 Good afternoon everybody. I would like to congratulate you that we're fearless to not be intimidated by one inch of snowfall That may land sometime today. I can't get over Washington. I mean we're you know this this the the federal government has said It's probably so risky with this one inch that you can leave early if you want to I think My Swedish ambassador friend is laughing over here. I just want to just for good reasons welcome Welcome. We're delighted to have have you all here this is going to be a Rare treat and a privilege. I of course have this luxury every day I I'm able to sit and talk with dr. Brzezinski and to Learn from him almost on a daily basis, and I have in 11 years Found it more exciting every every time and so I'm I'm I want to share that with all of you And I'm glad so many of you can come. Thank you for for coming. This is a I think an exceptionally important book at a time the the the geopolitical landscape is really profoundly in flux without a sense of Direction on where it is going and the question is where should it go and what role should The United States play and play with all of its important friends around the world And I think we're going to explore that this afternoon. I want to say a special thanks to dr. Brzezinski for giving us this time I would especially also like to thank david ignatius I I love calling david ignatius because I don't pay him and he's still willing to come and do things for me Which is just really fabulous, but then I also plug his books and so please buy his books easier And because it's the only way I can say thank you to him for his generosity Let me just say a couple things first of all would you please take your Your cell phones if you have them and turn them to silent stun You know so I'm perfectly happy if you fall over dead with your cell phone But I don't want you to disturb anybody with it going off alive in here number one number two Dr. Brzezinski does have to leave early and and I want to tell you something I learned from watching the antique road show you all know this the antique road show that books that have only the Author's signature and not an inscription sell for ten times the value of ones that have a Personalization and scripture that so I've pleaded with dr. Brzezinski to make all of you rich by only signing his name And he's agreed to do that. Okay, so we have that clear And then what dr. Brzezinski is going to begin with a with a pre-sees of his thesis that he That he outlines in this book and then we'll turn to david to come up and to explore the depths and nuances of it So would you please join me in welcoming doctors big to Brzezinski? Thank You John good afternoon First of all, I want to say hello to some of my friends here and Follow that with an immediate apology If you haven't received my book in the mail by now You will not receive it and I'm sorry, but in the publisher only gave me a certain amount of free books to hand out So I hope there will be no resentment and it will not be reflected in the discussion period And secondly, let me say that I'll just be very brief in telling you a little bit what the book is about and why it was written I wrote it largely because I sensed that The most vital part of the world that is to say in the United States and Europe Vital in the sense of the role of its core ideas its sense of mission Its concept of the relationship of the human being to his society and to government Is in fact Increasing the wallowing in a self preoccupation in dealing with immediate problems all of which are real But I also have the feeling that the ability to deal with problems is increased If your effort is undertaken in the context of a shared larger sense of direction and I think the West should have such a sense and therefore the book in many respects Deals with what the West should be doing in the world in Relationship to the changes in the world and this is the sort of underlying theme of the book The book itself is organized Essentially into four major portions and I'll give you a quick summary of it The first deals with the nature of change of global power the United States in 1990 became the only global superpower and I write that book with the realization that by and large We failed to exercise that opportunity responsibly that our moment of historical uniqueness in that respect the only global superpower was in many respects wasted and I in that context raised the question whether we can recoup and if so How do we handle our opportunities if we can again create them? I start then by arguing that global power as a concept itself is historically brief and probably no longer relevant That is to say global power as something that could be attained physically Was only a reality for about 400 years 500 years. It starts with the Spanish Portuguese expeditions Increases into maritime warfare Then the conflict is centered on Europe and then the last century was dominated really by Three major contests for global supremacy Imperial Germany and then later Nazi Germany Soviet Russia and of course then we emerged as the only superpower. I Think it's highly unlikely that in the current world Anyone power will again be what we became 20 years ago 25 years ago And in that sense the nature of global power has changed it's become more diffused Another aspect of that is of course the rise of Asia the rise of Asia and the global scene as a vital Increasingly engaged continent composed of states which historically did play a major role, but in isolation Both India and China were major economic powers Actually larger than the European powers that were contesting for global supremacy But they were in isolation and they did not reach out But today that Asia is now important and hence how one deals with it is critically significant for the future But it also contributes to the new reality that no one is likely to preponder it that in turn is reinforced by my sense that a Further new aspect