 Thank you for the kind words. It's a delight to be here. You need to understand that this is a technological challenge. You have a previous infant with something in each hand. I'm perfectly prepared to make a hash of this, but we'll see what happens. First, a comment. I'm at the stage of life and at the age, as you can tell, where colleagues are rich people indeed. I just want to personally acknowledge Martin Cook. We've worked together for well over a decade. We've labored in the same vineyard for a long time, published a lot of articles, a lot of books, done a lot of developmental work in educational institutions, and I just want to note that it's been a privilege, your privileged people to have him on your faculty here. You can see the topic of my discussion this morning. My intent this morning is to frame for you three conceptions. I want to frame for you the conception of steward of a profession. I want to frame for you the conception of the military ethic, and I want to frame for you your understanding of moral character and the role that it plays in stewardship. If I'm successful at those three things, then this will have been, from my perspective, a trip well spent. Stewardship of military professions, so let me address the noun first, professions. I'm not talking about the National Football League. I'm not talking about professional golfers. That's to use the word profession as an antonym for amateur. That's not what I'm talking about. Everything I'm going to talk about today comes out of the sociology of professions. And the sociology of professions is a study of how do Western democratic countries organize expert work, not routine work, expert work. And historically, they have done that in a unique way, and they've done it a way which creates trust between the profession and the client. You'll hear me say this more than once today, but there is only one currency of profession and its trust. You either have trust or you don't have trust. If you have trust, you have the potential for a professional relationship. If you don't have trust, there's no potential in the world for a professional relationship because that's the currency that makes it work. So that's the noun, and then stewardship. What does it mean to be a steward? Let me move forward. A definition right out of the dictionary. One called to exercise responsible care over something entrusted. So what are you entrusted with? Simply stated, you're entrusted with the profession in which you serve. There are three military professions. There's the land power profession. There's the maritime profession, and there's the aerospace profession. These three professions somewhat coincide with military departments that were created by our government at the founding of the republic, but not exactly. They include uniform people, and they also include civilians. We had a big argument about this, which I'll come to later, as we were writing doctrine for the army profession. Are the civilians in or are the civilians out? Must you bear arms to be a part of the army profession? We'll come to that. So a steward is one called, and what are you entrusted with? You are entrusted with the profession. As we wrote it in our doctrine, one of those aspects of stewardship, the key aspect of stewardship, is the long-term viability of the profession. Now I'll come to this in just a minute, but let me state it now. There will always be a United States army. It is a big government bureaucracy. It was created by the founders as a department of the government. That will always be there. The question is, will there be an army profession? Because it's not necessary that there will be an army profession, just because there is a bureaucracy. So we decided that if the army is going to be a profession, we have to see these five things. They have to exist in the army. Junior professionals have to see those, or they will not believe that there is a profession. They have to see that we're working with expert knowledge, not non-expert knowledge. Non-expert knowledge is the work of bureaucrats and bureaucracies. Professions deal with expert knowledge. Asprey to core, we have to work through the mud and muck of land combat. Honorable service, we want a culture in which every soldier can live according to the values that we espouse. It's their responsibility to do so, but we have to create a culture which motivates them to do so, a professional culture. And then we need stewards, and then we need that lubricant which makes all of the rest of this the difference between a bureaucracy and a profession. Final point, when you took your oath, I will well and faithfully discharge the responsibilities of the office, of which I am about to enter. When I said the word office, what was the mental map in your mind? I hope it was not a physical place, because that's not the office you occupy. The office you occupy as a steward, the office you occupy as a professional is a moral office because of the fiduciary responsibility that you hold in trust for the American people, the common defense, the profession that provides the common defense. So rightly understood, your oath is about a moral office as much if not more than about. So let me put this in context. The subtitle of my presentation was stewardship of a profession during a defense