 Good evening. My name is Susan Stagant and I am the Director of the Africa Program at the United States Institute of Peace. Welcome to our first conversation in the series, Why All the Coos. This week, the Biden-Harris administration will host the Summit for Democracy to activate its commitment to renew democracy in the United States and around the world as an essential priority to meet the unprecedented challenges of our times. As conversations take place about addressing and fighting corruption, promoting respect for human rights, and defending against authoritarianism, it is impossible to ignore what the UN Secretary General has called an epidemic of coos. The number of coos and coo attempts in 2021 matches the highest point in this 21st century. And we are concerned about the impacts of instability, undermining democratic progress and human rights, and the acceleration of cycles of violence in countries grappling with conflict. While the headlines about coos often point to a backsliding of democracy or political transition gone wrong, there is no one narrative, particularly in Africa. We are also interested in drawing forward the stories of the responses to coos. These include narratives about the organizing and mobilization by youth, women, civic and political organizations, the decisions by international, continental and regional organizations to uphold norms of constitutional change of government, and the mediation efforts to facilitate negotiations and reach new political agreement about how to move forward together, and intense discussions about what security means, for whom, and who provides it. In short, the narratives about the hard, courageous work of peace and democracy. Today we will focus on Sudan, and I am delighted to be joined by three distinguished panelists. Ahmed Keduta, the former senior policy advisor in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs in the government of Sudan. Hala El Karib, the regional director for the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, and speaking today in her capacity as an independent activist. And Joe Tucker, senior expert for the Greater Horn of Africa at the United States Institute of Peace. For Sudan, we are not just talking about one coup that you may have been tracking in the media on October 25, but in fact two critical coos over the last two years, and several attempts in between. So let's dive right into our conversation and start with some reflection on the 2019 coup. Joe, I'm going to turn to you first, and ask if you can help us to set the scene, starting back in 2018-2019, when the political transition in Sudan started. What, what in your view sparked that 2019 coup? It's really an important question because in Sudan, like everywhere else in the region, history and political history, especially definitely matters. And I want to sort of focus on, on two things. What, what came technically before the coup, and what led to this, frankly, opening for the military to act as it did. So, as many people know, there were a lot of protests that led to what happened in 2019. And, you know, on the surface, these protests that began in December of the previous year were really grounded in extreme frustrations among the population of various elements of society. On what on the surface was economic reasons, a real sharp rise in the cost of bread and basic commodities, a reduction in subsidies, inflation really across the board. So that aspect of the protests that led up to what in effect was a coup, that overthrew the Bashir government, really grounded in the frustration from, from the public. And I want to note here what others have documented is that a lot of those protests were from relatively prosperous areas in and around Khartoum, that some say benefited from the previous regime, and sort of a knock on economic impact. And some people refer to this as sort of the inner periphery areas that were hit hard places like Aparah, Abhmedini, Port Sudan, Gadareff, and so those places that really are sometimes out of the international eye, so to speak. You know, and I think a question we might come to after is what did that mean for areas in the more traditional periphery Darfur, southern court of thumb, Blue Nile. In fact, did what was happening there have on this given that a lot of the focus was on protests related to the economy in these areas that people don't see as that quote normal periphery. I don't really want to, of course, don't want to discount the fact that there was of course a lot of popular anger resentment of the Bashir regime, decades of real depredation and significant crackdowns on political and civic forces obviously that did play a role into this and I want to note that as the protests advanced as 2019 started and got underway there was a real sense of a growing organization unity among political and civic forces among unions on the ground and I think that that was taking things the next level so to speak, as opposed to the prior protests in the years following sassidans independence in 2011. I think that really got the attention of the military and the ruling elite. And so of course then we saw what has happened prior times in Sudanese history the military intervening on the surface intervening on the street so to speak and I think just to know briefly here I think it's important to know that there were a lot of fractures among regime elements among the ruling party going back years, also sort of jockeying and differences of the pinning of the military and the intelligence services. And I think that sort of a lot of those gray areas frankly created space for the military to to act as it as it did I think in retrospect they, they did act to take sort of the side of the streets to unseat President the top tier of the National Congress Party. I think they were acting in their economic interest I think they were acting in the sense that they always like to be seen as a protector of the nation. They obviously wanted to seat at the table, as, as this went forward there was also some internal content on President Beshear making the decision to run in the 2020 elections. So again I think we'll leave it there briefly but the last thing I would say is that, you know, in the years prior to this they were always the threats of coups, especially one incident particularly November 2012. So sort of taking stock of those those internal fissures among the key elites is important then and I think it's important now and I think this highlights one big question that that Hala and Duda can speak to more more correctly than I can is that this really gets the point of what is the ultimate role, if any, of the Sudanese military and security services in politics in the country that's this underlying theme throughout all this so I'll leave it at there but but thanks again for the question because it's important. Thanks Joe. And, dude I want I want to turn to you because we talk about the protests as requiring a tremendous amount of organization, but I don't think anybody who hasn't been part of that organizing in the years that go into it can really address the intensity and the structure, and, and the courage and energy that has to go into that and I'm particularly interested in hearing a bit more from you about what was happening in the organizing of the mass protest movement, what was the response where you know as Joe said, so often military say you're stepping in to defend the people. And, and what happened to really take the position and push forward with the necessary political negotiations. I remember at the time. Sudanese kept saying, we are not Egypt, you will not act in the same way that the street acting Egypt acted in Egypt and it was like this weight of history, not just Sudan's history but some global history in terms of mass movements and the trajectory