 For this particular program on the Middle East, West Africa, North Africa and the Sahel, some of our speakers who were supposed to be here had to leave for different reasons. So we have to do without Miguel Angel Moratinos, former Spanish Foreign Minister, who you saw yesterday in the Latin America panel. We have to do without Fatala Sigilmasi, the Moroccan diplomat and former president of the Union for the Mediterranean, who would certainly have given an important input on the Moroccan perspective and cooperation across the Mediterranean. And we also have to do for reasons connected to the situation in his own country without Farid Yasin, the current Iraqi ambassador to Washington, who had to stay put in his embassy to give advice to his government about how to handle the situation to Iraq. Still, I do have a now much smaller but wonderful panel with four speakers who I will briefly introduce. We have Mohammad Ibn Shambas from Ghana, who is currently the SSG, which means the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel. He has quite an experience in mediation and UN and AU peacekeeping because he also used to be a war's, the AU UN Joint Representative for Darfur and among other positions. He is a former president of ECOWAS, the regional organization for West Africa. We have, aside from him, Mamduh Karakalukjo, he is the founding president of the Global Relations Forum in Turkey, which is an important think tank in that country. He's an engineer by training, which probably means, and an economist, which probably knows that he, or means that he knows what he is speaking about, at least we hope so. And he will give us a Turkish perspective, actually I think his presence has become even more important through the developments of the last couple of days. We have at the end of the row, I'm sort of going west to east, Abdulaziz Sagar from Saudi Arabia, also the founder and president of a think tank in his country, the Gulf Research Center. In UN circles and circles who are interested in mediating conflicts, he's also known as a person who has been moderating the Syrian opposition meeting in Riyadh, trying to get a unified delegation of the Syrian opposition for peace talks to gather. Now, we didn't have peace talks then, but we had the delegation at least. And we have last not least, Dong Manian, the vice president of the China Institute for International Studies, himself a specialist in Middle East issues, who among other things has previously served at the Chinese Embassy in Ankara, if I got that right. Let me briefly, before I enter into the debate, first with my colleagues here on the panel, and then with you in the audience, try to set the scene a little bit. We're dealing with a vast area here, West Africa, the Sahel, North Africa, the Middle East. So that's a region from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean, if you so wish. And if we are looking for one headline to characterize the situation in that vast area, it's probably the dissolution of order and the dissolution of order on different levels as it were. On state level, quite a number of these states in the region, be that in Libya, be that in Mali, be that in Syria, be that in Yemen, order being undermined either through civil war, through war, or through the weakness of states, which has undermined institutions and societal relations. But we also have a dissolution on order on a regional level, as some of the regional organizations that had been set up in the last decades are disintegrating or not really working well. We still have something called the Maghreb Union here in the Maghreb, but I don't think it is working in any way as a Gulf cooperation council has been undermined by conflicts between the member states as to what the Arab League does. We can discuss, I think, the only healthy organization among the regional organization seems to be the African Union, but we may want to discuss that at a later stage. Some people would say that there's also something to the software of the region which we could call the normative order, which is being undermined through civil wars, through unrest, through the way that governments are dealing with their people. A normative order which always was difficult, but sort of was resting on a time-honored tradition of the coexistence of cultures that at least is being questioned in a couple of states or in parts of this region. Speaking geopolitically or strategically, if you so wish, we don't have a stable but a very shifting balance of power. We don't have a regional hegemon, but we do have various struggles over sub-regional hegemony, and we do have a high level of military or hybrid interferences into the states of the region, into Syria, into Iraq, into Yemen, into Libya, into the Sahel, by regional and international actors. I would find it difficult to mention them all, but it's certainly among them. We have Iran and Israel. We have Saudi Arabia and Qatar. We have the United States and Russia. We have some Europeans and we have some others. Paradoxically, and that is probably something we want to discuss, the regional polarization, struggles for hegemony, non-cooperation, civil wars, and the weakness of states and institutions has opened the space very widely for external influence and external actors. And at the same time, and I think that's a paradox, the situation in this area has made international actors much more hesitant to involve themselves long time in a sustainable manner. That goes for the Europeans, who in the past try to engage in long-term transformative processes, Barcelona, Union for the Mediterranean, southern neighborhood, call it whatever you like, or even the Middle East peace process, which some Europeans still call that Middle East peace process, or it goes for the United States, which of course was known for its long-term security guarantees, which actors could rely upon, that is, as much in question, I think, as a transformative engagement of the Europeans. My first question, therefore, and let me try to make this experiment, I would ask my four friends here to all answer in sort of 30 seconds in a yes or no, or yes but, and no but manner. My first question, therefore, would the region be better off? Would it be less polarized? Would it be more at peace if we had less international involvement? In other words, should we rather let the states of the region sort it out, as Mr. Trump, President Trump, indicated in one of his tweets, should we rather have the states and the societies of the region sort it out by themselves? Would we be better off here? Mohammad Ibn Shambas, would you like to start? The current and Sahel region, within the scope of the Ekoas in particular, has been doing relatively well and with good support from partners to reinforce many areas in which Ekoas has been trying to create a strong regional approach to grow the economies, integrate the region, but also in governance and in all of these areas, it has indeed built strong partnerships with the UN, with the EU, for instance, but also with the greater Middle East. However, the new threats to the region, the form of terrorism and violent extremism, if we see that as something that also had some external dimension, is certainly negative and that the region could do better without that kind of external negative impact. Thank you. Clear statement. We are going into more detail in around. Memdou, how is that with you? I mean, you're sort of on either side of the question, in a way, representing Turkey here for better or worse, was you? Like to be a representative of your country today, but you are by birth, as it seems. So would the region be better off with less of that interference from outside? Well, interference is a tricky word. Indeed. Instead of interference, if we can say more constructive sort of engagement, no, it would not be better off without constructive engagement from external parties provided that those external parties, particularly the EU and the US, adjust to the new realities of power configuration, both globally and in the region. I will need to expand on that, but I can't do that in 30 seconds, so maybe we