 Okay, great. Hello. My name is Laura Silver. I am a third year PhD candidate at the Voice Studies Department here and I welcome you to this year's first new voices seminar, an extraordinary story of long-term homicide decline in Mahiko in the 20th century. So those of you who are new to new voices, this series has been called to life to promote the research of PhD students and early career researchers working both within and beyond the School of Securities Studies and our speakers highlight diverse empirical, biological and theoretical approaches to understanding global security and engage with questions of equality, diversity and inclusion within the discipline. New voices has been successfully running for a couple of years now and it's usually chaired by Dr. Amanda Chisholm, senior lecturer in security studies and research and gender and security at King's College London, because unfortunately she cannot be here today. Today I have the very special honor to chair the first years, this year's first new voices seminar. I have the equally special honor to welcome presenter Raul Zepeda Hill and discuss and Dr. Vinicius Dekarwai. Raul is a PhD candidate at the Defense Studies Department and the Graduate Teaching Assistant at the Department of Varsities. Previously he earned a master's degree in political science from a colegio de Mejico and a bachelor's degree in political science and public administration at the National Autonomous University of Mejico. Currently working on youth and organized crime in Mejico, he has published research for organized crime, foreign policy, peacekeeping and Mexican politics. Dr. Vinicius Dekarwai is a Vice Dean International at the Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy at King's College London. He was the director of King's Brazil Institute between 2020 and 2020 and at the Varsities Department he is convening MA in strategic communications and teaches the undergraduate and Latin American issues. In an extraordinary story of long-term homicide decline make when the 20th century, Raul explains the logics and developments behind a long process of pacification in Mejico over the 20th century that came to an unfortunate ending in 2006. Raul will be presenting for about 20 to 25 minutes and Vinicius will have around 10 minutes to discuss Raul's presentation after which we will open up for a Q&A. So you, the audience, you are very welcome to write your questions in the Q&A section and at any time of the presentation. So yes, without further ado, Raul, we are looking forward to your presentation on this exciting topic. Thank you very much, Laura. Vinicius will be here in this seminar. I think Amanda, I know she cannot be here but she has been really nice to present and invite me to new voices and I think it's a really important space for PhD students to share the research. So what I'm going to present today is I'm going to start to share my screen. So one second. So you're seeing my Twitter feed promoting this but now you can see basically this paper that has been published in the Journal of Crime and Justice, that is the effects of long-term developments could expansion on the decline of homicide rates, from the 1950 to 2005. So, super specific at any journal paper and academic research, but I will give you some context of this. So you can read the full paper because Gladly is open access. So if you come after this presentation, read the full text as Vinicius has done. So if you have further questions, obviously you can send an email or read the paper. My email is in the paper and I'm going to share the last part of the presentation. So this is a presentation. Everyone can see it. If you can. Laura Vinicius. Right. So, with this, I'm going to tell you like the, how the, how the topic began to be made by me and my colleague that is Carlos, but Ricardo Carlos, when I, when we began this project he was a postdoc in Oxford University in the Latin American Center of Studies. And now he's a professor in CEDA that is a high in social sciences research center in Mexico. So he's now a perfect key is now part of the faculty graph that I'm going to show you next. But in that moment, one of the discussions that we were having is how to explain is everything right. Sorry, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but we are seeing the webpage of the article, not the presentation. Oh, okay. Yeah, okay, that's that's good to tell me so I'm going to. Yeah, I'm going to reach her again. Yeah, now you can see the presentation. Oh, yeah, yeah, perfect. Things that happen. Okay, so basically Carlos and I, my colleague we were in a seminar, and we saw the next graph I'm going to present. And we had no explanation for this graph. We have some intuitions about this graph and it's going to surprise to people that are not aware of the Mexican case and I will make you the context of this. This is one of the most popular presentations of Mexico show us a violent country, but I'm going to present you two different stories at the same time that is interesting. So, basically, this was the trip that I and Carlos made to explain the graph. So, and can everyone see the graph. So, this is a graph of the homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants in Mexico during the 20th century. Usually we measure homicide rates by 100,000 inhabitants, so we can compare it over time. Basically population Mexico was smaller back in the 20th century and has increased. But as you can see from 1926 to at least 27 homicide rates in Mexico sharply declined. But those homicide rates increased after 2007. So, the two main sources that show us this decline. First is a database that I use for this paper that is what Pablo picato. Sarah Dalgona and there's a juice made in Columbia University. They basically gathered information on homicide rates in judicial records, and they made a database. The other line, like that's the dark red line, the light the light red line is the official homicide statistics in Mexico. They might see different because they are