 Hey guys, so it's me, Praxben, and I have my friend Jung-Yin here with me. So we're starting this new podcast called The Great Fiction. It's titled that after Hoppa's book, The Great Fiction, which is about property, economy, society, and the politics of decline. And what we're gonna do with this is we're going to bring on intellectuals and academics, or as Hoppa might call some of these people, the anti-intellectuals intellectuals, and they're going to teach us about economics, sociology, the old right, and stuff like that. And we want to really introduce you guys to these very important people. Our main objective is to promote the right libertarian position instead of some of the more libertine libertarianism that has been circulating the libertarian movement over the last couple of years. You might argue the last couple of decades since the Cato Institute rose to gain a predominant position in this movement. But yeah, we will be discussing political philosophy, history, various topics, and our guests will not only be libertarians, we'll have many paleoconservatives on, many reactionaries. So it'll be a podcast that covers the entire scope, the entire landscape so to speak of the old right. And we hope to better inform people about not only our movement, but just the general movement against the intellectual elite, what I might call the intellectual establishment. The entire status edifice can be brought down if only the work of the intellectuals is countered by the work of anti-intellectual intellectuals, as I like to call them. Hello everyone, welcome to the Great Fiction podcast. This is our first episode where we will discuss the intellectual contributions of Hans Hermann Hoppe. And today we have Mr. Stefan Kinsella, who will be introduced by Jungian. Ladies and gentlemen, it is our pleasure to have with us today's Stefan Kinsella, a close academic colleague of Dr. Hans Helm on Hoppe's, and a foremost contributor to the development of modern right libertarian thought. Mr. Kinsella is the founder and director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and a former adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, who holds an MS in electrical engineering from Louisiana State University, and an LLM, or Master of Laws, from the University of London. He is a well-known opponent of intellectual property laws, and has authored many prominent works on libertarian legal theory, such as Against Intellectual Property, Defending Argumentation Ethics, and Astopal, a new justification for individual rights. Mr. Kinsella, thank you for being with us today. Glad to be here, guys, and congrats on your new show. All right, so first, we would like to discuss argumentation ethics, which is definitely one of the most well-known contributions of Dr. Hans Hermann Hoppe. So we would like Mr. Kinsella to briefly elaborate on what argumentation ethics are and the significance they have for libertarian political philosophy. Yeah, well, so Dr. Hoppe is actually perhaps nowadays more well known in certain circles for his, for the work that came after his earlier more theoretical Austrian and political theory work, his democracy, his cultural theories, his immigration views. I think a lot of people know him, a lot of the younger generation of libertarians know him from that. The earlier sort of generations, my age and maybe a little bit older, knew him from his first two or three books, especially his first two books, his first two large books, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. That's his first books in English anyway. He had some in German, which is still you have to be translated. So A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism in 19, I want to say 89. And then a collection of essays, economics, the economics and ethics of private property in 93. And then there was a economic science in the Austrian method, which is a monograph on epistemology and methodology. And then later on, he started writing democracy and things like that. And he started the Property and Freedom Society near his retirement, which relates to your title of your show and his, his, his thought. I, he first came to my attention when I was in law school in 1988, he had moved from Germany to the U.S. in 1985 to study under Rothbard and he studied with Rothbard as his colleague for 10 years until Rothbard's death in 95. So from 85 to 95, he was with Rothbard over here, first in New York and then in Las Vegas. And in 1988, he published a series of articles starting in Liberty Magazine and some newsletters published by the Mises Institute on Argumentation Ethics, which was his unique approach to justifying libertarian principles. And instead of doing it in the consequentialist and utilitarian way, which a lot of people do, like, you know, the sort of unprincipled, whatever works best, you know, Liberty is best for, best for men because it produces lots of, lots of guns and butter, which he does. But and as opposed to the the other traditional approach, which is the more deontological or natural rights approach, right, which is the more Aristotelian or natural rights approach of Ayn Rand and even Murray Rothbard, his mentor and colleague, because he came from a more Kantian background, and also Misesian background, but also absorbed the radical libertarian politics of Rothbard, he sort of synthesized what he knew and came up with his own approach to it, because he saw defects in consequentialism and utilitarianism, obviously, as an Austrian and as a principle libertarian utilitarianism is unprincipled because it basically would would count in its violation of property rights for the greater good, you know, like you could steal half of Bill Gates's wealth and distribute it to the poor. So if you believe that the poor are made better off by that and Bill Gates is still rich. So but from our point of view, it's still theft. So we would oppose that. And methodologically, as an Austrian, you know, when you believe that value is subjective, that is, it's what an individual, how the individual acts in the world and views things. And it's, it's, it's not a quantity that you can measure. So it's not, it's not cardinal. It's an ordinal thing, like it's just how you rank things. And it's so therefore, it's not interpersonally comparable, you can't compare it between people. So you simply can't even theoretically add up these utils or these values to maximize utility. So there's various ethical and methodological problems as a libertarian and as an Austrian with utilitarianism. The problem that Hoppe saw with the natural rights approach, which basically is the idea that we can we can determine what we ought to do, like that's normative thinking, right, prescriptive thinking, by asking what the nature of reality is. So you're basically going from an is to an ought. Now, he he agrees with David Hume that this is a logical gap that is unbridgeable. You cannot, you can't just announce what we should do based upon what the way things are, which is which is one criticism of natural law thinking. Another criticism of natural law thinking is that it says that based upon what human nature is, it determines what we ought to do and how we ought to act. And these ought to inform what laws there should be to so it informs politics and libertarian theory. And one criticism of that is that human nature is so vague and so broad and diffuse that you can't get many prescriptions from that because people are different. So what might be good for you is not good for me and so on. So there are many problems with the natural law approach. Primarily, you can't just announce I'm going from an is to an ought. I think Hoppe implicitly recognized that you can only build oughts or normative statements upon earlier normative statements. So because he was familiar with Kant and Kant's sort of categorical imperative and his idea of the synthetic a priori, the idea that you can get knowledge, very certain knowledge a week, which means is called apodictic knowledge from certain logical reflections like you can realize that certain things are true by true because you would have to contradict yourself to deny them. And actually, this mode of thinking is common. Even on Rand who thought she was opponent of Kant had similar reasoning like I ran thought that it was it was an she called them axioms, which is a confusing terminology because axiom like in mathematics means a positive truth, where she meant it to be something that's undeniably true, which is basically what Kant thought his apodictic truths are Mises thought his apodictic truths are Mises restricted his analysis in this way, mostly to praxeology and economics like the the