of who's really sat on the shoulders of Sudanese so take us take us back a little bit to that time. First of all, thank you for organizing this panel. You're absolutely right. I think the political mobilization has really had an accumulated legacy over the years throughout the 30 years of this year's rule, whether it was the student movements and the university's moving forward to the establishment of youth groups, such as good if not and change now, and then the series of, you know, a boarded mobilization against the regime whether in 2012 2013 in September, and again moving forward leading up to 2018. I think what made the mobilization different in 2018 is the fact that it really began organically in many ways it was not driven by the political elites, or, or, you know, the street was basically as Joe said, reacting to the context on the ground. It was clear that the regime had basically reached the end of its lifespan. What we did see however was the fact that there was a consensus amongst the political elite to really let the Sudan professionals association take the forefront when it came to mobilizing. And what was interesting is that, you know, I worked on some research with a colleague of mine, Dr. Mejha Sen at the University of Michigan, looking at the mobilization at the street and what we found was that there were two distinct periods in the uprising itself, starting from late December until the end of January. So for a period of about a month and a half, the mobilization was largely driven and organized through a series of centralized protests. So the Sudan professionals association would call for protests at a particular time at a particular location that was known to both the protesters and the regime itself. And that in many ways gave the advantage to the regime because you declared the location and the time. And it was a disadvantage to the protesters because as people came to protest, they were in many ways dislocated from the areas that they know. They were coming to a centralized place, whether it was downtown Khurtoum or Umdurman or Bahri or other central marketplaces in other cities around the country. And that gave an advantage to the regime and its ability to suppress the protest without any sort of concern for the people doing the oppression. However, the second phase was beginning from about January 19 20 up until April 5. And that period was marked by the protests being relocated to the neighborhoods and every neighborhood would actually declare a day that they're going to be going out. And the nature of the mobilization also changed in ways that wasn't easily suppressed. So, whether it was Burri, whether it was Shambat, Calakla, these various neighborhoods around Khurtoum for example. I'm focusing here on Khurtoum because of its importance to the to the revolution. Obviously other cities also were central in draining the energy of the security apparatus. But if we look at the mobilization in Khurtoum, the move of the protest to the neighborhoods did several things. First, it allowed the protesters to have the upper hand because they knew the territory. They were, you know, more knowledgeable. And it actually gave the advantage, took the advantage from the security apparatus. And what we found in the research is that oftentimes, whether it's the police or even the security, the national intelligence service, the people that were deployed in the neighborhoods were of those neighborhoods. So there were social ties that made it difficult for them to oppress as severely as they would have been able to do in central Khurtoum, for example. So several people told us that the police would come to them and they would know these police officers. And they would say, you know, please burn the tires in the street and get out of our way. We don't want to beat you up. We don't want to arrest you. So that social network moving the protest to the neighborhoods really allowed the protest movement to start building these intra-neighborhood networks, where the seeds of what later became the resistance committees and the neighborhood committees. And these neighborhood committees then started creating bonds of trust and eventually allowed them to better mobilize and organize. That period continued until April 5 until the call by the Sudan Professionals Association for a centralized protest on April 6. That call for centralized protest was again aimed at basically confronting the military and directing people to go to the general command of the armed forces. The beginning of that day, there was actually no plan to have a sit-in. The sit-in was called for later in the afternoon when there were, you know, hundreds of thousands, arguably upwards of close to a million people, showed up in central Khurtoum and occupying the central place. Then the third phase of the mobilization began at that point. The people who came to the protest came with those networks that they built in the neighborhoods. So when they would come to the protest in the sit-in, they would come with several people. It wasn't just themselves or their friends. It was a whole network almost. And that sit-in created an opportunity for those, at that point, isolated neighborhood networks to then create intra-neighborhood linkages. And it created this culture of the resistance committees as really being able to operate independently. And I think that's what marks Sudan's uprising and makes it unique is that the street is now almost autonomous. It has its own brain trust in the neighborhood committees, in their ability to communicate, in their ability to organize and facilitate. Of course, the role of the internet is central here. The internet was central initially through the use of social media with the Sudan Professionals Association. But it really helped in helping coordinate. However, the sit-in made it possible for these networks to intermingle that allowed them to even survive a month-long shutdown of the internet in June of 2013 after the massacre. So I think the protests really are now going to build on this legacy of the uprising and continue to create a very strong resistance to both the military and the Putschers. But as well as to any elite that are interested in co-opting the protest movement moving forward as a reaction to the October 21 coup. Thanks. Thanks, Kuduta. Hala, I want to bring you into the conversation and Joe's talked about the political history that led to the drivers for the coup itself. Kuduta's talked about some of the organizing that took place, and I'd love to hear more from you about what were the aspirations of the Sudanese people going into the mass protest movement in resisting the coup and in setting forth this really, I think, singular political agreement between civilians and the military that in theory set forth this plan for the political transition in the country. Because I think we often get so focused on those who lead the coup and their interests and the norms and values that they may or may not be violating. We sometimes forget what are the aspirations of the people, men and women, young and old, across entire geographies, who are really seeking to see a change in their country and for the region and I think as an example globally. Thanks, Susan. And thanks for bringing that up. I always, you know, I'm someone who has been traveling across Sudan for the past 20 years. And I, you know, as a Sudanese, I would definitely be able to say that Sudanese has a very unique appreciation for the blur and nature of their cultural identity, which is something that's, it's very interesting that it's always been assumed it's the opposite. But I think what happened in 2019 and the whole scene of the sitting, you know, in terms of how people they came together from across the country. I would say it's actually beyond neighborhoods because