 comments, questions, sharing experiences. Let's take first three. Please present yourself, your name, where you come from, and if you have a question to whom you are addressing the question, and we'll take here the gentleman with the red shirt, then here in front, and there a gentleman with the glasses. Well, we've covered a lot of interesting issues, and my name is Asti Dolvan, and I'm retired, I used to work at the University of Helsinki, and before that at Concordia in Montreal. A lot of work, among other things, I used to do with immigration, and unlike what the chairman advises, we've listened to three speakers, and then we're supposed to ask them questions individually, I'll depart from that, ask questions of all three of the speakers, and they can, I mean, unison and respond to them, which is what we're doing now. So first of all, to the speaker from Sweden, I'd like to ask this curious feature that you mentioned about asylum seekers that 50% of them live with friends and relatives in Finland. We have some church activists who are trying to do this, and very few asylum seekers live in the community, most of them live in the reception center. There's some kind of a social program, for instance, do people who house asylum seekers get some kind of a subsidy from the state, that they spend the same money on refugees who go to people's homes as people who are in asylum centers. I didn't quite understand what you said about resettled, have lower employment, you did say that resettled have lower employment than asylum seekers, but did you say that, what did you really mean about refugees do better after intermarrying? Do you mean that this indicates that refugees are perhaps not as active in seeking opportunities on the marriage market as other employment related immigrants? Or is it generally that job seekers who come in search of employment that are used to traveling around from country to country and may not be caught by the census taker? The refugee miners issue that Mr. Muttikhan mentioned in Finland, where he mentioned that we have a fairly successful program for receiving refugee miners. Well, recently the policy was announced that although the number of refusals is going to go up as the selection criteria are tightened, I think it's said from about 30% to 10% only will be received, it's been announced that however children will be taken. In other words, we have a situation where the parents will be asked to leave the country and the children will be taken into the protection of these programs, how humane a policy is that and what do you think the results will be on the education of the children. And I'm just curious as a short question to Professor Nandi from Essex, you mentioned that people have a stronger or weaker sense of ethnic identity because they live in London. What is the explanation for that? My name is Thomas Sama. I'm a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki in the Faculty of Social Sciences and my research interest includes the labor market and integration issues. Now I want to address my question to Alita Nandi, but before my question I'm going to make a comment. Now if we look at integration refugees issues in the UK, from outside in the UK and France, from outside in, unlike in Finland and Sweden, the UK is known as a great colonial power. So we have to trace this to the time of colonialism. The UK and France colonized, I'd say, more than 10% of the world. And today we have the common world. I'm originally from Cameroon. We have the common world made up of 52 countries and we also have the Francophonie. And through the common world and the colonialism by the UK, the UK exercises a lot of political, economic and social power on so many countries, especially the common world countries. I'll tell you from outside in that many of the leaders in the common world countries from Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, all the countries that were colonized by the UK were all trained in the UK. And their children and families have formed an elitist family there in the UK, up till today. So colonialism, the issue of refugees and so on in the UK dates back really, really a long time ago. My question is, and it is something which the UK cannot escape from it, I've been following up how the UK is struggling with these issues, issues of common world, people from common world countries migrating there. So my question is, how does the UK deal with the integration of the various ethnic groups of people from all over the common world countries? So how do they deal with these people there in the UK in terms of promoting equal opportunities, equality, social inclusion to ensure that the gap in terms of inequality and segregation doesn't grow that much between the ethnic groups and that some ethnic minority groups are not left out. Thank you. My name is Miguel Niño, I am a research fellow here at Wider. So I have, if I may, just a few questions, just brief questions. The first one is to Nagikari. I found the paper very interesting. So I just have a few questions for clarification. So you make a distinction between asylum seekers and refugee resettled individuals. And you saw difference in their choices about where to live. But is it not that asylum seekers then become later on resettled refugees? It's just the differences between in the time before asylum seekers become refugees. So I was not sure whether you, this is the same problem, but