axiom or the or the undeniable truth that people the a priori truth that humans act. And when you act, that has certain implications by definition, and by our by our introspective understanding of what action is. So we know that when we act, we conceive of the universe, we're aware of certain facts, we have some dim awareness or understanding or hypothesis about the nature of causal laws that are effect. And we have some dim awareness, or some belief of the future that's coming. And, and something about the future that we think is coming without our intervention bothers us or gives us what's the word he uses uneasiness felt uneasiness. And so we use our understanding of the way causal laws work and the tools at our disposal of scarce means he would call them to grapple them with our bodies and act and interfere and intervene in the course of events and to create a new universal effect to change the course of events. So that's what human action is. And there's certain a priori categories of action like opportunity cost, profit and loss, even uncertainty about the future, various things like that. So Hoppe as a student of Mises, but also in philosophy, he studied under a very well known German philosopher who I think is still alive, but he's very old now, he's a leftist, but he's extremely influential, his name is Jurgen Habermas. So Habermas was Hoppe's PhD advisor in Germany. And one of Habermas's contributions was what's called discourse ethics, or it's a type of argumentation ethics. He and another philosopher in Germany named Carl Otto Appel. So it's Appel and Habermas sort of developed this discourse ethics view of political norms. Now, because they're kind of democrat socialist types, they work their theory into a defense of the democratic welfare state. But the core idea there is that when people come together in discourse to solve, you know, to discuss the right norms that we can use, what's just what action is justified in interpersonal behavior, that there are certain normative presuppositions in the context of the argument itself. And those have to be those can be identified. And once you identify those those normative presuppositions of argument itself, those could never be challenged as unjust, because you're assuming them to be just by virtue of participating in argumentation or discourse itself. So actually, I've talked to Hans Hoppe about this a lot myself. And he actually was unaware of this, or he didn't study this under Habermas. He studied different things under Habermas. But he was aware of that that writing and studied after his PhD. So he's actually never had our conversation with Habermas about this. But what Hans saw was that if you if you blend or combine the insights of Austrian, Misesi and economics, which is praxeology and the sort of neocontian understanding of the implications of human action, how humans use scarce means to act, right, which is a descriptive economic idea, with some operating categories, to combine that with the radical libertarian politics of Rothbard. Being aware of the of the drawbacks of the natural law approach, right, the inability to go from an is to an ought. He used sort of the core insight of Habermas and appell to say, to basically bend their discourse ethics in the libertarian way, like he thinks that they're like they're wrong in how they apply their own discourse ethics to achieve Democrat social results. But their core insight is valid. And the core insight is that there's a normative presupposition of all of all discourse. Now from Hans Hoppe's point of view, that is basically peace, right, because argumentation is a peaceful activity where people are having a discussion with each other. And the attempt is to find the truth of a matter either a factual empirical truth, or, or, or a normative sort of truth, you can say, like, which basically means a norm that you can justify argumentatively that in Kantian terms, it means a norm that everyone can accept as fair, given their given their general characteristics in nature as participants argumentation. So basically, and Hans emphasizes this over and over again, and his argumentation ethics. The one key thing to recognize is that when people argue, trying to find out trying to just trying to settle on a rule that they can both accept or a norm, they both agree to disagree if they have to, which means they're not coercing each other into accepting their argument, they're not basically threatening each other like, I propose this rule. And if you don't agree with me, I'm going to hit you over the head, because that's not a genuine argument. A genuine argument is one where people are, are agreeing to disagree if they have to, which means to walk away, which is basically a normative stance of peace. So basically, this normative presupposition of discourse is unavoidable when you're trying to argue with each other in a peaceful context about norms. So that's why you can build libertarian norms up without violating Hume's is ought problem, because you're going from an ought to an ought, you're going from a norm to a norm, but you're going from an undeniable norm, one that everyone by virtue of participating argument already presupposes basically just say peace, our willingness to negotiate that kind of stuff. And also property norms, right, because we have to recognize that I'm peace simply is another way of saying I'm not going to hit you. But saying I'm not going to hit you basically means that you own your body, right? That's another way of saying that. So property rights of your body, or the core thing that's recognized in any discussion between people. And then, and then you can understand also arguing and living is a practical affair. So these people couldn't even be existing and participating in discourse, if they couldn't survive in the world, which means the ability to act, which means in in Austrian terms, the ability to use scarce resources and scarce means. So that means that so that means that the the property rights in your body or a prototype for the idea of property rights and other means that we employ in the world to to live and survive and be part of the discourse. So Hans presented this in I think it was 1988 in Liberty magazine and a big symposium. And it blew my mind because I was study I was I was a I was a growing I had been in libertarian for a long time, but mostly a menarchist a randian type menarchist, but I recently become influenced by some of the anarchists like Rothbard and the Tannehills and and David Friedman and people like that. So I was hungry for this stuff, but I also had a dissatisfaction with natural thinking. And I was also in contract theory, contract law, say, sorry, in contract class at the same time in law school was my first year. And I come across this, this principle of a stop all, which is which is a legal principle in contract cases and in other situations, which basically says that a person who represents a fact about the world to someone else to induce them to do something. And that other person relies upon that representation to their detriment. You can't later deny what you had said in a in a like a lawsuit about it. So you're stopped or prevented because it's so it's basically it's a type of way of it's a way of making you be consistent. So the question is it whether your first statement is true? It's simply that you can't change you can't you can't contradict yourself. So there was something about that that appealed to me. And when I read Hoppe's argumentation, I think it's sort of all gel together. And it made me think that you can you could take the a stop all idea and extend that take that core idea and use that to develop libertarian rights theory to which is what I did in my own writing. So my own writing is like a theory of rights based upon the estoppel or an extension of legal estoppel reasoning. But it's very compact. It's very complimentary to and draws upon a lot of Hoppe's argumentation ethics. So that's sort of a base of a basic overview. Now in that in that article, there was a symposium and there's about a dozen or 18 liberal well known libertarians at the time who were invited to respond. David Friedman, I think Douglas Rasmussen, David Gordon, Murray Rothbard, T-bar McCann, and others. And I think also respond Roger Rodger along and most of them either lightly or or severely criticized Hoppe's argumentation ethics, except for Rothbard, Rothbard thought it was breathtakingly a pathbreaking argument. And basically was it was an insight that that kind of broke a log jam in thinking. So Rothbard recognized that his own natural law argumentation was sort of flawed, but that Hoppe had found the key to fix