registering the same phenomenon from two different sources, but they coincide at least in the tendency that Mexico was experiencing a sharp decline in homicide rates during the 20th century. And in 2007, those homicide rates increased again. Why? Because the president of Mexico during that term Felipe Calderon deployed the army against drug cartels in Mexico and drug cartels responded to that deployment violently. And since then we have seen really high homicide rates in Mexico. Even if that makes it have had even higher homicide rates, according to the data that Pablo picato, Sarah Dalgona and there's a juice gathered. These years that is a statistic as a criminal in Mexico, and there's a source in the presentation site. Mexico used to be really violent. And it becomes really peaceful during the 20th century. There's many explanations of why homicide rates in Mexico increase since 2007. But what's my interest to explain that because basically everyone in Mexico and other parts of the US and the UK have explained that graph, the second part of the graph. My interest was explained the first part of the graph that is the dark red line. So it's really interesting. In 1926, it's basically one the Mexican Revolution finished. So that's a context you need to know Mexico was living a really deadly conflict that was a Mexican Revolution really famous one. And by this point, Mexican authorities were beginning to establish a new form of government that, if you know about Mexico was a one party state system. And the BRI pre we call it Mexico, dominated politics since then. So well, the formation of the pre was later but people know that know the history of Mexico, not about this, I'm not going to throw you into political taste. So, this is the graph without the data from 2007 so you don't get too confused. So they gathered these really important database. And they basically went to the official records of the attorney general offices in the 32 Mexican states, Mexico's a federation so we have 32 states, and they made this number. So basically sharp decline from 40 homicides were 100,000 inhabitants to less than 10. So, quite, quite a remarkable process. These papers about this process. Some Latin American context, these homicide declined happened. While all Latin America since the 80s has experienced high rates of violence. So you can see several countries there. Columbia Brazil Costa Rica Salvador and Guatemala. You can see several of them suffer really, really steep increases on violence since the 80s. It's some really gruesome like the case of Columbia that almost reach 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants rate homicide rate. Basically was the war against FARC and the war against organized crime there. You can see El Salvador that was basically organized crime after the peace processing in that region in Guatemala homicide rates decline after the end of the Civil War in the 1980s. And Costa Rica has seen a spike on homicide rates. And the case of Brazil. We know that least is a country that has experienced long violence with well drug cartels but also gangs in certain cities of of Brazil. And Mexico is you see the red, the green line with with triangles basically what had lower homicide rates and anyone else, and it began to increase again in 2017. So Mexico was going in a path really different from for the rest of Latin America. So this homicide rate data show us this graph is there for all the crimes. So pick up them, let's use it alone. Also gather data on other crimes. So you can see basically that homicide the client, even if injury rates, property damage, and rubber increased after the ages. And that's not coincidence that violence in other countries in Latin America and probably Mexico increase in the 80s. Basically is, if someone is aware of Latin American history is the increase of inequality and economic crisis in days, the depth crisis that several countries in Latin America suffered. In Mexico, in particular, in 1994, we had a really big economic crisis, you can find it on Wikipedia as the tequila crisis. So that transmitted to all the region. So, and eventually, Argentina had a currency crisis Brazil had some effects, not as much because Brazil is more close economy that the other lab liberalized economies in Latin America. But basically, even if crime rates increased homicide rates did not increase, and that shows the question of why this happened, why economic trends by itself do not explain to the climate homicides. So, which are the main drivers of this homicide. The literature goes to many places. If you read people that those conflict violence crime from different sources conflict criminology sociology, international relations political science. There are some kind of important explanations. First, the legacies of the Mexican Revolution. So, most literature and civil war says that after war, new peaceful new peaceful agreements come after place so basically state, the state increases its forces, because one of the leads of the civil war winds. And they just rule the country and they establish a new order of things, and they can use force to implement that. So this literature is really remarkable for example the case of Guatemala, as you saw in the graph about Latin America, or for example the case of Japan. If you see the case of Japan that is one of the countries with the lowest homicide rates in the world. Basically the steep decline of homicide rates in Japan is due to the end of the second world. So you will see a steep decline in homicides or violence after wars civil wars or interstate wars. Basically, not all countries can keep up having violent conflicts forever. The second is luring long to a drivers of conflict, so pacification. Mandoline's another authors, taking from the civilization of theory of other sociologists has found that some cultural changes have driven the decline of homicide in the world. In the case of Europe, for example, the adoption of the decline of honor culture, and the centralization of governments