 CHAPTER VIII. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. PART III. CHAPTER SUMMARY. When the head of the executive power is re-eligible, it is the state which is the source of intrigue and corruption. The desire of being re-elected, the chief aim of a president of the United States. Disadvantage of the system peculiar to America. The natural evil of democracy is that it subordinates all authority to the slightest desires of the majority. The re-election of the president encourages this evil. It may be asked whether the legislators of the United States did right or wrong in allowing the re-election of the president. It seems at first sight contrary to all reason to prevent the head of the executive power from being elected a second time. The influence which the talents and the character of a single individual may exercise upon the fate of a whole people, in critical circumstances or arduous times, is well known. A law preventing the re-election of the chief magistrate would deprive the citizens of the surest pledge of the prosperity and the security of the Commonwealth. And, by a singular inconsistency, a man would be excluded from the government at the very time when he had shown his ability in conducting its affairs. But if these arguments are strong, perhaps still more powerful reasons may be advanced against them. Intrigue and corruption are the natural defects of elective government. But when the head of the state can be re-elected, these evils rise to a great height and compromise the very existence of the country. When a simple candidate seeks to rise by intrigue, his maneuvers must necessarily be limited to a narrow sphere. But when the chief magistrate enters the lists, he borrows the strength of the government for his own purposes. In the former case, the feeble resources of an individual are in action. In the latter, the state itself, with all its immense influence, is busied in the work of corruption and cabal. The private citizen, who employs the most immoral practices to acquire power, can only act in a manner indirectly prejudicial to the public prosperity. But if the representative of the executive descends into the combat, the cares of government dwindle into second-rate importance, and the success of his election is his first concern. All laws and all the negotiations he undertakes are to him nothing more than electioneering schemes. Places become the reward of services rendered, not to the nation, but to its chief. And the influence of the government, if not injurious to the country, is at least no longer beneficial to the community for which it was created. It is impossible to consider the ordinary course of affairs in the United States without perceiving that the desire of being re-elected is the chief aim of the President. That his whole administration, and even his most indifferent measures, tend to this object. And that, as the crisis approaches, his personal interest takes the place of his interest in the public good. The principle of re-eligibility renders the corrupt influence of elective government still more extensive and pernicious. In America it exercises a peculiarly fatal influence on the sources of national existence. Every government seems to be afflicted by some evil which is inherent in its nature, and the genius of the legislator is shown in eluding its attacks. A state may survive the influence of a host of bad laws, and the mischief they cause is frequently exaggerated. But a law which encourages the growth of the canker within must prove fatal in the end, although its bad consequences may not be immediately perceived. The principle of destruction in absolute monarchies lies in the excessive and unreasonable extension of the prerogative of the Crown, and a measure tending to remove the constitutional provisions which counterbalance this influence would be radically bad, even if its immediate consequences were unattended with evil. By a parody of reasoning, in countries governed by a democracy where the people is perpetually drawing all authority to itself, the laws which increase or accelerate its action are the direct assailants of the very principle of the government. The greatest proof of the ability of the American legislators is that they clearly discerned this truth, and that they had the courage to act up to it. They conceived that a certain authority above the body of the people was necessary, which should enjoy a degree of independence, without however being entirely beyond the popular control, an authority which would be forced to comply with the permanent determinations of the majority, but which would be able to resist its caprices and to refuse its most dangerous demands. To this end they centered the whole executive power of the nation in a single arm. They granted extensive prerogatives to the President, and they armed him with the veto to resist the encroachments of the Legislature. But by introducing the principle of re-election they partly destroyed their work, and they rendered the President but little inclined to exert the great power they had vested in his hands. If ineligible a second time, the President would be far from independent of the people, for his responsibility would not be lessened, but the favor of the people would not be so necessary to him as to induce him to court it by humoring its desires. If re-eligible, and this is more especially true at the present day, when political morality is relaxed, and when great men are rare, the President of the United States becomes an easy tool in the hands of the majority. He adopts its likings and its animosities, he hastens to anticipate its wishes, he forestalls its complaints, he yields to its idlerous cravings, and instead of guiding it as the Legislature intended that he should do, he is ever ready to follow its bidding. Thus, in order not to deprive the State of the talents of an individual, those talents have been rendered almost useless, and to reserve an expedient for extraordinary perils, the country has been exposed to daily dangers. Federal Courts. Chapter Summary. Political Importance of the Judiciary in the United States. Difficulty of treating this subject. Utility of Judicial Power in Confederations. What Tribunals could be introduced into the Union? Necessity of establishing Federal Courts of Justice. Organization of the National Judiciary. The Supreme Court. In what it differs from all known Tribunals. I have inquired into the Legislative and Executive Power of the Union, and the Judicial Power now remains to be examined. But in this place I cannot conceal my fears from the reader. Their judicial institutions exercise a great influence on the condition of the Anglo-Americans, and they occupy a prominent place amongst what are probably called political institutions. In this respect they are peculiarly deserving of our attention. But I am at a loss to explain the political action of the American Tribunals without entering into some technical details of their constitution and their forms of proceeding. And I know not how to descend to these minutiae without wearying the curiosity of the reader by the natural aridity of the subject, or without risking to fall into obscurity through a desire to be succinct. I can scarcely hope to escape these various evils, for if I appear too lengthy to a man of the world a lawyer may on the other hand complain of my brevity. But these are the natural disadvantages of my subject, and more especially of the point which I am about to discuss. The great difficulty was, not to devise the constitution to the federal government, but to find out a method of enforcing its laws. Governments have in general but two means of overcoming the opposition of the people they govern. Visa v. the physical force which is at their own disposal, and the moral force which they derive from the decisions of the courts of justice. A government which should have no other means of exacting obedience than open war must be very near its ruin, for one of two alternatives would then probably occur. If its authority was small and its character temperate, it would not resort to violence till the last extremity, and it would connive at a number of partial acts of insubordination, in which case the state would gradually fall into anarchy. If it was enterprising and powerful, it would perpetually have recourse to its physical strength, and would speedily degenerate into a military despotism, so that its activity would not be less prejudicial to the community than its inaction. The great end of justice is to substitute the notion of right for that of violence, and to place a legal barrier between the power of the government and the use of physical force. The authority which is awarded to the intervention of a court of justice by the general opinion of mankind is so surprisingly great that it clings to the mere formalities of justice, and gives a bodily influence to the shadow of the law. The moral force which courts of justice possess renders the introduction of physical force exceedingly rare, and is very frequently substituted for it. But if the latter proves to be indispensable, this power is doubled by the association of the idea of law. A federal government stands in greater need of the support of judicial institutions than any other, because it is naturally weak and exposed to formidable opposition. If it were always obliged to resort to violence in the first instance, it could not fulfill its task. The union, therefore, required a national judiciary to enforce the obedience of the citizens to the laws, and to repeal the attacks which might be directed against them. The question then remained as to what tribunals were to exercise these privileges. Were they to be entrusted to the courts of justice, which were already organized in every state, or was it necessary to create federal courts? It may easily be proved that the union could not adapt the judicial power of the states to its wants. The separation of the judiciary from the administrative power of the state no doubt affects the security of every citizen and the liberty of all. But it is no less important to the existence of the nation that these several powers should have the same origin, should follow the same principles, and act in the same sphere, in a word that they should be correlative and homogeneous. No one, I presume, ever suggested the advantage of trying offenses committed in France by a foreign court of justice in order to secure the impartiality of the judges. The Americans form one people in relation to their federal government. But in the bosom of this people, diverse political bodies have been allowed to subsist which are dependent on the national government in a few points, and independent in all the rest. Which have all a distinct origin, maximums peculiar to themselves and special means of carrying on their affairs. To entrust the execution of the laws of the union to tribunals instituted by these political bodies would be to allow foreign judges to preside over the nation. Nay, more. Not only is each state foreign to the union at large, but it is in perpetual opposition to the common interests, since whatever authority the union loses turns to the advantage of the states. Thus to enforce the laws of the union by means of the tribunals of the states would be to allow not only foreign but partial judges to preside over the nation. But the number, still more than the mere character of the tribunals of the states, rendered them unfit for the service of the nation. When the federal constitution was formed there were already 13 courts of justice in the United States which decided causes without appeal. That number is now increased to 24. To suppose that a state can subsist when its fundamental laws may be subjected to four and twenty different interpretations at the same time is to advance a proposition alike contrary to reason and to experience. The American legislators, therefore, agreed to create a federal judiciary power to apply the laws of the union and to determine certain questions affecting general interests which were carefully determined beforehand. The entire judicial power of the union was centered in one tribunal which was denominated the Supreme Court of the United States. But to facilitate the expedition of business inferior courts were appended to it which were empowered to decide causes of small importance without appeal and with appeal causes of more magnitude. The