 The hearing will please come to order. Although I'm certain the record will show that Mr. McFarlane is still on the oath. Mr. Garmin, do you believe we should repeat the oath again? Please rise, sir. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to help you God? I do. Please be seated. Yes, Mr. Groome. Chairman, I'd like to raise the point of order just for clarification. I wonder if the chair would advise the panel as to what the future president of the committee is going to be in view, allowing Mr. McFarlane to come back and testify. What is your plans for others that wish to come back and have a second time? Because of the unique nature of this request, Mr. McFarlane gave his testimony before we had received any information from Colonel North. And as a result, I don't believe that Mr. McFarlane was in any position to respond. Secondly, in the cases of, say, for example, Admiral Poindexter, he will be testified after the fact. And so we felt that in fairness to Mr. McFarlane and at his request, we decided to take this extraordinary step. We do not wish to make this a precedent. I would like to announce that in the future, if other witnesses feel that their characters have been impugned, I would advise and recommend that their testimony be taken together with counsel in deposition. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But I believe the witness that was just before us, Colonel North, is without question one of the most important that this panel will receive. Therefore, of this unique nature, we felt that it was only proper in the name of fairness to permit Mr. McFarlane to testify. Mr. McFarlane? Yes. Mr. Chairman, so that I might not be misunderstood at a later date, and I don't intend to make any issue over Mr. McFarlane's appearance here today. But I think it is outside of the process that we had understood that we were following, and I for one wish we had not done it at this time. Well, it was a possibility at all times because I'm certainly will recall that whenever a witness was finished with his testimony, the chair advised the witness that we may call you back. And I think the record will show this very clearly in the case of this witness. Mr. Chairman, if I may, again, I don't wish to make an issue of it. Mr. McFarlane is here, and I don't mean to second-guess the chairman. I think you have tremendous responsibilities in trying to make this a fair hearing and preserve its appearance of fairness as well as the reality of fairness. And I don't mean to impugn that motive at all. It's just that my concern is that whenever a witness feels that some other witness has testified in a way they don't agree with, they may wish to have another day in court. And I just don't know where that's going to end. I think if indeed Mr. McFarlane feels that Mr. Norse testimony was at variance with his experience, I suspect the same thing may be true of every other witness we have heard or will hear. It is a problem that we will have to face as they present it to us. And I'm certain that we will do our best to abide with the rule of fairness. Yes, sir. As I understand it, Mr. McFarlane has requested the committee for the opportunity to appear to testify. Senator is correct. The committee was therefore faced with having to decide whether to exceed to that request and his appearance today represents a decision by the chair that he should be allowed to come and testify. He was not recalled by the committee. Is that correct? The senator is eminently correct, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it should be noted that Mr. McFarlane initially appeared before us and does so again without any grant of immunity. I have been advised, Mr. McFarlane, that you have a statement that you wish to make. Yes, sir. Please proceed, sir. Thank you, sir. I have just a statement being filed with us for 48 hours. And no, it has not been because the request came in yesterday. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to take part once more in the committee's efforts to use these hearings on the Iran Contra matter to identify ways in which the processes used to formulate and carry out American foreign policy can be improved. Since last I was here, the committee has heard very important testimony. In particular, I would cite that of Olly North. Perhaps as never before in this administration, the nation has treated to a comprehensive explanation of just what United States interests are in Central America. How those interests are threatened and why our support for the Contras was and is, in my judgment, still justified. It was a superb performance, passionate in delivery, and persuasive in argument. And for it, all of us, I think, are deeply indebted to Colonel North. In addition, as a personal opinion, I believe that everything that has been said by committee members and others about Colonel North's bravery and devotion to his country is true. And I say that as one who knows, for I have worked with Olly for many, many years. As is to be expected, just as new testimony sheds light on previous areas of darkness, it may also raise new questions, which require further illumination, such as the case here. For just as millions, literally millions of Americans found themselves saying over and over again during Olly's testimony, his goals were certainly right. Or I agree with the ends that he was seeking. Many of the same people found themselves asking, I wonder if the means have to include lying. Or do we really want to keep the Congress completely in the dark? Or shouldn't there be some system of accountability? I'm here today because I want the record to be clear regarding my beliefs about how our government should function in the sensitive area of covert actions under our Constitution. I believe accountability is at the heart of our system of government. Also, while recognizing that the recollections of detail of events may differ between people, that honest witnesses who are busy with many matters, inevitably, will have different recollections of