of this global mosaic, which is now much more contentious and Not subject to global domination is the new reality of global political awakening That is to say in the course of the last two centuries progressively all of humanity has become politically conscious That was not the case prior to the French Revolution Prior to the French Revolution most people lived in an apolitical world Politics at that time was really something that involved on the top elites and then gradually it spread throughout the world And in the last century the process was enhanced both by the world wars and also very much by the diffusion of new technologies specifically of course first radio then television then internet and that means that today Masses of the world as political are politically activated. They're staring. They're resentful in some cases. They're vengeful Their historical narrative incidentally is heavily anti-western Because to the extent that a political consciousness is developing in previously Passive dormant peoples it focuses on Western imperialism and Western colonialism And this is another reason why it is so difficult now to think of any kind of a global arrangement that is based on one power All of that creates a world very much more volatile and perhaps facing turmoil The second part of the world of the book deals with America in that context and in it I discuss what I call the waning American dream that is to say this country was the inspiration for the world But that inspiration to some extent lately was translated into megalomania and Adventurism one of our very recent presidents declared publicly in a major speech that America was chosen by God I'm using his words chosen by God and commissioned by history to play this imminent uniquely hegemonic role in the world Well, this kind of misconception is unless is sadly Reinforced by the difficulties that we face domestically and not part of the book I analyze a set of specific problems that we confront be it financial or economic or social in terms of social disparities or Infrastructure etc Which makes me concerned about our future as a participant in the global process and in a way as a social competitor I then weigh that against what I consider to be the American assets And I conclude basically that it depends really very much on what we do in the next decade About the problems that have been identified and how effectively are we likely to be in responding to them on these problems are rather acute and Significant and cumulatively do pose the question Which I raise explicitly whether perhaps and I know it's a stretch America may be facing the same kind of systemic paralysis that the Soviet Union faced in the 1980s with a well-known result. I think that result is avoidable. I Hope it is more than avoidable that is unlikely, but it depends very much on what we do and In that context, I then discuss something that I called the long imperial war namely the last 20 years of Involvement in conflicts which by and large have been draining of our resources and so forth Leading from that I say what happens if we don't recoup and here my message is very brief Although I try to develop it in some specificity namely that if we do not recoup the world by 2025 or thereafter is not going to be Chinese the world will not be Chinese It will be chaotic that will be the dominant global condition So that the danger we face is not Another hegemony another superpower, but it is rather more and more turmoil which will be very inimical particularly to our set of values to our concepts and in fact I mentioned in that Context the risk that we as a society may be increasingly prone to Demagogy and extremism to viewing the world in many key in terms in a bifurcated perspective This is a danger inherent Domestically in America given of our difficult of understanding these very complex global processes That then leads me to the final part of the book in which I try to outline What I call a strategic vision now a strategic vision should not be confused with a strategic blueprint a blueprint is Design of specific steps necessary to the implementation of the large Sort of conception or goal that is being set. That's true of architecture and that's true of military affairs Mine is essentially a strategic vision which combines history with geopolitics What I think would contribute to global stability and to our ability on the global scene Collectively to deal with increasingly important global problems Literally global problems that threaten humanity Which you will not be able to address if the world is dominated more and more by turmoil Demagogy and conflict and here I argue essentially for two large propositions as the strategic vision one America should be the active promoter and sponsor of what I call a larger more vital West and That means not only the sharing of common purposes with Europeans With whom we have bonds of history and values But jointly also seek to expand the scope of that West and particularly in two important ways Which I discuss at some length by reaching out and drawing in Turkey, which I think is important geographically But also Social-culturally because it is the democracy Increasingly imbued with values that we associate with the West it has for more than a hundred years now Consciously model itself on Europe. That was the gist of that a tourist concept of change to create a European Turkey and it has made significant progress which can be further enhanced by drawing European and the second one is Russia I Argue in my book that Russia is now in this sort of phase in which it really has no choice But to go into the West because of a variety of domestic problems Which I discuss in more detail but ranging from demographic crisis to stagnation to the flight of the intelligentsia and so forth But that this will take time This will require patience in our part It will probably be moving in the opposite direction initially under Putin But behind