 My Viking roots and failed over the last week. I was snowshoeing out in Yellowstone and it was about 10 below and I thought, there's a reason my family emigrated, you know, I can't handle such adverse weather. And so in talking to the minister, she said, well, it's just rainy in Oslo these days. There's no snow. I said, well, there's two excuses. Either it's the Gulf Stream is active this year or we have dispatched our Congress to Oslo and it's warmed everything up. I mean, it's one or the other. But anyway, welcome. We're delighted to have you here, minister. It's a privilege to have you come. And let me just share with all of you a brief conversation that I had with the minister to say that America's got, we've got a lot of issues these days and a lot of problems that we're wrestling with. Yet the foundation of our security, honestly, is this transatlantic partnership. We spent a long time building this partnership. It didn't come naturally, actually. It's something that we invested in with a great deal of personal commitment through the years. Matter of fact, I think many of the people in this audience were participants in that journey to make this a foundation for our security. And now we're not talking about it much. We're not focusing on it very much. It's as though it isn't important and yet I would still challenge anyone here to think what is more a foundation of America's security today than this deep, mature partnership with Europe? Now, no country, I think, has been more devoted to that than Norway. The reason for that, of course, is that there are nine million Norwegians in the world, four and a half of them live in Norway and the other four and a half live in the United States. I mean, I grew up in a Norwegian ghetto out in South Dakota, but it is part of that foundation that has bound us together. We really are uniquely connected as two countries. And we share a world view that's quite similar. But I did say that right now, Norway, this region is becoming a little more dynamic. There are questions as we look to the opening of the Northwest Passage and Northeast Passage that are opening up all kinds of security issues. There are environmental concerns that are growing. There are sovereignty claims that are being asserted. And we Americans should take our counsel now by listening carefully to our Norwegian friends. You're closer to the problem and wiser to its solutions. We tend to be a little too rambunctious. We'll tend to define an answer to a problem from our own internal passions and our domestic politics rather than listening organically to the conditions on the ground. So I think it's a very important time to have you here, minister. Delighted you're here. Congratulations on your election. And I know that you're bringing a great deal of personal energy and conviction to the security of Norway and to the transatlantic alliance. So with your applause, would you please welcome minister Sarita. We're delighted to have you here today. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, let me thank you for the opportunity to give my perspectives on NATO and also the future of the transatlantic relationship. And I especially want to extend my warm thank you to Dr. Hammer personally for your longstanding work in the transatlantic security area. I want to extend my gratitude also to the CSIS for having me on the podium here. Your important endeavors and Dr. Hammer is really has really found, I would say, an impressive home in this new building. I mean, it's really wonderful. I have already started to make my staff take notes for new buildings in Oslo if they were to occur. And this, your contributions to the transatlantic security is really vital. And as well as crowning them with this magnificent achievement of a building. And on that note, I would like to present you with a gift on behalf of the Norwegian government. If you could come up to me. So I think you will have to stand over there. So while I read the weapon is an American model. 1911 Norwegian model M 1914. The gun is produced under license at the Kongsberg Weapons Factory in Kongsberg, Norway. Norway is the only country with a license to produce a cult. This cult was the first semi automatic weapon introduced in the Norwegian armed forces beginning in 1914. After the invasion of Norway by Germany, German forces in 1940, the Germans continued the production. The cult was during the war used by German forces with a German control label. During the German occupation, the workers at the Kongsberg Weapon Factory were in secret working underground for the resistance movement. The workers smuggled out gun parts from the factory, usually in their lunch boxes. The pistols were later assembled in the woods and became the weapon of choice for all the men and women in the Norwegian resistance movement. The weapon has become an important symbol of Norwegian American friendship and partnership and solidarity during times of crisis. This cult has also been a representation of the close bonds between our special forces, which in Norway's case was founded in the Norwegian resistance movement. Finally, the gun represents the gratitude of the Norwegian people to the U.S. for its support and the victory over Nazism during World War II. These words are also put here on this diploma. So you'll probably not be paying attention to the rest of the speech right now. But I'll try to give it anyway. Well, the transatlantic relationship and the future of NATO are at the top of the agenda for my government. We took office mid-October and I have made it a priority to come to Washington as early as possible because I want to make one point absolutely clear. The U.S. is our most important ally and we don't take you for granted. I