 Well, we are at Congress, we have enterprise class routers, we have our enterprise management interface and we have our enterprise traffic. The Cremia has experienced a much more complicated architecture rework at the past years. Senior, will show us what changed and will update us on the very last stage of the information freedom on Cremia. Please welcome, Senior. Hello, a lot of humans. So I will present you this research that I was doing for last year. I was based at Citizen Lab, which is a very interesting research center based in Toronto. We are interesting because we are interdisciplinary and I'm coming from the perspective of soft science, but I'm heading towards hard science and I'm curious about exploring, especially the hardest of the hardest is the underwater cables. I'm passionate about infrastructure and I will tell you how in the case of Cremia this is important to understand what exactly was happening after the annexation on the very, very deep level of routing, of agreements between providers of transit and peering agreements and how this matters for the end user and for the ISPs. So let's start with this picture. It's like before and after, classic. In this case we see on the left 2014 a lake that is not the lake where you can swim. You cannot swim in this lake. I wouldn't recommend you. It's a lake for technical purposes that treats sulfuric acid. So this sulfuric acid is used in production in a very big factory that is called Titan and this factory is located on the north of Cremia. So near the border, now border with Ukraine. So this lake was used to treat the waste from the factory, but after the annexation Ukraine stopped providing this clear freshwater to Cremia as part of its reaction to what happened after the annexation. Cremia was dependent on 85% on Ukraine for freshwater. So in four years this lake dried out and what we see now on the right is the same lake but four years after and this resulted in a catastrophe. In September 2018 people had to evacuate kids from these surrounding areas and they lost their harvests and a lot of equipment was rusted. Everything was destroyed in terms of plants and animals were suffering. Who is guilty? That's not the question. Ukraine did a very interesting decision. Russia did even more interesting decision in 2014 but my talk here is not happening on this level. I want to question the role of infrastructure in this big political process and how exactly Ukraine and Russia were dealing with this question of annexation on the deep level of infrastructure. If you look at dependencies of Cremia on Ukraine, it was dependent on Ukraine in gas, water, electricity and especially telecommunications that will be interesting for us here. So you have those two cables that connect Ukraine to Cremia and these cables are not operating anymore. And you will see the dramatic history of how this disconnection of Cremia happened progressively and what it means for the end users and the providers. So in order to do this research, I actually used some experiments. I did a lot of experiments. I used mixed methods. First of all, I'm a sociologist of technology by training. So I was interested in meeting internet service providers who work in Cremia still now after the annexation. I also interviewed those who left Cremia for various reasons, economic, political. I interviewed big associations like the Internet Association of Ukraine that defend the rights of providers, but also interviewed software engineers working in Cremia or who left Cremia, journalists and your workers. Besides, I had to use some network measurements to see what is really happening on the network. And for that, I used UNIPROB. Some people who work with UNI or used to work with UNI are in this room. And I thank these humans for doing this project because it's really useful. What UNIPROB does, it lets users in different regions test a list of websites to see if it's blocked and if it is, then how it is blocked. This tool helps me to see how censorship is applied in Cremia and also to establish the list of autonomous systems that really function in Cremia because it's a disputed area. It's hard to understand who is really providing service there. So you need to use mixed methods to understand who are the real ISPs in Cremia. And also, I wanted to analyze VGP data over time and it was hard and I will tell you why. I think this is the core of my talk, why it's so hard to analyze VGP data. And, sorry, the last moment, the web ethnography, the forums. The forums are a great source of information for this kind of research because you see how end user is complaining about providers not working, internet being very slow, gamers were the first source for me. World of Tanks players were the first who started complaining about loss of speed and the ping becoming crazy and all these small signals made me think something is happening, so forums are interesting to start the research with. So now to the core, after this introduction, to the core of the topic, how the traffic evolution happened in Cremia. I call it a soft substitution model because the usage of weapon and physical force was not that important in Cremia as compared to the Eastern Ukraine, where