 The session two is on the North Korean problem and North Korea policy. The chair of our session is Chairman Ha. Where is Professor Jung? Following the first sessions, the second session will focus on North Korean problem and North Korea policies. As I briefly mentioned and welcoming remarks, it is perfect timing for us to have rather in-depth discussions on the current situation of North Korea and also the future of North Korea. And finally, how do we respond to the continuous changing situation in North Korea? In particular, we will give a little bit more focus on how should we interpret the Kim Jong-un leadership's announcement of the so-called the two-track new strategic line of concurrently development of nuclear arsenal and economics. And also what will be the future of that kind of new efforts of North Korea. Finally, what will be the more efficient or fruitful responses of relevant countries such as South Korea, U.S. China and other relevant countries. To discuss this topics, we invite two very well-known and also the leading scholars from South Korea and also from the United States. From the South Korea, Professor Choi Sung-cheon. Choi Sung-cheon will give his speech on South Korean strategies for North Korean problems. He is now the professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations Seoul National University. He also chairs Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the EAI. And from the Americans side, another leading specialist in North Korean issues, Dr. Scott Schneider, as we all familiar with his bio, but where can I read? He is currently senior fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program and U.S. Korea Policies at Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining CFR, Schneider was a senior associate international relations program of the Asia Foundation. And after two presentations, we will have further discussions on this matter. We are now having three specialists on these issues. Bruce Klingner from the Heritage Foundation and Professor Bong Geun-jeon from the KND and finally, Professor Victor Cha of CSIS. I will turn off the microphone to Professor Chan. He will give us presentation on North Korean problems. Professor Chan. Thank you, Professor Ha. I have a slide. Okay, I made some PowerPoints. I also have a short article, so you might want to read it. And I put some more ideas to the slides, so it could be slightly different. The first thing, North Korea became a first mover in 2013 when we have a new round of leadership in Northeast Asia. So there was a very heightened level of aggressive and very provocative behaviors. They tried to elaborate their, you know, many policies by raising up the level of provocations, but it should be a short of the full-scale military reactions from ROK and the U.S. So after three or four months of provocations, we can have evaluations of what North Korea did. Well, North Korea did not gain anything, I think, diplomatically. The isolation became more severe, and North Korea now know that they don't have more options. So they seem to try to search for their own kind of exit strategy. And we witnessed a strengthened level of ROK-U.S. alliance. So after all these provocative behaviors, ROK is more sure of U.S. assistance and coordination in coping with North Korea's security threats. Interestingly, we have deepened tensions or fissures between North Korea and China. And North Korea tried to warn China against its approach to South Korea, maybe to the United States, but now we see a more and more tensions between two countries. And we know that North Korea, maybe they have exhausted all the military means so far. So we know what North Korea can do and what North Korea cannot do in the future. And so there is many analysis about North Korea's intentions, and this is a very important part. Well, we can easily guess that North Korea tried to show its military ability and preparedness, especially with nuclear capacity to deter the so-called the U.S. and Taekwondoist policy toward North Korea. They tried to heighten the level of negotiating positions probably for the coming negotiations, if any, vis-à-vis the United States, for a possible subsequent round of negotiations. And they tried to deliver the message to South Korean president, new president, a new regime that North Korea will not accept, hardline policy, which is a, you know, Nih-Myeong Park policies, you know, the principled so-called engagement policy. So they tried to change South Korea's regime's North Korea policy. And they also tried to warn against China that any possible policy coordination between China and South Korea or the United States will be countered by the North Korea. But here I try to emphasize and also discuss about Kim Jong-un's intention in terms of their domestic situations. Maybe there are some differences in Kim Jong-un's regime, which is different from Kim Jong-un's situation. So they tried to consolidate their regime bases. They are confronting the need to exaggerate external security threats for domestic reasons. So we have to take into account what kind of North Korea's domestic factors. Some people think that, well, Kim Jong-un's regime is just as similar as Kim Jong-il's. But there could be some differences. First, Kim Jong-il was very successful in personalization of his own political power. So he personalized all the political power. And he could be, he can have benefits from traditional charismatic legitimation of his political control, according to Max Weber's, you know, typology. So he is a son of Kim Jong-un, who still has some charismatic dominance over the minds of North Korean people, even though Kim Jong-un himself doesn't have that much level of the charisma. But still, he could enjoy some level of the legitimacy from his father. And he has a very strong domestic control and effective foreign policy. So he is not hindered by some domestic needs in dealing with foreign policy issues. His first, military first strategy, he strives for the strongest, prosperous, great power. And anyway, his idea is that nuclear weapon is just a means for diplomatic and economic purposes. So from, you know, the perspective from now that his position is a little bit more flexible than Kim Jong-un's position in dealing with nuclear weapons. But how about Kim Jong-un now? He's just a very young, 29-year-old, a new, unexperienced leader. So he probably is suffering from weak institutionalization of political power. So Kim Jong-un, before his death, tried to have a new institutional base for his son, but it was not so successful. He didn't have much time. So Kim Jong-un could not personalize his political power. He could not have a strong base for institutionalization. This is just a guess. I'm not really a North Korea specialist, but there are many signs, you know, that he still having needs to do this kind of job domestically. So he has some need to rationalize his political control based on his own performance. He does not have traditional or charismatic kind of legitimacy in his political regime. So he has to prove himself. He is kind of elected without election. So after he became a leader then, he should collect the political consent from his own constituents. To track strategic line, I will go to that person. And he declared North Korea as a nuclear power, a so-called legitimate nuclear state. And he thinks that there will be no discussions or negotiations about denuclearization of North Korea. So there are some domestic factors in looking at North Korea's position. Very interestingly, you know, in a series of North Korea's provocations for the last three or five months from December or from the third nuclear test in February, on the last day of March, as Professor Ha mentioned, Kim Jong-un advanced the so-called two-track strategic line. So North Korea set forth, according to North Korea's, you know, document, a new strategic line carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously under the prevailing situations and to meet the legitimate requirements of developing resolution. So what is this? Can we just ignore this? It's just one another version of the military first strategy. As far as it's really important, we have to pay attention to the so-called long-term strategic line by North Korea. There could be, I think, two versions of interpretation. A pessimist's interpretation to us is that Kim Jong-un is just another, his father. You know, he is just pursuing his father's strategic line. You know, Kim Jong-un didn't