 Good morning. Thank you Gardner for those kind words and good morning fellow warriors and Indeed that's probably where I want to start so a couple witnesses Gardner you use this great language of Leaders leading thinkers. I don't know if I would ever have put myself in that category But Jamie's a witness. I do spend a lot of time thinking and so I wanted to share with you some of my thoughts today but it is really this warfighting aspect that Got me going when Jeff Harley gave me these words Strategy and maritime power in a contested environment. This is a current strategy for him and Yet the words maritime power in a contested environment. I felt was pulling me down to the operational level of war We often think about and mostly agree to this framework of strategy operational level and then tactical level and So then I started to think is this forum is the world change so much that just like we have strategic Corporals, there's no way to talk about the operational level of the war or the tactical level of war without having strategic implications and Then that gets to this very new CS 21 where we talk about the sea services and the functions And it is at the strategic level But because it is about services it does talk to operational and mission-level concepts and Are those all interconnected today? And then we we bring in this new idea of all-domain access We put out this premise that there are these multitude of domains space air maritime And my favorite fight inside the joint arena is whether Maritime is one domain or whether air is separate from surface and subsurface And if you're a light blue suitor and of the Air Force you kind of want to think air is separate If you have to fight in the maritime domain You want all of those to be in one domain because you have to fight in all three dimensions at the same time And so when we're talking a contested environment, are we talking all of those domains or one of those domains? And so these are the thoughts that were running through my head and Now I'm going to take you through where I think I'm where I went with my answers for myself first slide, you know, there's this line that History doesn't repeat itself historians repeat historians and So when we're talking all-domain access We're really talking about how we have capability against anti-access aerial denial Circumstances and I access that means we're going to stop you from from even getting into Maneuvering and then area denial you just can't get in there And yet throughout history this problem of not being able to get in Has been at the tactical level an issue And it has been sometimes at the operational level And so I started to think about our ability in anti-access aerial denial And when you think about us in the Civil War There was this great plan by the Union to blockade the South literally to contain them and Then the thought was if we can blockade them we could we could actually sort of Split them up the middle divide and conquer so to speak starve them The strategic level thinking was that we had to stop the South from being able to sell goods in order to resupply and buy Armament but as they built and contain the South with this blockade it actually probably another fantastic piece of strategy was Literally the Union convinced the rest of the world that it was legally fine to blockade the South And not to intervene as we got down to the individual ports Some of those ports had strategic importance one of the last ones being mobile and Mobile Bay, it's sort of an arrowhead inlet in the middle You go up through the center and this the town of mobiles at the top of the end at the top of the bay 20 nautical miles from the entrance The point was that mobile was a railhead You could take the Ohio Railroad out to Mississippi and you could take the Great Northern Railroad out to Atlanta So taking mobile meant that we were going to succeed in Containing the South and it was part of this grand blockade and it became a strategic point when Farragut and his cruisers and Monitors went to take it He had a thoughtful opponent and I will be canon He had a narrow he had a narrow inlet with two forts one on each side He drove pilings part way out and then he mined the rest of it The channel to get in at that point was only 500 yards wide and so good old Farragut Who became our first admiral in the Navy? Had an anti-access problem, and I don't think there there had been that much thinking about Anti-access, but the mines were there that referred to as torpedoes in those day So his plan was simply just to charge right through At great risk and the first ship that went up to fight the Confederates inside the bay that to come So hit a mine that ship According to stories sank in less than a minute losing 93 people of 124 and that realization Even with hardened a combat hardened veteran started to cause the rest of the unions union ships to pull over to the side to safety and Literally, it was the leadership bravery of Farragut saying damn those torpedoes to the seal of the Hartford and driving up the center and an awful lot of luck The Hartford didn't hit a mine and the rest of the ships fell in behind her and then the battle of Mobile Bay was on So anti-access has probably been around for a while But what we've come to say is that we have to be able to fight in this domain The lesson learned is we can't rely on luck in the future that will just Time time and luck find that channel to fight the enemy we have to be able to Have all domain access and be able to burrow in if we need to in order to have the fight next slide We're starting to see some of this play out today When you look at the Strait of Hormuz that's still a pretty important energy producer for the world It's about 17 million barrels a day But most of that energy flows to the western Pacific and the biggest customers are India Japan South Korea China Important to us because there are training partners and so if energy was disrupted to them There would be economic impact around the world and then of course some of that oil flows around to our European partners Who are also