have said this in meetings that I've had this week in Washington and I will make this point also when I meet with Secretary Hagel tomorrow. We have a long shared history, a history that we still remember. We will never forget your enormous sacrifices in the two world wars, sacrifices securing the liberty of Europe and other parts of the world. We stood together during the trials of the Cold War and over the past two decades, soldiers of our nations have fought shoulder to shoulder in demanding operations across the globe, too often making the ultimate sacrifice. We should also have a long and shared future, but I am under no illusion that this future is predetermined. We have to define it, frame it and build it together. So I will make the case here today for a continued strong transatlantic relationship with NATO at its core and I pledge to make every effort to make sure Norway makes the best possible contributions to such shared future. Ladies and gentlemen, does the transatlantic relationship still matter? Well, my answer is allowed and empathic yes and let me explain why. We live in a highly volatile world. On the one hand, globalization and technological developments have raised the standard of living for a large portion of the world's population. The world today presents more opportunities for economic freedom than ever before. On the other hand, threats to our security are not disappearing. Indeed, threats are increasing in number and complexity. And geographic distance does no longer automatically constitute security. We have lived now for a while with a growing threat of terrorism and other asymmetric challenges. I now see a growing risk also of symmetric challenges. New powers are rising, old are reemerging and the global power system is shifting. This could and should be managed without military conflict. But history has taught us many hard lessons. We cannot ignore that we seem to be entering a period of potential rivalry among increasingly capable major powers. Even in Europe, there are some worrying trends. Nationalism is on the rise in certain parts of Europe, including tendencies towards a re-nationalization of defence and security policies. The financial crisis has led to increasing popular resistance to the established European order. Massive youth unemployment presents a significant challenge and we cannot exclude the possibility of increasing social unrest. I see the transatlantic relationship as a source of stability in a world that sometimes can seem adrift. It provides not only regional but also contributes to global stability. The need for a transatlantic security partnership based on common values, norms and principles is as great as ever. The transatlantic partnership as it exists today would not have been possible had it not been institutionalized through NATO. NATO's value as a political alliance should not be underestimated. Multilateral work is often hard and at times extremely frustrating. But over time, NATO facilitates political cohesion by forming common approaches and building military capability. What makes NATO truly unique and sets it apart from all other organizations and alliances is the combination of its integrated military structures and its permanent political decision-making bodies. No other organization has this combination of common defence planning, a common command structure and a North Atlantic Council that is able to make decisions 24-7. This makes it the only multinational entity which can carry out high intensity operations on a short notice. This capability must be maintained. So for Norway, the value of transatlantic partnership and NATO as its institutional manifestation is beyond doubt. However, we are faced with numerous challenges. As the world changes, so does the transatlantic partnership. The debate on NATO and the transatlantic relationship seen from Europe tends to be about the fear of US abandonment. These fears have been accentuated by the US intention to rebalance to the Asia Pacific. Norway still calls for continued US leadership in order to preserve the transatlantic community. But from our point of view, we see the US focus on Asia as a natural response to the challenges in the global power structures. In fact, this US engagement in parts of the world perhaps is the single most important contribution to global security. In the future, US presence in Europe will be different in nature than it is today. But we trust that the US will still retain a robust presence linked among other things to the establishing of missile defence systems in Europe and through annual participation in training and exercise. If Europe and the US manage this in a constructive manner, a reduced permanent US presence in Europe will be replaced by a more active and maybe more relevant presence. However, it is important that the debate not only focuses on how and at what level the US engages in Europe. We need to take a hard look at burden sharing and Europe needs to contribute our share to our common security. The situation today where the US shoulders more than 70% of NATO's defence expenditure is just not sustainable. It is indeed undermining the very core of the transatlantic relationship. The US is faced with significant economic challenges of its own along with a difficult domestic political situation. The new generation of US policy makers does not necessarily have the same close historical ties to the transatlantic relationship developed during the decades of the Cold War. Nor do they have the same experience with NATO. Today you are more likely to find or meet officers and officials who have served in the Pacific or in the Middle East rather than in Europe. After my meetings in Congress yesterday, I was left with a