 My name is Sam Wunderstach. I'm the head of International Ideas Europe Programme and you're participating in one of the many 25th anniversary events that International Idea is organizing today. And in all those events, we'll be looking at the future of democracy support, combining what we have learned from the past 25 years and casting our eye to what lies ahead of us. This particular session will be about Europe, especially Central Europe and those countries that in Central Europe that are part of the EU. And the background to that debate, of course, is the discussions we are witnessing about the state of democracy and rule of law in Central Europe today. And we're gonna look back at how democracy assistance started in that part of the world about 30, 25, 30 years ago, just after the fall of the burning wall and then ended 15 years later when many of those countries joined the EU. And many of us felt that Central Europe had passed a point of democratic no return, that democracy could not get worse, could only get better. Now, that is something that of course, quite recently we found is not the case that democracy and the rule of law are under threat. And therefore the topic of this debate is there a case for rekindled democracy assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. We have a wonderful panel with us today, a very experienced high level speakers from the sides of politics, from the side of think tanks, academics, and we'll ask them these questions exactly, how do we go about supporting democracy in Central Europe moving forward? Now, before we kick it off, a couple of housekeeping messages. First of all, we have a bit of a packed program, which is great, but it also means that we'll be very strict with time and all the speakers have allowed me to notify them when their speaking time is up, so that we stick with time and we don't let participants, the audience, wait beyond the time that is set for this debate. Now, the participants, the audience can ask questions. There is a chat function that allows participants to raise questions. Please do so with your name, with your organization. Given that it is a packed program, we will only be able to pick out a few of those and ask them to some of the panelists. Now, last housekeeping message, a couple of the speakers will have to leave a little bit early. Ms. Katrina Barley and Kevin have important other engagements that prompt them to leave a little bit early, so we will have to say goodbye to them before the end of this session. Now, that's all by way of introduction. I will now hand it over immediately to the first speaker with words of welcome, that's Dr. Kevin Casas-Sarmura, the Secretary General of International Idea, my dear colleague, of course. Kevin combines a rare combination of having both a really distinguished academic career with a lot of practical experience in supporting democracy. The practical experience is in his background as second vice president of Costa Rica, but also as a secretary for political affairs at the Organization of American States, his time at the Bookings Institution, well-renowned global think tank, and with UNDP. His academic career has been with many different institutions as well, the University of Essex, he got his PhD from the University of Oxford, and this combination of academia and practical experience makes him a fantastic first speaker with a few words of welcome. Kevin, the floor is yours. Kevin, can you unmute your microphone? Okay, now we're on. Thank you, Sam, and good afternoon to you all. Honor guests, members, state representatives, partners, colleagues, and friends, I want to welcome you to International Ideas 25th Anniversary Conference. We are here today to celebrate our achievements, but most of all to launch a conversation about the future of democracy and the role of International Idea. I would like to thank all the speakers that have accepted to be part of this global conversation, our member states, and especially our current chair in host country, Sweden, which has made democracy a priority of its foreign policy. 25 years ago, 14 countries signed the founding declaration of International Idea. In 1995, the fall of the Berlin Wall, that the solution of the Soviet Union, the first post-apartheid election in South Africa, and the spread of democracy all over Latin America made the expansion of democracy seem irresistible and irreversible. However, the founders of our institute understood that the progress of democracy was not inevitable. They understood that they had a collective responsibility to nurture it, protect it, and advance it. They understood the need for collective action and support. They understood the need for comparative knowledge about the fundamentals of democracy, about elections, constitutions, and political participation. Those insights have defined our mission ever since. Today, International Idea encompasses 33 member states from all regions. In the past 25 years, we have played a decisive role in activating regional and global networks of practitioners and activists. We have contributed through publications, databases, events, and advice to global debates, regional collaborations, and national actions. We have supported dozens of electoral, constitutional, and political reform processes all over the world, where our evidence-based advice has made a difference toward partners on the ground. It is a record that our member states, our donors and partners, and our wonderfully talented staff, can be proud of them. And we are proud, but not satisfied. The challenges to democracy are greater today than they were in 1995. Democracy was faced in severe headwinds even before the COVID-19 pandemic. From our global state of democracy report, we know that while the number of democracies kept increasing, the quality of democracy was decreasing. In many democracies, checks and balances were becoming weaker, civic spaces were shrinking, and freedom of expression was under sustained assault. These challenges have been accentuated by the pandemic. Over the past few months, we have seen many cases where emergency powers have been invoked to do things that have nothing to do with the pandemic and everything to do with the intention of shutting down critical voices, limiting civic spaces, and harassing minorities. And there are also the problematic political consequences that stem from the global economic crisis, which are only now beginning to be felt. If there is a moment to monitor the health of democratic systems, it is now. And this is precisely what international idea has been doing through our global state of democracy report. And more recently, through our global monitor on the impact of COVID-19 on democracy and human rights supported by the European Union. We need trustworthy information more than ever. Yet, this time also demand that we use our voice in defense of democracy. Last June, together with our partners from around the world, we launched a call to defend democracy, where we argued that the pandemic threatens the future of liberal democracy. This open letter enlisted the support of over 70 pro-democracy organizations and more than 500 global leaders. This is the task in our hands. We must build the global coalitions needed to protect democracy, but we must also strive to revitalize it. Now is the time to help democracies return to the drawing board and renegotiate their social contract. Now is the time to act against the spread of this inflammation and existential threat for democracy. Now is the time to protect the ability of democracies to hold free, fair, and safe elections. Now is the time to discuss how best to equip democracy to tackle intergenerational challenges, such as the fourth industrial revolution, the sustainable development goals, and especially the climate crisis. Above all, now is the time to be unapologetic in defense of democratic values. The good news is that the case for democracy remains strong. To a much greater degree than any other system, democracy protects our agency and inherent dignity, allows for the correction of policies, and makes a difference for key tenants of sustainable development, particularly for gender equality. Sustainable development requires sustainable democracy. Making sure that democracy can reform and revitalize itself is the cause that international idea pledges to take forward for the next 25 years. We will do this by teasing out the lessons from democratic experience from all over the world, by leveraging that knowledge and putting it in the hands of leaders and activists, by continuously monitoring the health of political systems, by accompanying democracy-building processes and lending our impartial advice, by building regional and global coalitions of practitioners, activists, and academics, by speaking out in defense of democratic values, by insisting that democracy is a global public good that requires multilateral action, by working closely with member states and our supporting partners. This is our pledge to you. It is a pledge infused with the hope that the sacrifices made by millions of people in the quest for democracy, from Soweto to Santiago, from Prague to Jakarta, from Yangon to Hartoom, from Hong Kong to Minsk will have not been in vain. Our collective responsibility is to ensure that the memory of those struggles to advance the democratic cause is honored and preserved for generations to come. That is the challenge of our time and we at International IDEA intend to meet it in full. Thank you very much. Thank you, dear Kevin, Secretary-General of International IDEA, for putting these points on the horizon of lending our collective voice in defense of democracy. And you're very right, we should do so as experts, as institutions, and as member states. What better bridge of that message to go to the next speaker, which is the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has recorded a video message, especially for this 25th anniversary celebration. We will now be listening to Miss Anlinda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. 