afterwards. So 13th century, 14th century 15th century Europe saw really deadly violence between countries, we have the classic words that we know in Europe, but also the decline of some forms of interpersonal violence that happened. So I said a paper that is really interesting one that is, it was common in Kent in England in the 13th century that people were into duals, and they killed each other in duals so basically you find someone do disagree on something. So property or owners are they honor killings happen so basically they found each other in the middle of the street and they shoot each other or they just sold, etc. So this kind of homicide that is basically to do worlds and other kinds of interpersonal violence declining in Europe in the 20th century. All their kind of theory that has come across is that education can drive down violence by transmitting values of peaceful ways of, of dealing with with complex. The other is economic growth and the reduction of inequality and poverty can drive also to the decline of homicides basically that there's some economic drivers of violence because people are getting into violent crime to make ends meet. So basically it's a way of labor. And finally, Albertus and Kaplan for the case of Columbia, say that land reform basically distributed land prevents country insurgency, many guerrillas in Latin America searched because land wasn't distributed between the farm for the peasant class, and the elite in this country countries were landowners, and they say this for the case of, of Columbia and Peru, but all of America had really large stress of population of landowners. So these large populations of landowners were part of the motivations of revolutions in the 20th century in, and in Mexico, what happens is that after the Mexican Revolution. We draft any constitution that allow what we call the biggest land reform in history of Mexico so basically we distributed all the land to the peasants, and we abolished most of the private property of land. This happened since the 1930s, until 1997, when the government allow farmers to sell their land. Basically we collectivized land like in Soviet Union. Yes, inspired in the Soviet Union, we had a president who was an admirer of the Soviet Union that was Lázaro Cardenas from 1934. So, with all this in mind, what I did in the paper was using the database I told you so. And I read all the theories behind the reduction of violence and I just did these variables, you can see them and increase of employment reductions could reduce homicides increases cooling can reduce homicides increase in food culture so pressure demographic pressure of having lots of juice without employment can increase violence, economic growth can increase violence because basically there's more opportunities for crime. That's rational theory, economics of crime. And sociology and economics urbanization can increase violence because they're social organization family controls family can that cannot control their juice. Usually the judo are going to commit crimes. This comes from sociology, live reform can reduce homicides democratization can increase violence because it expands. Basically what theory says that democracy can expand opportunities for crime because there are many openings for organized crime to inflict in government policy. A more crime opportunity so one crime can allow you to commit another crime and an increase in punitive authority so basically police forces state can reduce crime. I tested all these theories all these theories are reviewed. And you can read about them. It's tons of many fields and stuff. So, I want you to understand Mexico 20th century, I have said something, some things about it but I'm going to share a bit more of it. What is really interesting about how Latin America, but in particular Mexico, close to the US developed in the 20th century, and you will understand my results, my results are written directly linked to this. First, Mexico is huge in terms of population, we passed from 40 million people to at least 129 million people in 2020. And this is says that we are 129 million Mexico, not because I was in census because I was here in London, but it's a huge country, we are one of the most populated countries, obviously in the table of the at least 15 most populated countries in the world in Latin America the only country that beats us and population is Brazil, and in America just in the continent just the US that has 300 million and Brazil was 200 million so we're a huge country. Feed all these people is a government's challenge. Urban population so not only population increase so also the number of the population that lives inside cities, 80% of the population of Mexico now lives in a city, and not in the, not in a rural area. So that changes that shows a lot of how Mexico changed through the 20th century. These was because we have an extensive growth period after the Mexican Revolution in literature about Latin American economy, you can see it and in Mexican history, we call this the Mexican miracle and Milagro Mexicano. That was this imaginary names, but basically saying that the module of production, the commodities at the time and the adaption the adaptation Mexico, the global economy after the Second World produces. We had increases in 12% rates some years, and it was definitely 7% growth, until the 80s, when, as I told you we had the economic crisis to face. And then is when economic expansion stopped, but these like years at least 2040 years, not 20 to 30 years of steep economic growth were really important. That basically meant that GDP per capita I know it's not the basic indicator of forward to inequality because there are many issues with this measurement, and you can have, you can read those discussions but at least we can see that increase was exponential. So basically, the economic growth in Mexico benefited that some way in some ways to most of the population in the 20th century. This also happens with life expectancy from 50 years to 74 years life expectancy