 Okay, folks, all right, Richard, you're having too much fun back there. Thanks everybody for coming. Delighted to have you here. We're going to have an interesting afternoon together. My name is John Hammery. I'm the president here at CSS. And when we have outside groups that meet with us, we always begin with a bit of a safety presentation. So I want you to know I am your responsible safety officer. I'm going to take care of you this afternoon, but if something happens, follow me. We are going to, these are the exits you just see on this side. The stair goes right around the corner, right in that corner back there. So everybody head out that way. We'll rendezvous across the street at the Beacon Hotel and I'll pay for the drinks. Okay, so just follow me if we have to do anything. I want to say thanks to our friends at Boeing that are making it possible for us to hold this conference on next steps in missile defense. When I first started in think tank land about now 15 years ago, I think every think tank every month held a conference on missile defense, you know. It was deregure. I mean everybody was focused on it. And over the last 10 years, you know, our focus has really shifted to other things. We've become so focused on things like insurgency, insurgency warfare, et cetera. And there hasn't been this national perspective to look at a role that missile defense is going to have to play. You look at all the kind of troubling advanced technology developments in the world and they all kind of come around to this point. We need to be able to respond and have confidence that we can still operate successfully in this country when we could very well be attacked by missiles. And that's just the reality. It's not a happy reality to talk about, but it's real. And it's part of what we're doing here today is to learn where we are. Where are we in this work together? I want to say thanks to Tom for you for heading up our effort. Tom Kerakos just joined us. He has been with us as a senior fellow for the last year, but we twisted his arm and offered and asked him to stay with us permanently to help us with this. So I want to say thank you to him. He's going to really launch this effort for real, but it's obviously we've got excellent panelists that are with us, but the quality they'll give us is inversely related to your engagement. So you have to be very active here and pull out of them all of the insights we know that they have for us today. So thank you very much. And Tom, let me turn it to you to get this started for real. Thanks, everybody. Well, thank you, Dr. Hamery. Again, I'm Tom Kerakos, and I think we've got a great lineup of three panels today. I think Dr. Hamery was really alluding to some of what I was going to say about just how the character and the tenor of the discussion on missile defense has changed over the past couple of decades. It's over 10 years has passed, of course, since missile defense became operational in Fort Greely, Alaska. And I think during that time, as missile defense has gone from infancy to adolescence, you've got a lot more bipartisan and much more widespread support. It's no longer as divisive an issue. It's a question of how much missile defense we can afford and what kinds and what priorities and what balance we put into it. So this is an exciting time for it. There's a lot going on in the missile defense world. You're going to hear over the next several hours, over the next three panels about both homeland and regional missile defense and also some technological and other steps that we can be taking along those lines. So our first panel is going to be on policy and operations. Our second is on international dimensions and third on future directions. I'll be directing traffic. And first up, we have Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Missile Defense Policy, Elaine Bun, followed by Missile Defense Agency Deputy Director Brigadier General Ken Todorov. So, Elaine, would you like to kick us off? Thank you. Thanks, Tom, and thanks, John. And thanks for having this forum. I do find that CSIS continues to be in the forefront of civil discourse on defense issues and security issues. And I find that to be the case, whether it's their engagement with international partners, whether it's the project on nuclear issues, which is near and dear to my heart, or events like this one. I've been asked to focus on the policy aspects of missile defense. That is really, I think, to set up a framework for the discussions throughout the afternoon. Part of that means starting with basics, so that we're all speaking of it in the same terms, or at least know when we're not speaking of it in the same terms. So for those of you who are deep, deep into missile defense, please forgive the basics here. The U.S., I think it's clear, as John Henry just said, that the United States, as well as our deployed forces, our allies, our partners face a number of threats around the world from literally thousands of ballistic missiles. Those missiles can be short range, medium range, intermediate range, long range, ICBM kind of range. Keep that distinction in mind as we talk about the policy. What that means is that we're pursuing a variety of missile defense capabilities for two missions. First, and highest priority, is for defending the United States against limited attacks by countries such as North Korea and Iran. And then the second is defending against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, allies, and partners, and then also enabling our allies and partners to defend themselves against those threats. So keep those two different missions in mind, if you would. For both the homeland and the regional defense missions, our policy and strategy have to take into account uncertainties. Uncertainties in the development of threat capabilities and uncertainty with regard to technological and fiscal constraints as we develop missile defenses. So a lot of uncertainties in both those categories. The policy goals of homeland and regional missile defense are different. And sometimes you hear discussions that mix and mingle the two, but let me lay out very clearly what they are. For homeland missile defense, we are trying to defend against the whole range, against all of the long-range ballistic missiles that threaten the United States from North Korea and potentially from Iran. We are not, let me remind you, designing our homeland defense to defend against Russia and China, and their much larger, much more sophisticated ballistic missile arsenals. In the regional context where there are thousands of adversaries, short, medium, and intermediate range missiles. More at the short range, fewer at the medium, and fewer still at the intermediate range, but still collectively thousands of ballistic missiles. What we are trying to do is to defend against some of those. We know that we will not be able to defend against all of them. We just can't buy enough interceptors for that. What can regional missile defenses do if you're not going to say, I'm going to be able to shoot down every one of those