the same events many years later. And there is also the tendency for recollection to be colored by the way one would have liked to have acted, not the way in which one, in fact, did. And there are, in my judgment, some core facts about which I feel it's necessary to speak. At the outset, there seems to me to be a consensus, at least within the committee, regarding the legitimacy of and need for covert actions. Simply put, we aren't in a competition with a democratic opponent. For the other side, unrestrained covert actions are a way of life. And just as they support Leninist political parties in developing countries, we had better be able to use a range of means to support people who aspire to freedom. Or they will perish, and our own freedom, as we know it, will be in jeopardy. I also believe there is a consensus around the proposition that both the funding level and the intended scope of covert activities should be relatively modest. Any foreign policy issue that involves threats to truly vital national interests, the resolution of which will take significant funding for a long period of time, had better have the understanding and support of the American people going in. That support is engendered by vigorous public debate, something that is impossible in the case of covert actions, which must remain private. Well, if we agree on these two points, then the question becomes, how covert actions ought to be conducted so as to maximize the prospects for their success, as well as to minimize the damage if they fail? It seems to me that the answer to this question, especially under conditions of governance that we face today in which one party occupies the White House and the other control of the Congress, must be cooperation and compromise between the two branches. Needless to say, such an approach is inherently infeasible if either branch lacks integrity. That is, if either the executive branch ignores congressional restriction or fails to give the Congress full and complete information, or alternatively, if the Congress cannot protect the secrecy of information it is given, or through frequent changes of law demonstrates a resolution, as it certainly has here. Coming to cases, the issue before you concerns what went wrong when the Congress and the President disagreed over U.S. support for the Contras. First, if preventing the consolidation of an alien regime in Nicaragua was so important, the President should not have penned his hopes in 1981 on a covert action for the reasons that I've discussed in earlier testimony. Second, once he did so, however, the Congress and my judgment worsened matters considerably by requiring the United States to break faith with these people before the policy had been given a fair chance to be tested. Third, notwithstanding the Congressional vacillation once the Congress spoke, the administration should have listened. Even though to do so would have surely involved a tragic loss of life among those in Nicaragua who had become publicly and fatally identified by the Sandinistas. Alternatively, the administration could have chosen, as it apparently did, to disregard the Congress and pursue support for the Contras relying entirely on private support. And my judgment doing so was wrong for three reasons. First, it was very little prospect that this course would have been sustained by private funding at anywhere near the levels that could be poured in by the Soviet Union from the other side. In short, it would ultimately fail and at a much larger cost in terms of human lives. Second, it would be politically unwise to do so. For by going it alone without Congressional support, the current furor was almost guaranteed. And when it came, the President would be, as he is today, without allies to share in the defeat. Third, however, and most important in my judgment, to have chosen to establish a legal precedent concerning the President's sole responsibility to conduct foreign policy on an issue that was so poorly understood by the people of this country and by behaving as if the President is not accountable to anyone. It's simply wrong. The concept of accountability is firmly rooted in our political history for a very good reason. While in time of war one might imagine a justifiable transgression of law by a President to avoid a catastrophe, even the limited exercise of this license has been a matter in which Presidents have traditionally been very careful to enlist the support of members in Congress who would be there to share the blame if something goes wrong. The other reason for assuring accountability is also compelling. Without accountability, the temptation for a President to go beyond prudent limits to salvage a failing policy, especially if the majority in office is of the opposite party, will be virtually irresistible. And in circumstances of distress, while relying upon private parties who may not be competent or incorruptible, the margin for not just failure, but for the establishment of a climate of enduring hostility with the Congress is dangerously high. Colonel North testified that I gave him general authority to conduct covert operations involving widespread military and paramilitary activities based upon the position that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff. He also stated that he kept me advised of all of his activities. Colonel North did report to me from time to time on a few, but certainly not all, of the activities that went beyond mere political support for the Contras. The committee has seen those memoranda, all six of them. One, for example, involved his request for permission to ask a private U.S. donor to provide a helicopter to the Contras. I specifically disapproved this proposal and noted that I did not believe that it was legal. On other memoranda, in which Colonel North asked me to solicit funds from foreign governments, I rejected the proposals, and that is stated on the face of those documents. And you have them. On other memos, I did not respond, or the proposals were mooted