have any intention to give up nuclear weapons, so this is just a fake. I mean, it's a one prevalent view in South Korea as well. So this is just a military first strategy, another one, you know, version 2.0. North Korea will not denuclearize, and he is less likely to work for genuine negotiations. So it's kind of an offensive policy type. They try to be very offensive in maintaining their survival strategy or maybe in the future they want to have an upper hand against South Korea. Optimist's view to South Korea, you know, there is more emphasis on economic construction, so more emphasis than his father. Provocations, this is true, but it's a provocations for future negotiations because North Korea know that they cannot economically develop without outside economic assistance. So they have to do anyway negotiations for the future. So they want to elevate the level of provocations for as a negotiating chip. So it's still hopeful that we can have denuclearization of North Korea. So Kim Jong-un is likely to come to the negotiation table maybe in the future. So he is suffering from security dilemma. It's kind of a defensive release type of interpretation. I think both are true. It's up to the future what kind of options that he will take. So these two are true. But if you look at some recent statements from North Korea, well, it's still nothing new about criticize in Washington and Seoul. So it's a very old same kind of repetition of the statement. But there are some interesting ideas to me, I think, and very strong emphasis on the need for economic development, especially for improvement of standard of life for North Korean people, which is related to the domestic factors as I emphasized. So forces should be directed to agriculture and light industry, key fields in building economic power to improve and put out a stable basis that people standard of living. And very recently Kim Jong-un said that we have to pursue new way of economic management. So we have to follow our own socialist way, but with more incentive system and reforms. So reform is not North Korea's own term, but he says that well, we have to try a new thing, like Park Bong-joo as a new important political actor in North Korea. And nuclear weapons and missiles are used as a tool for domestic political justification. So nuclear weapons is not just for foreign policy. If we look at a New Year's address by the North Korean Labor Party, it talks about the status of North Korea as a scientific great power. So science, we are advanced country to legitimize Kim Jong-un's control, Kim Jong-un's leadership. So it's also related to domestic factors. And it's very arguable, but in the documents he says that nuclear weapons is for cheap deterrence and defense. So we have to economize, we have to save our money for economic development. Then what is the cheapest way of achieving our security posture? It's having nuclear weapons. So they want to redirect political resources from military expenditure to economic construction. And there is also an expression in the document that they have expected something from the results of our U.S. summit, maybe some more flexible position toward the North, but they say they are disappointed. Nothing is changed from E. Myeong-bak times. So the North Korean kind of tri-lama among three different elements. You know, they want to sustain Kim family's data ship, and they want to keep nuclear weapons, also with economic recovery. So as President Bakun mentioned in the address to the Congress, they cannot eat and have the cake at the same time, and we have one more dilemma. So they cannot sustain a dictatorship without economic recovery, but if they have nuclear weapons, then there will be no outside coming assistance, which make impossible economic recovery. Also, in the long term, if they have economic recovery, there will be a heightened level of consciousness, political consciousness among the North Korean people who will be opposed to this kind of dictatorship. There will be slow a demand from the society toward the political leadership that you have to liberalize a little bit. So now Kim Jong-un's idea is not sustainable at all. So what kind of future roads for North Korea? Two different scenarios. One is they could, you know, they can adhere to this type of two-track strategic line. In the short term, well, they will have a stronger domestic control, but in the long term, there will be no economic recovery, which will pose a threat to maintaining a domestic control. So in the long term, the domestic political control will fail. So very deep prospect for recovery. They might try a new strategic line, you know, which has the contents of the economy-first strategy. They have to renegotiate about their nuclear programs. Then they might have a legitimize, they could legitimize their political control for the time being with a dictatorship. Well, they can make efforts for establishing peace system. Now, what are the North Korea policy from United States, South Korea, and China? So we divide into three each areas, deterrence and defense and political status quo and the area of active engagement. So in the blue box, in the U.S. strategy, China, in the red box in South Korea, we all agree about our ideas of how to cope with North Korea provocations. You know, U.S. always emphasized that there should be security corporations among U.S. ROK and Japan. China, they try to have stability on the peninsula, which is very critical in maintaining their economic development in the future for their own interests. South Korea, we want to maintain strong deterrence defense, you know, strengthen our alliance with the United States. That's our president always emphasizes. Poltka status quo. U.S. says that, you know, and all of this actually, U.S., China and South Korea, we, the baseline is that denuclearization of North Korea, which is just the opposite to the new strategic line of North Korea, but because they want to, you know, develop economy and nuclear weapons at the same time. There will be no reward for bad behaviors in North Korea. That's the U.S. position. In China, also denuclearization in South Korea, we want to take initial steps for trust-building. So now we have the question of trust-politik. And active engagement, U.S. says that a Myanmar model of engagement toward North Korea, but still, you know, Myanmar did not have, you know, South Myanmar. You know, the no problems of being renafied by another party of their nation. So North Korea is suffering from the dilemma, you know, their fear of being observed by South Korea. So we need a more secure guarantee to North Korea if there is any. In China, they want to peacefully solve the North Korea question and, you know, recover the six-party talks and they want to solve the problem through dialogue. This is some vague and weak position, but we can have a common ground with China in doing the active engagement. The real point, real question maybe, the real issue is trust-politik of South Korea, that Park Geun-ae's, Park Geun-ae government's new policy, what kind of, you know, roadmaps, contents that we can have in terms of trust-politik, that's the question. We need more discussions. So President Park is talking about strong engagement with the North, but the problem is the feasibility. And what will happen in the future? Important factors to watch. One is the evolution of international cooperation. So after the summit, we confirmed that there will be a cooperation between two countries. That's a good thing. Six-party talks, we are not sure about that. And there will be a new summit between ROK and China. We are expecting some results from that. And we expect that, you know, many South Korean specialists expect that China will entertain, you know, our president's trust-politik, because, you know, so far we have the common interests. What will be North Korea's reaction to this? You know, North Korea will be very concerned about this. So maybe North Korea will feel that they are encircled by international community. U.S.