I also interviewed operators who were working in Donetsk, for example, who told stories about how guys with guns came to the office, took the equipment, took everything and said now it's our ISP, we are running it and you go away. In Cremia it was different, it was very slow, progressive. There was one year of transition period when the internet service providers who were Ukrainian had to become Russian. What does it mean? I will tell you later. But look at these dates. It's very interesting, these four key dates. On the 24th of March Medvedev announces his desire to build a new cable that would go under the Black Sea and connect Cremia to Russia to provide Russian traffic to Cremia. The cable was built in one month and it was 46 kilometers long, so quick, very fast operation. Maybe something has been there before already, but we don't know. I don't have proof and I don't want to speculate. Five days after, six days, five days after, on May 4th, Ross Telecom announces the creation of a new operator that is called Miranda Media and owns the big stake in this company. So basically it's a new brand under which Ross Telecom operates in Cremia. Ross Telecom cannot operate under the real name because of sanctions. It will fall under European and American sanctions and will lose agreements with international partners and have heavy consequences. And four months, it took four months for providers to actually start receiving connections over this catch-trade cable. So Miranda Media first appeared in the routing table only in July 2014. It's interesting why it took so long. I had various hypotheses and I will tell you the one that seems to work. In the meantime, there were some other measures that were taken by Rossen governments. First of all, they relocated frequencies and the relocation of frequencies is managed by the State Radio Frequency Commission. It's a government institution. They started with allocating CDMA frequencies. And this is due to the technology that is popular in the post-Soviet Union. They prefer CDMA for some reason. And the operator that was using it was one of the biggest operators in Ukraine called PeopleNet. So PeopleNet was providing mobile phone internet and mobile communication or using 800 megahertz. But this frequency was allocated to military almost immediately after the annexation started. So PeopleNet had to leave the Crimea. Also, this process of creating new brands was very popular as a tactic of substitution. So they would create new brands under new name and register them in the neighboring regions like Krasnodar. So officially, the provider will not be registered in Crimea, but will be registered in Krasnodar. And thus, it will avoid sanctions again. So this is one of the tactics used for the soft substitution. And finally, very quickly, on May 9, all communication cable infrastructure was bought from Ukraine to Russia. So now, Rostelecom owns these 2,000 kilometers of traffic. Well, it doesn't own officially, because it's Miranda Media and K-telecom that own it. But you know that in practice, it's Rostelecom behind it. So I call this process, this period between the annexation and 2017, the routing interregnum. Why? Because both countries were still dividing, still disputing around the traffic. Which traffic do people get, Russian or Ukrainian? What does it mean to get Ukrainian traffic? What does it mean to get Russian traffic? And actually, it took three years for Crimea to disconnect from Ukraine. Why? Some people would say it's patriotic. Ukrainian providers didn't want to become Russian. I would not use any political hypothesis here, but I would say that there is certainly one reason that is very pragmatic. I analyzed discussions on various channels and professional charts of internet service providers. What is interesting maybe for you to know is there are a lot of connections still between Ukrainian and Russian ISPs? They are still chatting a lot, especially about the censorship, because censorship was to be applied in Ukraine, but now it's frozen, this law. So there is a lot of discussion, a lot of connection between these communities. And reading these charts, I saw that actually first reason was pragmatic. It was much more expensive for them to plug to Russia under the water, and they would lose in speed and quality. And this we see on this graph on the right, they would lose up to 50 milliseconds, which is a lot for world of dance, for high-frequency trading, for everyone who is streaming. And this is important, because other source of information, for me, were the civic media, civic journalists, who would film, for example, manifestations, or court hearings, or any other action in real time, and they would complain that they cannot stream as good as they used to. Some quotes from very respected people, some of them work in RIPE NCC for the Eastern Europe region, some others are ex-cremian providers. So they explained that actually this cash-straight cable was built anyhow, in a hurry, very, very fast. And another provider says, well, the reason for this fast operation is that they, first of all, used it for military purpose, for voice communication, and not for commercial communication. The cable was not powerful