can get back to that. That's fine. Adel Aziz, how is that with the external interference? Would the region be better off without? Well, giving the type of policies that the US is implementing in the region, which is a very confusing, and also giving the position of the other powers also, I think we will be happier without that intervention. What we need to see is a much more constructive engagement from their side rather than a destructive engagement which is taking place now. So it seems the bottom line for the three regional speakers is more engagement, but less interference or another form of engagement. Now, Dominion, you happen to be the international representative here. We don't have our European or American speakers here. So what do you think? How does it look from China, from Beijing? More interference is better or less interference is better? First of all, I fully agree with my two colleagues that we should change the terminology from interference to engagement or cooperation. I think the new terminology of cooperation is better than the terminology of interference. Personally speaking, I am optimistic about the future of Middle East or the whole Minna region, because the first, all the regional countries and peoples, they hope this region should be a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region. And secondly, I think since the so-called Arab Spring, nine years after the people in the region realized that they are fed up with turbulences, fed up with wars, conflicts, and they even suffered from the rise of international terrorism and extremism. So they hope such a facade or scenario should be finished as soon as possible. Okay, let's leave it. By the way, I think that even though to some extent the Minna region is so turbulent, but I think the majority of the countries, they still focus on the domestic economic development. Thank you. I'm going to ask you for the specific role of China in a minute, but let us try again from the people who are actually working in the region and coming from the region. Muhammad, in the last report, a briefing you did to the Security Council, you wrote and spoke of, and I quote, a worsening security situation in the entire Sahel. And you elaborated and spoke about benditism, terrorism, inter-communal violence. You also mentioned some progress on the governance side, democracy building, but basically you're concentrated on the worsening security situation pointing to Mali and Burkina Faso particularly. So my question to you is, could you give us a little bit more detail on the specific kind and the magnitude of the security challenges in that region and also try to tell us what organizations like the G5 Sahel or Burkan or the UN mission in Mali actually can do? Please, Marlon. Well, there are two areas to keep in mind here. First of all, the Sahel and then the Lechad-based area, which are facing specific threats from terrorist and violent extremism. In the Sahel, the result of the situation and the activities of the terrorist group in north of Mali, which has descended to central Mali and now is pulling over into Burkina Faso and Niger. We are indeed witnessing what we have characterized as this deterioration in the security situation in the Sahel region. And evidence of it is the almost now daily attacks by terrorist groups in Mali, of course, particularly in central Mali, which has also triggered inter-communal conflicts because of the skilful manner in which the terrorist groups have infiltrated setting communities, leading to an unfortunate characterization of the entire community as supporting terrorism and therefore the kind of attacks that we see, their unfortunate attacks that we see, for instance, in Mali, between the Pearl communities and the Dagong. And then, of course, this has flowed over initially into Niger, in west of Niger, in the provinces of Tilabere, which also are more and more witnessing the presence, a very active presence of these terrorist groups. Recently, and this has caused the entire region to wake up to this challenge, we have also seen in the Sahel the phenomena of terrorism descending into Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso, which otherwise has been seen as a fairly stable, strong country, sort of a buffer between the Sahel and the coastal states, is indeed descending into this instability, regular attacks while we were here. Two days ago, there was an attack near Fadalgruma, which has come pretty south, because this is one of the bigger cities, towns in Burkina Faso, a little bit outside of the Zoom and Sahel region. And it's a crossroad city linking many of the countries such as Benet, Togo, Ghana, and in fact a major regional highway into Niger. So when cities like that come under threat, then you see that this phenomena is expanding. So in general, that is the threat in the Sahel. But then in, and this particularly linked to terrorist groups which have been known to exist in north of Mali and have declared and do have links with international terrorist groups, al-Qaeda, Islamic states, etc. Now in the Lechard Basin, it's a slightly different story. You could talk of a homegrown terrorist group, which Boko Haram is, having come out of Bournemouth, in northeast, Bournemouth state in northeast of Nigeria, and initially affecting six northeastern states of Nigeria and then spreading into Cameroon, into Chad, and into Niger, for instance, south of Niger in Defa County. And although it was seen as maybe perhaps just a fluke, it has shown resilience. In the campaign that brought current President Buhar into power, his strength and I think the perception that he succeeded in giving was that being a former military man, and you know, rather tough reputation from those days of military governments in West Africa, that he would take on and defeat Boko Haram. Boko Haram recently celebrated his 10th anniversary, and that more or less in the 50th year of the government of President Buhar. So it hasn't been that easy to fully contain Boko Haram. It remains effective in Bournemouth state. I should say the progress has definitely been made, because before it was at least six states in northeast that were threatened. Today it's Boko Haram's influence and effectiveness reduced to Bournemouth state. So that's definitely progress. And certainly even in Cameroon, in Chad, we have seen that there has, there are influence or there are effectiveness that have been reduced, and it's reduced to just predatory, attached communities on villages, et cetera. The response of the region has been, in both cases, on the one hand, the creation of the JCCSRL as a community of countries facing this existential threat from terrorists, violent extremists in the Sahel. And they have been able to organize, to seek to address the phenomena in a comprehensive way, more or less along the lines of whether you and advocates, that it should be a total approach, not just a security approach, but also address root causes. That means address the poverty and sometimes exclusion. And what Professor Roberto so has talked about, the governance deficit that in some of these countries, because the territories are so huge, whether you take Mali or Niger or Chad, and the government itself, question of state capacity, so limited, its presence has not been felt in some communities. And then let's face it, there has been clearly some discrimination and negligence and just not the right attitude of some communities in the past. So all of these need to be attacked at the same time as we seek to address the poverty and the lack of basic socioeconomic infrastructure of schools, of education, providing for women and youth, particularly generating youth and employment. So the JCCSRL has this comprehensive approach, in addition to seeking to stand up a force to fight against terrorism and which force, of course, UN position has been very clear, especially Secretary General and all his advisors have recommended that this needs the support of Security Council. And so we still hope that Security Council will come around to authorize support, direct support to this force. And very quickly, if we shift back to