it. Like, you're not really you're not really bridging the Izzod gap, you're sidestepping it with this technique. The others were mixed in their criticisms. I think they're basically all flawed or uncharitable or they misunderstand Hoppe's argument. He did reply to some of them in a subsequent issue of Liberty magazine. And those are collected as the appendix to his second book, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. And it's had some success over the years in influencing people. It's still not accepted by a large number of libertarians, I think partly for professional jealousy and partly because of lack of understanding and partly because some people are just stuck in their old arguments and they don't want to give it up, you know, they're just used to the Randian way of doing it or the Aristotelian way or the utilitarian approach or whatever. But I think it's I think it's the correct approach and is the is the way forward to build upon that. Now, you mentioned Juergen Habermas's and Carl Otto Apples discourse ethics and studying that I noticed that they make a couple arbitrary assumptions. For example, Habermas states that the something called the universalization principle is key to Habermas's argument. However, he reformulates it in order to claim that that everyone who will be who everyone who will be affected by the norm in question is entitled to participate in argumentation. Yeah, in a way. So so that seems to me an arbitrary assumption, whereas Professor Hoppe is saying no, by the very fact of proposing something in argumentation, you are presupposing certain norms, certain certain convention, so to speak, that might not be an appropriate word to use in this context. But so that was one one error that I that I found and well, I think that Hoppe actually does not go into a lot of detail about the details of Habermas and Appel. He just took that core insight. If you try to read through their stuff, it's extremely murky and I don't find it. It's not even very coherent. A lot of it, especially Habermas, he has a lot of stuff about worlds, World One and World Two, and they they they have a lot of reliance. Is that similar to modal, modal logic? Because in philosophy, we have something called modal logic, where you work within different universes. I don't know. I think it was his own terminology. I'm not sure. I'm not a philosopher. I'm not sure. But but he they both took for granted, I think, democracy, like as a they took that as a as they assumed that was a valid system like democracy itself. Right. So they incorporate this ideal of democracy and democratic decision making into their discourse ethics, which I think makes it just flawed right there because it's a it's a it's a question begging type thing then. And of course, you're going to get democratic socialist norms out of that once you assume that. And they go into all kinds of metaphysical excursions, which especially for Habermas, which to me are almost incomprehensible and noise. Now, I haven't read them in German, obviously, I don't speak German, and the translations are hard to find. Opel seems more common sense to me. But basically, when I read them, I get the core insight, which Hapa took and ran with and used praxeology and radical libertarian thinking to and, you know, understanding of scarcity and property. I don't think these guys dwell upon scarcity and that kind of stuff that much. But as for universalizability, I think that's more of a content inside that that hopper right, the the content, categorical imperative and the more I've thought about this over the years, I think universalizability is a presupposition of discourse because the entire endeavor of discourse about norms simply means to give reasons for your propositions and your claims. So if I propose, OK, the rule is X, like, like the rule is white people have rights and black people don't, let's say, like, that's the rule. I've got to give a reason for that. Right. If I if I if I simply say, well, white people have rights because I'm white and you don't have rights because you're black. So I have rights because I'm me and you don't have rights because you're you. That's what Hapa would criticize and Kant would criticize as a particularizable rule. Like and to my mind, that simply means that you're failing to give a reason, right, which is what universalized when you say you have to come up with the rule that universalizable, that means you have to be able to universalize it to everyone has to apply, in a sense, equally to everyone. And the reason is if you have discourse with another person, the presupposition is that we're both rational actors. So we have some characteristic in common that makes it an argument like and you're not going to have an argument with with a statue or the tree or the bull. But we have a rational argument with another person who's a participant in discourse. You're assuming that we have enough sufficiently similar characteristics to be part of the same discourse. And that those those characteristics make it. So if I say, I have a certain right. Then the prima facie assumption is I have that right because of my nature. But the only nature that we agree on that we have is whatever we share in common at first. So if I'm claiming a right, I have to at least at first admit that you have that right to because we have the same nature. So whatever reason, whatever source or whatever, whatever characteristic of my nature gives me this right, I have to recognize at least prima facie, you have it too. If I want to say we don't have the same rights, I have to come up with an argument, I have to give a reason, which is what universalizability to my mind means. So for example, people have criticized Toppa's argumentation ethics by saying that, well, he says that it's impossible to argue without recognizing other people's bodily rights. But what about a master arguing with his slave? As Hoppa explains, well, all that means is some people are not being consistent, right? You and it's recognized that rights are prescriptive, their norms, they can't they're not like laws of nature, they're not causal laws that can't be violated, like you, you cannot violate the law of gravity. But you can violate a normative law, a prescriptive law, because they just tell you what you should do. But you can violate someone's rights. So just because you treat someone in a way that's unjustified doesn't mean that you've proven that it's just right. But I what I would say is, let's suppose I have a criminal is attacking my family. He's trying to burn my farm down, right, and murder all my murder my family. And I capture the guy, and I hog time and I tie him down, waiting for the sheriff to arrive for a few hours. Okay. So for that three hour period, while I'm waiting, I've got this guy subdued, he's, he's, I basically kidnapped him, I'm basically enslaved him right, I put him in a cage or whatever. So he's my slave. Now, I could have a conversation with the guy. We could talk about this if we want to, right. And so some people will say, well, I'm proving that argumentation ethics is invalid because I am holding a slave. And I'm arguing with them at the same time. But what I would say is this, I am saying I have the right to use force against your body and you don't have the right to use force against mine. I am coming up with a different rule for us. But I can ground it in something, I can point to some objective fact of reality that does give me a just claim to have a different rule for each of us. And that is that you committed aggression against me, right. But in general, the prima facie assumption when people argue is you have to assume they're the same. So unless you can point to an objective distinction. So what what people have done in terms of bigotry and this kind of stuff is you'll say, well, I'm a man, you're a woman. And men and women are different. Well, men and women are different. But are they relevantly different, right? You could say whites and blacks are different. They have different skin color, maybe some different, I don't know, some different genetic characteristics. Okay, they are different. But we know that they're similar enough to have an argument. So they're both rational human actors is the difference they're relevant, you know, what if I'm six foot one and you're six foot two is that that's a difference, but is it a relevant difference? You can't just come up with a difference, you have to point to a relevant difference that justifies having a different norm or rule applied to each person. So I think in the case of someone who is committed aggression, they have used force against me. So by my estoppel