if we look at and clearly remember that documented that many times, you know, seeing villages, whole villages, they migrated from Darfur, they migrated from the mountains, migrated from blue Niles, they set their tents and they came there with the hope for justice with the hope. You know, everyone came in with their grievances, you know, and they came into this place assuming that this is, you know, this is where when we are going to be able to speak about, you know, decades of grievances, and then, you know, eager to interact and to see each other again after years and years of polarization and division that the country has lived through under the control of the NCB and the Muslim Brotherhood. It was amazing how, you know, as if those 30 years never happened. And one of the stories that I remember very well because I used to go and, you know, and engage in political debates and things like that. And I remember I was speaking about women rights and one of the young men who is from the far north, he came in and he said, I think women can never be equal to men. I think, you know, and he was saying that and he was very calm. He said, I'm saying that because this is what my religion told me and I strongly believe in that. So I started arguing with him. And then the crowds kept increasing around me. And we are standing in front of the army head commanders, there were soldiers passing by, there were a lot of people. It was such an interesting debate that went on for more than two hours. And in my mind, I was debating religion, a very sensitive topic. This is the country that has been controlled by militant Islamist for 30 years. You know, I am surrounded by people from every corner of the country, you know, and yet, you know, every rich people, they are not educated, they are street vendors, they are villagers, they are just people. And they were quite open and they were quite eager, you know, to listen to the conversation and many they would agree and those who disagree, you know, they would disagree politely, or they would just, you know, smile and leave, you know, and things like that. This level of tolerance and ability to engage and to speak to each other, you know, I think this is one of the most remarkable legacy of Sudan, Sudan political history. And this is, you know, what's actually, this is why Sudan is very much insisting, despite the disparity, despite what's happening, you know, to navigate a peaceful route for their democracy. And I think, you know, what, what's happening in Sudan at the moment, you know, is, is that it's, it's clearly challenging the concept of strong men that Western institutions and Western countries and mindset has been kind of adopting the, you know, the boss colonial modern states in terms of how we should be ruled. I think Sudanese are currently challenging that mindset and, and, and I think they are clearly enabling not only the world but also Sudanese elites, you know, to see and to reflect, you know, on the fact that, you know, this is a country that's, you know, culturally and is very much prepared to impress plurality. It's very much willing to impress, you know, its diversity. And, you know, Sudanese has proven, you know, for the past two years, we have endured a very, very harsh times. Every trick on the book has been played on, you know, on the potentials of democracy by, by the military. Having said that, you know, people has been extremely patient and, and they are willing to, to endure with the hope that they are going to move forward into, into a democratic system. Yeah. I think we often get so uncomfortable with those sense of difficult debates, and, and conflicts, and also thinking about our own respective role. It's so important to remember to listen to those, those many narratives and before, before we turn entirely to what's happened today to the coup that just happened in October. I want to shift us to talk about the role of external actors back in 2019. I remember as the, as the protest movement was developing I was, I was sitting in Addis Ababa at the chair of the African Union, and we were watching so closely to see what the African Union Peace and Security Council will do, would do. And I think we're struck that at that moment, they suspended Sudan, immediately following the coup deployed mediators, and continue to engage and I think in many ways it was held up as a way for the AU to to stand behind its charter and its principles. And at the same time, there was engagement from Gulf countries from Egypt. I'm using engagement not making any judgment yet so I'm going to turn to all of you to help me to understand and help our, our listeners to understand whether what those roles were. The United States was deeply engaged, the Troika, UK, Norway and the US, the EU, the, the regional actors, Russia has been involved in Sudan, China has interest in Sudan. So, so I'd like to turn to each of you and hear a little bit about your perspective of what, what was that an external influence role. And at a moment where we're thinking about the global construct and how that's shifting, where, where did different powers play into what was eventually the resolution in the agreement that was that was reached in 2019. And, and the conflicts that led up to it itself. I'm going to turn to you first for for this question. Sure. I think the international community played a central role in 2019. So, the, I mean, largely, I would say driven by the African Union, and the role of Ethiopian Prime Minister of the Ahmed, as well as the role of the Troika led by us. There was a significant exerted pressure in order to come to an agreement. But I think the, one of the issues is that the international community really did not understand the complexities, didn't have the complexities of the various problems facing Sudan at that point and the transition. And there was this urgency to push for an agreement, regardless of what it looked like. And initially, after the June 30th protest, which really forced the Transitional Military Council to come back to the negotiating table, the FFC at the time really had the upper hand. And they could have leveraged that popular support for a much better agreement. And in fact, there were negotiations that immediately began after that in Addis Ababa with the Sudan Revolutionary in July of 2019. For about three weeks, there was momentum to kind of come to a, you know, a really big tent position. However, the international community really pushed very hard to come to any sort of agreement that would basically create this partnership. That was more or less gave the upper hand in some ways to the military. I think that pressure doesn't, again, understand the complexities of Sudanese politics. As I like to say, you know, in Sudan, as in many parts of Africa, the bus leaves when it is full. It does not leave on time. And, and unfortunately, the bus was not full for a proper agreement to really create the necessary institutions for a successful transition to democracy. Transitions to democracy are very difficult. In fact, with a legacy of autocracy for so long, they're possibly impossible in a place like Sudan. But when the international community comes and puts pressure in a way that gives the military more or less all that it wants, then that's certainly not pushing for democratic transition. And after that, I think complexities of the of the region, you know, there is a contagion effect of democracy, you know, Sudan is surrounded entirely by non democratic countries, and they're, you know, the region prefers autocracy. And for democracy to flourish, it's very difficult in a context in which all the countries around you have an interest to control the destiny of the country and to install an autocracy that will serve their own interests. And finally, I think when it comes to the