-China cooperation, I think we are doing fine. The Minister Kerry had a visit to China and a joint statement about the possible future cooperation between two countries about North Korea problems. So we can see some evolution of international cooperation. What about North Korea? Economic situation from the summer will be very critical. You know, the weakest point for North Korea, if North Korea come back to negotiating table, that is because of the economy, which will have a bad impact upon sustaining their domestic dictatorship. And we expect some bad, you know, economy harvest from, you know, from the fall, because there is very, very, you know, low level of, you know, fertilizers, you know, came to North Korea from this year. So if North Korean people suffer from economic hardships, then we might think that North Korea leadership will come back to the negotiation. And here, Chinese economic relations with North Korea will be critical. You know, if there will be another round of economic assistance to North Korea, then they will go with Chinese support and will not come back to negotiating table probably. And if China keeps purchasing North Korea's natural resources, then they could have some hard currency from China, which will block North Korea from coming back to negotiating table. This is the last slide. So trust the politic for the future. So if North Korea suffers from economic problems, it is a bad thing, but it's a necessary thing to persuade North Korea to come back. And if we maintain some international corporations with some concrete road maps, hopefully from the trust the politic idea, then we'll have better situations from late this year or next year. So how can we take North Korea from this two-track line, strategic line, which is hopeless, it seems to us, to more co-evolutionary process in which there will be evolution of international community with a better ideas of engaging with North Korea and North Korea evolving into a better strategic line. Then we have in all this familiar menus, communicative engagement. We can communicate with North Korea even during the times of tensions. We have to give them a signal, which is we should be restoring credible with some higher audience cost, which will guarantee our genuineness in dealing with North Korea, which is kind of, you know, time-hand strategy. Active works maybe from South Korea for international epistemic and policy community, especially with China toward North Korea. And trust. Trust is important. It's an important means, not purpose itself. So we can start with a very realist idea. Interest-based trust. And then we can build some institutions. Then we can have functional trust. It's an abstract trust. And maybe not during the Poconinus period. Maybe in the future. Then we can have some personal or practice-based or emotional trust, which will help this co-evolving process between North Korea international community. Thank you. Okay. Thank you, Professor Chan. As expected, he gave us a very much succinct summary of North Korea's trilemma and also evaluate the present and personal responses to the North Korea's problems. I will introduce as a second speaker Mr. Scott Schneider. He will give us another excellent presentation on U.S. policy toward North Korea. Scott. Okay. Well, thank you, young son. I actually feel very much squeezed being here on this panel as a second presenter because J. Sung has just given, I think, a very good tour de raison of policy toward North Korea and North Korea's dilemmas. And then I have Bruce and Victor following me as discussants. And we all spend a lot of time talking about North Korea, and probably I doubt if any of us are going to break much new grounds today. And so hopefully we'll be able to come out with something more. But as I was thinking about U.S. policy toward North Korea, one of the things that I spent a little bit of time contemplating was the impact of two decades of failure in U.S. policy trying to stop North Korea from pursuing nuclear development. And I think that the fact that both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration essentially had opportunities to address the North Korean nuclear issue but also failed in various aspects meant that the Obama administration as it came into office saw very little political upside in terms of the prospects for achieving something with North Korea. And if you go back and think about where did we go wrong, I just want to suggest that in the Clinton administration I think the problem was not sustained, there was not sufficient sustained political attention to addressing some of the key issues following the negotiation of the agreed framework. And in particular I think it turned out that the failure to get the fuel rods out of North Korea as a result of a lack of that sustained attention obviously created problems. And then Bush administration obviously North Korea broke out and so that is not positive. I'm sure Victor will have more to say on that but essentially by the time the Bush administration started negotiating with North Korea the horse was out of the barn and then we have the Obama administration coming in I think they basically faced actually a different problem. The parameters of the problem changed as a result of North Korea's decision to reframe this issue in terms that were different from what had been agreed under the joint statement where you essentially had denuclearization for normalization of relations as the core principle that framed the US-DPRK interaction under the six-party talks. North Koreans came in and said no we want essentially normalization first the end of the US hostile policy toward North Korea and then maybe we'll denuclearize at some point in the future. And so I think the Obama administration faced a fundamentally different problem at some point in time they faced a reality that there was very little prospect for success. So we saw the strategic patience policy of the Obama administration which essentially was alliance based focused on alliance consultations. It did I think in the end have an engagement component to it. We all know about the failed leap day understanding from last year but I think to their credit the Obama administration also continued to send North Korea clear messages about what the parameters would be in terms of potential for making progress and we don't know all of the details about what went on in the direct secret meetings that have been publicized from last year following the leap day agreement but I think that it's pretty clear from especially national security advisor Donald's speeches that some criteria were laid down that provided a basis upon which the Obama administration could judge whether the North Koreans were serious. And so he kept on referring here at CSIS last November to a lack of seriousness of purpose so far in terms of what the U.S. has seen from North Korea. It's also very clear that the administration tried to sharpen the choice put to North Korea a strategic choice and that basically North Korea needs to change course as a prerequisite to entering into quote-unquote authentic negotiations. So there's still a negotiation pathway that the administration has signaled and then I think the other aspect that I think is notable is that President Obama keeps on referring to Burma when he talks about North Korea and he addressed North Korean leaders from Burma last November and so it's very clear that the administration is interested in seeing North Korea take steps in that direction, that that would be the preferred U.S. solution to the DPRK dilemma that it currently faces. In addition, I think that we've seen focus on strengthening alliances, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea coordination in response to North Korean provocations and also efforts to reach out to China. And of course the China piece of this I think is the most challenging and in a way the most disappointing and the most necessary aspect of what the administration has been trying to do. On the one hand, I think the Chinese continue to view the peninsula in geo-strategic terms. That means that essentially there is fundamental strategic mistrust between China and China about U.S. policy toward the peninsula. We keep on talking about denuclearization. So in some sense I think the U.S. and China have been, you know, talking past each other. As you look at China's own set of strategic interests and their emphasis on stability, it means that we should have limited expectations for what China will be willing to do vis-à-vis North Korea. But it's also clear that North Korea has been our best friend in terms of trying to convince China to adjust its policy. Because every provocation that North Korea puts greater pressure on China in the international community, and China has to try to triangulate between the international pressure that they face and their own core policy and interests vis-à-vis the peninsula that I think they still essentially have