trading partners in? 2012 Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz That is the anti-access problem Which if she had tried to close the straits obviously would have re economic repercussions around the world since then Navscent has created an exercise a mind countermeasures exercise Which the first time it was announced we had European partners join in rapidly and has only grown over the years and So every fall we now demonstrate a collective capability to keep the straits open and this last fall in November of 2014 we were up to 38 warships from around the world 32 civilian merchant vessels and 44 navies represented There were over 6500 people in this mind countermeasure exercise And so then when you look at the strategy and we talk about all of our functions Power projection that's demonstrated in this exercise see controls demonstrated in this exercise deterrence is demonstrated in this exercise and our strategy talks about the reliance of allies and partners in this case it is collective deterrence It is all of us working together to signal to Iran That we have the might to keep the straight open and we're willing to use the might to keep the straight open There are other additional benefits that come out of something like putting an exercise like this together interoperability Which is important to us if we should ever have to go to war and we're going to fight with allies and partners And so anti-access is coming to the forefront and not just in the maritime domain next slide But it's coming to the forefront in this domain and I heard gardener say that Peter singers talking tomorrow If you've never heard him speak he will give you some great Enlightenment about what's going on. This is a this is a tough domain and when we talk about contested environments This domain is like an urban fight I grew up in a Navy that was deep blue and We had one enemy the Soviet Union life was a lot simpler then And we were actually pretty happy when that fight went away We should not have been life's a lot easier when you just have one enemy This domain this domain has criminals in it. This domain has hackers in it This domain has honest businessmen in it. This domain has family in it This is like an urban fight and there will be a lot of collateral damage Should we ever choose to fight in this domain? This is a contested environment It's aptly illustrated by the cyber attacks on and stony in 2007 and during April and May and In the course of three weeks there was a distributed denial of service attack and fundamentally the attackers who the Estonians later identified as Russian took a hold of several people's individual computers from around the world and sent droves literally millions of hits to different websites in Estonia crashing all of those websites on 26 April the first assault happened and In the first week all of the websites related to the government and the parliament were knocked offline By the second week major Estonian news publications were all out of business. They couldn't communicate online The heaviest attack came on May 9th 2007 the Estonia banking system cyber attacks forced Hanna set bank the largest bank to shut down all internet-based operations at that point in the country 97% of all banking transactions were online The hackers severed connections to all of the ATMs throughout Estonia and Estonia debit cards would not work outside of the country They shut the country down That meant Estonians couldn't pump gas get groceries use cell phones or make money transactions The Estonian government immediately accused the Russian government, but had difficulty proving it And so this environment is not only contested We have the challenge of getting to attribution Making it hard for us to counterattack Who is doing this to us? And when we do figure out there's a latency to it That means We're too late for the counter-attack to defend ourselves So was this an example of a 2 a d in this environment Was this a blockade a blockade of Estonia in the electronic world just the way We were blockading the Confederates in the Civil War and then when you get back to our strategy And we talk about the reliance on allies and partners One of the biggest strategic implications out of the Estonia attacks was the only way Estonia could recover Was to work with allies and partners the pass of destruction went through several different countries and That meant internet experts from Germany Finland and Slovenia Had to help in tracking down the source of the computers in order to get the attack turned off So we are in a different world and particularly in this domain Allies and partners come to the forefront Not because we want that to be that way because that is the way the internet has involved And so it is by necessity The largest biggest strategic implication to me Was the change in Estonia And now becoming a leader in the cyber domain and helping the rest of the world understand what policy should be And how we need to behave and a leading voice Estonia stood up the cyber center of excellence within NATO A leading voice and us trying to get to understanding on exactly what does an article five mean in this domain Next slide And so I think a 2 a d has been around for a while We've got these domains some of them have only evolved in the last century like space or the last few decades Like the cyber domain, but any one of them could be contested at any time So where are we as the sea services and what does it mean in our ability? I think the other historical metaphor Is we may be the british in the war of 1812 Where the dominant global power There may be a conflict far from where we are that we want to say We're going to exert pressure on that nation Or we're going to go into war with that nation And in the war of 1812 The british were able to do power projection But there were limitations And they had come to the strategic conclusion that they weren't going to win this fight Unless they had allies and partners And so they ended up partnering with the canadiens and with the indians But my biggest strategic takeaways from that is