rate increase. This is due not only to the increase of birth plus also because of the expansion of the health services in Mexico, even fragmented, at least you can find a clinic in some of the rural areas in Mexico and in most of Mexican cities. I think we have like the decline of like the increase of birth was paired with a decline of birth rates, but it's still high for comparative in Europe. Just to give you an example out of hand and on average at the European nation now, and mostly Western Europe is one kid per woman in family in Mexico is 347 in 1990. So that tells you that every family was having four kids five kids so we had a large, large number of young men in Mexico that still fits into the Mexican economy at their part of the working force. I'm going to show you those these population permits. Basically, we had a lot of young men that were in 1980s. Now that's the climbing Mexico is now looking more like an industrialized country with a steep decline in birth rates, basically, women are designed to have less children, and they're having to in on average, and they're going to have a population problem later, like any other European country is going to have. But at least in 1980 you can see that we have a long number of young men, basically needed for school employment, so forth and so forth. So Mexican Mexico developed a lot during the 20th century. And we increase schooling years. One of the end of the country's big success in establishing central government was universalizing schooling, we increase schooling rates from less than a year to nine years of school. An average in Europe, for example, people that reach university reach to 15 years. What is nine years of schooling in Mexico system is secondary school before high school. The comparative with the UK is like 10th year. So basically before going to university at least people know how to read, how to write, and the basic mathematical operations. Obviously this is an average. There are people going to university 34% of Mexican population go to university as myself. It's increasing, but at least we expanded schooling ranks. This graph is really important, and you will see it later. Why did I did with all this data? As you can see, I love data. First, I did for the people that don't know statistics don't worry. Basically is a panel data analysis. So I compared years and states. Mexico has 32 years, 32 states, and I compared eight decades. So these allow me to have to check the variances between regions and check the how during time these homicides rates decline. So I use what Picato, I don't want to just use your database and originally wasn't complete. So what I did was, and it's a physical tree that is called imputation. If you want to ask me about that you can, you can ask me later because it's a long thing that involves population statistics that I am not interested to show you now, but if you ask me I can show you later. I collected all the historical data I could on the 20th century. So I checked all the senses that were available and compatible registers and estimations from mostly sources. So some data is not in the database in the database because it has not been produced. For example, one clear case is inequality. So you can have a genie index for that is inequality some sometimes measured by the genie index, and you can check that later. But basically I don't have those estimations, I cannot calculate them because that requires another mathematical process that is not my time so I just So I calculated the average and you can see here. These are the two states in Mexico, and you can see that some states were pretty violent since the 20th century. Since the beginning of 20th century, Tamo Lipas, that's one of, sorry, I made myself for accident. Tamo Lipas was really violent. And then Veracruz, Tabasco, Baja California, where Tijuana is, Chihuahua that is in the northern border of Mexico, Colima that is in mid-western Mexico, Hidalgo that is central Mexico, but in general you can see there that the tendency is the same. Each state had bigger or larger homicide rates at the beginning of the century and in every state declined. Obviously there are differences between them. Some have declined in the same pace, but they had higher rates before so the decline was different, but basically the tendency was the same. So I compared from the decades from 1950 to 2005 because there's more available data. So if you don't want to be in which state I was born, I was born in the state of Mexico, a state that doesn't have any sense of name, because I will make that joke another time. So the pen and Bible homicide rates with 100,000 inhabitants to the states. These are the years of study, you can see them. Census, agrarian reform data. So I also measure the land reform, judicial records brought by states. So these are the sources, you can check them later. And I actually uploaded the database to my website. So the people that doesn't know about how to read this table, because it's very econometric econometric analysis, don't worry, just care about the numbers that have the stars besides. So the variables that have the stars besides are the ones that have a statistical significance related to the decrease of homicide rates. And as you can see, there was just one variable of all the models that I made. Each model is a different mathematical specification of how to calculate these things. If you need more details about those, you can send an email, etc. The people that knows econometrics from the public might know how to interpret these things and know the difference between the state and models. Basically, in all models, the each increase of each schooling year per decade reduced on average 24 points into the homicide rates in Mexico. So it's impressive. There wasn't a model where these didn't have effect. There wasn't a negative signal in years of schooling. So basically the variable has had more effect calculating the probability of the decrease of homicide rates was increasing schooling, so building