lecture based in countries, they have also made their own effort in standing up what is called the multinational joint task force, where the four countries have contributed troops. I must say they have been a bit more even advanced than the JCCSRL, which is in a way still working project in progress. The MNJTF has actually been operational with support from Force Balkan, which is deployed in the region, but also from EU in particular, but partners such as US, France and UK, which have provided bilateral support. And then Nigeria's role there has to be acknowledged, where the initial 100 million dollars was granted from Nigeria. So there is that effort to deal with the problem in the security sense. But for me, the most significant is the acknowledgement that the root causes of this phenomenal violent extremism and terrorism needs to be addressed. Hence in the lecture basing, you now have a regional stabilisation strategy, which addresses not just the security aspect, but indeed is also looking at how do we ensure that this objective of sustainable development, the SDGs, is actually part of the national programs decentralised to these regions where we are seeing high levels of poverty, low electricity rates, lack of health and other basic facilities that need to be there. And now to give it a regional chapel, we have recently seen the Air Coas convened a summit on the 14th of September, where West Africa as a whole, together with Sahel. And it's significant that for this summit, Cameroon, Chad and Mauritania were invited. I see to say this is no longer a problem just exclusive to the Sahel countries, like Chad Basin countries. It's a problem that is threatening even coastal states and countries like Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana and Togo and Benet are saying we would like to join hands in tackling this phenomenon and ensuring a truly regional approach in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. What I understand you're saying is that the root courses of course are not terrorism and jihadism, but governance, poverty, lack of sustainability and development. But when I understood your interventions yesterday and the day before here at this conference correctly, you were basically saying the Europeans and the Americans should engage as strongly and I understood militarily as they do in Syria and Iraq. Isn't your recommendation actually? Well, some who would be probably less diplomatic would say that until the Libya problem is solved, what we are doing in West Africa and Sahel is maybe just putting a bandage on the wound because they will argue strongly that, and in fact some of the heads of state in the region often say, we told you to be careful about Libya and you didn't listen. So perhaps as Colin Powell would say, if you broke it, you fix it. And until Libya frankly is stabilized, that it's a capable state there and doesn't become a theater where all these groups have free reign and with a different support. So that's the concern of Sahel and West African states. Yes, it's true that if you look at governance issues and if you look at the neglect of past governments, particularly military governments in Nigeria, it's not a secret that most of the military governments were led by people from the north and who frankly did not do enough. It shouldn't be the case that you go to Borno and literacy rate is less than 50%. That's not acceptable today that there are not enough schools. And you can repeat that of whether it's extreme north in Cameroon or in Chad and in the areas of Burkina Faso where you're seeing this phenomenon. There are certain patterns that there was clearly, I mean 60 years after independence, it shouldn't be that that level of poverty still passes, but it's the reality. And then not to forget even the aspect of women, that they're not being enrolled in school, the fertility rates are still too high, whether it's in Niger or Mali. So all these issues need to be dealt with, but we have to also understand that today the groups that are fighting there are aligned to international terrorist groups of Al Qaeda, of Islamic State, Islamic State West Africa province claiming attacks in Niger, attacks that led to killing of Americans in northeast of Nigeria, Borno State, now I'm saying that one of the factions of Boko Haram is fully aligned with Islamic State West Africa province. So there are those internal factors with your governance issues that need to be dealt with, but our concern is also that these groups are aligned with international terrorist group. And that's why we say that the same vigor with which these nefarious groups were taken on and defeated in Iraq, in Syria, we are not seeing that same fever, that same vigor, but we need that on the part of international community. Thank you and also for already making the connection to the next theater we are going to move to and also reminding us of the Pottery House principle which here seems to be redefined in a way who breaks Iraq and who breaks Libya may become responsible for the Sahel and for West Africa, but the connection to the Mashrek, to the region east of the Mediterranean is clear, you lined it out if only by the movement, by the migration of terrorists who've lost their space, so the territorial dominance in parts of Iraq and Syria now Turkey has been a strong actor in Syria for a long time, but the engagement has changed a little bit last week. When President Erdogan first became Prime Minister, his lead principle was zero problems with neighbors. Today it seems to be the principle of having no zero friends among the neighbors and even zero friends among the international partners and allies Turkey uses and used to work with. Can you explain to us what the Turkish government actually is trying to achieve with its recent, we are not allowed to call it an invasion as Europeans because Mr. Erdogan said if you call it an invasion we will send you an invasion of refugees, so we call it incursion, so please explain to us what Turkish government is about with this incursion. I actually did have two comments about your introductory remarks, but let me take this first and then get back to that. I think it's been, the Turkish government has been clear on what it intends to do, two things and this has been true from the beginning and this has very broad sport in the country, one there will not be a Kurdish terrorist corridor by the Turkish border, so that has been very clear, very predictable, very consistent from the beginning, so I don't think there is any surprise there and I think this in that sense, I mean if you sort of you know we can all sort of think about all convoluted complex reasoning rationals, but I think that's a very simple statement and I think it has the full backing of the Turkish people. That's very difficult, it is an economic burden, it's a social burden, it is becoming a political burden and we have to deal with it and it seems the only reasonable way as our friends around the world including those who have these high values are very reluctant and unwilling to take those refugees, the only way forward is actually to create a safe zone for them so that they can go back or create the conditions in Syria where they can go back. I mean how we do it, whether you know we create a better Syria so everyone can go to their original homes would be ideal, but in the absence of that solution it seems we need to come up with a solution. In the absence of that solution you send them to other people's homes. No, no, no, in the absence of that solution we need to come together and think of a solution because the problem is the default absence of a solution means 3.5 million people living in Turkey forever so it's a very asymmetric problem. We as time passes and the community, international community does not find the solution, the burden, the cost accrues on Turkey, not on anyone else. A few billion here, a few billion there, yes it helps but it doesn't really address the fundamentals of the problem so in response to your question the two very clear, very predictable and I think very coherent consistent principles, objectives. One, no terrorist