 to our latest talk in the Russian and Eurasian Security Research series here from the Department of War Studies, King's College London, obviously coming to you virtually for now. I'm talking to you from the UK, and then I am delighted to have with me also Professor Elizabeth Wierschnick from the United States. She is Professor of Political Science, Montclair State University, and also a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute part of Columbia University. And Professor Wierschnick has been working on Russia-China relations for quite some time, but has also expanded into other areas. But I can't think of anyone better really to talk about this. When I was writing my PhD on Russian relations with China and Japan, you know, she was one of the few people working on that area at the time. And I'm also delighted to have here today Dr. Martyn Kaszmaski from Glasgow University, Lecturer in Security Studies. And Martyn and I, I think met her some time ago at a conference and realized that we were to have a new handful of people still at that time working on the area. So it's a great pleasure to have Martyn and Elizabeth here today. And what we're going to do today is to look in the time allotted at actually a huge topic, but we're going to try and kind of focus in on a few areas of the Sino-Russian rapprochement. What are the drivers and limitations of this very important relationship? And there is, you know, this is the kind of topic that really invites a lot of speculation. And, you know, I'm sure you will have noticed that the media is often prone to rather hyping up this relationship, but also policymakers sometimes have a tendency to, you know, sort of blow up this relationship into, out of proportion, perhaps some might say, you know, so that question of course comes up time and again, you know, is this relationship an alliance or is it moving towards an alliance or is it something else? You know, how close is it and what is this relationship actually based on? And I think given, you know, the new administration that we now have in the United States, the question of the relationship of these two members of the P5 who also, you know, wield a certain amount of power in their own regions, if you like, is really quite a oppressing issue. So we will also touch a little bit on what we might expect in terms of the Russia-China relationship from the new Biden administration. So I'd like to invite Professor Wyschnick to begin the proceedings. She'll talk a little bit about what she thinks are the main challenges of this relationship. Thank you. Thank you, Natasha, for inviting me. And it's a pleasure to talk to all of you about this important topic. And so as Dr. Kurt mentioned, there has been a lot of speculation about this relationship, this important partnership. And there have been characterizations that discount the consequence of this relationship, calling it transactional and fundamentally not very durable. Others also have focused on the asymmetry involved with Russia being a dependent junior partner and seeing this relationship also is one that one or the other might abandon for this reason. And by contrast, there are a few more common in the United States during the Trump administration was to focus on the great power competition viewpoint and seeing the US factor as key in terms of serving or critics of the Trump policy would see this approach as motivating China and Russia to seek a closer partnership. And so I think these are approaches that you've all heard of if you're following this topic. But I would like to propose a different approach from what is driving them. I think to understand what's driving them, we need to look at when did this rapprochement really begin to come together. And I think I would date it from 2008 from the financial crisis when China and Russia look at the disarray in the global economy and the weakness of Western states and try to create some kind of alternatives of their own. And so this is not to discount the perceptions of Western pressure that they each feel and the problems and relations that each has with the United States. But I think that what has served as the anchor for this relationship is the agreement that they have on various values and norms of international behavior and the joint effort that they have to delegitimize Western values and to promote alternative ones that support their domestic narratives. This partnership, I think, contributes very much to the ability of Putin and Xi Jinping to maintain their political hold domestically. So for example, the principle of non-interference in the affairs of authoritarian states, the portrayal of democracies in the US in particular as unstable and ineffective, a use of disinformation campaigns in different ways, and repression of democratic movements at home. I think all of these are of a piece to counter these Western values. And also a second component of this is to create alternative approaches to various international problems. For example, to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and to create an East Asian order that would be more conducive to their own domestic goals. And so I wouldn't say they have identical approaches, but they have parallel ones. And they don't act much in multilateral for, although they are members of many together, I think they act more on a bilateral basis within a multilateral context. And they are also neutral where they disagree, so they don't always agree. They don't have identical ways of going about these efforts to create alternative approaches. But I think that they do have this joint quest to develop some kind of alternative frameworks that are more conducive to their domestic goals. However, I would say that in the regions, they have different regional identities that will create some barriers. And I'm going to just briefly mention two different areas where I think this is the case. One is in the Arctic. That's a region I've been following closely lately. And China, as you may know, is advancing a near Arctic identity to justify its growing participation in this important region. And I think this runs across purposes with Russia's Arctic identity, which is rooted in its geographically and historically and economically in terms of the importance of the regions for the Russian resource-connected GDP. And so I think this is a region to watch in terms of how Russia and China will interact in the future, especially as Russia takes the leadership of the Arctic Council this coming spring. And then Central Asia. So Marge and I, I think, will disagree perhaps on this issue. I think that this is an area where Russia and China so far have managed not to compete very overtly. But there are some new challenges on the horizon. And also, I want to mention the case of COVID, which has showed a new arena for competition. So one issue is hard security. The division of labor has always been China provides the economic goods, and Russia provides the security. But recently, China is becoming more involved in security with using its own border forces in Tajikistan and private security companies in Afghanistan. And so what will this mean going forward for this unofficial division of labor? Is this going to cause some consternation in Russia? And what kind of reaction will there be in the region? And turning to the region, I found it interesting to look at the vaccine situation in Central Asia and who's buying whose vaccine. And so while on the surface, you see cooperation between China and Russia in terms of combating COVID-19, mutual support, where their positions on the issue, some efforts to joint development of vaccines. There's a Chinese vaccine being tested in Russia. Also, some joint disinformation about the US responsibility for this virus. However, in Central Asia, you see some competition in terms of which countries are using, which Russian or Chinese vaccines, both of promoting them. But so far, what I've found is only Uzbekistan has committed to a Chinese vaccine. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which claims it has no COVID, are all using the Sputnik 5 vaccine. And others are also hoping for the Kovacs, the WHO vaccine. So it's interesting that Russia has more vaccine dominance in Central Asia than China, despite China's effort to promote a Silk Road health diplomacy. And you would think that this would be a part of development aid that China would be proposing to Central Asia. But in fact, it hasn't worked out that way. And I think that's a curious. I wasn't expecting to find this result when I was looking into it. But I find that's an interesting indication that Russia still has some is trying to maintain its soft power in this region through nontraditional means. And I don't want to go on too long, but there are other areas where I think Russia and China are at odds in this region over nontraditional security issues like water rights and so on. So I'll stop there. Thank you very much. Great. Thank you. And that was a fascinating detail there on the vaccines because I guess vaccine nationalism has been a part of the pandemic, I mean, even here in the UK, I think. But clearly, as you say, there's sort of maybe slightly hidden soft power competition there in Central Asia. And as you say, I think the respective roles of Russia and China in Central Asia, particularly with the BRI, and then Russia promoting the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, there is debate obviously among academics and others as to essentially what China's aims are in Central Asia during the extent to which Russia might accommodate those aims and what it is exactly that China wishes to achieve in the longer term. And as you said, Martian has a slightly different take to you. I tend also slightly to be a little more skeptical about Russia, China, and Central Asia. But I would be very interested now to hear Martian your take on this. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. It's a real pleasure. And what I find a bit problematic is that I agree with almost anything what Professor Wiesing has just said. So I will try to address some other aspects and return to Central Asia a bit later. If I were to sum up the Sino-Russian relationship today in one sentence, I would say that it's an ever closer relationship, but the obstacles to what we could term a full of list alliance continue to persist. And if we are to start with external factors or external pressures that to what extent they are drivers of the relationship, it has been a constant thread in the IOR literature that it is the US policy that pushes Russia and China closer together. And we can trace it back to the year 2000 into Kenneth Waltz's article, where already at that time he indicated that it is the US that pushes both states closer together. So from this perspective, and according to this logic, what we should have expected is another stage of cooperation after late 2017, early 2018, when the US puts Russia and China on the same level as strategic competitors. But despite these dual pressures or despite this conducive in quotation mark environment, we have not seen such development. So I would argue that the picture of Sino-Russian relations for the last three years has been quite mixed. Because on the one hand, what we have seen has been the flourishing of cooperation in a number of areas, security and defense, energy cooperation, normative proposition towards the West. But at the same time, we have seen Russia having more and more difficulties walking this fine line between China and India and trying to stay neutral during their conflict. Russia has limited means to support China in the rivalry with the US, even if it's genuinely wanted in such areas as technology, investment, or trade and financial markets. It is also a similar case with the South China Sea, with Russia trying to walk this fine line between China and its traditional partners like Vietnam. Discussing drivers of the relationship, we should also pay attention to at least three other elements. So firstly, the domestic politics, which Elzabeth mentioned some aspects of this, it certainly facilitates Sino-Russian cooperation. I would argue that it mitigates the effects of power symmetry. The fact that China is not a threat to Russia in terms of regime security and regime survival makes the Kremlin more willing to accept the fact that China's all the distribution of material capabilities is very biased towards China. And China's influence has been growing, for instance, in Central Asia. At the same time, there is a growing number of domestic players in Russia who benefit from China's rise and from whom the perspective of closer relations is very promising with the energy industry, both state-owned enterprises like Rosnift or private companies like Novatec, which have clearly benefited from cooperation with China. Secondly, I would throw our attention to the kind of learning process in the part of the Russian elite. Just as in the case of relations with the West, we continue to argue that Russian bad experiences with the West, the bad experiences of the Russian elite with the Western policy pushed Russia into a more assertive approach. I would say that in the case of China, positive experiences make Russia make the Russian elite less to perceive China as less threatening. For me, still the case is here, the reaction of Beijing towards the Ukrainian crisis. Finally, I would argue that we should remember about unintended consequences of the Russian policy and should not see the relationship as driven only by rational, strategic, intentional actions. For the last decades, Russian leaders have been repeating about the turn to the East and the turn to Asia. Ultimately, they have ended up with the turn to China with limited room for maneuver vis-à-vis other partners. If we look at such recent developments in the Russian security cooperation as joint bomber patrols, which were conducted both in late 2019 and towards the variant of 2020, they do not help Russia to establish good relations or cordial relations with Japan or South Korea. They are specifically serving Chinese rather than Russian purposes. And I would not like to exaggerate the Russia's dependence on China, but still I would see it as problematic for Russia in terms of growing asymmetry in its relationship with China and inability to balance it even for the last couple of years when China faced such numerous pressures from the US. So