 Good morning, everybody, and good afternoon if you're joining us from South Asia. I'd like to welcome you all to a great discussion we have today with a world-renowned journalist, actually, two world-renowned journalists. A great conversation today between Declan Walsh and Cyril Almeida. My name is Thamana Salikathine. I'm director for South Asia programs at the US Institute of Peace. USIP is a national nonpartisan independent institute founded by Congress and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for US and global security. Today, I'd like to introduce both our discussants here. Declan Walsh is, I'm sure, no stranger to all of you. He's one of The New York Times' most distinguished international correspondents. And his new book, The Nine Lives of Pakistan, is an electrifying portrait of Pakistan over a tumultuous decade that captures the sweeping images of different individuals in this strange, wondrous, and benighted country. And we're very excited that Cyril Almeida, who is also, in his own right, a celebrated journalist and a visiting senior expert with the Asia Center at USIP, will be discussing the book. Interestingly enough, Cyril actually features in Declan's book. And I remember I was actually in Lahore during the 2013 elections, the night that Declan was actually asked to leave Pakistan. And I remember getting calls from Cyril and other friends who were very concerned. So I'm very interested to hear behind the scenes stories of what happened then and throughout Declan's time in Pakistan. Since his departure, he has served as the Cairo Bureau chief and currently is the chief Africa correspondent for The New York Times based out of Kenya. He has worked all over the Middle East and South Asia, but he spent many years in Pakistan covering a very tumultuous period and learning about the different parts of the country that sometimes mystify outsiders. So this book is really an intimate and complex look at the different parts of Pakistan that are vying for maybe supremacy. And I don't want to take too much time, but Cyril and Declan, I welcome you all to discuss the book, but really just tell us, what is it about Pakistan that keeps drawing us back and keeps perplexing us at times? And why is it that Pakistan remains so vital to US national security interests and our foreign policy objectives in the region? With that, I'll turn it over to Cyril and Declan. Just to note, if you are watching this on our USIP website, you can ask questions in the chat box. You can also follow along with the Twitter hashtag that's there. Thank you. Thanks, Tamanna. Hi, Declan. Hello, everyone. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever you are. It's a happy day for me to be, you're chatting with Declan, your friend of mine, and also, as you mentioned, our stories have been entwined a little bit over the years, and wish Declan best of luck for his book, I have the American version right here. Tamanna, you were mentioning about the last night that Declan had in Pakistan, and I hadn't publicly talked about this before, but since Declan has mentioned it in his book, we had actually been scheduled to travel down to Lahore together because that was election weekend in Pakistan, May 2013. And of course, we couldn't travel down the motorway because Declan suddenly got his orders overnight. And so when I got to Lahore, obviously just busy with election coverage, meeting people, et cetera, so I didn't really have a chance to check in with Declan until after sort of filing my story on election night. And I went across to a hotel, a hotel well-known to everyone in Lahore, and was late, probably one, half one in the morning, and going inside, you know, you get a sense that maybe there's some kind of VIP guest out here as you can see, security personnel stationed inside the hotel and outside. And so then I pressed the lift, I got to Declan's room, the room he told me, and I'm like, oh wait, looks like Declan's living next to the VIP visitor. Turned out it was him, and I wouldn't get much time to speak to him because they kept knocking on the door and asked me to leave. And so I thought it was a decision I made right there. I was like, look, you know, he's a dear friend and I think he's a friend of Pakistan's too. It's very sad what's happening here. So I offered to drive him to the airport. I think probably three or four in the morning. And I haven't told Declan this, but when I did that, I went away for a little while and fortified myself. I made a few phone calls to a few friends and I said, you know, it's been a long day and a long weekend for all of us, but if you get a call from me in the middle of the night, please pick up. And that's how we went off to the airport. So while Declan, thanks for doing this. Thanks for being here. I think what we're gonna do, you know, many people are keen to hear from you. So what we're gonna try and do is like, maybe open up with some comments about your book and what you were trying to get across in this book. And then maybe we'll just have a few questions back and forth between us. And then, you know, I encourage people to ask questions in the chat box because I know Declan's keen on hearing from them and maybe that will just help and aid our conversation along. So over to you, Declan. Tell us about your book. Tell us about your stint in Pakistan. Tell us what it means for you having this US edition out. Hey, Cyril, thank you very much. It's a real pleasure to be at the USIP just after the launch of the book. It's a particular pleasure to have this chat with you and thank you for taking us down from that night in 2013 when we had this flashing light escort to the airport in Lahore and you very graciously provided an unusual taxi service for an unusual flight. I just wanna start off by speaking just very briefly a little bit about the book. It's background for people who might be interested just to sort of give a sense of where I'm coming out with the nine lives of Pakistan. The book is mostly, it sort of zooms in on this incredibly combustible period in Pakistan's recent history. It starts with when I arrived in 2004 but really the narrative takes off from about 2007 with the protests that, the street protest that started against Prevez Masha'raf. And of course, you'll remember from that period on from that moment and particularly I think about the, you know, the defiance of then chief justice Iftikar Muhammad Choudhury who was called President Masha'raf and then President Masha'raf's officer is home to get his marching orders and he fused to go. That was the starting gun in a way for this dizzying chain of events that really went on for years in Pakistan. There was the protests against Masha'raf. There was the red mosque siege. There was the return of Benazir Bhutto, her assassination, the Taliban insurgency, so many violent events across the country and the tribal belt. And then of course the American operation against Osama bin Laden in 2011 that I think in many ways was a turning point for the country as well. And I guess we're going to talk about that. So my story is framed around obviously around nine people who lived through that period or rather eight people and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. And, you know, these are nine people who have very strong