25 years ago, representatives of 14 countries met here in Stockholm for the first council meeting of the newly founded International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, or International IDEA. Following the developments around 1990, countries needed an international forum to exchange and learn from others how to shape their form of democracy. Because democracy cannot be exported, it has to grow from within a society. But there are lessons to be learned and experiences to be drawn and the international IDEA was to be the place for countries to do just that. International IDEA has faced a chair of challenges, but is today steadily forging its role as a center of excellence for the advancement of democracy worldwide as a universal human aspiration and an enabler of sustainable development through supporting the building, strengthening, and safeguarding of democratic political institutions and processes, quoting from its mission statement. While the conviction that democracy was the way forward seemed to be uncontested in the 1990s, things have since changed. Democratic backsliding, challenges to human rights, and the undermining of the rule of law are trends we have witnessed for several years. IDEA's Global State of Democracy report, a reference point when it comes to monitoring the development of democracy around the world, provides an invaluable evidence base in this regard. The most recent addition to IDEA's toolbox, the global monitor of COVID-19's impact on democracy and human rights clearly shows how this negative global trend has been further accentuated the pandemic. Dear friends, we need to act against and formulate a counter narrative to these negative trends. We know that authoritarianism is not the answer to today's challenges. We are as convinced today as we were in 1995 that democracy is the best form of governance for stability and development, but we need to make the case again. Democracy provides political accountability and therefore a mechanism to correct mistakes and do better. Democracy ensures transparency and access to information without which there can be no progress. While the fear of COVID-19 has understandably triggered dramatic measures, we need to remain vigilant. The current pandemic must not be allowed to become an excuse for governmental overreach to undermine democracy or its institutions. It takes times, sometimes generations, to build up stable and impartial democratic institutions, but they can be dismantled very quickly. Any limitations to the enjoyment of human rights must be in accordance with international law. The response to the pandemic must be based on gender equality, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, because only that can ensure the confidence and credibility in societies to make it sustainable. Democracy allows for civil society to mobilize, for inequalities to be confronted, for policy issues to be openly debated, for trustworthy information to freely flow, and governments to be accountable to citizens. All essential tools for successfully dealing with the current public health, emergency and its consequences. Precisely for this purpose, the Swedish government last year initiated the campaign Drive for Democracy. Through diplomatic activity and a series of events and democracy talks, it aims to promote and strengthen democracy and the aspects that in our view must be part of a sustainable democracy, equality, participation, sustainable development, inclusive growth, governance, human rights, and security. We have particularly focused on supporting civil society actors, human rights defenders, and trade union leaders as their role is central to upholding democracy and holding governments to account. This includes strengthening free and independent media and the safety of journalists and media workers. But we must also build global coalitions. In connection with this year's virtual United Nations General Assembly high-level meeting, we launch as a follow-up to our Drive for Democracy a cross-regional partnership together with a core group of countries called the Friends in Defense of Democracy. With two exceptions, the countries in this partnership are also members of International IDEA, and the IC IDEA and its member state as a platform and partner in this continued struggle of narratives. Dear friends, Swin is proud to be an initiator, founding member, host country, and this year's chair of the Council of Member States of International IDEA. And I want to congratulate its current Secretary-General, Mr. Casa Samora, and all its dedicated staff around the world on this special occasion. The current circumstances show the absolute necessity of multilateralism and the continued pursuit of rules-based international order. International IDEA will continue to be a central partner in this work, and we look forward to the next 25 years of democracy promotion. What a great way to start our 25th anniversary. I think we're now all back. Yes. What a great way to start this 25th anniversary with a presentation by my colleague, Kevin Casa Samora, and then the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. We have an image of colleagues in Sweden that I don't think should be here. I'm just asking my colleagues whether maybe they can switch off the image of what we now see as a Swedish Stockholm city landscape. While they're working on this, I'll continue with the panel discussion. We're now going to listen to someone that has been at the forefront of democracy and rule of law support at the front line of current debates in Central Europe. We will be listening to a keynote by Dr. Adam Bodnar. And Adam Bodnar is currently the ombudsman or the commissioner for human rights of Poland. Adam has a background as a lawyer with a law firm that works globally, but soon after having started that job, joined the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights and really got involved in human rights issues, rule of law and democracy. He has been at the front line of supporting democracy and rule of law in Poland for years, and especially when he became the ombudsman, has met with many, many citizens all across Poland to learn and defend their cause, their democracy and rule of law issues within Poland. He has been a very visible person in that capacity for the past couple of years. As of late, he has taken up another position as professor at the SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Poland. Adam, we are very glad to have you with us and please take the floor for your keynote presentation. Thank you very much for inviting me to this great discussion. Congratulations on your 25th anniversary. Congratulations to Kevin, Sam and all members of EDIA. It is really my pleasure to be with you today. Over the last five years, I could directly participate in events in Poland as the ombudsman and suddenly we are in the process of democratic backsliding. But on the other hand, I have a feeling that we have made some good lessons from this moment and I would like to share some of them because it seems to me that thanks to some actions by different actors, we could prevent further worsening of the situation in Poland. And at least right now, we are in this moment that we still have some hope that maybe we will not end up as some kind of authoritarian system. So let me just make a few points. First of all, I see that you are attacking on the Republic of Poland. I must say that I survived five years of my life and it seems to me it wouldn't be possible if not the situation and the support which was given by international organizations but also by other institutions that were helping me a lot with this. And I mean here international ombudsman institute or the European network of national human rights institutions. Why I mentioned them? Because I think that the support by peers was of key importance. And moreover, peers like other ombudsman institutions may play an important role in terms of strengthening the relationship between member states in the context of the recent annual rule of law report prepared by the commission. I think these are those institutions that may provide that could be like good agents of this annual rule of law report both domestically but also internationally by preparing something like shadow reports. And also I would encourage European Union to further legislate on the independence of equality bodies. I think it is one of the ways to strengthen national human rights institutions. Second point I would like to say that we have important aspect of democracy protection in Central and Eastern Europe is to what extent civil society is independent and is having independent access to human rights support. And here I see a problem that during recent years, over recent years, you could expect much more support from Norwegian funds from so-called European economic area funds than from the European Union funds. Moreover, in Hungary, there was a huge pressure of subordinating those funds to the needs of the government, the same in Poland. Fortunately in Poland, we have managed to save, let's say, independence of distribution of those Norwegian funds. But the question is what is the role of the European Union when it comes to the civil society? The good initiative, and I'm very fond of this initiative is the rights and values fund. But on the other hand, I'm afraid that maybe, if you have that kind of a fund, the money that should be provided to protect human rights rule of law and European values could basically be relatively small for central Europe. But in my opinion, especially civil society in this part of European Union, needs a lot of support because of different conditions. First of all, usually they do not have any access to public funding, and due to domestic pressure, their possibility of crowdfunding is limited. Second, they stand up to values not only in opposition to the government, but also to plethora of NGOs that support governmental policies and that have almost unlimited access to public funds. And in terms of this information, this is of crucial importance. That's like this real civil society is having access to funds via which it may promote its activities. And also leaders of NGOs, and we have with us here, Marta Pardavi from Hungarian Health Sinking Committee are subject of legal targeting and so-called discriminatory legalism, and you need to support them. And they must to have support coming from the EU. Of course, in addition, there is a risk that European Union, that there is a risk that central member states may try to create a legal environment in a similar way as it happened in Russia. So that kind of foreign agents law or some laws on prohibition or on disclosure or foreign funding. It is, you could feel it in the air that basically that kind of ideas are coming in the pipeline. And the question is, what would be the European Union response to this? The third point I would like to say is that there is a need to strengthen bilateral cooperation between judiciaries, prosecutors, but also other professional associations in member states. I claim that this need is important because some of those institutions are important to protect democratic values and they still remain relatively independent. And it seems to me that European Union was mostly interested in supporting initiatives that are top down. Also reactions of the EU were like top down, like from the Brussels level to the level of the