members of the Supreme Court are named neither by the people nor the legislature nor by the President of the United States acting with the advice of the Senate. In order to render them independent of the other authorities their office was made inalienable and it was determined that their salary when once fixed should not be altered by the legislature. It was easy to proclaim the principle of a federal judiciary but difficulties multiplied when the extent of its jurisdiction was to be determined. Chapter Summary Means of determining the jurisdiction of the federal courts difficulty of determining the jurisdiction of separate courts of justice and confederations the courts of the union obtained the right of fixing their own jurisdiction. In what respect this rule attacks the portion of sovereignty reserved to the several states? The sovereignty of these states restricted by the laws and the interpretation of the laws consequently the danger of the several states is more apparent than real. As the constitution of the United States recognized two distinct powers in presence of each other represented in a judicial point of view by two distinct classes of courts of justice the utmost care which could be taken in defining their separate jurisdictions would have been insufficient to prevent frequent collisions between those tribunals. The question then arose to whom the right of deciding the competency of each court was to be referred. In nations which constitute a single body politic when a question is debated between two courts relating to their mutual jurisdiction a third tribunal is generally within reach to decide the difference. And this is affected without difficulty because in these nations the questions of judicial competency have no connection with the privileges of the national supremacy but it was impossible to create an arbiter between a superior court of the union and the superior court of a separate state which would not belong to one of these two classes. It was therefore necessary to allow one of these courts to judge its own cause and to take or retain cognizance of the point which was contested. To grant this privilege to the different courts of the states would have been to destroy the sovereignty of the union de facto after having established it de jure. For the interpretation of the constitution would soon have restored that portion of independence to the states of which the terms of that act deprived them. The object of the creation of a federal tribunal was to prevent the courts of the states from deciding questions affecting the national interests in their own department and so to form a uniform body of jurisprudence for the interpretation of the laws of the union. This end would not have been accomplished if the courts of the several states had been competent to decide upon cases in their separate capacities from which they were obliged to abstain as federal tribunals. The Supreme Court of the United States was therefore invested with the right of determining all questions of jurisdiction. This was a severe blow upon the independence of the states which was thus restricted not only by the laws but by the interpretation of them. By one limit which was known and by another which was dubious. By a rule which was certain and a rule which was arbitrary. It is true the constitution had laid down the precise limits of the federal supremacy but whenever this supremacy is contested by one of the states a federal tribunal decides the question. Nevertheless the dangers with which the independence of the states was threatened by this mode of proceeding are less serious than they appeared to be. We shall see hereafter that in America the real strength of the country is vested in the provincial far more than in the federal government. The federal judges are conscious of the relative weakness of the power in whose name they act and they are more inclined to abandon a right of jurisdiction in cases where it is justly their own than to assert a privilege to which they have no legal claim. Different Cases of Jurisdiction Chapter Summary The matter and the party are the first conditions of the federal jurisdiction. Suits in which ambassadors are engaged. Suits of the Union. Of a separate state by whom tried. Causes resulting from the laws of the Union. Why judged by the federal tribunals. Causes relating to the performance of contracts tried by the federal courts. Consequence of this arrangement. After having appointed the means of fixing the competency of the federal courts the legislators of the Union define the cases which should come within their jurisdiction. It was established on the one hand that certain parties must always be brought before the federal courts without any regard to the special nature of the cause. And on the other that certain causes must always be brought before the same courts without any regard to the quality of the parties in the suit. These distinctions were therefore admitted to be the basis of the federal jurisdiction. Ambassadors are the representatives of nations in a state of amity with the Union and whatever concerns these personages concerns in some degree the whole Union. When an ambassador is a party in a suit that suit affects the welfare of the nation and a federal tribunal is naturally called upon to decide it. The Union itself may be invoked in legal proceedings and in this case it would be alike contrary to the customs of all nations and to common sense to appeal to a tribunal representing any other sovereignty than its own. The federal courts therefore take cognizance of these affairs. When two parties belonging to two different states are engaged in a suit the case cannot with propriety be brought before a court of either state. The surest expedient is to select a tribunal like that of the Union which can excite the suspicions of neither party and which offers the most natural as well as the most certain remedy. When the two parties are not private individuals but states an important political consideration is added to the same motive of equity. The quality of the parties in this case is of international importance to all their disputes and the most trifling litigation of the states may be said to involve the peace of the whole Union. The nature of the cause frequently prescribes the rule of competency. Thus all the questions which concern maritime commerce evidently fall under the cognizance of the federal tribunals. Almost all these questions are connected with the interpretation of the law of nations and in this respect they essentially interest the Union in relation to foreign powers. Moreover as the sea is not included within the limits of any peculiar jurisdiction the national courts can only hear causes which originate in maritime affairs. The constitution comprises under one head almost all the cases which by their very nature come within the limits of the federal courts. The rule which it lays down is simple but pregnant with an entire system of ideas and with a vast multitude of facts. It declares that the judicial power of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the laws of the United States. Two examples will put the intention of the legislator in the clearest light. The constitution prohibits the states from making laws on the value and circulation of money. If notwithstanding this prohibition a state passes a law of this kind with which the interested parties refuse to comply because it is contrary to the constitution. The case must come before a federal court because it arises under the laws of the United States. Again, if difficulties arise in the levying of import duties which have been voted by Congress the federal court must decide the case because it arises under the interpretation of a law of the United States. This rule is in perfect accordance with the fundamental principles of the federal constitution. The Union, as it was established in 1789 possesses, it is true, a limited supremacy but it was intended that within its limits it should form one and the same people. Within those limits the Union is sovereign. When this point is established and admitted the inference is easy for if it be acknowledged that the United States constitute one and the same people within the bounds prescribed by their constitution it is impossible to refuse them the rights which belong to other nations. But it has been allowed from the origin of society that every nation has the right of deciding by its own courts those questions which concern the execution of its own laws. To this it is answered that the Union is in so singular a position that in relation to some matters it constitutes a people and that in relation to all the rest it is a non-entity. But the inference to be drawn is that in the laws relating to these matters the Union possesses all the rights of absolute sovereignty. The difficulty is to know what these matters are and when once it is resolved and we have shown how it was resolved in speaking of the means of determining the jurisdiction of the federal courts no further doubt can arise for as soon as it is established that a suit is federal that is to say that it belongs to the share of sovereignty reserved by the constitution of the Union the natural consequence is that it should come within the jurisdiction of a federal court. Whenever the laws of the United States are attacked or whenever they are resorted to in self-defense the federal courts must be appealed to. Thus the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Union extends and narrows its limits exactly in the same ratio as the sovereignty of the Union augments or decreases. We have shown that the principle aim of the legislators of 1789 was to divide the sovereign authority into two parts. In the one they place the control of all the general interests of the Union in the other the control of the special interests of its component states. Their chief solicitude was to arm the federal government with sufficient power to enable it to resist within its sphere the encroachments of the several states. As for these communities the principle of independence within certain limits of their own was adopted in their behalf and they were concealed from the inspection and protected from the control of the central government. In speaking of the division of authority I observed that this latter principle had not always been held sacred since the states are prevented from passing certain laws which apparently belong to their own particular sphere of interest. When a state of the Union passes a law of this kind the citizens who are injured by its execution can appeal to the federal courts. Thus the jurisdiction of the federal courts extends not only to all the cases which arise under the laws of the Union but also to those which arise under laws made by the several states in opposition to the Constitution. The states are prohibited from making ex post facto laws in criminal cases and any person condemned by virtue of a law of this kind can appeal to the judicial power of the Union. The states are likewise prohibited from making laws which have a tendency to impair the obligations of contracts. If a citizen thinks that an obligation of this kind is impaired by a law passed in his state he may refuse to obey it and may appeal to the federal courts. This provision appears to me to be the most serious attack upon the independence of the states. The rights awarded to the federal government for purposes of obvious national importance are definite and easily comprehensible. But those with which this last clause invests it are not either clearly appreciable or accurately defined. For there are vast numbers of political laws which influence the existence of obligations of contracts which may thus furnish an easy pretext for the aggressions of the central authority. Chapter 8 The Federal Constitution Part 4 Procedure of the Federal Courts Chapter Summary Natural weakness of the judiciary power in confederations legislators ought to strive as much as possible to bring private individuals and not states before the federal courts. How the Americans have succeeded in this direct prosecution of private individuals in the federal courts indirect prosecution of the states which violate the laws of the Union the decrees of the Supreme Court innovate but do not destroy the provincial laws. I have shown what the privileges of the federal courts are and it is no less important to