perhaps I will stop here. Thank you, Martyn. Yeah, that was a great summary, I think, really, of a kind of warning, if you like, of not assuming that Russia and China are being pushed together by what's happening elsewhere, if you like, that the relationship has a kind of momentum of its own. And I think we do need to remember that that momentum has been building since at least 1989 and Gorbachev had the window on the Asia Pacific and so on. But as you say, also unintended consequences and unintended developments. I mean, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian Federation foreign policy, policy towards Asia, the idea of a very close relationship with China, I think, was seen as actually not really on the cards, particularly at all. And for the first couple of years, it was very much Japan that was going to be the key partner. Obviously, things have changed very much since then for all sorts of reasons. And unfortunately, the Japanese-Russia-Japan relationship is still very much hobbled, if you like, by the territorial issue amongst others. But Japan obviously keeps a very close eye on what's happening with Russia and China. And I think what you said about the asymmetry in relations, I mean, really, although trade has, of course, increased year on year and is now probably about $100 billion turnover, which has obviously come on in leaks and bounds. But as before, obviously, we see that huge proportion of raw materials, hydrocarbons, and so on, making up the trade turnover. And that hasn't changed. If anything, I think it's got actually worse. I mean, as in the raw material, hydrocarbon component of bilateral trade, Russian exports to China, essentially, are raw materials. But the Russian government hasn't really done anything to try to change that for all sorts of reasons. As you said, there are domestic players who benefit from that cooperation. So positive experiences are different. Perhaps that's one of the positive experiences rent-seeking. But I guess what's maybe interesting to think about as well is there's this economic dependence quite clearly. At what point does that translate into some kind of dependence politically? Because is there a relationship between the two or not really? Because obviously, especially in the 1990s, the whole idea of Russia being a raw materials appendage, a resource appendage of China was very much in the air. I mean, these days, it's become much less of a trope. But I think that was really very much utilised in order to denigrate the idea of closer relations with China. So I just wondered if Liz and then Marcin, what do you think about this asymmetry? Does it really matter? Maybe it doesn't matter. Does it, in the longer term, what kinds of repercussions might it have, do you think? I'd like to say, I think the issue of asymmetry is often over-emphasised. And I think that that's because we don't take into account what China gets from this partnership. This China without Russia would really have very few friends. David Chambow once described China as a lonely power. And I think that's right. I mean, who are China's other closest friends? And Pakistan, and at least on paper, North Korea. So these are problematic friends. And so without Russia, I think China would find itself very isolated, especially in the UN. And also China benefits from these resources that Russia is sending, and the number two source or number one, depending on the year of oil for China, increasing gas cooperation, and now this Arctic route, which is very important for China's ability to be a participant in the region. Without Russia, I think it would be hard for China to be able to implement many of its goals in the Arctic. And similarly with Central Asia, even though China has expanded its influence, I think this is because China and Russia have come to this partnership that enables China to do that. And some China scholars are very aware that Russia can try to limit China's role in the region and does to some extent. So I think that partly the view of the asymmetry is because the Russian side talks a lot about it. They securitize this problem. And China does the opposite. They desecuritize. They say, oh, we may have different strengths, but this doesn't mean we're an unequal partnership. So I think that we need to keep in mind that China also benefits and needs Russia in certain ways. And it's not just Russia being dependent on the Chinese market. I think you're right to emphasize the fact that China does need Russia. So I suppose the question is why does Russia highlight this dependence and the asymmetry? Who is the audience, if you like, that they're talking to with that narrative? Is it the West, or is it domestic factions and players within Russia? I don't know if there's an answer to that, but marching. I would say that when we speak about the asymmetry, we need to go beyond just seeing it as a pure asymmetry in terms of material power and in terms of just GDP and military budgets, but also look at how much China's influence comes at Russia's expense. And what we have discussed before about Central Asia, the process of China encroaching into the security realm is one of these elements of growing asymmetry, which Russia cannot balance by increasing its presence in East Asia, because in East Asia, there's rather Russia that is following in China's footsteps. When we speak about the export of energy resources to the Asian markets, Russia made itself dependent on the Chinese market in terms of both the oil pipeline to China, for which the part of the Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline, which goes to China, but also the power of Siberia gas pipeline, which cannot go anywhere else. And all the ideas of building a pipeline to Korea or building an LNG terminal, the Vostok LNG, they came to nothing because of focus or forced by the Kremlin to strike a deal with China. So I would argue that from this perspective, Russia has made itself dependent on China. But certainly, there is what we can term as both self-restraint and strategic patients on the part of China. Because if we discuss the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia's brinkmanship and Russia's aggressive policy, for instance, towards Ukraine, generated a lot of difficulties for the Chinese project that completely turned off or shut down the route via Ukraine since 2014 and that's only since late 2019 when Russia agreed that cargo transports from China and to Europe and the other way around can go via Ukraine. And we don't know whether it was the pressure from the Russian participants in the Belt and Road, so mostly from the Russian rivalries, or was it the case of China pushing Russia to change its policy? And I would see the implications, the long-term implications of the asymmetry as a situation in which Russia will be forced with uneasy choices, especially if China's foreign policy becomes more aggressive and if China pushes its neighbors like India or Vietnam further than Russia has been able to to resist this pressure so far. But the question I would say is how long is it is possible for Russia to keep this as well as? Thank you, Marcin. Yes, I mean, obviously East Asia, or should we call it the Indo-Pacific now, which is