young people into schools. So some models you can see that some variables have meaning, have some validity, in evidence per home. That's how I measure urbanization and property damage rates. So basically, there were more young men going to school. There were seven, six young men into the same household in Latin America. There was some steep crime increase that pushed a bit more homicide rates, but not that much, because most of them were going to school. I'm going to show you each triangle is each state and decade. So each state and decade. And we configure in this graph like schooling years and homicide. So, when more schooling years are measured by states, there are less homicide rates. So this is a vibrant regression. Just concentrate in the red line. If you're an expert in econometrics, the red line is going down. Basically saying that by any increase of schooling years in Mexico, by Mexican state is a kind of a 25 on average. It's impressive. And when I saw this, this graph, I was impressed that this was the most important variable in my research. So, before going. So what's the conclusion. Getting kids into school reduces violence. Three ways. But I don't know how this happens. Why, because this is hard to get in numbers. So I don't know what actually happened in those years. I just know that they have a four relation statistical. The theory say basically three things one. And schooling gives young men opportunities for life. So, if you give them formal opportunities in the formal economy that was growing up as you saw, step lead during the 20th century, giving them jobs and schooling, basically keep took them away from violence right. Second is a more routine is the way to see in school. You're keeping young men in schools for long hours. Basically we know in literature about young men and violence that is my thesis, my PhD thesis about young men violence in Mexico since 2007 that in this age critical ages between 15 and 24. Because it's your psychological transformation as an adult that you're having problems of what psychologists and communities called self control. Basically, you are more prone to take risk more prone to aggression, more prone to have a non mature kind of personality to engage in crime, and if the opportunity comes to engage in crime for example if your peers commit violent crimes. Keeping them into school, basically moves them physically from committing crimes. And the third is the transmission of culture is cool transmits culture to me. Peaceful cultures, but what kind of culture. What kind of culture was transmitted to them. That's for historians to tell me, but my hypothesis is basically that these were cultures of obedience and authoritarian government and Mexico was a one party system with an authoritarian government. And this authoritarian forms of politics and systems usually to submit authoritarian values to schools. And I have read also recent research by other scholars that Chile for example in the 19th century, the dictators after the civil wars in Chile pushed through the education system authoritarian values. The authoritarian values go to school obedience to authority obedience to the government obedience to the police. So basically schools, families, and religion is telling you to obey your audience. So that has some consequences on peace that is peace based on obedience, which happened, probably the three of them at the same time. But I cannot assure what happened in those schools in the room by historians later. Okay, limits to cut the short first. I don't have data on state capacity of law enforcement and law levels. And that's unfortunate. I don't know how many policemen were in each of these states. These results are could be better if I have that data, if education rates persist with new data. Well, my, my findings will be more useful in the future. I don't have circle date on inequality. I haven't wrote you saw in the table. There are some events of political violence that happened in 20th century Mexico that actually existed, where for example, for example, repression, political violence, we had guerrillas communist guerrillas. So there are many of the political violence in the 20th century that I don't have data. But my argument is that even with political violence violence reduce. I don't have information about health services and health consumption of people in the 20th century. For example, homicide rates are highly correlated with alcohol consumption. Basically, people get drunk and get violent and eventually they keep people. So I don't have the data. And also there's some data, so dirty war guerrillas, etc. Mexico guerrilla in the 70s. There's a region that we had steep presence of guerrillas communist guerrillas in Mexico that were eventually brutally repressed by the government in what we call the dirty war. So, contributions. This is a starting point to discuss the history of violent crime in Mexico and Latin America. The evidence of the effect of a school expansion can be tested in more settings and comparisons with the other countries in Latin America and other places, like Latin America in that sense is not alien to other processes of development. And historical research provides evidence for peace building and violence reduction. That's one important thing. So these helps us to understand how we can develop development policies, in this case, opening schools to reduce violence in countries after come in countries that experience deeply violent conflicts later. So, basically that's many references to consider later and that's my email. So, that's my name. And thank you very much. Okay, great. Well, thank you very much. This was a very rich explanation of the story behind the defining and yet little characteristic of a significant part of my recent history. So, yeah, to give enough time for Q&A, I will just right now pass on to Vinicius for his discussion. Thank you very much, Laura. And thank you also Raul for your presentation and for the invitation to discuss your paper is a great honor for me. I