point out the manner in which they are exercised. The irresistible authority of justice in countries in which the sovereignty is undivided is derived from the fact that the tribunals of those countries are a nation at issue with the individual against whom their decree is directed and the idea of power is thus introduced to corroborate the idea of right. But this is not always the case in countries in which the sovereignty is divided. In them the judicial power is more frequently opposed to a fraction of the nation than to an isolated individual and its moral authority and physical strength are consequently diminished. In federal states it is naturally decreased and that of the justiciable parties is augmented. The aim of the legislator in Confederate states ought therefore to be to render the position of the courts of justice analogous to that which they occupy in countries where the sovereignty is undivided. In other words his efforts ought constantly to tend to maintain the judicial power of the confederation as the representative of the nation and the justiciable party as the representative of an individual interest. Every government whatever may be its constitution requires the means of constraining its subjects to discharge their obligations and of protecting its privileges from their assaults. As far as the direct action of the government on the community is concerned the constitution of the United States contrived by a master stroke of policy that the federal courts acting in the name of the laws only take cognizance of parties in an individual capacity. For as it had been declared that the union consisted of one and the same people within the limits laid down by the constitution the inference was that the government created by this constitution and acting within these limits was invested with all the privileges of a national government one of the principle of which is the right of transmitting its injunctions directly to the private citizen. When for instance the union votes an impost it does not apply to the states for the levying of it but to every American citizen in proportion to his assessment. The Supreme Court which is empowered to enforce the execution of this law of the union exerts its influence not upon a refractory state but upon the private taxpayer and like the judicial power of other nations it is opposed to the person of an individual who observed that the union chose its own antagonist and as that antagonist is feeble he is naturally worsted but the difficulty increases when the proceedings are not brought forward by but against the union the constitution recognizes the legislative power of the states and a law so enacted may impair the privileges of the union in which case a collision is unavoidable between that body and the state which has passed the law only remains to select the least dangerous remedy which is very clearly deducible from the general principles I have before established it may be conceived that in the case under consideration the union might have used the state before a federal court which would have annuled the act and by this means it would have adopted a natural course of proceeding but the judicial power would have been placed in open hostility to the state and it was desirable to avoid this predicament as much as possible the americans hold that it is nearly impossible that a new law should not impair the interests of some private individual by its provisions these private interests are assumed by the american legislators as the ground of attack against such measures as may be prejudicial to the union and it is to these cases that the protection of the supreme court is extended suppose a state vends a certain portion of its territory to a company here afterwards it passes a law by which the territory is otherwise disposed of and that clause of the constitution which prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts violated when the purchaser under the second act appears to take possession the possessor under the first act brings his action before the tribunals of the union and causes the title of the claimant to be pronounced null and void thus in point of fact the judicial power of the union is contesting the claims of the sovereignty of a state but it only acts indirectly and upon a special application of detail it attacks the law in its consequences not in its principle and it rather weakens than destroys it the last hypothesis that remained was that each state formed a corporation enjoying a separate existence and distinct civil rights and that it could therefore sue or be sued before a tribunal thus a state could bring an action against another state in this instance the union was not called upon to contest a provincial law but to try a suit in which a state was a party this suit was perfectly similar to any other cause except that the quality of the parties was different and here the danger pointed out at the beginning of this chapter exists with less chance of being avoided the inherent disadvantage of the very essence of federal constitutions is that they engender parties in the bosom of the nation which present powerful obstacles to the free course of justice section summary high rank of the supreme court amongst the great powers of state no nation ever constituted so great a judicial power as the americans extent of its prerogative its political influence the tranquility and the very existence of the union depend on the discretion of the seven federal judges when we have successfully examined in detail the organization of the supreme court and the entire prerogatives which it exercises we shall readily admit that a more imposing judicial power was never constituted by any people the supreme court is placed at the head of all known tribunals both by the nature of its rights and the class of justiciable parties which it controls in all the civilized countries of europe has always shown the greatest repugnance to allow the cases to which it was itself a party to be decided by the ordinary course of justice this repugnance naturally attains its utmost height in an absolute government and on the other hand the privileges of the courts of justice are extended with the increasing liberties of the people but no european nation has at present held that all judicial controversies without regard to their origin are the charges of common law in america this theory has been actually put in practice and the supreme court of the united states is the sole tribunal of the nation its power extends to all the cases arising under laws and treaties made by the executive and legislative authorities to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and in general to all points which affect the law of nations it may even be affirmed that the constitution is essentially judicial its prerogatives are almost entirely political its sole object is to enforce the execution of the laws of the union and the union only regulates the relations of the government with the citizens and of the nation with foreign powers the relations of citizens amongst themselves are almost exclusively regulated by the sovereignty of the states a second and still greater cause of the preponderance of this court in the nations of europe the courts of justice are only called upon to try the controversies of private individuals but the supreme court of the united states summons sovereign powers to its bar when the clerk of the court advances on the steps of the tribunal and simply says the state of new york versus the state of Ohio it is impossible not to feel that the court which he addresses is no ordinary body and when it is recollected that one of these parties represents one million and the other two millions of men one is struck by the responsibility of the seven judges whose decision is about to satisfy or to disappoint so large a number of their fellow citizens the peace the prosperity and the very existence of the union are vested in the hands of the seven judges without their act of cooperation the constitution would be a dead letter the executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers the legislature demands their protection from the designs of the executive they defend the union from the disobedience of the states the states from the exaggerated claims of the union the public interest against the interests of private citizens and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of democracy their power is enormous but it is clothed in the authority of public opinion the powerful guardians of a people which respects law but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt the force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents because its exact limits cannot be defined and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain below the boundary prescribed the federal judges must not only be good citizens and men possessed of that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates but they must be statesmen politicians not unread in the signs of the times not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy of the union and the obedience which is due to the laws the president who exercises a limited power may err without causing great mischief in the state congress may decide to miss not destroying the union because the electoral body in which congress originates may cause it to retract its decision by changing its members but if the supreme court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad citizens the union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war the real cause of this danger however does not lie in the constitution of the tribunal but in the very nature of federal governments we have observed that in confederate peoples it is especially necessary to consolidate the judicial authority because in no other nations to those independent persons who are able to cope with the social body exist in greater power or in a better condition to resist the physical strength of the government but the more a power requires to be strengthened the more extensive and independent it must be made and the dangers which its abuse may create are heightened by its independence and its strength the source of the evil is not therefore in the constitution of the power but in the constitution of those states which render its existence necessary in what respects the federal constitution is superior to that of the states section summary in what respects the constitution of the union can be compared to that of the states superiority of the constitution of the union attributable to the wisdom of the federal legislatures legislature of the union literature of the union less dependent on the people than that of the states executive power more independent in its sphere judicial power less subjected to the inclinations of the majority practical consequence of these facts the dangers inherent in a democratic government eluded by the federal legislators and increased by the legislators of the states the federal constitution differs essentially from that of the states in the ends which it is intended to accomplish but in the means by which these ends are promoted a greater analogy exists between them the objects of the governments are different but their forms are the same and in this special point of view there is some advantage in comparing them together I am of opinion that the federal constitution is superior to all the constitutions of the states for several reasons the present constitution of the union was formed at a later period of its superiority of the states and it may have derived some ameliorations from past experience but we shall be led to acknowledge that this is only a secondary cause of its superiority when we recollect that 11 new states have been added to the American confederation since the promulgation of the federal constitution and that these new republics have always rather exaggerated than avoided the defects which existed in the former constitutions the chief cause of its superiority of the federal constitution lay in the character of the legislators who composed it at the time when it was formed the dangers of the confederation were imminent and its ruin seemed inevitable in this extremity the people chose the men who most deserved the esteem rather than those who had gained the affections of the country I have already observed that distinguished as almost all the legislators of the union were for