international dynamics, I think the role of the United States was also very, very important. Historically, even today, I think, I think we'll talk about that later when we talk about the current coup. Thank you. Thanks. Hello, I want to open it up up to you and I wanted to share that I remember seeing signs and the protests that were were specifically resisting interference by the UAE by Saudi Arabia in some instances by the United States by Russia. And I'm wondering if you can tell us a bit about the feeling in the midst of those demonstrations about the role that external actors were playing and was there was there a sense that they were standing beside the aspirations of the Sudanese people that you so so articulately laid out. Well, I definitely think there is an issue of trust, particularly when it comes to the role of the United States and the other Troika country from the streets. And I do remember in 2019, you know, the extensive conversations about the soft landing and pre-constellations with elements of Bashir's regime of the Muslim Brotherhoods. That was very intense and serious conversations. And some of the activists like myself who were not part of that conversation, we were actually isolated, you know, and sort of as being radical, you know, and the truth is, you know, we were, and, you know, anyone who knows Sudan very well, you know, will definitely understand that there is no soft landing with the Muslim Brotherhood, you know, those are really a very conservative group that they are there to stay. And, you know, what we're living through at the moment speaks to that, you know, this persistence, I definitely believe, and, you know, the obsession with preservation of the political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if changing allies and masking new forces and all those things. So to a large extent, I think the international community at some point has played that game at a time where the Sudanese were completely, you know, at a point where they had no acceptance, not only for Bashir, but for the Muslim Brotherhood as in our organizations, you know, and for politically slimmest. And this is a very important part of the conversation that often not being addressed, that the 30 years of Bashir's regime, it wasn't Bashir, it was a political structure that has its laws, has its policies, and it was 100% focused on repressing Sudanese people. And then this led to eventually, of course, the secession of South Sudan that has created a lot of grievances and anger among many Sudanese and what happened in Darfur and the war crimes that was committed in communities that has been, you know, stable communities, productive communities, they became displaced, and then that discourse of polarization that constantly, you know, the Islamist has continued to create and to generate. So for Sudanese people, they felt that, you know, that a sense of betrayal that is happening, you know, in terms of, you know, an engineering of political change and sidelining the people, which is basically, you know, something that is, I would say, it's, you know, it's extremely of colonial nature, you know, it doesn't match, you know, concepts of democracy, it doesn't match concepts of human rights and civil rights, you know, so that was, that was one of the, when you talk about, about the intervention. The other important thing, you know, we need to remember also that, you know, UAE and Saudi Arabia, they always dealt with Sudan as a proxy country. So that, you know, their perception store, which is quite interesting, you know, such a massive country like Sudan, you know, that has all this complexity to be minimized into a source of mercenary soldiers or, you know, lands where they could cultivate to generate more weeds or, to get, you know, gold or so that perception that has been actually, you know, because this is how Bashir ruled Sudan. I mean, Bashir reconstructed that, you know, that for his own survivor and his group and his political organization, that's Sudan for him to stay, you know, he would do whatever it takes, you know. And he made out of Sudan a country that's actually a proxy country where they provided services for the neighbors. I mean, the situation with Egypt, I believe it's completely different, you know, and it has its historical dimension and the whole issue of the Nile water and all those things. But just, you know, in brief, I think there is definitely basis for the distrust by the Sudanese streets on international regional actors. And this is basically coming from the fact that they constantly feel that they are not regarded as part of the conversation. Thanks a lot. Before we return to 2021. I, I want to turn to Joe, I think you were you're sitting in Washington at the time that this was playing out. And at a moment where conversations about global power competition and and the role of various actors is is incredibly live and, and in many ways, centered Africa policy under the previous administration so I'd like to hear from you about your perspective on this, the role that international international actors played in that 2019 period. You know, I think when when one looks at the US and the Troika, you know, I think, as I sort of alluded to before, very much informed by, you know, US and the Troika's prior sort of engagement and thoughts on on Sudan, especially the very contentious relationship that the US Troika other Western countries had with with President Bashir and the NCP regime and so I think it's key here to look at and to sort of mine so to speak what was public signaling and messaging and what were sort of private actions I think you know when it came to public messaging I think, you know, one one saw back then what, frankly, one expected to see and sort of what we're seeing right now in terms of statements, you know, condemning violence, noting the respect of the will of the people, noting that there is a close eye on what's happening. You know, I think those are things that will happen, regardless, I think and we've seen that for for a long time. I think the Sudanese were very, very savvy and should take credit for this of watching and analyzing parsing the public signaling from the US and others. You know what what meetings were held I remember vividly significant outcry, one that was a meeting with with Hamedi from the RSF in the midst of all this. And I think that might have caught some people in the West off guard that there's the assumption right that it's important to have dialogue to discuss what's going on to keep channels open but the Sudanese reaction to to that I think was very was very telling at as it goes forward as what is what is that public signaling and what does that symbolism mean it's very powerful right given social media and whatnot and you know I think when it when it comes to private engagement and messaging I think we get to where you know both Kuduta and Hala have mentioned you know when when diplomats when special envoys engage sort of with parties, it's it's extremely difficult obviously and it's, it's tempting and perhaps in some quarters understandable to want dialogue to want mediation to want negotiation in the interest of accommodation of incremental progress that is a normal diplomatic process on managing the perceptions of that incredibly important. I wonder when one looks at those international diplomatic undertakings I wonder what those actors think of that in terms of, could more have been pushed for could there have been more time. I think and again Kuduta spoke to this little more eloquently than I can I think there was an understanding among, among many in the West that there was a Sudanese way, so to speak that there was a need for, given, you know the contested legacy of military, the need for this military and hybrid. And it's not to me to sort of say that