compelling stories. There are people who I knew in the country but it also, you know, through their lives telling, recounting those events through that time. But the idea is also to really use that as a frame to give a much broader look at the country, you know, reach back in the history all the way back to partition in 1947 to look for the root causes of some of the things we saw erupting at that time. Also to kind of get at some of these abiding truths about Pakistan that applied in that period but also could apply in any other period in losing this one now. So, you know, crisis about religion, the role between the military and civilians all of that sort of good stuff that I'm sure we're going to talk about a little bit here. When I sat down to write and already been written about Pakistan before that ghost wars, Ahmed Rashid has written numerous books and it's a broad book about the country. And then there have been specialist books as well of course on militancy and some of the other things. So I knew that there was already a crowded field but what I was aiming for really was to try and write a book that would appeal to a somewhat broader audience not necessarily speaking to the Pakistan specialist and I'm sure there's hopefully some or many of you on this call or on this chat but really to try and appeal to a reader who knew something about Pakistan probably had followed it in the news had an active curiosity but was really probably as perplexed about what makes this place tick? How do all of these contradictions make any sort of sense about Pakistan in the same way that I had? And, you know, one influence I definitely had right at the start was Emma Duncan's book. She was an economist correspondent who had been in Pakistan I think from the late 80s on her book is called Breaking the Curfew and it starts with Zia's funeral in 1988 and that really kind of got me thinking about at least an approach. The book was originally called, my book was originally called Inshallah Nation which was a title I was very fond of and then there's some of the publisher's desire that the public might struggle with. You know, it kind of this idea, a theme that I think is still in, obviously religion plays a role but also the role of fate and how much people are trying to control their own destiny and these were ideas that really interest me. When I started writing it on that note actually I did try, in my early drafts I tried to write it in a thematic way but I quickly realized that wasn't super satisfactory it felt a little dry and I wasn't sure it was the best vehicle to really reach the kind of audience that I wanted to get to with the book. So I then started to think about how I had learned about Pakistan, how I felt that I had really started to get under the skin of the country. And I realized that a lot of the most, the strongest lessons that had stuck with me were really through encounters with people often not with the big name personalities, you know, the Masharovs or even the Benazirs or these people but kind of like the second tier, if you like, personalities of mostly of public life not all of public life, but often of public life. So, you know, politicians further down the rung police chiefs, people in the ISI or the military and it was really in my encounters with those people people who would invite me into their homes have a drink, let me ride along with them give me really this kind of incredible degree of access to their lives. And, you know, I would socialize with them and so on. And it was that kind of ingress into these really dramatic lives that got me thinking this is how I learned about the country. And this might also be a good framework to try and explain it to other people. And I think we'll probably come back to this but, you know, this idea about, I mean, there are many reasons for me why Pakistan is such a special place. It's an infuriating and complex and at the time we were there often frightening place to be but also a place that I met so many inspiring people and also a place where as a reporter I had an incredible degree of access. I mean, reporters would come across from India to cover Pakistan and they would complain about how you couldn't get a minister to speak to you or you're really shut out from government or all of these sort of, or, you know, their access in some degree was restricted. In Pakistan, I would have ministers and it wasn't just me, other reporters, ministers would return my calls at midnight or, you know, even when you would go to the most far away places, you know the basic impulse of people I met was to talk and to share and they shared these lives that were dramatic and quirky and telling. And that's what I'm trying to, that's what I hope I'm getting across here. The other aspect in the book is that as well as telling these stories and trying to explore some of these broader themes that hopefully will resonate now as much as they'll resonate with the telling of what happened back then in that period is also there's a little mystery which Cyril gets to in his introduction. As Cyril said, it was about three days before the election in 2013 when this group of a police jeep turned up at my gate at midnight with a plainclothes man in the front and he handed me this letter and this letter said, your visa is canceled forthwith and you have 72 hours to leave the country and the explanation that was given was simply on account of your undesirable activities. So there was no explanation for what those undesirable activities were. And once I left the country it started off this process for me trying to figure out why. And I'm happy to talk about that in greater detail later. It's in the book as well. But there was this mystery of why was I kicked out from Pakistan? And I went on this sort of circuitous journey to find some sort of an answer to that. And in a way, I think anyway the answer that I came to wasn't just about me but also reveals a little bit more about how the country works. Sure, yeah. I mean, it was an inviting question for many of us why that happened. And in many ways your exit from Pakistan triggered this new phase of media repression in Pakistan we've seen ever since. And of course you mentioned Hamid Meir's attack in 2014 in the book, et cetera. We'll just circle back to that. I think what I'd like to start with and sort of because as you mentioned a lot of these books in Pakistan is basically Pakistan 101. This is Pakistan, they have nuclear weapons, they have militants, they have, et cetera. And you chose this different tack of sort of writing the story through the story of these individuals. And I think you mentioned enduring truths in your opening. And I just, one thing that struck me reading your book, sort of you have Abdul Rashid Ghazi the bad guy, sort of from the early 2000s and mid 2000s, the Lal Majid character and fast forward, seven, eight, nine years and you have Khadim Rizvi sort of laying siege to Islamabad, something that Abdul Rashid Ghazi and his counterparts couldn't have even imagined to have doing. So you see these recurring sort of characters, I mean, sort of rooted in the same kind of thought process as it were. And then you have as a counterpoint someone like the iconic figure who was Asma Jahangir. So like a titan in her field, beloved by many