short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles? So what does it do if it can't do that? So regional missile defense can help defang, which is not really an English word. I like the word defang, the coercive value of ballistic missiles. It can provide some protection and defend against cheap shots. It can defend against some number of those regional ballistic missiles, and it can make sure that adversaries don't get a free ride, thinking that if they shoot it, it will get through. Regional, I have to emphasize this. We had a discussion of it around lunch earlier today. Regional defense is only a part of a broader mix of capabilities. It has come into the forefront again, and I think you'll hear more about it this afternoon from Ramo Macy, but missile defense is not the silver bullet. It's part of a mix of capabilities for dealing with ballistic missiles. On the regional side, we are focused on developing capabilities that are mobile, that are relocatable, that you can surge where they're needed as crises build. So in other words, you're not going to have enough everywhere all the time. Regional combatant commanders want more and more and more, and these will always be low-density high-demand assets. Let me go back to homeland defense and talk a bit about the threats and what do we see out there? The threats to the U.S. territory from North Korea and potentially around what we're trying to stay ahead of that threat, to be early to need and stay ahead of it. North Korea, it's conducted three nuclear tests, is seeking to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States. They continue their effort to bring the road mobile K-08 ICBM to operational capacity. They've paraded it several times in parades, up to six missiles in those parades, operational. Again, the reliability of an untested K-08 is likely to be very low. If we were going to deploy a missile, we would want to have tested it. North Korea hasn't yet tested a K-08. They have used their Taepodong-2, which is a launch vehicle they've used to put satellites into orbit, and some of those technologies are applicable to long-range missiles, but they have not tested that K-08. While the reliability of their long-range missile is likely low, the issue really is how much risk is the U.S. willing to accept when it comes to defending the U.S. against a country like North Korea, where our confidence, or maybe I should say our lack of confidence, in our understanding of North Korea's leadership and what their decision-making calculus is, really, I think, motivates a lot of our high priority on homeland missile defense. Turning to Iran, Iran has not yet deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile. It does have space launch vehicles. A number of folks speculate that they have the motivation and desire to be able to deter the U.S. and allies, and that provides them, along with their space capabilities, means and motivation to bring to fruition an ICBM. I would note that if the negotiations that will be concluded by the end of June are fruitful and we come to agreement on the just-agreed nuclear framework, then its ballistic missiles would not be nuclear-armed. That's a good thing. The U.S. homeland today is it has defenses to protect us against ICBM attacks from North Korea, the K-08, and from Iran if they can make it to an ICBM capability to ensure that we can stay ahead of the threat, and again, that's the policy on homeland defense. Early to need to stay ahead. Don't want to take chances on those two actors. To ensure that we can stay ahead of that threat, we're continuing to strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in technologies that better enable us to address evolution of threats in coming decades. So this is over a longer term. That means continued improvement to the ground-based, mid-course defense system, the GMD system, including enhancing performance of the ground-based interceptors, the GBI's, and deployment of new sensors. We're on track, if you look at some of the changes that have been made in that GMD system, we're on track to deploy an additional 14 interceptors. This was the announcement that Secretary Hagel made in March of 2013 that we would deploy an additional 14 interceptors in Alaska. And those, along with the 30 that are already deployed in Alaska and in California, would improve the protection against both North Korean and Iranian threats as they emerge. Late last year, we also deployed a second ground-based discriminating radar in Japan, and that's operating today, thanks in large part, to the amazing work of the Japanese government, as well as to MDA. That radar is important for homeland defense, but it's also important for regional defense. Talk about regional defense in a moment. This year's President's budget request, I think, reflects that highest priority on homeland missile defense. It reflects the commitment to modernizing the GMD system, moving toward more reliable, more effective. You'll hear more about this from General Kintotaroff in a moment. But the development of a new radar, that when it is deployed in Alaska, will have persistent sensor coverage against and improved discrimination capabilities against North Korea. This year's budget also continues the funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptors. There had been some problems in the past. Those are identified. The test in June of last year showed that the changes made for the GBI's would make that system more successful. So it's backfitting those onto existing interceptors, but also the redesigned kill vehicle that not only gives you better performance and discrimination capability, but also will be easier to build, easier to maintain, easier to upgrade than the previous versions were. Let me turn now to regional missile defense. What is it that we see as the threats there? North Korea, besides the threats to the homeland, also poses a substantial regional ballistic missile threat. It's conducted a number of short-range ballistic missile launches in the recent past. And also has medium-range missiles, the Skudzie and the Nodong, that can threaten further allies and U.S. forces in the region. They also, their efforts to produce, not only produce, but to market their ballistic missiles raises broader concerns about ballistic missile technology proliferation. Regional threats from the Middle East, Iran and Syria have regional ballistic missiles today. In fact, Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region and is capable of striking targets throughout, not only throughout their region, but also into the eastern part of Europe. The Assad regime in Syria also possesses several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, and they've shown themselves willing to use them. In the regional ballistic missile context, I would also note that China's development of advanced ballistic missiles in the conventionally armed, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile area improves their ability to strike regional targets at greater ranges, as well as the concern about their anti-ship ballistic