held on to. And so in recent weeks and months we've all been analyzing, you know, what's happening in China. We've seen some very interesting public statements about enforcement including the sanction of the foreign trade bank. But then you start digging down into reports and basically, you know, other banks seem to still be operating. Trade still keeps on, you know, seeming to go on. And so, you know, is China really going to put the screws to North Korea the way that American policy analysts would like to see? No, I don't think it's going to happen. I mean, basically we're in a situation where China, American analysts think that China has all the leverage, and we expect China to use it. And if you go to China they think that the United States has all the leverage. And they expect the United States to use it. And so you've got this fundamental gap that I think still remains. And then, of course, we have the Change Administration in South Korea. And there's been a lot of emphasis and expectation on the idea that trust politic and the more engagement-oriented approach of the Pak-Gun-Hae administration was going to be kind of the way out that South Korea was going to be in the driver's seat in terms of maybe finding some way of political opening to North Korea. But frankly, over the course of the summit and the past weeks, you know, it's just the issues in inter-Korean relations, the failure of K-Song, apparent failure of K-Song, you know, frankly, South and North Korea are just moving further apart. And so I don't know how a substantive inter-Korean new framework is going to easily develop because I think that both South and North Korea probably have ideas for a new deal in terms of inter-Korean relations, but I imagine that Kim Jong-un's price tag is higher. South Korea's willingness to pay is going to be lower. And so, you know, I think things are getting more difficult. And so this creates I think a really fundamental set of challenges that we are all facing. One is I think the U.S. fundamental dilemma is that frankly, I don't think the Obama administration wants to see a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. We obviously literally can't afford it at this point. At the same time, we're telling North Korea that they have a strategic choice, but I don't think that the message necessarily has teeth. And we saw a show of force in March which I initially thought was very interesting as a way of signaling to North Korea potentially that the U.S. really was going to essentially force a choice, but then it doesn't seem like that set of activities was really carried out in the context of a strategy. Now I'm wondering whether that did anything other than to reveal U.S. discomfort and lack of certainty about the North Korean leadership. And so I think that essentially where we are headed is that there's a lack of options and basically now the question is because there's a fundamental contradiction in the U.S. and DPRK approaches, I'm pessimistic about what can happen in the enter Korean relationship. Essentially the I think that the trajectory that we are on is increasingly certain to lead eventually to conflict with high cost. Or it's possible that some of those costs could be deferred but that also carries with it costs. And so basically we're in a situation where I think that anybody who is hoping for unification if it occurs will come to regret it, but at the same time anybody who wanted to defer unification once unification occurs will also come to have regretted that because we know that internal situation in North Korea is so horrible. And so increasingly I am pessimistic I think that basically there's not a great exit for this set of issues and essentially we've seen heightened possibility for North Korean miscalculation and increasing intolerance for North Korean provocations in South Korea in the United States and in China. And so this I think poses the most serious challenge actually for South Korea and that is South Korea wants peaceful coexistence. But I'm not sure whether there's a peaceful path at this stage given the nature of the North Korean regime. The co-evolutionary path would be a better option and provide some limited opportunity for avoiding conflict compared to the other path. But as Chae Sung indicated there's still a lot of ambiguity in terms of the North Korean intent and it may well be that the optimists will end up being disappointed as North Korea essentially remains in this cul-de-sac with the only way out being a reversal in course and accompanying loss of face which as we all know is probably from the perspective of the North Korean leadership the highest price that they could possibly pay and the one that they would most likely want to avoid. So I'll stop there. Thanks. For the first round of discussions Mr. Bruce Glinga will bear the first discussion. You will have comments and questions toward both speakers in roughly about seven minutes. Thank you. Almost seems a little unfair to have three commentators on two speakers is sort of ganging up. Actually when Scott mentioned that he and Victor and I spent a lot of time together so we probably know what each other is going to say even before we say it I realize that's pretty true and not just the American colleagues but our Korean colleagues as well it reminds me an old story. It doesn't even really qualify as a joke but where there's a bunch of guys spent so much time together they work together they spend a lot of time on weekends together over many many years so that they no longer had to if they wanted to remind people of a funny incident that had happened they didn't even have to go through the whole story they could just say number 23 and everyone would laugh because they knew exactly what they referred to where they all had told the same joke so many times and they'd all laugh about this good old joke so it's sort of like us with Korea and as luck would have it in the story a younger guy joins the crowd and tries to fit in and he sort of says number seven no one laughs and one of the guys says that new guy just doesn't know how to tell a joke so we're sort of like that we know a lot of what we'll say but in looking at the presentations I thought they very eloquently identified the underlying themes of this problem that we keep coming back to year after year I guess just to focus maybe on two maybe historical quibbles one in each of the presentations I would disagree that North Korea has a new strategic plan so I guess that puts me in the pessimistic camp because if we look at two assertions that North Korea now Kim Jong-un won't give up nuclear weapons and the second being this new emphasis on economic reform or economic development I just refer back to several statements by North Korea during Kim Jong-il's era about not giving up nuclear weapons in 2006 Kong Seok-joo said how is it possible for us to give up our nuclear weapons why would we conduct a nuclear test in order to abandon them in 2009 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs these are the supposed softliners the engagers said it's become an absolute impossible option for the DPRK to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons in 2010 it was those who talk about an economic reward in return for dismantlement of our nuclear weapons would be well advised to awake from their daydream and the quotes go on only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our nuclear deterrent for petty economic aid so I think there has been a long trend in North Korean policy that they won't give up their nuclear weapons and certainly I think you can make a case that they were never going to give them up that they were not developing a bargaining chip they were always developing a policy tool and a military deterrent on the economics emphasis I think if we have long been expecting economic reform the Kim Jong-il was predicted to be a bold economic reformer by the State Department's Intelligence Bureau in 1994 and that didn't pan out and now we're awaiting the 628 or the June 28th of last year reforms again we're still waiting for Godot on those and if you look at amongst other things this year's New Year's Day speech and compare it with last year's joint editorial and the previous years and the previous years there's actually less emphasis on light industry there's less references to light industry than there were last year and then less again than the previous year and then also the new economic thinking that's referenced in this