that there is a variety of developments Which one can see on the scene in Russia which argue or more positively for the possibility of Engaging Russia and drawing it into the West. So these are the two prongs of a policy that should be motivating our response even to immediate problems because such a Europe can then even reach Geographically through the embrace with Russia the Democratic Japan the Democratic South Korea And who knows who else by then might be moving in that direction in terms of political values Philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of the human being and its relationship to society At the same time however, the United States has to be engaged in the Far East Because it is not only an Atlantic power But it is also a Pacific Ocean power and the question there I ask is how be engaged and here Essentially my propositions in a nutshell are the following one Not engaged the way we have had to be engaged in Europe, which is by direct Military political involvement necessitated by the struggle for global domination. That's why we became involved in Europe That's why our troops for the first time ever in 1917 moved across the ocean back to Europe from where they came That is no longer the case and we can't afford to get involved in Asian conflicts I think the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are such that we should not be avoided in any Asian conflicts And there is no conflict between any Asian power The outcome of which could be more dangerous to us than our own involvement in it So we should not be involved, but we should play the role in Asia that a great Britain played in Europe in the 19th century the balancer the manipulator and Also in addition to that the conciliator I think one of our tasks in addition to developing a genuinely cooperative relationship with China Based on the premise that both of us will lose if we get into a conflict Which happens to be the case I draw a difference between Rome and Byzantium in that respect and our relationship with China today in addition to that We should be promoting actively Japanese-Chinese reconciliation and We should be mediating Indian-Chinese hostility so as to contribute to more stability in Asia So it doesn't replicate the experience of 20th century Europe because there are some tendencies in Asia in that direction Warfare competition and so forth and if we do that And I think we can manage in a sense to contribute to greater stability in the Far East and Permit all of us and particularly the two most important parts of the world the Far East and the West To deal with the various global problems that are going to dominate the lives and the fate of our children and grandchildren So that in a nutshell It's what the books about and now I think David is going to expose its shortcomings and Defend myself as the best ideas I can if It's big if you're expecting a sharp critique And an attack on shortcomings. I'm afraid that neither you nor the audience is going to get it As readers of my column in the Washington Post know I turn often to Dr. Brzezinski for his insights and Simple explanation of what I think is unusual about him especially now is that he thinks strategically So when he writes a book called strategic vision, which really is that I think it's a special opportunity And and I commend the book having having not only read it But having plugged it on morning Joe with his big daughter Mika There next to me So I want to turn to one of the concepts that you talked about in your presentation And it's one that you've been writing about for a number of years now And I think it's it's one on which you've been especially prophetic And that's the idea that there's a global political awakening taking place four years ago when we collaborated on a book called America and the world with Brent Scowcroft You put a lot of emphasis on that and we've just lived through a year time magazine called it the year of the protester But it's a year highlighted by the Arab Spring in which this global political awakening was palpable. It was a Million people in Tahir Square. It was a an Arab world chanting the same chance about about dignity and freedom And as we've watched that story, we've seen something that's very familiar, which is the arc of revolution in which An awakening becomes a revolution becomes chaos and then there are all sorts of dangers And I want to ask you if you if you a year later a year on in the Arab Spring if you if you'd comment about what you see today as the opportunities and also the dangers and Say a little bit about what you think wise u.s. Policy would be as we deal with this phenomenon that is so rich with Possibility but also with with potential difficulty That's a tough one actually because it raises so many issues And I must say that when I watched it unfold on television. I Was both impressed by it But also somewhat alarmed by it I was impressed by it for obvious reasons. There was a spontaneity to it There was a kind of authentic enthusiasm a sense of liberation against things which obviously one should up or corruption Authoritarianism Hypocrisy all of that was wrapped into it but I was also alarmed because I Had the uneasy feeling that even our mass media or maybe particularly our mass media in their enthusiasm for what they were reporting They were projecting it forward To a conclusion that I was not so inclined to anticipate will happen namely that this upheaval this Arab Spring is a democratic upheaval when I say that I had that sense of skepticism. I have in mind a Little bit of anxiety. I felt that what was called the Arab Spring Might before too long become the Arab winter And that is to say it might turn into something else and the reason for that is that I tend to differentiate quite a bit analytically between what might be called populism as a movement and Democratic movements and there's a difference between them democratic democratic movements in my mind