 London and the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy in Washington DC, I'd like to express sincere gratitude to exceptional panelists from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea and our distinguished audience from various nations for sharing valuable time insights and caring to discuss about regional stability. I am Hyun Kim, President and CEO of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and my partner Professor Greg Kennedy, Director of the Corbett Center at King's College London will join us soon. Today is very meaningful for both organizations because it is our first collaborative symposium after we signed MOU early this year to work together to focus on strategic policy solutions in the defense and security in the Asia Pacific region. CAPS and Corbett Center have a lot in common that we both focus to provide practical and strategic policy recommendations to governments and we value alliance and coalition partnerships in the Asia Pacific region. Today we discussed about three topics general security concern trade and maritime security in the Asia Pacific under the theme global maritime Britain and the Republic of Korea as Asia Pacific partners. Each topic will be presented from Korean panelists and the UK panelists and it is such great timing that we discuss these topics right after the Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the President Moon Jae-in had a bilateral talk at the UN General Assembly three days ago here in the United States. Two leaders had an agreement on the strong relationship between the UK and Republic of Korea distinctly in trade and defense as exemplified by the recent visit of the UK's carrier strike group to South Korea. I believe our six panelists from both nations will provide us with each nation's first-hand perspective and insight on the current situation and the future partnership prospect. Now let us move to our tremendous panel member introduce I'm sorry let us move to our tremendous experts discussion. So I'd like to introduce our panel members for the first topic regional security concerns in the Asia Pacific. Dr. Shin, he is now a director of Center for Foreign Affairs and Security at Korea Research Institute for National Security Strategy. Previously he served as director general for policy planning at MOFA which is a two-star general equivalent and also he served as policy advisor to minister of rock defense ministry and he is one of the respected and famous leading opinion leaders in Korea. So thank you for participating in our symposium today. And next our UK panelist is Dr. Ramon Vacheco-Pardo. He is head of the department of European and international studies at King's College London and he has participated in track 1.5 and 2 dialogues with South Korea, North Korea, China and Japan. And Professor Vacheco-Pardo has testified before the European Parliament and a device the OECD, the European External Action Service and the South Korean MOFA and the UK's Cabinet and Foreign and Commonwealth offices. He is a frequent media commentator on Northeast Asian affairs and EU East Asia relations. Now shall we start the presentation? Maybe start with Dr. Shin Bum-chur over to you sir. Thank you Dr. Kim for your kind introduction. Thank you Admiral Kim and Professor Ahn and my colleagues, friends of UK. It is great honor to make a presentation this afternoon, probably in early in the morning UK. My chosen topic is the security perspective in Asia in the Pacific. I will focus on China and North Korea. As you know that there are many issues caused by Chinese offensive diplomacy these days, so three of them are most unique. One is the Taiwan Strait, second is the South China Sea and third one is North Korea related issue. As we all know that China as it becomes a big economic power, its foreign policy is more offensive and unilateral. In particular, countries like South Korea, China is our just neighbor, so we have a great affection in many ways, not only political but also diplomacy and most importantly economically. So South Korea's position is very unique. Traditionally, we are very careful when Korean government made a comment on China particular as after experience of third economy retaliation in 2016, South Korea has kind of a tendency that not speak against on China's position. That is a kind of bad practice in South Korea's diplomacy. On the other hand, because of this government practice, the anti-China sentiment in Korean people has grown, so more than 74% of Korean people has some degree of anti-Chinese sentiment. That's another aspect. Anyway, if I return to the security issue, we have three major issues as I mentioned, Taiwan issue, Taiwan strait. China made a more offensive behavior, not only diplomacy but also military. So China does many military drills with regard to Taiwan strait and the U.S. position is to support Taiwan, but as we know that Biden administration's position is not only U.S., but also other allies and partner work together to stop Chinese offensive behavior in Taiwan strait. So United States ask support from Korean government. Traditionally, as I told you that South Korea's position is very neutral on this issue. However, last May, May 21, President Moon Jae-in visited the United States and the summit, and the joint agreement of the summit was very great when it comes to a rugged alliance. For the first time, Korean government mentioned the Taiwan strait. It's an important issue. No, before May, South Korean government just avoided any comment on Taiwan strait. So that was kind of dissatisfaction of the U.S. government when it comes to South Korea's position on China. However, after May, South Korean government made a comment on the Taiwan strait. Although we made such kind of wonderful decoration, but real practice is not concrete and detailed. After the summit, South Korea started to avoid the issue of the Taiwan strait. So last week, September 15, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited South Korea at the time. We do not have any comment on the Taiwan strait. It's kind of another change of position. However, anyway, there are U.S. expectation on South Korean role as egregious. However, South Korea is not still ready. Yesterday, our foreign minister, Jung E-young, made a comment at New York. The President Moon visited New York for 76 General Assembly of the United Nations. And then there is an invitation discussion from CFR Council on Foreign Relations. The foreign minister Jung E-young visited that and made a comment just like that. China is a big country. It has grown up. So it has a certain right to behave offensive. It is quite a surprise. I know today's major newspaper in South Korea criticized Foreign Minister Jung E-young's position. It should not be a South Korean government position. It may be a Chinese government position. But in New York, United States, South Korean foreign minister made such a bad comment. I believe that this is because of North Korean issue. I will explain later, but this kind of flip-flop of South Korea's position. So it is very hard to get strong support from United States on China issue. South China Sea issue is almost the same. South Korean government traditionally made some comment of freedom of navigation and respect of rule of law in South China Sea. That is a usual one. But South Korea would not behave, go beyond, made such kind of a comment. United States probably suggests a joint petrol on South China Sea. But unfortunately, South Korean government did not participate in any kind of joint petrol in South China Sea. We selectively participate in joint military drill, not directly pointing to China. But anyways, a certain small level of joint military drill we have joined. Maybe the Admiral Kim will explain that. So this year, we have a joint military drill at Australia and Alaska, I believe. But South Korea is still very careful on doing that. Last one is North Korean issue. It is very tricky and very interesting. Although North Korea fired its cruise missile, it's tested its cruise missile and ballistic missile last week, yesterday, the day before yesterday. President Moon Jae-in made a speech that it still continued to seek end-of-war declaration among four partners, North Korea, South Korea, China and United States. North Korea would not respond to this kind of a declaration since 2018. And China would probably support this kind of a declaration. Because if the declaration is made, China would probably say the United Nations command, which was established in 1950, after the Korean War breakout, the UN Security Resolution 84 provides such a legitimacy to establish such kind of command. But the command itself is limited to defeat North Korea's aggression and restore the peace. So if the declaration is made, China would say that the UNC must dismantle. And then if the UNC is dismantled, there is less legitimacy on the USFK, United States forces in Korea. So that's the China's strategy. But South Korea tried not to focus on the issue, but instead focusing on the peace process. The United States position is totally different, although the spokesman of the US Pentagon spokesman mentioned this issue yesterday that US is open to discuss about this declaration. However, US position is clear. The declaration is just a political one, not a legal one. And then the declaration should not tackle on the existence of the United Nations command and USFK. So although South Korea raised the issue of end of war declaration, however, the position of each participant is totally different. So it's not easy one. The Korean Peninsula at this moment, North Korea tried to seek to recognize as a defect on nuclear power. So it would not return to the negotiation table. But the Moon Jae-in administration still to seek peace process and wanted to have a summit probably at the Beijing Winter Olympics, February next year. February next year is just before the presidential election of South Korea. Probably time is already up. Okay, I will be very short. So the Moon administration tried to seek a new dialogue with North Korea. It tried to persuade China and the United States probably come to Beijing to make such an end of world declaration. That's a present Moon strategy at this moment. However, it is risky, I think, because at this moment North Korea would not show its interest of denuclearization. So if South Korea stick too much on the restart of negotiation, it might lose its strategic position. This is a current situation in the Indo-Pacific. I focused on China issue and North Korea issue. But if you raise another question, I'll respond to that. Thank you for your listening. Thank you, Dr. Shin. He explained us a really comprehensive focus that Korea government and is focusing on. And we'll take the questions after we hear from Dr. Ronon Pacheco-Pardo. Thank you. Thank you very much for the invitation to join this panel. I'm very grateful to be here. And as you say, it's a very good timing considering the meeting that we had in New York just a couple of days ago. Of course, there have been other developments. We had AUKUS being announced a few days ago as well, the EU launching its Indo-Pacific strategy. So what I want to focus on during my presentation is on the regional security concerns in the region, in the Asia-Pacific region as per the title of the session. But also where does Europe stand in terms of cooperation, potential cooperation with Korea in these issue areas? And this includes, of course, the UK, but also includes France, potentially Germany as well, potentially the US as well, because I think when it comes to the strategic interests of European countries and institutions in the Asia-Pacific and concerns and potential cooperation with Korea, there are many similarities among them. I just spent six weeks in Korea actually discussing these matters precisely, cooperation between the two sides. So