial entities that are under your purvey under your regulation regulatory umbrella, require them create rules that force them to have to acknowledge and quantify and put in their balance books and provide reservists for to cover the carbon liabilities that alone would be a huge step so that would be my first thing I'm sure others will other. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mikael, and just aware of the time here that we don't have that much time left. And so I would actually like to have a final question. And thank you so much for all the questions that you put in the chat and please contact us outside of this webinar if you have more questions. And thank you for showing interest and participating and thank you for all the present presenters here today and the authors. And but I would like to ask one final question and I put it to you Pete if you can make like the main conclusions of this year's report, how closing the production gap what are the main conclusions from the report what would you say, and also bearing in mind that we are getting close to COP here. Sure. Thank you. Thanks everyone for joining today. It's been a wonderful discussion. We hope to dig into the report, share it, talk about it. So, as I understand your question on it's what will it take to close the production gap we've heard a lot of talk about that harrow particularly laid out a number of strategies related to transparency, and, you know, as one who helped calculate the production gap. First a very literal answer to what it takes to close the production gap and that is quite simply for governments to align their fossil fuel production outlooks with the need to wind down fossil fuel consumption. And this means no longer hoping to be that last producer standing, but instead take proactive steps as national governments to plan for and manage that decline in fossil fuel production. That is, you know, the simplest answer to how to close the production gap obviously that is not so simple in practice, but there are multiple benefits of doing just that of planning for that wind down a fossil fuel production, not least of which is greater certainty for those communities that have long produced fossil fuels so that their transition is less of a sharp shock and more something that can be planned for in an equitable way. Another theme is to do this in cooperation with other countries. The global, the climate benefits of managing a wind down in fossil fuel production come largely from working together across countries. So that production and consumption can really be limited effectively. And one place to start in that as we've heard time and time again this morning is in the UNFCCC. Their countries can talk about fossil fuel production as part of their climate strategies or rather limiting it as part of the climate strategies. They can start to do so in the, in their nationally determined contributions, their NDCs and in their long term strategies. And that would be a starting point. There are also other venues for cooperation. Many venues for cooperation that could be adapted to fossil fuels, but just one to start with it could be the net zero producers forum. And even though that is not yet focused on fossil fuel production, you know, they've mainly focused on say reducing methane emissions, which is important, but could existing organizations, institutions like the net zero producers forum expand their focus or be adapted to help manage that wind down to explicitly align fossil fuel production outlooks with climate limits and and to do so in a way where the higher income countries, the higher income countries lead the way in that wind down because they have gotten the lion's share of any wealth that there was to get from fossil fuels that makes sense for them to go first in moving us away. So encourage you to look again at the much more richer details on all these topics in the report and thanks to everyone again for joining us this morning. Did you or others have final words to close this out? I can just remind everyone that Lindsay put the link, the link in to the report in the chat and please take a look at that. And if you have any questions, let us know afterwards. And thank you so much for joining today and a huge thank you to you all in the presenters. And I don't know if no one else has anything else to say or say goodbye and see you again, I hope.