 Propositions 1-19 of THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY by Proclus, translated by Thomas Taylor, Proposition 1. All multitude participates in a certain respect of the one. For if it in no respect participates of the one, neither will the whole be one whole, for each of the many of which the multitude consists. But there will also be a certain multitude arising from each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of these infinites likewise will again be infinite multitude, for participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains. It will be in every respect, and according to the whole infinite. For each of the many which you may assume will either be one or not one, will either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which consists of these will be nothing, and if each is many, each will consist of infinites infinitely. And this not in capacity, but in energy. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any being consist of infinites infinitely assumed, since there is not more than the infinite, but that which consists of all is more than each, nor is it possible for anything to be composed from nothing. Every multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of the one. Proposition 2. Every thing which participates of the one is both one and not one. For, if it is not the one itself, since it participates of the one, being something else besides the one, it suffers, or is passive to it, according to participation, and sustains to become one. If, therefore, it is nothing besides the one, it is one alone, and does not participate of the one, but will be the one itself. But if it is something besides the one, which is not the one, but its participant, it is both not one and one, not indeed such a one as the one itself, but one being as participating of the one. This, therefore, is not one, nor is it that which the one is, but it is one, and at the same time a participant of the one. Hence, being of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else besides the one, and so far, indeed, as it abounds, it is not one, but so far as it is passive to the one, it is one. Everything, therefore, which participates of the one, is both one and not one. Proposition 3. Everything which becomes one, becomes so, through the participation of the one, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of the one. Four. If things which are not one become one, they doubtless, become so by a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the presence of the one, not being that which the one itself is. Hence, they participate of the one, so far as they suffer to become one. Four. If they are already one, they will not become one, since that which is, does not become that which it is already, but if they become one from nothing, eatest from the privation of the one, since a certain one is generated in them, the one itself, is prior to them, and this generated one must be derived from the one itself. Everything, therefore, which becomes one, becomes so, through the participation of the one, etc. Proposition 4. Everything which is united is different from the one itself. Four. If it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of the one, so far as it is said to be united. That however, which participates of the one, is both one and not one, but the one itself is not both one and not one, for if this were the case, again, the one which is in it, would have both these, and this would take place to infinity, there being no one itself at which it is possible to stop. But everything being one and not one, there will be something united which is different from the one. For if the one is the same with the united, it will be infinite multitude, and in a similar manner each of the things of which the united consists will be infinite multitude. Everything, therefore, which is united, is different from the one itself. Proposition 5. All multitude is posterior to the one. For if multitude is prior to the one, the one indeed will participate of multitude, but multitude, which is prior to the one, will not participate of the one, since that multitude existed prior to the subsistence of the one. For it will not participate of that which is not, because that which participates of the one is one and at the same time not one, but the one will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. It is, however, impossible that there should be a certain multitude which in no respect whatever participates of the one. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to the one. But if multitude subsists simultaneously with the one, and they are naturally coordinate with each other, for nothing of time will prevent them being so, neither will the one of itself be many, nor will multitude be one, as being at one and at the same time oppositely divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other, hence multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature, participates of the one, and it will not be possible to assume anything of it which is not one, for not being one it will be an infinite consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated, hence it entirely participates of the one. If, therefore, the one, which is of itself one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be entirely posterior to the one, participating indeed of the one, but not being participated by the one. But if the one participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as one according to Parxis, but as not one according to participation, the one will be multiplied just as multitude is united on account of the one. The one, therefore, will communicate with multitude and multitude with the one, but things which coalesce and communicate in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected together by something else, that something else is prior to them, but if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each other, for opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence if the one and multitude are oppositely divided and multitude, so far as multitude is not one, and the one, so far as one is not multitude, neither will one of these subsisting in the other be one, and at the same time two. If also there is something prior to them which collects them, this will either be one or not one, but if it is not one, it will either be many or nothing. It will not, however, be many, lest multitude should be prior to the one, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can nothing congregate? It is therefore one alone. For this, which is the one, cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is therefore the one itself, and all multitude is from the one itself. Opposition 6. Concerning Unity. Every multitude consists either of things united or of unities. For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident, but if it is not multitude alone, it is either united or unities, henatus, and if indeed it participates of the one it is united. But if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if there is the one itself, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities, for if it consists of things united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily united should consist of unities, and thus we have discovered what we proposed at first. We darely kept that every multitude consists either of things united or of unities. Proposition 7. Concerning producing causes and things produced. Everything productive of another is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced. For it is either more excellent or less excellent or equal. Hence that which is produced from this will either also itself possess a power productive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific. But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy it is unequal to its cause, which is prolific, and has the power of producing, but if it also is productive of other things, it either likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and no one thing will be better than another. That which produces, always giving subsistence, in a consequent series to that which is equal to itself. Or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that which is produced will no longer be equal to that which produces it. For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which produces indeed is equal to the cause prior to itself. But the thing posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence it is not proper that the thing produced should be equal to its producing cause. Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this be the case, it will also make itself more powerful. Impotency cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will, since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence if it is able to render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence that which is produced is not equal to, nor more excellent than its producing cause. The producing cause therefore is in every respect better than the nature of the thing produced. Concerning the first good which is called the good itself. That which is primarily good and which is no other than the good itself is the leader of all things that in any way whatever participate of good. For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with someone being, either being and the good are the same, and this particular being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which it is passive, the rest, since it is the good. For that which aspires after anything is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is different from it, and if someone being and the good are the same, being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being will be the good. Hence the good is a certain good inherent in a certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires, but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For this is the common object of desire to all beings, but that which is inherent in a certain thing pertains to that alone which participates of it. Hence that which is primarily good is nothing else than good. For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition the good, and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that which is simply good. For that which is added not being the good, but something less than it, will by its own essence diminish the good. Proposition 9 Concerning that which is sufficient to itself Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended from another cause. For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself, but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. By how much the nearer therefore the former is to that which supplies the object of desire, i dest to the good? By so much the more excellent will it be than that which is indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its who parks us or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to the good itself, than that which is not self-sufficient. It is diminished indeed through participating of the good, and because it is not primarily the good, yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good. Proposition 10 Every thing which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is simply good. For what else is a thing sufficient to itself than that which from itself and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good and participates of it, but is not that which is simply good. For that is better than participation and plenitude as has been demonstrated. If therefore that which is sufficient to itself fills itself with good, that from which it fills itself will be more excellent than the self-sufficient, and will be above self-sufficiency, and neither will that which is simply good be indigent of anything, for it does not aspire after anything else, since by aspiring after it would be deficient of good. Nor is that which is simply good sufficient to itself, for thus it would be full of good and would not be primarily the good. Proposition 11 Concerning Cause All beings proceed from one first cause. For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all finite things are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one thing is the cause of another, and the presubsistence of essence will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings, there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we are then said to know scientifically when we know the causes of things. But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, more powerful and more imbecile, for every thing which produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from cause through many or through fewer media, for cause will be more excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause, and by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the causality of the cause. And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being, for there is not a knowledge of anything infinite, but causes being unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from which as from a root everything proceeds, some things indeed being nearer too, but others more remote from it. For, that it is necessary there should be one principle has been demonstrated, because all multitude subsists posterior to the one. Proposition 12 The principle and first cause of all beings is the good. For if all things proceed from one cause as has been above demonstrated, it is requisite to call that cause either the good or that which is more excellent than the good, but if it is more excellent than the good, whether is anything imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing, and if indeed nothing is imparted by it, an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause, since it is everywhere requisite that something should be present from cause to things caused, and especially from the first cause, from which all things are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by the good, there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent than and above the good, it can never bestow on secondary natures anything subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself. But what can be more excellent than goodness? Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good, hence if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to the good. If likewise all beings aspire after the good, how is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to the good, how can they especially aspire after the good? But if they do not aspire after it, how is it possible that things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all? Hence, if it is the good from which all beings are suspended, the good is the principal and first cause of all things. Proposition 13 Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good, and the good is the same with the one. For if the good is preservative of all beings, on which account also it is desirable to all things, but that which is preservative and connective of the essence of everything is the one, for all things are preserved by the one, and dispersion removes everything from essence. If this be the case, the good will cause those things to which it is present to be one, and will connect and contain them according to union, and if the one is collective and connective of beings, it will perfect everything by its presence. Hence therefore it is good to all things to be united. If however union is of itself good and to good has the power of uniting, the simply good and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner fall off from the good are at the same time also deprived of the participation of the one, and those things which become destitute of the one being filled with separation are after the same manner likewise deprived of the good. Hence goodness is union, and union is goodness, and the one is that which is primarily good. Proposition 14 Concerning the immovable and self-motive principle or cause Every being is either immovable or moved, and if moved it is either moved by itself or by another, and if indeed it is moved by itself it is self-motive, but if by another it is alternative. Everything therefore is either immovable or self-motive or alternative. For it is necessary, since there are alternative natures, that there should also be that which is immovable, and that the self-motive nature should subsist between these. For if everything alternative is moved in consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will either be in a circle or they will proceed to infinity, but they will neither be in a circle nor have an infinite progression, since all beings are bounded by the principle of things, and that which moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something immovable which first moves, but if this be the case, it is also necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For if all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? It cannot be that which is immovable, for it is not naturally adapted to be moved, nor that which is alternative, for that is moved by something else. It remains therefore that the self-motive nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which conjoins alternative natures to that which is immovable, being in a certain respect a middle, moving, and at the same time being moved. For of these, the immovable moves only, but the alternative is moved only. Everything therefore is either immovable or self-motive or alternative. Corollary From these things likewise it is evident that of things which are moved, the self-motive nature is the first, but that of things which move, the immovable is the first. Proposition 15 Concerning an incorporeal essence and what the peculiarity of it is, Everything which is converted to itself is incorporeal. For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that which is converted to anything is conjoined with that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is converted to itself will be conjoined with all the parts. For this it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is converted and that to which it is converted become one. This however is impossible in body, and in short in all partable things. For the whole of that which is partable is not conjoined with the whole on account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated differently from others. No body therefore is naturally adapted to revert to itself, so as that the whole may be converted to the whole. Hence, if there is anything which has the power of reverting to itself, it is incorporeal and impartable. Proposition 16 Everything which is converted to itself has an essence separate from all body. For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a certain energy separate from body. For thus energy would be more excellent than essence, since the latter indeed would be indigent of bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself and would not be in want of bodies. If therefore anything is essentially inseparable from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is converted to itself being something different from body has an energy separate from body, and not either through or together with body, since the energy and that to which the energy is directed are not at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself is entirely separate from bodies. Proposition 17 Everything which moves itself primarily is convertive to itself. For if it moves itself and its mode of energy is directed to itself, that which moves and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part, but is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or the contrary. But if one part indeed is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self- motive, since it will consist of things which are not self- motive, but which appear indeed to be so, yet are not so essentially. If however the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in both which according to one moves, and at the same time is moved, and this is that which is primarily self- motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Everything therefore, which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself. Proposition 18 Everything which imparts existence to others is itself that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence. For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence by the seventh proposition, but that which it is, it is in a greater and more perfect degree, since everything which gives subsistence to a certain thing is better than, and not the same with it, for it is primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the other secondarily. If however, indeed, there is the same definition of both, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect, nor will the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation, nor will the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to the existence of the other. Hence it remains that the one should be primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily that to which existence is given, the former supplying the latter from its very being. Proposition 19 Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner. For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others secondarily that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one time exists, but at another time does not, exist primarily nor of itself, but it is adventitious and is imparted from some other place to the things in which it is thus inherent. And of Proposition 19 Propositions 20 to 39 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus Translated by Thomas Taylor This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards Proposition 20 The essence of son is beyond all bodies. The intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and the one is beyond all intellectual hypotheses. For every body is movable by something else, but is not naturally adapted to move itself. But by the presence of soul is moved of itself, lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain respect self-movable. But when it is absent, is alter-movable, as deriving this nature from soul, which is allotted a self-movable essence. For, to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. It is however by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become self-movable by participation as being essentially self-movable. Again, however, son, which is moved from itself, has an order secondary to the immovable nature, which subsists immovable according to energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-movable essence is the leader. But of all that move, the immovable is the leader. If therefore son, being moved from itself, moves other things, it is necessary that prior to it there should be that which moves immovably. But intellect moves, being immovable, and energizing always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For son, on account of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as body, on account of son, possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellect was primarily in son, it would be inherent in all sons, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence, perpetual intellect is not primarily in son. It is necessary therefore that prior to it there should be that which is primarily intellective, and hence intellect is prior to sons. Moreover, the one is prior to intellect. For intellect, though it is immovable, yet is not the one. For it intellectually perceives itself and energizes about itself, and of the one, indeed, all beings, in whatever way they may exist, participate. But all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings, to whom intellect is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge, because intellectual knowledge is the principal and first cause of the gnostic energy. The one, therefore, is beyond intellect, and there is no longer anything else beyond the one. For the one and the good are the same. But the good, as has been demonstrated, is the principal of all things. Proposition 21. That intellect is not the first cause. Every order, beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude coordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad. For the monad, having the relation of a principal, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence, one series, and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order or a series if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all coordinate natures. For that, in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connection, and sameness, through which some things are said to be coordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principal. In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connection to the natures arranged in it, both to each other and to the whole. For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series. But that, which ranks as the cause of the one series, must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things, must be generated by it as coordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order. Corollary From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body, that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it, and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. It follows also that the order of souls originates from one first soul and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls, that in the intellectual essence also there is an intellectual monad, and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect and is converted to it, that a multitude of unities likewise originates from the one, which is prior to all things, and that there is an extension of these unities to the one. Hence, after the first one there are unities, after the first intellect there are intellects, after the first soul there are souls, and after total nature there are natures. Proposition 22 Everything which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither more than two, but is only begotten. For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist, since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two, or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be two things that are first. And, if it be one of the two, each will not be first, nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For, if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For, that subsists primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these, being different, is, and at the same time, is not that which it is said to be. If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be, for this primarily suffers that which is the same. Both will not be first, but that of which both participating are said to subsist primarily. Corollary. From these things it is evident that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two, that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects, and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal, and in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the form of animal, and to the form of man, the first of each is one, for the demonstration is the same. Proposition 23. Concerning the imparticipable. Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated, and all participated hypotheses are extended to imparticipable aparxies. 4. That which is imparticipable, having the relation of a monad, is subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing honorable, or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to a certain thing, by which it is participated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others, but that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable. Proposition 24 Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated, and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable. For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. For, so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates, which makes it to be perfect. That, however, which is participated, since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all things, is again allotted and haparxies, subordinate to that, which is something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For the latter is more allied to the cause of all, but the former is less allied to it. The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things, which are participated, but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many, but that which is participated in the many is one, and at the same time not one, and everything which participates is not one, and at the same time one. Proposition 25 Concerning the Perfect Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all. For, as that on account of its own goodness, uniquely gives subsistence to all beings, for the good, and the one are the same, so that the bona form is the same with the unical. Thus also, those things which are posterior to the first on account of their perfection hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is a certain portion of the good, and the perfect, so far as it is perfect, imitates the good, but the good gives subsistence to all things, so that the perfect likewise is productive according to nature of those things which it is able to produce, and that indeed, which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more numerous or the progeny of which it is the cause. For, that which is more perfect participates in a greater degree of the good. It is therefore nearer to the good, but this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all, and thus it is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause. For, being more remote from that which produces everything, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For, to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a greater number of each of these, but that is more remote which produces a less number of each. Corollary. From these things it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the principle of all is unprolific, and is not the cause of anything. For, if it generated a certain thing and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself, from the principle of all things. But it would be nearer to productive power, and besides this would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings. Proposition 26. Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the nature's posterior to itself, and such as are successive. For, if it imitates the one, but that immovably gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, every thing which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy, but the one gives subsistence to things immovably. For, if through motion the motion will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be the one, in consequence of being changed from the one. But if motion subsists together with it, it will also be from the one, and either there will be a progression to infinity, or the one, will produce immovably. And every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For, everywhere, from that which is primarily, that which is not primarily, derives its subsistence, so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence, every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself, and, while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For, that which is in any respect diminished cannot abide such as it is. Proposition 27 Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures. For, if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect according to power, it would not be able to preserve its own order immovable. For that, which imparts existence to another thing, through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its own mutation and change in quality. But, every thing which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that which is posterior to it, proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immovably, and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them, nor diminished. For, that which is produced is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause, since this is neither appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition, for it does not become the matter of that which proceeds, since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence, that which generates is firmly established undiminished, through prolific power multiplies itself, and from itself imparts secondary hypostases. Proposition 28 Every producing cause gives subsistence to things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. For, since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each other, and equal in power. But, if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different from it. For that which is participated gives communion to its participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from hence possessing its essence. But, if that which is produced is partly separated from, and partly united to its producing cause, if indeed it suffers each of these equally, it will equally participate and not participate, so that after the same manner it will both have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And, if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and to be more deprived of than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence. If this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree united to their producing causes