build-down. Now, contrary to what it looks like, I did not live through this build-down, but I have lived through these three. So I'm probably the only person in the room who has experienced three build-downs, maybe another or two from the distinguished guests here. But let me tell you, folks, it's intensely harder to maintain a professional culture in a build-down. Build-downs bureaucratize, and that's the difficulty. That's defense expenditures. If you want to see it worse, this is what the Department of the Army is facing. And notice, over seven years, more than a 50% reduction in resources if you count the OCO funds, which we do because that's what funds us, particularly the expeditionary forces. This is an immense challenge for stewardship. You have to contextualize this correctly. It's difficult enough to be a profession. It is doubly difficult to be a profession in this kind of culture. So let me go first to the subject of the dual character of professions. And let me remind you of the uniqueness of the profession in which you serve. Read this carefully. There's only four tasks for the American soldier to prepare to kill and then to write authority to kill. And since we're in the killing business, we have to be in the dying business. And that means the American soldier must prepare to die and, when necessary, for the mission to die. The four tasks of the American soldier. This is not ask of any other profession in America. With exception, perhaps, there's some categories of first responders. So a unique profession we're talking about today, not just any profession. So what do professions do? This is what all professions do. This is how to think about the sociology of professions. A vital service which the society cannot provide itself but must have for its flourishing. The law. You can't represent yourself before the bar. Medicine. You can't heal yourself. Theology. An intermediary between the almighty and you. The fearful. The fearful cannot provide their own security. That's why our founders decided that the government would provide for an army and a navy. So something they must have but cannot provide for themselves. You work with expert knowledge. It takes years. It's not repetitive work. If you get up every day, folks, and go to work and do the same thing you did today before, you're behaving as a bureaucrat and a bureaucracy. And that's a good thing if that's what we need at that point. Let me make a point in this presentation right now so that I don't confuse you. I am not against bureaucracies. I will contrast bureaucracies to professions throughout this presentation. I'm not against bureaucracies. We need them. They're designed to do repetitive work efficiently. And some places in our big organizations, we need that. But we always need that institution surrounded by profession so that bureaucracies stay confined to the work that they're supposed to do. You earn and maintain the trust. And you have a means of social control over your work. And it's called the ethic. So now we've introduced the ethic. Why do professions have ethic? Because that's how they control their work. That's how we control who does what work, where it's done, and how it is done. And notice, I haven't mentioned the law at all. We'll come to that later. And so if this works out, then professions are granted autonomy. The Army just produced a new intellectual document about how to fight in a complex world and win. Nobody in Congress told us what to write in that doctrine. They didn't help us a bit in writing that doctrine. You know why? Because they would know what to put in it. They don't have the expert knowledge of fighting combined arms warfare. But they trust us to get it right. They granted us autonomy to do that. You want to lose your autonomy? Ignore your ethic. What happened to the Navy after tail hook? For how many years were people redlined on promotion list? But my count, seven years. That's what happens when you lose the trust of your client. They give you the back of the hand and they treat you like a bureaucracy, because that's how you behaved. And they know how to treat bureaucrats. Give them more rules. Give them more SOPs. Hammer them with compliance. That's not the behavior of profession. So you folks had to re-earn the trust of the American people, and you did. The Army suffered the same thing after the Aberdeen scandal. We suffered the same thing after Abdu-Garib. We do not have a resplendent history. Our professionalism has ebbed and flowed, and your challenge as a steward is to make it eb every single day. That's what professions do. Let's apply this now. The Army, incidentally, I will speak about the Army most of the time, because that's where my research comes from. And as a scholar, I've learned to talk about what I research, not to talk about what I haven't researched. So you can take what I have done and what we have done in the Army and apply it to your profession and civilians. Apply it to the agencies within your working, those who are seeking to have professional status. So we were formed 12 years before the Constitution. We were professionalized after the Civil War. So as of this year, 244 years in Army, but only half the time is a profession. So what were we before that? What was the Army before the Civil War? Well, it was, as I mentioned