year's New Year's Day speech is actually a return to the old thing throughout the speech there's references to the need to build a socialist paradise there's no indications whatsoever of reforms or changes it's all in Soviet style exhortations to fulfill the national plan as dictated by the Korea Workers Party so really it's much more orthodox really if you compare it with some of the New Year's Day editorials from Kim Jong-il's era anyway and on Scott's presentation he didn't really go into the history as he did in his written hindsight one of the things I found in that retrospective look was a great focus on the U.S. U.S. missed opportunities George H.W. Bush didn't do this and Clinton and Bush and Obama missed this opportunity I would have switched it around and put in Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-un North Korea having long denied the existence of its decades long nuclear program failed to do this so again sort of a historical quibble now looking forward I think both of them quite correctly point out the the many reasons why those many of us would be pessimistic about the chance for success some have depicted the U.S. policy now as we have decided to let PAKUNE take the lead or we are allowing South Korea to take the lead in a way I think it's more passive I think it's the Obama Administration feels they twice really attempted dialogue first in 2009 when they came into office and then with the leap day agreement both sort of exploded in their face and so now I don't think there's real inclination by the administration to lean very far forward or put a lot of political capital into it so I think there's sort of a PAKUNE hopefully you'll have better success than a long series of U.S. administrations and part of that I think really reflects the very strong confidence and comfort that Washington has with PAKUNE she's very well known very well respected very trusted here in Washington so there's not the kind of nervousness that if she reaches out to North Korea or if she reaches out to China that Washington would have had say had Moon Jae-in won the election or that we saw the nervousness with the DPJ in Japan or Noh Mi-hun in the previous South Korean administration so I think there's a hope that PAKUNE can be more successful I'd argue that actually her trust policy has far greater continuity with the email box policy than change I think it's just as he offered many benefits but also emphasize the need for South Korea to be able to defend and that eventually the you know supposed hard line outrageous demand that E-Myeong Bak had of simply asking North Korea to begin to live up to its many many international agreements you know that was seen as dooming South Korea's policy for which he was blamed for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations I think unfortunately I think we may seem that same parabola with PAKUNE I think she's emphasizing her first pillar is always a strong deterrent capability implementing defense reform and other measures and then she will as she already has tried to reach out to North Korea I don't think North Korea is going to act any better under her administration than many previous US and South Korean administrations so we're likely to see continued impasse continued provocations continued you know lack of progress on six-party talks in other areas and then eventually you know 80% of South Korea self-identified progressives will clearly blame PAKUNE for North Korea's failure to abide by its commitments and then I think we're going to be really going around in circles again just sort of in closing in looking ahead we haven't really mentioned too much about China I agree with Scott that their hopes that some signals indicate they will change but I also don't think we'll see much change from China we've seen many of these signals actually for several years now and then the US I think really right now we have a rudderless ship the you know as I said we're not real eager to push forward with North Korea you know Secretary Kerry's comments in Asia I think showed a difference between himself and the rest of the administration now whether that was just sort of still Senator Kerry not yet realizing he's Secretary Kerry and in fact he was asking US forces Korea for Massachusetts soldiers he could get his picture taken with kind of not realizing he's made that transition to Secretary you know so whether and I think some of his comments were walked back by the administration after he got back but you know is this a divided dysfunctional Obama administration like was often criticized of the Bush administration or was it Secretary Kerry just sort of playing to his engagement with few conditions inherent desires or beliefs we'll have to see and then with two other points is the Asia pivot there is no pivot there is no forces going from Europe, Iraq, Afghanistan into the Pacific there's no new permanent deployments that have been identified and in fact we're now seeing under sequestration in the previous cuts one in three Air Force planes is being deployed six more ships including two in the Pacific will stay in port rather than going out on training exercises so unfortunately these cuts are having an impact on US capabilities for deterrence of defense in Asia and I think on sanctions we're seeing the administration talk very tough about both UN and US sanctions but really there's no teeth to what they're doing there's far more that they could be doing so I think with that pessimistic view I'll conclude thank you Professor Chan Bong-geun you're too all of us were following North Korean issues and especially North Korean nuclear issues must have been extremely frustrated I just like many other Korean experts on these issues might have been approached by the government officials during our preparation of US Korea summit I was approached by one government official he was saying that what this you know the first summit should discuss my first advice was don't spend much time on North Korean issues since during the last 10 years SCAR said has not produced much it's just whatever we do it doesn't make much difference there was kind of an expression of my frustration in fact by the way our custom phrase about 20 years is becoming almost a quarter century now we have started US-DPR informal dialogue in late I believe 80s the first one was but we are passing a quarter century and probably in a few years it's going to be but I I'm kind of still relatively pessimistic that we come up with any situations the problem was this is that you know we are always saying we can't live with North Korea in your nuclear North Korea I think the consequences are too severe the problem was that are we ready to pay for the denuclearization are we ready to make certain sacrifice to denuclearize North Korea that's quite a question of always I thought that it's much cheaper to buy earlier than later but even now if we are going to buy out North Korea nuclear program you may have to pay some political, economic, diplomatic prices it might be cheaper than 5 years later 10 years later but we can do that just like we couldn't do that in 5, 10 years earlier than now that is all about you know this problem North Korea and also our problem of not making really good decisions and our North Korea policy has been very much event or incident driven I think that's going to be true for some time that is I think now it's another time of moment of truth that we have to think again are we going to continue this drift of our North Korea policy or are you going to make a new change I think that is really a serious question that I want to raise and I want to raise to both speakers are there any momentum for new thinking or new change of our North Korea policy I thought personally that in years ago we had made a fallacy or mistake of underestimating North Korea's nuclear will or nuclear capability and the regime durability but nowadays we are making another mistake a fallacy of underestimating North Korea's capacity still I believe that if only we are mobilizing our resources and are really ready to make a good strategic movement I think we are having chances of making denuclearization moving toward that direction even if it's going to take some time so there was another question that I want to ask whether are there any seeing any moment of new change of our policies another that kind of a problem that I thought could be a problem was that this so-called Myanmar case previously US always coming with good