than separated from them. Things, however, which are more united, are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, gives subsistence to things similar to itself, prior to such, as are dissimilar. Proposition 29 Every progression is affected through a similitude of secondary to first natures. For, if that which produces gives subsistence to similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will give subsistence to the things produced. For, similars are rendered similar through similitude and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a certain seemness of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits that which is posterior to the generator, such in a secondary degree as the generator is primarily, it will, have its subsistence through similitude. Proposition 30 Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium abides in its producing cause and proceeds from it. For, if every progression is affected while primary natures remain permanent and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars, if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For, that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the seem with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it and will not have anything common with and united to it. Hence, it will abide in its cause in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something different from it. For, if it is something different, it is separated and apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause in order that, while it abides, it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing cause, it abides in it, but so far, as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is, in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is neither of these without the other. Proposition 31 Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially is converted to that from which it proceeds. For, if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For, everything which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, everything aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Everything, therefore, aspires after its cause. For, well-being is derived to everything from that through which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which appetite is first directed. Proposition 32 All conversion is affected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted. For, everything which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and aspires after communion and colegation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude, if this be the case, all conversion will be affected through similitude. Proposition 33 Everything which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it has a circular energy. For, if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one end continued, one motion being from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding cause. Hence, all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes, greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some of which are to the natures immediately placed above the things that are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far as to the principle of all things. For, all things proceed from this principle and are converted to it. Proposition 34 Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its conversion to that from which also it had the progression of its proper hypothesis. For, if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire of that to which it is converted, but if this be the case, the whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also, it has a natural sympathy with as being allied to the essence of it. If this however be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other, and if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It remains therefore that the one must derive its being from the other, but if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the conversion is according to nature. Corollary From these things therefore it is evident that intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world, though it is perpetual, possesses its essence from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order. Proposition 35 Everything caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns or is converted to its cause. For if it alone abided it would in no respect differ from its cause, being without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompanied with separation, but if it alone proceeded it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that, which has not its essence from the cause, be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural desire to everything of well-being and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but should not abide, how being separated from its cause will it hasten to be conjoined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure, since if it had been conjoined it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and be converted, but should not proceed, how can that which is not separated be able to revert to its cause? For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary, however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that every thing must abide in its cause, proceed from and be converted to it. Proposition 36 Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively. For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first, it follows that first natures, in proceeding, are more conjoined with their causes, being as it were germinations from them. But second natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner such as are successive. Things, however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes, are more perfect, for causes are more perfect than things caused. But things, which are more remote, are more imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes. Proposition 37 Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow, but the last are the most perfect. For if conversions are affected in a circle, and conversion is directed to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most perfect, and if conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most imperfect, hence in things which subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the first, but such as are most perfect the last. Proposition 38 Everything which proceeds from certain numerous causes is converted through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and all conversion is through the same things as those through which progression is affected. For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed which has a transition immediately from a certain thing is also immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a medium, but that which requires a medium in proceeding requires also a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should be affected with reference to the same thing, hence the conversion will be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than the medium. Through such things therefore as being is derived to each thing, through so many while being also as derived, and vice versa. Proposition 39 Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also nostically. For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together with being, or it likewise receives from hence a nostic power. So far therefore as it alone is, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a nostic conversion. For in such a way as it proceeded from its cause, such also is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire therefore is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude to the participation of causes, but to others it is according to life, being a motion to more excellent natures, and to others it is according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes. And of Proposition 39, Propositions 40-59 of The Elements of Theology by Proclus, translated by Thomas Taylor. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain, recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Proposition 40 Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence, are the leaders. For if everything which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is suspended from another cause, but that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence, but that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself, and the self-sufficient is more allied to the good, but things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar. This being the case, things which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent or the good is a thing of this kind, or the first things that subsist from the good, but if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not in reality be in anything self-sufficiency, nor will it be in the good, since that being the one is better than self-sufficiency. It is also the good itself, and not that which possesses the good, but if the good was self-subsistent in consequence of itself producing itself, it will not be the one. For that which proceeds from the one is not the one, and it would proceed from itself if it was self-subsistent, so that the one would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the first, and it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause. For it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to the good as has been demonstrated. Proposition 41 Everything which is in another is alone produced by another, but everything which is in itself is self-subsistent. For that which is in another thing, and is indigent of a subject, can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to generate itself does not require another seat, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is productive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of itself, and thus it is in itself as the thing caused in its cause. For it is not in itself as in place, or as in a subject. For place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent. For it is self-subsistent, and it is in such a manner in itself as that which is from a cause is in the cause. Proposition 42 Everything self-subsistent is convertive to itself. For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a conversion coordinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone proceeded from itself, but having proceeded was not converted to itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which it is able to impart to itself. Every cause however is able to impart to that which proceeds from it, together with the essence which it gives, while being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the proper good to that which is self-subsistent, and hence this will not be the object of desire to that which is not converted to itself. But not desiring this it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it it will be imperfect and not sufficient to itself. If however self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to anything, they must pertain to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good and will be converted to itself. Proposition 43 Every thing which is converted to itself is self-subsistent. For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to everything essential progression is from that to which conversion according to nature is directed. If therefore it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the Lord of its own hypothesis. Hence that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent. Proposition 44 Every thing which is converted to itself according to energy is also converted to itself, essentially. For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is without conversion in its essence, it will be more excellent according to energy than according to essence, the former being convertive, but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself is better than that which alone depends on another, and that which has a power of preserving itself is more perfect than that which is alone preserved by another. If therefore it is converted to itself according to the energy proceeding from essence, it will also be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize towards itself, but will depend on itself, and will be contained, connected, and perfected by itself. Proposition 45 Everything self-subsistent is unbegotten. For if it is generated because generated indeed, it will be imperfect of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because, however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself. For everything generated is perfected by another which imparts generation to it, not yet existing. For generation is a path from the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if anything produces itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence of itself, or rather, being inherent in that which is perfective of essence. Proposition 46 Everything self-subsistent is incorruptible. For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be without itself. This, however, is impossible. For, being one thing, it is at the same time cause, and the thing caused. But everything which is corrupted departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For, so far as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves its cause, because it does not desert itself. For it is the cause of itself. Everything, therefore, self-subsistent is incorruptible. Proposition 47 Everything self-subsistent is impartable and simple. For, if it is partable, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself partable, and the whole will be converted to itself, and en will be in en itself. This, however, is impossible. Hence that which is self-subsistent is impartable. But it is also simple. For, if a composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent, and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Further still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the elements of itself of which it consists. Everything, therefore, which is self-subsistent is simple. Proposition 48 Concerning the perpetual in order to demonstrate that the world is perpetual. Everything, which is not perpetual, is either a composite or subsists in another. For, either it is dissolvable into those things of which it consists, and is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into non-entity. But, if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and incapable of being dissipated. Proposition 49 Everything self-subsistent is perpetual. For, there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing should not be perpetual, the one arising from composition, and the other from a subsistence in something else as in a subject. That which is self-subsistent, however, is neither a composite, but simple, nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual. Proposition 50 Everything, which is measured by time, either according to essence or according to energy, is generation so far as it is measured by time. For, if it is measured by time it will be adapted to it to be or to energize in time, and the was and the will be, which differ from each other pertain to it. For, if the was and the will be were the same according to number, it would suffer nothing by time proceeding, and always having one part prior and another posterior. If, therefore, the was and the will be are different, that which is measured by time is becoming to be or rising into existence, and never is, but proceeds together with time by which it is measured, existing in a tendency to being. It, likewise, does not stop in the same state of being, but is always receiving another and another to be, just as the now in time is always another and another, through the progression of time. Hence it is not a simultaneous whole, for it subsists in a dispersion of temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This, however, is to possess being in non-being, for that which is becoming to be is not that which is become. Such a kind of being, therefore, as this, is generation. Everything self-subsistent is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time. For, if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not, according to existence, be measured by time. For, generation is conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence, nothing self-subsistent has its being in time. Everything eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And, whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once present. Nor will it have this thing pertaining to itself now subsisting. But that, afterwards, which as yet is not. But, as much as is possible, it now possesses the whole without diminution and without