clear impression that there are growing factions on both sides of the aisle that are questioning the value of continued US investments and engagements in Europe. What this means is that we in the future no longer can take for granted the current US engagement in NATO and Norway understands this. So we know what the challenges are. The true question is what can and should be done. Allow me to make three propositions. First of all, Europe needs to demonstrate clearly that we are willing to invest in our own security. Realizing that many European countries are still burdened with a financial crisis, we still need to maintain credible defences. We cannot expect the US to invest in European security when we are not willing to make necessary investments ourselves. I realize that Norway is in a better economic situation than many of us since we have been spared the worst effects of the financial crisis. However, I can assure you that Norway still faces the same dilemmas as other countries when it comes to public spending. We had to make tough choices, but we have come to the conclusion that we need to keep spending on defence. On the one hand, this is because we believe that military threats have not disappeared and that we need the national ability to meet these threats. On the other hand, we see our significant investments in our own defence as a contribution to a stronger collective defence and security within Europe and across the Atlantic. We have over the past decade steadily increased our defence budgets. We are investing in deployable high-end capabilities such as the new Aegis frigates, new F-35 combat aircraft, C-130 transport aircraft and a major modernization of our army. These are capabilities that both serve our national needs, but they also contribute to NATO's ability to execute collective defence as well as out-of-area operations in crisis response operations. Our transformation is not taking place in splendid isolation. Our posture remains linked to the transatlantic community and to NATO. For the high-end challenges, Norway will still depend on firm support from NATO and from individual allies. Close bilateral ties with the US will also remain crucial. A good example of this cooperation is the current development and expansion of the concept of the US Marine Corps Pre-Positioning Program of military equipment in Norway. This is of mutual benefit, both providing Norway with increased reassurance and assisting the US in putting in place a more flexible and cost-effective operational concept of forward deployment. Secondly, I want to emphasize that burden sharing encompasses more than a level of defence budgets. Europe also needs to take a greater share of the political burden. This goes beyond defence. The process of removing chemical agents from Syria is a good example. This is close to Europe, and several NATO allies are directly affected by what will happen in Syria. It is only natural that European countries assist in this operation. I am glad that Norway, in close cooperation with Denmark and the US, are contributing to this operation. Our civilian transport vessel, as well as a frigate for escorting, began the operation on Tuesday, and the first shipment out of Syria has been completed. This is transatlantic burden sharing in practice. Thirdly, Europe needs to demonstrate a greater understanding and willingness to address US security concerns, not only in Europe. The developments in the Asia-Pacific area are not only of consequence to the US, it affects all of us. US engagement in this part of the world is important to global stability. There is no hiding the fact that there are political limitations and resource limitations to what Europe can do in Asia. Still, European allies could and should demonstrate that we care about what happens in the region, because it will affect us all. We need to demonstrate that we stand ready to support the US in addressing its security concerns. That is the essence of transatlantic collective security. For just this reason, Norway has committed to participate in the naval exercise in the Pacific, RIMPAC, this year, with one of our frigates. Another measure that we should consider is holding more NATO exercises in North America. Europe needs to demonstrate that we are not only net importers of security, but also exporters of security, as well. Let me now turn to the Norwegian perspectives on the future of NATO and the upcoming NATO summit in Wales. Many claim that the ice-off mission in Afghanistan is coming to an end. NATO is at its crossroads. Well, after almost 20 years involved in numerous out-of-the-area operations, we are facing a new period in the Alliance. NATO has been at crossroads before. The basic instinct among policymakers has often been to argue for the reinvention of NATO. The thesis that unless NATO takes on a new role, new missions, the Alliance will become irrelevant. This does not hold true. NATO does not need to reinvent itself. We have the strategic concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The concept gives good guidance on what should be the priorities of the Alliance in the coming years. The real challenge is to make sure that Allies invest in new and relevant capabilities to conduct a task that we have agreed on. Unfortunately, we are actually failing at this. The initiatives that we agreed on in Chicago have not been implemented. Partly, this can be explained by the financial strains burdening the majority of Allies right now. However, the fundamental challenge is that there is simply not enough political engagement by Allies on NATO issues. We need to break this pattern. Smart defence is in certain cases turning out to be less smart than we envisioned. A key question is whether the