Pakistanis and her losses, felt by many even today. I guess like, you know, sort of just the context of the book and some of the characters that you've talked to in Pakistan for every Abdul Rashid Ghazi or, you know I mean, rather for every Asma Jahangir and I know it's not possible to compare to many other people but you see far more on the other side the bad guys, the bad characters, et cetera. And I was wondering, and you have a sensitivity to Pakistan and that's why I maintain you're a great friend of Pakistan. But if you could talk a little bit about sort of, you know, Khadim Rizweez, Abdul Rashid Ghazi is occurring and coming through into sort of the public discourse in Pakistan in a much bigger way than your average and there is no average Asma Jahangir but your average human rights campaigner, for example, might. So if you talk a little bit about sort of why that may be the case. Well, I mean, I guess, you know certainly the period I was there and even these people, the Abdul Rashid Ghazis were the people who were, in simple terms, driving the narrative about the country that was seen from the outside, right? The siege of the Red Mosque in 2007 was this incredibly dramatic event not just because it transformed Islamabad which was this city that up until then people made jokes about how sleepy it was. And now, you know, it's the scene for this kind of Waco style siege with helicopters bombing a mosque in the middle of the city, just down the street from the ISI headquarters in Nampara. So the symbolism is rich, the characters, these very up until the start of the siege very media friendly clerics who were trying to get across their message. And so, I guess, certainly during that period these were the people who were driving were really, I think, at the cool face, at the cutting edge of this perfect storm of elements that were coming together all at once. And I think really unexpectedly for people. It seems to me that when I look back at it now, 9-11 and what the American military deployment in Afghanistan, it had so many second order effects in Pakistan that really changed the dynamic inside the country. And just to lay out the most simple of them, it precipitated this probably inevitable clash between the military and the security services and the groups they had been coddling for years. And it was clearly, you know, there was a divergence between these two groups that was strained to breaking point after 2001 when Basharov sends Pakistani soldiers to the tribal belt to go after al-Qaeda. They end up being sucked into this war against al-Qaeda and local militant groups in Waziristan. And suddenly then that explodes into the rest of the country. So, you know, I think that's why those figures are the people. The other reason, though, I think is it's to do with the role of the state. You know, in every society and, you know, the US, I don't need to point out obvious comparisons, but, you know, in every society, there are extremists on all fringes, on the left and on the right. But, you know, in Pakistan and arguably in India these days, what is striking is that, you know, the state is, or has at least in the past, at times, abdicated its responsibility to act as a neutral arbiter in these fights that play out. I mean, in Pakistan, of course, it's a more dramatic story because, you know, of the role of the place of Islam in the functioning of politics, all that sort of stuff has been unsettled or undecided for years. But I do think that, you know, you saw with the emergence of these groups like the Red Mosque and more recently with Khadim Rizvi and the instrumentalization of the blasphemy laws and so on, these things really show you that the state still is not acting as a neutral arbiter to try and impose, have a monopoly on the use of force and impose basic rules for a functioning democracy and for a healthy body politic. And I think that is one of the defining features of the Pakistani state, actually, that unfortunately really, you know, came to the fore during the period I was there and still seems to be the problem now. Yeah, I like that what you just said about the neutral arbiter and the state not being there. I think that tends to explain a lot of why you see this sort of disproportionate, certain kind of characters appearing time and again. The question's already started rolling in, Declan, as I expected, but I'm gonna ask you a couple, and this is one really interesting one about enforced experiences. But I'm gonna ask you a little bit, this is, you know, a day after your US version of the book has dropped, you know, the Park-U.S. relationship, as you said, since 9-11 has been defined, you know, has been a tumultuous relationship for many years, and you were there sort of the peak or the troughs rather, you know, post Osama. But sort of the relationship as it stands today, and I know you've been gone from Pakistan for a number of years, but somebody continues to watch the country, the Park-U.S. relationship, have these guys figured it out yet? Have these two states? I mean, you know, Pakistan's always had a litany of grievance, and the US has its own litany of complaints and grievances, et cetera, in the back and forth. Is this a strategic relationship? Is it a transactional relationship? And then of course, you know, sort of then over the last few years with the current administration, maybe there was sort of, you know, seen perhaps more than they've had in the past. I do I own Afghanistan, what should be done? But I just wanna, you know, sort of get your input on the Park-U.S. relationship. What we see right now, what is it? And do you think is this a sustainable proposition? Well, I always had the impression that, you know, as you say, in the book, I say it's a bit like a, I mean, it's not an original thought, but it's like a very bad forced marriage over the years. And really after 9-11, it became clear that, you know, the US and Pakistan at times have had share interests, but did not always have shared values. And in that negotiation that went on, that goes on between the countries, I often thought that even though the Pakistanis complained a lot, you know, they often seemed, I felt to get the better of the Americans in what they were trying to get out of the relationship. I think that probably changed after Osama when it really brought things to a head, but there was a long period where Pakistan was getting a lot of money and playing double games on the border and in Balochistan and so on. But, you know, looking at it from, as you say, I'm not following it day to day at the moment, but looking at it from, you know, from a distance still following, it seems to me that, you know, what's really changed, of course, is the China equation, you know, the arrival of China and Pakistan in a big way. And I'm told that in Islamabad and in many cities, there is a Chinese presence that, you know, in the past just wasn't there when I was in Islamabad. As you know, I mean, the main Chinese presence was, presence were restaurants where you could go and get a beer in the evening. And maybe a few massage parlours that ended up getting caught up in the red mosque. But that was it. So, you know, you have the Chinese aspect. And then, of course, the other thing is you have the relationship with India that's so