theory, they have laid down the law, something like this, I agree that it's okay to use force against other people when they object. And I'm like, okay, I'm accepting your rule, I'm going to use force against you when you're objecting to being imprisoned because you've already said you agree with that rule, you know, right. So the point is, you come up with a reason. So to me, the universalizability requirement simply means to give a reason, but the reason can't be arbitrary, because then it's not a reason, right. So it has to be grounded in the nature of things, which is what Hoppe and Kant emphasize. So when I read your, your estoppeling new just justification for individual rights, I was, I was fascinated by your formulation of the argument because you point out, as you previously mentioned, that when a murderer commits a crime, he is presupposing that he has that right. Now in the court of law, he could say, no, I don't think that anymore. However, he would then be trapping himself because he would, he would be conceding that what he, the act that he committed was wrong. So he would be conceding that presupposing in making that statement that the, that that they can prosecute him, that the state or whatever legal institution to which he is subject and prosecute him. So I thought that was an interesting, an interesting formulation. Correct. Because he's still objecting to being punished. So when you object to being punished, now you're taking a stance that it's wrong to use force. So, but if he concedes that he used force before, he's conceding that he did something that was wrong. So presumably if, if I were to use force against him, he doesn't want to just say it's wrong, he wants there to be some sanction applied to me if I do it, which means he's conceding that some sanction should be applied to him because he did it. So the thing is the reason, the reason you can't change your mind there is because he can't undo the fact that he already acted. He's already done some damage. He's already invaded someone's property. He's already used it without their consent. That can't be undone. So it's too late for him to deny it. Right. Yeah. And I think, as you mentioned, I mean, he would be he would essentially be conceding in the court of law if he says, I don't think this anymore. This isn't a performative contradiction given that I'm saying two contradictory things. This isn't a performative contradiction since I don't think this anymore since I think I now think my past actions were wrong, were immoral, well, then he would be conceding in the court of law that they can prosecute him, which I again found the thought was was an interesting formulation of the argument. Before we conclude, I want to ask you about a couple criticisms that you mentioned. Roderick Long, for example, points out that I think this is a fundamental misconception, misunderstanding on his part. But Roderick Long made the argument that according to what we call Aristotelian negative demonstration, you can point out that you have to prove that Hoppe's premises are true. And if you want to prove that Hoppe's premises are true, then you end up making another argument and you end up with this infinite regress. Regress is ad infinitum. So he says that according to Aristotelian negative demonstration, this essentially falsifies Hoppe's argument, which I think Hoppe has addressed this counterpoint in his lecture, which I believe he delivered at the Property and Freedom Society, in which he said that, no, that's not true because this is a transcendental argument in order to propose anything you have to presuppose certain things, you're not trying to derive the conclusion from certain premises. So Hans replied to some of the criticisms in the original Liberty thing. And then he sort of left it alone for a long time, except for one reply to Lauren Lemasky too, I believe. But then I think was 2015 at the PFS, he finally dressed up his argumentation ethics again. And he and he replied to a lot of them again. So that's a good one to listen to. Now, Roderick. So here's what I recall. I can't remember everything in Roderick's original reply. But Roderick has written something interesting, which was has also been relied upon by another colleague of mine named Jeffrey Allen Ploche, who's a nurse Dahlian anarchist libertarian. Roderick has this idea that he thinks you can get if I'm stating Roderick correctly, he might correct me here. You can get over this humane objection from going from that you can't go from is to an aunt by by not using. So here's the idea. Kant has categorical imperatives and he distinguishes those from hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical would be if then, right? So like, right, if if you want to have human well-being and prosperity and peace, then you should have libertarian norms, right? So that's just applying common sense libertarian or free market economics and political knowledge and his historical knowledge to the to the presupposed goal of we want peace and prosperity. But that's an if then that still doesn't get you over the is odd problem because it's a saying if and what if someone doesn't have that same value. Roderick says, well, there's something called so and the categorical hyper hypothetical is is Kantian. That's not that's not a risk to tell you. So we can't use categorical and if then doesn't really solve the is odd divide. Roderick says there's something called an acertoric hypothetical. And instead of being an if then it's a sense then. So it's like, since you agree on this norm that we all share and we all agree on, then you should do X. And I actually think that is very similar to Hoppe's argumentation ethics. He's saying since we all favor peace parentheses when we're arguing, then the following norms have to be accepted as valid or the the only ones that can be justified. So they're both in a way a sense then or an acertoric hypothetical. I don't think the risk to tell you to would agree with me on this because they're jealous about their territory. But just like on Ram would not agree that she was a Kantian, but right, right. And Rans arguments for her her axiom her axioms like existence exists, consciousness exists. There is a conscious observer and there's a universe out there that we observe that's aware of that's different from us. The law of non-contradiction, these various axiomatic truths, things that are undeniably true, you validate those truths the same way that some are priori truths in Mises and the neo-Kantian Mises would justify and then the way Hoppe would justify some of his. So it's the same kind of law. I've always thought it's the same kind of logical demonstration. Now, I think again, like I say, some of the neo Aristotelians like Long and Ploche might not agree to this. But I think the sense then the acertoric hypothetical is basically the same solution that that Hoppe has come up with. All right, so I think that's a good conclusion for argumentation ethics. Now we can move on to I guess the Austrian reconstruction of history and how much Hoppe contributed to that, which I guess to put it simply is applying Austrian economics and principles like time preference to history to give us better views on what happened and why things happened. And of course, Hoppe also applies things like argumentation ethics and class analysis to his views on history. So I'd love to hear Mr. Andsela's views on that. Well, so if I understand what you're talking about in the theory of socialism capitalism, the first several chapters. So the first two chapters are his property analysis. And then he goes into his essentialist understanding of what socialism and capitalism are. So most people say socialism is the centralized ownership of the needs of production. And capitalism is the private ownership of the means of production. And Han says, well, yeah, that's true. But the essence of these things is really socialism is the institutionalized interference with or aggression against private property. And capitalism is the is the institutionalized respect or recognition of private property rights. So like just generalizing them. And so then he takes that understanding of socialism capitalism, and he analyzes different forms historically of socialism. So I think he's got a chapter socialism Russian style, socialism I think fascist style or something like that. Socialism social democratic style. So he so in the theory of socialism capitalism, he analyzes and dissects various forms of socialism, which all share essentially socialism in common, like they all aggress against private property rights, but in different ways, right? So you have centralized planning of