corridor by the Turkish borders, two the 3.5 million Syrian guests in Turkey, they need, we need to find a way forward to bring them back to Syria so those are the two objectives. Two additional questions or footnotes to that. The one is everybody calls his adversaries terrorists now in the broader Middle East so I think we should be a little bit more cautious with the term. We know about the PKK and its long struggle with Turkey and we know that the YPG, PYD has a very, very strong relationship to say the least to the PKK. At the same time it seems to be true that from the SDF which is now being fought by the Turkish army no shot has ever been fired into Turkey because they had enough to do to organize their self-administration in the Syrian Kurdish areas. So is terrorism here actually the wrong term to talk about whereas settling of refugees which are a burden in Turkey back into Syria seems to be the main background to that, to that incursion including a degree of ethnic engineering in northern Turkey if you settle Sunni Arabs from southern or central Syria to northeastern Syria which is mainly Kurdish and the second part of the question or second question is you already had or there already are immediate political effects to the incursion which is that the Kurdish administration and their militia, the SDF has now made an agreement with the Syrian army with the Syrian regime in Damascus to invite the Syrian army in. Is that in the end the solution also for Turkey to have the Syrian regime or the Syrian government recover its authority over the entire country or most of the entire country and have the Syrian army on the border with Turkey rather than an American-backed Kurdish militia? The first one the definition of terrorism obviously it is a universal sort of conversation going on that that discussion goes on but in the Turkish case the PKK has actually inhabited the Iraqi space and from there attack Turkey so for us the idea of PKK in Turkey is not how we define it PKK actually inhabits regions that are south of the border the Turkish border so for us the PYD PKK link which is very real the fact that you know it hasn't this or that person or this faction within YPG has not taken a shot does not mean much because that is how I mean we've experienced this for 40 years we know how PKK functions and how PKK sort of cooperates with its with other parties in that region so it's the kind of risk and the kind of definitional sort of subtlety that the Turkish security sensitivities cannot accommodate it is just too sensitive because we've lost too many people 40 years and we know how PKK functions and the mere fact that as you've shared the link with YPG and PKK is very real I think that is sufficient for Turkish sensitivity so that's number one in terms of ethnic engineering I mean ethnic engineering has already taken place you're an engineer after all well I was about to say you know my CPU works well with integrated circuits but not with the Middle East it's very just too complex even generally equilibrium models are fine it's just Middle East is too much but I'm trying the it seems like the Kurds I mean not the Kurds the YPG has already done some of that ethnic engineering so it's really allowing people to come back arguably and the second thing is if there is indeed I mean I understand that our European friends are very concerned about demographic shifts and that's very understandable and I think that is the point at which our European friends should say not allowed if that happens if that materializes then the EU will act but preemptively saying that this may happen at some point and then going after the Turkish operation forcefully with sanctions and threat of sanctions I don't think it's constructive I do think your concern your issue about ethnic engineering is a real issue and the Turkish government the president himself has come out and said no we're not going to do it so we can hold him to his promise and when that happens if he somehow strays from that very strict rule then I think our European friends would be rightfully in the position to say look we told you we're not okay with this but we are not there yet it's not happening and your other big question is what's the end game we don't know I mean I personally don't know I can tell you about what I sense will happen the feeling I get I mean I understand that they have invited the Syrian government to interfere the Syrian military but again this morning the president says in Kobanian Membej which is the area where there's a possible sort of conflict with the Syrian army it did that there's cooperation with the Russians or that the Russians are aware of the situation and the Russians are cooperating so it's not going to happen but my guess is YPG is a tactical instrument for big powers in Syria I think it was a tactical instrument for the Americans and I think it may well be a tactical instrument for the Russians so the Russians if the I mean we know what the Russians want the Russians want this Assad and the Turkish the Turks to come together so that the Syrian the Syria can be yet again under the control of Assad and that is the end game for the Russians so I think they want to steer the whole system towards that direction in going towards that direction my guess is as I said if the Turkish part our side does not cooperate fully with that scenario and there's food dragging for this or that reason my guess is the the Russian colleagues friends will use YPG instrumentally will try to bring them together with Assad and see whether that can nudge the Turkish side and looking at the picture I don't think Turkey can be at odds and can be in conflict continuously with both YPG and the Syrian government I think at some point we'll have to choose I don't know when that point will come it may be soon and between the lines I think there is some room for some rapprochement with the Syrian central government Assad I guess we have the thank you very much I guess we have the answer by next year's world policy conference yes exactly Abdulaziz um in any I mean to to add another theater to the conflicts we are speaking about in any confrontation between Iran and either the United States or its neighbors in the Gulf or Israel whatever Saudi Arabia would probably be at the receiving end as it already looked when Saudi oil installations were attacked by whoever it was who attacked them uh Saudi Arabia itself has come under closer scrutiny of the international community and also of its friends in the United States particular in congress related to human rights issues the murder of our friend Jamal Khashoggi the Yemen war and it seems to have reduced its regional engagement a bit not in Yemen but in Syria where also with your participation Saudi Arabia was very instrumental at some point very active has Saudi Arabia overreached a bit and now is trying sort of to limit its engagement trying not to get into the limelight of international attention with regard to Yemen and human rights and sort of withdrawing a little bit to trying to mend its own affairs or is that the wrong interpretation well that's a bit complex you know situation I think if I if I look at the current situation in Yemen today for instance it is very much directly linked to the conflict with Iran because without the Iranian support to this militia which is to my surprise how the rest of the world and the community call them the de facto government or reality on the ground if we are supporting a reality on the ground and militia that throw a legitimate government and took over and then we try to endorse those behavior I think there is something wrong because that's where do you stop and where do you put the limitation there Saudi agenda today of course yes we were involved in Syria on the beginning we try to help the Syrian people to reorganize themselves we extended a lot of support with the coordination with the international community but I think on the Syrian situation today it's more of the you know the three level have failed you know the direct discussion on the Arab you know circles have failed the through the OIC the organization