enough to give enough traffic for civil population. And this routing in Toregano actually was lasted for three years. And the first important event that I wanted to show you here, and that showed how strongly, how deeply Crimean internet was dependent on Ukrainian path, was this operation that was conducted by a group of pro-Ukrainian activists when they exploded the power line connecting north of Crimea and Ukraine. For a month, Crimea was in the dark, or more or less blackouted, with a lot of disruptions and shutdowns. The traffic was not present everywhere. Different operators suffered in a different way from this, and we saw that, analyzing various operators, that some of them were almost 100% dependent on Ukrainian traffic. And the consequences of that were that they actually decided, maybe it's a good idea to buy some from Russia as well, because if Ukraine continues to cut us down like that, then we have to have a backup. So if you look at the graph that I will show you later, where you see how they unplug from Ukraine and plug to Russia, that was one of the events that made Ukrainian providers go for opt for Russian path as well, as a backup. So in a weird way, this patriotic action from Ukrainian activists conducted to actually more Russian traffic in Crimea, in a paradoxical way. And after that, of course, Russian government took a decision to build the bridge, that's called Kerch Bridge, that is providing Crimea electricity, also connecting it, giving a possibility not to use the ships, but also cars and stuff like that. And this bridge also has a second cable that connects Crimea to Russia. So this gif briefly presents the story of replugging. First, you see Ukrainian traffic, then in March, 2014, the idea to build a Russian cable under the sea, and then progressively the plan is realized and the traffic is mixed for a while, both Ukrainian and Russian. But then after this operation, these actions that showed how dependent Crimea was on Ukrainian traffic, a decision to build a second cable appears, and finally all Crimea becomes Russian, the traffic in Crimea becomes Russian. That's official. We don't know for real if there is still Ukrainian traffic happening. And I think that there is, but I have no proof for that, only some rumor. And I will never, never tell you who and why told me this, because these brave people who still connect Crimea to Ukraine for some reasons, maybe patriotic, maybe pragmatic, will be criminals, both for Russian and Ukrainian government. They are doing it on their own. So, my research question after all this was how did these ISPs position themselves as Russian or Ukrainian? How did they transition? And how can I get this data? How? It was for me a big puzzle. There are around 3,000 ISPs in Ukraine according to the license, who has the license to operate as an intern service provider. And I count, after a long, long, long time of work, 114 in Crimea. I must precise that actually 114 autonomous systems and not internet service providers. It means that, for example, some universities that also are autonomous systems are in this list. Where did I get this data? Mixed methods. Again, UNI, I had a group of people who bravely in very risky situation, condition, were running tests in Crimea. I didn't know the name of these people and I will never know them and I don't want to know them. These people were communicating the numbers of autonomous systems that they saw on their test results. Then I was checking in RIPE Atlas what was available there, which probes are installed in Crimea and are still running. Then I was looking at downstreams of this big operator around the media that I already told you about. And then I was looking at forums with three points, exclamation marks. It's very important forums, forums, forums. You see an autonomous system, you look at the forum for the name of the ISP, you read how bad the quality of connection is, how bad the technical service is. This is a real one. It's really in Crimea. So I built this list progressively and then I collaborated with brave humans from RIPE, NCC and Internet Health Report Project and we built this beautiful timeline that shows the transition of providers from Ukraine to Russia or vice versa. So in red you see Russia in blue, Ukraine and gray is other. Other, it means that the provider is registered officially in some other country, would it be Czech Republic, for example, or I even saw Armenia and so on. Sometimes this is really happening because of bureaucratic administrative reasons because the provider is registered as Czech, for example. Sometimes it's a way to avoid sanctions again. So it's a trick. To show you an animated version of this, maybe it will be easy for understanding than this graph. So each dot will represent an ISP within Crimea and what I learned by talking to RIPE and NCC people is that there is a procedure that you need to comply in order to actually change your attribution as being Ukrainian or Russian. So if providers state Ukrainian, it doesn't necessarily mean that they are patriotic or pro-Ukrainian, it may just mean that they didn't want to take extra steps to fill extra papers and things like that. But those who change to