their intelligence they were still more so for their patriotism they had all been nurtured at a time when the spirit of liberty was braced by a continual struggle against a powerful and predominant authority when the contest was terminated whilst the excited passions of the populace persisted in warring with dangers which had ceased to threaten them these men stopped short in their career they cast a calmer and more penetrating look upon the country which was now their own they believed that the war of independence was definitely ended and that the only dangers which America had to fear were those which might result from the abuse of the freedom she had won they had the courage to say what they believed to be true because they were animated by a warm and sincere love of liberty and they ventured to propose restrictions because they were resolutely opposed to destruction the greater number of the constitutions of the states assigned one year for the duration of the House of Representatives and two years for that of the Senate so that members of the legislative body are constantly and narrowly tied down by the slightest desires of their constituents the legislators of the Union were of opinion that this excessive dependence of the legislature tended to alter the nature of the main consequences of the representative system since it vested the source not only of authority but of government in the people they increased the length of the time when the constitutions were returned in order to give them freer scope for the exercise of their own judgment the federal constitution as well as the constitutions of the different states divided the legislative body into two branches but in the states these two branches were composed of the same elements and elected in the same manner the consequence was that the passions and inclinations of the populace were as rapidly and as energetically represented in one chamber as in the other and that laws were made with all the characteristics of violence and precipitation by the federal constitution the two houses originate in like manner in the choice of the people but the conditions of eligibility and the mode of election were changed to the end that if as is the case in certain nations one branch of the legislature represents the same interests as the other it may at least represent a superior degree of intelligence and discretion a mature age was made one of the conditions of the senatorial dignity and the upper house was chosen by an elected assembly of a limited number of members to concentrate the whole social force in the hands of the legislative body is the natural tendency of democracies for as this is the power which emanates the most directly from the people it is made to participate most fully in the preponderating authority of the multitude and it is naturally led to monopolize every species of influence this concentration is at once prejudicial to a well conducted administration and favorable to the despotism of the majority the legislators of the states frequently yielded to these democratic propensities which were invariably and courageously resisted by the founders of the union in the states the executive power is vested in the hands of a magistrate who is apparently placed upon a level with the legislature but who is in reality nothing more than the blind agent and the passive instrument of its decisions he can derive no influence from the duration of his functions which terminate with the revolving year or from the exercise of prerogatives which can scarcely be said to exist the legislature can condemn him to inaction by entrusting the execution of the laws to special committees of its own members and can annul his temporary dignity by depriving him of his salary the federal constitution vests all the privileges and all the responsibility of the executive power in a single individual the duration of the presidency is fixed at four years the salary of the individual who fills that office cannot be altered during the term of his functions he is protected by a body of official dependence and armed with a suspense of veto in short every effort was made to confer a strong and independent position upon the executive authority within the limits which had been prescribed to it in the constitutions of all the states the judicial power is that which remains the most independent of the legislative authority nevertheless, in all the states the legislature has reserved to itself the right of regulating the emoluments of the judges a practice which necessarily subjects these magistrates to its immediate influence in some states the judges are only temporarily appointed which deprives them of a great portion of their power and their freedom in others the legislative and judicial powers are entirely confounded thus the senate of new york for instance constitutes in certain cases the superior court of the state the federal constitution on the other hand carefully separates the judicial authority from all external influences and it provides for the independence of the judges by declaring that their salary shall not be altered and that their functions shall be inalienable the practical consequences of these different systems may easily be perceived an attentive observer will soon remark that the business of the union is incomparably better conducted than that of any individual state the conduct of the federal government is more fair and more temperate than that of the states its designs are more fraught with wisdom its projects are more durable and more skillfully combined to execution with more vigor and consistency i recapitulate the substance of this chapter in a few words the existence of democracies is threatened by two dangers vis-a-vis the complete subjection of the legislative body to the caprices of the electoral body and the concentration of all the powers of the government in the legislative authority the growth of these evils has been encouraged by the policy of the legislators of the states has been resisted by the legislators of the union by every means which lay within their control section summary characteristics which distinguished the federal constitution of the united states of america from all other federal constitutions american union appears to resemble all other confederations nevertheless its effects are different reason of this distinctions between the union and all other confederations the american government not a federal but an imperfect national government the united states of america do not afford either the first or the only instance of confederate states several of which have existed in modern europe without adverting to those of antiquity switzerland the germanic empire and the republic of the united provinces either have been or still are confederations in studying the constitutions of these different countries the politician is surprised to observe that the powers with which they invested the federal government are nearly identical with the privileges awarded by the american constitution to the government of the united states they confer upon the central power the same rights of making peace and war of raising money and troops and of providing for the general exigencies and the common interests of the nation nevertheless the federal government of these different peoples has always been as remarkable for its weakness and inefficiency as that of the union is for its vigorous and enterprising spirit again the first american confederation perished through the excessive weakness of its government and this weak government was not withstanding in possession of rights even more extensive than those of the federal government of the present day but the more recent constitution of the united states contains certain principles which exercise a most important influence although they do not at once strike the observer this constitution which may at first sight be confounded with the federal constitutions which preceded it rests upon a novel theory which may be considered as a great invention in modern political science in all the confederations which had been formed before the american constitution of 1789 the allied states agreed to obey the injunctions of a federal government but they reserved to themselves the right of ordaining and enforcing the execution of the laws of the union the american states which combined in 1789 agreed that the federal government should not only dictate the laws but that it should execute its own enactments in both cases the right is the same but the exercise of the right is different and this alteration produced the most momentous consequences in all the confederations which had been formed before the american union the federal government demanded its supplies at the hands of the separate governments and if the measure it prescribed was onerous to any one of those bodies means were found to evade its claims if the state was powerful it had recourse to arms if it was weak it connived at the resistance which the law of the union its sovereign met with and resorted to inaction under the plea of inability under these circumstances one of the two alternatives has invariably occurred either the most preponderant of the allied peoples has assumed the privileges of the federal authority and ruled all the states in its name or the federal government has been abandoned by its natural supporters anarchy has arisen between the confederates and the union has lost all powers of action in america the subjects of the union are not states but private citizens the national government levies attacks not upon the state of massachusetts on each inhabitant of massachusetts all former confederate governments presided over communities but that of the union rules individuals its force is not borrowed but self derived and it is served by its own civil and military officers by its own army and its own courts of justice it cannot be doubted that the spirit of the nation the passions of the multitude and the provincial prejudices of each state tend singularly to diminish the authority of a federal authority thus constituted and to facilitate the means of resistance to its mandates but the comparative weakness of a restricted sovereignty is an evil inherent in the federal system in america each state has fewer opportunities of resistance and fewer temptations to non-compliance nor can such a design be put in execution if indeed it be entertained without an open violation of the laws of the union a direct interruption of the ordinary course of justice and a bold declaration of revolt in a word without taking a decisive step which men hesitate to adopt in all former confederations the privileges of the union furnished more elements of discord than of power since they multiplied the claims of the nation without augmenting the means of enforcing them and in accordance with this fact it may be remarked that the real weakness of federal governments has almost always been in the exact ratio of their nominal power such is not the case in the american union in which as in ordinary governments the federal government has the means of enforcing all it is empowered to demand the human understanding more easily invents new things than new words and we are then constrained to employ a multitude of improper and inadequate expressions when several nations form a permanent league and establish a supreme authority which although it has not the same influence over the members of the community as a national government acts upon each of the confederate states in a body this government which is so essentially different from all others is denominated a federal one another form of society is afterwards discovered in which several peoples are fused into one in the same nation with regard to certain common interests although they remain distinct or at least only confederate with regard to all their other concerns in this case the central power acts directly upon those whom it governs whom it rules and whom it judges in the same manner as but in a more limited circle than a national government here the term federal government is clearly no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete national government a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly national nor federal but no further progress has been made and the new word which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist the absence of this new species of confederation has been the