earlier, a government bureaucracy. It was the Department of War. When I worked on the NSC staff, there was a great prerogative and who worked in the old executive office building by what kind of doorknob you had on your door. Because in one hall, the doorknob had the symbol of the Department of War. And the other hall, the symbol of the Department of the Navy, because when that building was created, those were two of the four executive departments. There were only two others, state and treasury. That was the federal government at that point in time. 241 years in Army, 127 years of military profession. So before that, we were a bureaucracy and here you are, stewards. Every place you see VS, you put yourself because that's where you reside in your moral office. You are challenged by profession to work under expert knowledge but bureaucracy under non-expert. These people accept lifelong learning. They practice by new situations. The work is done humanly. We'll talk about this more in just a minute, but the work of a military professional is the repetitive exercise of discretionary judgments. That's it. How many times a day do you do it? That is your work as a military professional. It's practiced by humans, even though it's surrounded by technology. There's only one measure for a profession, effectiveness. Over here, we want efficiency. Now, obviously, you cannot be inefficient and satisfy the trust relationship with the American people. We're not here to squander their resources. But the point is the primary measure for professional behavior is effectiveness. The sick want a cure. They don't want to talk about it. I just had surgery six weeks ago. I was selecting the surgeon. The first question I asked him was, how many of these have you done? How many turned out with condition A and how many turned out with condition B? And he answered me. He could tell me. And that created a trust relationship. And eventually I said, okay, you're the surgeon. You can work on my back. I trust you to do that. A trust relationship with a client. We have an ethic which polices are at work. Not over here. The ethic is externally imposed. It's rules, regulations, SOPs. And over here, critically, we are motivated intrinsically. Here, the motivation is extrinsic. I'll come to that in another chart. This is the principle point I want you to understand. Have you accepted your calling? I'm sure you have. At this point, you probably wouldn't be here. But can you create a culture in which the junior professionals around you can see their life work as a calling? From the Latin, vocari, what does it mean? Very simply stated, it means my work is more important than I am. Let me restate that. My work is more important than I am. I am part of something bigger than myself. I am providing for the common defense of the Republic. They trust me to do this. They can't do it themselves. They will not be secure if I don't do it. At one point, after my third tour in Vietnam, I had serious reservations about whether I was going to stay in the military. Very serious reservations. And I finally resolved that issue personally by saying I'm probably more prepared at this time to do this than most of the people I know. Therefore, the American people are better served if I continue to do this than if I walk out and someone else comes in who hasn't had the experiences that I've had. A calling, vocari, my work is more important than I am. Where does careerism fit in that? See, with the right moral conception of what it means to be a steward, what I'm talking about today and trying to help you understand is a moral identity. The military professions, we all talk about leadership and in the Army we have this prideful and incorrect perception that we are great at developing leaders. Leader as a noun is an amoral word. Gangs have leaders. ISIL has leaders. No, we're not after an amoral conception, an amoral, excuse me, an amoral conception. We need to see ourselves. We need to understand ourselves and create a culture in which other people can see themselves as occupying a moral office and having an identity that motivates moral behavior. So this is the principle chart I will show you today. Everything else is derivative of this framework. You work in organizations that have a dual character. Folks, we can't get rid of that. If we could get rid of that, we could make our military profession so much better. But we can't get rid of that for a whole bunch of reasons one of which the Congress loves this. Congress loves to have you over here. They want you right under their thumb. They even control your manpower down to the man day year. Yeah, how much do they really trust you? That's why we have to constantly be earning their trust. They love this. We are stuck with being a big government bureaucracy. We have to, by dint of our effort, develop the culture and behavior of profession. So this is critical. You are in the middle of each of these trying to make the behavior over here and not over here. We have expert knowledge. I only show you this to let you know that all professions have internal and external jurisdictions, law, medicine, everywhere. You have places where you do your work. Hours are negotiated with Department of Defense and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This is where you