missiles. So when it comes to regional missile defense, I think what you'll see in the President's FY16 budget request continues to implement the deployment of defenses tailored to the specific circumstances of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia Pacific, the three big areas. We are also, we spend a lot of time, energy, and effort encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defenses of their own and to strengthen the kind of operational defense cooperation, whether through exercises or sensor sharing. In Europe, we are continuing to implement the European-faced adaptive approach. We're doing that in close collaboration with NATO. NATO is developing an advanced network of sensors and interceptors on land and sea. Since 2011, the U.S. has operated the forward-based radar in Turkey and maintained sea-based missile defense presence in Europe. We're on track to deploy Aegis Ashore in Romania at the end of this year and to send two additional Aegis BMD destroyers to join the Donald Cook and the USS Ross that are already in Rota, Spain. So we will have four Aegis destroyers, BMD destroyers that are deployed in Spain. They're multi-missionships. I think you all know that BMD is not the only mission of Aegis ships. They're amazing capabilities, and so they're in great demand, whether it's in Europe or elsewhere. The President's budget also supports the Aegis Ashore that is to be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the development of the SM3-2A interceptor that will be deployed both on land and at sea. When we have that capability and the other Aegis destroyers in Europe, we will have the U.S. donation to European missile defense will indeed extend BMD coverage to all European territory. That's not to say that U.S. is doing it all with regard to NATO missile defense. Our allies are also making significant contributions. Romania, Spain, and Turkey obviously are hosting missile defense systems and providing security for external parts of those facilities. Poland, beyond just hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in the 2018 timeframe, has announced its intention to buy about $10 billion worth of advanced air and missile defense capabilities. The U.S. Patriot system is a finalist in that competition for Poland's acquisitions, and several other allies are also in the process of considering the purchase of air and missile defense capabilities. We have combatant ships with sensors that can be upgraded. The Netherlands and Denmark are in that category. The Netherlands and Germany have committed Patriot PAC-3s as part of NATO's deployment in Turkey, and Spain will be replacing the Netherlands later this year in that mission. If you look at the Asia Pacific region, our force posture there, so there's what we do on missile defense in these regions and then there's what allies do on missile defense in these regions. Our force posture in Asia Pacific includes Aegis BMD-capable ships along with Patriot batteries that are deployed in both Japan and South Korea. And we also have a THAAD battery in Guam. Where does that fall? Is it at homeland or is that regional missile defense? It's both because Guam is indeed U.S. territory. Those are U.S. citizens. We have a THAAD battery there that we deployed during the 2013 cycle of North Korean provocations, and it remains there. The strong bilateral alliances that we have in this region with Japan, South Korea, and Australia also play a role in the effective missile defense capabilities there. Japan, very far along on its own missile defense capability, they include their own Aegis BMD ships and the standard missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries, their own PAC-3 batteries, early warning radars, sophisticated command and control systems. They are upgrading two of their Otago-class Aegis destroyers to BMD-cap certification schedule for, I think, 2018 and 2019. Correct me if I'm wrong. And they also host two of our missile defense radars. They are becoming a critical partner for international cooperation as well. One of our most significant cooperative efforts in co-development is with the advanced version of the SM-3, the 2A, and that is being produced in Japan. South Korea obviously has an immediate approximate stake in preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We've worked closely with South Korea to ensure that as an alliance we can maintain the capacity to do that. I've already talked about some of the things we bring to South Korea. Patriot PAC-3 batteries to defend both our forces deployed there as well as South Korean forces. But South Korea is also taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense, including sea and land-based sensors, upgrading its Patriot missiles, and also pursuing its own indigenous Korean air and missile defense capability. U.S. and Australia long cooperation, a partnership on missile defense research and development, most notably with regard to sensors. In the Middle East, we have robust missile defense presence, including land and sea-based assets deployed there. That's in addition to our efforts to work with allies to build their own capabilities to defend themselves. We have a strong relationship with Israel on missile defense. That was the action officer in 1986 for the very first agreement we had with Israel on cooperative missile defense research and development. And it has just advanced and advanced over the years. They now have a comprehensive architecture going from Iron Dome to the David Sling Weapon System to the Arrow Weapon System. And a lot of that is in conjunction with both missile defense agency and then operational cooperation with the United States. We're working with a number of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries on missile defense, including supporting their purchases through foreign military sales programs of capabilities. The UAE is procuring THAAD. The first delivery of that is expected later this year. That's in addition to their earlier purchase of Patriot, which has already been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the process of upgrading their existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3 configuration. Kuwait is purchasing Patriot PAC-3. Qatar has also joined the international community of U.S. Patriot Partners late last year. And that as the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, we and GCC partners are trying to work together more on the integration of capabilities across the region, including especially sharing of sensor data among those countries. Technology development, let me just say one word about that, about the need to continue to look ahead. We're talking at lunch about how sometimes when budgets are tight and you're trying to prioritize very high priorities, homeland missile defense, regional missile defense, it is the advanced technology. It's your seed corn that gets cut. But we do have to balance the investment priorities to be sure that we do continue to look at advanced technologies that can help us be more effective and efficient and respond to