that was the original sin, so to speak, but I think looking at that and the international engagement with that, with that is critical I think I'll note here is that one thing I think that through a lot of thoughts for the Luke is, all of a sudden, they were forced to engage with political and civic actors that they never really had engaged in a diplomatic and political way here here I'm talking about. The sectarian political parties, the Communist Party, the Baph Party factions, the FFC as a block, the SPA in the unions, you know, they're very, I think, unique and in some ways impressive organizations that I think required a real deep understanding of where they're coming from at that period and I think that it's an immense opportunity to really understand and have those actors understand where the US and others were coming from. To go back to what I said before, I think one has to look at the US and the Troika and others relationship to the NCP and the Bashir regime and let's not forget that this all came in the midst of a push, an engagement between the United States and the NCP and normalization that that is all part of this, the pause on that how that played out behind the scenes that it's not quite clear to me that that's of course part of this, this dynamic. I think I'll close by saying here that, you know, perceptions matter and I think there are more questions than answers on terms of how the military, the RSF, political amount elements really viewed. There are other others at that time I think, I think some on the ground in Sudan might have thought it was a little too reactive, but I want to say something here that I've often sort of tried to think about and, and I would urge Keduta and Holla to let me know if I'm completely off base here I think that when, when political security actors in Sudan for really when it comes down to when they have their backs against the wall when really things are on the table, the either sharp gain or loss of power. I think in those moments I think many on the ground got tunnel vision, and that they look at this real zero sum nature of this and perhaps they don't look so much at the role the national community, and what leverage the nationals may or may not have I think they get very narrow and looking at how does one preserve those interests that are either on on the rise or not so I think that's worth discussing also in the context of how the military. After this most recent coup how they viewed international messages and threats. And so I'll leave it at that but happy to hear from others on that last point. Thanks Joe I think that the complexity of who the players are and the time and the creative approaches that are required to effectively understand and listen is something that that we really can't can't underestimate. I do I want to get to 2021. Susan can I jump here. I would just like to, you know, to speak about the political parties and political organizations versus, you know, a very strong and structured power that has been in control for 30 years and of course, you know, the international community they would be much more responsible, you know, and, and, you know, and of course, you know, they, you know, they have the capacity to engage with international actors as opposed to, you know, political parties who has been in hiding or scattered or polarized for years. But I also think that there is, there is a long term vision that's needed when we are looking and working on Sudan, you know, beyond what's comfortable for the technocrats of the international community or not, you know, and I think that's really very important to take into consideration and I just like to stress that whatever has happened in 2019 under the circumstances and everything. I think it would be very difficult to assume that it could have happened differently. You know, in terms of the preparedness and the readiness as well, you know, off of Sudanese political organizations. But I think, you know, something that, you know, that Sudanese have learned and as I said earlier, which is really strikes me how they have been patient and enduring with the transitional government. And that means, you know, that we are ready, you know, for the fact that, you know, democracy is a very long term process. It's not something that happens magically. Yeah. Thanks for that. I think that's incredibly important because our, our anchor here is around the summit for democracy, not just around cruise and around political transitions and how complex those are, how they don't move in one direction. They often move forward and they almost always move move backwards. And, and the politics of that is incredibly complex to navigate effectively so thank you for bringing that forward. Kuduta, I want to turn to you because as we think about 2021 and let's be just academic here for a short moment. Some people really claim that it's not just democracy that's contagious but indeed coups are contagious across the region. And that even if the country experiences a coup, it never really recovers, and is in fact more vulnerable in the future. I'm not, I'm not quite sure the academic literature bears this out, but there's certainly this sense that it's almost expected that if there's a coup once you'll see it again. And we've talked about 2019 but of course Sudan has seen many coups and it's on history. But Kuduta, you had a frontline view of what was happening in the transition in 2021. And this really delicate and maybe increasingly contentious relationship between security elements and the civilians and within each of those, those groups. So I asked, was, was the coup a surprise to you. Absolutely not. You know, in fact, the government had warned of the coup weeks and months before the coup actually took place. In fact, even before the supposedly failed coup attempt that took place a month before October 25th. I think, you know, you're absolutely right. The legacy of Sudan and the involvement of the military Sudan has been under military rule for 53 of its 65 plus years of independence. And that legacy has created a culture within the military institution that it was in many ways made to govern, you know, and I think the important context here is of the balance of power between the military and the civilians. And I think, you know, the coup, planning for the coup in fact began on April 11th as soon as the military deposed Bashir. In fact, June 3rd the massacre of the protesters in the city was a coup in and of itself against the transition process and the negotiation. That was a coup attempt and they attempted to govern. They in fact brought in the so-called native administration. They said we're going to create a transitional government. We're going to, you know, create a, or put in place a prime minister and the balance of power shifted after June 30th, which is arguably the largest protest in Sudan's history. We saw the military walk back and in fact come to the negotiating table once more. And as soon as the constitutional declaration or constitutional document was signed again, the planning for the coup began again. And we saw this in the, I guess, creeping into the role of the executive. And I think here the civilians have a share of the blame because the military under the constitutional document had, you know, its share of power was in the sovereignty council, which was supposed to be a ceremonial body. But as we saw from day one, the military created parallel institutions in order to make sure that it controlled the trajectory of the transition itself. And I think, you know, the military's number one concern has been the fact that it does not believe that it can actually function under civilian oversight. I think any officer that goes through the officer ranks of the military and graduates from the military academy is trained to think of