ideas look at Libya look at Ukraine but they didn't really apply to Korean situations now we may look at the Myanmar case and people maybe scholars got together and come up with a good Myanmar model and try to apply to North Korea and again we may spend another five years or so so I want to really raise that we need a really specific model of denuclearization and this case is much more difficult than other cases in the world and just like how do we solve this Pakistan nuclear problem it's extremely difficult I think we need that much our resources to solve this problem that's my idea and I want to raise another quick questions assuming that North Korea have nuclear weapons and North Korea law says that their supreme leader has a final control of the use of nuclear weapons so that means that Kim Jong-un is in control of nuclear weapons by the law do we have to leave with that I will ask Professor Victor Cho to join discussion thank you Chairman Ha so I have really three sets of comments and I have to do with the trust politic the impediments to trust politic and then this whole question that Jae Sung raised of whether North Korea is a defensive realist nuclear weapons state first on trust politic as Bruce mentioned President Park had a very successful visit here last week and one of the things that President Obama said when they came out of their meetings was that he really supported her vision of trust politic and so you know sort of analytically speaking what is trust politic about I mean how does it work and I think in my conversations with some of the people who came up with this idea I see it as being three things the first is that it starts very simply with promises they can be small promises that are kept and then once those promises are kept you build a process based on those small promises or the aggregation of those small promises and once that process is put into place over time you can create institutions this is sort of the way at least conceptually it's been explained to me I think as a conceptual exercise there's nothing wrong with that but there clearly are impediments so what are the impediments to this sort of trust building or trust politic the first is history it is very difficult to build trust between countries that have bad history and it's arguably the case that there probably is no more adversarial relationship in modern international relations history than that between the United States and the DPRK there's nothing about as adversarial relationship as you can get so the history clearly is one impediment the other and it derives from a bad history is that there always a lot of you get a lot of biases in the relationship a lot of cognitive biases in the relationship if you have really bad history so for example if I'm really if I had a really bad relationship with you then anything you do seemed to me to be less than hostile because of my biases I just disregard as aberrant information I just don't it just doesn't register for me and so these and other sorts of cognitive biases can make it very difficult for countries to build trust whether that's the US the DPRK or North and South Korea a third impediment to trust is emotion the US DPRK relationship has a very bad history but at the same time there's emotion in this relationship there's a for those of you who study international relations there's a new article by John Mercer about emotion and the Korean War and the new issue of international organization very interesting piece but again it's the role that emotion can play in effecting the way that we make rational decisions undeniably there's an emotive aspect to the US DPRK relationship when President Bush calls the North Korean leader a pygmy there's some emotion there right and in the propaganda that's spewed out on the North Korean side about the US there's clearly some emotion there and then the last and at least for the short brief remarks that I wanted to talk about is signaling and to to get to a to do this promises process and institution you have to be able to signal and this is where the points that some of the commentators raised earlier about Burma comes up because if you look at the Burma case first of all the irony President Obama saying talking about Burma as the example for North Korea is that actually part of the US government that was most against was the White House until it was successful then they piled on but the thing with the Burma precedent is that what enabled that to move forward was the ability of the leaders in Burma to signal very clearly to the United States and to the world that they were interested in making a change and that they were very they were able to do that because they had a long time which was a very easy clear and transparent way the way they treated her was a very easy clear and transparent way to signal a change in what they wanted to do arguably there are no such signals in the US DPRK relationship perhaps K-Song and Kumgang were possibly ways that you could do this but now because they have been basically destroyed as mechanisms in the relationship it's very hard to see that as a symbol and this is where I think and I'm not rendering judgment on this but here I just raised here is where I think President Park's proposal that she unveiled here both in the White House meetings and in her speech to Congress about a DMZ Park as you know Parks Park proposal is an interesting proposal because perhaps what she's doing is trying to create some way for North Korea to signal create their own version of an Aung San Suu Kyi my last set of comments around North Korea as a defensive realist nuclear state that Chesung raised as one of the possibilities right so here the argument is as a defensive realist state it's seeking cheap deterrence through nuclear weapons the problem here is that even if this were the case and this is clearly the best case scenario even if this were the case this is a terribly destabilizing situation when you have a country that is looking for cheap deterrence with a handful of nuclear weapons and here is where I think because and I would agree with Scott Bruce pretty much everybody on the panel that on the official policy side there doesn't seem to be a lot of clear path ahead it doesn't seem to be much going on but you know it's in times like this where some of the track 2 stuff may actually be helpful and one of the things that I think would be helpful in that context would be to have a track 2 premised on a very stretched assumption that North Korea is looking for cheap deterrence because if they are looking for cheap deterrence there are a number of things that track 2 could talk to them about to try to lessen the potentially destabilizing impact that this could have so for example nuclear safety you know it has been I mean over a decade since there has been anybody from any sort of international inspection regime that has been inside North Korea particularly as they are building these new reactors presumably the people who built Yongbyon are a little bit older now they must be training a younger generation of scientists that probably do not have the benefit of a great deal of information outside about safety issues second is a dialogue on nuclear doctrine and nuclear deterrence when you have a small nuclear weapons state like North Korea there is a real danger of preemptive issues sort of an escalation in which you get preemptive use as well as what is sometimes called the stability instability paradox when a country for some reason believes it has a nuclear capability that may deter action at the highest level of escalation but it actually encourages more belligerent behavior at lower levels on the escalation ladder because they believe they are a nuclear weapons state that would be a disastrous scenario in a North-South context and this could be something that American academics could participate but even South Koreans because again in a broader context I think in a situation like we are today where the policy doesn't seem like it's going anywhere having an unofficial Track 2 discussion about nuclear issues on the peninsula that raises the issues of safety as well as the issues of non-proliferation rather than simply always talking about nuclear stuff in terms of weapons or energy but talking about safety and non-proliferation responsibilities would I think be a very useful path forward among academic groups thank you two speakers will respond to major comments three discussions Scott okay well as expected I don't