what the US has been calling it for a while. And of course, Russia, I mean, Lavrov has made quite a big fuss about it being called the Indo-Pacific, you know, and has really sort of expressed Russia's displeasure at this kind of branding or rebranding, if you like, of the region. And obviously that's, I think, a point where we kind of remind ourselves that Russia also has a so-called strategic partnership with India, you know, which is, you know, a long-standing relationship. Liz, I don't know if you'd like to come in on that. And maybe here we could link to a little bit to maybe the new administration in the White House. I wanted to go back to a point that Marcin made about how China limits Russia's Asia policy. I think that what limits Russia's Asia policy is the Russian economy, that the weakness of the Russian economy has really prevented Russia from being a big player in the Asia-Pacific. I think I don't see the partnership with China really constraining Russia too much, except perhaps in multilateral fora. But on its own, I think Russia has been expanding its network in the regions in Southeast Asia, beyond Vietnam, and maintaining its partnerships with Vietnam and India. And I think that gives Russia some leverage, because Russia can increase arms sales to India, can speed up as 400 sales, can create new energy exploration agreements with Vietnam. So I think Russia has some disruptive power if it feels that China is overstepping in other ways. And I think the energy projects, I mean, the gas pipeline, admittedly, can only go to China. But other projects also go to Asia, like the oil pipeline has sales to Asia. The Arctic projects that China is invested in also will supply other Asian countries. And there are other Asian investors in the Arctic, including Vietnam and India. And so I know about the Indo-Pacific, I think Russia is concerned that the US is trying to pry India away from Russia as a partner. And India is a longstanding partner, and it's not a partnership that's directed at China. It's a parallel partnership that, or even predating the China partnership in many ways, that Russia wants to maintain. And so it's looking at how the US is creating or trying to reaffirm its partnerships in the region, especially with the Biden approach, which is likely to improve relations with South Korea and Japan and to reprioritize engaging with Asian allies while maintaining the Trump administration's earlier focus on India. So I think that creates a challenge for Russia. But so does the China-India border clashes. And so I'm sure Russia is not very happy about this outcome, because on many levels, Russia would agree with India about the importance of observing borders and not with the Chinese's more flexible understanding of border zones, which has been an impediment to Russia-China relations in the Russian Far East. So I think this is a very tricky issue for Russia. They've been trying to stay neutral, but Chinese actions may test them. So I think this is an issue to watch going forward. And when I think about the US. So in terms of the US policy, we don't really have too many clues about whether the Biden administration is going to continue with this focus on great power competition or not. And there are some indications that from an article that our national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote about how we should reframe the China challenge as not being a quest for regional hegemony in Asia, but being a broader geoeconomic challenge in terms of China seeking to play a more leading role in global governance. And I think that is the argument I was trying to make for why China and Russia are cooperating, because they can do this together in terms of internet governance or using ruble yuan payments for things or trying to create alternatives to the US or Western led order. So I think that there's some attention to this issue. And we'll have to see going forward how the Biden team navigates between Russia and China. Yeah, thank you, Liz, because I think Biden has called Russia an opponent and China a serious competitor, which suggests there's a little bit of a hierarchy there. Martin, would you like to say anything about perhaps US, potential US policy going forward and the implications for the rapprochement or perhaps policy recommendations that you might have? How should they, what would be the ideal approach if you were yourself the US National Security Advisor? Secretary? Right after the elections, we've seen signals from the Biden administration that it wants to establish a serious dialogue with Europe on the issue of China and the issue of sign of Russian relationship, entered the agenda of NATO. It was supposed, it found its place in the report. They prepared by advisors NATO Secretary General. What I am very surprised by is the policy of Europe actually. So the fact that the European Union without waiting for the transition in Washington has decided to opt for a investment agreement with China, which actually makes all the idea, the whole idea of a transatlantic dialogue on China and possibly on the sign of Russian relationship much more difficult. I would, prior to this, I would see a much more robust transatlantic approach to China and Russia and to the sign of Russian relationship. But at this stage, I don't think that the China has much to be afraid of in terms of a strong shared position of Western states. And of course, it depends on the developments within Europe. And to what extent those who oppose the agreement are able to either prevent its stratification or are able to force this type of transatlantic dialogue on China. But I think that now, I would say that now the Biden administration faces a serious test when it comes to agreeing its policies with its allies in Europe. Yeah, I mean, obviously, as you say, that trade deal does kind of raise a certain number of questions. Elizabeth. Yes, I think probably from a European perspective, watching all the chaos in the US political system of late, probably they felt that who knows what's going to happen in four years or two years or two days in Washington. And so perhaps they were moving forward. And I'm sure the Chinese side was certainly pressuring them to do this. But we'll see if it's ratified. Many agreements have not been ratified in Europe, EU constitutions, and so forth. So we'll see what happens and how the Biden administration engages with the EU, because that was not a priority for the Trump administration and perhaps a serious effort on the part of the Biden team to have a dialogue about China or about China-Russia issues might change some minds. But of course, there are reasons to have an EU-China investment agreement that relate to the issues of business and how European businesses can compete in China. So there are some rationale for this. The timing was perhaps unfortunate in terms of the message it might send, as Martin was saying, about the likelihood of some kind of unified response. Yeah, thank you. Martin, any comeback on that? I guess that we, as Liz mentioned, it's the early days of the administration and probably the dynamics of China-American relations in the coming weeks and months can push the policy or can change the course of