emerging threats. I know you're going to get more on that this afternoon from Rich Matlock, so I won't belabor the point. All of that is really just a very brief summary of sort of policy strategy and priorities that you will see in what others are going to talk about in more detail today. I know that Kintotarov will talk a lot more about budgets and programs, and Frank Rose, who will be on the second panel, cannot help himself. He will talk a lot about allied missile defense, and he has been quite a stalwart in those efforts. And so I don't want to steal all of their thunder just because I got to speak first. But I just want to close by noting that we've made a lot of progress on missile defense in the last several years. But we really do have to constantly reassess the mix of missile defenses as well as the role of missile defense in the broader set of capabilities that we bring to bear on dealing with ballistic missile threats in the world. And I think the budget for all of you here from the Hill, I think the President's budget that we've submitted to you does reflect the policy strategy and priorities that have just laid out here. So thank you for having me here today, and I look forward eventually to questions. Good afternoon, everybody. As Tom said, my name is Kintotarov. I'm the Deputy Director of the Missile Defense Agency. It's an honor to be here today and continue this dialogue with you. Dr. Hamry, thank you for the invitation. Tom, thanks for your work in getting this set up and getting everyone here. On behalf of the 8,000 or so employees of the Missile Defense Agency and my boss, Vice Admiral Jim Searing, thank you for allowing MDA to be here and talk a little bit about our priorities, talk a little bit about the work that we're doing, the very important work that we're doing near term and into the future to advance the course and the cause for missile defense. What I intend to do today is give you an operational perspective on the world of missile defense because I'm an operator. I'm sort of a unique animal within MDA in that I'm not an engineer. We've got a lot of hugely bright people who are engineers that are working these problems. I'm not an acquisition officer, which I'm glad I'm not an acquisition officer some days given the difficulties of that enterprise, but I am an operator. I come from an operations background and I'm a pilot and in 2009 I came to the United States Northern Command headquarters in Colorado Springs. It's a wonderful place to work and that's where I really got into, as they say, missile defense. I was the deputy director of operations there and that officer's job is to really be the point man or the point woman for the combatant commander for the ground based mid-course defense system. So that's really where I cut my teeth in the system. I've been involved with missile defense ever since that day and I've come to love this mission and the people who work it. I want to thank all of you for whatever your role is in this dialogue. It's an important role regardless of what you're doing, whether you're here from the press, whether you're here from the Hill, whether you're here from one of our foreign partners, whether you're here from government. It's a team effort to be sure and so thanks for what you do and we're glad to be part of that team at MDA. Now as I said I'm a pilot so I like to rely on videos to make my points, simple kind of guy. And I'm also a military officer as you can see and so no self-respecting military officer can get by without a little PowerPoint. So that's how I'm going to walk you through my presentation today, show you a few short video clips and then make some points about the video that you see. So Tyler, my assistant over here, if we can roll the very first video please. Didn't say I was good at PowerPoint. I just said that I like to use it. I'll show you that video for a number of reasons. The threat is real in our minds. And I have the benefit every morning when I get to work opening up an intelligence book and I see what's going on in various places around the world. I can tell you that it's real. And the threat is increasing both in quantity and it's increasing both in quality of our adversaries. And so as Elaine said, we aim to stay ahead of that threat in everything that we do. It's vitally important that we do. In North Korea, the K-08, as Elaine once again mentioned, is something that we're very, very concerned with. That regime, as you know, is very unpredictable. Just last night they had another unannounced short-range test of some of their systems. They're not resting on their laurels. In Iran, DIA assesses as early as this year there could be a space launch from Iran. Yes, space launch, but as you all know, those technologies and capabilities could be translated to an ICBM. And Iran has the largest short and medium range inventory of ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles in the region. So clearly the threat is real and something that we take very seriously. Next video, please. Today's BMDS, it's credible, it's reliable, and I can tell you from the warfighter perspective, having been there, we have confidence in this system to defend our nation, both the homeland and our regional interests around the globe. We have confidence in that system. Now we've got a shot doctrine that's set to deal with some of the issues that the system may have, but that's why the shot doctrine is what it is. And I won't get into what the shot doctrine is, but I can tell you that we have confidence and the warfighter has confidence from the operational perspective to deal with the threat. The key will be to continue to outpace that threat as we go. And as Elaine rightly mentioned, a point that I always like to make about this system is it's not designed to be sort of a stand-alone, catch-all system in and of itself. It's part of a larger continuum of capabilities that the warfighter brings to bear, both offensively and in this case, defensively. We have to continue to look at the system that way, not as some kind of a fly catcher or a catcher's mitt. I've heard a lot of analogies used when talking about the ballistic missile defense system. It just doesn't make sense. It's part of a larger warfighter toolkit. Next, please. Apologies for the little bit of the issues with the videos. We'll get it straightened out. So I don't want to belabor the points on this slide or in that video. All of you in this room are probably intimately familiar with the ground-based mid-course defense system. But what I do want to talk about are our priorities and the things that we're working on in the very near term. We've got a flight test coming up in December. We're calling it CTV, Control Test Vehicle, CTV02+. We're going to really, really ring out a discrimination scene in this flight test that we've never done before, based on the results of the last flight test, which was very successful. We want to continue again to outpace the threat. That flight test will be a huge hallmark for the ground-based mid-course defense system. We're going to continue to work