 I think the next speaker who is in the order of Pierre Jaquet. So Pierre, you have the floor. Thank you. Thank you, Jean-Claude. Let me focus on another pathology of the international financial system, which actually creates a bridge between what Bertrand and others say, that there is a lack of money going to developing countries right now, and the fact that a few years ago there was a lot of money going to developing countries. And the bridge is called debt. And I think that this pathology of the international system is the risk of emergence of a new debt crisis with considerable impact, especially for countries in Africa, but not only. And the situation is a bit similar to the 1980s. We had an influx of money into these countries, and that corresponded to the recycling of excess liquidity in rich countries in search of higher potential returns. And then we had a number of shocks. And of course the shocks are COVID, the economic slowdown in developed countries, inflation, rising uncertainties, a drying up of new funds, depreciation of currencies against the dollar, and so on. So as a result, the burden of the debt service, which is still lower than historical records, has significantly increased, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, again not only, and in Latin America. Let me also mention the net transfers to IDA countries, that is the net financing inflows minus the debt service, after negative in the face of needs to... And that happens in the face of rising needs to engage into strategies of green growth strategies to fund the energy transition, to reach the SDGs, and so on. Right now about 30 countries or more are considered to be in a high risk of debt distress. Second point, there are three differences with the earlier debt problems. One is that the match of this debt is now held by the private sector, private sector and multilateral institutions, but the big new thing is the private sector, the whole of the private sector. And that has been a major tendency in the evolution of debt. And I'll come back later to the implications of that. The second which is linked to it, this match of it, is a shift from loans to bonds. With an interesting fact, which is, bonds do not carry the same risk of systemic event than loans. And therefore, when there is a problem, the incentives to act is even lower, and we all know that the incentives to solve debt problems has always been quite weak. It's even weaker when you have bonds, which are a private thing, not a collective issue. So that's one of the difficulties. And the third difference is the considerable rise in non-DAC creditors, especially China. In sub-Saharan Africa, China now holds close to 60% of bilateral public and publicly-guaranteed debt. And China has become the first bilateral creditor of developing countries. The implications are mounting obstacles to prompt an effective resolution of debt crisis. And we see that every day. We take commitments. We have nice frameworks. But implementing those frameworks has become increasingly difficult. So ineffective crisis resolution. My third and final point is that we are again addressing this debt issue in a crisis resolution mode. As I said, as I argued, this crisis resolution mode is not effective. It's very slow. But again, we are doing what we did in the past. We have a crisis. We try to solve it. It takes too long. But in the end, we will do something. I think it is time to move to more crisis anticipation. It's not really prevention, but the idea that we should prepare for the next crisis. This is the nature of capitalist financial flows. There are excesses followed by excessive disillusion. It's always been the case. And we have not been able to integrate that in the approaches, strategies, and instruments. So I would suggest that there needs to be more thinking about how to make ex-ante debt restricting mechanism more automatic. It is complex. It requires to distinguish between proper and improper use of borrowed funds. It requires to distinguish between liquidity crisis and solvency crisis. But I think the risk of debt distress in the face of exogenous shocks need to be endogenized. There are, I think, many ways to do it. One is to go back to the proposal made by Anne Kruger long time ago to create a sovereign debt restricting mechanism, the SDRM, which never floated very far, but I think it's a very important idea and suggestion. It could be endogenized in debt contract. It could be also endogenized through contingent debt instruments. And I think that's one aspect of financial innovation that could be quite promising. So my point is that the time has come to spend energy on a more lasting debt management framework, which is today really lacking. Thank you. Thank you very, very much, Pierre. You're absolutely right in mentioning the fact that China is not members of the Paris Club and that as far as governments are concerned, it's an enormous hole in the system. And I cannot resist to hope that China will understand at a certain moment that it is time to join some kind of, I would say, global mechanism. I'm a little bit more skeptical on Anne Kruger proposal, but we will discuss that.