cause which has brought all unions to civil war to subjection or to a stagnant apathy and the peoples which formed these leagues have been either too dull to discern or too pusillanimous to apply this great remedy the American confederation perished by the same defects but the confederate states of America had been long accustomed to form a portion of one empire before they had won their independence they had not contracted the habit of governing themselves and their national prejudices had not taken deep root in their minds superior to the rest of the world in political knowledge and sharing that knowledge equally amongst themselves they were little agitated by the passions which generally opposed the extension of federal authority in a nation and those passions were checked by the wisdom of the chief citizens the Americans applied the remedy with prudent firmness as soon as they were conscious of the evil they amended their laws and they saved their country End of chapter 8 part 4 this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bob Tassenary Democracy in America Volume 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville translated by Henry Reeve Chapter 8 Part 5 Chapter 8 The Federal Constitution Part 5 Advantages of the federal system in general and its special utility in America Chapter Summary Happiness and freedom of small nations power of great nations great empires favorable to the growth of civilization strength often the first element of national prosperity aim of the federal system to unite the two-fold advantages resulting from a small and from a large territory advantages derived by the United States from this system the law adapts itself to the exigencies of the population population does not conform to the exigencies of the law activity, amelioration love and enjoyment of freedom in the American communities public spirit of the union the abstract of provincial patriotism principles and things circulate freely over the territory of the United States the union is happy and free as a little nation and respected as a great empire in small nations the scrutiny of society penetrates into every part and the spirit of improvement enters into the most trifling details as the ambition of the people is necessarily checked by its weakness all the efforts and resources of the citizens are turned to the internal benefit of the community and are not likely to evaporate in the fleeting breath of glory the desires of every individual are limited because extraordinary faculties are rarely to be met with the gifts of an equal fortune render the various conditions of life uniform and the manners of the inhabitants orderly and simple thus if one estimate the gradations of popular morality and enlightenment we shall generally find that in small nations there are more persons in easy circumstances a more numerous population and a more tranquil state of society than in great empires when tyranny is established in the bosom of a small nation it is more galling than elsewhere because as it acts within a narrow circle every point of that circle is subject to its direct influence it supplies the place of those great designs which it cannot entertain by a violent or an exasperating interference in a multitude of minute details and it leaves the political world to which it properly belongs to meddle with the arrangements of domestic life tastes as well as actions are to be regulated at its pleasure and the families of the citizens as well as the affairs of the state and the citizens this invasion of rights occurs however but seldom and freedom is in truth the natural state of small communities the temptations which the government offers to ambition are too weak and the resources of private individuals are too slender for the sovereign power easily to fall within the grasp of a single citizen and should such an event have occurred the subjects of the state can without difficulty overthrow their revolt small nations have therefore ever been the cradle of political liberty and the fact that many of them have lost their immunities by extending their dominion shows that the freedom they enjoyed was more a consequence of the inferior size than of the character of the people the history of the world affords no instance of a great nation retaining the form of republican government for a long series of years and this has led to the conclusion that all of these things is impracticable for my own part I cannot but censure the imprudence of attempting to limit the possible and to judge the future on the part of a being who is hourly deceived by the most palpable realities of life and who is constantly taken by surprise in the circumstances with which he is most familiar but it may be advanced with confidence that the existence of a great republic will always be exposed to far greater perils than that of a small one all the passions which are most fatal to republican institutions spread with an increasing territory whilst the virtues which maintain their dignity do not augment in the same proportion the ambition of the citizens increases with the power of the state the strength of parties with the importance of the ends they have in view but that devotion to the common wheel which is the surest check on destructive passions is not stronger and enlarged than that of a republic it might indeed be proved without difficulty that it is less powerful and less sincere the arrogance of wealth and the dejection of wretchedness capital cities of unwanted extent a lax morality a vulgar egotism and a great confusion of interests are the dangers which almost invariably arise from the magnitude of states but several of these evils are scarcely prejudicial to a monarchy and contribute to maintain its existence in monarchical states the strength of the government is its own it may use but it does not depend on the community and the authority of the prince is proportioned to the prosperity of the nation but the only security which a republican government possesses against these evils lies in the support of the majority this support is not however proportionably greater in a large republic than it is in a small one and thus whilst the means of attack perpetually increase both in number and in influence the power of resistance remains the same or it may rather be said to diminish since the propensities and interests of the people are diversified by the increase of the population and the difficulty of forming a compact majority is constantly augmented it has been observed moreover that the intensity of human passions is heightened not only by the importance of the end proposed to attain but by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them at the same time everyone has had occasion to remark that his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far greater than those which he would have felt in solitude in great republics the impetus of political passion is irresistible not only because it aims at gigantic purposes but because it is felt and shared by millions of men at the same time may therefore be asserted as a general proposition that nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of man than vast empires nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the peculiar advantages of great states for the very reason which renders the desire of power more intense in these communities than amongst ordinary men the love of glory is also more prominent in the hearts of a class of citizens who regard the applause of a great people as a reward worthy of their exertions and an elevating encouragement to man if we would learn why it is that great nations contribute more powerfully to the spread of human improvement than small states we shall discover an adequate cause in the rapid and energetic circulation of ideas and in those great cities which are the intellectual centers where all the rays of human genius are reflected and combined to this it may be added that most important discoveries demand the display of national power which the government of a small state is unable to make in great nations the government entertains a greater number of general notions and is more completely disengaged from the routine of precedent and the egotism of local prejudice its designs are conceived with more talent and executed with more boldness in time of peace the well-being of small nations is undoubtedly more general and more complete and more acutely from the calamities of war than those great empires whose distant frontiers may for ages avert the presence of the danger from the mass of the people which is therefore more frequently afflicted than ruined by the evil but in this matter as in many others the argument derived from the necessity of the case predominates over all others if none but small nations existed I do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free than the great nations is unavoidable this consideration introduces the element of physical strength as a condition of national prosperity it profits a people but little to be affluent and free if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged or subjugated the number of its manufacturers and the extent of its commerce are of small advantage if another nation has the empire of the seas and gives the law in all the markets of the globe small nations are often impoverished not because they are small but because they are weak the great empires prosper less because they are great than because they are strong physical strength is therefore one of the first conditions of the happiness and even of the existence of nations hence it occurs that unless a very peculiar circumstance is intervened small nations are always united to large empires in the end either by force or by their own consent yet I am unacquainted with a more deplorable spectacle than that of a people unable either to defend or to maintain its independence the federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the greater and the lesser extent of nations and a single glance over the United States of America suffices to discover the advantages which they have derived from its adoption in great centralized nations the legislator is obliged to impart a character of uniformity to the laws which does not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts as he takes no cognizance of special cases he can only proceed upon general principles and the population is obliged to conform to the exigencies of the legislation since the legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and the customs of the population which is the cause of endless trouble and misery this disadvantage does not exist in confederations congress regulates the principle measures of the national government and all the details of the administration are reserved to the provincial legislatures it is impossible to imagine how much this division of sovereignty contributes to the well-being of each of the states which compose the union in these small communities which are never agitated by the desire all public authority and private energy is employed in internal amelioration the central government of each state which is an immediate juxtaposition to the citizens is daily apprised of the wants which arise in society and new projects are proposed every year which are discussed either at town meetings or by the legislature of the state and which are transmitted by the press to stimulate the zeal of the citizens this spirit of amelioration is constantly alive in the American republics without compromising their tranquility the ambition of power yields to the less refined and less dangerous love of comfort it is generally believed in America that the existence and the permanence of the republican form of government in the new world depend upon the existence and the permanence of the federal system and it is not unusual to attribute a large share of the misfortunes of befallen the new states of South America to the injudicious erection of great republics instead of a divided and confederate sovereignty it is incontestably true that the love and the habits of republican government in the United States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies in a small state like that of Connecticut for instance where cutting a canal or laying down a road is a momentous political question where the state has no army to pay and no wars to carry on and where much wealth and much honor cannot be bestowed upon