what I'm going to be talking about deals quite a bit on discussions that we had with Cheongwadae, the Minister of National Defence, MoFA, but also with discussions on the European side as much as my own analysis. So first of all, I think top of the agenda, and I think Dr. Shin mentioned this, is, of course, China's behavior. However, where you want to characterize it, it is very clear that for Korea, for other Asian countries, or for European countries, China is seen as more threatening today than it was five, 10 years ago or even two years ago. So there's this belief that China has become more assertive and we have to respond to this. I think it's quite obvious that the position of the Korean government has hardened in recent months. The joint statement between President Moon and President Biden very clearly pointed out in the direction of hardening of views. Some conservative friends in Korea were telling me, this is a statement that a Korean conservative president could have signed when it comes to China. I mentioned the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, of course, then Korea came to the G7 meeting that actually took place in Cornwall in the UK and it signed the open societies statement that very clearly was targeting China as well as much as Russia. And they're having discussions between Korea and British officials, French officials, EU officials as well on how to deal with China's rights. And I think that three areas in which we can see that are of concern in the Asia Pacific region where we can see potentially more cooperation with the UK and other European partners. The first of them is maritime security very clearly. I think from a European perspective, South Korea's participation in joint exercises, the port calls that are taking place in Busan in the future, in Incheon probably as well with the UK aircraft carrier and the German ship going to the region respectively. The fact that Korea is developing an aircraft carrier by itself, these are all welcome developments from a European perspective. I think there is a realization that of course the major power continues to be the US, but the US is trying to build this set of alliances with different partners in the region and you see European navies working together with the US, you have of course the Quad, you have Korea as I mentioned as well. So you have this set of alliances, partnerships, maybe led by the US, but with the participation of many different countries and this is the area in which I think the European side sees a huge potential for cooperation with the Korean side. If we look at the EU itself, for example, there is cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and we have 4 and we have participation cooperation, formal cooperation actually with Korea. The only Asian country that actually has permanent formal cooperation with the EU in this area and I think when it comes to the UK we will see more cooperation moving forward. The second area is cyber security, of course from a European perspective and from a Korean perspective, this is not only about China, it's also about North Korea, it's also about Russia and they are perceived as being equally threatening and in the case of Korea has received cyber attacks from the three of them, even in most of them seem to come from North Korea, same form from the European side, most attacks coming into Europe may come from Russia, but we have also received attacks from China and from North Korea. So there is a cooperation here, there is the discussions here about how to strengthen a cooperation, for example the South Korean government has recently taken more seriously the cyber security threat. You see this in the Ministry of National Defense as well as as well as MOFA and on the European side there is a thirst for cooperation, how to improve cyber defense capabilities, for example in cooperation with other countries and in the case of Asia the partners are really Korea and Japan when it comes to cyber above anyone else. So you see how this can happen between militaries but also between police forces, government officials you see these discussions taking place, so for example Europol and different European police forces are deepening links with South Korean police forces to deal with cyber crimes and sometimes the boundaries between cyber crimes coming from individuals and states in the case of China, North Korea and Russia, pretty much there aren't any boundaries in many cases. So these are two areas in which they arrive for cooperation between the Korean side and European partners including the UK and there is one last area that has come to the fore as a result of recent developments in Afghanistan which is conflict management. I think both European allies and partners of the US and Korea and other Asian partners were surprised at the way they withdraw from Afghanistan to place the US withdrawal from Afghanistan to place and I think this is quite interesting in terms of potential cooperation between Korea and the UK and other European countries or the US as well because the discussions about conflict management in third countries have been very formal up to now. There were more of expressions of an interesting cooperation between like-minded partners but what I find very interesting is that since we're doing Afghanistan there has been an acceleration in discussions about how there could be cooperation in a way that could lead to stronger capabilities being deployed by so-called like-minded partners and reducing reliance on the US, not excluding the US of course, no one is talking about it, but reducing reliance on the US because the US has its own security interests and sometimes they might not be fully aligned with the security interests of Korea, of European countries in these third countries. So as a result of this we might see more cooperation taking place and of course the Asia Pacific region is one in which there are different conflicts and conflict management might take place between the Korean side and European partners especially if we broaden the region instead of referring to the Asia Pacific only we broaden it today in the Pacific. So this is the first part of my presentation that I wanted to focus on the potential for cooperation as a result of regional security concerns in the region and the greater interest of the UK and other European countries in getting more and more in dealing with the security issues. Now for the second part I wanted to focus on the North Korean issue which it is fair to say is not as important for the European side including the UK as it was in the past. So you saw much more involvement from European countries in dealing with North Korea in the early 2000s even in the early 2010s but what you have seen in London, Paris and Brussels different European capitals is the realization that the role that Europe can play is secondary and can only become more important if there is an agreement between North Korea and the US that makes North Korea move towards the nuclearization. I think no one thinks that fully nuclearization is possible but it could be an agreement as there has been in the past which North Korea agrees to the nuclearization or maybe we settle for an arms control deal as an internal step towards potential denuclearization and here is where the European side could actually play a role and of course this is one of the key security interests of course for any South Korean president the current one but whoever is elected next year will have to continue to focus on North Korea of course. So what will we see is on the European side three areas in which if there is an agreement between North Korea and the US with the word denuclearization somewhere in the agreement through roles that the European side could play. First of all countries such as the UK itself, France as well, Sweden for example too, they have expertise in the technical aspects of denuclearization right the dismantlement for example of nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, even nuclear weapons, the safe transportation and storage of these materials. So from a very technical point of view if there is an agreement with North Korea agrees to dismantle some of its nuclear facilities or even nuclear weapons right there could be a role for different European experts from different European countries to play and we have seen for example the involvement of British experts when Gaddafi agreed to give up the weapons of mass destruction, Libyan weapons of mass destruction back in the 2000s so clearly there is a role that the UK and other countries from Europe can actually play. Secondly as we have seen with the nuclear deal with Iran there is the potential threat that if there is an agreement between the US and North Korea one of the two parties might decide to defect from the agreement in the in the case of GCPOA it was the US under the Trump administration that decided to withdraw from the agreement if there is an agreement between the US and North Korea it could be the North Korean side for example that decides to withdraw from the agreement. Now from a European perspective and if we look at GCPOA this is a UK France Germany plus the European Union that play a role one of the advantages of having a process that is not necessarily multilateralized but in which different partners sign or support the agreement is that the agreement can be maintained while negotiations take place for the party that has left the agreement to come back and we see this very clearly with Iran the only reason really why GCPOA survived is because the UK France Germany and the EU actually push for the agreement to remain in place in the hope that the new US administration would come to office and would decide to potentially rejoin the agreement and this is precisely what we have seen with the Biden administration which is now negotiating the potential for the agreement to resume the GCPOA agreement so from a European perspective I'm taking into consideration that originally Iran and North Korea are very different in terms of where they are in the development of the nuclear programs but from a European perspective it might make sense if there is an agreement between the US and North Korea for different parties to support the agreement in the hope that if one of the two parties decides to leave the agreement that this can be maintained for a period of time and then the other party can the this party can review the agreement and thirdly also from a European perspective of course the North Korean nuclear which is not only about North Korea or the Korean Peninsula there is the risk of proliferation from North Korea to the Middle East we know that North Korea in the past has sold nuclear technology has sent nuclear scientists to countries in the Middle East and even North Africa as well so countries such as Iran, Libya, Egypt in the past as well, Syria all these countries have benefited from North Korean nuclear know-how and nuclear transfers from North Korea and this is a direct threat to the European continent right and what happens for example if some of this nuclear technology falls in the hands of terrorist groups this is a real threat that we have been discussing in a European context right what happens if some of these this nuclear materials for example are used for a dirty bomb that explodes in a European capital these are actual discussions taking place between security services police forces across across Europe so from a European perspective any deal involving North Korea with the word in nuclearization should have a strong safeguards to prevent proliferation from North Korea to the Middle East and here's another play and another in which the European countries UK France Germany the EU itself other European countries would try to play a role in preventing making sure that this proliferation doesn't happen that North Korea