they're just like a time varying problem there. This is the first question. So I don't know too much about this issue, but my second question is that I don't see the marriage market, or as you call it, the intermarriage sector as a strong explanatory factor that may lead to better outcome for the migrants, because I see it as an intermediate, actually, outcome. Because I can imagine that, you know, more, not only better educated people, but maybe more sociable individuals, more entrepreneurial individuals, and more likely to engage with the locals, and therefore they ended up with better outcome. But it's not to marry a sweet, or no. So, and therefore you have, I think, an indigeneity problem. I'm talking about economics here. But if you take away Stockholm, for example, does your results hold? So that's my first question, my other question. So if you take away Stockholm, where I'm sure many of the migrants, or those who have specific characteristics go, if you take away Stockholm from the sample, I'm sure the results may be different. And the other question about I have for Thomas is, what are the main reasons for rejection of the applicants? Because the percentage that you show is a large percentage of rejections. So which are the main reasons that the Finnish government have decided to reject those applications? Yes, hi. So thank you. So one question was, why do ethnic minorities in living in London have weaker ethnic identity? Or why I think they do? It goes back to this idea that if you're living in an area where you're surrounded by people who belong to the same ethnic group as you, you don't register because there has to be another ethnic group. There has to be a difference for you to be aware of your ethnic group. So when you live in this situation in London, ethnic minorities are not aware, as much aware of their ethnic group, because everybody is an ethnic minority. Ethnicity itself is less of an issue. But if you're an ethnic minority in rest of England, that's what I'm studying here, you are always aware. You're the five people living in a village. I mean, your family's the only Indian family, your black family, your Caribbean family. And so in those interactions, you're always aware of it. And the thing is that it's not that ethnic identity for ethnic minorities living in London is very low. It's just relatively lower. Again, the idea is that, I mean, this is where it's not an individual action. It is a societal action. If you're constantly made to feel that you're the other, you will be aware of that you're the other. And so that depends on what actions everybody together does. Because there is no reason why particular groups are salient in one country, but there is no difference in another country. That's what I'm saying, that these groups are differences, we create them in a sense. And so that question perhaps answers your question. I cannot say what the government is doing as such, but in the 1960s and 70s where there were a lot of riots and issues were highlighted about the discrimination, open discrimination that used to go on in terms of housing employment, the Race Relations Act, the first one was introduced, I think 1973, since then it has been upgraded and ethnicity, religion, your accent, dress appearance, all these have become protected categories so you can't be discriminated on those bases. Having said that, if you look at the actual numbers, so proportion employed, proportion living in poverty in the different ethnic groups, there is a huge difference. So ethnic minorities are more likely to be poor, more likely to be without job, have a lower income, but in UK particularly it's Pakistani and Bangladeshis who have a very high poverty rates. So I agree to all the other things that you said, there's nothing to say about that. Just the point is there are some policies in effect, but there is still discrimination and harassment that goes on for another different project. I am looking at the effect of ethnic and racial harassment and its effect on mental health and well-being, and it exists, I mean the initial results show that not only there is a high proportion of ethnic minorities saying that they have experienced physical or verbal abuse in the last one year, but as a result, their well-being and mental health is lower after controlling for all the other factors that could affect. So it is a reality and let's see. Thank you very much, Ali Dandian, Tuomas. Thank you. There were two questions for me, the first one by Ahtit Olvan, so there has been some debate in Finnish public that there might even be cases where the parents of a family of asylum seekers would not be allowed to stay, but a child would stay. So I don't have any knowledge about to what extent this is actually the case, because sometimes the stories twist a little bit when they are mediatized, but the big question is really, and because there are, there's a fair number of unaccompanied minors in here that it doesn't look good in many respects for the children who will remain here. I mean, in terms of family context, so I cannot be any more specific in my reply to that because I don't know. Was it Miguel, the second question? So what are the reasons of rejection for the reasons of rejection in the rise, well, anyway, yeah. So why there are more rejections today? There are two key features as far as I have understood correctly. It would be actually somebody better for the finished immigration