by events. But implicit in all this was the premise that the Boland Amendment governed our actions. This is not to say that it isn't reasonably and properly subject to a court test, and I believe it should be. But on my own, I determined that because I had engaged and Don Fortier had engaged were days and weeks with members of this committee and others, chairman and ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate counterpart, and others who would vote on this measure spent literally days and nights trying to forge compromise. At the end of it, we lost. And it was very evident that the intent of the Congress was that this amendment applied to the NSC staff. So it was a political judgment on my part without prejudice to the legal position that must ultimately be determined by the courts. And I think also that the evidence that surely I did believe that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff is expressed in the fact that otherwise, why would we have worked so hard to get rid of it after it was passed? If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing? What was Don doing coming up here day after day trying to get rid of it? Colonel North testified that he and Director Casey had agreed upon a full service operation to support the Contras using nonappropriated funds. I never heard of any such full service operation from either Director Casey or Colonel North, and I certainly never concurred in one. But more importantly, I do not want the record to reflect that I subscribe to the notion that the executive branch, can or should, establish a self-sustaining private enterprise to carry out activities outside the oversight of the Congress. Colonel North has testified that he did not recall that I had directed him not to solicit funds to support the Contras. I did instruct him not to solicit funds, and according to his own testimony and apparently other evidence. In fact, he did not do so. Colonel North also assured me that he was not soliciting funds when, as I have testified, I questioned him on this subject before signing the letter that he drafted for me to send to Congressman Barnes and to Chairman Hamilton later. Colonel North also testified that, at a time before, Congressman Barnes came to my office in October of 1985. When I drew Colonel North's attention to certain of his memoranda to me that raised doubts about his compliance with the law, I then instructed him, in Colonel North's words, to, quote, fix them, close quote. This is incorrect. In fact, Ollie proposed revision of certain of the documents, but only to conform them to his actual intent, which he said that I had misunderstood. He gave me, in order to obtain my go-ahead for the project, two revised pages which were grossly at variance with the original text. So I did not approve them, I did not return them, and I ultimately discarded them. The effort so far as I was concerned was ended. Prior to my testimony, during questioning by the committee staff, I learned for the first time that within days before Colonel North left the White House in November 1986, he withdrew these documents and altered them. This was done without my knowledge or concurrence. Colonel North testified that I directed the White House chronologies, be altered to say that everyone in the United States government believed in November 1985 that, quote, oil drilling parts, close quote, were being shipped by the government of Israel. This is not true. Colonel North advised me on the evening of November 18, 1986 on the one brief occasion when I was involved in the chronology process at all, that no one in the US government was aware that hawks were involved in that shipment until January 1986. I had no clear recollection of the matter, having spent the entire period, variously in Geneva, Rome, Paris, London, California, but not Washington. Accordingly, my addition to the chronology on this subject, which is contained in a November 18, 1986 prof note to Admiral Poindexter, that's exhibit 56 to my testimony, states only what I knew to be accurate. It states that, in addition to the shipment of tow missiles in the summer of 1985, quote, other transfers of equipment, close quote, were made in the fall. It is a subsequent version written after I left town the next day, specifically the November 20 version that discusses, quote, oil drilling parts. Apparently language similar to Director Casey's prepared testimony, with which I had nothing to do whatsoever. There are a number of facts upon which Colonel North's recollection differs from mine, but they are marginal to our basic disagreement. That disagreement involves a clear implication from his testimony that I authorized an operation involving pervasive disregard of statutory restraints, that I permitted with knowledge the creation of a separate clandestine and far-reaching network of private operations that involve private profits and which was to be concealed even from other members of the executive branch, officials who were entitled to know the details of an authorized covert operation. It is true that the conduct of a covert operation, consistent with the narrow and changing restrictions of the various bowland amendments, required determinations of authority that were difficult and debatable and in the long run could have been dangerous. But this is a far cry from saying that I or other members of the administration authorized what was clearly beyond anyone's power to authorize, specifically the so-called full-service offshore operation of Messers, Secord, Hakeem, and Gorbani Far. This is untrue because it is unthinkable. It violates every tenet of my political beliefs, everything that I have sought throughout my career to sustain and advance. These are my beliefs in the rule of law and the doctrine of accountability. These are the essence of the constitutional form of government, which I have fought in war to defend, which I worked in Congress here to carry out. And we're part of my deepest beliefs when I served in the executive branch as