Russian, there we can have some speculation about maybe they wanted to show loyalty, maybe they wanted to comply, maybe they were forced to comply. So no political consequences, the conclusions on this data yet because it needs to be again and again iterated with interviews with qualitative. So that's where the sociology can finally be useful to check if these are that person may have some extra technical reasons to stay Ukrainian or become Russian and so on. Interesting about this dynamic is that they suddenly started becoming Russian after 2017. And now you will see Russia will start winning. So, winning. Why? There are hypotheses, one of which is this opening of the second cable in July 2017 when providers had a chance to have more traffic going there and it became cheaper to connect to Russia. But not all the providers were happy and there was some resistance in providers circles. Some of these resistance was happening through very fun practices like this one. So I was manually looking through who is, information about every autonomous system that I found and this nice joke, Vladimir Putin as a contact person for this provider. I had to anonymize but unfortunately I should maybe have anonymized the city also but now it's too late. And now I come to the second part of my presentation which will be a bit of complaining and maybe giving some ideas about what to do in the future. For those of you who are interested in this kind of data, I must say that it was very interesting to do this research because there is no perfect tool to analyze historical BGP data. It's hard. What I was doing first, maybe some recognize where it comes from, it's a very nice hurricane electrics tool, bgp.he.net. I was going with every AS number to check manually how this autonomous system is connected to another one that is bigger and how this is connected finally to tier one in the end. Manually, 10, 15, 20. And then I stopped because I thought maybe there is a bot a script, someone, something that can help me to do this without me becoming crazy. But there was something very useful in this method because every time I was checking this second and especially the third hop, the hop that happens before the route propagation becomes very beforcated, that was pointing all the time to the same player, all the time I saw Miranda Media, Miranda Media. Okay, there should be some process of centralization going here. It's not normal that there is just one player all the time that is connecting the whole territory to the outside internet. Then I found this other AS down there that is called UMLC. And I thought, hmm, this player is also very frequent but less than the first one. Maybe this is a new one that is kind of sharing the market. So I had some hypothesis. I presented this on one conference and I found people who helped me. So that was a long story of collaboration with different humans, some of them are in this room. First we looked at Kaida, that is a great project and they have this BGP reader that you can use, but you need to take data from another project that is called Route Views. That is also a very good one, made by University of Oregon. The problem is that the data is super heavy, so you have snapshots of the whole internet every two hours. When it's zipped, you see how heavy it is. So it becomes like 4.5 gigabytes after it has been unzipped and transformed into a file. The file can be read by a human, I more or less can read some parts of it and understand, but not enough to do a quick sociological analysis of that. So in the end I was about to invent the tool myself but I didn't have enough knowledge and enough experience and I finally met these people from Internet Health Report who invented this new notion that I find very interesting, the Autonomous System Hegemony Index. So what does it mean, this Autonomous System Hegemony is how central a certain autonomous system is for a region or for how many downstreams it has and if these downstreams have only one route through this upstream, this upstream is hegemonic. So you can check this paper, it's a small proceeding paper, three pages, a poster and I think you will be very interested. That's what we did after long work. This is actually the history of Autonomous System Hegemony in Crimea that is associated to some events that you may not know, but I know and I will give you some hints. So there are about four or five major events on this graph. Maybe some of you already guessed 2014, mid-2014 July, that moment when Miranda Media appears in the routing table and starts providing Russian traffic, the cache cable is built, the connection starts flowing, the traffic starts flowing in Crimea. Beam, we see Ross Telecom and Miranda Media appearing on the graph, not as hegemones but already quite present. And then you will see some interesting political moments like in 2015 there was this attack on the networks where I showed you the power grid, we also see Ukrainian operators losing their hegemony and Russian operators gaining more in hegemony and another interesting moment, this opening of the second cable in the mid-2017 where Ross Telecom strikes as red. It provides a lot of traffic and actually starts occupying for a while the