particular member states, but we shouldn't forget that the European Union is also a union of citizens and those citizens should have different bilateral and multilateral links. Just look at one of the most successful European programs which is the Erasmus program. It is successful because it creates a lot of horizontal relationships between citizens, students and universities. And it seems to me that Polish, Hungarian judges or judges coming from other states do not have always a feeling of support from their colleagues from other member states. And the feeling of belongingness to the European family of rule of law increases bonds of solidarity, but also it increases the professional ability by judges to use the EU law and also power of resistance against authoritarian pressure. Obviously it applies also to attorneys and also other professions like prosecutors. And the good example, very symbolic one is the March of 1000 gowns that took place this year in February in Warsaw. Because in this March, you could see the participation of not only Polish judges, but also judges representing almost all member states of the European Union. And in my opinion, it is the role of the European Union to support that kind of initiatives, to support initiatives that create better links, better bilateral or maybe multilateral links between different member states, professional organizations, organizations of judges, prosecutors, also maybe local governments. My final point is about value of communications. In my opinion, one of the reasons for democratic backsliding is a low level of legal culture. In majority of Central and European countries, checks and balances institutions were to great extent legal transplants from other jurisdictions like Germany, like Austria. And they came as a result of so-called process of reception of law. But it seems to me that this 25 years time was not enough to accommodate those institutions into the social understanding. What does it mean to have, let's say independent constitutional code, or what does it mean to have judicial independence? Moreover, due to communist past, it is much easier to implement policies based on fear and chilling effect. For example, seemingly neutral provisions concerning judges are used to achieve a completely different effect. But for the general public, it is difficult to understand what is the real objective of the given law. In addition, new disinformation techniques and smear campaigns are used against judges or other state institutions. And usually those traditional institutions are professions like courts and judges are not prepared for the communication change that happened over last years and is used against them. And in my opinion, therefore they need agents that may help them to protect themselves that are more flexible and that they are ready to respond. And here I see a great potential of national human rights institutions, professional associations, civil society, but also independent journalists. They need support because judiciary will not defend itself in this kind of a war of communication. Let me conclude. These are challenging times, but we are not fighting just for future of Poland, Hungary or other, the particular member state of the European Union. We are fighting for the democracy in whole European Union. It seems to me and in Poland, especially we claim that Joe Biden's presidency in the United States might be a great support to all democracy believers. But before we get to the stage, first of all, we must take advantage of all lessons learned until now. And it is especially the task for the European Union to take advantage of those lessons. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you so much, Dr. Adam Bodnar, for giving us the outline of what is happening in Poland, how Poland, in your opinion, can improve, that it is not too late, but that we have to take serious and significant steps to make it work, one of which is international cooperation. Another one is the support of the EU and better forms of support. And we'll get to that in the panel debate that we'll be starting later on. But also you highlight the important point of supporting the value of democracy and really making sure that it is ingrained within the minds of citizens. Now, that is exactly what the question from the audience is about. Volbona Karakacchi from Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation, who is based in the Western Balkans, is asking about that. If we talk about a democratic transition, we have to make a business case for democracy that appeals to citizens, appeals to the values they have. Where do we start? What is the secret to getting people to share those values? Any hints, Adam, that you have seen in Poland? If I may respond to this, I think the major point is to convince people what is the value of democratic processes to their daily life. So not just to talk in abstract way, but you have to create different communication possibilities via which you can explain to every individual in every situation that democratic values matter to Kim or her. So for example, you shouldn't say, judicial independence is important because nobody understands this. You have to explain with particular examples why you need to have independent courts, why they are needed in case you have problem with your government, with your neighbor that is, I don't know, member of the ruling party, or when you are having a problem with the state-owned company, which is not paying some debts or you are a consumer of some products and you cannot enjoy professional adjudication of your case. The same with parliament. For example, right now we have a lot of problems with and discussions concerning recent verdict of the constitutional court concerning abortion. And it is the moment when people start to understand, okay, so this manipulated subordinated constitutional court is replacing a proper legislative process and we do not have any voice in this discussion because it was just a purely political decision to limit availability of legal termination of pregnancy in Poland. So I think the good explanation is that we should, when we are talking about parliament, it is not just talking about nice building in the middle of the capital city, but that it is talking about a certain process where every individual may participate in the consultative process in different readings of a given law and that the voice of every citizen is being heard. And I think that we are missing this game. I think that we are, sorry, we are losing this game because we are not spending enough time on getting to the grant, to the grassroots level and explaining the different features of the democratic system. And that was the reason I was traveling so much around Poland. I really, I visited and had meetings in 200 Polish cities over five years. And thanks to this, I really understand how big distance is between what we are thinking about democratic values and principles in Warsaw and let's say in a 20,000 city in the middle of nowhere in Poland. Thank you, Adam. I think you've started to paint the contours of what we want to get out of this discussion. If we have to look at the renewal of democracy, we have to go down to the grassroots levels and make democracy more concrete for the everyday life of those citizens that have to support it. Thank you very much, Adam. We will see you back later on in the discussion that will follow from the panel. But thank you for now. Thank you. That brings us to the panel discussion of today. And I will set the scene for that discussion by saying a couple of words about the state of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in reference to the work that international idea has done on measuring the state of democracy around the world. Now, in Europe, we see that everywhere, not just in Central Europe, but in all parts of Europe, democracy is in decline. Democratic erosion, which we define as the decline of democracy in all parts of how we see democracy, is happening in virtually all European countries. 40% of Europe has seen a form of democratic erosion. 18% has seen serious forms of democratic erosion, which means that in many parts of its democratic system, there have been steps back instead of forward. Now, what is unique to Central and Eastern Europe if this is the situation across Europe and we're seeing that the whole of Europe is not doing very well? Well, Central and Eastern Europe is experiencing something and it's been referred to already that we call democratic backsliding. And democratic backsliding is a form of democratic erosion as we see it at international idea, but more severe. More severe because it touches on more areas of democracy, but especially on those areas that are the safeguards of democracy as such. It checks on governments such as media freedom, the functioning of parliamentary oversight and judicial oversight, but also the civil liberties that people experience. A lot of countries in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone democratic backsliding and they have often done so not by chance, but intentionally by the governments that were in power. They have used the democratic instruments such as winning elections, having power over parliament within the democratic framework to hollow out that democracy from the inside. Now, and this phenomenon is something that we see, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Countries like Hungary, Poland, but also Romania and outside the EU, Serbia and Turkey are the cases of democratic backsliding that are unique in the world. And that is a reason why we feel that we have to talk about democracy and rule of law in Central and Eastern Europe particularly. The pandemic has compounded this situation even more. It was referred to a couple of times already. The idea is running an EU funded COVID-19 democracy and human rights global monitor. And here we see that especially the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have introduced anti-pandemic measures that are disproportionate, are concerning and much more so than the rest of Europe. So that's all to make the point that there is a good reason to talk about Central and Eastern Europe, specifically those countries within the EU. And that of course is the topic of today's panel debate. Is there a case for rekindled democracy assistance in Central Europe? And we already mentioned this type of support started 30 years ago after the fall of the Berlin Wall ended about 15 years ago when we thought that the process had become irreversible. And today we wake up in a situation where democracy and the rule of law are under threat again. Now the EU has done a lot to try and push back. They have done a lot of important reports such as the quite