the chief citizens no form of government can be more natural or more appropriate than that of a republic but it is this same republican spirit it is these manners and customs of a free people which are engendered and nurtured in the different states to be afterwards applied to the country at large the public spirit of the union is so to speak more than an abstract of the patriotic zeal of the provinces every citizen of the United States transfuses his attachment to his little republic in the common store of American patriotism in defending the union he defends the increasing prosperity of his own district the right of conducting its affairs and the hope of causing measures of improvement to be adopted which may be favorable to his own interest and these are motives which are want to general interests of the country and the glory of the nation on the other hand if the temper and the manners of the inhabitants especially fitted them to promote the welfare of a great republic the federal system smoothed the obstacles which they might have encountered the confederation of all the American states presents none of the ordinary disadvantages resulting from great agglomerations of men the union is a great republic in extent but the paucity of objects which its government provides assimilates it to a small state its acts are important but they are rare as the sovereignty of the union is limited and incomplete its exercise is not incompatible with liberty for it does not excite those insatiable desires of fame and power which have proved so fatal to great republics as there is no common center to the country vast capital cities, colossal wealth abject poverty and sudden revolutions are alike unknown and political passion instead of spreading over the land like a torrent of desolation spends its strength against the interests and the individual passions of every state nevertheless all commodities and ideas circulate throughout the union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people nothing checks the spirit of enterprise government avails itself of the assistance of all who have talents and knowledge to serve it within the frontiers of the union the profoundest peace prevails as within the heart of some great empire abroad it ranks with the most powerful nations of the earth 2,000 miles of coast are open to the commerce of the world and as it possesses the keys of the globe its flag is respected in the most remote seas the union is as happy and as free as a small people and as glorious and as strong as a great nation the federal system is not adapted to all peoples and how the Anglo-Americans were enabled to adopt it section summary every federal system contains defects which baffle the efforts of the legislator the federal system is complex it demands a daily exercise of discretion on the part of the citizens practical knowledge of government common amongst the Americans relative weakness of the government of the union another defect inherent in the federal system the Americans have diminished without remedying it the sovereignty of the separate states apparently weaker but really stronger than that of the union why? natural causes of union must exist between confederate peoples besides the laws what these causes are amongst the Anglo-Americans Maine and Georgia separated by a distance of a thousand miles more naturally united than Normandy and Brittany war the main peril of confederations this proved even by the example of the United States the union has no great wars to fear why? dangers to which Europeans would be exposed if they adopted the federal system of the Americans when a legislator succeeds after persevering efforts in exercising an indirect influence upon the destiny of nations his genius is lauded by mankind whilst in point of fact the geographical position of the country which he is unable to change a social condition which arose without his cooperation manners and opinions which he cannot trace to their source and an origin with which he is unacquainted exercise so irresistible and influence over the courses of society that he is himself born away by the current after an ineffectual resistance like the navigator the vessel which bears him along but he can neither change its structure nor raise the winds nor lull the waters which swell beneath him I have shown the advantages which the Americans derive from their federal system it remains for me to point out the circumstances which rendered that system practicable as its benefits are not to be enjoyed by all nations the incidental defects of the federal system which originate in the laws may be corrected by the skill of the legislator but there are further evils inherent in the system which cannot be counteracted by the peoples which adopt it these nations must therefore find the strength necessary to support the natural imperfections of their government the most prominent evil of all federal systems is the very complex nature of the means they employ two sovereignty's are necessarily in presence of each other the legislator may simplify and equalize the action of these two sovereignty's being each of them to a sphere of authority accurately defined but he cannot combine them into one or prevent them from coming into collision at certain points the federal system therefore rests upon a theory which is necessarily complicated and which demands the daily exercise of a considerable share of discretion on the part of those it governs a proposition must be plain to be adopted by the understanding of a people a false notion which is clear and precise will always meet with a greater number of adherents in the world than a true principle which is obscure or involved hence it arises that parties which are like small communities in the heart of the nation invariably adopt some principle or some name as a symbol which very inadequately represents the end they have in view and the means which are at their disposal but without which they could neither act nor subsist the governments which are founded upon a single principle or a single feeling which is easily defined or perhaps not the best but they are unquestionably the strongest and the most durable in the world in examining the constitution of the United States which is the most perfect federal constitution that ever existed one is startled on the other hand at the variety of information and the excellence of discretion which it presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern entirely upon legal fictions the union is an ideal nation which only exists in the mind and whose limits and extent can only be discerned by the understanding when once the general theory is comprehended numberless difficulties remain to be solved in its application for the sovereignty of the union is so involved in that of the states that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance the whole structure of the government is artificial and conventional and it would be ill adapted to a people which has not been long accustomed to conduct its own affairs or to one in which the science of politics has not descended to the humblest classes of society I have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgment of the Americans than in the ingenious devices by which they elude the numberless difficulties resulting from their federal constitution I scarcely ever met with a plain American citizen who could not distinguish with surprising facility the obligations created by the laws of Congress from those created by the laws of his own state and who after having discriminated between the matters which come under the cognizance of the union and those which the local legislature is competent to regulate could not point out the exact limit of the several jurisdictions of the federal courts and the tribunals the condition of the United States is like those exquisite productions of human industry which ensure wealth and renown to their inventors but which are profitless in any other hands this truth is exemplified by the condition of Mexico at the present time the Mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system and they took the federal constitution of their neighbors, the Anglo-Americans as their model and copied it with considerable accuracy but although they had borrowed the letter of the law they were unable to create or to introduce the spirit and the sense which give it life they were involved in ceaseless embarrassments between the mechanism of their double government the sovereignty of the states and that of the union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges and entered into collision and to the present day Mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism the second and the most fatal of the defects I have alluded to and that which I believe to be inherent in the federal system is the relative weakness of the government of the union the principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty the legislator may render this partition less perceptible he may even conceal it for a time from the public eye but he cannot prevent it from existing and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful the reader has seen in the remarks I have made on the Constitution of the United States that the Americans have displayed singular ingenuity in combining the restriction of the power of the union within the narrow limits of a federal government with the semblance and to a certain extent with the force of a national government by this means the legislators of the union have succeeded in diminishing though not encounter acting the natural danger of confederations it has been remarked that the American government does not apply itself to the states but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the citizens and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its demands but if the federal law were to clash with the interests and the prejudices of a state it might be feared that all the citizens of that state would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a single individual who should refuse to obey if all the citizens of the state were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the union the federal government would vainly attempt to subdue them individually they would instinctively unite in a common defense and they would derive a ready-prepared organization from the share of sovereignty which the institution of their state allows them to enjoy fiction would give way to reality and an organized portion of the territory might then contest the central authority the same observation holds good with regard to the federal jurisdiction if the courts of the union violated an important law of a state in a private case the real if not the apparent contest would arise between the aggrieved state represented by a citizen and the union represented by its courts of justice he would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should imagine that it is possible by the aid of legal fictions to prevent men from finding out and employing those means of gratifying their passions which have been left open to them and it may be doubted whether the American legislators when they rendered a collision between the two sovereigns less probable destroyed the cause of such a misfortune but it may even be affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the federal element in a case of this kind the union is possessed of money and of troops but the affections and the prejudices of the people are in the bosom of the states the sovereignty of the union is an abstract being which is connected with but few external objects the sovereignty of the states is hourly perceptible easily understood constantly active and if the former is of recent creation the latter is co-evil with the people itself the sovereignty of the union is fractious that of the states is natural the existence from its own simple influence like the authority of a parent the supreme power of the nation only affects a few of the chief interests of society it represents an immense but remote country and claims a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill-defined but the authority of the states controls every individual citizen at every hour and in all circumstances it protects his property his freedom and his life and when we recollect the traditions and prejudices of local and familiar attachment with which it is connected we cannot doubt of the superiority