actually stops its proliferation activities of course in cooperation with other partners in cooperation with South Korea with the US with Japan as well but trying to prevent this from happening I don't want to go over my time so I will leave it there for my next presentation and I look forward to the Q&A thank you very much thank you very much that was that was really really helpful for me to for people I think people to understand a little different but similar but different perspective in terms of the concerns and and focus that focuses that you think what the security threat maybe potential threat are so I think we'll save the Q&A session to or towards the end because your this topic is a very comprehensive we could actually match this and then combine this without with other topics we're gonna listen in so this time if you allow me to introduce to go back go next to next to the topic second topic so I'd like to introduce our panelists for the second topic on the CPTPP it is too long too long word um comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-pacific partnerships so we would like to hear from this time maybe we'll go with the UK panelists first and then Korean panelists so we have I'm delighted to introduce our UK panelists he is Dr David Hennig he is director of UK trade policy project at European Center for international political economy and a leading expert on the development of UK trade policy post-Brexit in 2017 he co-founded the UK trade forum which brings together UK trade policy experts to debate and analyze these issues also he was heavily engaged on TTIP throughout the three and a half year of negotiations working with both sets of negotiators to develop ways forward particularly on regulatory coherent TBT and sustainable development and next our Korean panelist is Professor Andeok Geun he is dean of international affairs at Seoul National University and he is also professor of international trade law and policy at graduate school of international studies and he is director for international commerce and strategy professor An has been key advisor to rock government for a long time still now still he does on the trade and international economic issues and he he has been chair for CPTPP strategic forum and he also taught at WTO regional trade policy course at the World Trade Organization for eight years and he has lots of awards and publication I can now introduce here it's going to take so much time so I will pass that on the stage to Mr David Hennig over to you Yes thank you for the introduction and please note this is not my normal office set up though it is very pleasant where where I am CPTPP has become dramatically newsworthy in the last week China applied to join last week and yesterday Taiwan submitted an application the UK had previously submitted an application earlier in the year and it's starting to go through an accession process and this is really creating a lot of complexity and what I want to talk about is the CPTPP as a trade agreement the UK in the way we are approaching it but also the way in which we might approach it and how the UK and Korea may wish to work together on trade as part of a broader partnership now I should say at the outset that it isn't clear yet that the UK's trade and foreign policy after leaving the EU is fully mature I would say it isn't in fact we're still thinking very carefully or in many instances about exactly how to balance our new freedoms on on trade policy our own neighborhood in Europe traditional alliances in North America and the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy in that sense I don't think we are unique in trying to balance all of those areas and obviously it's also complicated to be considering the the rise of China and how our economic interaction is with China China is not our major trading partner the EU remains our major trading partner we do around 50 percent of trade with Europe followed by North America at around 15 to 20 percent nonetheless these are big and important questions and clearly there is a sense of a strategy around the phrase global Britain the UK does want to show or the UK government wants to show that we are an increasing force around the world after leaving the the EU but it's not clear how that will work out and consideration of China is a good lead into thinking about the CBTB or the Trans-Pacific Partnership as it started and I think that this has been two different kinds of trade agreements in it or three perhaps in its history and I think it's important to recognize that we're still not sure which it is the first was an exercise in regional integration led by New Zealand and Singapore primarily and started as a small group of countries wanting to deepen their own integration and that that's the origins in the late 2000s were on that then the US showed an interest as did a number of other countries and we it became a 12 country negotiation which with the US at the same time negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership that I was involved in was very much seen as a China containment measure so the idea was that the US would form strong economic ties with both Europe and the Asia the Asia Pacific through the two trade agreements that they would be different in nature but essentially they would help for the US and friends and allies to set the standards and regulations of the future clearly that didn't happen the US with TPP became controversial in the US and it was an election topic in the 2016 presidential election even after the text had been finalized and the US had signed and then the t-tip failed to had not quite progressed so far that was a deeper agreement and and essentially stalled after the election of President Trump after the election of President Trump he also pulled out of TPP at which point it was recast as the comprehensive and progressive agreement and it became more like the economic integration that had originally been between the 11 countries of the of the CPTPP of whom only of which only seven have so far ratified nonetheless with such an economic agreement that is of great interest to countries in the region and countries around the world it's certainly of interest to the UK looking around for what we may do after Brexit obviously it has also been of interest to countries in the region now the CPTPP is not a particularly high standard trade agreement as is often stated the it does have provisions in the areas such as state-owned enterprises environment and labor but these are not particularly onerous some have suggested that China would struggle to meet the criteria others however on seeing it think that that would not be so much of a problem and Vietnam has already joined has certain easements on the provisions and certainly there is every reason for China to believe that they could join and this would be part of China's economic integration and similarly we have of course seen in the last year the signing of the regional comprehensive economic partnership involving ASEAN countries and also East Asian countries China and Korea and Japan plus New Zealand and Australia and so we see a move towards economic integration but there is also a China element and for the UK there are again two elements there is an element which is the economic benefit is not significant we have trade agreements with most of the countries concerned as indeed we do already with Korea and the extra economic benefit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is quite limited less than 0.1% of GDP in terms of growth but the opportunity to work potentially to deepen relations with like-minded countries and many of the most like-minded countries globally for the UK are in the CPTPP and I'm here where we're thinking I would be thinking about New Zealand I'd be thinking about Singapore Chile perhaps Australia perhaps a little less Japan certainly and in that sense I would also want to add in Korea and say okay this is a potentially a interesting club of like-minded countries who could come together and help to if you like influence the larger powers in global trade such as China the EU and the US but this now becomes more complicated with China seeking to join and I think the worry and I think what has overtaken us in the last week is that whereas previously I would have said the CPTPP is a very good idea for the UK it will help us to strengthen the idea that we can use trade agreements as a foundation of our alliances with like-minded countries that we can replace perhaps in quite the same way the some of the political aspects of the EU with close relations with CPTPP countries and in the hope that Korea would see the possibility of joining this now becomes much more complex I am no longer sure and I think that we have to think very deeply now about whether CPTPP really can be that basis for the UK's Indo-Pacific strategy it has been very fast moving I am not sure how the CPTPP member countries will consider the new accession countries I think it is very difficult for them there is not a separate full-time CPTPP secretariat is lodged within the New Zealand government I do not envy their job in having to think now what they do about handling the accession processes of the different countries involved it could indeed be tricky for the UK I will leave it at this point I won't with apologies be able to stay for the entire of this fascinating discussion but I will be obviously listening with great interest to what Professor Ahn has to say as well on this subject thank you very much thank you very much Mr. Hanig thank you for your time and I actually like your background so much it gives the feeling of UK like it so yes so I think we will we will go go to Professor Ahn's presentation okay thank you very much thank you David it was an excellent point for CPTPP actually at the beginning of the negotiation Korea had a big challenge about whether to join this negotiation we were actually invited by US government to join this negotiation but the Korean government decided not to join CPTPP at that time mainly because of two reasons the first one was China Korea FTA at the time as you mentioned the President Obama described the TPP as basically economic weapon economic entrapment of China with this the strategic alliance of like-minded countries because of this description the China made it clear to Korea that you should join either Korea China FTA or TPP at that point in time Korea had to join had to choose China Korea FTA because China becomes a larger and larger market for Korean industry sector plus the the second reason was we actually had huge political difficulty to rectify Korea US FTA negotiations it took a long time to conclude Korea US FTA but much longer time was required to rectify the chorus FTA as you may know because of the political controversy in the United States as well as in Korea we had a really hard time especially in Korea the the new government at the time the President Lee Myung-bak government did kind of the mistake to handle the the beef trade issue he casually thought that he could give this beef market to expedite the ratification of Korea US FTA but that decision basically inflamed the whole the Korean general public so at the time the government almost kicked out of the office and we had huge demonstration in the middle of the downtown in Seoul for almost a couple of months and then when we had this chance to join TPP the Korean government basically thought that well we just went through difficult political procedure to rectify FTA with the United States and then not again no more so that was basically main reason and then another difficult challenge was how to arrange FTA with Japan that was a big challenge for us so with this issue Korea at the time did not join the TPP negotiation but that actually costed us a huge loss because the KORUS FTA probably that was kind of the the last and the