evoke some analogies With Europe in 1848 The whole notion of liberalism the Frankfurt assembly the ideas that Were being nurtured by these events Then I think of central Europe in the 1880s 90s of Havel of a Wensa and Of the variety of intellectuals and workers and students around them They were clearly committed to the notion of democracy and in some instinctive, but deep fashion understood its Its human complexity because democracies are complex institutions in which you balance Individual versus collective rights and try to make that as explicit as possible and then constitutionly defined Here I sensed more a rage and anger. Yes, maybe an aspiration also, but also a great deal of that aspiration is driven by television visions of the rest of the world richer more comfortable spoiled maybe even in in enviously decadent in I didn't sense a really strong and Deep understanding of what democracy is about and I didn't see the movement led by people and structures that could create Deferment and the upheaval into democratic institutions So my prediction already articulate and on television and so forth when I was commenting on this occasion in the late spring and summer was This will probably become an interdictation Then it will become some sort of Islamic a Form of self assertion and the big question will be whether it will be moderate Islamists of whom there are many and their number of Islamic countries that are moderate or whether it will become more extreme And I think it's still wide open on that issue, but the prognosis is not too good And I'm not particularly encouraged By the outcome otherwise, which I supported the Libyan operation where I thought was necessary But it certainly hasn't produced a democracy yet, and I'm not so sure that we're going to see a democracy in Syria soon Actually, if we were a little more intelligent in the way we deal with the Iran I think Iran would probably be a better prospect for democratic evolution than the ones. I've just mentioned because if you look at the social indices of Iran and of Turkey in terms of education role of women in society Despite the crude ayatollahs on the top in the level sort of of cultural sophistication and the orientation towards Europe I think there's more there potentially for democracy than Syria or Egypt right now, not to mention Yemen or Saudi Arabia you've That's a somber not sad dark picture of where this global political awakening Is taking us and the question I'd ask you is This administration has taken a fairly passive role It has wanted to let People in the Arab world feel that they're writing their own narrative that this is their revolution That the United States for once is not trying to dictate outcomes. Do you think the the United States is being too passive? should we be seeking to Bend the arc of this story in directions that are favorable to us more than this president and this White House are doing well We perhaps could be How do we not done the things we have done lately? Because I think our stock in the Middle East in the Islamic world is very low very low because of the war of 2003 Which you know no one in the world really legitimated Which still many Americans support with with growing hesitations because of the costs War which I think was wage and dubious assumptions and with very dubious outcome in terms of stability in Iraq Then there is the failure of the United States to pursue that to which it has been committed for 30 years Which is the promotion of a really enduring and fair Israeli-Palestinian accommodation. We have not done that So I think our standing in the Arab world or the Islamic world for that matter We could talk about Pakistan for example in Afghanistan. It's not very high So maybe we could be doing more if it was otherwise, but ultimately It's also a question of maybe historical sequencing It takes time for democratic standards democratic elites Institutionalism to evolve to jump perhaps anticipating anything you might be asking me I would think that the prospects for democracy in Russia are higher Then they are in the Middle East right now that that was indeed the exception Turkey then the next thing I was I was gonna gonna jump to well One fascinating thing about you about your book because you've often in your writing been Very skeptical about Russia and Russia's more than the ambitions skeptical is putting a Miley Is is that you're you're more optimistic both about about Russian about the ability to draw Russia into this larger West If this movement on the first question is is this movement in Russia today for real meaning Does it does it have the dynamism to really pose a challenge to Putin's order of things? Then second how's Putin gonna react and how should we react? I think Americans when they look back to the Green movement in Iran and the the challenge that was posed then to the Ayatollah's I think we probably should have done more to help suppose Democrats in Russia call out for help in some way to the United States in the West. How should we react? well That movement is suppressed obviously we ought to react to with as much ostracism condemnation as we can without Going to war with him without without as much support as we can for the movements within although that always becomes Complicated because at some point it really becomes a form of overt intrusion So that has to be always calibrated carefully But I would argue that what we are seeing in Russia today is something that I don't quite yet see In some of these countries in the Middle East that we've been talking about Which is the emergence of a real civic society? within the urban major centers of Russia and Particularly among the new middle class Particularly of the sort of middle younger age bracket which has by now been traveling to the West in the millions Studying abroad in the scores of thousands and who more important anything else now live visually Because of the internet, but also other mass media