smart defence we are now building really is smart, or just more or less random but necessary rationalisation policies and spending cuts forced upon us by outside forces, first among them fiscal pressure. As we try to cope with fiscal constraints, we need to acknowledge that cuts made outside of a wider context and without coordination in the community of Allies affect and weaken the whole of the Alliance, not only the individual nation or nations. We risk that the aggregated negative sum of the consequences is much greater than the parts as such. The three core tasks that we have agreed on for NATO is one, collective defence. Two, crisis management, that is the ability to operate high intensity conflicts beyond NATO's border. And three, cooperative security. In other words, strengthening security partnerships with other nations and actors, leading to increased collective security and stability. I believe that we need a balanced approach, ensuring NATO's ability to perform its core tasks. In fact, these three are linked together. For example, it is our ability to meet potential threats against our own territories and populations, which makes it possible for us to conduct high-end operations beyond our borders. At the same time, the interoperability we gain from operating together out of area increases our ability to provide collective defence at home. Our concern is that we have not focused enough on our ability to do the collective defence and deterrence missions. NATO's most important task is to prevent an attack against Allied territory, to deter and dissuade a potential aggressor from contemplating military action against NATO's territory and populations. Our deterrence posture is closely linked with the credibility of our collective defence. The credibility of NATO's ability to conduct collective defence is crucial for public support, as well as for the willingness of Allies to continue to invest in the Alliance. Military and political cohesion have made it possible for the Alliance to operate collectively in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. This cohesion is coming under strain, demonstrated most recently in Libya. There are many reasons why our cohesion is being challenged. I am convinced, though, that it will be even more difficult to maintain cohesion if we do not focus efficiently on collective defence. Specifically, I would prefer situational awareness. Two, increase NATO's training and exercise activity, thereby ensuring interoperability. Also, these activities will provide a venue for exercising and validating NATO's operational plans. Norway will continue to offer our territory for Allied training and exercises. And we are also considering an offer to host NATO's high visibility exercise in 2018. Three, we need to establish mechanisms whereby we can develop high and deployable capabilities that are made available for NATO. This should include agreeing on key projects to meet critical capability shortfalls and mechanism for ensuring implementation. I believe that this set of recommendations will strengthen the credibility of NATO, ensuring NATO's continued relevance in the longer term as well as our future common defence and security. That is in essence what the upcoming NATO Summit should be about. In conclusion, our ability to deal with the present and future security challenges depend on a strong and vital transatlantic link. We can no longer take the transatlantic relationship for granted. Steps need to be taken on both sides of the Atlantic. We need a better burden sharing, where Europe needs to take a greater share of the costs and political burdens of providing security. If my military assistant could provide me with a glass of water, I would be very happy. This is one of the good things about being a ministry. You can just tell people to get you things. Thank you so much. Where was I? Well, this should start with Europe increasing our ability and willingness to invest in our own security. The question can no longer only be, what can the US do for Europe? We should take steps to engage more in those areas where Europe can actually support the US. More NATO activity on US soil and a greater European willingness to engage collectively or bilaterally outside the Euro-Atlantic area will be important. Excuse me. Europe needs to step up to the plate, and we cannot escape the fact that the future of NATO depends on strong US leadership and engagement. It will be up to all transatlanticists, myself included, to ensure that Washington continues to see the value of the alliance and that Europe still matters. In a sea of instability, there is no better anchor than NATO. In the alliance, the US has a functioning military organization that is based on common values among its member states. The point about common values is often neglected. However, for Norway, this is as crucial as ever. Emerging powers are challenging these values, highlighting the need for more transatlantic cohesion. Norway believes that global stability depends on the ability of Europe and the US to work together, and that this will become even more important in the future. Our hope is that the summit will result in a common pledge of our continued willingness to make the necessary commitment to realize this future. We need to go beyond slogans and start making tough decisions that are needed. The founding fathers of NATO heeded the call in 1949, ensuring freedom and security for its members during the Cold War. We do not face the same monolithic threat as they did, but the need for NATO is as great as ever. The present generation of transatlantic leaders have been beckoned. Norway stands ready to heed the call. Our future common security depends on it. That and the coughing