culmination of kind of the old-fashioned FTA arrangement but completely new version of modern style of the began with TPP Korea basically lost the chance to join this TPP style modern economic arrangement so that was a big big challenge now everyone tried to join TPP as they explained China even Taiwan actually Taiwan was very very eager to join TPP from a long time ago in this part of the world when we had our same negotiation and TPP negotiations were in progress the Taiwanese government actually tried to join TPP they politically tried to provoke major FTA negotiation but they knew that because of the Chinese opposition the chance to join our set is really really slim so their final calculation was by provoking this two FTA negotiations they had kind of the agreement with China and then they tried to join actually TPP negotiation by sacrificing the RCEP opportunity now a whole situation has been completely changed the Korean government actually showed and clarified the intention to join CPTP early this year President Moon Jae-in made it clear that we had a strong intention to join CPTP although we did not make the former accession application yet but now in Korean side our situation has been dramatically changed we signed the RCEP negotiation and for RCEP China ratified it even Japan ratified RCEP and probably early next year the Korean government will also ratify our same negotiation that means between Korea and Japan one of the most controversial economic relationship we had may be the formerly concluded under the auspice of RCEP negotiation it becomes the first ever the former FTA arrangement between Korea and Japan at the current stage we the Japan actually made a lot of the exception against the Korea against China so bilaterally speaking between Korea and Japan the China versus Japan the FTA arrangement doesn't mean much under RCEP so we actually need the further economic cooperation probably with the CPTP CPTP is completely different for us we are actually substantially prepared as the president Kim mentioned I actually worked as the chair for TPP strategic forum since 2015 so Korean government actually prepared for a long time to join this initiative if necessary but still we have a lot of challenges for example in terms of market access on its appearance it looks very easy game because we already have the FTA with most of the the TPP partners CPTP partners only except for Japan and Mexico but the problem is for Japan for example Japan has no industrial terror Japan is one of the most open country open developed country when they had the trade controversy with the United States during the 1980s and 1990s basically it dismantled most of the the trade barriers already so it's completely the free countries it has relatively high agricultural terror but nothing for industrial terror that means for us when we have a particular Japan it was almost a unilateral liberalization against Japan also with other countries in New Zealand Australia Vietnam and those ascent countries we already have FTA but we actually left out most politically controversial agricultural theft there it was very difficult to leave one exceptions when we joined CPTPP we have to open that sector so for us basically we left out all the difficult challenges and we have to now open this so from the the minister of trades point of view in Korea this is really really difficult situation in terms of the rule for CPTPP we still have a lot of challenge for state-owned enterprise digital trade and center five to century and kind of value issues so the the state-owned enterprise issue I don't think that China can actually finish the accession negotiation in any foreseeable future it is one thing for them for China to apply for a session to CPTPP but probably it would be completely different story when they can actually complete the session negotiations here China is not allowed to negotiate the terms and conditions for CPTPP it is just a matter of whether they can take it or completely absorb the as given in the current CPTPP but the SOE chapter alone can raise huge huge issue also the digital trade chapter e-commerce chapter the China still block the the facebook and google but then they have to allow the the data fee flow and then they have to dismantle the server localization that kind of thing will raise really really difficult the the policy issue for Chinese government so those are still the issue probably they have to think about and we the Korea also is the struggling to complete but but in any case well basically the CPTPP is the is the direction we are heading for Korea is actually preparing for this this direction because actually we know that this is not the ultimate call maybe not under the the first the term of the president Biden but in case Biden's administration will come back to this Asia Pacific region and then try to propose the Biden version of the TPP not the CPTPP then I don't think that the Korea can lose that chance we have to join that opportunity then we probably at that point in time probably the arrangement the trade rule the trade order will be based on we believe not just on the CPTPP but probably based on the US NCA which is much higher level of the economic the the cooperation or even the solidarity so the in in that regard as David alluded the Korean UK I hope work together to to establish the industry infrastructure and the the economic the environment especially to deal with the digital transformation and the democratic the technology alliance that becomes really hot topic for the EU UK and many leading country nowadays probably I should I should stop here thank you very much thank you professor on this this was really really interesting and really fun discussion and before we let Mr. Hanek go we will be very very missed but we're going to have a Q&A session in the end and we have our professor Kennedy here and I think maybe we can have another in person session on this not not only CPTPP but this economic cooperation aspect I wish we could have in-person meeting maybe next year anytime that we can travel with this whole same panelists if you are scheduled out later it'll be really going anywhere anytime soon will it I mean I think we'll I think it's a very solid thread for CAPS and the Corbett Center to continue to stay on top of because as both the speakers have alluded to there's there's a lot of ground yet to be covered and there's a long way to go in both the journey so I think I think you're exactly right here and we'll end up we'll end up back again hopefully in in face to face yes yes that would be great so whether you want to do in UK or Seoul or or in Washington DC it's up to your preference we have all the options and I'll be Mr. Honek do you have any last word before you take off yes my apologies that I do have to to to to leave the the call it's very interesting from Korean point of view as well and I think that what that tells me really is that there is scope here for the UK with Korea and with others to develop deeper trade dialogues and I think not just government to government but I think at this level as well with academics and experts and practitioners and I think that we do need to develop these deeper dialogues to understand the direction of global trade and how we can work together CPTPP may be the excuse to do that it may not be the final result of it and I think we should be careful to distinguish those maybe and that is what the last week has taught us is that maybe don't rely on CPTPP as the venue for our future discussions between the UK and Korea thank you and my apologies for having to thank you very much thank you very much David really appreciate that and taking the time to help us to be able to raise the awareness here in the UK because I think you know as as you've indicated the need for UK elements to be more aware of Korea as opposed to the traditional kind of views of Japan and Australia and China I think are going to be important so thank you very much much appreciated okay thank you so shall we move to the our third final topic it is about the impact and influence of UK carrier strike group for the strategic relations between the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom it is a really exciting topic I think that there are many news coverage in Korea after the visit and there was also MND the Ministry of National Defense International Division chief he actually very in detail explained how great experience that that was today we have our panelists from Korea Rear Admiral Kim Jin-young who graduated of the Rock Naval Academy in 1982 and actually he graduated from variety of institutions such as OBC at U.S. Army Chemical School and Rock Naval War College and U.S. Naval War College and he is a significant Navy assignments that are sure includes as an aid to the Minister of National Defense and as a chief of protocol officer to the CNO he also served as the naval attache to the embassy of the Republic of Korea in the U.S. for about three years and as a flag officer Rear Admiral Kim served as a secretary of national crisis management in Blue House which is the office of president afterwards he served as a commander at the first fleet of Rock Navy and director of strategic planning J5 at Rock Joint Chief of Staff and his final assignment was commander in Navy logistics command thank you for joining us and our our UK speaker is our Captain Kevin Fleming from Royal Navy who retired he is a former links helicopter pilot in command of Murray Time Link's training squadron at the UK and also at the UK Defense Academy he was director of the Royal Navy Division and also he served as the UK defense attache to Brazil and he is now an international engagement consultant engaged in various regions of the world currently he is engaged in South and South Southeast Asia focused on developing blue economies by enhancing their Murray Time Domain awareness also he is a senior research fellow with the Corbett Center shall we shall we move to Rear Admiral Kim Jin Hyung's presentation sir thank you very much very wonderful introduction me so nice to meet you everyone so it is great honor to joining this seminar and today's main many part of today's presentation is a little bit overlap but I would like to talk with the first one is the United Kingdom's King Elizabeth aircraft carrier strike groups visit Korea and China's Murray Time Strategy Korea's strategic of choice and conclusion so especially I would like to thank the Chairperson Eunhee Kim and Kings College for hosting this event first one British carrier strike group visit Korea this year in August British newest aircraft carrier the Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group came to Korea it consists of eight warships destroyers frigates ship ships and submarines even during the Korean war the United Kingdom send a large number of troops and worship to help defense Korea's freedom and democracy the United Kingdom dispatches the second company unit after the United States and diplomatic effort was made to cooperate with the establishment of the United Nations forces including the commonwealth countries on June 27 1950 the United Kingdom expressed support for the UN Security Council proposal on military aid to South Korea and the next day decide to send a ship from the far east fleet station in Hong Kong accordingly the Royal Navy dispatch a fleet of eight warships on June 29 including one light aircraft carrier two cruisers three destroyers and three frigate it was about the same size as the carrier strike group that came to Korea this time afterward the light carrier invisible in 1992 and the light carrier is illustrated in 1997 which is still Korea however this is the first time that has conducted during the exercise with the South Korean Navy the aircraft carrier Elizabeth had a public event in the water of Busan before the exercise inviting key South Korean