communism, you have the nominal private ownership of fascism, but still stay controlled. And then you have social democracies, which this diffuse democratic system still controls private property and invades private property rights. And he analyzes that. So that's one thing he's done. And then he also has an interesting article on arguing about reunification of East and West Germany, where he was from. So that's another interesting insight. As far as reformulating history, probably the one of the single best things to read on this would be his introduction to his democracy book, where he basically has a complete reformulation of the understanding of modern history, starting, say, with World War, like 1900, sort of around the beginning of the 20th century, where he says, look, the traditional idea is that and even Rothbard and Mises and some libertarians share this in their reverence for the American founding and the Constitution and the modern world, this reverence for democracy, like they know it's not perfect, but they thought it was an improvement from the old system, like the Asian regime of monarchies and things like that. It's certainly superior to to dictatorships and authoritarian states and you know, theocracies and empires. But but is it is it really an improvement over republics and republican monarchies? He argues that that it wasn't it was retrogression, or at least in some way. So so when with with the with after World War One, you know, he says like, you know, American intervention caused it to be this major ideological war, which had to which had to result in the total extinction of the previous systems, the total subjugation of Germany, you know, through the first Treaty of Versailles and all this stuff led to the uprising, which led to World War Two and Hitler and Nazism and and and ultimately all this led to communism and all this stuff. So, you know, I don't know if he blames America because we didn't do it on purpose. But you know, the intervention into World War One led to World War Two and communism and the Cold War and the war we have today and to the erosion of the monarchies and to the rise of democracy and democratic lawmaking and legislation and all that. So that's a fascinating sort of revisionist history, which makes sense to me. I'm not a historian, but it makes a lot of sense to me. I think it's I think it's brilliant. Yeah, I wanted to ask you about your your position on on Professor Hoppe's and that analysis of the origin of human society because he essentially refutes the Hobbesian position that in the natural state of affairs, everyone would be warring against everyone else. And I think two thinkers are worth mentioning here in connection to my to this point, also discussing because I want to delve into the law of comparative advantage, which was developed by David Ricardo. There were Mises points out that the the law of comparative advantage is predicated upon the fundamental assumption that there are a diversity of resources, a diversity of different talents, different people in the world who can then cooperate in order to increase total output and individual consumption for each exchange participant. And this is obviously impossible if everyone is perfectly equal to everyone else in a perfectly egalitarian world. The division of labor would be essentially useless because there is nothing to exchange. Everyone is is identical. And so I what I what I found in Professor Hoppe's work is that he also he that he indirectly, I shouldn't say he indirectly, but he addresses a point that was that was made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which which was that at the at the origin when human society, the inequality is is emerged when human beings decided to form a society. So they built huts and they began helping each other. We moved away from from natural resources to property rights, private property. And this is how inequality arose, whereas someone like Joseph de Maistra who was a counter-revolutionary argue that inequality is natural and that that we are all inherently unequal to one another. So Professor Hoppe's reformulation of for his analysis of the origin of human society, I found very interesting. And I was wondering whether you had any any thoughts on on this, because it is very in my in my view consequential. Well, I do like like one of his good papers that has influenced me is he's in the journal I found a libertarian papers. He wrote an article in there and it sort of reformulates a lot of stuff he had written in his earlier books, but it's about sort of the logical kind of origins, plus the historical origins of humanity. And I don't really know a lot about his particular I can't recall his particular views on the sort of primitive primitive man's normative systems or something like that. But he he in that article, he imagines like a town, right, a primitive town, which has that some respectful property rights. And he even in that in that article, he even admits that you could have so called collective ownership of property, like the town can have an easement over the road. And he's using that, I think, in service of his immigration stuff. Now, there was a big debate which Hoppe contributed to in the in the late 80s, if I recall, in the review of Austrian economics, I have a lot of links assembled on my website under a post called a great de-homogenization debate. And I think Joe Salerno started that and Joe Salerno makes a lot of the same comments that he's opposing the Hayekian view of knowledge being dispersed and all this kind of stuff. It's like Hayek does it as a problem to be solved through the free market. Salerno points out similar to what you just said about Hoppe, that, you know, the differences in knowledge is a good thing. It leads to the division and specialization of labor, which of course is a point of Mises, too, that when people have empathy with each other, they cooperate and they trade, but they develop the specialization division of labor. One thing I have liked about Hoppe, and this relates a little bit to this, is his way of, like I've always been this satisfied with the left right spectrum, right? As a libertarian, like at first I took the standard Nolan charview of things, right? Like, oh, we're orthogonal to left-right spectrum. And left-right is virtually meaningless because left and right at these streams are both socialist and they're both horrible and totalitarian. But the way Hoppe reformulated it in a talk several years ago is that he says that essentially the left, the main characteristic of left, left thinking is egalitarianism, which is unrealistic. And the essential characteristic of the right is being realistic, realistic about the existence of differences between people and natural authority figures and natural hierarchies among people. And in that formulation of the left-right divide, which I think it makes a lot of sense, I would agree that I would be a rightist, right? I would be a realist and I don't oppose hierarchies and natural natural authority. I think it's almost inconceivable to imagine a world of equality because it is sort of like if you have, you know, people say, what if you clone someone or you duplicate someone with a Star Trek transporter or you have two twins, why aren't they the same? It's like, well, even if you could copy yourself and the other guy walks out of the out of the teleporter machine with your same memories, from that second on, you're going to diverge and be different people, right? Because your experiences are different. So even in a world of if everyone looked the same with the same height, the same age, everything, they still wouldn't be the same. So you would have to have natural specialization emerge. I think it's impossible to imagine a world of automatons who are exactly the same because no one, no one's located in the same location on the earth, you know, they're all right, right. It's just just like entropy happens in different ways, a little clusters of order here and there, and it's random in some way, everyone's going to be different. And that's going to lead over time to the specialization and division of labor, which is a good thing, right? Because it makes us more efficient. I don't know if that answers your question, but that's one thing I've gotten from some of this writing. Yeah, well, he also addresses Rothbard's argument, which you can find in the first, I believe one of the first sections of an economy and statement, which he says, human society did not form because of a mystical sense of communion between men amongst men. Human society formed because of the economic advantages of the division of labor, which Lyftik von Mises