do your work. These are your jurisdictions in the language of sociology. The important thing I want you to note down here. Every profession takes their expert knowledge which they develop themselves and puts it in humans to practice. We work with human expertise. And there are generally four fields to your knowledge. We've mapped these in the Army, finally. When we started this project a decade ago, I asked for the map of the Army's professional knowledge and folks throughout the Army, there was not one. There was not a map anywhere. There are four fields of knowledge, the military technical, how you fight, the moral ethical, how you fight rightly, the political cultural, how you deal outside the boundaries of your own organization with other organizations that have different politics and different cultures and the critical expert knowledge which we used to articulate, what we were so good at is the development of leaders and the practice of our professionals. And folks, when we did the research and we published the first book, Guess Which Expert Field Was the Weakest. For the Department of the Army, this was the weakest. That was 2002. And this is the core if you understand professions of what it takes to make a profession. Here's the quintessential act of professional practice. When you're facing a new situation, you diagnose it just like a doctor. In the military, we call that the estimate. You reason about it with inferential logic. You execute, you evaluate, you change the knowledge if it was bad or you change the jurisdiction if you shouldn't be working there. But here is the practice. So when someone asks you, what do you do as a military professional? This is the answer in one sentence. Many times a day, I make discretionary judgments. How many times a day? Anyone? Your last job, how many times a day did you exercise discretionary judgment? Scores, can then someone give me an example of one of those judgments that had no moral content? I'm using the word moral to mean influence the well-being of another human being. Kind of a generic definition of what is moral. It influences the well-being of another human being. Can anybody give me a decision that you made, a discretionary judgment? Incidentally, we chose those words in our doctrine, discretionary judgment specifically because we wanted to get the army out of the idea of decision-making. A mechanical process of, no, we're not into decision-making. We render judgments as humans. The army is wrapped around the axle on quantitative analysis. We can do quantitative analysis until we're paralyzed by analysis. Professionals make judgments. Ultimately, the action is a judgment. And we put the word discretionary in front of it because we wanted it understood that nobody looks over your shoulder when you make your judgment. Or at least we hope people are not looking over your shoulder when you make your judgment. We trust you to make a judgment. We have a new doctrine of mission command that says this is how we now operate by trusting people and underwriting their judgments. All of high moral content. So we've just established the necessity for moral character. This is a restatement of what we decided, notice, essential. We had great debates in the army at the four-star level wall. How many essentials are there? You should have seen this lesson we started. It was around 11 or 12 or 13. It took two councils of four-star generals before the army could come down and say, okay, there's only five. And actually, there's only four because if we have these four, we will produce trust. And it will all be based on the ethic. So in a way, this is our doctrine. We finally wrote it in 2013, the first time in the storied history of the United States Army that we have ever had a doctrine to define what it means to be a profession. Why do we care? You're probably saying, well, Snyder's all hyped up about this. The army's all hyped up about this. Why do we care if you're a profession or not? Two things, if you're not a profession, you will not get. You will not get expert knowledge out of bureaucracy. And you won't get social control of an organization that does not have an internal component. Let's go to the first one. Expert knowledge? Read this. Former Chief of Staff of the Army, writing about his experience in March of 2003. Some of you were perhaps there. This is Baghdad right after the takedown. March, 2003. What's the Chief of Staff say? We had no idea. We didn't recognize. It took too long. We were surprised. This is a two-star division commander commenting, well, then it was a four-star, commenting on his experience as the division commander to two-star level. What's he describing? What he's describing is the egregious failure of stewardship within the United States Army. The United States Army arrived at Baghdad, took down the Saddam regime, was confronted with an insurgency with criminal elements and did not have the expert knowledge to counter it. We had lost it. There was no expert knowledge in the Army of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or nation-building. We had washed it all out of the Army after Vietnam. We turned to the European Front. This is an egregious failure, folks, of my generation of Lieber. I was the generation that instituted the all-volunteer force after Vietnam and