changed. And, you know, you see this, you know, triangular struggle that, of course, has always been there between Pakistan, India and China about really taking on new dimensions now. And then the Trump administration, frankly, seemed to have pretty much given up on Pakistan the last number of years, other than to, you know, create a space or given up on creating a meaningful relationship with Pakistan other than the space that Pakistan, you know, occupied in the Taliban, in the Taliban talks in Afghanistan. And right now, when I look at that, on the one hand, it looks like Pakistan is, you know, has certainly changed its image. It's no longer seen as the kind of provocateur in Afghanistan. It's not seen as now an ally for the U.S. But I also, as you know, you see these Taliban talks and serious jeopardy, a lot of violence. And I guess my question, and I don't have an answer to this, my question is what happens if this Afghan process, God forbid, collapses and you do have a new type of war in Afghanistan or you do have the Taliban coming to power again in some, you know, in some way that is not negotiated. I just wonder where Pakistan will be at that point. I don't have an answer to that. But it seems to me that even in this new phase of the relationship over the talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan, you know, where that is leading for Pakistan is not clear. And, you know, I'm not sure Pakistan is entirely the master of its own destiny either. Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned China and India. And I didn't want to come to that because exactly those are the two, so the rise of Modi and CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative since you've been gone from Pakistan. These are the new sort of big factors in sort of how Pakistan's perceived outside and how it must interact. But before getting to that, I'm going to like flag the question from former ambassador, Cameron Munter, former ambassador of Pakistan. And he says, Declan, you said that the bin Laden raid was a turning point for Pakistan. Can you elaborate what you mean on that? Well, I think really this is probably a question Cameron Munter should be answering as he was a witness and participant to many of the things that went on during that period. But, you know, it brought to a head, of course, these questions about where Pakistan stood in relation to certain Islamic groups. Of course, there's, you know, then and still now there was this lingering suspicion that Pakistan or parts of the security services were harboring Osama bin Laden or somehow had been helping him. You know, I got to say for the record, I'm not sure that I have a clear answer on that and I'm not sure anybody does. And it always struck me that if there was clear evidence that the US had that Pakistanis had been supporting Osama bin Laden, apart from anything else, I just find it hard to believe that it would not have leaked from DC at some point by now. So anyway, for what it's worth, that's where I stand on that issue. Otherwise, though, I think, you know, it was clear that the bin Laden raid, you know, set in motion a number of minor crisis and then bigger crisis for the army and its relationship with America. It was so humiliated. It was such a blow to the prestige of the army. Not only, you know, this question about how Osama happened to be in Abbottabad, but also, of course, from a Pakistani perspective, how an American team of multiple helicopters had stole across the border from Afghanistan, carried out this raid and returned completely unmolested to Afghanistan. So, you know, there were all of these questions that it raised and, you know, to my mind actually, and I'd be interested to hear what you think, you know, it became clear to me when I look back, as you said, what happened to me was in the bigger scheme of things for Pakistani media, a very small event, but it did seem to be the start of, or at the start at the least of a period of media repression that still goes on now. And I think that, you know, the humiliation of the bin Laden raid, the impact that that had on the image of the military inside the country really made the military tick-stock and combine effort that they made against the Pakistani Taliban from, you know, 2014 on. I think you also saw them really making a concerted effort to sort of reclaim the narrative inside the country as well. You know, there have been so much incredible criticism after the bin Laden raid. I mean, Asma Jahangir, who of course features in the book, she, you know, she's going on TV, calling generals useless duffers, mocking them. There were parliamentary hearings where the head of the ISI was being pilloried. You had General Kiani, the chief army staff who did a tour of military bases in the country to try and quell discontent from young officers who were incredibly angry and frustrated or confused about what had happened. So, you know, I think in that sense, the second order effects of the bin Laden raid were also that it really, you know, forced the Pakistani military to try and, you know, come back from this period where they had, you know, they'd had a perverse mashara, they'd been in power and then humiliatingly pushed out. You had the death of Benazir Puto and all of the noise around that, all of the implications around that. Then you had the humiliation of bin Laden. And, you know, all of these things come together, really it seemed to me put this, were really heavy blow to the prestige of the military inside the country. And, you know, to put things bluntly, the Pakistani military has not been very successful in fighting conventional wars, at least. But it has really, what's extremely important for it is to maintain its prestige in the eyes of Pakistanis. And I think when we look at the media crackdown since then, you know, to my mind anyway, and I'd be curious to hear what you think, to my mind, that crackdown, you know, in large part has been dictated by the army's needs, the military's needs to reassert itself and to take control of the narrative about where Pakistan is going. Sure, yeah. You know, I mean, I think there's a lot of truth to that about sort of how the principle contradiction with the Abdul-Bad raid and the killing of Fosal and the others, the outside world, the western world asked Pakistan, how is this man here in Pakistan? And inside Pakistan, the principle question was, as you mentioned, how are the Americans able to come into Pakistan and militarily strike? I think because the helicopter crashed on site in Abdul-Bad, that was, you know, you could no longer deny it, otherwise you could say it was something else or whatever. But the crashed helicopter left physical evidence behind and after that, you know, there was this great rage inside Pakistan. And so I think maybe that does go to the sort of, the principle contradiction I think about, you know, here there's the world's most wanted terrorist and the world's question of Pakistan is the polar opposite or it's the opposite of what Pakistanis are asking themselves. And I don't think we've ever really sort of been able to sort of answer that satisfactorily. And to your point, I think President Obama's memoir, the part one of his new memoirs out, and he mentioned that I've seen a couple of excerpts from it, with the