recent rule of law report. They have initiated article seven. There's a current discussion going on about budget conditionality. We're in the midst of that discussion. But a lot less discussion has focused on is to reinstate the democracy support that we all considered so important in the early days of democracy. And that's what we're going to discuss with the panel today. We have, as I already mentioned, a fantastic panel. Katharina Barley, the vice president of the European Parliament. Thomas Carruthers, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ivan Krashchev, the chairman of the Central for Liberal Strategies in Bulgaria and Marta Pardavi, the co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee. And they will talk about, as I mentioned, the case for democracy insistence in Central Europe, what shape it may take, what lessons from past democracy support in the region and what role for the European Union. Now, without much further ado, I'll now let the panelists give a couple of minutes of introduction after which we will turn to a discussion. And we will start with Dr. Katharina Barley. Dr. Karina Barley is the vice president of the European Parliament and is part of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. And in that capacity, she has been a shadow rapporteur on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. So very pertinent to today's debate. Before she entered in her current position, she was a member of the German Bundestag for seven years. She was also the secretary general of the SPD, the German Social Democratic Party. She has been a federal minister in Germany for family affairs, senior citizens, women and youth. She has also been the federal minister for labor in an acting position and importantly, federal minister for justice and consumer protection. Now, before she entered politics, she was a lawyer, she was a judge. So she is very well placed to talk about the topic of today's panel discussion. It is also Katharina's birthday today, so not just International Ideas' birthday, also Ms. Barley's birthday. And we wish her a happy birthday with this. Katharina Barley will have to leave a little bit early just before the end of this debate. So please, we will excuse her at a later moment. But now, without further ado, Katharina, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Sam. Also for the good wishes and congratulations, of course, back to you to your anniversary. Well, as you mentioned, I'm a new member on the European level of the European Parliament. So I don't have as much experience as the other panelists with democracy assistance, probably. But I would like to start actually where you finished them because we do speak a lot about backsliding, democratic backsliding, but I think what we witness at the moment is more than that because already in the past, we've had issues with the rule of law and democracy in some member states every now and again with corruption, especially, but also with the independence of the judiciary when I think of Berlusconi time in Italy, for example. But we always found ways of dealing with these problems. We found it all off when talking about corruption. We now have got the European Prosecutor's Office and Well, the Rights and Values Program, et cetera, was already mentioned also. We're far from perfect. That's true. The European Union is work in progress. It's probably never gonna be perfect, and we've seen the limits of, for example, taking corruption, all of that then cannot pursue the cases in the member states or European Prosecutor's Office, not every country accessing it. But we've always, I would say, had a common goal. We've always had this common set of the acceptance of union-based values. And I think when you had governments that were corrupt, obviously corrupt, they were kind of trying to hide it or trying to sneak out somehow. But what we are witnessing now is actually much more than a backslide. It is member states that have a different mindset and that are actively promoting this mindset. They're not ashamed of themselves. They're not hiding their intentions. They're not, not even the corruption in Hungary, which is so obvious as seems to be a matter that anyone is ashamed of in the government. But what they want, and that is my point, is to actually change the European Union. It's not only that they want to have this impact in their own member state, that they want to control their own judiciary and hold down the opposition, et cetera, but they actually want to reshape the European Union. And we are seeing that concerning the notion of the rule of law. They are not, their narrative is that there is no such thing as a European understanding of the rule of law. This is their new narrative. What they are saying is that you have, there is no legal definition of the rule of law. This is true. So what they are saying is we have a special history, we have a special culture, and rule of law in our member states means something else than in other member states. Of course, we have different cultures and different histories, and we do not want to have uniform member states. We are united in diversity. This is absolutely fine. But if you accept only to discuss if the independence of judiciary is actually part of the rule of law, and if what is happening in Poland is still complying with the independence of the judiciary, you're already on a slippery slope. Because I think yesterday we've seen the case of Judge Tuleja in Poland who was convicted by the disciplinary chamber. They took away his immunity and they cut his wages by 25%. And they are preventing him from taking part in judicial decisions. And they are not allowed to do so. We have a ruling by the decision by the European Court of Justice dated I think from April, that they are not allowed to issue disciplinary verdict. So what we are seeing is that they are trying to shift the common understanding of the basic principles of the European Union to a segregated understanding where the rule of law can mean this in one country and that in another. And I think there is not enough attention on this point. And this is really something that is a different level. It is not only a backslide, it is an attack on the fundamental values of the European Union. And this is why I'm so very vigorous about all this and probably one of the most hated persons by Hungarian and Polish government, finding myself in portraits next to Hitler, et cetera. But I think this is really, we have to speak out at this very point because this is infectious. We're seeing the Slovenian prime minister supporting Orban now in his fight against the rule of law conditionality. So it is infectious. And we need new mechanisms, you mentioned too. If democracy assistance, something like it, would be suitable, I prefer to listen then to talk about that because I think the others are more experienced there. But we really have to be very, very cautious at this point. This is what I wanted to underline. Thank you very much, Czekaterina. You've touched on again a very important point that this is not just a problem for Poland and Hungary and that is a huge problem. It is a problem for the EU as such because the EU is not just a technical or an economic construct. It is a values-based organization as well. And as soon as we have different values within the European Union, it touches on the very foundations of what brought the European Union together. We'll talk about the ways to address those values and to bring those values together later on. Thank you for your introduction. We're now going to move to the next speaker, which is Mr. Dr. Thomas Carruthers. Thomas Carruthers is the Senior Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In that capacity, he directs the Democracy Conflict and Governance Program. And for years and years from that position, he has been a central voice within the democracy assistance community. So he's an authority in that area. He has written many books on the topic. The most recent one is Democracy Divided, the Global Challenge of Political Polarization. And he has worked on the topic of democracy assistance in Central Europe since the early 1990s when he was very invested in democratic transitions in many countries in Central Europe. So again, a very good person to both look back at how democracy assistance took place in the past but also look forward. Tom, the floor is yours. Sam, thank you very much. First of all, congratulations to International Idea. I'm a 25th anniversary. I have a vivid memory in the summer of 1995 being invited to Stockholm to one of the first meetings of International Idea. And in the headquarters, there were light fixtures that were just wires hanging from the ceiling. There was still a discotech in the basement but already work on democracy was getting underway and I knew something good was being built. And it's been my pleasure over the years to have had extensive contact with International Idea. I've been asked to both look forward but to look back. Let me start by looking back and I'm gonna build a bit here on what Adam and Katarina said. If we look back at Western democracy assistance to Central Europe in the 1990s, many good things were done and one would have to salute the work of hundreds and back thousands of activists and officials and others who contributed. But there were two fundamental flaws that to this day haunt the legacy of that work. The first was that the work was built on an idea of institutional modeling that both economic transitions and political transitions would be built on the back of certain institutions that you had to create by modeling their forms. You take forms of institutions from the West and you translate them to the East in simple terms. The problem with that was that you were trying to build institutions on the basis of ground in which the rule of law was deeply missing. Westerners who came to Central Europe in those years were fooled to some extent by the extensive state capacity that the socialist regimes had built and so they saw states that looked a lot like, states that they lived in in their own societies and thought, oh, one just needs to transform these states by showing them how a parliament works, showing them how a civilization agency works and so forth, but these were states that had been built on the abuse of the rule of law and the use of laws as an instrument of oppression rather than an instrument of justice. And so you built transitions on the basis of injustice and inequity in many cases and the experience of citizens of this process of institutional modeling was the experience of injustice. And so the transitions became associated in the minds of many Central Europeans with unfairness and with injustice. And so