points out. And that's what I wanted to Yeah, to address and ask you about because someone like Hobbes would disagree with that. And Rousseau, I think, was also very harmful to the development of the social sciences because he contrived this idea of inequality being a construct rather than an inherent property of mankind. Yeah, well, I mean, I guess I'm more of a randian in the sense I don't think there's a natural conflict of interest between people. In fact, I don't think rights can conflict at all. Right. So you never have to balance rights. They're always composable. Hillel Steiner would say, I assume, and I think Hans Hoppe would agree with Mises. Mises has a lot of interesting stuff. I've got a couple of blog posts like empathy is a source of rights. Mises talks about how the division of labor society makes us empathetic or maybe the other way around. I think they all naturally go together. What I what I personally think happened is that we evolved in a certain way as a social species. Partly because intelligence intelligence gave us an advantage, right? So bigger, bigger heads and brains gave us an advantage. But that required the mother to give birth before the baby was was was formed basically right because otherwise it would kill her. Right. So unlike other some other mammal species where the the foal comes out ready to walk and is independent. So are some fish or things like that. The baby comes out informed and needs is dependent and hopeless for for a long time. And so that maternal feelings developed and the social structure around that. So I think all that contributed towards the development of empathy, which simply means that psychologically most normal people have a certain natural value of other people's well-being maybe not as strong as their own, but they do value other people's well-being so they don't know, you know, so they have a desire to help other people into one to be part of the community. And to so they have a propensity to to have social intercourse to trade and to cooperate with each other. Now, the fact of scarcity leads to war and conflict and fighting. But the reason we've had progress in human civilization in history is because there is an advantage to to trading the people that do tend to trade and to live socially and civilization with each other or more economically effective. So they're richer, so they are more powerful, so they have more weapons, so they dominate, right? So the misanthropic people tend to die out. So I think there's a natural progression that selects for cooperation, right? It's not perfect, but I think that's kind of how we got here. So in conclusion on this section, I think these things that have been talked about here and Hoppe's whole views on society and especially primitive society are definitely very useful things to know when speaking with people like Marxist on primitive communism. You know, these things like division of labor and how property rights developed or property in general are definitely very important things to know. So moving on from here, we've got class analysis and Hoppe's sort of reconstruction of the Marxian dialectics. Of course, he applies things like time preference and points out the flaws in Marxist dialectics through ignoring the actual consent of, say, the proletariat with the bourgeoisie. So Mr. Kinsella could briefly elaborate on Hoppe's whole view of the Marxian dialectics and class analysis. Well, Hoppe has a great article, I'm trying to read the title now, you might have it up to hand. What Marx gets right? Well, I don't know if that's a title. That's maybe the title of the lecture. Yeah. Yeah. But he has an article that's based upon. It's I think it's called Marxist and Austrian class analysis or something like that. And I think he makes a kind of a statement startling to some people that like Marxist class analysis is substantially correct except for one thing. So he goes through the sort of whole Marxist class analysis of exploitation and different classes exploiting each other or one exploiting the other. And he says that's all correct except Marx gets the analysis of exploitation wrong. So Marx thinks exploitation is when the capitalist employer class exploits the working class. And the reason he believed that was he had a fallacious view of economics. So he had this labor theory of value, which I think which came from Ricardo and Smith. Right. And I think you could argue ultimately in a way it might have come from John Locke and his labor theory of property, which are not the same thing. But I think they're related in the end. This is the idea that you own your labor. Yeah. So Locke argued that the reason we own he was Locke was trying to argue against the aristocratic divine right of King's idea that Kings are basically empowered by God to do whatever they want. He was trying to come up with some limits to that. And I guess this guy named Filmer, if I'm recalling right, a modern political scientist. But I think so Locke was trying to come up with an argument why we have these natural rights that that that even Kings can't violate without trying to without without sounding too much like he rejected King's authority because he didn't want to kill. Yeah. So I think I think his arguments that well, God gave the world to Adam, the first King. And he gave into humanity and he gave the whole world in commons to everyone and all of Adam's children. And effectively, the stuff that's not being used yet is unowned. So so so the argument is that God gives everyone the right to themselves. So they own themselves because God gives you this right to your body or to yourself. Now, I think you own your body. But if you say if you call owning yourself, then that's a little bit more metaphorical and vague. And then you say, well, if you own yourself, you own your labor, right, you own your labor. Then that's why you own these unowned resources that God gave us to use and to enjoy. Right. You mix your labor with it because now your labor that you own has been mixed with it. And you can't unless you own the thing you mix it with, you've lost ownership of your labor because it's it's in a strictly bound up in it like when you transform something. So that was his argument. He was he was doing something noble and admirable. He was trying to argue that people have a solid, natural, right, inviolable right to to these resources that they homestead and that no one can take away from them, you know, even the king. But to argue that he came up with this kind of fuzzy, you own yourself, therefore, you own your labor, therefore, you don't things you mix it with. So which I think is wrong. It's just you don't own your labor and you don't need to say you own your labor to argue that you own things you mix your labor with. What you can say is that right, you've you've established an objective link between yourself and this thing, which gives you a better claim on it than anyone else because you've transformed it in an objective way, set up a border around it or whatever. Let's hop is argument, by the way. So you don't need to go through this this step. And by the way, David Hume saw through this. David Hume said Locke is right, but he didn't need to add this labor. It was an unnecessary, I think he called it a circumlocutioner, like it was an unnecessary step. Right. So this idea that you own labor has been around for a long time and it's sort of a mist, I will call it mystical, but it's just it's not coherent and rigorous. And I think that's that's present in this labor theory of value, like trying to explain why something has a value on the market. It's because while you you put your labor into it, all this idea that we're these people that exude this substance called labor, right? It's just not true. You don't exude labor. It's not a thing that you own. But I believe that's also the argument they make for intellectual property rights. Yeah. Yeah. I think it's right. It's led to intellectual property as well. Right. So this this mistake that Locke made has corrupted political theory and economy and all this anyway. So so Marx basically believes that the employer, if he makes a profit, that he's selling the product that the that the worker made with his labor for more than the value of the labor that. Well, he's selling it. The workers not getting the full return on the labor, he put into it, because there's a difference between what he's paying and wages to the laborer and what he's selling it for. That's how he makes a profit. So the very existence of profit by the capitalist or the employer is is is exactly the amount of surplus labor value you're stealing from the worker. Right. So it's theft, which