service because they deal on a daily to day-to-day basis of this. But the first major reason seems to be that many of the people who arrived last year were not to say the same type of asylum seekers that had arrived in the previous years, meaning that the profile was somewhat different. And in this case, they didn't fulfill the existing criteria. One, another big reason is, but I cannot say how large part of the explanation this is, that this one is in popular terms called a secondary protection, that you don't actually fulfill all the criteria, but we cannot send you back. So this has been taken away. And that is the big question, that is also probably if I have understood correctly the main reason why probably the paperless, the undocumented section will grow. So and that's a very clear political message in a way that who is invited to stay. Thank you very much. Tuomas and Denna Hickory. I'll start with the first set of questions. I'm not sure if relatives or family members of refugees get any funding if they house refugees. I know that the family reunification of refugee family members is supported by the Swedish government. But beyond that, I've never heard that they receive any funding, which doesn't mean that they don't, but I haven't heard of that. About the second question, differences in employment between resettled refugees and asylum seekers, is that what you asked me? So, yes, studies find that asylum resettled refugees, they have lower employment rates than asylum seekers. And they explain this by, yes, sorry. Yes. And they explain this mostly by differences in placement policies. That's the main explanation. And then in relation to that, faster acculturation, et cetera, networks that asylum seekers would have in comparison to quota refugees. How about the role of intermarriage in refugees' labor markets integration? According to our study, in general, intermarriage increases, immigrants' labor market outcomes, but for refugees, we only found these on employment rates, but not on salary increase. That was our finding. So, the second set of questions, are asylum seekers later on resettled? No, when I talk about resettled refugees, I'm referring to quota refugees, actually. So, I wanted to make that distinction because as I said, there are policy differences that may later affect their labor market participation. About the intermarriage premium, we did control for the most common human capital and socio-demographic variables, but I do agree that there are certain characteristics like personality traits, perseverance, even physical appearance that can actually make all these people more attractive when they are seeking a job and also when they are meeting people socially. And I didn't quite understand your question about if I remove Stockholm from our study on intermarriage? We have an optimal sorting problem. Those individuals which we cannot control for the servos, I'm more likely to go stuck. So, if you remove it stuck all the time, as a lady of the final sorting problem, you may have a clear decision. Yes, perhaps that will be the case. Thank you for suggesting that. Thanks. Thank you very much for the first set of questions. Next ones, please, here in the gentleman in the front. Yeah, thank you very much. My name is Jeff Crisp. I used to be head of policy at UNHCR, now at Chatham House in London. I just had a question about citizenship and the extent to which citizenship plays a fundamental role in the integration process, and I don't think here's the time to talk about what integration is, but let's assume that we know what we're talking about, but does speedy access to citizenship actually make people feel more part of the society that they've joined rather than part of an ethnic minority group? I know in Canada, for example, it's always been a policy to offer very rapid access to citizenship for precisely that reason, and I just wondered whether there's any evidence from the three countries that you represent on the podium about the impact of citizenship on integration. Thank you. So I'm Rachel Gisselquist. I'm with UNU Wider, and I wanted to pick up on a point that came out at the end of Thomas' presentation and also Alita's presentation about the policies and programs to support integration and to reduce inequalities. I was very struck by Alita's presentation and the discussion of thinking about social identity and personal identity and how that's a useful way of sort of stepping into thinking about what sort of policies might work, and you went over the slide quickly, but I think I got this right. You make a point about policies and programs that force people to think of themselves as individuals rather than group members as being particularly promising and supporting integration. So I guess first question, is that right? That I understood your point correctly. And then secondly, for the other panelists, what do you think about that? Do you find that that's, do you find support for that also in your work? And then for the panelists as well as for the room, because I know many of you here work on these issues and know much more about these topics than I do, what are some examples then of policies and programs in this vein that have worked or simply have not worked? My name is Jonathan Hall. I'm an assistant professor at Uppsala University and I teach a bit on social psychology and so my comment is directed to Anita. So just following up with the previous comment. So