economic transitions that to Westerners were about growth were about injustice to people who experienced them on the ground. A second flaw was that this assistance came out of a mechanism that had been established for developing countries, Africa, Asia, Latin America and so forth. Those mechanisms went to Central Europe and it was a bad fit. Central Europeans on average were better educated than Western Europeans in the 1980s. Central European educational systems were very good in many ways, yet this institutional mechanism came and treated Central Europeans as though they were Asians, Africans and Latin Americans in many ways with sort of very old fashioned ideas of transfer of knowledge and very old fashioned basically condescending ideas of this is how you treat the quote locals in the quote field. And the experience of this assistance for many citizens over time wasn't good and it was basically insulting. Left behind the legacy of feeling that the West was coming and insulting them in various ways and started to build up a strong sense of grievance in the process. And so lack of rule of law and a lack of matching of the cultural realities between Western Europe and Eastern Europe created fundamental flaws that in the 2000s came back to bite this world very strongly. Because they don't have much time, it would be very blunt. How to go forward? There really have to be three concepts. Pressure, solidarity and mutual learning. If Western Europe or other parts of Europe are gonna work with central Europe on their democracy they have to do all three things. They have to get serious about pressure not be embarrassed or inhibited about exerting pressure on forces that are anti-democratic. And European Union is very consensus oriented but it has to shift gears and get serious about pressure. Secondly, solidarity. There has to be a real solidarity expressed horizontally across lines with professionals like Adam and his world. And solidarity can be financial support but it has to be a much deeper. We stand with you. We are with you. We are horizontal professional exchanges. We are associations. We stand side by side with the people who care about democracy in these regions. And third, mutual learning. If there's gonna be any kind of assistance it can't be we have the answer. Here's the solution. It has to be we have a problem. You have a problem. Let's sit down and work together. And so I've been saying the same in Washington let's have a conference on political polarization in Washington and invite people from around the world who've experienced political polarization to help us work on it. And then maybe we can go talk about it with others. Looking forward to the Biden administration you asked me to say a few words about that. President Biden, when he takes office on January 20th will bring a better more democratic focus lens for central Europe. It'll have several characteristics that the Trump administration has not had. First, he will be interested in the region. He cares about it. He knows about it. Second, he has no fondness for your liberal regimes or authoritarian figures. In fact, he dislikes them and will protect that. Third, he will not make the mistake that some people in the Trump administration made of thinking that if we push Hungary or Poland too hard they will go into the quote arms of the Russians. They won't make that mistake which was a serious tactical mistake on the part of some people in the Trump administration. And fourth, he will not appoint ambassadors to the region who are embarrassing figures who cultivate illiberal friends and associations. So better times are coming, but it's only the start. The Polish authorities and the Hungarian government will push back against this. Orban gave a preemptive speech before Biden's election talking about he fears quote moral imperialism coming from the United States. They'll try to use the same tactic as he uses with the European Union which has always to say, oh, from the European Union to the Soviet Union you've seen this before. They'll also attack the United States for leaning on him, but he's nervous. He knows he's lost an important friend in the White House. So the fact that he gave that speech before shows it's on his mind but we need to take advantage of that concern and begin to translate together a new US administration and European friends and partners to do better in the years ahead on this topic. Thanks Sam, look forward to the discussion. Excellent. Thank you so much for telling us what went wrong in the past and also showing us the way forward. And I think more of the contours of how we have to move forward are now coming up. I think one of your important points was that we cannot take a top-down approach. We have to treat those that we're trying to support as equals, we have to learn from them at the same time as we're supporting them. And I think that is the balancing act that you're referring to, that somehow we have to avoid to be moral imperialists but at the same time, we have to somehow engage and that is a fine line to walk. Thank you very much Tom for that contribution. We'll now move on to the next speaker, which is Dr. Ivan Kraschev. Ivan Kraschev is the chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Bulgaria and a permanent fellow of the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. He's also the founding board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a very important group and a trustee of the International Crisis Group. He writes very regularly for the New York Times and he has written many, many books. Probably the most important one for this debate is his last year's book, The Light That Filled, A Reckoning, which deals with how democracy was introduced in Central and Eastern Europe, just after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Dr. Ivan Kraschev, we will turn to you immediately, the floor is yours. Ivan, can you unmute your microphone? So I just said that I want to congratulate you, you and Katerina with the birthdays and I want to continue with Katerina and Tom particularly, I have been coming from because I have a problem both with the idea of the backsliding and the idea of the democratic assistance, simply like wording the lessons of the 1990s. Backsliding, by the way, is a very strongly religious terms. It was used in the Middle Ages about the new converts to Christianity that go back to their bad habits. And I do believe something which Katerina Barly said is particularly important. This is the type of political regimes and their voters do not believe that they're kind of a deviation, the alternative understanding of what is democracy and the idea of democracy is very much democratic majoritarianism and much more based on the idea of the sovereign nation and the idea of the sovereign democracy. So from this point of view, this is not the people that basically does not know what they're doing or basically failing to do things like this. They simply said that the model that have been imitated from the 1990s is not the model that they want to follow. And this is quite important because obviously we also have a crisis with the model itself. If you're going to the opinion polls, you're going to see that the younger Westerners are much more mistrustful towards democracy than the older generations and much more mistrustful than the older generations have been when they have been of their age. So from this point of view, it's not simply that you have central and East European countries that basically were newcomers into the Democratic Club that went into a crisis. I don't believe we're talking about much more general crisis of democracy and this crisis of democracy has a different versions, but the most important of them is that on certain level, nobody is questioning that the will of the people in the way it is represented in elections is the only legitimate source of power, but it's a totally different definition of what is the nature of the democratic power and how you're going to exercise it. So from this point of view, the regimes like Orban's, the most articulate on the Hungarian side and the Polish, they're not declaring war on democracy, they're declaring war on liberalism. And basically they said democracy does not need to be liberal, Orban's idea of illiberal democracy, they're very much pushing on the fact that the majority has the right to govern and what is critically important that for them the idea of the national sovereignty is at the center of their discourse. Why I'm saying this, from this point of view, you cannot talk about democratic assistance like before, where you have a government which at least they're pretending that they want to be assisted in kind of a going with a certain model, they don't want. And from this point of view, European democracies in a much more difficult position than any type of a democracy is in the world exactly because of the existence of the European Union and the incredible level of interdependence of our countries. So all of these countries has their vital power in the European Union. And at the end of the day, what you're seeing now in the EU is a kind of a, not a military version of the American Civil War of the 19th century. Basically, you have a totally different idea of what is the meaning of the union. So from this point of view, the idea of the democratic assistance is going to have a totally different meaning when we talk about it today. And this way, even the idea of the assistance is something that basically many of these political leaders, but also their voters are going to oppose because the idea of assistance is a symmetrical idea. There is a countries that know what it is and they're going to assist others who does not. And I'm very much in agreement with Tom Carrados that we're in a different stage now. In a certain way, democracy always was an experimental regime. And we basically have this democratic experiment going in different direction in different places. And this is much more about democratic solidarity on one side, basically taking the side of the people that you believe stand for values that you stand for, but also exchanging experiences based on what we're learning out of it. So this is not simply about the technical assistance which many people believed was at the heart of the democracy assistance in the 1990s. It's not going in my view to work like this. And also it's quite important to understand that for many of the voters of these regimes, this populist governments and this change of politics was perceived as an act of democratization itself. You are going to see the trust in democracy being increased in some of the country after populist leaders come to power. And when we talk about even the grassroots level, listen, there