rebuilt it. The beautiful Army that wasn't Desert Shield and Desert Storm, one of the finest armies ever to do armored warfare. And yet that Army, when it got to Baghdad, had no expert knowledge. Folks, that is an egregious failure of stewardship. And our chief was willing to admit that. So that's what happens to professions that lose sight of the future, who lose sight of their responsibility. So my question to you today is very straightforward. What expert knowledge must the naval profession or the maritime profession have? Six years from now to succeed. Why do I say six years? It generally takes from my study, in the study of the folks that I've been working with, six years from the development of knowledge to the creation of practice in individual humans and in units, that's about a six-year period. Now, in this period, the Army did it in a little over two years. In a little over two years, we had renewed the doctrine of counterinsurgency and we had majors going into battalions as operations officers and executive officers. And within two years, we were reasonably well-fusing intelligence and operations on the ground and starting to map and fight counterinsurgency. Folks, that's unprecedented. I haven't found anywhere where that's been done that rapidly before. But that doesn't change the fact of what happened. It doesn't change the teaching point. It doesn't change what I need for you to understand that you need to be thinking about here in this school. The school needs to have you thinking six years forward. Do we have the right expert knowledge and the right expert practices? So, that's one thing you don't get if you're not a profession. The second thing is you don't get social control. Lieutenant Colonel George Patton, 1914, Musargon commanding the first tank brigade, 845 people, 84 tanks. The battle started on 3 August, ended on 14 August, as I recall. I know it was an 11-day battle. Patton was shot from the front, leading from the front, shot through the front on the third day. By the end of the battle, there was not a tank moving, not one. The 845 people, they mustered 83 at formation out of 845. Two years later, Patton wrote a letter to Pershing when Pershing was the chief of staff, and in the letter, Patton recounted what happened on that day. And he said, quote, we did not turn and run from the enemy because we were more afraid of our consciences than we were of them. Look around you in the room. Now look at me, look around. Look at the people around you. What you're looking at when you look at the people around you is you're looking at your profession's ethic. Professions have embodied ethics. Patton embodied it. Some of his peers embodied it. Not every soldier, of course not. But professions operate on an embodied ethic at the level of moral conscience. We were more afraid of our consciences than we were of the enemy. So he leaves from the front and gets shot through the front. And the battle marginally succeeded. So two things you don't get if you're over here on the bureaucracy side and not the profession side, you don't get two things. You'll never create expert knowledge. I've been challenged on this, but I haven't found anything. If anybody out here has got any information, let me know. But I have never found an example in America of a bureaucracy producing expert knowledge. Now maybe there is one, but I haven't found one. And you won't have an internal means of social control. So that's my first point for you today. You got bureaucracy, you got too much, it's too powerful. There's a dual character of the profession. Now I quickly wanna cover just two more points and then go to your question. So I'll skip some of this because I wanna get to our ethic. Here's your ethic. This is your means of social control. It resides in your culture. It's influenced by the functional imperatives of the profession. That's your job as stewards. You have to make sure the civilians allow you to keep an ethic that has the right functional imperatives in it. For the army, there's a big one over here. We cannot have obese soldiers in the army. You can't do land warfare unless you're physically fit. We have to maintain fitness standards. We've learned that in war. We have to negotiate that with our civilian leaders. They're gonna impose some things on us and they have just imposed two major changes on your culture. Gaze openly and women in combat. And so you can see there's gonna be a clash between women in combat and maintaining the functional imperatives. And of course we have to abide. My point in this chart is very simple. You are the steward of the ethic of your profession. That's one of the treasures that you control. It changes over time. It needs to be steward as it evolves. Ethics are not static. They can't be static because you're a dynamic profession. So we mapped our ethic. Here's the legal side of it. Here's the moral side of it. Here's the part that applies institutionally. And here's the part that applies individually. So we start with the constitution and treaties and then legally we have owes and standards of conduct. This is all legal. Part of our ethic. This is the moral side. We start with the Declaration of Independence. We hold these truths to be self-evident. A compelling moral document about who we are and how we fight under