concludes my remarks, and I will be very happy to continue the conversation with Heather and the podium. Well, Minister, thank you so much, and I'm going to ask one of my colleagues if they can get the Minister another cup of tea. I think that would be helpful. Thank you so much. I just want to say an all-transatlanticist said, amen, because I heard a couple of ah-mens in the background as you were speaking. Thank you. Thank you for a stirring speech about NATO and its relevance and its importance and a very focused effort on Europe. Colleagues, good afternoon. My name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program here at CSIS, and we have, according to my watch, about 25 minutes to ask the Ministers some probing questions, keeping our questions nice and short because there are so many colleagues here that have such great questions. I want to make sure we get as many questions in as possible. Again, standard format if you could raise your hand, if you have a question and your name and affiliation, and we can begin. I have two questions if I may to start things off. I have to. Dr. Hermey mentioned that Russia was a dynamic region, and I'd like to specifically look at the Arctic, if I could. We've certainly seen over the last several weeks a much more concerted effort. Oh, thank you, Dr. Hermey. Tea Arriveth. Are you a staff now? When I met a colleague, I wasn't sure I had the boss in mind. And I would really welcome your thoughts and impressions as we've seen Zapad 2013, some exercising in the Kola Peninsula, President Putin's recent very public focus on enhancing Russia's modernization program in the Northern Fleet, in the Arctic, the reopening of previously closed bases. Russia has been such a collaborative partner in the Arctic and the Arctic Council, but we're starting to see a different tonal quality with the Ascander placement. So I'd welcome the government's perspective on Russia and how that relates to NATO's future chapter. Absolutely. Thank you Heather. That is a very good and very important question. You point at some of the issues that raises our concern as well. Bearing in mind that we are probably the only country in the region who has never been at war with Russia, and we have quite a good working relationship. We do this practically, pragmatically. We share, as you know, 196 kilometers of land border, and after the agreement on the delimitation line, we also share 1750 kilometers of sea border, huge areas, as you can imagine. But we still have, I would say, a pragmatic and good relationship. However, there are really calls for concern. The one issue you mentioned is what they're doing now with their military capabilities. Bearing in mind that they, of obvious reasons, were not investing in their military over the 90s, so they have a lot of old equipment that needed to be either replaced or modernized. But of course that has also increased their military ability, no doubt about that. And we see increased activity in our close proximity. Nevertheless, we have still, I would say, a good relationship where the U.S. is also involved. We have one annual, or actually the biannual exercise, the Northern Eagle, where you and the Russians have this naval exercise, and we are joining in. And we have a biannual exercise called Exercise Pomor, which is also a naval exercise. And those are, I would say, trust-building measures. But we are seeing exactly the same things as you are. I went to the NATO ministerial in October, and actually it was the first meeting in the NATO-Russia Council for two years. Yeah, I had to look at heading just to make sure I'm right about the timing. And the meeting was assessed by almost all participants as quite good. But at the same time, quite interesting because it was obvious that whereas we regarded the exercise as much larger than expected, they were regarding exercise that fast jazz, as NATO had just been conducting as a lot larger and something completely different than what we had told them about before. So we don't quite see eye-to-eye on these things, and that transparency is extremely important in order to get that relationship working. And we are seeing on the inside of Russia's border, of course, how to put it nicely, we are very concerned especially about the human rights situation, the political situation and what that could encompass over time. So we pay close attention. Thank you. I have one more question. You did such an excellent job of outlining a future agenda in the summit agenda in September in Cardiff. I have to ask you, another important decision that the Alliance needs to make is the next secretary general. So if you could develop a job description for the next secretary general, what would some of the key areas be, and I have to ask this question, is it time for a woman to become secretary general of NATO? I couldn't resist. No. Well, to the job description, it's a very tough job and there are a lot of things that you have to take into consideration. But I do think that trying to work along the lines of keeping NATO relevant is extremely important. If we wind back a bit, you will see that over the last years, there has been a lot of new, let me say, slogans that has been introduced like smart defense. In essence, a very good idea and I think everyone thinks that it is a good idea. But the next secretary general will have the quite tough task, I would say, of filling this with some relevance and content. As I mentioned, my fear is that the discussion on smart defense is more or less becoming some sort of a way of hiding behind budget costs and in fact reducing the capabilities that are vital to securing the Alliance as a whole. It's really not a very good idea if all countries reduce the same