is a liberal grassroots, there is also a liberal grassroots. This is not that basically you have this kind of a... This is important because to try to view these leaders simply as a kind of an isolated, small authoritarian cliques which it is enough basically to go beyond misinformation and everything is going to be fine in my view is a big illusion. Secondly, and this also can be very easily seen in the United States, it is very difficult to defend the rule of law and support for any impartial institutions in a highly polarized society in which each of the sides believe that the victory of the other party is the end of democracy. And this is the critically important and this is why for me, how to have a certain type of consensus about democratic norms is the new thing that we're seeing. It's not simply these days that you have a problem with the rule of law, you have a contested elections. And unfortunately, I fear that because of what we think in the US today, we can see the proliferation of contested. I believe we have lost Ivan Khrashtchev. Ivan, can you hear us? Just trying to see if there's anything that my colleagues are telling me. No, the rest, Tom, Adam, you can still hear me well. Yeah, so I think it's just even that we have lost, which is very unfortunate. We'll try to get him back as soon as possible, but in the interest of time, I think he was moving towards the end of his presentation. We'll now move to the next presenter. But before that, I'll try and summarize two things that I picked from Ivan's presentation, which is first. If we want to support democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, do the ones that we hope to help even want us to help them if their view of what democracy means is so fundamentally different from ours? And secondly, we should realize that support for democracy cannot just be technical support. And I think Tom Khrashtchev has also referred to that, a flaw that was initiated when we first supported democracy 30 years ago in the region. It is a political approach that requires political instruments and that will be a completely different game. Now, let's leave it there for the intervention by Ivan Khrashtchev for the moment and we'll turn to Marta Pradavi. Let's see, do we have Ivan back? Yeah, I do believe I'm back. Okay, Ivan, let's give you one more minute. Is that all right before we then move to the next speaker? We had lost you four... No, no, I do believe basically my only last point was that from this point of view, basically going and trying to base our work on the ideas like backsliding and simply democratic assistance and the way they have been developed could be a misrecognizing the problem that we have. Thank you very much, Ivan. That is fantastic and I had summarized much of what you had said just now. We'll now turn to Marta Pradavi, the last speaker. And Marta is the co-chair of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, position in which she has tried to support and advance democratic values in Hungary for years and years. So she has been one of those people at the front lines and I've already referred to her important work. She has received many international awards in that capacity. I'm not going to read them out all, but one of them is that she was part of the political 28th class of 2019. And let me tell you, that means something in the Brussels bubble where I sit. She is currently on sabbatical leave from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee because she has taken up a position as policy leader fellow at the School of Transitional Governance of the European University Institute. Marta, the floor is yours. Thank you very much and congratulations to the birthdays. But as we all know, birthdays mean that there is a next ordinary day and so we have to continue our work just as we did before. When I first met Adam Bodnett, I think it was in the late 90s. It certainly doesn't feel like yesterday, but it doesn't make sense. But it was in the past and certainly there are similarities and there are differences. The previous speakers have addressed some of the differences and I think it is important to highlight the polarization and sobriety that is a factor that we have to take into account and also the fact that there is, so to say, no carrot day as it was in the 90s. The prospect of European integration and the social and the political and the infrastructure legal frameworks that came with it, they are not there. These countries that we're discussing now are members of a club band. As Katarina Barley said, they want to turn the club inside out and it is quite a lot of pride. I see the difficulties, but I still say that, yes, we do need to invest in this critical infrastructure of democracy support, not only in Central Europe, in the whole of the European Union. Without that, no measure targeting just the countries so often described as backsliders will work. And we have to see how, as you also talked about this, there are quite a lot of troublesome developments on democracy, on polarization within the European Union, in every member state, particularly young people. I think they like to point that out. But still, Central Europe, I would absolutely argue that there's quite a lot of people, high percentage of the population, who is absolutely in favor of European Union membership. And they are supportive of the idea that the EU also means something beyond just the fund transfers. When you look at people in the Visigrad 4 region, for example, a National Democratic Institute survey has just found that from June, so already conducted in COVID, that while there is quite a lot of dissatisfaction among young people, the 19 to 20, sorry, 16 to 29 age group, the political dissatisfaction is low, is not political participation, but at the same time, over 70% in all four of the Visigrad countries of young people support democracy. And they mostly agree that there is no better regime, no better system for us. Ask them, what are they worried about? It will not be rule of law. And Adam Bonnard pointed out, there is a good reason for that. It's an abstract concept, but people and young people are worried about corruption, rising prices, rising cost of living, also unemployment and health care, and climate change. And no one can do any of these without good participation and law. And I think it's important to highlight how crucial civil society is in this context, particularly in these countries. And I would argue that despite the clear government to engage in support schemes that want to strengthen civil society and democratic participation, and we've seen that happen very clearly in Hungary with the EA Norway grant scheme. But despite this, civil society is really important. It can convey ideas, it can convey values, and it can also of course hold governments accountable. And this is what the government, the ability and actually the impact of civil society to mobilize and to monitor and take part in debates. And this is one essential difference in the 90s that civil society organizations in central Eastern Europe are much better shape in terms of their experience, their knowledge. There is a lot to do to boost this experience, this mobilization capacity. And I would propose that we look at this in the framework where civil society activism, civil society, solidarity, collaboration, cooperation is a key target of support actions. Now, there's one thing that we absolutely have to address and the EU has not been very good so far at addressing this. Human rights defenders are at risk within the European Union today to be put in place for that. People might have to relocate. There are women, NGO leaders who are helping women victims of domestic violence who are being targeted. The Fundamental Rights Agency has found that in a recent survey, one out of five human rights defenders heard attacks, physical attacks in the EU. So we have to also take account of this. But beyond this, there needs to be a lot of other types of solidarity. Thomas brother has addressed some of these and I'd like to just give you a couple of more ideas about how to promote this idea of solidarity. Yes, grassroots local action has to be supported but linked up to others beyond the sort of human rights or civil society sector. So there is a world out there that civil society organizations can and should connect to and vice versa. And also trans-nationally, how come that when Polish judges are being attacked a thousand, yes, went to Warsaw, but we don't have thousands going or speaking up. So I think it's important to realize this aspect of solidarity that we really do need to show that we stand with those who are under attack and we stand together and proudly so with the values that civil society represents. We also need to encourage coalition building and these coalitions need to also take into account trade unions and policy makers and academic then this is something where some of the organization be encouraged and helped. I'm working now on a project to do that to enable civil society activists working on rule of law defense and human rights to be better able to connect to others. But if we look at this as a sort of a specific issue and don't address the larger text, then we will not be able to really see change. And I think a lot of people do want to see change and want to be a part of that and look forward with a lot of commitment and that dedication to their energies into this. Thank you. Thank you very much Marta for giving your views and of course as a human rights defender and a rule of law democracy activist you have been in the midst of it. I think the points you make are very important. First of all that we have to focus on young people and that echoes what had been said before and that those young people are not necessarily are not by nature supporters of democracy. It's something we have to fight for we have to make it concrete for them for the everyday lives, what it means to support democracy. Also that we have to do so better than we have done in the past. We have been given our delta a better hand because civil society organizations are much more professional now than they were 30 years ago. So the starting point is much better. And then that transnational international cooperation to support that solidarity that Adam Bodnar referred to that is something that you also highlighted. Now we've heard from all four speakers and I'd like to give the opportunity for speakers to see is there anything you would like to respond to from what you from the presentations that others made? Is there anything that the panelists would want to respond to in reflection to each other? And please raise your hand if you do. Yeah. Tom, go ahead. Just like to reinforce something that