counselor to the Secretary of State and as the President's National Security Advisor. Finally, I would like to say something about all the talk going around about who was to be the fall guy that took place during Ollie's testimony. No such plan existed to my knowledge. I know I wasn't party to any such planning before I left government at the end of 1985. But I don't doubt for a minute that Ollie would have offered to step forward to protect me or his commander in chief or both. It would be as much in character for him to do this as it would have been for him to throw himself upon a grenade to protect his comrades, colleagues in battle. But surely we can agree on one thing. Ollie North should not be the fall guy or scapegoat or sacrificial lamb for anyone. Ollie acted at all times without regard to personal gain and was motivated by devotion to the people that he loves, the freedom fighters and Nicaragua. Mutual recriminations about it are out of place. Surely we can make distinctions between profiteers and patriots like Ollie North. The time is at hand to stop assessing the damages and counting the wounded and to begin the job of repair. We simply have to live and work within the lessons of this experience, learned in some measure by everyone. Or we risk the worst and most lasting injury of all, the anger and bitterness of an atmosphere of unresolved and unending constitutional confrontation. This is the last but the most urgent matter that I would like to discuss today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Chair recognizes, before I recognize any member of the panel, I would like to advise everyone here that we will adopt a new and radical procedure. The staff will not question Mr. McFarlane. Senator Nunn. Ten minutes. And you can go on a second round if you wish to. The Vice Chairman, Rodman. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. McFarlane, there are elements of that brief statement that are very, very compelling and in some ways very disturbing because I think that what we have here is a situation in which all of the North, in terms of having derived authority, there is very little that anyone here heard that would deny that he did. You have testified as to the one area that concerns many of us so much, the one that obviously leapt off of the video screen into your head and when they talked about the off-the-shelf covert, privately funded, off-budget, non-accountable covert capacity. That's what obviously you were directing your attention to. And if I understand your testimony today, you not only didn't authorize that, but further, you did not know about that. Is that correct? That's correct, Senator Rudman. I think perhaps I stressed that too much. My intention really was not to be so concerned about that, but rather two other points, and that was the authority, which Colonel North had assumed for these actions, not the full service organization, but separately, what's cometh the directions for the cover-up? Well, Mr. McFarlane, there was a sense amongst the members of this committee that Colonel North, although he was working for you for a time and then for Admiral Point Dexter, there's a very strong sense, which was referred to in your initial testimony before our committee, that maybe the line wasn't too clear between Mr. Casey and Colonel North, but it would appear from all that's involved here that he had a very unusual working relationship with the director of the CIA considering he worked for you. Is that an accurate statement? It's really speculation on my part. I really don't know what the relationship was. Well, it would appear that he got authority from Mr. Casey to do things if he didn't get it from you, according to his testimony. Senator Rudman, I understand what you say. I just have no personal basis for confirming or denying it. I don't know whether that is so or not. Well, let me just ask a couple other quick questions. It is your testimony today that this broad-ranging resupply effort, which Colonel North testified he discussed in great detail with Mr. Casey, and also said that you were informed of, that in terms of being generally informed, you were, but in terms of being specifically informed, you weren't. I want to understand your testimony. I wasn't sure I'd followed it. I think a separate point that hasn't been made at all is this, and that is that the counter-movement had been in operation in the field and under the advice of the CIA from 1981 through 82 and through 83 and much of 84 before the Second Boland Amendment was enacted. Now, one has to assume that during those more than three years of training by the CIA that they learned something, notably how to buy weapons and train people, conduct tactics, and so forth. Now, I say that because I think, frankly, that it may have been too much of a crutch for me and for others to assume that once Boland was enacted, that the contras were on their own, capable of continuing to buy arms, train, so forth. But to answer your question, to say that I was generally aware that the contras were being resupplied, of course I was, and that the conduct of the battle was going on and so forth, certainly. Whether or not Colonel North was involved to the extent that seems now evident is another matter. That's my question. Well, I guess what you're saying is you would not, after hearing his testimony, what you're testifying here to is that you were not aware of the extent of his involvement. That's correct. And it came as a surprise to Colonel North that the Tower Commission, of course, indicated that the president said he was not aware of the involvement of his NSC staff in the resupply effort to the contras. To the best of your knowledge, is that correct? I think it is correct. And I don't want to contribute, as I think I did contribute my earlier testimony, to the fact that the president was witting of every single thing that Ollie did. For clearly, he was not. I briefed the president on what I thought Ollie was doing. And I don't want to lift the blame from my