have much to disagree with from what I heard from Bruce or Victor I will make a couple of comments about Professor Chun's comments because he asked a couple of questions one are we ready to pay for denuclearization in some respects I think this actually illustrates some of Victor's points about cognitive bias because the North Koreans I think have clearly said that the nuclear program is not for sale and so that means that there's not a deal to be made in terms of a buyout at this stage the North Koreans seem to be looking for something else and so I'm not sure that we're going to benefit very much from trying to approach it in terms of a buyout I think that we need a different formula aside from a cost benefit calculus by which to address this and then Professor Chun asked about potential shifts or new changes in policy toward North Korea and boy I need to be careful because the newest new thinking that we've seen has been Dennis Rodman and so I thought that I was trying to be creative and have new ideas but I must admit that he completely outflanked me in terms of being able to come up with new ideas for engagement of North Korea but in an odd sort of way the North Koreans at this stage right now given given the worms analysis of Obama administration policy what I would do is I would empower the worm I think that's the way the North Koreans should go and they should try to do as much to cooperate and show that they're willing to work with Dennis Rodman including turning over the sky bay that actually would create further problems for the Obama administration but it actually could in the end shift the dynamic a little bit and then the last thing I'll say is just a small comment on Victor's focus on the park park proposal because the North Koreans have already reacted to that but the reaction that they gave I think was just illustrative of what a big challenge we have because essentially they criticized President Park for proposing a park proposal because we're at war so how can we have a peace park if we're at war that's a very tricky and dangerous approach but I think that it shows that right now the North Koreans are very confident in building it's going to be a very challenging and long process and it's actually hard I think to find places where we can get attraction, it's a real challenge Thank you very much for your great comments Momentum for New Thinking by Professor Chan after I hear all three comments the number one option for South Korea and the United States is to have a very good level of deterrence and wait for some changes from North Korea but it is not that promising there could be something happening inside North Korea so there is not that much that we can do so many pessimistic thinking from American side so it's really hard for us to have a momentum for our new thinking what I'm saying is that there will be change from the intention of leadership of North Korea it will be very hard but the structural environments are changing especially domestic environments of North Korea like in international structure if North Korea leadership does something bad to domestic structure then structural punish North Korea leadership and very weak North Korea is threatening to South Korea because they want to you know make provocations against South Korea to consolidate its own domestic power so in the short term it will be meaningful but in the long term if there is a weakening of North Korean leadership then there will be some changes it could be a hard landing or a sudden North Korean collapse so we have to prepare for that but it's not the best option because there will be a very expensive unification costs there might be some a sudden behavior from collapsing North Korea which will be very threatening to South Korea a massive inflow of North Korean refugees and many things so if possible then we can make full use of this process of weakening North Korea so what I'm saying is that we have to pay a very close attention to the change of domestic structure even though we have limited information so if we could be a optimistic then it is not because of the change of intention of North Korean leadership it's because of the changes of structural you know imperative of North Korean domestic politics and let's see and also North Korean leadership is weak in observing the police failure of North Korean leadership itself so after three or five months of provocations I think there might be some potential evaluation of Kim Jong-un's performance and it's very disappointing even to North Korean elites and also North Korean public now they cannot speak in public but they will be growing level of a failure of North Korean policy which will lead to the weakening of North Korean leadership as well and Professor Victor Chas very interesting comment on the emotional side I think it's really important in the emotional aspect of relations between North Korea and the U.S. and also between two Koreas so how can we cope with this emotional side with policies because policy tends to be very rational if we can approach the emotional aspects of the problem with emotional response then how can we rationalize the emotional side of the problem but suddenly when we look back in April Kim Dae-jung's speech about North Korea he said in Berlin that Kim Jong-il is some trustworthy or rational counterpart of dialogue and after that Kim Jong-il changes the position and well he's not the real one component of the June summit but if there is a refreshed image and then construct a process from a renewed perspective then the emotional side can change very quickly even though it's very hard so I'm saying is that we are able to change suddenly but we should have our own policy measures or aspects of dealing with the emotional side of the problem I'll stop here thank you now the floor is open any kind of comments and questions for the speakers or discussants you go first, second and third so I'm Mai with TV Asahi so Mr. Ijima Japanese Prime Minister Visit Visited North Korea this week and so I wanted to ask about this visit which occurred without any notification to the US or the East Asian neighboring countries and do you think it'll have a good or bad influence on these countries and the relationships among them that's it three questions the speakers and discussants will respond to the questions questions first? Frank Gaum Department of Defense several years ago the former US Ambassador to Korea James Laney essentially proposed the idea of putting the cart before the horse so a peace treaty before the nuclearization I guess on one hand it's basically a political non-starter on the other hand it calls and it undermines their primary argument of a deterrence so I just want to get the panelists thoughts on this idea Ji Young Lee American University this question goes to the presenters and the discussants all together I became curious what exactly is it that we've been talking a lot about how China should play a greater role in dealing with this nuclear North Korea problem but I was wondering what exactly is it in practice that the United States and South Korea wants China to do you know and if the end outcome were to be that China is in the driver's seat in the whole process of the nuclearization is it something that United States and South Korea would like to see? Okay Jae Sung and Scott will answer the question raised up Jae Sung Japan well I do not know much about the results of the conference but South Korea may want a close policy coordination among South Korea I mean US and Japan if Japan strikes a deal only for the issue of abduction and pay some returns to North Korea then this kind of behavior in a policy will hurt as I said a coordinated policy toward North Korea because North Korea only changes if it suffers from economic situations so there will be no reward well it is a bad thing but it is a necessary step that North Korea realizes that there will be no way of economic recovery without giving up nuclear weapons I don't think Japan is that far so we just hope that Japan at some point have a coordination with US and South Korea peace treaty well right now if we open a round of peace treaty that North Korea will assert that there will be a nuclear arms reduction negotiation first which is really unacceptable to South Korea and in many states so now that North Korea threatens South Korea with nuclear weapons peace treaty is very hard to achieve but we know that only with security guarantees from outside powers toward North Korea North