official then until September 1st they conducted naval maneuver and tactical training with the South Korean Navy in the east sea for two days captain James Blackmore commander of the carrier wing who met with the reporters about King Elizabeth on same time said about the reason for the training in the east sea of the Korean peninsula it is most important for the British Navy to conduct operation on the global stage so the South China Sea like any other sea must be free to sail and train for the British Navy with these allies and friendly country he said at the end of May the King Elizabeth carrier strike group which left the United Kingdom and tour the Indo-Pacific region conducted joint exercise with the United States carrier strike group in the east and south China Sea and trained with many countries British defense secretary Ben Wallace referring to the development of King Elizabeth you know meeting with defense minister Seoul in July he said this will be a largest naval and air force deployment from the picture mainland in 30 years we plan to deploy two warships at all times in this area he explained the war is the China's military expansion finance maritime strategy changing from coastal defense in the early day of the establishment of the military to aggressive maritime strategy with national gloves since the immigration of Xi Jinping has promote the construction of a naval power through the one belt one load policy and the power necklace strategy to secure maritime traffic route and base ports thereby securing overseas military base to secure maritime traffic route and expanding national power China has to challenge the United States multi-dominance capability in the western Pacific with this powerful a2 ad strategy which include modernized naval and air forces long range of tank missile and space and cyber electronic warfare technologies however the chinese navy is now going beyond the a2 ad strategy to deter the United States Navy for conducting bilateral or multilateral joint level exercise with the naval forces of allies and partner countries in the region the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait now China carrier battle group and expeditionary strike group are being developed for similar maritime control operations currently following the Liaoning and Sangdong carrier carrier number three which will be equipped with caterpillar type a government landing aircraft is under construction and the type 075 large amphibious assault ship Hainan has been deployed to the southern southern threat commands in the near future the Chinese Navy is expect to sending carrier battle group similar to the United States Navy CSG and ESG to the Indo-Pacific ocean after all this means that Chinese Navy is changing to an offensive military strategy rather than defensive military strategy that was limited only to the a2 ad strategy in the past therefore China's maritime hegemony strategy to expand this international political influence in the in the Pacific is a realistic threat to most of the country in East Asia however the prevailing opinion is that it is still insufficient to deter the United States maritime power and one example according to reports such as the British daily express in our the British carrier frigate Kent and Richmond attracted on discover two Chinese 7000-pound shang plus nuclear powered submarine persona the Chinese submarine were caught while following the British carrier group China is North Korea's traditional sponsor it doesn't play a special role Chinese is North Korea the nuclearization issue China wants to use North Korea to draw US forces from Korea and completely remove US influence from Korean Peninsula ultimately China wants to include the Korean Peninsula within its sphere of influence China overtly exerts its influence over Korea and is acting close in 2016 while China was monitoring South Korea in detail with its radar it even took economic retaliation against South Korea deployed that us fkz the relation that China traditionally demand of Korea is not mutual equality between countries in April 2017 there was a summit between president Trump and president Xi Jinping at this time president Xi Jinping said Korea actually used to be a part of China it shows the true heart of China China has been make making free country request for repair of Korean Navy and maritime palace petrol vessel that have been operating in the high sea of Korean West Sea since about 10 years ago similarly there is a demand from the China side to give it Korean maritime survey vessel that are conducting ocean exploration in the east China sea and the west sea and the south sea of Korea China also seeks control over South Korea's and south and west sea what is what is that in the near future effort to make South Korea's south and west sea into China's inland sea will be in full swing China is blocking US military power in the Indo-Pacific and based on its military initiative it pursued China's Sino-centrism by making neighboring country at the level of semi-domestic satellites Korean strategic choice Korea is a representative export-led country nearly 99% of trade is done by sea in particular as most of its energy include in crude oil has through the South China Sea if military tension escalated in the region the South Korea economy will be severely affected Korea can never escape from the political military problem between the United States and China in the past China's military expansion is a very important impact on South Korea's security and economy directly Korea is a dynamic economic powerhouse located on the geopolitical axis of North East Asia Korea should actively engage in political economy security and environmental issues in this region now the strategy South Korea must be true is first to strengthen is solidarly with countries that pursue global value of liberty and democracy and the rule of law in this regard it is necessary to actively consider participating in the court it is also worth considering that Korea joins court and creates the plan for a gathering of five countries second based on Black US alliance is an active cooperation strategy will alliance should be pursued South Korea maintain strong alliance with the United States based on Black US alliance it is necessary to develop a strategy of close cooperation with United nation countries such as United Kingdom Australia which participate in the in the Korean world and Japan and Indo-Pacific countries the Indo-Pacific region is aware the interest of several countries are concerned cooperation with the relevant country should be strengthened to ensure freedom of navigation on the high seas finally South Korea military must be expanded military capabilities and so key member of the United States in the Pacific strategy it should be built with the naval forces capable of participating in regional stability operation and depending national interest my brief conclusion the visit of King Elizabeth aircraft carrier strike group is the time was on act of action that the United States alive the United Kingdom would actively walk before the stability of the in the Pacific in the past when the Soviet Union tried to move south into Asia United Kingdom send the group to this region to contain the Soviet Union it shows the importance of cooperation with countries that pursue the global value of liberty and democracy in particular the joint exercise with the South Korean Navy in East Sea is very meaningful a logistic support ship that is part of the carrier strike group is a Korean made warship it symbolically shows that the military cooperation between South Korea and the United Kingdom was being carried out successfully stability and the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific must be guaranteed as North Korea continue to threaten nuclear and missile threat and China continue to expand its military power cooperation between countries bearing common value is more important than ever for the stability of North East Asia and in the Pacific thank you well thank you very much sir now we're going to move to the presentation from Captain Kevin Fleming thank you very much Dr Kim and thank you Admiral Kim for an excellent presentation from the South Korea perspective I'm obviously talking from a UK perspective and not just from the from a cerebral point of view but obviously geographic South Korea and North the Northeast Asian area is a long way from the UK and therefore a lot of the UK population either don't aren't familiar with it or it's not high up their agenda as we speak and so the impact and influence of the UK carrier strike group from a UK perspective I think is slightly different I think the impact of COVID-19 is inevitably impacted on the on the deployment not just in the cancellation of the visit of Queen Elizabeth to South Korea but also many others and so I think perhaps the opportunity might have been lost from the UK population perspective to bring this to life bring this to life for many people as the carrier strike group has transcended from the UK where it left in May all the way out to Guam and it's now starting its return so the impact I think has definitely been lessened that hasn't precluded one of the US sorry UK SSNs visiting Busan recently for a logistic stop but by the very nature of those sorts of platforms publicity and so on is not usually associated with those sorts of visits many of the esteemed colleagues on this call have already talked a lot about the geopolitics of the region it's worth reminding UK audiences and of course whilst we do know we took a very large part in the Korean War North Korea and South Korea are still technically at war and many interactions across the border occur both seen and many unseen and I think that's an important geopolitical context to bear in mind when you think about going into a region with the size of a strike group that we have to understand the context and I'll come back to that right at the end the importance of China is inevitable both from a trade perspective from a UK inward trade and obviously from a South Korean perspective flowing both ways and the Admiral has already talked about the vast majority of South Korean trade by in the maritime environment so clearly the maritime aspirations of China are important to understand that he set those out but also understanding the regional history and the regional disputes some which carry on the North Korea point we talked about China which I would put in parentheses Taiwan which has obviously been brought out with the CPTPP news over the over the recent days and I think also Japan a very very close neighbor to strategically for the UK the UK needs to understand the history between Japan and South Korea just to understand the history but also the current and future direction of regional policies I think it's it's vital for that and as I said the Republic of Korea is a significant maritime trading nation so the the parallels and overlaps with the UK will be absolutely obvious but it's also about common allies the Northeast Asia region there are many but then you look into the region into Southeast Asia you're then into South China Sea challenges but then more widely through the Malacca Straits to the Indian Ocean into the Gulf the Mediterranean and I myself spent a very short period of time on a South Korean Navy ship in alongside in London back in 2015 it was a real honor and a privilege for me to do that as I've never had the benefit and pleasure of visiting your country to do that but this sense of pride and the fraternity between South Koreans and the veterans that we brought on board from the Korean War was was a wonderful thing to see and and I know they really enjoyed that talking about trade and prosperity we've heard global Britain has been talked about already I think there are some history obviously and there are some future opportunities