downstreams and also you see appearing this fjord and UMLC that I told you about, I interpret this as the understanding of Russian, maybe it's Ross Telecom, maybe it's the government, that they didn't have enough resources to actually provide whole traffic to Crimea. They had to let other players in and they let fjord and they let UMLC in but these are only hypothesis. We are still working on interpreting this graph. We need to write a correct plot. There are a lot of things happening here. Also, if you look at the Ukrainian ones that are very present in the beginning, but there is one, you see one, two, three, four, from the top, WNET. This WNET appears only after the annexation. It's a Ukrainian provider and suddenly it only appears after the annexation, why? Some sociology was done by me to understand what happened there and actually this provider had weird connections with some Russian governmental services that may actually have been using this provider for special reasons and that's why it disappears in 2017 in the middle because SBU, Ukrainian political police, searches five companies including WNET and searches and takes away all the equipment from them and stops actually the operations in Crimea. So WNET was one of those. One funny fact, I was analyzing again manually the who is and I found one operator that is still in Crimea that in its contact information has at wnet.ua. They didn't think of correcting it. Then I checked somehow and it seems that WNET people are still present there under a new name, under a new brand name. So there was this traffic war and the end of Interegno around 2017 when SBU was searching, as I said, providers and accusing them of actually collaborating with occupied territories and another event that I find very important on the 31st of May, Crimean citizens start seeing Ukrainian block pages when they try to access vk.com or yandex.ru that is due to the decision of the president of Ukraine to block these Russian services and a lot of complaints from Crimean users why do I see this block page? According to decision of Ukrainian president, you cannot go. Are we Ukrainians? I thought we were Russians. That was a confusion. That was a big media attention to the traffic, to the source of traffic. First time the media started writing about where does the traffic come from was after this event, after this blocking of vk. So that's when the decision was taken by Ukrainian government or by something else to stop providing traffic to Crimea. And it's weirdly coincidenting with this launching of the second cable. Interesting, huh? So to come to my conclusions, because I want to talk to you and to hear your questions, what are the consequences of this interregnum of this operation of progressive transformation of traffic in Crimea? First for the IT market. So due to the sanctions, as I mentioned, it became very hard for Crimean IT experts and developers and providers to work there. So the market actually lost about 30% of internet service providers, according to qualitative data. We need to find sources that we can actually cross with to see if it's really correct, but interviews show that that's more or less what we lose. There was a huge wave of migration of IT experts from Crimea to the mainland of Ukraine and the crisis of jobs in IT sector. No international operators or IT companies are openly operating in Crimea due to sanctions. And there is a big gray market of internet service providers that is developing, including collaborations with the Eastern Ukraine. That is very interesting. They're providers who have their office in Lugansk, for example. And the last point, roaming. Humans who live in Crimea and want to use mobile internet, they find themselves using roaming. I'm already in the end. So what are the consequences of this annexation for internet service providers? First of all, they have to comply with the Russian law. They have to install some equipment and this equipment is very expensive. First, they have to install SORM, according to the new law that's called Yeravaya law. They have to store the traffic for 30 days and the metadata for six months or three years, I'm sorry. And for telephone companies, they have to store all the traffic for six months. A lot, a lot. It's very expensive. You see the price, huh? Then they also have to apply censorship and there is a weird censorship practices in Crimea that they block a certain blacklist that is not the official blacklist in Russia. They block something else according to the decision of local governments of municipal administrations and that I found out by interviewing these internet service providers that still work in Crimea. So they have to block certain websites, especially Crimea and Tatar media. Crimea and Tatar are the indigenous people of Crimea and they have their own media, the most censored in Crimea. Ukrainian liberal media, Russian opposition media. For the end users, they lose in speed and quality. The internet service becomes more expensive, at least 10%. But this concerns all Russia. There will be a big, big rise in cost of internet service because of this equipment, because of this laws, because of this way of internet governance. And we will have