raid itself. I think the question mark really for journalists inside Pakistan over some of us was like, you know, if it had been three months, six months, nine months that he had been there, you know, you've been in Pakistan long enough, everything can slip through the cracks and mess. It was the duration and the sort of unchallenged, or as far as I understand duration for which he was there in the same place that really raises questions about how is it possible to miss this? And I don't think, I mean, you know, ever since the Osama raid, there's this thing that's come up in Pakistan about, you know, is it complicity or was it incompetence? And often the official explanation always veers to within competence, never complicity. And I think, you know, there are some question marks at least for some of us on that. But yeah, I think sort of you flagged China and you flagged some of the other things that have happened since you've gone. As you mentioned, when you were in Pakistan, China at that time, obviously dear friend, close friend of the Pakistan State, deeper than oceans and stronger than steel, et cetera. We've heard all of that over the years. But what I'm going to get a sense of is now as Pakistan goes into a much deeper economic and sort of strategic relationship with China, CPAC, you know, whatever, security cooperation, et cetera. From your time in Pakistan, what is your sense of like what underpins this relationship and what will propel it forward? Is this again, something which is destined to with some kind of uneasiness or conflict or will it just go smoothly into an ever tighter embrace? I mean, I think there's never to be got to be some friction points. One friction point that again, from the outside has really struck me, but apparently it has not caught fire inside Pakistan is the issue of the Uyghurs. It's just so, I mean, what a contradiction when you talk about contradictions, that there is a Muslim minority that is suffering terrible repression just across Pakistan's border in the Himalayas. And the prime minister of Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that he hasn't really properly read the reports about what's gone there or he can't comment on it. You know, I mean, of course we know what the real politic of that is. And, you know, I think it's important to recognize that for what it is as well. But, you know, it's so striking that, you know, for so many Pakistanis, ordinary Pakistanis, people hold dearly, you know, the case of the cause of the Palestinians or discrimination against Muslims in Kashmir or of course in India with good reason, obviously in recent years, but, you know, the kind of the ability, the willingness to turn a blind eye to what's going on in China with the Uyghurs is really striking. But having said that, it doesn't seem that that is a factor either way in this economic relationship and the strategic relationship which has grown and grown. And of course, you know, the fighting between India and China on the border, you know, only strengthens Pakistan's hand. I will say though that I'm, it's interesting to know that this is in a way, you know, a development of something that of course has been going on for decades and decades. I was just reading, I've started reading on Benet Jones's book on the buttoes, which, you know, goes through Zulfqar Ali buttoes relationship with China in the 1960s when he was, you know, viewed by the U.S. actually as a sort of Chinese, as a Maoist sympathizer. And so, you know, it reminds you that, you know, of course the scale of this relationship and the, you know, Pakistan, the way that the economic engagement that China has in Pakistan now is, you know, totally unlike anything that there has been before, but that this is a dynamic that has been there for a long time, this triangular dynamic between the three. And I guess, you know, again, we should probably, the other, the third leg of that, of course, is India. And, you know, it's hard to see actually how there's any single bilateral relationship that drives this. It seems that there's always the third thing that is a driving force as well. And I think obviously, you know, the premiership of Narendra Modi and what's going on in India is a big factor in that as well. But it strikes me that the U.S., you know, you'll be a better judge of this over the last number of years, but the U.S. really seems to have been pushed out quite a lot actually as a significant force in Pakistan's foreign policy with the, you know, growing strength with China. Yeah, I mean, the rise of China and its importance in Pakistan, well, what's interesting, I think perhaps from what gets missed sometimes outside Pakistan, is that there is an ease inside Pakistan too within, for example, the current government when it first came to power in 2018. There were some comments about CPAC. Is this commercially viable for us? Are these loans and the terms on which they are conditions? Are they good for Pakistan? I think those weren't just limited to the current government. I think it's definitely in sort of military circles too, that yes, there's a friendship here and there's a deep and we need this because Pakistan's looking for, particularly CPAC essentially started out or has been predominantly about power projects in the country, right? And fixing the power crisis that bedevils the country for a decade. Well, even this is, it's definitely an element of, from, you know, sort of the official line has been, you know, yes, this is all good, absolutely great, terrific for Pakistan, we want more of it. But quietly questions have been asked about, hey, hey, hey, you know, is this really sort of what kind of relationship are we getting into? And is this sustainable for us? But, you know, sort of the other third big peg, I guess as you mentioned, sort of conflict with India, the rise of Narendra Modi, when you were there, obviously in 2006, the Hades and Mushara for this peak and seeking, you know, the full point solution to Kashmir, et cetera. Try to understand again, as somebody looked from the outside looking in now and looking across at what's happening with India, the threat of conflict is always there since the revocation of article 370, Pakistan and India have been sort of there. Rectric has actually been sharper than ever before. Going forward again, sort of given your experience and an understanding of that part of the world, do you, is this something that concerns you unduly or is this just more of Pakistan and India sniping at each other and eventually, you know, nothing in terms of like a heart-conflict breaking out, for example? Well, one of the things that really struck me when I was in Pakistan, as you said, the period when I was there, the relationship with India was actually, relatively speaking, pretty good. You know, the Cargill War was a memory at that point, even the confrontations after 2001 over the Indian Parliament tax and so on had pretty much passed over and the sheriff and Mamohan Singh and cricket diplomacy, if you remember, and so on. So things were pretty warm during that period. And I remember I had a lot of friends, you know, in places like Lahore, and actually, particularly in Lahore, people who would go across to India, they had personal friendships there, but they also, even some people were, I