perhaps for both nations the history already really alluded to by Admiral Kim the four tide class tankers built in South Korea between 2014 2016 they were built there but the tech was added later in the UK and I'll come back to that in a in a little bit the Lynx Wildcat helicopters both one of which I used to fly in but that may have been overtaken by a recent USC order so again these things are never in stone when you're talking about defense industry it will depend on politics very often as opposed to capability so I think that's something worth with pursuing or thinking about when you think about future strategy and the new light carrier mentioned with the F-35B a recent signature between Babcock UK a defense company with Hyundai for building that ship will be interesting to see how that develops obviously it's a long game building something as complex as that but clearly the F-35B that will likely be operated from that that vessel there are some opportunities there for some collaboration looking at the the missions if you like and the functions of the of the Korean Navy there are many similarities with the Royal Navy and so there are opportunities that fall from that deterrence is key in probably more so than met for many other nations in the world deterrence is key for for South Korea so the ability to show force is important and also to show who you're allied with and so the CSG exercising with the Korean Navy I think would send a very strong message that will will help in the Korean Navy's wish to to show deterrence but then of course the Navy's don't exist for themselves they're there to support foreign policy and clearly CSG 21 is supporting the UK foreign policy global Britain and trade has already been mentioned but also the international rules based system again already mentioned and freedom of navigation CSG not all of it only one part of it a Type 45 destroyer was involved in this in the Black Sea and that did get noticed in the UK with the subsequent Russian interventions and so on and I would say that the CSG has not returned home yet it's got to go back to the way it came more or less and so it will be interesting to see what noise or other activity goes on in the South China Sea on its way back but there the other thing with naval vessels is it's inherent is there ideal for low level engagement and diplomacy and that happens many many times it happened off the coast of South Korea very recently with Queen Elizabeth hosting many influential people from South Korea and I would suggest the region and it's obviously engaged with other nations as it has as carried on its deployment and the final thing of course is the protection of national sovereignty and the maritime interests both trading nations both need to keep sea lines of communication open as far as possible to allow that global trade upon which everything else really does depend some of the less politically loaded activities and so on that that can come in terms of future activity could be in the aid of in the area of human humanitarian aid and disaster relief um peacekeeping operations South Korea very involved in those these sort of so-called force for good operations are politically safer and they also give navies an opportunity to operate together learn from each other and so they develop each other's capability side by side such that if the more testing environment of war fighting comes along it's not the first time you've spoken to people it's not the first time you've met and this is something that has endured for centuries between navies around the world but on a slightly lower scale but no less threatening is the gray zone warfare if you like or and organized criminal activities so opportunities to engage in counterterrorism operations counter piracy which South South Korea navy has been involved in for many years off the Horn of Africa these and other criminal activity arms and people smuggling these are areas for easy collaboration in terms of doctrine and training opportunities and sharing from experience as Admiral Kim has mentioned already the Royal Navy does have a distinguished history from the Korean War over the three years up to about 15 Royal Navy warships in total were used from light aircraft carriers down to frigates and as the Admiral really pointed out extremely well the CSG looks really similar to to the first intervention at the beginning of the Korean War and so that has not been lost on on me either I do think the opportunity to build capacity is really important and I'm not suggesting that this is one way or two one way only because the Royal Navy can learn a huge amount from operating in the sea space of the of the Northeast Asia South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region from our Korean allies and of course we can also assist in developing the Korean doctrine and how they train and so on clearly the the Korean Navy is hugely influenced by the US Navy but of course and it's been mentioned a little bit before in a post-Afghanistan world is the US to become a little bit more isolationist I think it's way too early to say and obviously Afghanistan being a land campaign very much supported by by maritime aviation but a land campaign maritime forces of course are inherently less engaged less fixed there are possible opportunities perhaps for UK armed forces to get more involved and potentially the RN in particular but that's not to say that the US are going to disappear because they I don't believe they will so and common tasks equals common equipment UK defense industry which is cutting edge Korean I would say catching up very rapidly in many of these areas and so I think there are some some opportunities there so looking sir to sort of close in in a few points looking beyond CSG 21 will there be a CSG 23 25 27 to the region is this affordable for the UK and for the RN because be under no doubt how expensive this is to deploy such a task group a strike group to the other side of the world what role for the strike carriers in a post-Afghanistan world I think that's something for the Royal Navy staff to to get their heads around and of course these strike carriers do need to be escorted and defended and that would I would say there's considerable pain for the Royal Navy to achieve that for this but let's see what what goes on but it is also an excellent opportunity for collaboration multinational collaboration and perhaps we may see a Korean air defense destroyer escorting a carrier strike group in the future I think that would be an excellent an excellent opportunity to move to move that forward in the in the way that the US and the Dutch have done for CSG 21. Admiral Kim mentioned the two river class patrol vessels that will be deployed to the region and will remain there for at least five years it's a more enduring presence there's no assigned base so they are inherently flexible depending they can go from the Bering straits down to Antarctica that's a large piece of ocean but they can still they can still do that one of the attributes of maritime maritime power but no disrespect to these warships they are small less capable and less impactful but I do think that time is is a really powerful way of building relationships so I don't think they should be underestimated and then the final thing which has come as a little bit of a shock to most is the orcas impact very new full detail really not yet known but I have seen it discussed that there may be the opportunity to base a Royal Navy nuclear powered submarine in Australia how that might affect the regional balance will be interesting to see how it would affect actually the EU or the European interaction in the region resulting from the considerable French upset well I personally hope that will be short lived and we can get back to get back to more cordial relations sometime soon but I wouldn't underestimate the the potential impact for that so to sort of answer impact I think COVID-19 has had a considerable negative effect on what would have been a highly impactful deployment and a highly impactful opportunity for UK South Korean strategic relations and of course I would say that CSG 21 is not over yet so let's not let's not answer that question fully and the the defence the integrative review rather from last year did talk about a UK Indo-Pacific tilt and it sort of seems to be happening but is it a one-off perhaps it's a what we would say a flash in the pan apologies for using the color grill phrases there but I think you'll get my my drift does the orcas does the OPV deployment does the SSN basing signify a real change or is it just window dressing is it just trying to kickstart global Britain and trade post leaving the EU and this will be beneficial to UK defence industry perhaps or does it hold a strategic longer term properly resourced shift for the UK I'll just end with a couple of things one is a quote from Commodore Steve Morehouse who's the commander of the carrier strike group itself CSG 21 has taken us from the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean across the Indian Ocean and has brought us here to the western Pacific for a series of exercises engagements with regional partners including the Republic of Korea the UK like the Republic of Korea is an outward looking trading nation committed to contributing to the maritime security which underpins global prosperity by sailing here we make clear our determination to work with like-minded nations in support of an open and transparent system of international rules our aim is to strengthen the ties between our two countries and pave the way for closer cooperation in the future so it feels there's lots of ticks lots of positives in that but I would just like to say for the UK and for the Royal Navy perhaps I think the chance of a miscalculation in a region where they've not been properly engaged for many decades actually over half a century in defence and security matters I think poses a considerable risk there's an urgent need I think for the UK to rapidly improve and develop their understanding of the complexities inherent in this region thank you thank you very much for your presentation I think now we are we're going to move to the Q&A session so both Professor Greg Kennedy and I agreed that we'll have the collective Q&A session because everything is all connected and over to you Professor Kennedy thank you brilliant I'll go in the order of which I have noticed the questions coming through and I noticed you know obviously Larry you and myself we definitely have got questions and I'm sure you guys have got questions for one another amongst the panelists but I'd like to bring some of the audience in here right off the bat and so for Ramon and Dr. Shin we've got a question on I don't know if you can see it over in the chat we're witnessing shift of Britain's strategic focus towards Indo-Pacific region the recent voyage of the Queen Elizabeth carrier group and creation of Akka's coalition with Australia are good examples it's noteworthy that Britain's action is proceeding even conflict with Russia is getting worse since mid-2010s so how would it be interpreted how is this going to be seen does Britain believe that conflict with Moscow is manageable so the question is about the Russian influence in the region or despite Tenzin with Russia engaging in the Indo-Pacific is worth a new cornerstone for global Britain including a stronger alliance with the United States which is a really good question which I think speaks to a number of the topics that were brought out here which is this pull is the UK European slash North Atlantic state still or is it going to have to refocus its attentions to the Indo-Pacific so Dr. Shin Ramon have you got some things you would like to address to that and we should go first Dr. Shin you want to go first or I can take it again go ahead Ramon I don't know if Dr. Shin can hear us yeah