capabilities, the result being that NATO is without that capability over time. So, filling that with some content and actually making the burden sharing issue be something put on the table and solved in practice. It is extremely much more difficult to do than to say and I am totally aware that putting that on the shoulders of the next secretary general is a tough task. But I think it needs to be done because my fear is that both the US and Europe will avoid discussing the elephant in the room unless you do so. And I think that for the first time, European allies are starting to realize that the American talk over years about burden sharing and your irritation and frustration over the lack of burden sharing is now becoming more realistic. You are seriously considering what kind of future you should put into NATO. And of course Europe isn't the place where the security situation is at it's worst to put it mildly compared to other areas. But still I think that you also need to build your security through Europe because the transatlantic link needs to be strong. So trying to keep up with that will be extremely important and also the issues that I mentioned in my three recommendations of course. Whether it should be a woman or not, well I think that the most important thing is that NATO get a secretary general who is able to cope with the challenges that the alliance faces. Whether it is a man, a woman, well there are not other options maybe. I search for the third option there. The best person. The best person. Well I think that is the most important thing and I hope that it will be. Fantastic. Alright I know there are some really great questions out there or I will dominate this conversation gratefully. So who has a question out in the field? You overwhelm them with your powerful remarks so I'm going to ask a little bit about Afghanistan. You gave a really powerful speech in November in Norway about the lessons learned from Afghanistan. And if I may I have to actually pull a quote because I thought it was excellent. You noted in your speech for an organization like NATO, Afghanistan has been an almost all absorbing effort. For years the alliance has been geared towards running an operation far outside its own territory. We must ensure that we both retain the advances in lessons gained from Afghanistan at the same time as we brush the dust off of old lessons and practices. I find it vital to underline that NATO is so much more than running a major operation. It is a political alliance in which we put great emphasis and I think this again comes back to your remarks. And I think some questions remain out there. Will the September summit be another or the last Afghanistan summit or will it put NATO on a future course? And I think there's a lot of questions some in Washington think it will be another Afghanistan summit put resolute support on the table. Get that although we don't know what Afghanistan will look like in September of this year. Or is it help us put Afghanistan in context from a Norwegian perspective. What were those lessons learned? Well there are a lot of lessons learned and I suppose here I could have help from among others who served very well in the OMLT in Afghanistan. He's a Norwegian commander and he did a great job. Well the lessons learned are many. I think that if we look at what is coming up to September my fear is that the delay now of the signing of the BSA could actually make sure that Afghanistan and the BSA is on the agenda up until the summit and on the summit maybe. And I say that I fear that it will be because my hope was that this would be cleared out before we get that far and allowing NATO to plan for the resolute support mission. Right now everyone is just sitting waiting what is going to happen because no BSA means no SOFA means no presence so that's why we need to get it in place. Otherwise I think that it can be quite a major issue still on the summit. So hopefully we will not do that. I think that there are many lessons to be learned. One of them being that many partners and allied countries almost 50 of them have had very different strategies as to how they have approached Afghanistan and their own presence. Let me use one example. Norway had a strategy where we had a very strict separation between the military and civilian means. Others had a completely different approach like the Dutch who had in their PRTs a slogan or what to call it saying that well our PRT should be as civilian as possible as military as necessary. So a completely different approach trying to integrate the two. If it has been successful or not well we don't know all about the evaluations yet. But I would like to stress that one of the one of the lessons is that there has been a lot of different a lot of different strategies on different levels. There has been too little coordination between countries between different civilian efforts different military efforts. There has been at least 50 different ways of doing things even that even the simplest tasks have been done in very different ways. And I do think that one has not put enough emphasis on the fact that most countries have been present with a whole spectrum of different means from diplomatic to military means to foreign aid to long term peace building building schools. There is a whole range of issues and if it's not coordinated it's it's going to be quite difficult to get it on the right track. And there are of course also a lot of other lessons learned but looking from from the kind of Norwegian perspective I think that is one of the key issues we need to discuss coming up to evaluations. Fantastic I get ah thank you Marisa I have a question here in the front thank you. Yes Marisa Lino with Northrop Grumman