policy in unexpected ways as well. I would not exclude some difficulties between Washington and Beijing. And the question is, to what extent Russia benefits from it and to what extent Russia would like to strengthen its position vis-à-vis China capitalizing on the fact that China faces growing pressures from the US. But so far, I understand that the current administration intends to keep sanctions which target both Russian and Chinese companies, especially the recent set of sanctions which target companies with ties to the military. It seems that the current administration intends to keep these sanctions in place, which will, to some extent, push Russia and China a bit closer together. Yeah, I mean, the idea of joint financial agreements and strengthening going forward, perhaps as well, some people have speculated for Russia to essentially be able to bypass using Swift and so on. I mean, I don't know whether that might be something that would, that kind of cooperation might increase if there are new sanctions. I mean, obviously, the EU has discussed a set of new sanctions, but I think they decided against it. So we'll have to see. OK, so just finally, Putin described the Russia-China relationship recently as an allied relationship in the full sense of a multi-faceted strategic partnership. Is that just kind of obfuscating language or playing with words? Does it actually mean anything at all? Putin says one thing to one audience and another thing to another audience about alliance, the alliance issue. And both countries have said that they would not seek an alliance for different reasons. And I think we have to look at on the ground, are they acting like allies? Do they have interoperability of military forces? Do they come to each other's aid in the case of a security conflict? In terms of the values, I would say that's where they come closest. They share certain values. But I think in the operational sense, I don't see them acting as allies yet. I think that they float this idea of a possibility because that in itself is a deterrent, because it makes other countries think that there is an alliance or there could be an alliance. But I think we should be careful about taking too much or reading too much into individual statements because there are a lot of different statements by various different actors on saying that it is or it is not an alliance. And even Putin himself has said two opposite things about this. So I'm not convinced by that statement alone. I mean, he did in a way he just really said it was an allied relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership. So even with that phrase, he's really suggesting that it's more like a multifaceted partnership than an alliance. But yeah, I think probably holding out that prospect is quite convenient in terms of suggesting to others that it might develop into that kind of relationship. As you say, it acts as a kind of deterrent. Marcin, final words? Certainly the obstacles that we have observed for the last decades is the unwillingness to support each other's most aggressive moves and the realization that entering into an alliance means that each side limits its own room for maneuver is probably the biggest obstacle. But at the same time, what we have seen, at least in terms of how they view international politics, is that Chinese rhetoric becomes more anti-American, has become more anti-American, more anti-US in there for the last couple of months. And it starts resembling what he is saying, starts resembling what Putin has been saying, what Putin said in Munich in 2007. So in the long term, it might prepare the ground, especially that it comes from the very top in the case of China. Well, thank you both very much. We have time for Q&A. There are a couple of questions in the chat, but I'd like to invite our patient audience to pose further questions. If you can put your questions in the Q&A, in the Q&A function, I think that's the easiest way to tackle them. We can go to the Q&A now and have a look. So there's a question from Kavorka Skanyan. Hello, Kavork. And he asks if a long-term fixation with this relationship with the US and the West more broadly has, to a much greater extent, been a driver for Russia's attitude towards China rather than the other way around. And then there's a question about the Biden administration, which I think you've probably really addressed. Much has been made of the possibility of peeling Russia away from China as a way of balancing Beijing, especially by those in the West of a more realist perspective. What are the prospects for this? Now, Martin, I think you addressed that actually in your article recently in survival, but I think Liz might also have something to say about that. Martin, would you like to take that one? Thank you, Natasha. I would see these ideas as impossible to implement. I mean, one reason is that it's this kind of very simplistic kind of quasi-geopolitical thinking of the part of a number of Western politicians who see that Russia can be easily thrown away from China. And I would say that there are two main problems with it from the Western perspective. First, what actually the West could offer to Russia without risking a major rift inside the West itself? And secondly, such an approach assumes that the Russian-Chinese relationship is exclusively about this rational, objective pursuit of power and personal interest, which and it ignores the whole complex of questions like the role of domestic politics, the role of domestic actors and to which I like to return to this impact of unintended consequences and of the fact that the relationship is much more complex than assuming that it just can be changed with the help of several openings towards Russia. And I think that what the signing of the extension of the new start has shown is that the US can find some room for cooperation with Russia on very specific issues, but we should not expect that they translate into a broader rapprochement between Russia and the US against China, which would be much more harmful for Russia than beneficial. Thank you. And Liz, would you like to add anything? I would agree to that. I think that there's too much focus on the possibility of US maneuvering somehow more successfully in the triangle. And I think that there are real problems in both US-Russia relations and US-China relations that are going to be difficult for the new administration to resolve. And I don't think that these are issues that can be used as bargaining chips with one or the other. So I think that's a pipe dream to be focusing on somehow peeling Russia off. Because I think they do have, as Martin said, they are domestic factors. I would say they're ideational factors that anchor them together for better or worse. And I don't think that they're going to be inclined to overlook the benefits that they get from the partnership when they have so many problems of their own with the United States. So I think what's more likely to happen is that, as Martin said, they'll be efforts to engage with each one on issues that can be discussed, like arms control or climate change or Arctic search and rescue, scientific collaboration. I mean, there are more areas that can be discussed. And I think