am very limited quantitatively speaking on methodologies to discuss most of the elements the fundamental elements of your text but my comments will concentrate in some conceptual and and probably some some traps that we can have in your text that I would like to provoke you to talk about then. It is it's a very interesting work you have done looking about looking around statistics from a quite long period and combining elements that could give you a good, a good consolidation for arguments that you are putting there know. Well, first of all, some some issues on your paper that I would like to ask you if you could clarify better because I sometimes was in doubt if you are discussing violence or homicides, or taking the NSC synonyms, because sometimes you conclude about violence but talking about homicides and discussing that as one is almost similar to the other. There's one point that I would like to discuss here the other one is, you praise and use a lot the word pacification. This is a is a terminology quite often used in many Latin American countries. And would be good to know what's the definition of pacification that you are using when you use this terminology because in Latin America, sometimes and for many countries, the term pacification actually was used to justify state against large parts of the population included those that you are saying that are beneficiaries of those public policies like schooling. So it's so interesting when you quote Eisner and Norbert Elias and the element of strengthening of state control to reduce violence. And it's so curious because in many aspects of Latin America as well the strength of state control actually was an strength of state violence. Of course, we in modern terms we see them understand that the state is the has the monopoly of the violence over the violence but the question is, when, when this monopoly turns into and against the population itself. And how can we measure if this state violence is actually not increasing or sorry this is the strength of the state is actually not increasing. I will not say violence but homicide rates, or, or that's that's again what my point here because you mentioned that tangentially, and you, you are defending yourself very well that you are not getting into the political context of that but how much of the social violence committed in the States, like Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, etc. Also, cause a huge growing in violence, even through schooling as well. So what's the difference between homicides and that's in social confrontation. I would put like that thing is that would be very interesting to bring as well. How much, how that, how much that we have about state violence or state homicides or dead provoked by the state. Another important element that I think would be interesting to see more nuanced, if you are thinking on develop this further is the comparison among states in Mexico. And a few years ago I supervised the dissertation at a massive certations by Manuel solis galleana here, and he was talking about the violence in the state of Guerrero in particular. And actually, what we saw is really a growing numbers of homicides year by year despite his schooling happening there. So would be great to see how much this dialogue among states, don't, don't represent a counterpoint to the main argument that you are bringing in your paper know. There's a very optimistic approach to towards our society and especially very optimistic about schooling but again, we, we have some papers, and I quote one published by you none indeed school violence in Mexico exploits dimensions and violence by Jose del tronco Paganelli, he had a madrigal Ramirez, and then there is an aspect also to think about that how much schooling also don't reproduce social violence, and actually come make a sort of camouflage of this violence in order to happen within the walls of the schooling, and students start to experiment violence, probably not homicides, but violence within the institution school, and that will be not not visible on statistics, clearly here. Looking ahead for continuation of your research would be very interesting to see as well this counterpoint, how much schooling is also creating other sorts of violence or reproducing or perpetrating other sorts of violence that are not necessarily homicide. I will not go further and longer in that but just keep on this points that I think are fundamental for discussing this paper that actually taught me a lot and I learned a lot reading what you wrote is exactly is this clear definition of violence and homicide, how we correlate what we should or not, what's the risk of correlating this to only the second aspect is this concept of pacification, why we are using that and what we are considered pacification, which models of pacification are in terms here. And for many, as I said many counts pacification means exactly to for instance exterminate indigenous populations. So that's a, it's a process of state violence or institution violence as well. And the third one is this as this counterpoint of of violence is cooling also being a sort of space for reproducing violence or camouflage other sorts of violence as well. I am afraid I cannot as I said discuss further the data and the findings due to my ignorance on quantitative methodology methodologies, but I just want to congratulate you as well for for this work that you have done until now. Okay, thank you very much Vinicius. This is some very important comments on the foundations of the paper and say, actually, I think it would make sense not to pass it back to you Raul if you would like to comment on Vinicius discussion and then we can open up with you. Thank you. No, no, I really appreciate these, these questions, because they these are also academic debates by themselves that I understand. And obviously when one is crafting research is going to fall into this debate and has to defend itself as you say. Further, and I can see the Q&A the two questions are there that basically go