Corporation thank you so much for your comments and for being here. I want to take it back to the Arctic. Great. You knew I would. Fantastic. I wonder if you would share with us what Norway's perspective is on what are the defense or security issues involved with the changing nature of the Arctic. Thank you that's also a very good question. Well we have one vision for the Arctic when it comes to my responsibilities in the government and that is high north low tension and that has been crucial for different governments in Norway. We maintain the Arctic and the high north the most important strategic area for Norway but we need to keep the tensions low. I think that serves us all better than the alternative but in doing so we also have to engage countries around us other Arctic countries and also other countries that are not Arctic states. Mentioning that one of the one of the thinking behind our support for picking up new observer members in the Arctic Council was exactly that. That if you take on board big countries like China like Japan like others it is far better and easier to discuss the issues of the Arctic be they military or civilian. Everyone sits around the same table. The alternative would probably have been that the Arctic Council would have been challenged from a different body. And I don't think that would have constituted more stability and more low tension. But I do think we at the same time needs to realize that although Russia plays a very constructive role right now they are also having military capabilities very close to our areas in the Arctic and they do have the northern fleet placed in the Arctic. So it's something that we need to we need to keep an eye on that because I do at the same time as tension is very low right now I do think that smaller things could spark both tension and maybe more tension that we would like to see. I do think that the area being full of different resources that a lot of nations would like to get their hands on is always something that calls for attention. There are resources there that are that we know belongs to certain states but there are also unexplored resources that we don't know yet to which country belongs which could be of course of interest to many countries. But I do think that one of one of the things that separates the Arctic from from other regions is that we do have decision making bodies that works well like the Arctic Council. We have a framework around Arctic activity that you don't have many other places and as a contribution to the low tension I think that is a path to follow. Could I just have a pen so I can write down. Good afternoon Mark Smith also from Northrop Corporation during your remarks. Thank you very much for your remarks very insightful during your remarks. During your remarks you alluded to Norway's need for high end deployable capabilities without giving away any national secrets. Could you perhaps give an example or two of what you had in mind. Thank you. John Gunderson with the Foreign Service Institute National Defense University. NATO expansion has been on the table for every NATO meeting for the last 15 years or so. It doesn't seem to be in the cards now at least as much as we have in the past. How will NATO or should NATO address some of the security concerns of the non-NATO nations for example such as Ukraine at this summit. I'm Stanley Kober. Even in the United States defense spending is scheduled to go down from 5.6 percent security spending to 3.4 percent of GDP over the next 10 years. What goes up? Social security Medicare goes up. Baby boom retiring. Interest payments go up. If our interest payments go up your interest payments go up. If we can't meet the requirements of the increased spending without cutting defense how can you. So we have high end deployable assets the enlargement question I would actually partnerships where does NATO's partnerships go from here and then how do we wrestle with growing social costs and maintaining robust defense spending. Well tough ones this is a good audience tough ones and a very nice bouquet of very different questions also so I'm very happy for that. Well the high end deployable capabilities was as I mentioned two of them was especially our frigates our new frigates they're relatively new at least operating right now outside of Syria one of our frigates. We had the lead lead on the operation Ocean Shield in the Bay of Aden until December with one of our frigates. We are currently buying the F-35s and we have now gotten Parliament's approval of buying first 16 we're buying 52 and we're in good track with that. I had a meeting with the JPO today and those are two examples but aside from that we also are in the discussions right now. There has been no recommendations made but we are in the discussions of what to do with our submarine capabilities after some time because they are either maturing for to be replaced or modernized. So these are some of the examples and if you look at the personnel we also have especially with the US a very close and good cooperation with our special forces and they are highly deployable and they are used a lot of places. Right now they are among other things mentoring the special police crisis response unit in Kabul and they've been there for some time and they're doing a great job. So I mean Norway could never ever I mean we were just a few people as Dr. Hammer mentioned. We could never be the biggest contributor in numbers but we try to be a contributor of relevant capabilities that are needed in the context. And our special forces is one example. They're not many but what they do is highly valued both of the Afghan authorities but also within the NATO framework. The frigate taking the lead in Operation Ocean