the just war tradition. And then we've got some other institutional cultural issues. The old can-do attitude which can get way out of bounds sometimes. And then we've got all sorts of things to help individuals understand their moral identity. You know what we concluded out of this chart? We published this in 2013 in the first manual on profession. You know what the conclusion was? We got too damn many ethics. I mean, look at it. And that's where we are. That's where we were. That's where we were. I won't go into it, but we've now changed that. We have written a 10 sentence ethic. Excuse me, nine sentences. Moral principles focused at the level of E6. Things they can understand. And that American people can read and say, yes, I agree with that. But I wanna show you what happens about this issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. In leadership terms, if you lead by this ethic, this is what you create. You create the motivation of obligation. This is called the duty concept. I am obligated to do my duty. Fact is in UCMJ, we even have an article for dereliction of duty. So if you lead over here, and what do we call this kind of leadership? You've studied leadership theories here. Which is it? This is transactional leadership. This is quid pro quo. The duty obligation, transactional leadership. In some cases, that's appropriate. In most cases, in professions, it is not. We would prefer you lead over here under the motivation of aspiration where you are inspiring people to quote be all they can be, to follow their calling, to be trusted army professionals in our language. This is transformational leadership. Two different styles of leadership. Fortunately in the army, we do a lot of research on the subject of leadership. And I just wrote an article where I went through our latest biennial research report and I pulled out the data of how many people and folks we sample at every level. E4, E5, E6, E7, leader led relationships all the way to the top. And guess what I found? About a third of our leaders are not creating trust. They are not creating an environment of trust. They're leading over here. Why? Because the army's churning so fast now. We've come back to garrison. We've got junior NCOs that don't know how to live in garrison. They don't know their responsibilities in garrison. They couldn't set up a firing range if they tried. Because the last time they set up a firing range, it was in Iraq and there were no rules. So now we come back and put them on Fort Bliss and it's oh my goodness. So we have a lot of relearning to do. But the point is, so we've resorted to this kind of leadership too much at the point of the spear. We need to be over here with the motivational and the aspirational leadership. So you, this is your ethic. These are your leadership styles. My question to you is, are you creating cultures in which the leadership style reinforces the power of the ethic? Or are you truncating the power of the ethic by the way you're leading? Here's an organization that went from the right side to the left side. Anybody recognize this symbol? Everybody get paid this month? This is DFAS. This is the people who pay you. Up until 2004, the symbol of DFAS was just this. DFAS was a check mark. And what do you think that implied? The model of DFAS up to that point was our work is done when it's checked. How much trust does that create? Our work is done when it's checked. What kind of behavior does that sound like? Bureaucratic behavior coming from a bureaucratic organization. Starting in 2008 under new leadership, they came up with this. Proudly serving America's heroes. Leadership folks, stewardship. She and her team moved the institution from the left side behavior of bureaucracy to the right side behavior of profession. It can be done. Stewardship works. It's just a unique form of leadership with your eye to the future of the profession. Let me go to my last point now. This is James Rest's presentation of how he understands and this is not linear even though it says sequential. The process is spiral, iterates, iterates, you know that. Let me talk you through a moral decision. You've studied this but I wanna make a point to you. Just one point. So when you're making these repetitive discretionary judgments, how many times a day this is what you go through if you're morally sensitive to the content of the decision. First you have to recognize the moral content. We can teach some of that. The theories of moral development tells us that we can work on cognitive development and get people to see more be more morally sensitive. And we're doing that now. We've changed some curricular approaches to that so that people come out of education with a better understanding of the moral content of these discretionary judgments. And then you have to reason the ontological, consequential, virtue, ethics. We teach all three of them in our schools. We want people to understand the process of moral reasoning and we want them to reason by more than one process and we want them to be very careful if they're using consequentialist logic because it can lead you awry. So you discern in the judgment, the moral content, then you reason and then you arrive at the state that you know what the morally commendable act is. You know what it is. You know what is commendable