the tone might be different on certain issues than during the Trump administration. But I don't see the US having more leverage at this moment. Yeah. And I mean, I think we should bear in mind that I think sometimes one could be forgiven for thinking that this relationship only got started and got going in 2012, 2014 from what some people suggest. But actually, this has been developing for 30 years now, really. So it's not something you're going to just toss out into the garbage. There's a lot at stake now, I think, as well. So there are a few more. There's a question here on the Indo-Pacific. And so is there any difference? Are there any different approaches? Do China and Russia have different approaches? Some European countries are coming to the Indo-Pacific. I know Global Britain is heading there. So I wonder about the views of Russia and China. Does the due developments in the Indo-Pacific make them unsafe? Russia may feel sandwiched between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Are Russia and China challenging the initiative or view in a unified way? I think we kind of partially addressed some of that. But if you'd like to come in on that, either of you on the Indo-Pacific. I'd just say that for China, it's a much more of a security threat, because that's China's neighborhood. And India is one of its opponents. And to the extent that it links up with other challengers in the region that makes the security environment much more precarious for China. For Russia, the issue is more the Russia-India relationship and how it's connected to US alliances. And Russia has a different perception of the Asian security environment. And in previous decades, managed to cooperate with the United States to some extent in that region in the 1990s, for example. And Russia also has good relations with South Korea and would like to improve relations with Japan. And so Russia, I think, has a different set of relationships and might be more concerned about the Indo part than the Pacific part. For China, it's more about encirclement. Thank you. Marchion, do you want to say anything on that one or we can move on? I would just very briefly add that what I think from the Russian perspective is a bit of a non-starter in terms of Indo-Pacific is that it is the US, the American idea, and it makes it suspicious by default. Yeah, I think you're right. Although I would say that I think Liz is right to say the fact that it's been rebranded as Indo-Pacific. I think Russia does really take Umbridge, the idea of India being the beacon of democracy in that region when Russia has quite a close relationship with India. I think it sort of has raised Russia's hackles somewhat. But it can't really do very much about it, I think. And there I would probably say I don't see that Russia and China are going to challenge the initiative in a unified way, which was the other part of the question. I don't really see that happening because I think it's fairly compartmentalized. Although I know there have been exercises and so on, I think that's not really something very serious in terms of challenging the US on Russia's part. But let's move on to a question from Ivan. Ulysses, hello. Hope you're well. Thank you for the fascinating talk. I have a question to the maneuvering and balancing by the smaller states located between China and Russia, presumably Central Asian states, derailed the Beijing-Moscow rapprochement. Could a decision by, for example, Tashkent turn the rapprochement into competition? Or is the relationship robust enough to negotiate such unexpected exogenous changes? I don't know if either of you would like to take that, or both of you. I'll say something about Mongolia. I've been looking at the Mongolia, Russia, China corridor. And I think that it introduces new complications because smaller states, Mongolia, well, it's not small geographically, but in terms of economic power and I think similarly in Central Asia, are sandwiched between Russia and China and they seek some maneuvering space. And it gives them an opportunity to look to each one and see which one provides the most benefits, which one is the most concerning and a given issue. And in the case of Mongolia and some water issues, I found that Russia was siding with Mongolia against China and so it gave Russia an opportunity to push back on certain plans that China had for border river development that were causing unease in Russia as well as in Mongolia. So sometimes it provides a little bit of space for Russia as well, not just pressure. So it's an interesting dynamic. It is, yeah, we should probably think about Mongolia more often. I mean. Yeah, and I think probably in the terms of Central Asian states, I think China tries to prevent this kind of multilateral dialogue like on water issues with Kazakhstan, there are no trilateral discussions with Russia. And I think because China prefers to be the bigger party and control the negotiations. So China is well aware of this potential threat by smaller countries to engage with others. Thank you, Marcin, do you want to add anything or shall we move on? I would say the situation is certainly worth following in particular when we talk about Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it's still not clear why the fourth branch of the Central Asia China gas pipeline has not been completed. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan also threatened Chinese investments in this state. So I think we should follow the developments closer and see it as a possible incentive for China to become more assertive in the region if its interests are threatened. But at the same time, I would argue that from the perspective of smaller states, it's being able to play Russia and China against each other, it provides them with much more room for maneuver than just subordinating their interests to one of these two powers. Okay, thank you. We have a question about relating to Vietnam. Won't Russia be forced over time to reduce its ties with Vietnam because of its economic dependence on China? And because of presumably Vietnam's hostility to China and maybe over time have to side with China over India, especially if India gravitates more towards the U.S. Also, is Iran an important partner for Russia? Well, I think maybe we'll leave that to one side for this discussion because we're kind of trying to focus a bit more on Asia, but if we have time. I don't see Russia backing down on its ties to Vietnam. I think Russia argues that these are traditional partners. They have nothing to do with anti-China policies and that just like China has other partners, Russia is going to have its own friendships in the region. And so far, Russia has only marginally made adjustments on Vietnam in terms of slightly moving one energy investment that was falling into the so-called nine line. But I think that's Russia's leverage. They're not going to give that up. And it's more than that. It's their independent foreign policy. They don't give China the right to dictate who your partners are going to be. So I think China, some Chinese scholars are frustrated by that because they see the negative impact for Chinese foreign policy. And I'm sure that there are discussions that happen about it among the leadership level. But I don't think that this is likely to change. I think that's probably right. Marchion. I can only agree with this. Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, if we remember that at the time of the Sino-Indian border dispute, Russia still supplied India with the S-400 missiles. So, you know, it doesn't really seem that they were particularly taking Chinese feelings, let's say, into account. I think they accelerated the transfer. Yeah, in fact. Yeah, they did. Right. And then a question from Zach Pakin. Hi, Zach. What will the Russia-China partnership look like in 10 years or 20 years? Nice easy question for you there. If Russia-West relations remain hostile, is there anything that China can do that would cause Moscow to want to pivot back towards Europe? If I can start on this question, it's pondering possible scenarios for sign Russian relations for the UISS in Paris last year. I would say that the biggest question when trying to imagine Sino-Russian relations in 10 or 20 years is the answer to the question, what is Russia going to look like in 10 or 20 years? While this partnership with China is certainly multileveled and that this embedded in a number of segments of society, I think we should not forget that there is quite a strong backlash both in Navalny-type opposition which perceives the relationship with China as driven by corruption and China as supporting the corrupt Russian elite. And on the other hand, the strong nationalist opposition towards China. So while in the current political climate the Russian government managed to suppress most of the anti-Chinese voices, I would see the possibility of shifts in the relationship in case of domestic, deep domestic changes in Russia. That's great. And also partly answers the next question in the Q&A. Liz? I'll answer from the China point of view. I think what happens with China will also be of great importance. For example, is China going to become involved in some regional conflicts as it becomes more assertive? For example, what if Xi Jinping decides to try to retake Taiwan? Then what does Russia do? Right, I think that would be a real strain on the kind of partnership. Could Russia actually be neutral in that kind of situation? And that's one of the factors that led to the collapse of the previous of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s when the Soviet Union refused to support China's efforts towards Taiwan. Or what if the conflict between China and India deepens and becomes more militarized? I think that these kinds of conflicts would really test the ability of Russia to maintain its neutrality and you would see how Russia would act in these kinds of situations. Another factor would be domestically in China. China faces many pressures with its ethnic minorities effort to repress ethnic expression. So what kind of trajectory domestically will China have? Will it become more authoritarian? Will it become more fractious? Fracture is there also. Great. There was a question which is related about opposition to China domestically from ordinary people, anti-Chinese sentiment that is held by ordinary people sort of differently to the Russian government, let's say. So, you know, they're basically saying will domestic opinion in Russia have any bearing on future relations? I think, Marcin, you kind of answered that question, probably. I mean, I think one thing one can say is that in the 1990s, there was a lot more anti-China feeling, which was also often played up and used by particular political forces in the regions in particular. And we don't really see that to the same extent now, partly because there was a kind of bit of a clamp down in general, and it became a bit of a taboo topic, if you like. But I guess also because perhaps, you know, people can see greater benefits to some extent. I mean, it's difficult. I think in the Russian Far East, I think I'm not sure that there is anti-China sentiment to the extent that one might think there would be, but I don't know if you want to comment, Liz. Well, I was there in the fall of 2018. There were a few surprising features that I noticed. One is that there's a lot more back and forth among people in the region. So that seniors from Russia will retire to China. They're not English people, they're talking to Spain. Right. We'll go to the dentist in China and so on. So there's a lot of near actual real Chinese tourists that you do see in Vladivostok and other places. And the public opinion polls in the regions show more positive views of China. But I think that also reflects the anti-American mood in the Russian media. So Russian views of the US and the region have declined considerably compared to what they were in the 90s. However, what you don't see is a lot of regional cooperation. So the regional agreement between Russia and China recently expired and was only marginally completed. And the new agreement totally scrapped the old projects and created new ones, much more targeted ones. And the parties that are involved are mostly state-owned companies, not regional companies. And when you have regional projects, they tend to cause a lot of trouble, like the Baikal water bottle project that was scrapped, small-scale Chinese sawmen created a lot of opposition. Oh, yeah, the timber trade, yeah. Right, and then on a popular level, people are still skeptical of buying Chinese produce. And there are certain stereotypes that persist. So I think that there's still concern about border security and the different approaches that the two countries have with Russia really being concerned about maintaining the sanctity of its border regions and China being more open to border zones, which might potentially disregard sovereignty. So I think that that's a stumbling block for regional cooperation that they have yet to overcome. If I can very briefly follow up on this. One of the problems with the relationship is that we haven't seen any major, let's put it non-geopolitical projects between Russia and China that could convince the both populations that this cooperation goes beyond kind of high politics. What is going to be interesting is to follow whether the joint project of a wide-body jet, which is to be co-produced by China and Russia, is going to be completed. This would be one of the first examples of genuine civilian cooperation and not going beyond also the type of trade between the two that we have seen so far. I think we've only got a couple of minutes left. So unfortunately, we're not going to be able to get to all of the questions, but there's one on the likely nuclearization of North Korea, which may well be accepted by China, went to that alarm Russia and strained China-Russia relations. So I didn't understand that, the nuclearization or? You know, they're talking about the nuclearization of North Korea, which might be accepted by China. I mean, I don't really see China accepting nuclearization of Korea personally. No, I think that both countries are concerned about. Yes, I think I don't think anyone really wants the nuclearization of North Korea, apart from maybe North Korea, probably. I think where they differ perhaps is what happens to a united Korea. Yeah, a united Korea would be