civilian life as being disorganized. And the only way that Sudan can be managed is through the strong orderly institution that is the military. And in many ways, you know, any officer that reaches the rank of Brigadier automatically starts planning to coup. In some ways, a lot of people, there's this culture of the military having this destiny in some ways. The other thing was the fact that, you know, throughout the transitional period, there were certain benchmarks that needed to be met. And the most important of these is security sector reform and civilian oversight over military industries. And once the government started to seriously talk about these issues and bring these issues up, it became clear that the military is unwilling to actually give up its control over these big corporations and companies. And I think here, you know, the drivers of the 21 coup had their roots back in 2019. And of course, we knew that there were certain issues that that, you know, were coming up. For example, the transition of the presidency of the sovereignty council, which, you know, was supposed to happen either in November 2021 or in mid 2022 was a serious point of concern for the military. The issue of accountability and justice, that was also something that kept coming back up again and again. And it was very clear that, you know, the coup was a way to, you know, abort that. And I think finally, the success in some ways of the government's reforms, it was clear that by, you know, July and August 2021, Sudan had reached, you know, the plateau, if you will, of the economic crisis and had begun to enter the phase of stability and eventually starting next year of economic growth. And I think it was clear that the military wanted to intervene just at that point in order to make sure that credit for the economic recovery, which is inevitable because of the reforms that were put in place by the civilian government, that credit goes to the military when in fact, obviously all of that was put in place as a result of the Sudanese people's patients during the past two years, because there were very difficult reforms that really were born by the people in the form of very severe austerity, the rationing of subsidies, the, you know, unification of the exchange rate. There was a very difficult reforms and the people were willing to give the government a chance to implement these policies. But now the military basically allowed the civilian government to remove Sudan's name from the state sponsors of terrorism list, begin the process of debt relief and arrears clearance, stabilize the exchange rate. And now the military, once that difficult set of reforms was implemented is now ready to take over. And it was, it was clear. I think the final thing, which made it clear is that the context regionally, I think the ongoing civil war in Ethiopia gave cover to the military, thinking that you know the region is so enmeshed or concerned with what's going on in Ethiopia that there wouldn't be much interest in actually countering the coup. And of course, the series of coups that had taken place before then, whether the coup in Mali, the coup in Chad, the coup in Guinea. So possibly seeing that as kind of momentum. The military, you know, made it clear that their interest is in in cooling. And I think the final thing domestically was the, the initiative that was started by Prime Minister Hamdouk, really put them on the on the defensive, because that put that started to do two things. First, it started to raise the concern of the security sector reform as a question. And it laid the groundwork for the unification of FFC, you know, FFC by mid 2021 was very fragmented. But in September, FFC had signed a political declaration, which brought back the umma party, for example, one of the biggest parties in Sudan, under the umbrella of FFC, it brought all of the RSF, save for the SRF sorry, the rapid, the revolutionary war, save for the movement led by Miny and Jibril. And that made the military very concerned, because if people started to unify, then then they won't be able to cool very easily. And finally, you know, again, going back to this question of the transition, if the Sovereign to Council had gone to the civilians, then there would be no excuse. You know, it would, it would definitely be a coup because they would have removed a civilian head of the Sovereign to Council, because the military was in charge of the Sovereign to Council they can simply say oh this is just a changing government. So there were many factors I think that made it clear that this is this is coming. I think that's I mean it's a really interesting and maybe a bit of an academic debate about when is a coup a coup. And that is something that's very live in the conversation. I also want to acknowledge that we don't we don't have anybody from the military represented here today as part of this conversation and that I think we would we would welcome at any point, a follow on discussion to to hear really about some of the, the calculations, the concerns, the fears, the vision and the perspective, something that's always struck me is that there are a number of former military officials who have been advising and thinking through this pathway towards some sort of sector to sector transformation and I think those are voices that that we really value hearing from, and that I think as we, as super needs negotiate a way forward. It's not just a single conversation it involves all of those complicated conversations that took place during during the revolution as well. Hello, we've heard a lot from Kuduta in terms of the drivers. I'm curious if you agree that the crew was not a surprise. And, and if you can share anything about your, your insights on what, what shifted in terms of either people's aspirations for what they hoped to see in the transition. And then the organizing that was taking place in both civic and political spaces to to safeguard or to resist, or to respond to or address the crew that that seemed to be on people's radar and and on the Well, for me, I think the cool as a surprise and not a surprise. It was not a surprise, you know, exactly as Kuduta has said, you know, we are dealing with an institution that's accustomed to a structure that on privilege, you know, particularly when it comes to privilege access to resources lack of accountability, and so on. So this is how the Sudan military has been functioning for decades. And, and, and it's basically happened because, you know, they were assigned assigned themselves, you know, by the by the power they hold at the guardians of the states. And so on. But also I'd like to highlight something very, very important, you know, which is the phenomena of, you know, of the SLA and the justice and equality movement joining forces which is, it's basically speaks to a mindset, you know, that's actually being shared among, you know, militarized groups, whether being in the opposition or being part of the state structure. And this is something that I've always, you know, for me, personally, I'm very interested in because I've, you know, we have done research and we worked with women who lived under armed groups, controlled areas. And we saw the level of repression that's happening, you know, not only to the women but also to the use, you know, to other groups. And yet, you know, thinking about, you know, the full or, you know, global mountains or Blue Nile or other areas, the, the violation that keeps occurring within those territories, you know, we always saw as a feminist groups and and, you know, we saw that it mirror, you know, the same type of violation that happens outside of that. However, you know, there is this notion that as long as you are opposing, you know, Bashir's regime, that means, you know, you are exempted from accountability. And so we