of Islamic country have failed also that one so it went into the international level and once it is in the international level it started in Syria as a request for a little bit of a freedom and ended to a platform for a major international conflict zone that you know everybody trying to exercise their power their interest on that territory no there is no disengagement in Saudi Arabia I think the engagement is still there but at the same time if you look at today to the US agenda you will say China Iran and then North Korea if you look at the Saudi agenda today yes for me the first priority will be Yemen I have 1450 kilo borderline with that and my second of course will be the Iranian aggression sort of you know policy interventionist and expansionist policy that has been adopted to Iran so I need to deal with that situation as a second priority of course today Iran and Saudi at a very strategic challenge in both border north and south because in the north side Iran you know continuously supporting all the militia group we call them and has to show me in Iraq which you know they're fully funded trained supported by the you know iran revolution god and at the same time in Yemen so you know being in both side and having the also in the Gulf waters seeing the threat coming also I mean 14th of September is a changing name of the game you know if if the international community today is not condemning a real act which I think the good thing that Europe at least you know recognize that despite of the strong relation between Europe and Iran I was in New York and I was very happy to hear you know President Rouhani saying that he would like to have a new hormones sort of regional security framework which will be based in two principles one is the non-aggression and the second is a non-interventionist this is what we have been suffering from regarding the Iranian policy but what I will add to that that we would like to see an international guarantor a role for the united nation to play the guarantor for such a policy to be implemented if they are willing to do and to move toward real implementation of non-intervention and non-aggression trust me we will all be happy to to move toward that regional arrangement and we do not wish to see more international presence I mean somebody like President Trump coming out and say why do we need to be involved in the Middle East war we should be out of that one I think he's mistaken by two things he has the two strongest you know enemy and a friend I mean Israel is the strongest you know friend for the United States and it is within that Middle East you know you know geographical location and Iran which is his biggest enemy or the second top in the list for him is there so by this engagement or by having you know double standard in one way yes you would draw your you know your soldier from the north Syria Syria but at the same time you're willing to send three thousand soldiers to Saudi Arabia yet you will say we have agreed with the Saudi to pay for the cost of that one you know if it's really a matter of course and pricing and so maybe we should have an international tender and see who's the cheapest price and come up with the right rfb and then see who will provide the better security at a cheaper rate you know if that's the way it is unfortunate to see a such a policy coming out of the u.s. where we would have expected to see a much more real engagement in bringing peace and stability what the invasion of 2003 into Iraq did that really brought the stability to Iraq are we having a stable secured safe unified Iraq today we don't so back to your first question when we start is the involvement and the engagement to the you know external power is it in the best interest or the worst interest of the region it debays how that involvement play roles I mean without a withdrawal of Obama president Obama red line as he called it we have we would have not seen the Russian back into the region with with such a strong you know desire and presence and today in Saudi Arabia we are receiving president you know Putin visits so you know that makes it a much more complex scene in the region so we will still Saudi Arabia we will they will be involved through the four different layers of course you know their own interest you know with each one of the countries second through the GCC despite of whatever current situation in the GCC through the Arab League and through the OIC and then through the United Nations so they have all this different you know multi-layered Saudi did condemn the Turkish you know role in the north part of Syria and they despite of that personally I understand the interest of the different I don't think Turkey would have taken such a step without consensus at least or I wouldn't call it consensus but no disagreement from the different strong player in the region being it Russia US and the you know other power there that could well be I mean you already pointed to that that Saudi Arabia compared to the to the Kurds and the in Syria have the advantage you can pay for American soldiers even though not many Saudis have probably fought in the Normandy and they wouldn't have been called Saudis at that point anyway I think there's one important point which I would like to stress and I don't know how far you want to reveal things I know that you are involved personally with your research center in second tracks with the Iranians and without going into too much details you don't want to reveal would you see real opportunities for de-escalation and security building across the Gulf based on the contacts you are having with the Iranian counterparts I think it was very pretty I mean WikiLeaks did leak the information so it's not any more secret you know about about our track two which we have started in 2012 but at the same time you know last meeting it was in New York end of September after the assembly my feeling today since the Iranian came for the first time saying yes we will have a regional security based on the two you know principle non-intervention and non-aggression I think you know with a strong presence of the UN as a guarantee as I said it will be welcomed and I don't think there will be any rejection from the Saudi side you know toward that and we have indicated very clearly and also when we talked about you know Yemen and how situation will be in Yemen you know Iran realize that it is not even in their best interest because they do also have a different militia they do have you know different groups so if the international community start recognizing the role of the violent United States actor and giving them a role to play where do we stop there every country then will have its own problem in that one but am I pessimistic or optimistic I think it all depends on Iran today Iran they if they realize that they can't live in a lake of hatred in the region that they need to fix their relation in that one and they need to address the various issues they need to address issues from Hezbollah to the militia in Syria that they have created through the Afghani Pakistani and the through the Iraqi also militia they need to look at the Hasid al-Shaab in Iraq they need to look at you know al-Houthi on the on the south if if they change that sort of attitude and willing to be because they have chosen by the way to deal with through this militia for two reasons one to support the regime that they want if they decided to like what they did with Hezbollah in Syria the second is to leverage with them to use it as a disturbance tools that you know the same thing well you know it's like what they did in Lebanon when they have delayed the you know the government troll in that one and became much more aggressive in that one I think I would still call for a real major constructive global engagement you know in solving a lot of the you know regional problem that we have starting from Libya all the way to Yemen you know going through the the the whole thing here thank you let's move to far to the east to to by Jing when Abdulaziz just said Saudi Arabia has condemned the Turkish incursion China doesn't seem to condemn anything just looking