in the same line that Vinicius. So if you allow me at Laura. So we just go directly to the questions to, but I will address it simultaneously because I think they are part of the same story about the paper. So, the first is, I do one thing that status Calipas does in the logic of civil wars, if it's seminal book that is basically saying for us for measuring conflict and violence, the proxy is homicides. It has indeed a problem that is conceptual that is other kinds of violence that are not deaths. In these cases implies for example torture and police violence, this police abuse harassment, meaning all these other ways that are not directly deadly violence made by the state are not necessarily measured. There are some consequences, of course, that it's meaning that overstates the pacification process, when the other kinds of violence happens. But I think that both are simultaneously. So to increase violence that is not deadly. So you can keep up the dialysis was that in some senses, and I will say it from Mexican history. So I'm going to use an example Mexican history. Now, if I'm not wrong in 1928. The presidential candidate, I don't want one wanted to run against, he wanted to run for a second term of president. If someone else the Mexican Revolution, what's the revolution against reelection, and he was killed months before taking off the second. So you can use violence to pacify. Exactly, you can do that like you can pacify by violent means, and that sends a signal to everyone in society that if more violence happens, or more attempts to break out the rules of the previous violence established violence is going to happen and repression is going to come. And that means, essentially, that those are the two heads of the same point, you can pacify by violence, or you can pacify by, in this case, social policy, what I say is that both happen in Mexico at the same time. There's a political violence happening. And there's a long historiography that I said in the article. If someone is interested in reading like the, there's one book by Benjamin Smith that is called big table and that basically he's, she shows all these kinds of other forms of state violence used that is case torture experiences menaces and kidnappings abused by police and threats. These old forms of state violence was used basically to make that, for example, the generals that initiated reports against the central government because we had reports against the central government since the Mexican Revolution like continuously. There was a general that popped up every two years, wanting to be president, and he was big again, beginning of rebellion explains the initial part of the graph is basically general rebellion against the state government, the central government, and the state usually use roots of violence against them. That's the case that used for example against that of me and said easier and other channels. So that's one. To understand that methodologically, it's out of my scope, the forms of political violence that is not. And also like the forms of violence that is not physical that I know the psychological violence and socio economic violence marginalization that comes to that. So I know that, and that's a defect of the data and the method. So part of my argument is that, how much I treat the client, but all the forces of violence happen. There's a recent book, actually the author, all the gather this database, publish a recent book about the history of the story of me Lima de la Valencia, Mexico, minimum history violence in Mexico by El Colegio de Mexico. So you can go to the Colegio de Mexico and search for the book by Pablo picato and he makes the historiographic accounts of these other parts of violence. The argument is that even if we have many types of violence, the country experience of the client on the deadly one, very steep. So this can coexist. And this is the case of the dirty word in Guerrero, for example, that you can have many way, many forms of violence happen at the same time. But in overall the territory, the steep decline of homicide rates was so big that even these increases that could happen in Guerrero and truck and where they were rebellious by communist guerrillas was not enough to reverse the decline of violence in the whole country. So that's interesting. So it's a case of the central government fighting against the localized rebellions. I'm reading the question so to not to go from this and go to the other, other way to respond to your questions that is the homicide data between 26 of the excluded dates of political armed conflict include the crystal wars. And the answer is, we don't know. Because these are judicial registries. And usually a nice site did closer, who usually studies, basically counting debts in conflict perpetrators of violence tried to hide their violence. So, we don't know if these homicides represented the crystal words, not probably. But in order to make that account. We would need to revise each and one of all the records of judicial system and this hasn't been done. And obviously I could don't myself I'm just a PhD student dollar and database, but it's probable that this was a violence that David is is talking about. The crystal words were really deadly. And there's some accounts of crystal words homicide rates and violence in general against the crystal words for the people that doesn't know. Basically the Mexican government is a liberal non religious one, and they repressed priests that were trying to escape from the regulation of the Constitution that is a very Jacqueline Constitution in Mexico since the 19th century. And so the rebellious Catholic guerrillas. By armed forces and they were brutally repressed by center government of Brutal Calias. So this is a John mayors book about to the crystal words you can check it. And the data I have, I cannot compare also this period, 26 to 40 because I don't have sentences on that period. So the sentences are a thing that is regular from 1950, and I know that's a period I cannot explain with these