Yvonne Krastev said that the notion of backsliding is, you know let's be blunt with ourselves is an inherently condescending idea. It's the idea that we're on some mountain top and people are trying to climb up to where we are and they keep sliding back down. Whereas neither Victor Arban nor certain people in the long justice party in Poland nor Vladimir Putin for that example feel they're backsliding. They feel they're moving forward and their supporters feel they're moving the country forward, not backward. People don't want to go backward. They want to go forward. The problem is there are different paths forward. And so it isn't about people some continuum on which people are sliding back. It's their divergent path, which is a much more profound problem because then there isn't agreement on what the continuum of desire behavior is. And so these simple terms really need to be rethought because we keep making this mistake that oh, he needs to stop backsliding. What we're saying is he needs to keep, he needs to change course completely from where he thinks he's going to something different which is a much more profound challenge. That's it. Thank you very much. I know a number of panelists we've used that term. Adam, go ahead. I just wanted to make one small comment regarding the speech by Katrina Burley because she connected and she said that it is one of the arguments used in the debate which is the connection of so-called tradition in a given country. And the fact that basically we don't know this tradition and we have the different way of interpreting things. So for example, we have a different tradition of rule of law. Please note that Polish minister of justice these days or the prime minister is using the term so-called rule of law. Not rule of law, such but so-called rule of law. And the same is with LGBT rights which are presented as somehow contrary to the Polish tradition. And you know the problem with this argument is such that if you really look deeply into let's say Polish doctrine, Polish discussions, developments, it's completely false because we have really quite long tradition of building rule of law at least in academia. Among judges, we have 25 years of a storage access of the Polish constitutional court. With LGBT rights, we are one of the countries, one of the first countries in Europe that decriminalized homosexuality in 1933. 1933 just before the Second World War. So that is I think something which requires maybe sometimes like more attention, like just getting to the facts that sometimes those authoritarian guys are using their interpretation of facts and they reference to this sovereignty of nation mentioned by Ivan Krustev in order to change completely the discourse and to prevent opponents from any real discussion on those issues. And those voices that are let's say like minority voices in the Polish society do not sometimes usually have access to counteract that kind of narrative. Thank you very much. I'd like to ask Ivan Krustev for his views because we're now seeing there's a bit of a discussion when we talk about democracy in the rule of law, when we talk about backsliding, is there one concept of those values that applies globally? Or should we accept that different parts of the world have different concepts and we should respect them in it or at least we should take that as a starting point and then have a discussion with them. So how do you see that Ivan? Should we respect the fact that as you said, governments, some governments in Central and Eastern Europe don't disagree with the fact that they have to abide by democratic and rule of law principles, but they simply say that our concept is different. Listen, this is slightly different for the member states of the European Union keep in comparison with the world as a whole. I do believe that they are universal values but of course this universal values can have an origin in a different cultural tradition and can be justified differently. So from this point of view, it's not that there is one model of democracy that is going to be applied everywhere. The problem with the European Union is that this is a common legal space. And from this point of view, this is something more than basically a group of sovereign countries that decided to cooperate with each other. And this comes the idea of the European citizenship. Could it means that I'm going to have a less rights if I decide to move to Poland than when I'm going to stay in Germany? So from this point of view, it's quite important to see the specific nature of the crisis that we see in the European Union. And part of the problem is that in the European Union, nevertheless, that we talk about European democracy to a certain extent, the democratic legitimacy of the Union very much comes from the transfer of the democratic legitimacy of the governments that have been elected. And from this point of view, the European Council is very much there. And what I really fear is that this kind of a policies and this kind of a governments really managed to weaponize a certain institutional contradictions that are within the European Union. And they had their strong way to mobilize it. I also want to be kind of quite open on this. Part of the fact that in 1990s and 2000s, the very process of European integration is the process of adopting the rules that existed before you entered the club. And this is basically the nature of the European integration process. So the process of Europeanization and the process of democratization, they coincided, but in a way they have a different meaning because the democratization all the time is about self-governing. We are going to decide for our own. But when we as a society decided that we want to join European Union, of course we had to adopt this kind of legislation that existed before. And one of the strongest message and part of the message that got support on certain parts of our society was that resisting to this kind of a European norms is the only way to show our sovereignty. And this is why these governments are really and I do believe that Rina Barley was absolutely right on this is a major challenge for the very existing existence of the European Union in the way it is. And by the way, don't forget it's not the governments that want to leave the European Union. It's very different than basically the Britain that said we don't like it, we want to be on our own. They said, no, no, no, we like it because we like European funds, we want the possibility to travel. But what we are not going basically to agree is any type messing in our domestic politics. And in the case of Hungary, I do believe much more than even in the case of Poland, one basic question that we're facing is the following. As Alam Shevvorsky has nicely defined it, democracy is a political system in which incumbent can lose elections and after losing elections is going to leave power. The problem is under what kind of conditions you can believe that in some of these kinds of sovereign democracies, the opposition really can win. And this is the story under what kind of condition basically these major characteristic of democracy that governments can lose elections is really going to happen. And I believe this is what we are facing in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly strong in Hungary because of the constitutional majority that Hungarian government has. Thank you, Ivan. If I may draw a rat threat through the discussions, I see that many are saying, well, it's either condescending to support democracy from the outside or it won't be accepted. It won't work. That seems to suggest that if we are gonna support democracy within the EU in future, it will have to be driven from those actors that sit within Central and Eastern Europe. And I'd like to ask Marta Pardavi, who is one of those leading actors within Hungary. How do you see that? Who should be at the helm of democracy support efforts in future? And should this be nationally driven regionally? So between actors in Central and Eastern Europe as I think also Adam Bodner mentioned, or is there also potential for Europe-wide or even global support to democracy in Central Europe? Thank you. There is, I don't think there is a yes or no answer to this. Obviously, society and civil society also in Central Europe is I think very mature in many ways. It's fragile, it faces threats. The legal environment is in many places not moving in an enabling threat. There is issues related to lack of free media and media pluralism. We haven't discussed this, but it's very, very closely connected. And so I would not see any success that successful that doesn't address the media pluralism issue. That should always be parts of the package. But I think, yes, Central Europeans would certainly need to play a driving role in this. Not only to negate the idea that it's externally forced, but also because there is quite a lot of expertise in this region. But I would very much advocate for having a lot of collaboration among Central European countries too. We do see, for example, Slovakia is in a not wholly, but partially different place this year at least. Then there is, so beyond the regional cooperation and collaboration, I think there needs to be a lot more and a lot of places outside of Europe have a lot to offer us and we would also a lot to offer them. And so why leave that out? So we'd see it more as a sort of centric circles than just silos. Thank you. We're coming to the end of our debate and we will end it in a couple of minutes by listening to the Chair of International Ideas Board of Advisors. Before we start with that part, I'd like to give all the speakers another 30 seconds to give some final remarks and especially give us our view on what the role of the EU should be. So what can the EU do better or more of if democracy assistance in Central Europe were to take a more prominent role? And let us start with the same order as we had for speakers in the panel. Unfortunately, Katarina Barley has left so that means we will start with Tom Kervades. Tom, 30 seconds please. The EU has to get serious. This is an existential challenge for what the European Union is. And it keeps thinking in rather old fashioned ways that these are rather small secondary states in the Union that are like rocks in the shoe of the European Union. They're not that. This is a fundamental debate about what the European Union means as an institution. I mean, it's as a... Tom, we lost you for the last 10 seconds. Could you please? No, all I said was this is an existential challenge to the Union. It keeps being treated as a rock in the shoe. It's time to get serious for Germany and France and the Netherlands and other crucial members of the European Union to the side. They're gonna take