at the situation and enjoying it I don't know but um there are no real statements on Yemen no real statements on the Turkish incursion into Syria and China seems to wait until opportunities open itself for both economic and more and more also political and security engagement throughout the region economic definitely in Syria and Iraq security engagement with the UN in in Sudan South Sudan for example so does China have some ideas of its own and does it want to launch any any initiatives of its own to solve any of the conflicts we have been talking about here I only to express my personal views uh by my observation I believe China is closely closely watch the whole Middle East and pay attention to the situation changing situation in the Middle East today my main argument is that uh there will be emergence of a situation of data in Middle East uh there is even though not currently uh in international community focused around Turkish operation in northern Syria and which trigger of the various uh response towards this incident uh but I think the general trend there will be the trend of the down in the very near future in Middle East the reason are as follows first United States is the first player actor in Middle East but let's give a very careful at a close look at the behavior of Trump administration what Mr. Trump wants to do or what's his priorities domestically and internationally domestically I think the top priority for Mr. Trump is to win the election of next year and globally speaking I think Mr. Trump's attention mainly focused on China so if his international agenda is a focus on China that means United States should concentrate enough and necessary resources to deal with China so let's look at Middle East as I believe the resources of United at the US disposal is limited if United States wants to concentrate resources do it with China that means United States has to maintain its interest immediately at the lowest cost no excuse me um we are all good at analyzing the United States we are actually interested in learning about the Chinese priorities I also I present the Chinese position later so don't take too long to come to the Chinese priorities please secondly since United States wants to keep the stability of this regional alliance at the lowest cost to safeguard the US interest at the lowest cost that means United States right now cannot do big things in the Middle East even though United States cannot do big things in Middle East that means United States regional alliance also cannot do big things because they hope United States to take the lead to take the leadership and to contribute more resources so this is the point one let's look at Russia no let's look at China please I mean I you you must admit I know let me summarize let me summarize since you you don't allow me to extend my my argument so let me summarize in one word very rare stakeholders in Middle East they are all tired even to some extent they are exhausted God exhausted Russia United States Saudi Arabia Iran and even Turkey so they I think to generalize their wishes as to at least not let the current attention to be get further escalated so that's laid down of a great foundation for the situation with data so my recommendations for all the policy conferences that international community should catch up this opportunity of data to firstly to hammer out a security framework in Gulf region in Middle East maybe can organize certain kinds of international conference to deploy the possibility and the feasibility of how to let this region more stable more peaceful and the second international community and regional countries should focus on the fight against international terrorism and religious extremism and also ethical separatism and certainly I think the general key to address the regional peace stability and development is development is the regional and the trans regional cooperation in this regard China wants to offer its contribution to that within the framework of Belt and Road initiatives and this is cooperation with all Middle East countries the reality is that China in fact keep good relations with all Middle East countries including Turkey including Saudi Arabia including Israel and Iran of course of course we keep very good relations with all Middle East countries that's I think is a better conditions to have a cooperation with all Middle East countries and so I think Chinese precision towards Middle East already illustrated very clearly by President Xi Jinping during his visit in Egypt and his speech in the headquarters of our league that is three notes China seeks no proxy in Middle East not to seek field power vacuum and not seek regime change rather than we persist in our traditional policy non-interference in other countries internal affairs also we call for United Nations to take play a leading role to address peace stability and development issues in Middle East we also very strongly support the Palestinian cause and support to stay solution based on relevant UN Security Council resolutions and you know with the border before the 1967 war and with Eastern Jerusalem as the capital of Palestinian state so we support the Arab peace initiative led by Saudi Arabia we also highly appreciate Saudi Arabia and our legal response to the recent I mean the so-called Dior of Century and our positions and our Saudi Arabia positions so this very short summarize thank you very much for laying that out we we have 13 and a half minutes to go and so I would invite you to raise your fingers as you already are doing and I would probably take three four speakers in a row and then gives a chance to you to come back would you the lady here in the front row would you please ask you of course I should have I should have other glasses as yeah please you have the first go well thank you very much enough for your thoughts however I'm so sorry that there is nobody from North Africa because we are having some hot issues too let me just ask three or four very quick questions first to the panel I would like you please to clarify the respective role of your states Turkey of course GCC since you have the the Gulf think tank in the first place the regional powers what is their involvement in North Africa the Sahel and West Africa and especially in the insecurity continuum from Libya to the Sahel second I'd like to move very quickly to China since you said to more global powers since China is taking a more active role in security in Africa we know it especially in larger frameworks but what is the price you would be ready to pay since the US wants it lowest cost what is the one you want to pay to see a more stable region which would be very favorable for your trade and what type of development would you be respected respecting since Africa now is looking for a more inclusive more self-reliant in development what would be the role of China you know in that respect I turn to you Volcker because I would like to you to answer me about Europe involvement beyond the role of France what could Europe do just to contain the risks from inflame in North Africa and further destabilize it and of course to try to contain the increase of the immigration flows on a much wider scope I would like you all of you please to tell us what would be the game changer to go beyond and avoid organized crime to take roots in the whole region which it is doing right now and avoid failing states more in this region of Africa where states sometimes are much more fragile than the big organized crime thank you very much for these very precise questions I see Joseph I saw Doroté and Zadalia at the very end there so let's take these three speakers and then we go to the panel thank you Volcker thank you for the panelists discussions and the panelists themselves three quick questions going into the debate that you have triggered here very interesting but my first question would be about Palestine about the Israeli Palestinian issue would shall I be shall I have to understand that the whole question of Palestine and the Israeli Arab conflict has become totally irrelevant when it comes to the Middle East where do you stand where do