including internal Russian mass media in an open world You know I have been following Russian affairs for years And I was actively involved in doing what I can to dismantle the Soviet system but to me this process of change is Really a pleasant surprise because it's moved more rapidly than I have expected and today if you live in Russia You actually can read newspapers which are openly critical of Putin's and then we don't fully appreciate We don't understand yet the extent to which political satire has become the dominant form of political dialogue In St. Petersburg in Moscow and elsewhere Really sharp satire against the regime against Putin himself It is even demonstrated by visible acts. You know, who could imagine some years ago people standing in the Red Square With placards showing Putin behind bars Saying you know imprisoned for tax on freedom or something like that in Putin has an opposition that's Operating also outside of Russia and much more openly and with money. There is a guy called beer as off ski in London Who used to be part of the Elton regime And who is extraordinary rich now he has sponsored a movie Which is designed to show that at the outset of the Chechen war There was a building shown a building blown up in Moscow a couple of buildings with people in it and Put in blame this on the Chechens and then started the war. This movie goes into some degree of depth I'm not validating it because I don't know the facts To develop the argument that was put in and secret police that blew up those buildings to have a pretext to invade Chechnya This is being shown in three movie theaters in Moscow. I Mean, you know, this is not democracy yet because it operates outside the political system But it begins to coexist with the political system as an alternative to it Much like the solidarity phenomenon in Poland, which in the course of ten years developed an alternative authority Alternative institutions which are briefly crushed By the martial law but not extopated and what it means ultimately is two things one there is now becoming a What is now becoming reality in Russia is a social realization that there is such a thing as a democracy Which involves understanding of the complexities of the system and a yearning for it and second Which gives a real momentum the elimination of fear People are not afraid. Yes, some individuals get killed some newspaper people have been killed But this is not the same thing as not being touched when you go out to the placard announcing Putin, I mean that is something totally new and therefore I think the prospects of Russia moving towards the West Will manifest themselves either under Putin's rule maybe as a showdown Maybe force them to accommodate and in any case within a decade or two as a dominant reality before we leave these we hope Democratic revolutions I want to ask you about Syria The situation Syria is getting bloodier by the day when you look at the YouTube videos from Homs, they're frightening and I think there is a growing question in the United States and in the West about whether some The Western intervention some some movement if the Russians and Chinese won't join it then a Coalition of the willing that that will in some way come to the aid of the Syrian people People are asking whether that's appropriate. So I want to ask you that what do you think? Well The question is you know, who would be in that coalition? We must remember that the French will the colonial power in the area and that may not be an asset and The British were competing with the French for colonial preeminence in the region that may not necessarily be an asset either We don't have the best record either because of the Iraq war and so forth and So I'm not sure that there's going to be a coalition the willing in participation by The West and that's a overt sense like in Libya is necessarily the best solution in my instinct is that we ought to be as Close as possible to Turkey Be guided as much as possible by Turkish views Turkish priorities and Turkish recommendations perhaps also in that context with Saudi Arabia And see whether on that basis some sort of response derived from the region Can be constructive and influential and helpful But how far to push that and how far one should involve oneself directly from the outside in the internal violence Is something that I would rather have people like the Turks the Saudis may be the Gulf States to some extent Set the pace here. So this is not yet a Libya like situation where You said you ended up supporting Joint military action Libby. You're not at that point. Yeah, no, I'm not. No, because I think it really is quite different and Gaddafi I think was in a sense a much more volatile element That once the uprising against him developed one who could never foresee what would happen if he prevailed in I think the Syrians are not as kind of unpredictably Ignatious as Gaddafi and I have obviously no sympathy for the regime But it seems to me that this is something that has to be handled Very much on the basis of the insights and understanding and capacity for action of its immediate neighbors There is in the background of this also a very subtle yet not not yet very evident sort of rivalry for influence of course of the Iranians With Israeli fear that the Iranians may gain an additional Degree of influence in an area immediately approximate to Israel So this is a further international complication And this is why working closely with friends and particularly with friends who have the same religion Who have some of the same history and culture makes much more sense than for us to be sort of organizing something like Libya So I want to turn to the audience in just a moment. So be thinking of questions. You want to ask a dr. Brzezinski I want to close my conversation with you as big by focusing on two wars One that may be on the horizon and one that this administration is is more clearly signaling it wants to end And the