remember there's a person we know who runs a wedding planning business and he was going off to India and doing gigs over there. And it was like very encouraging, you know? And by the same token, in the conversations I had with a lot of my friends about the relationship between the two countries, I often felt that when it came to, you know, the two nation theory, this idea that, theoretically, under pins back stands creation that Hindus and Muslims couldn't live, cannot abide each other, cannot live together peacefully in the same country, that there was a kind of, a lot of admiration for Jinnah as a person, but I felt there was a certain amount of, you know, not exactly embarrassment, but people sort of brushed over that. And I don't think that they really, a lot of them really believed in the two nation theory. They thought that this was a mistake, you know, as an ideological underpinning. And in some of the conversations with these same people that I've had more recently, we're talking about what's going on in India, what's going on in Kashmir, discrimination against Muslims in India, the, you know, across a broad range of things, ideological, practical, people being, you know, cow, people being killed for driving cows around parts of India, that kind of thing. And I, you know, in those conversations, people are saying, well, you know, maybe the two nation theory wasn't entirely wrong, you know, and you know, whether that's right or not, I don't want to make a judgment, but I do think that, you know, Narendra Modi or the Indian government seems to really be going out of its way to try and prove the founders, prove the people behind partition right. And I just find that dispersing. So I think that, you know, to get to your question, I don't think that this is just another phase. It seems like this is a step change, certainly inside India, you know, what it means for the relationship with Pakistan. You know, I think Pakistan has got other fish to fry as well. I don't think an all out war in India would necessarily bring anything to Pakistan right now. And of course, you know, very unpredictable effects. So I'm not sure that that would suit it, but you know, it seems that the danger of something unpredictable happening and Pakistan India history is littered with, you know, unintended consequences. Military campaigns that started with one thing and ended in something very different. I mean, look at Operation Gibraltar in 1965, you know, or Grand Slam and so on. You know, 1971, there are so many episodes where people on either side of the line and unfortunately often in Pakistan took a gamble because they thought that they were new or they were doing and it didn't work out. And so, you know, you look at what's going on in India and Kashmir and you've got to think that, you know, it's not, maybe it's no one's interest to have a war, but that doesn't mean that conflict will not happen. Sure, you know, I mean, I think you sort of touched on that. What's from my perspective, at least as one of the friends who shared this perspective, one of the more distressing things that's happened in between Pakistan India over the last decade or so. I probably sort of, you know, the turning point might have been the Mumbai attacks. Yeah, the two states have always fought and they've not gone long. Of course, there've been wars and it's a global flashpoint, et cetera. But these are two populations on both sides of the war as, you know, well-known tropes that when you put a Pakistani and Indian in a room together they get along famously, like as though they're, you know, sort of, they are neighbors. But what seems to have happened that I think, at least on the Indian side in the public, it seems to be this active, aggressive, sort of almost a hatred towards Pakistan that has. And again, I don't know whether it's sort of emerging India or rising India as it's become more powerful or others grown in economic stature. And on the Pakistani side, I think, as you rightly mentioned, since Narendra Modi, there's been this question mark that, you know, hey, what's going on with these Indians over in India? I think that's from the perspective of the journalist. It's a little sort of distressing that as long as the two states were fighting, but the people of the two countries there was a rapport between them that you could rely or fall back on, that seems to have disappeared and sort of regressed in recent years. And it's troubling. I don't know whether that's sort of in the long term going to be an even bigger problem. But so many more questions. Sorry, I forgot. I just add on that. I mean, even if you look at another big change is in the cultural sphere, right? I mean, even through the, you know, the 17s, 80s, and 90s in Pakistan people consume Bollywood movies because they love them, right? They got even when Zia banned Indian movies in the movie theaters, people brought in VCRs famously and so on. Now in recent years, you see even, you know, that cultural common point being weaponized on both sides as a way to get at the other country, right? I mean, in Indian movies now the ISI character is like your favorite bad guy, right? I mean, always was like that, but it seems like it's really been stepped up in recent years. And of course, in Pakistan, the ISPOR, which when I, that's the Inter-Services Public Relations, the Army's Press Office, you know, when I arrived, it was, you know, the ISPOR was a couple of pre-fabs in the Army headquarters and a few offices to be fair in Raul Pindi. But, you know, they interacted with journalists. They occasionally brought us on these, you know, guided tours in the tribal belt and so on. But they had a very limited rule. And now, as I understand it, you know, the ISPOR is engaged in movie production and making, you know, sponsoring its own movies that would tell a very different story about Indian provocateurs inside Pakistan. You know, it's a little trivial as an example, but, you know, it seems, again, to show, when you talk, I think you make an excellent point that even in bad times, there's been a lot of mutual solidarity and affection between Indians and Pakistanis that I've met on both sides. And it does seem that, you know, in the politics of the moment, some of that, at least, is being lost or eroded and that's sad. Yeah, yeah, I mean, for anyone who wants peace between the two countries, it's deeply worrying and troubling. But plenty more questions, Zach, then I'm gonna read one of them out right now. So it says, there's no name here, but several times throughout the book, you discuss the enforced disappearances of several Pakistanis. Drawing from your ground experience, what are some of the factors that allow, I'm gonna say, the Pakistani state to do so? We use more specific terms there. So yeah, I mean, obviously, you know, your Balochistan coverage, et cetera, and going back to the early 2000s. So this issue of enforced disappearances, missing persons, as we call them in Pakistan, is a 21st century phenomenon. I know it probably happened back in the 70s and maybe in Balochistan back then, and in other parts of the country, but it's sort of almost a defining feature, it seems, of currently Pakistan. So what do you think happened there, or has happened? I think there's probably a couple of things. Well, you