you they country your country stand regarding this question my second question would be to the the big change that has occurred in the Middle East which is the role of Russia would not be in talking very much about Russia since Russia has this tremendous role that it is playing today in in Syria so Russia has not welcomed the incursion like focus Volcker said of Turkey but now beginning from today I think that's right under the under Russian umbrella Russia would have to well manage relation with the Turks and with the Iranians what are the outcome what are the perspectives about that and my third question would go to the gentleman for from Saudi Arabia and a very interesting thing do you think sir that when it comes to the Iranian and the tensions in the Gulf area do you think that today we would be able I mean talking about global diplomacy to solve the problem by focusing only on one part of the problem which is the nuclear issue the European diplomacy is focusing very much on this issue don't you think that Iran has been very much successful in setting up a linkage policy that would trigger us or would drive us in order to solve the problems to discuss at the same time nuclear issues Syrian issues Afghanistan issues maybe the Houthis issues and the Hamas and the Hezbollah issue since Iran is having a very important role in linking all these questions together thank you thank you Joseph I have Dorothee Schmidt and Daria and Hatim but you already have the mic so you start and then Dorothee goes good morning everyone I'm the gentleman from China he said that the different parties in the region are tired I don't think so because if we go back in history to the history of Europe to the 30 years war that shattered Europe and it was also driven by ethnicity by sectarianism you know the the war stopped only when the different countries didn't have any money or any young people to fight and we are far away from that there is still money in the region and there are still young men who are ready to fight so and we have this political competition between three blocks Iran on one hand Turkey and Qatar on one hand Saudi Arabia and UAE unless we have some serious mediation what we have the bloodshed we see now can can go on for another 20 years so we need to have a serious effort we need to have awareness by the regional actors as well by the international community to pressure everyone to enter into an agreement thank you thank you very much Dorothee Schmidt thank you to all the speakers I'm more interested in the escalation escalation in Syria currently and so first simple question is who could mediate in Syria who should we mediate between that's a sub question like the Turks and Bashar al-Assad soon second question who will reap the benefits of the operation which I think personally is extremely risky for the Turks and third question is what is your take this is maybe for you Volker what's your take on the future of NATO so we have 10 we have 10 questions I'm not actually a panelist but I would probably try to say a word in my closing remarks 10 questions please don't try to all answer the 10 questions there would be 40 answers for six minutes so if each of you would would pick the three questions or so he seems to be most relevant and maybe Muhammad we start with you again yes what would be the game changer in the Sahel and West Africa and incidentally the issue that has been raised about transnational organized crime is real is serious in the Guinea-Bissau Senegal area alone in the last few months the seizures of of drugs has just been phenomenal in terms of the quantities you're talking of you know more than a ton in one case 800 you know pounds in another case it's huge quantities that are coming through and there is a good reason to believe that this is part of the network for financing of terrorism precisely because we know the routes of these drugs goes through territories now that are controlled by terrorist groups so we need to take that serious and therefore within the perspective of the UN this integrated approach will call for first and foremost scaling up on the security approach we all know that Munusma was well intended and we're doing our best to use that peacekeeping force in Mali but legitimate questions are being posed by the Malian people and it's not making any of us look good so we need to have serious discussions as to what type of force do you deploy in an area where the adversaries are using uh what somebody has someone has called unconventional and asymmetric warfare terrorist attacks etc do we have the right march or force to the security threat legitimate issue to be discussed there and I've suggested that this cannot be left just to the French as I think one of the contributors from the floor has also said which has deployed Balkan we know that others are coming on board but in my view in not sufficient vigorous force that we need to deal with terrorism at the same time that we must address the root causes of poverty and allow this region to harness the tremendous resources that are available to grow the economies tackle climate change and change the narrative of violence and extremism to one of creating growth and opportunity for the young people and the women very dynamic ready to move their countries forward thank you very much Mohammed Mamdouh you've got quite a number of I know very difficult ones the Russian issue now I think the criticism of the operation in Syria by the Russians is very contained and sort of subdued so that that signals quite a bit at the end of the day they managed to put a wedge between the US and PYD they managed to get us mostly out of it the northern Syria so they're probably quite okay with what's happening provided they've been very clear about this they do not want this operation to harm the constitutional process in Syria they're very clear they do not want this to harm the territorial integrity and unity of Syria and they hence they do not want a permanent presence of Turkey in Syria and I think you know that's very clear and I think that sort of aligns with the current statements by the Turkish president Erdogan so we will hope that just will work out and then and in the end I mean as as we were exchanging words with Walker as I mean the odds are the Russians will try to nudge Turkey and Syria together for a rapprochement and that may well be the end game if it happens but I don't know whether that will happen or not we'll see and Iran I mean Iran is obviously also sort of watching very closely and Iran I think will be quite okay with that as well because at the end of the day both Russians and Iranians seem to be very intent on having Assad rule a sort of an integrated unified country so that seems to be it's heading there in terms of who negotiates with whom who mediates it seems really the only external power at this point that can really mediate is the Russians unless the Europeans are willing to start talking about the reconstruction effort which will be a whole other thing but I don't think we are there yet so it'll be again I think the Russians will try to do something between us and the Syrians I don't know whether that will sort of bear any fruit and if that works out and we finally have our the corridor free of terrorism the you know the the the Syrians gradually going back the Turks will benefit from this hopefully the Syrian people will benefit from this but I agree with you Dorothea it is this will be a very difficult complicated and risky process I mean there is a good scenario going really through these very complex and dreadful scenarios I'm just hoping that that sort of tenuous line is the one that will materialize in the end that's and we'll talk about it next year hopefully. Thank you ma'am Duh. Don Manian I think there were two questions which you should answer the one is the price tag on your engagement how much are you actually prepared or you think China is is prepared to involve in terms of resources and maybe you should also take the question about who is going to mediate or who could mediate I just prefer the three points point one China attached great importance