perfect so yes I don't think it's that the Russian the Russia is perceived as less of a threat but that China is perceived as more of a threat than in the past and I think it's quite remarkable the this change had started already a few years ago but I think with the pandemic has really accelerated it has been seen in my view in the UK as China misbehaving due to secrecy at the same time as it is becoming more assertive not only in the region not only in the Indo-Pacific region but also more assertive in Europe as well and trying to have more influence right so we have seen all this with warrior diplomacy and we have seen for example the Chinese ambassador to the UK openly criticizing the country in a very undiplomatic way and not only in the UK we have seen this in Sweden in France in different European countries we have seen sanctions on on on individuals for from different European countries as well being imposed by China including MPs for example in the case of of the UK so I think that the shift there is the component that the question refers to which is the fact that the US is really asking the UK and other European countries really to be more involved in the Indo-Pacific and I think UK is top of the list with with all course right but there's also a changing perception within within the UK and the discourse about China is very different and I would say even more in the past China was not really a political much of a political issue in the UK beyond certain circles but now it has become an issue that is discussed openly in the media that different civil society groups are trying to influence the policy towards China and many of these groups have a have a different negative view towards China so so I don't think it's about change threat perception with in relation to Russia but change threat perception in relation to China and the view that this is a threat that the UK has to be involved in in in managing and there is a another issue as well which is Asian countries are actually asking the UK and other European countries actually to become more involved in in in in the region Japan and India doing this very openly Australia of course as well if we look at the Indo-Pacific but Korea has started to do this as well not openly more quietly but the current government has actually been trying to strengthen cooperation with with European countries in trying to manage the threat coming from from from China so I think it's more about this rather than Russia itself the way we perceive China has really changed in recent years okay thank you Dr. Shin I think there is a certain stage when we engage with China I I hope I welcome the European engagement on China issue we make we do make a great contribution because at this moment there is a strategic competition between US and China and but unfortunately the United States alone cannot handle China so we need some support from international community I think the biggest power can come from Europe beyond countries so that can change China's perception and diplomatic direction I believe although China at this moment China tried to appear strong however inside China there will be a many kind of a discussion and confrontation group by group I believe so I think the European engagement on China issue will be welcomed not only from United States but also country in the Indo-Pacific region including South Korea with regard to the de-escalation mechanism we do not have such kind of mechanism at this moment but fortunately I believe the current level of competition between US China is not up to military level as it's a probably up to economic level and political and diplomatic level so if we work together I mean the we means the United States and European countries and the country in the Indo-Pacific region and then there will be a strong de-escalation mechanism that can persuade China that's my answer thank you great thank you very much I'm going to take and move down to questions from Brigadier General Shim and he's asked about AUKUS and I think we need to to probably address the AUKUS elephant in the room so for the other panelists for Admiral Kim, Kevin and Professor Ahn the two parts to the question what's the impact of AUKUS on NATO and certainly Ramon and Dr. Shin feel free to jump in as well and the second question is do you believe that AUKUS may be influential in economic issues then within the wider Indo-Pacific area or even in terms globally will this have a knock-on effect and I think this this does speak to something that's quite clear in terms of of the presentations here today is in terms of this messaging and signaling and how is it that the sorts of communications that all of these activities are supposed to represent as as Dr. Shin just alluded to which one is prime which one is more important is it economic activity or is it the diplomacy tied to the military activity in actions and how do you know just exactly who's perceiving what so I'd be very interested to get the views of our panelists on Brigadier Shim's questions about this AUKUS kind of ripple go ahead Professor Ahn well in my opinion AUKUS situation seems to suggest that well in this part of reason the security concern seems to dominate especially among some key strategic allies well globally now well the clear distinction between Trump administration versus Biden administration is the President Trump basically focused on the trade deficit issue and it tried to and after China but when he tried to went after trade the deficit problem suddenly it had to target other strategic ally countries many European countries Japan Korea and so forth but President Biden now tried to go deeper actually the more the fundamental problem is the industry competitiveness but behind the industry competitiveness we have technology competitiveness so suddenly trade the technology and securities are all integrated and just strategic factors and then as you are well aware now the transatlantic solidarity tried to be rebuilt and then part of the most important the re-stabilization of the global order is probably the strengthening the relationship between the the EU UK versus the United States but then suddenly AUKUS tried to separate and divide its strategic partners and then tried to highlight this issue so well it seems to me that in this particular AUKUS initiative try to go after more strategic the security concern that is unique for for this particular issue but other than that economically speaking now supply chain re-shuffling are very strongly pushed by Biden administration that actually pressure not just China to react but also EU and Japan and Taiwan and Korea so in terms of the supply chain the rearrangement the the whole global trade order appears to be balkanized now but the AUKUS situation I don't know how it can be it can it can cause more trouble but from what I read now is US government desperately tried to appease the friends and tried to calm down the current situation so we we should see whether this current situation may have the broader implication or it is just the one kind of episode yes Admiral Kim yeah so this kind of issue is very interesting for about Korean also so security and economy the security is a survival issue survival issue or live or die economic issue is a hungry or not hungry so our Korean case also too we choose first security issues first Australia is also so contain the Chinese expanding maritime power and the joining the United States alliance so alliance is very important thing for about the security problem Korea is also too this kind of situation is also the Australia and United States very strong kite for alliance membership that so these living features Korea in the same case develop that thank you thank you kev yeah so just taking the two pieces about the de-escalation mechanism first I think my point about we need to understand the the region in a much greater way to avoid miscalculation because then you can avoid if you like escalating in an inappropriate or an out of control way I always think back to the Cuba missile crisis and and how that could have gone obviously very badly wrong but the opportunity to discuss and talk and engage is really important so I think rather than there being a de-escalation mechanism I think continued dialogue is absolutely vital be that with China be that with Russia be that with any nation including of course North Korea in this in this context so I think that's an opportunity there in terms of how August might affect NATO I think is really interesting there's been more discussion already about a European armed forces or a European army which the UK has always been extremely opposed to because it was seen as duplicating NATO but if NATO which is a military alliance starts to become used more politically and August feels to me whilst there is an underlying military capability at the heart of it the nuclear powered submarines it feels political from my perspective from a UK perspective it's an opportunity to for global Britain to look elsewhere apart from to Europe for the Australians it's trying to I think maybe show a bit more clear water between their allies their geographical allies in New Zealand and again the United States and Canada seem to be more often at loggerheads in terms of policy than in than they were in the past so to me at the moment August apart from the headline which was the nuclear submarines it feels politics at the moment but I think there's a lot more to play out and see how that how that develops brilliant thanks I want to I mean obviously Ramon Dr Shin if you want to come on to any of that then please do but I wanted to then present the question about the role of Africa so how far does this Indo-Pacific and how far actually does the idea of connect connectivity and maybe collaboration and this idea of commonality of view does say rock views of the development of Africa or the role of Africa within the greater Indo-Pacific security question fit with the UK or you know are there things that actually are more problematic for that so I'm not sure who might want to anybody yeah Dr Shin excellent thank you with regard to Africa I think that's too far from Korean Peninsula but South Korean diplomacy we have a kind of feeling and tendency and policy that South Korea must make a contribution on international peace so usually with regard to African security our approach is peacemaking or peace building approach it there and make a contribution that's our perception but we do not directly link African contribution on Indo-Pacific area especially with regard to China that's out of our antenna I think and then another question is of course I think this is a kind of consideration of the United States and UK and Australia because United States want to want to build a strong network strong military network that can cope with China however the Quad itself has a many problems to develop as a military organization or because the Indians India's position India is very unique position they do not want to military confrontation with China although they fear some rivalries strong rivalry against China but with regard to the military cooperation they step away Japan has another limitation because of it's a constant constitutional limitation or their their budgetary issue they do not actively link the alliance mechanism so I think the alternative approach is Ocos because they have the same value same strategic interest and then same military strategy I think so it's another one so from US perspective they try to make a various various group of cooperation as for example Ocos is military Quad is kind of a strategic cooperation or five eyes to nine eyes it's a intelligence cooperation among allies and partners and other CPTPP is an economic partnership so from US perspective they wanted to build these kind of a various organization to cope with China from South Korea view I think from