Shield is extremely important and us now being in a Danish and Norwegian partnership alongside the US ship Cape Ray where the destruction is going to take place is something that we did in a very short time and we did it in my opinion so far well. The same example over Libya we had F-16s conducting operations alongside our allies. So we could never probably do 30 fighter jets but we could do six or we could do four and they can matter. So that's the most important thing. Thank you. So the question of expansion well it's absolutely right that it's maybe not in the cards right now. And I think one of the issues that were brought on the table when it was last discussed was that it dawned on a lot of allies that many of the countries wanting to get in had very different experiences with Russia for instance and they had quite different expectations for what NATO could offer. It was a lot of discussions on where the threshold for Article 5 should be and those discussions aren't finished yet. Those are part of it. And of course Russia would not like some of the countries to be NATO members. I reveal no secret when I say that I suppose. At the same time I think it's quite important to underline that we have said clearly as have the US and other allies that no matter how you put it Russia could not veto what NATO is going to do be it missile defence or expansion. I mean we're an alliance that takes care of our security and we do that in the way we feel best. But to address the security challenges for new countries is something that can be solved partly now with partnerships and it is being as Heather mentioned the partnership issue is high on the agenda. Interestingly enough I think that the development that we have seen over the past let me say four or five years in NATO has been quite remarkable. Four or five years ago if you asked about partnerships, non-NATO countries taking part in operations or doing things together with NATO was a bit of a skepticism. You were quite much skepticism. Now the regional corporations for instance like our Nordic cooperation is highly valued because it contributes to strengthening the alliance as such. And NATO realizes that it's an interesting way of getting for instance Sweden and Finland who will not be NATO members any time soon. I can tell you looking at the political discussions in the countries I really can tell you that it's not going to happen soon. They are now being a part of operations. They've been in Afghanistan shoulder by shoulder with us. We have been in the same camps. We have been operating together. We have gained huge things when it comes to interoperability. We are having right now we have had for some time cross-border training with our fighter jets over Norway and Sweden. And also Finland. Now the US is looking to engage in this as a third country or maybe now a fourth country then as a third country which I think is good. And all those issues together makes it possible to also address the security challenges of partners and potential members. So the last question of this defense spending. How to as I understand your question how are we able to maintain our budgets when you're not. And well that was more or less the essence of the question wasn't it. Well as I mentioned and I think this is important to underline that a lot of people look at Norway and say that oh well you have a lot of money you don't need to prioritize. I can tell you there are tough priorities we have to make tough priorities. And one of them being that we have an interest in investing in our own security both because it is important in a burden sharing perspective but also because it contributes to the alliance security. It contributes to your security to other allies security which is extremely important to us. That is a very decisive investment. We could have invested or done a lot of other things but we do that. But have no illusions that the discussions are not also tough in our country. And that is also partly because in Norway as in every other country the discussion between hospitals schools defense spending is as clear in our country as in any other country. And we have to do the same priorities we have we're meeting with some of the same challenges many other countries have the only thing being that we have not been hit as hard by the financial crisis as many of our neighbors and our allies which of course gives us some more space. But when we are investing in new capabilities it's going to cost us and it's going to be extremely tough to prioritize among different things that we can do. What we could do and should do. So what we are trying to contribute with is as I mentioned these high end capabilities the things that can contribute to allies security in a very good manner but will never be the biggest. When we contribute a frigate to the naval exercise re-impact it will be one out of 200 ships so probably the exercise will not stand or fall with our participation. But it is however a very important signal from us that we take interest in your global security challenges. That's why we're there. So if it's with one frigate high end capability for us it is an important message to send and that's partly what my trip here is about to send that message that we are interested in sharing the burdens trying to contribute with whatever we can and trying to strengthen the transatlantic ties. You need to do your part. We will try to do our part together with our European allies. Thank you. Madam Minister thank you so much. I mean tough decisions, tough times, best leaders. Thank you. We are enthusiastic. I also have to thank you. I also have to tell the minister coolest gift and best building warming if we've gotten. Thank you all so much. Take care.