of a power which is interwoven with every circumstance that renders the love of one's native country instinctive in the human heart since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions as occur between the two soventies which coexist in the federal system their first object must be not only to dissuade the confederate states from warfare but to encourage such institutions as may promote the maintenance of peace hence it results that the federal compact cannot be lasting unless there exists in the communities which are lead together a certain number of inducements to union which render their common dependence agreeable and the task of the government light and that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable circumstances added to the influence of good laws all the peoples which have ever formed a confederation have been held together by a certain number of common interests which served as the intellectual ties of association but the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into consideration as well as his immediate interests a certain uniformity of civilization is not less necessary to the durability of a confederation than a uniformity of interests in the states which compose it in Switzerland the difference which exists between the canton of Jury and the canton of Vaud is equal to that between the 15th and the 19th centuries and properly speaking Switzerland has never possessed a federal government the union between these two cantons only subsists upon the map and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same laws to the whole territory one of the circumstances which most powerfully contribute to support the federal government in America is that the states have not only similar interests a common origin and a common tongue but that they are also arrived at the same stage of civilization which almost always renders a union feasible I do not know of any European nation how small so ever it may be which does not present less uniformity in its different provinces than the American people which occupies a territory as extensive as one half of Europe the distance from the state of Maine to that of Georgia is reckoned at about 1,000 miles but the difference between the civilization of Maine and that of Georgia is slightly than the difference between the habits of Normandy and those of Brittany Maine and Georgia which are placed at the opposite extremities of a great empire are consequently in the natural possession of more real inducements to form a confederation than Normandy and Brittany which are only separated by a bridge the geographical position of the country contributed to increase the facilities which the American legislators derived from the manners and customs of the inhabitants and it is to this circumstance that the adoption and the maintenance of the federal system are mainly attributable the most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a people is the breaking out of a war in war a people struggles with the energy of a single man against foreign nations in the defense of its very existence the skill of a government the good sense of the community and the natural fondness which men entertain for their country may suffice to maintain peace in the interior of a district and to favor its internal prosperity but a nation can only carry on a great war at the cost of more numerous and more painful sacrifices and to suppose that a great number of men will of their own accord comply with these exigencies of the state is to betray an ignorance of mankind all the peoples which have been obliged to sustain a long and serious warfare have consequently been led to augment the power of their government those which have not succeeded in this attempt have been subjugated a long war almost always places nations in the wretched alternative of being abandoned to ruin by defeat or to despotism by success war therefore renders the symptoms of the weakness of a government most palpable and most alarming and I have shown that the inherent defeat of federal governments is that of being weak the federal system is not only deficient in every kind of centralized administration but the central government itself is imperfectly organized which is invariably an influential cause of inferiority when the nation is opposed to other countries which are themselves governed by a single authority in the federal constitution of the united states by which the central government possesses more real force this evil is still extremely sensible an example will illustrate the case to the reader the constitution confers upon congress the right of calling forth militia to execute the laws of the union suppress insurrections and repel invasions and another article declares that the president of the united states is the commander in chief of the militia in the war of 1812 the president ordered the militia of the northern states to march to the frontiers but Connecticut and Massachusetts whose interests were impaired by the war refused to obey the command they argued that the constitution authorizes the federal government to call forth the militia in case of insurrection or invasion but that in the present instance there was neither invasion nor insurrection they added that the same constitution which conferred upon the union the right of calling forth the militia reserved to the states that of naming the officers and that consequently as they understood the clause no officer of the union had any right to command the militia even during war except the president in person and in this case they were ordered to join an army commanded by another individual these absurd and pernicious doctrines received the sanction not only of the governors and the legislative bodies but also of the courts of justice in both states and the federal government was constrained to raise elsewhere which it required the only safeguard which the American Union with all the relative perfection of its laws possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war lies in its probable exemption from that calamity placed in the center of an immense continent which offers a boundless field for human industry the union is almost as much insulated from the world as if its frontiers were girt by the ocean Canada contains only a million of inhabitants and its population is divided into two inimical nations the rigor of the climate limits the extension of its territory and shuts up its ports during the six months of winter from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico a few savage tribes are to be met with which retire perishing in their retreat before six thousand soldiers to the south the union has a point of contact with the empire of Mexico and it is thence that serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise but for a long while to come the uncivilized state of the Mexican community the depravity of its morals and its extreme poverty will prevent that country from ranking high amongst nations as for the powers of Europe they are too distant to be formidable the great advantage of the United States does not then consist in a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great wars a political position which renders such enterprises extremely improbable no one can be more inclined than I am myself to appreciate the advantages of the federal system which I hold to be one of the combinations most favorable to the prosperity and freedom of man I envy the lot of those nations which have been enabled to adopt it but I cannot believe that any confederate peoples could maintain a long or an equal contest with a nation of similar strength in which the government should be centralized a people which should divide its sovereignty into fractional powers in the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe would in my opinion by that very act abdicate its power and perhaps its existence and its name but such is the admirable position of the new world that man has no other enemy than himself and that in order to be happy and to be free it suffices to seek the gifts of prosperity and the knowledge of freedom CHAPTER IX Why the people may strictly be said to govern in the United States I have hitherto examined the institutions of the United States I have passed their legislation in review and I have depicted the present characteristics of political society in that country but a sovereign power exists above these institutions and beyond these characteristic features which may destroy or modify them at its pleasure I mean that of the people it remains to be shown in what manner this power which regulates the laws acts its propensities and its passions remain to be pointed out as well as the secret springs which retard accelerate or direct its irresistible course and the effects of its unbounded authority with the destiny which is probably reserved for it in America the people appoints the legislative and the executive power and furnishes the jurors who punish all offenses against the laws the American institutions are democratic not only in their principle but in all their consequences and the people elects its representatives directly and for the most part annually in order to ensure their dependence the people is therefore the real directing power and although the form of government is representative it is evident that the opinions the prejudices the interests and even the passions of the community are hindered by no durable obstacles from exercising a perpetual influence on society in the United States the majority governs in the name of the people as is the case in all the countries in which the people is supreme the majority is principally composed of peaceful citizens who either by inclination or by interest are sincerely desirous of the welfare of their country they are surrounded by the incessant agitation of parties which attempt to gain their cooperation and to avail themselves of their support CHAPTER X CHAPTER SUMMARY great distinction to be made between parties parties which are to each other as rival nations parties properly so called difference between great and small parties epics which produce them their characteristics America has had great parties they are extinct federalists republicans defeat of the federalists difficulty of creating parties in the United States what is done with this intention aristocratic or democratic character to be met with in all parties struggle of general Jackson against the bank parties in the United States a great distinction must be made between parties some countries are so large that the different populations which inhabit them have contradictory interests although they are the subjects of the same government and they may hence be in a perpetual state of opposition in this case the different factions of the people may more properly be considered as distinct nations than as mere parties and if a civil war breaks out the struggle is carried on by rival peoples rather than by factions in the state but when the citizens entertain different opinions upon subjects which affect the whole country alike such for instance as the principles upon which the government is to be conducted then distinctions arise which may correctly be styled parties parties are unnecessary evil in free governments but they have not at all times the same character and the same propensities at certain periods a nation may be oppressed by such insupportable evils as to conceive the design of affecting a total change in its political constitution at other times the mischief lies still deeper and the existence of society itself is endangered such are the times of great revolutions and of great parties but between these epics of misery and of confusion there are periods during which human society seems to rest and mankind to take a pause this pause is indeed only apparent for time does not stop its course for nations any more than for men they are all advancing towards a goal they are unacquainted and we only imagine them to be stationary when their progress escapes our observation as men who are going at a foot pace seem to be standing still to those who run but however this may be there are certain epics in which the changes that take place in the social and political constitution of nations are so slow and so insensitive that men imagine their present condition to be a final state and the human mind believing itself to be firmly based upon certain foundations