first is obviously that the danger of an Israeli attack On Iran seeking to retard its nuclear program That's something that's been very much on my mind the last week traveling with Secretary Panetta and hearing from Panetta's group this view that there is a significant likelihood that in the next several months in April May June Israel may attack and I want to ask you. Do you do you share that? sense that this is increasingly likely and What do you think about it? And if I think I know the answer you think it's a bad idea What should the United States do to try to reduce the likelihood of it? Well, you have written incisively on this and I think you're much more up to speed on this issue than I am But let me just sort of venture a comment or two you mentioned in the early part of your question also it's Sequence namely Afghanistan would be talking about it, but let me just say right away because it's relevant if Any of that happens in Israeli action against Iran and so forth with us then in some fashion becoming involved We can forget about any Stable rationally designed disengagement from Afghanistan And because of that happens I think we're going to see more violence in the region as a consequence of the upheaval involving Israel and Iran and Particularly the Iranians view us as either facilitating it or sponsoring it or participating in it Their retaliation will go after Iraq Which is unstable from which we have more or less disengaged but still have residual interests And they will make the attainment of a stable outcome in Afghanistan Very very difficult because they can easily do so They have historically been hostile to the Taliban But they'll change their mind in that context because they'll be going after us So you know the risks for us of anything of this sort are very very high in addition to others That could be easily mentioned price of oil and all of that So all of that leads me then more specifically to say that I don't favor that happening Namely is really attack on Iran I think the United States to the extent that it feels entitled to have a foreign policy of its own Let me repeat that feels entitled to have a foreign policy of its own ought to make its views felt and interests Clearly stated And I think it's not in our interest for this to happen and therefore we should make that clear to anybody concerned I don't think it's necessary either because While what the Iranians are doing is profoundly disturbing. It's a violation of the NPT treaty It poses long-range risks including proliferation We have another situation like it in another part of the world Where the North Koreans have already obtained nuclear weapons? And they have the means for delivering them Yet neither we nor anyone else is threatening them with the possibility of an attack Why not? Why not? Well part of the reason to that is that Those who might be affected by what the North Koreans are doing like the Israelis might be affected Or maybe the Gulf States could be affected also by what the Iranians are doing Those in the Far East and notably Japan and South Korea feel comfortable Because they have a flat clear-cut guarantee by the United States. We have security treaties with both of them They're in the same position as our European allies We're a much more threatened by the Soviets with nuclear weapons than we the Soviet war plan war plan Soviet war plan for World War three in Europe and Visit the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Soviets within the third day of the war Including several bombs. We have seen this man's Because we had someone I was providing them to us and can we talk after about about the Hamburg was going to be attacked with tactical nuclear weapons in the third day of a land attack by the Soviet army But the Europeans felt secure because they had our guarantees What am I leading up to a very simple position? We should tell everyone that if Iran threatens Any of the Middle Eastern States Arab or Israel with its nuclear weapons not to mention Uses them which they certainly will not they only have one and even someone as militant as a good barack agrees with that He says the notion that existential threat because they only have one is nonsense But if they were to do anything of that sort the United States would view it as Directed against itself and respond accordingly The Iranians did not succeed in existing for 3,000 years by being suicidal I think we can cope with this problem without it letting be blown up in a fashion that can be very destabilizing regionally in the long run very bad for Israel and Bad for us and incidentally the majority of the American Jewish public opinion agrees with what I've just said And so that's the majority of Israel On on that. It's a good time to turn to the audience. Please raise your hands I assume there are microphones and people will will call on you. So let me ask you to go ahead. Yes And please briefly identify yourself and then the question Your mic is not on it's Hello. Yes. Yeah, this is a man with a little my question is going to back to Russia You're talking about how we can draw Russia to the Western world The veto last this last week at the United Nations Against the resolution on Syria It shows that Russia is still Doing things on its own. What would it take you think to bring Russia to support an action or any? Resolution on Syria and what drives Russia you think? What are the considerations that the Russians have to take that take that position and who takes that position in Russia? Who is in charge of that issue on foreign policy? Well, I think it's quite clear that it's Putin who's the responsible for that and I can say why he feels that way because he is concerned about Evidence of rising instability in Russia and Given his interest and given his professional Experience and I think he views it as a menace And so it's self-interest involved here to some extent that's through the Chinese as well But if we are going