this seriously. Maybe the fight over the vote on the Recovery Act will help crystallize people's mind. Yeah. Thank you. Ivan, we'll turn to you now. 30 final seconds for some remarks. Listen, I very much agree with Tom. In a certain way, if Hungarian majority of Hungarians or majority of the Poles wants to be governed in the way they're governed in a democratic society, they have the right to have it. The only thing that they cannot have it is basically adopting this version of democracy and staying within the European Union. So I do believe in a certain way, there is a choice and there is a free choice on this. So from this point of view, the role of the European Union is not to try to discipline this society in the way it was in the 1990s, but basically to tell us there is a choice and you can make it. Thank you very much. Then Marta Pardavi. I agree that this is an existential challenge and today we see that with the Hungarian and the Polito of the recovery fund and the budget and people are rightly worried where will they receive support from people in Spain and Italy also are worried because of this. And I think the point that this is not only Hungarian and Polish issue is being made whenever you think of your future as a Spanish citizen today, but it's up to the Eurovision quite a lot to make use of the tools it already has. I think there needs to be a lot more resolve and political commitment. The technical tools need people to take them out of the toolbox, so to say. And so far in many cases, the most important political leadership from the European Commission has not been very ambitious in using this, but members too, there is of course a core group of member states extremely vocal, but what about the others? I'm sure that there will be more and they need to speak up today because otherwise those who are very vocal and very agile in destruction will get their way, will not be good for the European Union nor for the voters. So I'd say member states also need to really take action and coalition. Thank you, Marta. Final remarks by Adam Bodnar. Again, Adam, 30 seconds on what the EU can do more of or better. I just wanted to say that EU, in addition to all of this you have said, I agree with this, should take also more advantage out of the experiences and work of other international organizations. I think Council of Europe, OSCE, are quite neglected. And also those institutions should take those issues seriously, we cannot wait, I don't know, five years for the decision on the number of important human rights cases or two, three years for decisions on cases of judges who are subject of repression. It is also the responsibility of such bodies like the European Court of Human Rights to react to this challenge, but also it is the responsibility of the European Union to take advantage of the work of the Veterans Commission, Commission for Human Rights, OSCE and other international agendas. Not just concentrate on its own work. Thank you very much. Thank you, Adam. And that brings us to the end of the panel part of our debates. I'm not going to try to summarize all that has been said, but I think we have come to the conclusion that democracy assistance in Central and Eastern Europe at least would address a problem, that there is a problem of democratic and rule of law deterioration. Maybe the terminology is something we will have to change, but there is a problem and there is an urgency to address it. The way in which we should do it can vary. There has been a lot of mention on supporting values, especially of young people making it very concrete how democracy and rule of law affects their daily lives, but that we should engage with them in a non condescending way. The drivers of this type of support should be those that are in country, but not only them, that the civil society organizations that are stronger today than they were 30 years ago should be the drivers, but that the solidarity that they have with international partners within Central Europe, but also Europe-wide and globally is crucial. And I think all the speakers have referred to this. Now, lastly, the role of the European Union is important. We agree that the problem of democratic and rule of law deterioration is a problem for the EU, but the EU itself has also a role to play in addressing these problems to safeguard its very existence. The way in which it should do that, I don't think we came to full conclusion, but we did say that it involves both technical instruments, funding, but also a strong political role, speaking out, pushing back, and that is something that is not being done enough yet. Lastly, other international organizations such as the Council of Europe and OSEE, many, many others have a similar role to play. So that is what I took from this discussion. There will be a continuation of discussion in years to come. Idea has organized similar discussions in Brussels in the past and we will do so in future. Now, let us end this very fascinating discussion by hearing from the Chair of the Board of Advisors of International Idea, Amina Borskert. Amina Borskert has been a member of the European Parliament for 10 years in the past, but before that she spent a whole career supporting civil rights and the fight against racism. So she's very well replaced, well, very well placed to reflect on the discussion that we have had today and Amina, the final words of this session are for you. The floor is yours. In difficult times, such as the ones we live in, Spain is firmly convinced of the importance of robust democracies, inclusive multilateralism and global cooperation. Democracy cannot fall victim to the pandemic. It is imperative to remain committed to promoting and strengthening democratic values. We are also convinced that upholding multilateralism is the only way forward to deal with the major global challenges ahead of us, as well with the consequences of the pandemic. Happy 25th anniversary dear Idea Institute and dear colleagues. Let's continue working together, 25 more years towards sustainable and resilient democracies. Hello. It is my pleasure to extend my sincere greetings to all of you on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. It is the right time to reflect what we've achieved in the past 25 years. Democracy is not a single short effort. It requires constant attention and care. It requires polishing from promoting democratic education to educating people on democratic values. The idea is championing in this area to further promote democratic institutions and democratic values throughout the world. Once again, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to Idea and happy 25th anniversary. A sort of Chile in Sweden. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate International Idea for its 25th anniversary. As you may know, Chile is a founder, member of Idea and our commitment to democracy remains stronger than ever. We believe that during this difficult time of the pandemic, the work of Idea is more important than ever to defend democratic values worldwide. So I want to congratulate, especially to all the staff members, both in Stockholm and in the regional offices for this anniversary. And I encourage you to continue working to defend the values that founded this great institution. Congratulations to International Idea on its 25th anniversary. The German government is proud to be a member of International Idea. Over the past 25 years, International Idea has proven to be an important thing and do thank for the promotion of democracy around the globe. Nowadays, this task is more important than ever. The world faces an erosion of democratic systems and of civic and political space, worsened by COVID-19 crisis. We have to protect democratic values in all parts of the world. Germany is strongly committed to this challenge. German Development Corporation is focusing on democracy protection and promotion in more than 40 partner countries. And we are very happy to partner with International Idea in this endeavor. Minister of International Development, I'm sending you this message to celebrate the 25th anniversary of International Idea. Canada is committed to promoting and protecting democracy worldwide. Since becoming a member state of International Idea in 1997, we have been supporting and working closely with your organization. We value your strong international reputation, extensive programming, and high quality policy products. For example, we have benefited from your biennial report, the global state of democracy, and your leadership in calling to defend democracy during the COVID-19 crisis. We particularly appreciated the valuable insights you had provided during consultations for our Feminist International Assistance Policy a few years ago. With democracy under constant threat, we look forward to continuing to work with International Idea to support democratic development and inclusive governance across the world. Thank you and happy anniversary. Dear Idea Secretary-General, colleagues, and friends, Finland is a founding member of the International Idea, and we are proud of that. Nobel Peace Prize awarded and former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisari, was a member of the first Idea Board. Finland has contributed Idea's work for many years in Myanmar at present. Idea data and tools are used by Finnish ministries, political parties, and academia in advancing new forms of democracy. Democracy, the most successful political idea of the 20th century, is now challenged by authoritarian regimes and movements. We need Idea, its member states, and its dedicated staff in defending democracy and human rights. And all together, we can strengthen a sustainable democracy for next decades. After 25 years, International Idea is old enough to know better and young enough to be in one card to promote democracy. Happy anniversary. Democracy is not a finished task, but a permanent exercise for which it is necessary to have solid and effective institutions that make possible more fair and inclusive societies. Thus, next, to celebrate its bicentenary of republican life, Peru has launched internal reforms to improve its representation and electoral system, whose results must be verified in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2021. In this hemisphere, and as a promoter of the Inter-American Democratic Party, Peru continues to be committed to the values that inspire and continue to promote peaceful actions to recover democracy where it is vulnerable. As a member of this organization and a member of a national office, they receive the testimony of the unvariable bet of Peru for strengthening democracy and governability, as well as the support to International Idea, in this shared task. Thank you very much.