own shoulders. I did tell Ollie I want the movement to become more credible in the sense of political leadership. And I had no illusions whatsoever that Ollie was down there doing everything he could imagine to help the contras. But my judgment, and it is my judgment and error if it is, was that no one single human being could undertake the sufficient scale of activity to be in conflict with the law, which I saw to be, for mostly, a prohibition on raising money. And in no sense was I aware of those activities. One last question, Mr. McFarland. A very interesting note that you wrote on the 15th of November, 1986, to Admiral Pointexter. It started out with a personal reference that you were heading to Chicago for a family event. And it is an analysis of what's happening with the whole Iran initiative coming apart. You referred to it tangentially in your earlier testimony, I believe. But I'd like to have your comment today. I'll read it to you. It says, a final comment, and this is to John Pointexter. I lived through Watergate, John, well-meaning people who were in on the early planning of the communication strategy, didn't intend to lie, but ultimately came around to it. I don't know how, and it says Regan will tend. I'm not sure whether it's a typo or not, but it says, it's R-E-G-A-N. I don't know how Regan will tend. He might choose two courses, either to push it off on someone outside the White House, which is fine with me, or he might go ahead with a sell-it-on-its-merit strategy. If the latter is the course followed, it must not be confrontational, but open and candid. And I assume that's Don Regan you're referring to in that, or is it Ronald Regan? It says R-E-G-A-N. Well, it is Mr. Regan, but I don't want to impugn him. My point was. Well, I just wanted to know what that meant. Yes. Well, the point was to say that there had been 10 working days since the story had broken, and there was no evidence on the public record of the adoption of a strategy for dealing with this very serious matter. And that just from experience, it seemed to me that for as long as paralysis endures, the prospects for a flawed decision increase, and that I thought they ought to get on to it, get on with it, and get the full story out. It seemed to me that to be fair, Mr. Regan and the president chose the right course, ultimately, of trying to get the right story out and dealing with it. I did say, if they chose, on the other hand, to blame it on me on the outside, that that was fine with me as well. Thank you. Let me just read that into the record. I believe that's exhibit number 53 of your exhibits. That should be in the record, because it, I think, you've clarified your earlier testimony, which is important. And finally, Mr. McFrown, I just get the impression, listening to you here today, reinforcing a view I've already had, which Colonel North confirmed to a large extent, that although the line of command was rather direct from Colonel North to first you, and then Mr. Forte here, and then you, and then eventually Admiral Pointextra, we'll never probably really know. We will never know, Mr. Casey's side. But it just seems to me that there was an unusual relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and this Colonel, who I would think would have every reason to feel he could act with authority from the Director of Central Intelligence. Colonel North says that he had informed you, or Admiral Pointextra, on each and every one of these initiatives, and I think the difference in testimony is that maybe the briefing wasn't as much detail, at least in your recollection, as Colonel North has stated here today. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. McFrown. I appreciate your testimony. A vote is now in progress, and the House of Representatives, and that explains the absence of House members. Senator Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McFarland, we heard testimony over the last two or three days from Colonel North, and we came back to it this morning and went through it in some detail about a transition, as I view it, that took place in January, late December, January of 1986, December 85, January of 1986. Colonel North has described the January of finding from the President, which the President signed, as setting up two or three goals, including them trying to form a new strategic relationship with Iran, also getting the hostages back. He also testified that he had, not using his words, but my paraphrasing, diminished confidence in those goals when he met with Mr. Nier and Mr. Gobanafar. I believe the meeting took place here in Washington. He further testified that he expressed that concern, and then he was taken or invited to join Mr. Gobanafar in the bathroom, and at that stage, new incentives were offered. One incentive he revealed this morning was a million-dollar payment to him. You were not his superior during this timeframe, were you? No, sir, I had just left the government. Had you ever heard about that one million-dollar offer to Colonel North, anyone tell you about that? No, sir, I have never heard of it before. All right, the second incentive, which seemed to have quite an impact in his own words, again paraphrasing Colonel North, was the Gobanafar statement that the residual could be used, produced by the Iranian arms sale, could be used for support of the freedom fighters, which he knew that Colonel North was involved in. Did you know about that since you were staying in touch during this timeframe? No, sir, as I've testified, I first heard about the notion of diverting funds to the Contras on the trip in May of 1986 to Tehran. Now, you've been the National Security Advisor. Colonel North went on to state in his testimony that he came back and he told Admiral Poindexter, either early or in writing or both, he wasn't sure of which, that this new incentive was, again paraphrasing, a major consideration. Would you not, based on your experience, have think that since the operation officer had expressed diminished confidence