on reliability issues of the kill vehicle and of the interceptor, testing our alternate divert thrusters, testing again end-to-end discrimination. And another priority for the ground-based mid-course defense system, and it's in our budget, and Elaine mentioned it, is the redesigned kill vehicle. Very much a priority at the forefront of the work that we're doing within the agency. Really designed for, as I like to say, four things. Reliability, availability, reproducibility, and performance. All of the new redesigned kill vehicle that will help us maintain our edge on that threat that continues to develop. And finally, sort of in the big rocks pile amongst GMD, I cannot, I would remiss if I didn't mention the long-range discriminating radar. We've asked industry for help with that. They've delivered their bids. We're evaluating those bids right now. We hope this is going to be something that we turn the lights on, if you will, in the year 2020. And it will be sort of a crown jewel, if you will, of a compliment to the great sensor array that we've already got out there today. And again, it will have end-to-end discrimination for threats, particularly from North Korea, but also from Iran, should they develop in that region as well. So a lot going on within GMD. So that was my very first day at the Missile Defense Agency. So I like to take personally all the credit for the success of FTG06B, and I often do. But a lot of hard work went into that, obviously none by me, since I arrived on the day that happened. But that was a hallmark event for our agency and for the nation. I think the conversation would be a lot different today had we not had the success we did. And that's a credit, not only to the Missile Defense Agency, certainly, but to our friends in industry and a lot of people that helped us with this. But it was a very important event, to be sure. And I like to say it was necessary, but it wasn't sufficient. In other words, we had to do that test. We had to find those things out. We had to make sure that we gave that warfighter even more confidence in the system, but it wasn't sufficient to rest on our laurels. So a lot more work to do. And this really is laying the groundwork for the next GM flight test and GM flight test out into the future. Now, you see in the center of that screen, the SBX. There's been some things written recently about that platform. Maybe some of you had seen it. I want to go on record and just respectfully disagree with what I've read recently about the SBX. And I can tell you from the warfighter perspective again, the operational perspective is absolutely the most important sensor that we had in our toolkit when the Sabres were being rattled anywhere in the world, but particularly with North Korea. It's absolutely the first thing we thought of in a combatant commander's headquarters when we saw something, some intelligence cue, that the regime in North Korea might be lining up something to shoot into space or potentially at us. The first question of the combatant commander was, how soon can we get SBX underway? I was sitting with General Jacobi in spring of 2013 in the National Military Command Center. He was then the commander of the United States, North Com and NORAD. He had the responsibility to make the recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to the President, ultimately, whether or not we were going to release ground-based interceptors on a potential threat. And I remember looking at him at some point, and I said, boss, how are you feeling? We were waiting for the launch to happen. We knew, based on intelligence, that it was imminent. And he said, you know what? I'm feeling really good because the nation has options to defend ourself, and I'm feeling really good because we've got SBX in the right place at the right time. That's how important that system is to the warfighter. It's absolutely the best sensor out there for discrimination. It's laying the groundwork for everything that we're doing in the design of the LRDR. It's a hugely important sensor to the warfighter. But it's not just an operational asset. Interestingly, it's been a huge asset for us and vitally important in the test work that we do as well. Let me give you some statistics from the year 2006 to today. How many times we've deployed this asset? 13 real-world special taskings to include burnt frost, remember that in 2008, to include numerous cycles of provocation, every cycle of provocation since 2012. We've had SBX underway. 11 individual flight tests that she's participated in. Six ground test events. You don't hear a lot about the ground test work that we do, but the flight test gets all the press, right? But there's a lot of work that happens before a flight test or even independent of a flight test where we do analysis with ground tests. SBX has been a vital part of that as well. Three separate events supporting the United States Navy and the work that they do. 16 Air Force flyouts of the Minuteman III, basically stockpile reliability testing, making sure that those systems are operational and reliable and credible. The SBX is, in my mind, a huge value, has huge value for the taxpayer. It's versatile both in operations and the warfighter wants it every time, and it's hugely important for tests as I think the numbers bear out. And as I mentioned, it's informing the work that we're doing on discrimination for the LRDR. To call it a flop or to call it or to say it never should have been built, again, I just have to respectfully, based on my experience in the warfighting headquarters and now at MDA, respectfully disagree with that. So I just wanted to sort of give you my perspective on the SBX and how valuable it is to us. So this is a really good news story and there's some of my Navy brethren in the house today. This is a homeland defense asset and it's a regional defense asset, and it's an asset for the United States Navy globally. We're very proud of the work that we've done at Aegis BMD. We continue to advance the cause and advance the ball. 35 Aegis BMD-capable ships today. We're going to, excuse me, 33 today. We're going to 35 by the end of fiscal year 16. A very successful fall test campaign that we underwent. We really proved out the SPI array. We did a test called FTM 25. We really taxed out the array, the SPI array, on the Aegis platform itself, both with a ballistic missile threat at a high and a cruise missile surrogate threats flying low simultaneously. The system handled it beautifully. It's really the basis for the work we're doing in Aegis BMD baseline nine. A lot of advancements in this area continues to be a huge asset for the nation, a great asset for the nation and for our partners around the world. Another really, really good news story in my mind. We are on track to deliver European-faced depth of approach phase two capability via the Aegis Shore facility in Romania this year, this calendar year. And that project is moving along and we're ready to put the shovel into the ground in Poland not more than a few months after that and start the next phase of this campaign in Rejkovo, Poland. So we are maintaining our commitment to our friends and allies and partners in Europe, particularly in this case with the Aegis Shore capability. It's a fantastic capability, an improving time, and again, there's a facility at PMRF on the island of Kauai that participates in numerous flight tests for us. It's a fantastic capability. And again, things are going really, really well and we continue to be on track to deliver and keep our promises to our friends and allies. 