some talks in the following days by Leonid Dekimov, who is present in this room, for example, who will talk more about this various equipment that is imposed to providers in Russia and how it has some consequences for the industry. Also, there is a reverse censorship on the right. You see Slack that decided not to provide service to Crimean clients because of the sanctions. People cannot access to Google Play. They cannot access to Amazon, Airbnb, Microsoft. The problem is for the activists, for the civic society, for the journalists, that they cannot update their computers. Sometimes they have problems with uploading Signal, Tor or other nice tools that we like because they don't know how to use FDROID. They have to use Google Play, but they cannot. So I end here because I want to let you ask questions and discuss a bit and some acknowledgments for people who helped me and this Internet Health Report, Citizen Lab and other great humans from various countries in the world. Unfortunately, I cannot name them. They risk things. So that's all. And maybe you have things to ask me or to tell. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, Trinia. If you have any questions, please go to microphone number one or microphone number two and speak out loud. And of course from the Internet. No questions so far. Yeah, there we have. So yeah, the good IT people from Crimea, did they mostly went to the Ukraine or to Russia? We need to decide what's good and bad. First, the majority of those who I know or interviewed moved to mainland of Ukraine, Kiev, Lviv, or to Europe, Western Europe, or to US. It depends on how lucky they were. I don't know that many who moved to Russia, actually. But I'm sure they exist. I just don't have any date on them. Okay. Microphone number one, please. Hello. Hi. I was kind of curious about something. There's been numerous reports ever since 2014 of cyber attacks toward Ukraine. I was wondering if there has been, if you have ever heard of sabotage against Ukrainian ISPs, for instance, or against Russian ISPs working in Ukraine. Could you repeat the question? I was wondering if there had ever been reports through your different channels of sabotage attacks against Ukrainian ISPs, for instance, maybe trying to discourage them from working again or trying to make other coming. So the question was about whether Ukrainian ISPs were ever subject to cyber attacks. Yeah. So far, I didn't hear that. I heard about various phishing attacks on activists and journalists, but not against Ukrainian ISPs so far. I know there are very interesting patriotic hacking groups that operate both in Ukraine and in Russia. One of those has even its own telegram channel where you can go and look at their exploits, download and use them. It's a public channel. You can go and check what they do. They do a lot of cyber attacks against, for example, the Donetsk People's Republic, so-called, and the Lugansk territories. When they bring down the websites, they can hack into some databases and leak the data about the people who run this republics. So this kind of hacking, patriotic hacking exists, but so far I didn't see any attacks against Internet Service providers as such in Crimea. Thank you. Thanks. Microphone number two, please. Hello. Hey. This is quite concise, but I'm trying to put it together. This one question is about clarification on the ultimate demise of inter-Ukrainian Crimean links. If I understood it right, you said it really came from Ukraine or actions either by Ukraine authorities or other groups acting with or without collusion with the state. Another question is that, given that I'm new to understanding the region, but I understand that people across Ukraine and certainly Crimea are not... You can find a preference in terms of language. Some people feel more closer to Russian-speaking others to Ukrainian, but I did notice that a lot of Ukrainian websites tend to not support the Russian language. And so I was wondering if there's data on... Because you basically give the impression that the service is worse, but if people are using more Russian websites, Russian-hosted websites, would it not be better for them to be directly connected to Russia than have been going through Ukrainian roots? Thanks. Thank you. So the first question was whether the decisions were coming from Ukrainian government or... Am I sure about that, basically, if I understood you right? Did I, I hope, more or less? This is one of the central doubts in all research for me. Why did someone stop providing traffic from Ukraine to Crimea? Why would you stop providing your people with Internet that is not subject to tapping or filtering by the government of the country with which you are at war? For me, this is an interesting question and there can be some economic reasons, there can be some agreements, there can be political showing that look how you are dependent on us as they did with the clean water before. But I don't want to speculate on that now at this early stage because I have some weird feeling that why did it coincident like this with the opening of the second cable being 12 days after no Ukrainian traffic. Is it Ukraine that decided it? So it's a bit weird. I don't