that there's limitations When you project power into another domain And you're relying on allies and partners who are in their backyard They will have different motivations during the conflict And in the case of the native americans They had listened to the promises of the british that they would take care of them feed them and provide them weapons The british were at the the tail end of their logistic trail And weren't tail and weren't able to do that And so the motivations of the native americans It becomes about their home and family They in the end were forced to abandon the fight because of a bad season And they had to take care of their Their family in order to feed them And so you're the motivation of the people who live there You will have to take that into account when you bring them on as allies and partners And if you say you're going to support them promises that trust has to be kept And then also when I look at where we are and you look at the resource constrained environment we go to The war of 1812 is also has some great lessons in it one If you're in a resource constrained environment and you're power projecting in a contested environment deception comes to the forefront Both in the case of the british and in the case of tecumseh They used deception to win battles. So for example As general hall was sitting up in his fort in detroit Tecumseh used the fact that there were openings in the in the in the woods and would run his braves by several times Hall Hall thought he was outnumbered The british deliberately Sent false orders and had messengers captured talking about troops that were on their way to reinforce them And literally in the end with all of this information coming in general hall surrendered without firing a shot If we are going into a resource constrained environment I predict we'll see deception not surprise come to the forefront as one of the principles of warfare And then the The last piece is a resource constrained environments Simulation comes to the forefront. We talk about we can't afford to train at sea We can't afford to fly in the air. We can get to just as good a place with simulation In the war of 1812 That lack of resourcing and the simulation turned to be of turn out to be a factor in the battle of lake airy The british Were getting ready for the battle They didn't have the shot In order to practice firing cannons But being smart leaders, they had their sailors go through the motions of firing the cannons on our side Commodore parry He had them go through the actual sequence firing life shot and sometimes using whatever he could find On the day of the battle When the british went to actually fire their cannons They had simulated everything right down to the long wicks for the largest cannons They had not actually made the long wicks And so they were reduced to taking their pistols and shooting them into the cannons in order to ignite them That put a timing sequence and they lost the volley of fire they normally would have had They never knew That they hadn't built the wicks because they'd spent so much time simulating They never got to the ground truth of what they didn't have So we're going to see the same thing as we get to a resource constrained environment You will start to see an emphasis on simulation We as leaders just have to be mindful that simulation has its boundaries and at some point You do have to operate in the air You do have to train at sea and you do have to train underneath the water in order to be A proficient warfighter Next slide So this begats a lot of questions And the point of a forum like this is that we ask these questions And that the answers you find useful But you also find them useful as war fighters And so we have the potential of contested environments That we will have to fight in in the future We have the potential of anti-access area denial and that could be in the maritime domain That could be in the cyber domain That could be on the sea the air or undersea We have to ask ourselves With that particular adversary is it likely that all of those domains will be contested at the same time? And it's our responsibility as war fighters to understand Which domains at what time are going to be contested? And where we best leverage our capability? And if the vulnerability of our potential adversary isn't one of those domains Leverage our ability to to master that domain To take the adversary out in another domain So we should not be afraid to be asymmetrical Air against subsurface Cyber against land And we have to leverage what we know and what we can do really understand these domains Really understand if they're contested And really take advantage of our enemy's vulnerabilities when the time comes And so I think those types of questions and the answers are useful to all of us as war fighters and as strategists And with that I will take your questions. Thank you So I don't know if everyone heard the question. Thank you ambassador For that question the he asked about He put it in the context of our relationship with the soviet union the 10-year lead time To design and develop systems are I think if I can condense it the ability of our adversaries to move more quickly technologically And then how do we how do we manage all of that with the with the with the budget constraints that we have? So you get you get to the heart of a question that's actually being played out on the hill right now Acquisition reform who's responsible for requirements and then who can make changes to requirements as we go along but the other thing I think about and why I believe in a ship like the littoral combat ship Is we have to get out of coupling together combat systems to the platforms and be able to unintegrate What's been our way of doing business that we have to Set up modules so that we can take advantage of changing technology and more More easily take those c4i systems and upgrade them and the weapon systems And then plug them in where we need to need to plug them in And then that and then more have more agility and our ability to train our people. So that's that's part of the