to her relations with Minna region with Africa because in Minna region except for Israel all the countries in African continent all the countries are developing countries China is the largest developing country so first we share same historical experiences second we face same tasks how to develop our country how to better off people's living standards so we have 1,000 reasons to consolidate to upgrade our relations our friendship so let me determine let me define the nature of the relations between China with Minna countries with African countries that is we are this is my first response and second response ah Palestinian issue Palestinian just cause China for since the founding of a new China 70 years ago and from fifties of next last century until now China are strongly persistently continuously support Palestinian cause so in our in Arabic allies so how Arab world how Islamic world are shoving what is China doing in terms of support Palestinian cause so I think currently the whole Arab world whole Islamic world face a real challenge that is how to deal with the so-called dealer of the century I believe even though there is a imbalance of power between Israel and Palestine and between that Israel and that of Arab world Islamic world but I think the fundamental interests of Palestinian people the national dignity of Arab people Palestinian people and Muslims cannot be trade-off or swap so China will continue to support Palestinian cause and stand shoulder by shoulder hand in hand with Arab countries with Islamic countries to stick to the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and to support to state solutions and support Arab peace initiative and lastly the third point to the question raised by that beautiful lady about because she doesn't believe the regional actors they are they all get tired I think they get tired that's just one one of the reasons more important reason is that I think the main players of in Middle East their top priority is to how to rejuvenate their country for you take Turkey as an example Turkey under the leadership of type Erdogan by Turkey formulated 2023 strategic vision so I believe Turkey's domestic policies and foreign policy should serve for this strategic vision and also the same story of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of crown prince crown prince Mohammed bin Salman Saudi Arabia formulated 2030 strategic vision so that's the top priority for Saudi Arabia to realize and that will lead further solid foundation for the leadership of Saudi Arabia Arab world and Islamic world so thank you thank you thank you very much we are already in the negative when it comes to our time schedule so last remark by Abdulaziz well maybe I'd like to start by commenting a little bit on the Chinese side you know just very quickly not so okay until the China start to liberating the economy post 1991 yes we used to have a very firm position from the Chinese when it came to 1956 67 73 71 and but post that you know I mean lately unfortunately we start seeing much more interest from China in the economic side and the economic relation economic participation in the region yes China import today 1,550,000 a day from Saudi Arabia almost 17 percent of China import comes from Saudi Arabia which is a very important I myself take a lot of pride that I was one of the very few Saudi visited China in November 1980 when it was a different country at that time but at the same time what today my concern me the Chinese have followed the Russian when it came to the Syrian case they have joined them in the V2 that have in the Security Council without stating their clear position you know away from the Russian you know following them on such a decision and so but anyhow it's a very important relation we appreciate a lot of the Chinese position there but yet we would don't like to see a buyer and seller relation only with China we would like to see a much more you know holistic approach and a much more constructive approach from the Chinese yes the questions from the floor from yes the floor I will I will go through it very quickly with regard to the North Africa and the Sahel well when it comes to a country like Libya Saudi Arabia would like to see a unified Libya constitutional that you know taking consideration everybody some of the Gulf country have taken a step of intervention there I'm not so sure whether it's based on their own interest or based on another alliance that they have you know with other country but at the same time I can't speak on their behalf I can I can see that yes Egypt and and the UAE is involved in Libya Qatar and Turkey is involved in Libya I think if we leave the Libyan you know issue to the Libyan and we try to help them to come up with the you know a much better structure will be better in the Sawah and yes we are a big supporter for counter-terrorism issue and Saudi have contributed to that and we understand you know the situation there quite well on the Palestinian no it will remain to be the key issue in the region I don't think you know the Palestinian is coming down in the list maybe there are you know it used to be the only case the mother of all cases and the mother of all battles as they call it but now we have many different cases at the same time we have you know many issues to deal with but that would not because otherwise you know when we had the Arab summit in the Ma'am in Saudi Arabia King Salman called it the you know Al Quds summit so you continue to support the you know you know Palestinian government with no changes there are we in support not in support you know with the with the deal of the century I was one of those who met with Kushner when he came to Saudi Arabia and when we talked to him I don't think there is a real clear picture at this stage today that you can really judge whether the deal of the century has a clarity or not. Russian role as I said you know I will close it don't worry you know Russian role as I said if it wasn't the US declined I mean Russia will have their own difficulties the Russian economy is almost the same says of Spain can they really afford that expansionist policy their trade relation with the region is primarily in military and some mineral but not much it's not like the Chinese for instance you will compare a three billion China I mean Russia trade with the region to almost 170 billion from China you know that's a big different on that one. Last word we are getting signs that we are taking over time. Can we really solve the nuclear issue you know there is two division there is the strategic and then a strategic issue then a strategic issue we are willing to continue with the Iranian had Amra diplomat establishing the relation organized crime you know maritime issue in all of these issues we differentiate the key issue strategic issue for us that we will not compromise about it is their interventionist policy their expansionist policy and the JCPO which include the missile program the Iranian they used to insist in blinking them all together but today according to the last statement from President I mean from Minister Zarif he's willing to separate he's willing to deal on the both side the last word thank you I mean we need to thank the great country of Kingdom of Morocco for their hosting us and providing the platform we need to thank Terry and all his team you know for organizing the world policy we're very happy with what you see this is becoming the dafus of the international affairs. Thank you for already sort of making the last words here which usually belong to the chairperson but it's not a high job I'm not going I'm not going to answer as an idle question because that's not the panel on Asia's question would be great to have a panel on European engagement with this region my very short answer is containment is not an answer our strategy but it should be a mix of continuing transformative engagements plus empowerment of the states that work and function in the region but that would need more time to elaborate please join me in thanking these four gentlemen here for enlightening about the situation in that region and that was it thank you