paper that's why it comes from 1950 to 2008. The second question is about these appearances. This is a question that have been made by my reviewers, a long time. And the question about these appearances is the same as that violent conflict. We don't have systematic data on these appearances during the 20th century. So I would like to compare homicide rates and these appearances. Some people say that these appearances are the hidden number of homicides. The promises I don't have these appearances numbers during the 20th century. This appears in Mexico where began to be recorded since 2000 by the register of gone or disappeared people. Essentially that that data in quantitative measure hasn't been recollected. If someone finds a way to have the data and having a database, the results of the paper could be different. Yes, I don't know. But that's, that's real answer. I don't know. But I cannot assume that I know that or that someone knows because nobody knows because we don't have the data. So that that's the shortcomings of the data that we have available. So I see the other I understand the point that forms of violence can exist at the same time. But if you exclude brother political violence, you don't get fairly different impact of. But the point is, again, is that data codified. My problem is like I concur that there are some forms of political violence. There's an even violence derived from political violence. The thing is that it's not recorded in data. I would try and I try to find databases that could record the things and I think there's not available. I would suggest to many people, everyone that has funding that they could recollect new databases about political violence in the 20th century, and that could like basically close this gap. And maybe the paper would be different with this gap and I say explicitly in the paper. So if, if this data appears, maybe a different result can come up. And that's normal that's scientific research. Unfortunately, I don't have it. And the other thing, also the rest like different regional differences between balance and lastly about balancing schools, bullying, etc. So that's an interesting one. And I think that that might be also an explanation of longer pacification that is basically that you transmit really authoritarian values that is respect to authority through schools. Schools not necessarily are peaceful places that can be bullying. There can be people beating each other. And basically when they get out of school maybe get into wrong fights. If you see the injury data. We might see that also there was increasing injury data so basically maybe people have just to put it like an imaginary example so I'm seeing that we have two minutes so. So to put an imaginary example, and kids get out of the school, and there's a gang outside, and they fight each other. So they began to fight each other like a gang to fight that we know happens everywhere in the world. But we have two things that explain why these kind of violence outside schools didn't increase the rates, and it's the existence of health services. So when you have health services, you can avoid people dying from injuries. So I would like to have data on health services for example ambulance services and clinics to know if people are not killing each other so the school and I can fight. And the schools can be places to reproduce violence. Yes. And there's a historiography about for example, the teacher's school in Guerrero, the same state that we were talking about. There are some teachers school where there's discussion if they were being taught about communist guerrilla warfare. There's a lot of teachings in some schools of with communist backgrounds, and in other schools people were taught that the communists were the red scares. So you can have, and I guess that was a bit of a harassment kind of type of treatment of, of people in schools, basically because there was a cold war mentality during the 20th century. And finally according to your findings. You can think that can be done in Mexico is this in our family sites rates rising closure full time schools. Okay. Just to give a context, Mexico just closed full time schools, because of austerity cuts. We have different dynamics, and there's several papers on genocide dynamics, the schools can have an impact in the sense that you close in school so young people might youngsters that are not in schools might commit homicides against women, but most of the dynamic of homicides for women in literature is partner violence. So people that. So if you, they take homicide data during the 20th century, like afterwards after 2007 shows that young men are killed in the street by gun violence. Most of young woman in Mexico are killed by their partners without the gun. So the dynamics of MSI two different. I don't say that this doesn't have a schooling implication, I'm saying that might be different, but I cannot come up with a fully response right now. Yeah, the correlation might be different so we have to say, for example, if these boys are for example, going to school and getting early girlfriends, and then, like in some cases crucially killing those girlfriends. So, and that's a case of homicide and it's horrendous one, but that is also correlated for early pregnancy rates and all this kind of other dynamics that happens with female violence but yeah, I will leave it there because I know we are on time. Now, what amazing audience engagement I mean what more can we wish for for the first and your voices seminar this year. Thank you so much for your presentation and comments and just to come full circle. If you have any final comments, advice, anything. Yeah, I would say like my short my answers are short, but my emails there. I just want to congratulate you again for your work role. Thank you. Then thank you so much for everybody for being here. And, yeah, you have it all female, the paper is open access. So, yeah, thank you so much, and see you have a lovely afternoon from an email if you have some questions. Bye bye.