does not extend its researches beyond the horizon which it decries these are the times of small parties and of intrigue the political parties which I styled great are those which cling to principles more than to their consequences to general and not to especial cases to ideas and not to men these parties are usually distinguished by a nobler character a more generous passions more genuine convictions and a more bold and open conduct than the others in them private interests which always plays the chief part in political passions minutiously veiled under the pretext of the public good and it may even be sometimes concealed from the eyes of the very person whom it excites and impels minor parties are on the other hand generally deficient in political faith as they are not sustained or dignified by a lofty purpose they ostensibly display the egotism of their character in their actions they glow with a factious zeal their language is vehement but their conduct is timid and irresolute the means they employ are as wretched as the end at which they aim hence it arises that when a calm state of things succeeds a violent revolution the leaders of society seem suddenly to disappear and the powers of the human mind lie concealed society is convulsed by great parties by minor ones it is agitated it is torn by the former by the latter it is degraded and if these sometimes save it a salutary perturbation those invariably disturb it to no good end America has already lost the great parties of the nation and if her happiness is considerably increased her morality has suffered by their extinction when the war of independence was terminated and the foundations of the new government were to be laid down the nation was divided between two opinions two opinions which are as old as the world and which are perpetually to be met with under all forms all the names which have ever obtained in free communities the one tending to limit the other to extend indefinitely the power of the people the conflict of these two opinions never assumed that degree of violence in America which it has frequently displayed elsewhere both parties of the Americans were in fact agreed upon the most essential points and neither of them had to destroy a traditionally constitution or to overthrow the structure of society in order to ensure its own triumph in neither of them consequently were a great number of private interests affected by success or by defeat but moral principles of a high order such as the love of equality and independence were concerned in the struggle and they sufficed to kindle violent passions the party which desired to limit the power of the people endeavored to apply its doctrines more especially to the constitution of the union whence it derived its name of federal the other party which affected to be more exclusively attached to the cause that of Republican America is a land of democracy and the federalists were always in a minority but they reckoned on their side almost all the great men who had been called forth by the war of independence and their moral influence was very considerable their cause was more over favored by circumstances the ruin of the confederation had impressed the people with a dread of anarchy and the federalists did not fail to profit by this transient disposition of the multitude for ten or twelve years they were at the head of affairs and they were able to apply some though not all of their principles for the hostile current was becoming from day to day too violent to be checked or stemmed in 1801 the Republicans in possession of the government Thomas Jefferson was named president and he increased the influence of their party by the weight of his celebrity the greatness of his talents and the immense extent of his popularity the means by which the federalists had maintained their position were artificial and their resources were temporary it was by the virtues or the talents of their leaders of power when the Republicans attained to that lofty station their opponents were overwhelmed by utter defeat an immense majority declared itself against the retiring party and the federalists found themselves in so small a minority that they at once despaired of their future success from that moment the Republican or Democratic party has proceeded from conquest to conquest until it has acquired absolute supremacy in the country the federalists perceiving that they were vanquished without resource and isolated in the midst of the nation fell into two divisions of which one joined the victorious Republicans and the other abandoned its rallying point and its name many years have already elapsed since they ceased to exist as a party political parties are not then to be met with in the United States at the present time parties indeed may be found which threaten the future tranquility of the union but there are none which seem to contest the present form of government or the present course of society the parties by which the union is menaced do not rest upon abstract principles but upon temporal interests disseminated in the provinces of so vast an empire may be said to constitute rival nations rather than parties thus upon a recent occasion the North contended for the system of commercial prohibition and the South took up arms in favor of free trade simply because the North is a manufacturing and the South an agricultural district and that the restrictive systems which was profitable to the one was prejudicial to the other in the absence of great parties the United States abound with lesser controversies and public opinion is divided into a thousand minute shades of difference upon questions of very little moment the pains which are taken to create parties are inconceivable and at the present day it is no easy task in the United States there is no religious animosity because all religion is respected and no sect is predominant there is no jealousy of rank because the people is everything and none can contest its authority lastly there is no public indulgence to supply the means of agitation because the physical position of the country opens so wide a field to industry that man is able to accomplish surprising undertakings with his own native resources nevertheless ambitious men are interested in the creation of parties since it is difficult to elect a person from authority upon the mere ground that his place is coveted by others the skill of the actors in the political world lies therefore in the art of creating parties a political aspirant in the United States begins by discriminating his own political interest and by calculating upon those interests which may be collected around the amalgamated with it he then contrives to discover some doctrine or some principle which may suit the purpose of this new association and which he adopts in order to bring forward his party to secure his popularity just as the imprinture of a king was in former days incorporated with the volume which it authorized but to which it no wise belonged when these preliminaries are terminated the new party is ushered into the political world all the domestic controversies of the Americans at first appear to be stranger and more comprehensible and so purile that he is at a loss whether to pity the people which takes such ardent trifles in good earnest or to envy the happiness which enables it to discuss them but when he comes to study the secret proprensities which govern the factions of America he easily perceives that the greater part of them are more or less connected with one or the other of those two divisions always existed in free communities the deeper we penetrate into the working of these parties the more do we perceive that the object of the one is to limit and that of the other to extend the popular authority I do not assert that the ostensible end or even that the secret aim of American parties is to promote the rule of aristocracy or democracy in the country and to affirm that aristocratic or democratic positions may easily be detected at the bottom of all parties and that although they escape a superficial observation they are the main point and the main soul of every faction in the United States to quote a recent example when the president attacked the bank the country was excited and parties were formed the well formed classes around the bank the common people round the president but it must not be imagined that the people had formed a rational opinion upon a question which offers so many difficulties to the most experienced statesmen the bank is a great establishment which enjoys an independent existence and the people accustomed to make and unmake what so ever it pleases meet with this obstacle to its authority in the midst of the perpetual fluctuations of society the community is irritated by so permanent an institution and is led to attack it in order to see whether it can be shaken and controlled like all other institutions of the country remains of the aristocratic party in the United States secret opposition to wealthy individuals to democracy their retirement their taste for exclusive pleasures and for luxury at home their simplicity abroad their affected condescension towards the people it sometimes happens in people which various opinions prevail that the balance of the several parties is lost and one of them obtains an irresistible preponderance overpowers all obstacles harasses its opponents and appropriates all the resources of society to its own purpose the vanquished citizens despair of success and they conceal their dissatisfaction in silence and in general apathy the nation seems to be governed by a single principle and the prevailing party assumes the credit of having restored peace and unanimity to the country but this apparent unanimity is merely a cloak to dissensions and perpetual opposition this is precisely what occurred in America when the democratic party got the upper hand it took exclusive possession of the conduct of affairs and from that time the laws and the customs of society have been adapted to its caprices at the present day the more affluent classes of society are so entirely removed from the direction of political affairs in the United States that wealth far from conferring a right to the exercise of power is rather an obstacle than a means of attaining to it the wealthy members of the community abandon the lists through unwillingness to contend and frequently to contend in vain against the poorest classes of their fellow citizens they concentrate all their enjoyments in the privacy of their homes and occupy a rank which cannot be assumed in public they constitute a private society in the state which has its own tastes and its own pleasures they substitute to this state of things as an irredeemable evil but they are careful not to show that they are galled by its continents it is even not uncommon to hear them laud the deblites of a republican government and the advantages of democratic institutions when they are in public next to hating their enemies men are most inclined to flatter them mark for instance that opulent citizen who is as anxious as a Jew of the Middle Ages to conceal his wealth his dresses plain his demeanor unassuming but the interior of his dwelling glitters with luxury and none but a few chosen guests whom he haughtily styles his equals are allowed to penetrate into this sanctuary no European noble is more exclusive in his pleasures or more jealous of the smallest advantages which his privileged station confers upon him but the very same individual crosses the city to reach a dark counting house in the center of traffic where everyone may accost him who pleases if he meets his cobbler on the way they stop and converse the two citizens discuss the affairs of the state in which they have an equal interest and they shake hands before they part but beneath this artificial enthusiasm and these obsequious attentions to the prepondering power it is easy to perceive that the wealthy members of the community entertain a hearty distaste to the democratic institutions of their country the populace is at once the object of their scorn and of their fears if the mal-administration of the democracy ever brings about a revolutionary crisis and if monarchal institutions ever become practicable in the United States the truth of what I advise will become obvious the two chief weapons which parties use in order to ensure success are the public press for information of associations