ended up, you know, in this very strange setup that we are rewarding through what's called peace agreements, you know, we are rewarding, you know, militarized elites who committed massive violations by giving them power by giving them positions and giving them access to resources. So there is no surprise actually that, you know, they were really easily because, you know, integrated into the current structure. So, so that's, that's I think is, is something that's very, very important to, to pay attention to in, in this, in this conversation. There is another question if I'm looking for it. No, it's I'm, I was curious if you noticed any change in terms of the way that that people were organizing to either continue to hold the space for democratic transformation or to resist the risks of a coup or of this, this exercise of power. Okay. Yeah. So, so fantastic. So, so basically, you know, it's, it's absolutely a military coup. And I would like to say that, you know, adding, adding Hamdok to the equation, you know, it's still boys and it's still a coup, you know, and it's not going to help. It's, and, and, and I, and I talked earlier about I was surprised. So the element of me being surprised, it's coming from the weakness of this structure, you know, historically, all the military coups that are taking place in Sudan, they don't have successful goods. I mean, and, and basically if we look at 1969 numeric school who took, who ruled Sudan for 16 years, you know, and then, and then after that Bashir, you know, those military coups, they come with their own political incubators. They come with their own constituencies and they come with their own roots on the ground. This is the most random, uprooted, you know, cool. I would say I have seen in the history of Sudan, doesn't have a political incubator. It doesn't have any support, not only politically, but I mean, even instantly, it's extremely random, you know, and very uprooted, and it's very difficult for it to identify with any faction of the Sudanese people. It's, it's really telling that, and I'm quite surprised, you know, I'm, I'm literally surprised by the, you know, by the choices that Abdulhamduk has made, you know, joining this, this, and, and so I'm thinking, is it he himself internalizing the idea that he as the man, as the one man, you know, would make a massive difference, which is, it doesn't make any sense. It's absolutely irresponsible to think that way. There is a very close in Sudan who come taking advantage of political organizations, very strong political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhoods. At the end of the day, the military ended up, you know, having the upper hand on the military organization because then you are positioning yourself in a power equation that it, you cannot match it under any circumstances, as a political institution. And that keeps happening that the military, you know, they utilize, you know, political, political groups and so on, to take control. But that's very interesting that they assume that they could utilize one person who himself doesn't have any affiliation to any of the political structure in Sudan. So on the other hand, I'm quite surprised that actually this school is happening from that. It's fascinating that in these moments of crisis, the decision making is always complicated to track. And Joe, I want to turn to you because I think if we look at the regional and international dimensions of this, you know, the African Union Peace and Security Council again suspended Sudan. They met recently and they deferred the decision about whether to reinstate Sudan or not after this latest agreement between General Burhan and Prime Minister Hamdok. Others in the international community seem to be sending signals that this may be the best pathway that Sudan has forward. And there's been a lot of writing about the decreased influence of international partners to shape where, where this, how this developed and where it's going. And so I'd love to hear some of your reflections on in this, again, in this moment of global power competition in this, the regional dynamics that Kududah and Halan you have talked about. What's, what is, what is driving right now and what should be, what should we be watching in the coming weeks about where this, this agreement may land or may not land. Very briefly, I want to sort of double down on something Halan mentioned because absolutely important and it's been, frankly, I think overlooked is the armed movements and the Jew of peace agreement. I think, you know, looking back at US and international engagement in peace processes in the Sudan's plural. I think that basic assumptions of international actors about the nature of our movements and rebels, I think there desperately needs to be a relook at those assumptions. Obviously gone are the days of viewing them as good bad as, as that split, you know, I just think that we absolutely need to, to look at that again, I think, you know, what's fascinating is that was frankly a military to military negotiation. The, you know, RSF, the SAF, you know, really militarized elites in South Sudan, the arm movements and I think that relatively went, went unnoticed and what does that mean. What does that mean for the Sudan, South Sudan dynamic, again, very overlooked, but, but extremely critical and I think is going to play a perhaps a greater role. I think as this goes forward, I think it's absolutely fascinating that there's been some very good academic research and, and activists sort of messaging on the fact that, you know, the legacy of internationally mediated peace agreements and peace processes in the Sudan's that we failed due to sort of the focus on power sharing elite bargains sort of commissions and institutions that never get off the ground. What does it mean that the Sudanese and the South Sudanese brokered an agreement that basically mirrored those internationally brokered peace processes. I think that's, that's worth a PhD could do to looking at you here if you want to go back to it. It's just really critical and it raises so many questions that are hard because it's so easy for an Ash community diplomats to say we have a peace process they've got benchmarks. You know, but unfortunately this, it's such a sort of ethereal debate that I just hope there's space for that because it's, it's really, really complicated. You know, I think, I think a lot of the pathways forward are going to be in the big cities where protests are going on in places like Darfur, because I think what will perhaps drive what's going forward is the semblance or reality of unity among civilian political actors among military actors. Again, to go back to the arm movements, I was really, really struck. I was able to go to Western Central Darfur in August. We met with the arm movements, a lot of divergent opinions, a lot of differences of opinions among their leadership and in part to among the stakeholders on the ground, not even to mention the U.S. deputies and more politicized civilians. And so, you know, I think if one looks at the political civic landscape right now, the street, the resurgence of the NRCs, the sort of Sudanese political elite who had tried to broker Sudanese mediation of what happened. I think looking at sort of that from the coup until now, what is the level of unity? And is that level of unity going to keep decreasing? Is it possible to roll it back? Because I think the fundamental unity, cohesion among civilian elements will be key to this going forward. I'm not sure I'm that optimistic that the level of civilian political unity will increase or pause for now. And sort of, you know, I think what I mean by that is there's a great desire among internationalists to say Sudanese-led processes are the best. I'm not going to disagree with that. But what does it mean