11 for 11 in flight tests is that it's a great system. The warfighter loves it and Lane mentioned we've got soldiers today in Guam actually for the last two years defending both regionally and homeland in Guam. And you talk to those soldiers and they're very satisfied with the system. They love the capability that it brings. United States Army loves the capability that it brings and the combatant commander loves the capability that the system brings. We're continuing to develop it, working with the Army on future requirement. We've delivered four batteries already to the Army. We're working on a fifth and beyond. We're also delivering an additional 48 interceptors by FY16 to give us a total of 155 and studying the future of this system and how it may actually we can adapt this system to an evolving threat, a different threat down the road. So that is turning out to be, I think, a remarkable investment. And again, not only for our nation, but our friends and allies around the world who are looking at this as an FMS case. So that video covered a lot of items and we don't have time to get into all of them here. But a couple of highlights for you. You saw the ANTP-Y2 radars that are deployed in various places around the world. We just declared an operational capability this past December in Kyoge Masaki, Japan. Once again, that was on time. We delivered it when we said we were going to. It's already plugged in into the warfighter suite for United States Pacific Command. It's soon to be plugged in to the United States Northern Command. And so it's an asset that, regardless of where it is around the world, can plug and play into various and different systems amongst the BMDS. We're also, again, Elaine mentioned, but co-development with our Japanese friends and partners. Thank you for the SM3-2A. It's going to save the taxpayer. It's also a great initiative. We're partnering with our Japanese friends on. And I'd be remiss if I didn't offer kudos to our friends and partners in Israel. I think you've probably seen the press in recent days. We're still crunching the data, but we think very, very successful flight tests of the David Slings system, which you briefly saw in the video there. Lots going on in international cooperation. We can talk a lot more about it in the Q&A. So, again, I covered a ton of ground in a very, very short amount of time. Again, I'm open to your questions in a moment here. One area I didn't talk about is technology and what MDA is doing in the technology realm. That's because we've got our chief technologist here, Mr. Rich Matlock, who's going to talk to you in the third panel. So I don't want to steal any of his thunder. Suffices to say, though, in my mind, having been around MDA now for going on a year, close to, RDT&E is still the bread and butter of what we do at the Missile Defense Agency. And we have such talent within the agency, working with the Department and others around the Department of Defense to think of new things and new ideas to advance technology, and be MDS after next. We haven't lost sight of that being a priority for us. It's exciting times. Rich is going to give you more details. And so I'll close, again, going to put my warfighter hat back on. You know, you can say what you want about Missile Defense generally or about the system or about the cost and the expense. And we used to banter this around in the Norah and Cheyenne Mountain on a lot of cold, dark nights when we were in the mountain on an alert or doing an exercise or for a real-world contingency. We used to talk about the value of this to us. And oftentimes we would sort of come to the conclusion, yeah, what is it worth to us? Is it worth Seattle or San Francisco or Los Angeles or increasingly now Colorado, Denver, the heartland of America, potentially in the future, Eastern Seaboard, Boston, New York, Washington, D.C.? Is it worth the investment in these systems to protect what we value the most? That's our homeland, our way of life. I think the answer, my personal answer is yes. And so I'm an optimist about this, not without our challenges. We continue to deal with those challenges. We've got the best and brightest people I can tell you. I wish you could meet a lot of them, phenomenal people working these issues at the Missile Defense Agency. I'm really proud to work with them and be their deputy director. I'm humbled to do that. They're doing some really important work. And I thank you all again for your contribution to this debate. Look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. So now we're going to open up the questions and have a conversation. And I think we've heard now repeatedly just how much the conversation has changed in the past decade and change. That it's no longer a question of whether but how and in what way. And General Todorov, you walk through just many of the systems that were actively deploying. I guess one word that didn't come up is sequestration, that 13 letter word. And given everything budget-wise, I wonder if you might first of all, Elaine, speak to the relative weight given to the Missile Defense Mission that you feel in the Pentagon. And perhaps General Todorov, you might weigh in for MDA's priorities in answering that a bit. You know, I'm not sure that I am totally objective because I am the DASD for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. So I spend a lot of my time on Missile Defense. But having been in broader meetings on setting budget priorities in the DMACC and so forth, there is a lot of emphasis on Missile Defense in the Pentagon. There's, as we've said, a lot of co-com demand, combatant commander demand for the regional Missile Defense. There's a lot of focus on whether North Korea and the K-08. So it is a high priority mission. It is a balancing act. As I said, we have to constantly reassess priorities. Where are we on technology development? Where are we on fiscal constraints? And it's Homeland Defense highest priority, some commitments we've made on the regional Missile Defense side following through EPAA, combatant commanders who want more, can't cut the seed corn. That's a balancing act. You see that balancing act in the request for the Missile Defense budget. And that's at the President's request level. Cuts just cut. They hurt all the way across. So it's the old story. So as you mentioned, it's, and all of you know, resources aren't a plenty. And so we've got to make careful decisions and choices about where we invest within the work that we're doing at the agency. So we obviously get our guidance from the department. So our priorities fall into the broadsum