my question is, I'm tempted, well my comment would be I'm tempted to throw out the so what question, oh so what, social contact results in a reduction of the salience of ethnic identity. But at the same time, I wonder if, first of all, it would be nice to know what is your measure for, because you talk about it reduces identity. Do you mean the degree to which one rates on a scale the importance of a particular social category? Is that what you're looking at? Yes. Okay. And then apart from that, then I'm thinking, well, you could make this more interesting by trying to attach it to maybe a bit more of the findings in the literature. I mean, you talked about de-categorization, right? So you seem to be interested in prejudice. Mentioning, for example, the research on al-Poor and so on. So my first stepping back and back and back, I'm thinking, is this about prejudice? Is this about integration? These are kind of two different things related, but different. If you're interested in prejudice, then my next question would be, do you have measures of prejudice in the survey? No? No. Okay. So then your focus is then on, it seems that it's actually on kind of integration, in a way, seems to be your focus. Yes, I mean, okay, go ahead. Then you could go to the acculturation literature and look at not just the salience of identity, but see if you can create constructs of acculturation from the data, which might be quite possible, given that if you have like a categorical variable of social identity, like ethnic identity, and then, yeah, go ahead. Sorry, so we did that. So, I mean, it depends on how you're going to define. So we use Berry's framework of minority-majority identity and whether people identify strongly with both their, so obviously there's a way of, you could measure it different ways. The way we had measured is, we had question on whether they identify strongly with their parents' ethnic group, and we also had questions on Britishness, on a scale of one to 10. So what we said was, if they said, both were on the same scale, one to 10, and if their report was greater than median, the median value, we call that the strong identification. And we did find ethnic minorities were more likely to report being, I have a table over there, of integrated identity. So they would, about 47% reported having strong identity, both Britishness and their parents' ethnic group. And so that brings me back to this issue of integration, because I'm always amazed at this issue of ethnic minorities having to integrate, except I don't know what they're going to integrate too, because when we looked at it, for the white majority, we did a similar exercise where we compared their Britishness with their national, I mean country identity, so Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish, English. They're all residents, so white majority in all these countries were, I think about 50% were more likely to have a separated identity, so they were more likely to say very strong Scottish, Welsh, English identity rather than a British identity. So if the majority is not British, then what is the issue of integration? So anyway, that is one of your questions. That's a very interesting point though, it's fascinating. Now I'm wondering a bit about the still, the kind of what, like so what kind of question, and wondering how you can make it more interesting to me. That's one point. Maybe digging into the acculturation literature, attaching to it a bit more closely would be one avenue. The other avenue would be focusing on, you mentioned later, like what are the implications of your analysis, right? Is it that, for example, decategorization is an important strategy to approach, for example, for integration. But I don't know if you can really say that from your research, but you might be able to look at other strategies like decategorization, recategorization, social identity complexity. These are some things that you might be able to get at, at least measure in terms of outcomes, right? You could do that. And then you don't have prejudice to look at, so you can't look at those processes and their impact on prejudice, but you could look at the determinants of, for those different processes that you could do, and that could be interesting. But I would be very cautious to draw conclusions from this research that decategorization would be a good approach for integration, because you could just be measuring, for example, social identity complexity by, if you're just looking at reduction in the salience of one particular category, that could be combined with other categories and could be part of a complex structure of social identity. So it's not decategorization, it's multiple social categorization at work. So I would just caution against making that kind of jump to policy in particular, and also perhaps going and seeing what your data can do for you in terms of capturing those different processes. So decategorization, recategorization into a common end group, social identity complexity, those are at least three strategies you could look at. So just, so we do have, so this was a part of a module of questions on measuring different domains of identity. So the ethnic and racial background was one of them, there were others like your political beliefs, gender, family, now I can't remember the national identity, so on. And we did look at it, most of the identities actually do move together, but what was interesting, and