answer I also agree that the the Chinese are setting up to create a contested environment in terms of all of all of the domains And so we too are moving out in capacity in terms of air ballistic missile defense undersea and cyber The the the issue will be is What will that how do we think that war is going to unfold? And what domain do we think they're going to have their vulnerabilities in and I also think when you look at Where we are and how for all of us Battle space awareness Command and control We're all dependent on the networks not just the us But the chinese are developing along that way that will be our opportunity To look at their vulnerabilities in the way they command and control their vulnerabilities and how they do battle space awareness and think about how We either go into deception writ large or go into The introduction of their c2 and battle space awareness And their eye in the sky So those are all things and areas we just as they look at us and make decisions about how they want to develop capability We have to look at them and make decisions about How we want to develop capability as well and I I think the same Grand folks who've helped us work our way through this Um still still exist, but I think we have to be with the systems of the future Do more parsing out And have less integration so that we can rapidly bring in technology where we need to particularly in the cyber domain My classmates will know that I am not shy about asking questions admiral. My name is kim kelly I'm with the department of state. I'm in the senior class and we've talked about a lot of these uh concepts You've mentioned the constrained environment platforms new weapon systems As we need to operate more jointly in this contested resource constrained environment One of the topics that's come up repeatedly throughout the last 10 months is that politics can often get in the way And we end up with systems that we don't need or want and I've heard from my military colleagues across the services that oftentimes they get new weapon systems or platforms that are Really being sent out because of politics So what recommends what recommendations do you have for us students as we move into greater leadership positions Regarding managing the politics to develop joint platforms and new weapon systems that will be useful as we move forward I don't know that I want more fighters managing politics That's a premise in that question that I don't know. I agree with I think there's severe oversight and I think Congress has a role to play and they have a right to maintain that role So when I've testified Um There is a constitutional constitutional mandate for congress to maintain a navy The truth of the matter is They will help shape the size of the navy with the budget that they approve I think sometimes it's not trying to get into the politics of it It's helping educate them on what we see as their responsibilities and the impact of their decisions And what it will have on that navy that they are required by the constitution to maintain um And I think when it's laid out and the dialogue is in the appropriate framework I have a role in responsibility And if you want me to be able to continue control the seas Maintain maritime security and project power. This is the capability I need And those are fruitful conversations to have And then then they get to be the elected leaders they they need to be Good morning, admiral My name is steve fabrum with the naval oceanographic office. And I'm glad to hear you talk about mine warfare because that's my background I have a question about uh China china is a complex problem. We talk about what they're doing with the spratly islands in the islands They've talked about what's happening between japan and them and the senkaku's And we also talk about the the nine-dash line whatever it's called today And we also talk about them being strategic partner. I mean Commerce partners because we send a lot of our trade over there Do you see that there's any kind of a trigger that's really going to start an armed conflict with them? um You mean within the next couple of years Strategically down the line. I mean we rely on so much right now for our manufacturing That can we even afford to go to a shooting war with them? now economically no And you guys have probably been dime filled to death During your time here and I remind people dime fills a great acronym, but if you switch the letters around it's actually midlife Which might indicate a crisis so uh We are too entwined economically And then when you look at the economic capacity of countries You look at who has growing gdps Or surplus that they want they have to be able to lend dollars out and they need countries that are good uh recipients that There's a trust there like the mortgage banker that if I give you this money in the end I'm going to get the money back that when we say sure buy our bonds we we we mean it You know 20 30 40 50 years from now that interest rate will hold true Who else has an economy that can absorb? The excess capacity of countries like saudi arabia and china it's us I mean theoretically they could loan to countries like Greece Italy they could But the certainty of that's going to come to fruition at some low interest rate is not there So we are very intertwined when you look at the sheer volume of of trade and Dollars that are that are and yen that's being moved around the world And so that that is a we are an economic symbiotic relationship and that is one where For some of the countries who have a gdp where they can lend For them to do something they would definitely have to be cutting off their nose Despite In other areas one of the things i've been thinking about Where we have not had a probably broader national diet dialogue as strategic deterrence Nuclear weapons are always there, but they're sort of in the background We're well past the time frame where we have folks get under desk and prepare for a nuclear attack And so it's faded into the background consciousness of the american public But china is developing a sea base triad for strategic