they call exploitation. So that's what his class analysis is based upon. And Hoppe said, well, that's just that's just wrong. I mean, because, you know, if you have a proper understanding of economics, the Austrian view, you understand that there's no theft at all. However, the exploitation is the act of aggression against people's private property claims. And that is where the state comes in. So the state and its cronies, that is the small class that exploits the people that, you know, the taxing versus the taxed to put it crudely. So he reformulates Austrian or Marx's class theory by saying it's all correct as long as you replace labor, labor theft with aggression. Right. Well, he actually I believe he said that if you if you replace the word bourgeois with the state and every single one of Marx's writings, that would render that would render them correct. And I think it's right. Yeah. Right. I think it's important to point out that Marx's the the entire Marxian schema is derived from his adaptation of Hagellian dialectic. So Marx believed that there was a base and a superstructure and that the base consisted of consists of productive forces, the modes of production and productive relations. And Rothbard wrote a really brilliant article on this in which he points out that, no, it's actually it's not the base that influences the superstructure. It's the superstructure that influences the base. It's ideas and legal institutions and the framework in which property rights are acted upon and which people exchange with one another that determines whatever productive forces means. I think Rothbard analogizes that with compares that with with technology and technological methods. So Rothbard is essentially inverted that that base superstructure relation and adapted it, although it's not. I don't want to delve into the esoteric details of this, but Marx's Marxian dialect is bi-directional, whereas with Rothbard's formulation it is unidirectional. I mean, you can't have material forces cannot influence ideas, so to speak. It's the conscious actors who employ purposeful action that then influence the base. So, I mean, Marx had this idea that when there's a change in technology, for some reason, those productive relations are not going to change. So in order for that process to occur naturally, there would have to be a social revolution. And of course, Marx was a polylogist. Mises uses this term in human action. He believed that each class has its own logic, that they don't follow the laws of reason, which in my view is preposterous. Yeah, I think in the festrift we did for Hoppe for his 60th birthday called Property Freedom. Right. And it's called Property Freedom in Society. Yeah. Named after his Property and Freedom Society. I think Jeff Tucker, my friend Jeff Tucker has an essay on their own polylogism. Yeah. So it's very interesting how I was actually discussing something I call Hoppe in dialectics with a couple of friends of mine several days ago. And I pointed out that the entire Austrian view essentially rejects dialectical materialism. And then we can adapt that and apply to Austrian class analysis by, I mean Rothbard in the anatomy of the state uses Albert J. Knox's distinction between the economic and productive means to wealth. You can either expropriate wealth or voluntarily formulate established contracts and trade within the framework of property rights, the normative framework of property rights. And I think also that's either Dejuvenal or one of these other guys, the economic means versus the political means. Right. Yes, I believe it was Nock and Dejuvenal. Yeah. Yeah. So I wanted to ask you about your opinion on what I believe to be the necessity of developing what I call libertarian social philosophy in order to counter some of the new left wing developments, such as the synthesis of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxian class theory by the Frankfurt school. Because now they're working with a completely different definitional framework. It's not that they don't define coercion as physical violence. They define, for example, the patriarchal household is inherently coercive because the husband has functional authority over the wife. So I wanted to ask you about your thoughts on developing a libertarian social philosophy in order to counter some of the more recent developments that have occurred on the radical left, what I would call the cultural Marxist left, what Paul Gottfried calls the cultural Marxist left. I mean, on those matters, I'm more of a student than I haven't written a lot about that or developed a lot of that. I have basically, I mean, I know Hoppe has written a lot on this. And there's very little I've read by Hoppe and Rothbard and others on these topics that I disagree with. But I just haven't really specialized in that stuff myself. A lot of times these discussions come up when we talk about strategy and tactics, like when instead of talking about libertarian theory itself and like what, like from our philosophical armchairs, which laws are justified and what systems are justified, what our rights are, when you talk about being an activist and trying to achieve liberty, which is a substantial part of people that call us those libertarians. And in fact, a lot of these guys seem to be unaware of the fact that libertarianism is not necessarily activism. Like that's all their lives are in it, like they came into the Ron Paul movement. So they view everything through the lens of activism. Like, so if you promote, if you're, no, some of the unprincipled or the non radical guys, like 30 years ago, if you would say, we need to legalize cocaine, they would say, well, that's not going to sell. And that's true. That won't sell to the public, but they're viewing the validity of the statement by the lens of whether it will succeed, right? Right. So when you have this activist mentality, everything you're searching for is, how can we achieve liberty? What tactics can we use? What strategy can we use? And when you do that, then you do need to get more into social theory, like because it's all part of a whole approach to life sometimes, right? And there are a lot of, and the left has been good at this, right? That's why they've been, I think, dominant the last many decades. They have found a way to win the cultural wars, which is, I mean, I personally think that we have to have a cultural fight ourselves to counter that. And some people are trying to do that. You know, it used to be the Chronicles Magazine crowd. It's kind of the paleo libertarians now, to some degree, I don't know if they have a coherent overall worldview. Some people are grasping at different strands of it, likely you have these neo-monarchists now, and you have the kind of alt-right stuff. But it's just not my wheelhouse, really, to be honest. I mean, I'm happy to talk about any particular issue, but I'm generally in favor of the traditional, what Hoppe views as the, like for example, in Hoppe's writing, he talks about covenant communities. Everyone thinks he's advocating for this. I don't know if he exactly is. He's more predicting, like in a private law society, you can't just be libertarians. You're going to have people with values and practices and customs and things in their life that are not libertarian. That's just their religion, their tribe, their history, their family units, their country, their countrymen. And people would tend to segregate, in a sense, or live among people that have similar values and customs and traditions, and that would affect the way you live and the places that you live, right? I tend to think it wouldn't be quite as legalistic as a lot of people interpret that. They think that you walk into club A, city A and you pass the gates and you have to sign a big contract agreeing to all this stuff. I think it would be more organic and it would be less rigid, but I think that would tend to happen, of course. You're going to have a Mormon area. You're going to have a Muslim area. You're going to have a secular area. But I think, by and large, you'll be dominated by the sort of traditional, family-based, culturally conservative in the sense of not having a big opposition to the heterosexual family unit as the basis of society, right? Even if you have priests around or single guys or gay people, that's fine, they can live among these people, but they're not in an outright hostile opposition to it. A priest lives among councils and lives in support of bi-married people, but he's not criticizing the institution of marriage, even though he's not married, you know? So I guess that's the extent of my deep knowledge on this topic. Yeah, that is precisely what