of Homeland Defense and maintaining our commitment to the European phase adaptive approach. Within those sort of subcategories, I would say that clearly the work we're doing for GBI reliability, the work that we're doing in the upcoming flight test, the work that we're doing with RKV, as I mentioned, falls at the very top, followed or one in one A, if you will, discrimination, making sure that as this threat matures and involves, we've got the capability to continue to outpace it. And we are concerned about a growing threat and new capabilities to try to outmatch what we've got today existing. So for Homeland, I would say GBI reliability discrimination as well at the very top. And then, again, as I mentioned, maintaining our commitments to the European phase adaptive approach. And I think we're in a good place for all of that. All the while thinking about seed corn technology, Rich will talk to you more about it. And I think we're at the very site of BMDS after next. Are we outpacing the threat or is it outpacing us? Today on the Homeland side, we are outpacing the threat. We're ahead of the threat. Yes. I would agree with that. I would say that sequestration, which you mentioned briefly, is a dangerous thing. And my boss has testified, he used these words. He says, should sequestration come to pass and we're forced to take cuts in the programs so that our BMDS has the potential to be outmatched or overmatched, I think, is the word he used. And so that's a concern. But to answer your question, we are outpacing the threat. All right. Why don't we take some questions from the audience? We've got some microphones going around. I see one at that back table. I think that's Bruce. I want you to identify yourself and go ahead. Hi. I'm Bruce McDonald. I'm adjunct at Johns Hopkins SICE. And I'm doing a study with the Federation of American Scientists. I've been to China a couple of times in the last few months. And FAD got a very nice mention here. And we're no surprise to you seated up there that in China we hear a lot about FAD. And they say, listen, we have no problem with the interceptor. We understand the rationale. But that radar, boy, that gives them a lot of heartburn. And so my question to you, I've worked in missile defense for a long time, but what is the right response to that issue that is raised about why China, they're worried that the FAD radar would give us an enhanced capability to neutralize their strategic deterrent. What's the right way to respond to that? I have to say, I mean, my response, I just covered, I said, listen, if we wanted to really go after China, we would be deploying our missile defense forces differently than we are. So you can be sure. But what's from your perspective? What's the right answer to give the Chinese on that? First, I need to clarify that you're talking about U.S. deployment, potential U.S. deployment of FAD in South Korea. And I just want to make it clear that while that is something that the U.S. Forces Commander at USFK is interested in because it would provide defense for, certainly for U.S. deployed forces and for South Korea, we have not had formal consultations with ROK about our deploying that. So the concerns are a little premature. That's one. Two is that the threats from North Korea, especially Scudsy and Nodong, are why USFK Commander would like to look at that. And so it's North Korea that drives this. And I think any decision, if we do have consultations with the ROK on this, would be for the U.S. and ROK to decide. So this is just not about China. Nothing else? All right. Right here, gentlemen. You want to wait for the microphone? Good afternoon. I'm Charles Newstead from the State Department. But I must immediately add that I'm not speaking for the department at all. This is just me, the physicist in me, speaking to you. And my question is this. Given that Mr. Putin is increasingly behaving like he's the dictator of the Soviet Union, rather than a more benign Russia that we saw during the Gorbachev, etc. era, how can you be so sure that we don't need to have defense against Russian missiles or, for that matter, defense against China, which has tremendous capability? Admittedly, they're saying no first strike, but what does that mean? And admittedly, they appear to be on a somewhat reasonable course, but that could change instantly. And how will we prepare to respond to that? There are a number of ways that you can deal with other countries having ballistic missiles. Missile defense is one of those. It's not the only way. The Soviet Union, when it was the Soviet Union, had many, many ballistic missiles. And we did not, even when we shortly had a missile defense system, it was not about defending against Soviet ballistic missiles. That was about deterring their use through the threat of nuclear retaliation during the Cold War. So if you look at countries where it's feasible to have a homeland defense and countries where it's not feasible to have a homeland defense, Russia, I think, definitely falls in the not feasible, given the capacity, the numbers, as well as the sophistication of their ability to develop countermeasures to over... the sophistication in many ways, numbers and sophistication. The same can be said of China if it wants to be able to hold at risk the U.S. It certainly has the economic capability, the technical capability. And so then the question becomes how many GDPs would you like to spend on trying to defend against it? With countries such as North Korea, Iran, where, again, there are multiple reasons. One is more limited capabilities, less sophisticated capabilities that you can foresee being able to stay ahead of. The other is how much confidence do you have in your ability to deter attacks on the homeland? And again, all of these we're talking about the homeland. So how much confidence do you have in deterrence? We can never be absolutely sure about deterrence. I also do deterrence. But I think if you put confidence level about deterring attacks on the homeland, the larger, more capable countries, Russia and China, I'd put on one side, and countries such as North Korea, potentially Iran, I would put on the less confidence about other ways, including deterrence, I'd put on having less confidence there. So there are several factors in why we have not chosen to try to defend the homeland from Russia and China. Anything on that? All right, we've got one up here. Actually, while we're waiting on this question, I guess I just want to follow up on that a little bit. What are the big muscle movements in the FY16 budget that keep us ahead of the threat that you're thinking of? Maybe a little bit more for you, General. Discrimination, you speak a little bit to that. I know you talked about LRDR briefly, for example. You gave us an insight into how you might feel about SBX a little bit. But what are some of the other big muscle movements? I think it probably touched on them, but just sort of for repeat. Certainly reliability to the GMD system, big muscle movement. The long-range discriminating radar, as you mentioned, another large muscle