Korea can begin to think about giving up nuclear weapons so it's a very hard question so we might think of having a different kinds of dialogue regarding peace treaty but right now that kind of option is I think unacceptable China purposely this question is a really important question China needs to play a great role one thing is that China is worrying about some unified Korea which is opposed to inimical to China's natural interests to have a very long term strategic dialogue with China that a unified Korea will not be you know bad for China's interests and will have a unified Korea will have a good role in US-China relations thank you you know advisor Ijima's visit well let's wait let's see what happens it was admittedly unexpected but I'm not so sure that it's necessarily that different from what the US did contacting North Korea directly last year or what madam part wants to do with trust public in terms of the idea of engagement so let's see what happens you know there's obviously a fundamental gap between the US and DPRK on peace versus denuclearization and at this stage the way that both sides have framed their positions really does not provide any opportunity for productive dialogue but maybe there is space for a conflict stabilization dialogue that falls in between peace and denuclearization as a way of beginning to interact again I could imagine something focused specifically on counter provocation related issues done together with South Korea in a trilateral format that would essentially be an opportunity to address some of the specific conventional issues that in any event would have to be addressed as part of moving toward a more peaceful environment on the peninsula so you know that might be one potential option for dialogue that could be considered among the various governments and of course it would require North Korea to send the signal that it's ready to engage certainly and you know on China I actually think that the most conducive opportunity by which to address the issue of in-state on the Korean Peninsula is one that came up in Pak Geun-hye's campaign and that is the idea of a trilateral U.S.-China ROK discussion and so I'm very hopeful that this will be part of the dialogue between Pak Geun-hye and Xi Jinping next month and you know if it's possible for there to be progress you know toward being able to have that kind of discussion then you know I think that's probably the easiest way of you know from a U.S. perspective of eliminating the dilemma essentially of needing to make sure that there's compliance coordination regarding in-state issues on the Korean Peninsula while also engaging China on that question. On the Japanese mission I'd say any engagement is fine by any of the allies but coordinate as Scott pointed out you know the U.S. secret missions last year raised a lot of concern and suspicion by our allies when Kim Dae Jung didn't tell the U.S. about the summit until the day of his public announcement it caused a lot of suspicion the same when Nomi Han didn't tell the U.S. about his summit you know you need to coordinate if you aren't notifying your allies ahead of time there's a suspicion there's a feeling that you're out for your own objectives and then then your allies won't look out for you if you don't look out for them I'm sure as Victor would attest it works best if you have many many pre-meetings with your allies and then many many meetings afterwards to debrief them on the peace treaty I'd say before you get on the conveyor belt make very sure you know what the rules are you can control whether you get on the conveyor belt easier than you can control the pace of the conveyor belt Nomi Han and others said you could sign a peace treaty tomorrow it's the beginning of a process it begins a peace regime we argue just the opposite a peace treaty needs to be the end of very arduous negotiations I was on the conventional armed forces in Europe delegation and that's the kind of thing you would need laying out conventional reduction in the threat that North Korea poses to the south implementation of confidence and security building measures agreements before you sign a peace treaty and then finally on China I think even sort of more basic than the good things that Scott pointed out would be just sort of how about implementing UN Security Council resolutions as you're required to how about obeying international law how about not turning a blind eye to North Korean proliferation of prohibited nuclear and missile and conventional arms how about cracking down on North Korean illegal activities that are occurring on your soil how about not adopting a value neutral position toward calling on the two Koreas to show restraint when only one is a belligerent country I think just some very basic steps they could do first peace peace regime peace treaty and nuclear safety nuclear security and command control or military nuclear weapons use doctrine in North Korea may sum up that in a similar way there was just a minor opinion in Korean policy circle since it gave some indication that we are either accepting North Korean demands or we are just giving some North Korean nuclear is going to make denuclearization out of focus but as we are so desperate to solve this North Korean nuclear problem denuclearization then I believe that there should be some ways to deal with this peace regime peace treaty in a parallel way peace regime peace treaty process is not just one very single event it's a long process I believe that it could be made somehow interconnected with the denuclearization process and also while this denuclearization is going to take some time we have urgent needs to focus on nuclear safety nuclear security and command control of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon use doctrine in North Korean issues and also then these are some of our attention I believe just quick on Japan we don't know what Ijima discussed he wouldn't talk about when he left but the interesting thing here is that you know Abe now is what it 60-70% popularity and it seems to have emboldened him he doesn't play it safe it seems to have emboldened him and as we all know he is the one who has been the strongest on this abductions issue from in part his career was built on this issue so in a sense it's like Nixon going to China so it would be interesting to see what comes out of it I'm not frankly very optimistic but one can see why he might be trying to do this and the only thing I want to say was I like Scott's idea of having a USROK DPRK discussion on counter provocations I think that would be a very useful thing we can do that this nuclear use doctrine and then parks park we can put all those three things together into some sort of three-way dialogue time is almost up but I would like to ask any kind of final questions toward two speakers okay if not I will close sessions before ending the sessions I will have just one brief comments but generally there is very much stimulating discussions I do sympathize with the cautious and pessimistic evaluation on the North Korea's new strategic line and also the possibility of South Korea's trust politic I do agree with that in spite of that two points I would like to mention and the case of new strategic line as I briefly mentioned in the welcome everyone walks the future of new strategic line so on this new strategic line is very gloomy because of the incompatibility of economic development with nuclear weapons however because of that gloomy future we have to watch over failure of John's strategic line first perhaps it might be the first momentum for the new changes because of that we should watch over and have an in-depth analysis of the current efforts of North Korea and in the case of Park Geun-hye's trust politic I do agree that the trust politic cannot be a master key to open the door for the betterment of South and North Korea relations but when we look back the history after entering the front door we still have a long way to go to enter the main room during that process trust politic will be the crucial elements of whole process that's the points I would like to mention for our further discussion thank you very much for well organized and stimulating presentation and three discussions, thank you very much ladies and gentlemen we will now have lunch so lunch has been set up on the table in the back if you could help yourself so lunch come back to your table I see our honored lunch and speaker has arrived so we'll start in about 15 minutes so so