know, in broad terms, I mean, it's partly, it's just very simply to state the obvious an indicator of impunity. It's about a security apparatus that doesn't answer to the law and it doesn't answer to the, it doesn't answer to a political authority when it comes to these kind of matters. It doesn't really answer to the government, actually, or it didn't when we were there. And so, you know, it is an outgrowth of the power or the authority that the security forces, and particularly the ISI and the military, have accrued themselves since the 1980s, I would say, you know, 70s and the 80s. So, you know, this was, it's a power that has grown over the years, and it really only took this kind of really dark turn, I think, you know, in the post-911 era. And again, to come back to the earlier point, you know, it was precipitated by the crisis in the relationship between the military and some of its former proxies. So, you know, if you recall, when the disappearances first came to light, it wasn't really Balochistan that was the big story. It was Islamists who are suspected Islamists who are being picked up as part of an American sponsored sweep, actually, for, you know, terrorism suspects after 9-11. So, you know, I think there was a crisis for Pakistan and for the security services in managing some of those relations. And because there was so little oversight, they went for the shortcut to try and deal with them, you know? The other factor, and I don't wanna, I mean, I think this is worth noting. I'm not sure it was the driving factor, but it's definitely worth noting is that, of course, this is the period when Guantanamo Bay was taking place. And the example from the United States at that time was that, you know, abducting people, rendering them to a place where they cannot be seen and they've got no due process and treating them in, however, you know, torturing them, of course, and among other things, at black sites, that this is something that states do. You know, I'm not sure that the Pakistani state needed that example to behave as it did, but it certainly created an atmosphere at the time that this was behavior that states across the board from the ones which at least held themselves out to have the most lofty ideals, to those which arguably the Pakistani state held themselves out to be the greatest pragmatists, you know, were legitimately engaging in. And I think that was, you know, that was disturbing at that time. You know, that segue is sort of neatly into another question I have right in front of me out here and it can send one of the sketches in your book, but I think maybe you can speak about more broadly. And the question is, why was Colonel Imam so important to understanding the complex nature of Pakistan's relationship slash struggle with militant groups? And, you know, obviously, as you mentioned, in the beginning, Pakistan has had tremendous success. I mean, when we were together in Islamabad in the early 2010s, all the way to 2014, as you mentioned, when the APS school attack happened. It was a pretty horrific year. It's like you think thrice about it. In fact, when we went to Lahore to cover the election, at that time, you know, in the back of my mind, it was also like, do I want to be out in sort of a political procession or rally somewhere? So great strides achieved or made, but yeah, the question is sort of the complex nature of Pakistan's relationship with militant groups and how do you see it today? Knowing full well that there's been a large scale eradication, at least with the TDP. Well, just to go briefly to Colonel Imam, you know, he was this character who was a source of fascination for a lot of foreign journalists at that time because he came for better for worse. He came to embody this idea of Pakistani double game. You know, in the late 2000s, you had Pervis Mishar, who was hailed by George W. Bush as his best buddy. Pakistan was raking in, you know, billions of dollars in American assistance and proclaiming itself to be, you know, ally in the famous war on terror. But at the same time, we saw the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and, you know, the undoubted presence of the Taliban leaders in Quetta and surrounding areas, machine in these places. And so, you know, I remember as a reporter for a Western media outlet, we spent a fair bit of time puzzling over, how do you reconcile these two things? And for better for worse, Colonel Imam became for a lot of people, I think, you know, at the very least a symbol of that ambiguity, trying to figure out was he still active and so on. And, you know, just to briefly digress, he again was one of these people I met in Pakistan. And I can tell you, I've just done five years in Egypt, which is also a country, you know, where the military has a strong role and has some similar characteristics with Pakistan. But it was very hard to get access to people, frankly, particularly from that milieu. It's a very closed place for foreigners to get access. And Colonel Imam was someone who, you know, I remember the first time I went to see him, he was giving an interview for a Pusher of Language TV station and I met him afterwards, I button-holed him. Next thing you know, I'm like back at his home and he's showing me, you know, his collection of war memorabilia on the wall and he had a piece of the Berlin wall there along with this inscription saying to, you know, he who cast the first blow. And, you know, just to step back from the politics of it, but just as a reporter and the, you know, the ability to meet people like that in Pakistan and get inside what was going on was really at the heart of, you know, a lot of my reporting when I was there and one of the reasons why in this book, I was hoping to try and get some of that across because in regular newspaper reports, they, as you know, you leave out a lot more than you say, you know. When you look at- You get in trouble if you don't, but yeah, you know. Exactly, I mean, we've got a few minutes left and a lot of questions out here, but I think I would be remiss if I didn't ask you and I've seen a couple of questions out here about the circumstances of your exit from Pakistan. And one of the questions I wanted to know when you were writing this book, were you able to travel back? I know you weren't. And how difficult was that? So sort of, you know, as a sort of signpost in Pakistan's turn away from a rather, a freer media environment. Tell us a little bit more about you, the New York Times correspondent by France suddenly being given 72 hours to leave. What happened there? Well, I, you know, I mean, the expulsion order was issued during the period of the, I'm sorry, what's the term, transitional government? I'm trying to remember. Interim government, caretaker government, we call them caretaker government, right? So friends who's not aware in Pakistan when an election is about to be held, the regular government steps down and there's a caretaker administration that takes over for a period of weeks in the run-up to the election. So the order that was issued against me was actually issued by the caretaker interior minister, but really I learned pretty quickly had come from the ISI. And as I said, you know, we tried really hard to find out. I, you know, we made representations at the level of the