to have any sort of international activity in which we want to be engaged in It is I think very important that as Many other countries as possible be actively engaged in it And that they certainly not be tempted to oppose us So that's something we have to take into account as a fact of life But we're dealing with Russia as it is today That doesn't negate the kind of thrust and momentum which I see in Russia's internal historical change Should be did you ever had up this? I should be telling me from the University of Maryland and Brookings I Want to go back to the Iran question And I know that you've said that if the that the Israeli attack on on Iran is not an America's interest Therefore the rest should make it clear to the Israelis. I think obviously the administration has been Trying to do that very clearly, but we're an election year the Iran issue has become an issue in our politics Can you really envision a realistic scenario in which if the Israelis attack we're not actually drawn in Is it is it a foregone conclusion that doesn't matter what we say whether there's a red line yellow line how it happens that the Both in terms of the the scope of the war the likely Iranian response That inevitably we're gonna be drawn in if you're in Israel's position. You can make that assumption certainly this year I'm just wondering about your comments no matter what we say or Well, that's consistent that's consistent with what I was saying namely that if there is such an Israeli action it is More than probable that the Iranians will conclude that it was Undertaken with a green light from us and certainly undertaken with resources provided by us Therefore we're complicit to the extent that they don't have the capability to attack Israel right now Who else then is the likely choice for retaliation in and given the nature of that regime and they fear that if it does nothing It would be overthrown from within they're likely then to retaliate against us Just as we are very sensitive and for good Historical and moral reasons we should be to Israeli security problems the Israelis I think have an obligation to be sensitive to ours Especially given the level of support that we are giving them economically and financially and militarily So I think this is a legitimate position to take now will us do it will US leaders do it that raises the question of one's judgment about the quality of Leadership its determination to serve the national interest versus its political interests and immediate interests and on that We're entitled. I think as free citizens to have a variety of opinions judging from the Obviously primitive level of the Republican presidential debates One should not have too high a hope that the better alternative will prevail in their case Since they have already pledged publicly to start the war even if it doesn't start it if it's not started by the Israelis almost As far as president Obama's concerned he has a real problem because Actually our elections, and this is something which bothers me a great deal are no longer about votes Our elections are decided not by the number of votes, but by the number of dollars that are raised For a presidential campaign. I was watching yesterday the discussion on the air of the outcome in the three states in which St. Thorom 1 1 and it was interesting to me how often it was said Gingrich cannot raise money Romney cannot raise more money St. Thorom will now be able to raise money That is what elections involve in our system. You raise the money if you get more money than the others Your chances of winning are greatly increased. I think that is a very very major weakness of our electoral system But it raises a questioner how in a moment of crisis a national leader should act and How one hopes he would act and I think a war here would be very counterproductive my last point I am less convinced is going to be soon my sort of frame of concern is October Before the elections because if there is a strike then there's a higher probability that the public will initially be very supportive And whoever the candidates will roll with that the negative consequences of the attack will be felt domestically In November December, etc as the economic and other crises get out of hand So if they is ready to do it now, I think we could have a strong reaction against them in this country Closer to the elections and I'm sure they must be aware of that Let me take a few more questions this gentleman here and then madam Sir I like like to shift to a different part of the world dr. Brzezinski. I'm Randall Dwellin from the State Department and President or the future president of China Xi Jinping is coming very soon We haven't really talked about China today But as you know one of the historically one of the Chinese major paranoia has always been the periphery One of its 14 neighbors plotting against and so forth in the last couple years The United States has either solidified or built up its military relations with key countries South Korea Japan It's built up Guam. It's proposing new troops in Australia and also has improved this relationship with Vietnam and India When the new president or I suppose he will be the new next president of China when he comes to Washington, DC What would you advise you Obama administration to somewhat make China feel more secure about our Pivoting toward Asia toward Asia Pacific everything to make them not feel so paranoid or suspicious of US intentions in that part of the world Well, I would answer by saying by not doing some of the things you assert the United States is doing I hope we're not lining up with the Vietnamese or with the Indians against the Chinese I see no benefit in it for us. I do not see it as a contribution to Asian stability I see it as potentially intensifying American Chinese hostility if we were seriously to do it I fully favored the emphasis on the far east the pivoting and all of that But I deeply regret the way it was