to do. This is all and then we get to the point of moral action. Now you've been reading in the newspapers about your folks and your profession and we read in the newspapers about our folks and our profession who have become moral failures. And this is the gap of moral failure. Does anybody in this audience think that those people who got to this point did not know the right thing to do? I can tell you in the Army case, that's not the case. I haven't an R.I.G. just visited the War College and gave one of his behind the door briefings to all the War College students before they go out and discuss every single investigation against flag officers and how many brigade commanders we've relieved and how many battalion commanders. It's a pretty sore tail, folks. It's an exceptionally sore tail. And what happens? We get all the way up to here. People know the right thing to do and they don't do the right thing even though they know what it is. And so what do we call that? Here's what we call it. It's a failure of moral character. Now we can be too politically correct here but my way of thinking about this, it's either one or the other. You're either courageous or you're a coward. Now some of you are saying, oh, that's very black and white. That's not very 21st century. Folks, this is the teeter totter. It's not a merry-go-round. There's not a room for free riders on the merry-go-round. This is the teeter totter. This is how you need to conceive of your decisions. They're binary. They are either gonna be morally commendable or they are not going to be morally commendable. You're gonna create an environment where people can be and are motivated to be or they won't be. Our problem in the Army with sexual assault and sexual harassment is very simple to state. It's right here in one word, bystanders. Because they're cowards, they wanna be safe. We know what the problem is. And fortunately now that we've identified the problem in those terms of bystanders, guess who is taking on the problem to solve it? Our non-commissioned officer corps with a new program, I hate to use the word program, a new leadership emphasis on quote, not in my squad. And folks all over the Army, they are now owning their squads. And they're passing ownership down to the one, two ranks below them. This is E5s talking to E4s and E3s. Not in my squad. No bystanders here. And their understanding of this is an issue of courage versus cowardice. Or more importantly, it's an issue of moral character. So my question to you is, as stewards of the maritime profession, how are you doing at developing the moral character of your soldiers, sailors, and civilians? How much can you change moral character at this level? That's a very debatable subject. However, the answer usually comes out on the positive side. Maybe not as big as we'd like, but how about where you're training down, you mentioned 13th year of school. You're developing young sailors who are basically just out of high school. This is a colonial generation. What character do they come in with? And what can we do as military professions to assist in the moral development of that character? Folks, we gotta get over being politically correct and understand that we can't have people making decisions like this on a discretionary basis if they have no conception of the moral content of the decision and the character to make the right decision. And let me just say, for the army, this isn't a men's problem right now. I'll be straight up. I wrote about it in the article. I don't know if you've got a chance to read it or not, but we do not have anywhere in our doctrine of the army our expert knowledge, a model that explains the development of human character. We can't even have a conversation on it. I hope you got one somewhere. If you do, we may come and borrow it. We have a lot of insights in different doctrine. The leadership manual talks about it a little bit. Mission command talks about it a little bit, but nowhere have we come to grips and agreed this is how the moral character of soldiers is developed. We know what the most powerful thing is to develop it. Under social identity theory, the role of the moral exemplar, all stewards being exemplars at every, we know we've got a lot of good insights, but we do not have a unified doctrine that we can concentrate our developmental efforts on. I chose that word carefully, folks. I noticed a sign out here when I walked in educating naval leaders, but I knew the verb is educating. In our doctrine, it's called development. We want to develop the whole human being. Education works cognitively, I agree, but development is educating training and most of development occurs experientially. That's why the moral exemplars are so critically important. So let me stop there. I think those are the subjects I wanted to cover. Yeah, you're gonna work on a bad barrel or you're gonna work on a bad apple. We better work on both, folks. We better work on both. We've got to create the culture in which this kind of behavior, these folks can be intrinsically motivated to behave courageously and the most significant influence on the outcome of that decision, closing that gap between moral intentions and moral practice is the degree of reinforcement in the environment. It's either there or it isn't. So do we have questions?