movement for us. And Rich will talk about this. We're doing some things in technology, I think, that will start to change the course a little bit in this discussion. We can't wait till the threat materializes or we're behind it to try to catch up to it. So we're doing some things to try to stay up, and I think you'll hear more about that in a moment. Those are probably the big pieces, parts, if you will, of the work that we're doing. Okay, good. All right. Now we're good. Hi, I'm Scott Mossioni with Inside the Pentagon. If the Iran deal does come to fruition, would that change any of our plans for the homeland missile defense? And would it stay the same? Would it give us a little more leeway when it comes to scheduling things further out? First, if Iran, we foresee, will continue to deploy ballistic missiles, but they're not being nuclear armed. It would be a big deal. It would be a very good thing. Almost everything that we're doing, we want to do for the North Korean threat in any event. And we do have protection now against North Korea as the threat. It could be, even if KNOA becomes operational. And Iran, it might affect the future, how you go forward in the future. But for now, in this year's budget, I don't think it would affect it. That's a very good question, one that we sort of kicked around in the last week as this thing develops. I would argue that it might make missile defense broadly more important. Again, to outpace the threat, stay ahead of the threat. We're concerned about a breakout capability. I'm not going to speak to the policy piece or the treaty itself, but we can't take this as our pencils down. We've got to breathe it down. We've got to continue, I think, to forge ahead. The threat is not just Iran. There are other threats out there. As I mentioned in my talk, Iran has the largest short-medium range ballistic missile inventory in the region. So it's a regional threat as much as well. I don't think it changes. If anything, I think it ups the ante in the game rather than it allows us to relax at all. All right. So Charles, in the back, and then right here. Tom, thank you. Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists, working with Bruce McDonald on this project, looking at China missile defense. So I was recently in China about a month ago. So my question, I'm thinking about outpacing the threat. And could we imagine a scenario where North Korea, and I've been there a couple of times. I've talked to actual North Koreans and went to their technological museum. They're very proud of what they call rocket development, space launch development. They don't call it missiles, obviously, but that's the way we look at it. Could you imagine a time in the future where their threat is so advanced, they have such advanced capability, including countermeasures, decoys, the whole, you know, raft of things they could deploy against us, where it might become cost prohibitive for us to try to outpace that through further and further defenses. And such that China enters the picture and China gets worried and China says, uh-oh, U.S. capability in the region is getting so advanced to deal with the North Korea threat. That's our intention, but China feels now we've got to build up. And China may feel they have to build up because of India developing missile defense and further missile capabilities. So I guess my question to both of you is, are you playing out these scenarios you're thinking about just going to come a time where the North Korean threat becomes so sophisticated where we have to think differently? Always good to have your challenging questions, Charles. Yeah, as North Korea, you know, assuming North Korea just keeps advancing and advancing, then we go back to what we said earlier about regional missile defense. It's true today, even when you are trying to deal with, through missile defense, anything that North Korea could throw at you, that it is not the only capability that we have. And so then what's the role of missile defense in the overall mix of capabilities then becomes an issue. It doesn't assuage part of what you're getting at by interrelated, the gears that are all interrelated where you're turning one gear that is response to North Korea's nuclear missile programs and others are watching that, thinking it's about them when it's not. You know, and it's that what action do you take about some problem that others then take in reaction that is not what you were trying to do in the first place. So I mean it is a complex, you're working on some very complex issues there, but if you get to the point where missile defense against a North Korea hypothetical always a problem for officials to talk about hypotheticals, but then you have to reassess, as I said, we're constantly reassessing what's the role of missile defense against which threats and what's the role of other capabilities in dealing with ballistic missiles. So you're talking about some future reassessment of that issue. I'll put my warfighter hat back on and tell you that, you know, again, sitting in the Cheyenne Mountain, these capabilities, particularly if we go the route that we're going in terms of our programs, the work that we're doing that I've already mentioned, the technology work that Rich Matlock's going to talk about, never say never, but I'm not sure that's achievable of a goal for the North Koreans, first of all, for them to outpace us, if you will. And as a warfighter, again, what I said about a continuum of capability for the warfighter, an offense-defense mix, this is just one piece. Any capability we can, maybe not designed to catch every single thing that they could lob at us, but just long enough to buy sort of our leaders some time to be able to make an assessment and to have options, if you will. The nation would have options. So I continue to believe that we're on the right path, that's part of a larger continuum of capabilities, and I don't think we ever want to give up on the idea that we have some capability in the missile-defense toolkit. All right, I think we'll take one more question right here. Wait for the mic. Yeah, I'm Annie Kayaban, Wilderman, and for the first and only time in history, I attended the 35th reunion of the graduates of the Philippine Science High School, 1970. And this is, I call it learning trips, okay? And this is what I learned because they were sassing me, because I'm an American, okay? And this is a reminder to me by my batchmate General Esperon, CNO level Joint Chiefs and Economic Minister, remind the Americans that to a zero-based budget is zero, nothing. We don't have anything to spend at the end of the year. So that means, you know, to, he said, that's easy, but I retired from the Navy, sir. Let's keep it on, Miss Little Defense. Goodbye. Thank you very much. We have about seven minutes before our next panel. We're going to have Frank Rose, Assistant Secretary of State, and also Steve Pineford from Brookings. And so we'll be back in about seven minutes to continue our conversation for some international dimensions. Thank you very much. Thank you both of you. Thank you.