articulated publicly I think the notion of tying it publicly to symbolic act of deploying American Marines in Australia strikes me as Rather weird to be perfectly frank to my knowledge Australia currently is not threatened by Guinness Papua Nor by Indonesia and even less by China So it just didn't make sense to me why we were articulating that way The fact of the matter is we're gonna have tensions with the Chinese and Our public media are returning against them. The Chinese are responding similarly with triumphalism and predictions of You know our demise. I think both leaderships have to take stock reread again the communique issued by Hu Jintao and Obama It provides a good solid framework for how to handle the relationship And I think if we're mature we'll handle it correctly But let's not get involved in a desperate search for renewed miniature engagements as we begin to Consider the possibility of terminating the ones we're in The woman here in the second row and then the gentleman two rows back Thank you. I'm Fatima please so from Russian service of voice of America originally. I'm from I'm sorry Yeah, I'm sorry I'm Fatima please of a Russian service voice of America originally from the North Caucasus I'm a Circassian and my region is now bleeding for almost 20 years Your prediction for the situation in the North Caucasus. You said that Russia does not have any other choices as Only to move the democracy for my region. It sounds Almost impossible So Dr. Brzezinski, what do you think is going to happen with the North Caucasus and the situation there? Yes, thank you very much. The the the questioner is with the voice of America From the North Caucasus and asks Where what's where's the North Caucasus Chechnya etc. are going? Well, I'm afraid It's in a situation which is from a human point of view very tragic there is a Continuing warfare going on in the Caucasus in which the national aspirations of the people living in the Caucasus of different nationalities Are in obvious fashion being ignored? I would hope that as Russia moves towards democracy that issue will be addressed in a more civilized fashion And it is rather interesting that there are more and more voices being raised within Russia That Russia might have to rethink The territorial extent of its involvement direct involvement in the Caucasus And that would be one of the positive byproducts of Russia in effect becoming part of the West We may incidentally see we are already seeing some of that in Turkey Turkey because it is democracy Has significantly redefined how it is handling the Kurdish problem not fully to dissatisfaction of the courts But certainly significantly different from what it used to be So John hammer who's advice I follow on all matters says one more question. I apologize to everybody sir. I recognize you I'm afraid we'll have to Thank you very much. Abdel Raheem Fouqara from Jazeera. Dr. Brzezinski president Obama When the so-called Arab Spring started made it his policy that he was gonna deal with the Arab Spring on a case by case basis because every one of them is different and every Revolution is different as he said But when it comes to Bahrain and Syria We've recently heard accusations to the administration that it's being hypocritical pushing for the downfall of Bashar al-Assad, but supporting the Dialogue in Bahrain whether you agree whether there's hypocrisy or not there is certainly the perception of hypocrisy and I wanted to ask you to what extent you feel that the perception of hypocrisy Will damage you as interest in that part of the world and may to what extent it may Impact the final outcome in Syria and Bahrain. I have no way of knowing how that will impact in the final outcome But certainly the perception of hypocrisy as driving American policy is damaging to us In I'm not sure. However, whether his statements are really hypocritical. I think they may be The result of an overestimate of the power of words if he says Assad has to go Presumably the assumption is that will have an effect that he desires and I fear that in this case That may be an overestimate and I generally I'm of the view that the United States Should not engage in declaratory Assertions that are supposed to be self-fulfilling in other words if we make a declaratory assertion We better have the capability to make certain that it happens But I think that cumulatively undermines the credibility of American foreign policy and reduces the impact of what we do It's very easy to go around and say this must not happen. That must not happen. He must resign But if none of that happens after a while it begins really to reduce your own influence And I think there is a certain tendency In our political style and maybe even in our presidential style to see ourselves as somehow or other Talking From on high in a kind of divine inspired fashion But without necessarily the power that otherwise God commands when he makes such demands Let let I only have one difficult part of my job and that's to end the sessions like this I just hate bringing these to a close. It's been a rich rich Afternoon I have four things to say and then I'm going to let you break first Dr. Brzezinski is going to be signing books over at this table. It's right over on the side So you and there's a little bit of a way to queue up And so he does have time to sign books second It's not it's not happened before but we have run out of books the This is being done by the publisher. They said we Completely misestimated we've run our books So if you want to buy a book, but you didn't get one or if you want to buy more books Leave your business card with us at the registration desk and we will connect and we'll make sure you get it And I'll make sure they get signed Third let me just say There is no finer journalist intellectual in Washington than David Ignatius and we want to thank him for that And then may I just ask you to extend your applause to doctors big Brzezinski for a