I meant because of the Frankfort School, we now have this prevailing notion that the white heterosexual family is the source of all evils in Western civilization. And in order to counter this, I think we really need to develop something like a libertarian social philosophy. And hearkening back to your point about Halper's analysis of monarchy, he actually points out that he uses allodio, what we call allodio feudalism as an example of this because before the development of what I might call monarchical absolutism, you had a very decentralized order in the early Middle Ages. I believe families would form hundreds, these hundreds would form counties, counties would form duchies, and these duchies would form kingdoms, but communities would voluntarily commend themselves to the protection of lords, for example. And lords would depend on the loyalty of their vassals, precisely because there was no force. I mean, the common understanding of law was that you can't initiate violence. The king is subject to the same law as the peasant or the tenant. And what overturned this in a way was the Protestant reformation, which challenged the authority of the church. And there was a Belgian historian, I think he passed away, named, I can't remember Henry Piren, that's it. And Henry Piren points out that what initially happened was that the king, it was decentralized until up to this point, up until this point. The king incited riots by the peasants on the part of the peasants against the lords. And then created a Hobbesian situation. I told the aristocratic nobles, look, if you do not form an alliance with me, then this will continue on or worsen. So what essentially happened was that the king artificially created a Hobbesian situation by inciting riots amongst the peasants against these lords. And then you had the formation of the monarchical state where the king would now tax and legislate, whereas that did not exist prior to this development. So, I mean, I see very interesting trends in Edik von Kuhn and Ledin, who called himself a conservative arch liberal, which I go by that name. I also like reactionary libertarian because I'm still an anarchist, but I believe in a very hierarchical social order. I think that would result naturally from libertarianism. Well, as Hoppe has pointed out, even though from a pure libertarian point of view, you can't justify a monarch either. However, the monarchs were way more limited in their powers and they were identifiable. So if you have a horrible monarch, he could be killed or driven out of power. And you could on occasion have a good monarch. I mean, maybe have a tyrant every now and then, but you could also have a good one, just by luck. But in democracy, you're never gonna have, you're never gonna have good democratic rulers because the system selects for corrupt, venal, short-sighted, high-time preference people. That's just the nature of the system. Even Hayek saw this, like the worst rise to the top because of the nature of democracy. But at least on occasion, I mean, Han tells a funny story about one of his friends who was robbed. I don't know if you ever heard this story, but he was robbed at an ATM one night, like in Germany or somewhere. And so some guy held him up and saw him getting money at the ATM and held him up and robbed him of his money. And the guy looked at the robber and said, he goes, I need some money to take a cab to get home. So the robber handed him $20 or whatever the equivalent was $20 dollars back. So you could even have a nice robber on occasion. Right. But you never have a nice democracy because the logic of the system makes it always get worse and worse and more metastasized. Right. And the difference is that everyone can enter the state apparatus. So politicians' time preferences are significantly higher than those of monarchs. Monarchs would think about the capital value of the country, so to speak. And they would not... Yeah, go ahead, sorry. Yeah, they would take into consideration the capital value of the country. Whereas democratic politicians, they have this mindset that, look, we're going to loot and expropriate as much wealth as possible because we have term limits. And we can establish many friendships, long-lasting relationships with prominent people, whoever they may be in the political realm. And so their time preferences are significantly higher than those of monarchs because monarchs would at least try to pass on the country, pass on the territory to their project. Yeah, and this is all in his book Democracy and His Writings that preceded that. Yeah, so that's the problem with those types of leaders. And not only that, in democracy, the people are bamboozled or fed this idea, which they accept over time, that because they have the right to vote, right? So you lose this clear demarcation or distinction between the rulers and the ruled, like in a monarchy, even in North Korea, everyone knows who the leader or the state is and the leaders and they know that who the people are that are being ruled. Whereas in a democracy, it gets so big, and your cousin or your husband or your brother might work for the government in some bureaucracy. And not only that, everyone has the right to vote and you hear over and over again, well, you are the state. You have no right to complain about this law because after all, you had to say so in the law of being formed because you could vote for your representative and blah, blah, blah. So they shut out the sent like that, which allows the government to get away with far more than it could get away with if it was a monarchy. Like a monarch tries to tax more than 5%, 10%. People are gonna view it as expropriation and revolt. But if you're doing it to yourself, you're gonna have 65% taxation and people are like, well, we did it to ourselves. You can't complain. Just vote in the next election if you don't like it. Just vote in the next election. That's what you're told. Yeah, yeah, I think that's correct. And Kopp also points out if you have inflation, democratic politicians don't care that they're receiving inflated currency because it doesn't matter by the time they receive the state apparatus receives inflated currency from the expropriated subject population, that democratic politician is out of office, which is precisely the problem with democracy as compared to monarchy. Yeah, so it seems we've already sort of concluded the class analysis and we're kind of running out of time. Anyways, if I were to say just a few more thoughts on the whole class analysis thing, I would say it's actually good to view Hoppe's whole correction of Marx as rather a restoration of class analysis because initially, it was people like Charles Comte and Charles DeNoyer, I believe that's how you pronounce their names, who developed these class analysis in the early 1800s and they viewed it in a more similar way that Hoppe viewed it between the ruler and the ruled in the context of the state. And it was actually Karl Marx who kind of ruined it. And then you have people like Kappa and others. I believe Roger Long also wrote on a libertarian class analysis who basically kind of restored it but also applied a marginalist economics to that whole class analysis view. Now, we can kind of wrap it up here if anyone has anything more to say. Mr. Kinsella or Jung-Yin, I think I'm about done. No, I've really enjoyed the conversation. You guys are obviously very well read. What are your, are you guys a political scientist, philosophers or what are your specialties? No, I actually specialize in monetary theory but I read a lot of political philosophy and history. Honestly, my specialty would be like economic history or just kind of like dealing with very mainstream things because like what I do is I make content, online content, mostly on TikTok to change the minds of leftists. So I have to deal with a lot of the very mainstream things that people are talking about, they're talking about stagnant wages or talking about recessions and stuff like that. And so that's what I wanna talk to people about. I deal with a lot of like empirical data and stuff like that because that's what people really respond to. And then from there when I get people interested I kind of push them over to, you know, Austrian business cycle theory, argumentation ethics, try to get them to read HABA and stuff like that. So Jung-Yin is definitely more of a like academic person and I'm more of a like activist type person, I would say. Got it. Well, good luck with your podcast. I think it's gonna be very fruitful and interesting. All right, thank you so much for being a guest. Thank you everyone for watching and we will go ahead and wrap this up.