something different. Yeah, China is more concerned about that outcome than Russia, because for Russia having another, assuming it was not a state with a U.S. force or tightly involved with the U.S., I think it might allay some security fears for Russia having another medium-sized power. Yeah, I don't know if we're going to have the plug pulled in us or not. There's another question from Pete Duncan. Hi, Pete. Asking about Africa, have Russia and China divided Africa into spheres of influence, e.g. Russia and Central Africa and Republic China and Zambia, blah, blah, blah, thus avoiding conflict there? I would speculate, because I have not been following the Russian police towards Africa, but I would speculate here that we observe a similar process to the one in the Balkans or the Middle East, where Russia and China, because they are using, they use such different instruments, they are able to reconcile their interests. They operate in different segments, different sectors of those states and are still able to coexist, but not necessarily coordinate their efforts. Yeah, I mean, I have been following it a bit and I think I would agree with that, Liz. I would just say, look at the vaccine situation, because I was just looking at that yesterday and there's, like in Central Asia, you see different countries choosing Sputnik or Chinese vaccines and I think that's an interesting development to see. Is that, because that's an area where presumably you would think China might have the edge, but Russia is, I think, trying to make its brand better known in that respect as well. I mean, I think it is an interesting development, but I think talking about spheres of influence, maybe it's a little bit too, you know, too much. And we have to remember that, you know, for example, Central African Republic is a kind of francophone country. You know, there are other players, if you like, as well. And I think that's been a factor for Russia. You know, it's been kind of engaging in certain kind of anti-French sort of rhetoric in some parts of Africa. And there was a question about the Balkans, the dynamic between China's growing economic interests in the Balkans and Russia's more traditional, historic political and cultural interests. And I think Martin kind of touched on that already. So again, in the Balkans, you see there's a kind of division. Well, division of labor, if you like, but not in a formal way. I mean, they haven't kind of agreed on a kind of program or a plan of how to do things. It's just the way that it's working out. Is that what you would say? On the Balkans, yeah. We've got one final question. I think we've actually managed to answer them all. Basically, I think this person's saying there are 370,000 Chinese students in the US, 20,000 Chinese students in Russia. So can you comment on the educational rapprochement between Russia and China? That's always been a sore spot in terms of the soft power issue. And it's just a fact that Chinese elementary school students learn English. And so they're better placed to go study in American universities than to study in Russian ones. But that's a problem going forward in terms of preparing experts for the future. And that goes back to that question of the future of the relationship because Russian isn't seen as a career builder in China for the most part, except perhaps in northern China or maybe in western China. And so there's not a lot of Russia experts anymore. There's an older generation that was trained in the 50s that's retired. And you have younger people coming up, but not that many. And so if this relationship is going to move forward, you do need personnel on both sides. I think this is an issue in Russia as well. Gabyev has written about the problem of China expertise in Russia. So you do need people who are motivated to work in this partnership. And so that's part of that puzzle. What will the relationship be in the next decade or two? Thank you, Liz. Any final words, Marcin? I guess also the problem of, to what extent, China is able to attract Russians as a place to live and as opposed to Europe. So apart from these border regions, we haven't seen Russian companies going to the Shanghai Stock Exchange and investing that much in China. So I think if we discuss the future of the relationship, the lack of this type of crisis is certainly a long-term obstacle. And just one, if we're not going to have the plug pulled in us, there's just one more question, maybe final question. Will Russia and China continue with the BRICS in a quest for multi-polarity? Or are they dead? I think they'll continue. Will they succeed in their quest? That is another matter. I think these multilateral fora are a part of a presentation or an aspiration rather than a confirmation of an existent multi-polarity. But Emily, going back to my vaccine fixation today, if you look at where China is testing its vaccines, you see it doing so in some BRICS countries. And so it is a vehicle for a certain economic outreach. And we've seen also some naval exercises among some of the countries. And so you do see some outcomes, though I don't know that we've seen a systemic change in the global balance of power. Marcin? I would return to the beginning of our discussion with the question of asymmetry. And from this perspective, I wonder to what extent we should speak about multi-polarity and to what extent we see the A system in which there is the US, China, and only on the later other players. Right, yeah. OK, well, I think we've covered quite a lot here. And thank you to the audience for your questions, which were thought provoking and forced us to arrange across a huge number of topics. I'm sorry if we didn't answer all of them, but I think we probably answered nearly all of them. There was just one really quick one about Mongolia. Will China force Mongolians to learn Mandarin and stop them learning Mongolian? But I don't know if you really know the answer to that question. Mongolia? Sorry? Mongolians in Mongolia? Or Mongolians in Inner Mongolia? Well, that's the thing that isn't clear from the question, actually. Well, in Mongolia, definitely not. In Mongolia, they're doing the best to promote Mandarin instruction at the expense of Mongolian, causing protests in a region that has not been known for it. So probably a productive move. Yes, so maybe they did mean Inner Mongolia then. It wasn't clear. OK, well, all that remains is for me to thank both of you, Dr. Martian Kashmarski and Dr. Elizabeth Wyshnick for coming along and really engaging so well with the topic, which obviously is quite a complex topic. I think you did really well to range over so many different areas. And you had answers for pretty much everything, which is always nice. And I shall now go and read up on all these vaccines. You've kind of opened up a new area of research there. Thank you, Elizabeth, for that. I really enjoyed the discussion. Thank you both again for coming. Enjoy your day, Elizabeth, and enjoy your evening, Martian. And thank you very much to the School of Security Studies, to Danny McDavit for moderating and setting us up with the discussion. Thank you, everybody. Good night. Thank you very much. Thank you for having us here. Thank you. Goodbye.