 In this lecture, we're going to talk about a conceptualization of intellectual humility. Intellectual humility applies the concept of humility to epistemic issues, namely the extent to which the person acknowledges limitations of his or her beliefs or knowledge. Humility is, according to many philosophers, an intellectual virtue. In the context of virtue epistemology, which focuses on the processes by which beliefs are formed, the question has arisen among philosophers regarding the extent to which intellectual virtues, such as intellectual humility, are necessary even to the very foundation and advancement of knowledge. Scholars, whether they be philosophers or psychologists, or for that matter other disciplines such as theology, have different perspectives of what is meant by intellectual humility. My purpose here is not to argue for one position over another as much as it is to simply lay out the possibilities that should be considered in the development of measures. One account is that of the philosopher Julia Driver, who argues that intellectual humility is indeed holding oneself in low regard to underestimate self-worth to some extent in spite of the available evidence. We can call this the low self-worth perspective. And though I'm trying to be balanced in my presentation of the various options, I do think that this position has serious limitations and I'm not aware of any current measures of intellectual humility that reflect just this perspective. Another account offered by Peter Samuelson and his colleagues maintains that intellectual humility consists in proper belief. Intellectual humility is, in their terms, believing as one ought, believing with the firmness the given belief merits. Of course, it is a complex issue in determining the merit of a belief, and these authors try to spell out how this is best accomplished. We will refer to this as the proper belief understanding of intellectual humility. Yet a third perspective has been offered by philosophers Robert Roberts and Jay Wood. Their definition of intellectual humility has drawn considerable philosophical interest. They say that it's an unusually low dispositional concern for the kind of self-importance that accrues to persons who are viewed by their intellectual communities as intellectually talented, skilled, and accomplished, especially where such concern is muted, or sidelined, by intrinsic intellectual concerns. In particular, the concern for knowledge with its various attributes of truth, justification, warrant, coherence, precision, load-bearing, and so forth. Now, according to Roberts and Wood, intellectual humility may be especially important for those who are viewed by their communities as intellectually talented. Though communities may differ in terms of the salience of the intellectual domain, for example, academia in contrast to professional sports, leaders emerge often on the basis of intellectual ability and prowess that has the potential to exert disproportionate influence over group ideas. For them, intellectual humility and other types of humility as well can be thought of in terms of motivation, in this case a high concern for knowledge and its various attributes, and a low concern for status or self-importance. We can call this the low concern for status perspective. A concern for accurate knowledge requires that a person be aware of and willing to acknowledge and own the limitations of his or her beliefs, knowledge, or system of thinking. The owning limitations perspective has been championed by Dennis Whitcombe and colleagues, so we minimally have four views of intellectual humility. Low self-worth, proper belief, low concern for status, and owning limitations, only the latter three of which seem to be gaining much traction in the literature. Common to the latter three positions, proper belief, low concern for status, and owning limitations, is that intellectual humility should be thought of as a motivational characteristic, and at the heart of the motivational drive is a deep, overriding, intrinsic concern for knowledge, knowledge for its own sake, as an end in itself, and not as a means to some other end. It is this primary motivation to which all other motivations pale in comparison. Through such an overriding concern for knowledge, three primary characteristics or components of intellectual humility can be identified. First, a willingness to hold beliefs tentatively to the extent that one is willing to revise one's perspective, given a convincing reason to do so. Second, a willingness to undertake a critical scrutiny of one's perspective, including a balanced consideration of evidence that both supports and refutes one's perspective. And third, a willingness to acknowledge that equally sincere, capable, and knowledgeable individuals may reasonably hold different views. An individual who is intellectually humble will remain curious, open-minded, and cognitively flexible, because he or she acknowledges and accepts the limits on his or her knowledge and perspective of the world. Just as with humility in general, acceptance of limits can foster an attitude by which one is willing to seek new knowledge and accept feedback, including critical feedback from others. The intellectually humble person is able to maintain his or her perspective, but is always open to revising it, while simultaneously respecting and valuing others' views, even when such views are opposed to his or her own views. Now this is not to say that the intellectually humble are without bias. No person can be totally free of bias, and there are times when sticking to one's guns, even if biased, may be effective and turn out to be accurate. Consider the cases of Copernicus and Einstein, for example. However, the basis of the bias does matter. Intellectual humility posits that bias should not be derived from a desire for social status or a refusal to accept one's intellectual limits, but rather that intellectual endeavors be pursued in the service of outcomes beyond motivated self-interest. Intellectual humility can be applied to a variety of domains, including academia, organizational life, and civil discourse. Intellectual humility, if better understood and successfully fostered, should have wide-ranging social benefits in a culture where ideological diversity and plurality are frequently valued in principle, but rarely practiced. So in review, when viewed within a motivational framework, intellectual humility involves pursuing knowledge more for the sake of knowledge than for any other reason. As an intellectually humble individual pursues the epistemic goals of knowledge and understanding, he or she will be primarily concerned with the development of wisdom and knowledge, as opposed to seeking knowledge for prestige, admiration for mothers, or general self-enhancement. To develop a measure of intellectual humility is no small task, but it is a necessary task if we are to develop an empirically-based understanding. And so in the next few lectures, we will turn our attention to issues of measurement.