at this moment current stage it is very difficult to join the Ocos if we get invited even if we get invited because as we probably prepare to make a bilateral alliance to focus on the North Korean issue then China issue it's not the level of alliance but the security cooperation percept we might we will cooperate US strategy with regard to economy as a professor I'm no better than me but anyway we probably change our position to join CPTPP maybe next to government I think so the group is different I think thank you okay I'm conscious of the time and and you guys have been at this for quite a while and and the time zone differences in where everybody is so I want to I want to bring and I think Larry Monaco's question about Japan is quite good in order to bring a number of these different of threads together because we've talked about the United States Australians China a lot but this question about now whether or not the the point that professor on raised about the agreement for the first time with Japan this could be quite fundamentally important to shifting the kinds of perceptions of balance of power in the region if you actually had a consolidated Korean Japanese access and I just wanted to get all the panelists kind of views on whether or not this is the beginning of something that you think is actually sustainable and I suppose the other part of that question is whether or not the growth of a South Korean Japanese access is actually stabilizing or whether or not the perception of such an axis could be more destabilizing than it could be stabilizing for security in the region I know it's a real big question so your your points on this and maybe for and the next conversation we have so I'll start down at the top my my screen at the top and professor on can you start us off with that please well this is a really a big question I need to spend a long time but very briefly well this part of the world actually the korea's kind of China for a long time talked about like east asian economic cooperation or even east asian economic integrations so that terminology discussion has been kind of the very famous political agenda for a long time here but nowadays it completely disappeared in fact on the one hand it looked like we have R7 we have many FTAs so economically we are more and more integrated with each other but as you hinted because of the thought because of the Senkaku the the dispute between Korea and China Japan and Korea the China versus Japan these countries have more and more political problem that actually go beyond the political issue so even well for a long time this part of what happened was when we have some kind of political diplomatic issue that becomes too serious then economic or industry coalitions actually worked and then tried to calm down but nowadays it was actually reversed so the economic and the business coalition have been seriously disturbed now so it is no longer working to stabilize the the national relationship against each other so that is the big danger economically speaking actually many economists even OECD show that the trade costs among these countries in terms of the bilateral trade has been significantly increased during the past decade so that is the reality of what is happening here so we have a lot of issue we have to be very cautious if we try to broadly aggregate something then the situation will not be resolved you you have to look into very closely between Korea and Japan between Korea and China and China versus Japan that's the only thing I can say in short sentences economics is not everything exactly thank you Ramon want to give it a go yes sure I mean I think they are the the politics of it and obviously political relations between Korea and Japan have deteriorated in these recent years but then there's the reality on on on the ground and I mean the different ministries continue to cooperate like for example the misuse of foreign affairs and the misuse of defense sometimes I mean I compare it with with the UK and France right sometimes the politics of the UK-French relationship is not good and clearly this past week has been very bad with with the the announcement of focus but there is a lot of cooperation is still going on this does this is not going to make the headlines because it's more regular cooperation including the case of France and the UK between the two militaries right and I think it's similar for the case of of Korea and Japan that there is cooperation going on that is not going to make the headlines is not going to play into politics because within in in solar in Tokyo wouldn't help the the garments that are currently in in power and of course we have elections coming up but in both countries but there is cooperation taking place and I recall as an anecdote just the last year thing it was when there was another spat between Korea and Japan and then the two of them were conducting joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden together with European navies these didn't make the headlines but that you had the two navies cooperating with each other while politicians were basically playing to the domestic audiences and I think that's important to emphasize as well in the Korea-Japan relationship. Yes, perception is reality absolutely yeah uh Admiral Kim, your thoughts on the enduring ability of the Korean-Japan alliance to to continue to move forward and whether it's a good or not good thing for the region? The always is Korean-Japan is a relationship is very sensitive one because of the many nationalism and Joe rapidly dispute something like that. Especially for each politician group they use their domestic politics for the Korean-Japan relations so many things many kind of things we already have in the Japan and Korea. Fundamentally the Korea and Japan to make a good relationship is it's nice it's good every people wants to be but the historical problem so the island is the Dr. Island is mean the problem some critical point is issue if this issue comes up two countries for people for the other position this is big problem for the Korean-Japan relations and so many the politicians this kind of things used in the domestic politics it is a problem yeah thank you. Good, thank you. Kev, what do you think the odds are with the Prince of Wales escorted by rock anti-aircraft frigate and the Aegis Japanese cruiser? Well I'm a I'm a possibilities so I think that is possible absolutely as Ramona said there is so much that goes on at sea between nations that is just not seen it's not hidden it just is not looked for by many many nations so I see that as a as a distinct possibility and I would hope that it would occur because by understanding each other's capabilities and so on I think I think security is enhanced I won't comment on Japan career history I'm aware of some of it but not an expert so I won't comment on that but I just like to say a bit about maybe balance of power and the calculations that people make when they are looking at new relationships or new agreements so orcas came out of left field nobody saw that coming apart from the three nations and so I think people are still getting their head around what it actually means is it is it a security is it political is it a bit of both it's probably a bit of both and there's economics underpinning that because of defense industry and so on selling eight nuclear powered submarines is pretty lucrative for the seller so so I think when people start to look at what orcas means in looking forward I think there will be a better understanding but people looking from the outside in will have to make a calculation they'll have to make a calculation as to what risks or threats to them will exist once this relationship becomes stronger and so if there's a career Japan relationship that becomes stronger in the region other players are going to make an an assessment of the relative threat to them as per the status quo before and after and to see what occurs from that so I think there's a balance of power it that is sort of an underpinning doctrinal thinking about what balance of power means it depends how quickly and how strong the actual agreements that are made and orcas in this instance or Japan South Korea in the future depends on how that's perceived as you said Greg perception is reality thanks excuse me hold on just a minute before Professor Shin makes comment I'm sorry Greg like Professor on needs to leave for the next meeting so maybe we could farewell to him and Professor on we would like to invite you for another session later if you are scheduled for me thank you so much sir thank you very much for attending I'm very sorry for leaving really thank you very much thank you thank you thank you thank you thank you so we will give the last word on this yes it's a very tricky issue you know most difficult to the diplomatic question in Korea is a Korea Japan relations every government whether they is a conservative progressive they made the national diplomatic agenda they always mention two-track approach one is they're going to solve a history show one thing and then economic cooperation one other however if they become an incumbent power they they just deal with the Japan issue based upon domestic politics it's very difficult because it's a very volatile you know the problem fundamental problem is Japan is changed you know that those of generation who broke World War two is a current generation's grandfather and grandfather's father you know in the current 20 30s Japanese people do not feel any story to South Korean that's a reality but South Korea cannot that kind of change in perception in Japan so we always demand Japan's apology but from Japan's perspective it's an old story so it's very difficult to solve a history issue however because of the Chinese rise Chinese hostile rise assertive rise there is a kind of certain voices that Korea Japan tie must get stronger so I think it's not easy one but as time goes by as we notice a Chinese assertive behavior more and more then there is a room for Korea Japan security cooperation even more military cooperation but it's not now that's my understanding thank you thank you I think that your discussions here today more than validate why it is that the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy and our Center need to continue to work closely together and I think this first this first attempt at an annual event to link up the two centers and certainly the perspectives of Europe North America and the Asia-Pacific is something that we certainly will want to continue to carry on so thank you thank you all very much Hian would you like to say anything well thank you all thank you very much for the great discussion and like you just said Professor Kennedy I think more and more that we really need to meet in person and there are a lot to talk about in detail and but there are different perspectives in different nations but I think I see one one in common that everybody wants to cooperate but in a more constructive way it's not about the the cooperation itself I think we all seek for how we conduct it in what format so I wish we could meet again for the next event and I just want to thank you very much for the discussion and and all your staff's work from King's College London Corpus Center that's it from me thank you and thank you yes thank you everyone all the panelists for all of your time and the energies and the efforts to to help us here today to to get this inaugural event off and yes definitely I think that when it's allowed face to face and continuing to be able to break these kinds of groups into closer discussions around things will certainly be in the future so thank you to all of you thank you and be well be safe out there okay so have good night and have a day bye yes good night good morning good afternoon good night here and there is a good afternoon today yeah thank you take care