that is the paper that we are now working on, is how ethnic and political identity did not move together for ethnic minorities, but did move together for majority groups. So what we are trying to look at is what political identity does, and how that interacts with ethnic identity. So I agree that we have to look at it, but just to be sure, we have control for a lot of social demographic characteristics, which do also contribute to identity, so that is controlled for in the models. Thank you very much. Alita, there were also the two other questions that were addressed to all three of you. Do you want to say something, and then I'll give floor to Tuomas and Nahikari. Yeah, they're short, because we have not looked at citizenship, we have a question, you said citizenship, so we have questions on citizenship, but for this model we had not looked at, and that is a good point, we can look at it. And the other question was a general racial question, policies, and I do agree that this is a jump, like you said, to policies, but the idea is that small-scale surveys and experiments have looked at all the different links. What we were trying to just establish is how does it fair, because a lot of these social psychology and these kind of issues are not included in large-scale surveys. And so you're not never sure whether those were the result of these 50 people that you were looked at, you studied, or will these relationships hold in a large survey? The problem with that always happens is when it's a large survey, then the sophistication of the measure goes down, because you can at most ask one or two questions about that issue, there are a lot of other questions being asked, and so there is this balance, and the purpose was not to look at all of it, it was to look at just this one relationship between type of contact and ethnic identity, just because we could do that with a large-scale survey and to see whether those findings that people have found with experiments would also hold up for a large-scale survey to provide some robustness to those findings. And actual policies, I don't deal with policies directly, but I have heard of many London religious groups which have tended to not, so local councils, they have started giving money not for one particular religious group to have some activity, but to have interfaith activities, and the idea is it brings all religious groups together and they interact with each other, and I'm sort of, again, this is quite anecdotal, not based on my research, but when they were interviewed, the people who attended, they said, oh, I have a lot of things in common with this other person I was talking to, so I think some effort is being done, but I'm doing hand-waving at this point. Thank you very much, and then Tuomas, your reflections on the two questions asked. Yeah, I'm so sorry, both Jeff and Rachel, but you were asking, I think, quite simply, you know, what works or do certain things work, and I have been out here thinking for five minutes, can I think of any empirical study in Finland that would have actually been focusing on these type of issues? And I have to say that I just haven't come up yet. I hope I'm not doing injustice to anyone who has done her or his whole life work on this, but so I can't say. And what about my card? I'm afraid I don't have an answer for Rachel either. Sorry about that. As for the relationship between citizenship and integration, I haven't done research on that myself, but I've reviewed the literature on labor market integration for teaching purposes, and I must say that there is no consensus of the relationship between, on the effect of citizenship on labor market outcomes for immigrants, but there is also, there are very big differences in, first of all, who decides to naturalize. For example, in Sweden, EU people tend not to naturalize as much as non-EU people for obvious reasons, but there seems to be a citizenship premium for everybody, but especially for non-EU migrants. And, but again, it is difficult to say that it is actually citizenship premium because they could be that those people have invested resources in getting education or in, again, trying to get better jobs because they are thinking of staying in the country and then they decide to naturalize, also as part of the same idea. But I think, in general, research shows that citizen immigrants do better in the labor market. Thank you very much. I think that we are coming to the end of our session. I would like to thank Nahikari Tuomas and Alida for interesting presentations, bringing in the forefront some of the aspects related to refugees and integration. I think that, like, it shows from your presentations also from the questions that we are talking of a phenomenon, a process, which is very much in progress and our responses still are in a learning curve. And for sure, this is a topic that will continue to be in the forefront, not only in the Finnish newspapers, as Tuomas was saying, but also in the forefront of future research. I thank you also for the participants, for staying with us for the whole two hours and also for the interesting questions, definitely challenging also the speakers, I think, in a very nice way, and also broadening a little bit our own thinking, that, yes, where do we, how do we take this information? What are we going to do with it? What kinds of policy responses should we think about? So thank you very much for the participants.