extension. Or, whether it has its energy as well as its essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding in the same measure of perfection, and, as it were, fixed immovably and without transition according to one and the same boundary. For, if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be sometimes, and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior and another posterior. For, if it had, it would be generation and not being. But, where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and will be, but alone to be, and this a whole, there everything subsists at once, that which it is. The same thing also takes place with respect to the energy of that which is eternal. Corollary From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to holes of their existence as holes, since everything which is eternal, either according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its essence or energy present with itself. Proposition 53 Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to everything which subsists according to time. For, if everywhere the natures which are participated are prior to their participants, and imperticipables are prior to participated natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity which is in the eternal another, and eternity itself another. And the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a thing participated, and the third as an imperticipable. That also which is in time is one thing, for it is a participant, the time which is in this is another thing, for it is participated, and the time prior to this is another thing, for it is imperticipable. Everywhere also, that which is imperticipable, is in all things the same, but that which is participated is in those things only by which it is participated. For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures, in all of which eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner, but the time which they participate is indivisible, and there is one time prior to both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and time itself is a time of times, and they give subsistence, the one to participated eternity, but the other to participated time. Proposition 54. Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time, and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings. For everything which measures either measures according to a part, or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is measured. That which measures therefore according to the whole is eternity, but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other of things in time. Proposition 55. Every thing which subsists according to time either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypothesis once in a part of time. For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more similar to first natures subsist in union with them to such as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures. For as being generated they differ from first natures which are self-subsistent, and as existing ones they are separated from things which always exist, but the media between these are such things as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them. This being the case, the medium between things which are once generated and those that exist always is either that which is always becoming to be, or that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is however impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be. Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains therefore that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be, being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to be, but through subsisting always imitating an eternal nature. Corollary. From these things it is evident that perpetuity is twofold, the one indeed being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time, the one also being stable, but the other a flowing perpetuity, and the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting at once, but the other diffused and expanded according to temporal extension, and the one being a whole of itself, but the other consisting of parts, each of which is separate according to prior and posterior. Proposition 56. Everything which is produced by secondary natures is produced in a greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as our secondary were also produced. For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from thins. For powers in producing causes are essentially productive, and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from thins. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it are effects through that which is prior to it, for the one perfects a cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the thing caused is from thins rendered such as it is. Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thins is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause. And on this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thins a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation end primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause which imparts generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature. Proposition 57 Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it. For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than that which is posterior to it. And in consequence of this is the cause of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which is able to effect greater things among similars is also capable of effecting such as or less. But that which is able to effect such as or less is not necessarily capable of producing such as or greater. If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more numerous effects. Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is able to produce, the cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For everything which is produced by secondary natures is in a greater degree produced by such as or prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence together with the thing caused to such effects as the thing caused is naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to it, it is indeed evident that it energizes prior to the thing caused according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause, therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused and together with it and posterior to it gives subsistence to other things. Corollary Hence it is evident that of such things as soul is the cause, intellect also is the cause. But that soul is not also the cause of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes prior to soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures, intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as intellect is the cause, the good also is the cause, but not vice versa. For the privations of forms subsist from the good, since all things are from sense, but intellect being form does not give subsistence to privation. Proposition 58 Everything which is produced by many is more compounded than that which is produced by fewer causes. Four, if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants, some will consist of a greater number of things, but others of a less number, of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those from a less number of the same causes are more simple. Everything, therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple. Four, the more compounded participates of those things of which the more simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true. Proposition 59 Everything which is essentially simple is either better or worse than composite natures. Four, if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle from a greater number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the former some are more simple according to that which is better, but others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however, are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend beyond them two things to which subordinate natures do not proceed through a diminution of power. Four, on this account also, the last of things, edest, matter, is most simple as well as the first of things, because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity, however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all composition, but another according to that which is