New York Times to the prime minister's office, prime minister Noor Sharif, I met some pretty senior people in the ISI in London, in, you know, where I was effectively living for a couple of years afterwards. And, you know, they just did the classic thing really, which is they would say, well, you know, obviously terrible misunderstanding, it must be. And, you know, we'll look into it and, you know, come back to us. And I'm sure we can figure something out here. I'm sure we can, you know, get this, get this overturned and get you back. And of course, you know, I think 18 months, two years passed, and then it was pretty clear that there was going to be no going back. I would love to go back, of course. I would love to go back in a personal capacity as well as a professional one. I, unfortunately I can't, as I understand it, I'm still on something called a blacklist as one of the newspaper reports about it said, I'm category A blacklist, which I suggest, I suspect means that, you know, my chances are pretty low. But, you know, as I think, you know, as ever in Pakistan, there's a, you know, there's this security rationale for things and then it gets locked into the bureaucracy. And I think to get taken off one of these blacklists you need sign off from multiple agencies inside the country. And you need to get off the blacklist, you need someone to sponsor that or some one part of the government to really champion your case. And unfortunately, since I've been out, you know, the Sharif government and certainly the Imran Khan government really haven't been, I mean, press freedom and Cyril, you know, you're the embodiment of this. Press freedom has come under incredible, has been threatened to a way that, you know, I haven't, I don't think Pakistan's seen in decades. And so the chances of anyone being interested in a case like mine seems low. You know, I hope that's not gonna be a problem. Yeah, I remember a bit of Gallo's humor when we were driving to the airport. And I remember telling you like, well, at least the worst they can do to you is kick you out. And you know, fast forward a couple of years and I was on the ECL. So there's that, lots, lots of questions I've heard that I'm gonna try and cycle through. But before I ask another one from, I just wanna know, I mean, you know, obviously we're sitting or I'm sitting here in DC and the people tuning in are, you know, looking at the popular US relationship of course. So I guess the question would be sort of as a drawdown mirrors in Afghanistan, why should the US care about Pakistan and vice versa, why should Pakistan care about the US? Is there any basis for a longer term relationship here that you see? Oh, oh, oh, undoubtedly. Yeah, I mean, certainly from the Pakistani perspective there are even from, you know, we talked about the rising influence of China and it's, you know, how it has occupied at least some of the space that was previously occupied by the American relationship. But, you know, it cannot replace everything. And there are practical issues for the Pakistani military about the hardware they have, the F-16s and so on that are important. But to be honest, I think also there are still a significant number of people even in the security establishment who, you know, who value the relationship with the US who recognize its importance. And I don't think that they wanna throw that even though they may want to hedge their bets but I really don't think that they're willing to abandon that in any substantial way. And then, you know, from the American side I would say that if history, you know, history never repeats itself perfectly but as the, you know, as the Irish poet Seamusini said it does rhyme. And, you know, it seems to me when I was thinking about this book and the fact that many of the events I'm writing about are now firmly in the past, you know, there are things that occurred in the late 2000s nearly. And as you say, Cyril, things have changed in Pakistan. The Taliban insurgency has been beaten back. You know, there are no longer, there's no longer violence in the big cities like there was before. So things have moved on for sure. But I think it's also a safe bet to assume that, you know that the enduring issues of Pakistan and the potential for a huge comfort for some sort of major and completely unforeseeable problem to blow up is still there. And, you know, if I were putting money on it I think, you know, there is certainly, you know Pakistan will be back in the news and Pakistan will be a major or significant, you know, security concern of some sort in the future, you know whether that's next year, two years, five years away. And so, you know, only your fool really would try and pretend that, you know, that it's gone away. Yeah, I didn't agree with you on that one. I mean, again, we could keep going on for a long time. I'm sure there's many more questions rolling in but we just have a couple of moments left. I guess, like I said in the beginning I regard you as a friend of Pakistan. Your book itself shows your keenness in trying to bring out something about the nicer side of the better side of Pakistan, the better angels as they were. So just maybe close on that a little bit. Tell us, I mean, you know, obviously the security issues dominate. There's a lot of bad stuff going on in the neighborhood inside Pakistan, to Pakistan, et cetera. But, you know, as somebody who covered Pakistan sensitively and with a sensitivity over the years, just, you know, final thoughts on how do you feel about Pakistan, fast forward seven years. You know, I guess this book in a way, this book was like a little bit of a reckoning for me with, you know, my status as someone who had to leave but also of course, it just made me relive, you know those times and that was a period of, you know, a great drama and all of that stuff we've been talking about. But, you know, within that, there were so many things about the, you know, it brought me back to so many events that made me laugh, you know, quirky characters, you know, the kind of people that I chose to write about in this book or people really, I just think you'd struggle to find them in many other parts of the world and, you know, so I guess I'm just left with the sense that I spent a decade of my life covering this country and, you know, I left a part of me there and, you know, I think this book for me was a way of dealing with that and I really do hope that I find a way to go back because for me, you know it's fascinating as an intellectual puzzle and as an important corner of the world. But it's also a place that for all of its problems has got, you know, so much potential, so many inspiring people actually. And I would love to be a reporter who could tell the story that in the future some of those people will get a chance to really shape the destiny of the country and to have a bigger influence on it than they might have right now. Sure, I mean, just by the sheer volume of questions coming in, it looks like you have still have a lot of fans in Pakistan and here in the US too. So I wish you best of luck with the book, Taklin, plenty of sales. And unfortunately I think we're gonna have to sign off right now, but great chatting today. And let's hope that one day we can have a meal in a Chinese restaurant in Islamabad again soon.