deterrence And so we owe ourselves coming to an understanding of what that means We've been in this lockstep Uh relationship with russia because we developed nuclear weapons and grew up at the same time when we have treaties So as china develops the sea base triad What does that mean for our relationship? Where does the dialogue need to go and what kinds of understandings do we need to have to me? That's our biggest vulnerability right now because we don't have the same sort of Mature relationship with china on nuclear weapons that we have with russia And you think about it. I mean we're at the world with russia There's a there's a hotline. There's interpreters and all of that's in place to prevent misunderstanding So at some point As china goes down this path. I suspect we're going to have to get to that level of maturity and I think that's probably our biggest immediate vulnerability Admiral good morning, ma'am. Good morning. Amanda suni landrum. I'm part of the idc information dominance core And currently assigned to nga in light of some of our most recent downs in security with information being distributed such as snowden Where do you see information dominance going in the next 10 years? so If you're referring to insider threat But We have insider threats that exist in the physical domain What i'm seeing play out is all of the vulnerabilities we grew up with in the physical domain are coming to Coming to the forefront in the cyber domain. And so there are Processes and procedures that we've used in the physical domain that eventually we're going to have to figure out how to apply to the cyber domain The biggest challenge we have with the cyber domain is the lack of policy and and guidance and On on an international level and it has to be on an international level We we grow up as war fighters very grounded in the geographic thinking about boundaries that we can Influence at the tactical and the operational level This is is a domain that decouplized geography from tactical and operational effects But the same thing then is true when you're looking at trying to get to solution sets You know you may want to go after an adversary, but the the route of success may take you through Somebody else's commercial satellite owned by a private company in another country And servers that are in completely different countries. That's what estonia found out And so we have got to get to international agreement and norms on what it means to Work operate and innovate in this space And so I think the leadership responsibility is to help push that to the forefront The other issues there are There are answers that we can apply from the physical domain to that domain What we owe ourselves is the good thinking of as this domain matures There's still some of the same vulnerabilities we see in the physical domain haven't yet shown up in This domain, but they're coming and so we have time to think about it and say what will our response bill Response bill be or what should capability should we be developing? But it is a challenge. I I refer to this domain as um the wild wild west and And you know, there really is no white irp right now I mean, that's one of our challenges and I was on a panel A few weeks ago with Chris monday of of microsoft and in terms of of being exploited He he phrased it this way. There's there's There's just two types of companies in the world those that have been hacked And those that don't know they've been hacked And Okay, if expert talks you probably ought to listen Uh, and then that just means we have to we have to double down and apply ourselves in this domain and get smarter Yeah I do Founded Um, I happen to be chairing the cyber task force here for the foundation So we're very pleased to hear you address front and center the importance of cyber You mentioned the absence of policy and clearly that is an issue Not just within department of defense, but more broadly within our national security You also mentioned in your uh presentation simulation We're here at the naval war college, which is the home of navy strategic thought We also have fantastic academic resources But war gaming simulation expertise going back to the early part of the century What is the vision That you and the cno and the top navy leadership have for this institution In cyber security policy and the use of these very differentiated and scarce resources and simulation So first For simulation, this is a joint answer because right now anything we do in this domain Beyond defense is not just a joint answer. It's a it's an interagency answer And so we're going down the path dod is to the development of cyber ranges And and we do need cyber ranges. We need enclaves where people can practice their trade craft um I heard the superintendent at an aplas talk yesterday the They just uh this past year took the cyber Exercise defense cup and the way he got there is they created a small enclave within an aplas Where the shipment could go practice their actual network skills In a safe environment, so we're going to end up going down the same path that just as you have a physical training range We're going to need cyber training ranges The good news is it's an environment where people don't necessarily have to travel to be able to use the training range But we're going to have to develop those Uh, and I appreciate the reminder that the war college as well as nps have a lot of expertise in this area And gardener will tell you along with ron route. I have not been Afraid to tap into that expertise To help us move forward as war fighters in this domain And so let me in with that no matter what domain we grew up with Whether it was under sea on the surface or in the air In the future as war fighters, those are the domains we'll operate in And potentially the domains will fight in All cyber is is another domain that we have to be aware of As we operate in the physical domain, we'll be fighting in that domain simultaneously And so it's made us into fourth dimensional war fighters We have to recognize that and be prepared to do both at the same time So thank you for that question