that there were a few Sudanese-led processes from the day after the coup up until the meeting with Handbock? Was that a positive Sudanese-led process? Not really for me to say, but what does that mean that there perhaps isn't as much unity as one would like among the civilian political elements going forward? What impact is that going to happen? I think it's really complicated about the level of sort of regional influence, great power competition. I think, you know, it's difficult. Example, last week there was a UAE national day, the 15th anniversary of the UAE here in Washington. And at an event like that, you know, it's hard to see how an issue like Sudan rises to the top of these agendas of these great powers, yet we see them having an impact on the ground, the regional dynamic. And I think that it's incumbent on the national community to sort of walk and chew gum at the same time to do more things. And once I think there's going to be greater example of engagement with the political elements of cartoon, with the civilians of cartoon, with the street, sort of look at what that means, and then also, you know, make that more diplomatic engagement with the AU, admits the great crises in the horn, more engagement with the Gulf. It's hard, right? These are multiple strands of a complex problem. But I think as both Keduta and Hala have said, when Prime Minister Hamdok released that new initiative in June and July of this year, he, I think it's a seminal political document in Sudanese political history is one line. He said there's not only divisions between the military and the civilians, there's divisions within the military, there's divisions within the civilians. But that level of complexity that the internationals, I think, need to engage on, because, you know, I think, again, these things can be very, very zero sum and we need to try to help preserve any semblance of unity that there is now. So in the 10 minutes that remain to us, I'm going to ask all of you who have this incredible depth of understanding of that complexity and ability to ask really incisive questions to think of our audience who may not know Sudan all about all that well, maybe in a position to make policy decisions or influence policy decisions. And so we're going to do a little bit of a lightning round, and we're going to focus a bit on what external actors can be doing. And all of that said with a clear recognition that Sudan's political future belongs to Sudanese, and also an acknowledgement that what others do will fundamentally shape what that what that looks like. So I'm going to go quickly to each of you on each of these and would ask if you could be as quick and concise as possible, recognizing that we're missing a lot of the nuance that's necessary. My first question is, if you could identify one thing that could have been done differently to avoid the coup on October 25 by the United States, an international partner, even USIP, we'll put ourselves onto the table. What would that be? Kadud, are you willing to lead? Sure. I think it's difficult to window into one thing, but I think broadly, broadly, initially from the get go of the beginning of the transition, the civilian government needed significant support, and I'm talking here, financial support. And the reality is for a good year and a half, the government was forced to deal with all of the economic challenges Sudan faced by on its own and to put the burden on the Sudanese people, the delays that were, you know, the foot dragging on the removing of Sudan from the SSTL. That really put so much pressure on the Sudanese government. I think, you know, this whole wait and see approach, you know, the people had come in, agreed this transitional process. And, you know, the international community should have really been forceful in, you know, giving the civilians this push. I'm going to put it just on international community. There's, there's domestic dynamics as well here. I think there was significant political capital in the hands of the civilian government that wasn't properly expended, you know, putting pressure on security sector reform. That was the number one key to prevent the coup. But I'll stop here. Thanks to you. Hello. You could identify one thing. I'll identify one thing right now that the international community should do. You know, one that we are still being controlled by a military coup. That adding humdog to this, I would say, rotten recipe will not make it not cool. It's a coup, you know, and, and it's, it's absolutely engineered and controlled by the military. It's based on the 14 articles of agreement that was signed between humdog and the military, which is absolutely giving the military the upper hand over every single detail of the state, from the judiciary to the economy, you know, to the justice to every aspects of life. My last message will be that Sudan is the vast and complex country. And, you know, as Americans, you know, you understand very well, you know, the value of decentralization and the value of literally, you know, and, and just try to reflect on that on on a country like Sudan, you know, we definitely need to, you know, support Sudanese people to reach out or to reach into a path or to craft that would enable them, you know, to reach a level of stability and it's not going to be easy. It's not going to be smooth, it would be very turbulent, but we need that support to reach there. And, and, and I think that's, that's, that's really very important. There is, as I said, it won't, it won't be easy. It's not only good for Sudan. I think Sudan is much easier case compared to other countries within the region. And I think investing in Sudan will definitely long term influence the region. Yeah. Thanks. Joe, over to you. You know, I just think, as soon as the coup happened in October, people said we have to go back to the day before the coup. The transition before the coup was engraved was it was tenuous it was fragile it was in jeopardy and, you know, why if this following statement is true why did it happen why was there a sense that it was just the civilians versus the military that's way too superficial and why wasn't there a greater recognition that institution building was frozen. What happened to the legislative council. You know, what about the status of the tanking tanking committee I mean all their things were not going well and I think, you know, perhaps what if my clouded cloud of the vision among internationals is this was not a civilian led transition. It was it was a hybrid by design and I think that there might have been a little bit more of wishful thinking than necessary about the level of who was leading this and what that meant and, you know, I think labels and words matter in that, you know, Well, thank you to all three of you. I know that we tried to boil something incredibly complex down to some some quick ideas and recommendations, but I walk away with a pretty clear message that in addition to asking why all the coups. We also need to be asking why all the resistance, while the Democrats, why all the social movements why why all the political parties. And if we really want to get to the heart of what does that incredibly messy, incredibly courageous incredibly long term work of democratic transition political transition looks like. And we have to be asking about what happens when people exercise power in lots of different ways. So, so let me thank all of you for for your generosity of insights. I hope we can can have a follow up conversation at some point with with colleagues from the security sector from the political parties from the armed movements. And to our Sudanese colleagues, we wish you good courage in this this time of political transition. So thank you everybody. And thanks to everybody who joined us today. Thank you. Thank you so much.