want to get in the soil because it's moving. It can, you know, I can disappear in the swamp of speculations. But the question is here. I have no certainty about who did this decision. And the second one was about Russian language sites being more popular among Crimean citizens and isn't it good for them to have then Russian traffic. I think that this is another kind of research. I didn't look at the application layer. I looked at the infrastructure layer and a bit on the censorship. I need to use some other kinds of data. For example, maybe look at Google search, maybe look at statistics of what people, what websites people were visiting before and after. But I know from the reports of NGOs that document these kinds of information and the free speech and the expression online that indeed there was a shift towards more Russian-speaking content now in Crimea from Ukrainian content. Is it a consequence of propaganda, maybe? I don't know. Anyway, nothing would stop them from going to Ukrainian websites with Russian-speaking websites with Ukrainian traffic. There was no censorship so far administratively applied in Ukraine before the war. Actually, Ukraine didn't have a blacklist that would be then delivered to providers as in Russia, so the internet was more or less uncensored until 2017-19 until this decision to block VK and Yandex as a response within the information war to Russian censorship of Ukrainian media. So I guess Crimean citizens could have also used Ukrainian traffic to get to Russian language websites. It's another kind of data. I don't have it. Thank you. The second person on microphone number two because I think you already asked a question. Yeah, but the person behind you didn't ask a question. Sorry for being rude. First, absolutely fascinating research. Thank you so much for putting transparency on this. I notice that you did a lot of analysis on undersea cables, and I'm not even sure if it's possible to analyze this question I'm about to ask, but what about satellite providers? Thank you. This is something I have close to my heart. Last year, the congressman approached me and asked what about satellites that could be a solution for Crimean activists, at least. And indeed, there has been some discussion that I had with some humans from connected to satellite providers say about maybe we can try alternative infrastructure, alternative sources of internet, alternative networks, especially for Crimean Tatar. Crimean Tatar live in villages in the mountains, so it's very interesting for them to have this kind of traffic from satellite internet. I don't know how many of them have, exactly how many of them have this traffic, but it's very popular already because of the TV. They use satellite for TV, and now they use also, yeah, TV over IP or whatever it's called. I don't watch TV, but, yeah, there is the infrastructure needed for deploying an alternative source of internet with satellites. The Ministry of Communications of Ukraine has thought of that, and this is in the strategy of development for Crimea, but so far it hasn't been really applied on the big level. Maybe one day, let's see. But it's a good, good question, and I also think of Mesh, and I also think of whatever CGDNS, and I also think of any kind of alternative networks for these people. Maybe they don't need it. That's another question. And the last question, I think, from the interwebs. Hi. The internet has a follow-up question to the satellite link, which is, what about radio links? Yeah, the radio is very interesting, and indeed this was one of the first projects that the Ukrainian Ministry of Communications realized. They opened a radio tower that now is covering at least northern part of Crimea with Ukrainian radio content. Sometimes you can hear it from the south, but it's not really properly covering anything. So there is development in this sense. As for using radio as replacement for connectivity and for providing traffic for humans in Crimea, I haven't heard of these projects. We need people who want to go there, explore this, and maybe build alternative networks. The problem is that if you want to go there, you need to go through the very heavy bureaucratic procedure, ask a permission from Ukrainian government, so you become transparent, and when you enter the checkpoint, they have your data. It's impossible to enter from Russian territory without falling in the risk of being sanctioned by Ukraine. This is something that I didn't mention here, because it's not about technology, it's about geopolitics and legal arrangements, sanctions, and all these weird ways of governing people that I think are not going in the right direction. They are not helping us to break the wall, they are building this wall, and they are making it very hard for people like me or other researchers or journalists or human rights defenders or hackers who want to go to Crimea, they cannot go anonymously, they have to declare themselves. This is something that I would like to see changing. I would like to have a possibility for us to go there in order to make something to actually de-annexate the mind first. That's it. And with these final words, we close this talk, have a very warm applause for Xenia.