in the original finding, the goals set forth by the President of the United States, and that he'd had an offer for a new type incentive, that is money residual for the Contras? Would you not think that the operation officer having made that report to the National Security Advisor that that information would be of the nature that would go to the President of the United States? Well, I think, Senator Nunn, for me too, with hindsight, project what I would have done is a little unfair to Admiral Poindexter. I don't know what other considerations must have borne in his mind, and I think John is a man of very sound judgment while I was serving. If a change of that magnitude had appeared, I would have reported it. Well, I'll ask you this question then just directly. I assume you've heard most of this testimony. Yes, sir. A good bit of it. Would you agree with my assessment that this was a change of significant magnitude in terms of diminished confidence by the operations officer, Colonel North, in the original strategic goals and a new incentive being proposed? Well, I have to answer yes, and yet, if that prof's note was sent, for example, and I don't know this, concurrent to another memo that diminished its significance, I, in short, in context, which I don't have, it might be a matter of less emphasis by Colonel North, but under the terms that you cast it, I think it's a fair assumption. Well, I was trying to cast it in terms he did, and I don't have his exact quotes now, but that was what I was attempting to do. One other question, Mr. McFarland. Colonel North was under the clear impression, according to his testimony, that he did have your approval to ask General Secord to undertake the airlift effort. Is that a correct impression on his part? And that was the airlift effort for the Contra operation. I heard the testimony on that point, Senator Nahn, and I was surprised by that. I don't recall being aware of General Secord's involvement with any activity, really, of support to the administration after he left until December of 1985, when on a visit to London for meetings with the Iranians, I encountered him there. And no earlier offer or proposal, to my knowledge, for either directly with Colonel North or for the Contras to engage him had ever come to my attention, as far as I recall. Again, let me ask you something you've already testified to, but since it came up in this recent testimony, did you authorize or did you know that Colonel North was asking Ambassador Thams to open a Southern Front? When I heard that testimony, I did recall that Colonel North discussed with me whether or not it would be worthwhile for a Southern Front to be opened by the Contras. Well, it's manifestly in the interest of the Contras if they can do it and bring it off to do that. So there wasn't a serious matter of argument on that score with regard to having Ambassador Thams involved with it. To tell you the truth, I'm not sure what that would be. Surely Ambassador Thams was not to be the man in the field that somehow organized the effort and supported it. But my recollection is that the limit of the exchange was on whether or not the Contras opening a Southern Front was a good idea. And I said, if they can do it, that's fine. Well, that could have implied could it not that Colonel North, that he had the authority in that case. It seems to me that based on what you've said, he would be entitled to assume that he had authority when you said that what he had proposed was a good idea. Well, to say that it is useful for a Southern Front to be opened seems to me a long lead. But I think certainly I'm not perfect and I can be misunderstood. And I'm only saying that with regard to directing, Ambassador Thams to become involved in anything, I just don't believe that occurred. One other question that you previously testified to that came up this morning, the channel group, did you know again that Colonel North was associated with the channel group in the overall Contra effort? I won't call it solicitation because we've been through that one at length. But whatever it was, did you know that he was involved with the channel group? No, sir, I didn't. The existence of the channel group came to my attention when I suppose everyone else is here a few months ago. I had heard earlier that some group was promoting ads on television for SDI and for the Contra movement. But in the sense of raising money for direct linkage to the Contras, no, I was never aware of that. One final question, Mr. Chairman. Testimony from Colonel North this morning indicated that you did authorize, as I recall, a July flight by Colonel North to meet with Calero, Bermudez, and Secord concerning the ad lift. Do you recall having authorized or having known about that July 1985? And that was to Florida. I heard that today, I believe, and I'm not familiar with it. I don't recall that my permission or authority was asked. It is true that I was conscious that Colonel North did travel periodically to Miami for meetings with the Contras. In fact, I think that's probably where the San Jose Declaration was written. And that's good. Whether or not one of those cast as a meeting for political topics occurred in July of 1985, I don't know. But a request to me for authorization to go down and to organize the Contras on resupply efforts, I do not recall whatsoever. Well, I suppose there's a difference here between knowing about and authorizing and nuances and words. But of these activities that you did not know about, were there any of them that you would not have considered authorized? Well, I think basically, Senator Nunn, that the only activities that I would have considered matters at least that I would have approved of were the kinds of things that Colonel North could offer to the Contras on occasions when he visited them in the field that didn't involve strategy or even tactics, but what he naturally, inevitably, as a military expert, and he is, would have given just because that would have been almost impossible not to. Furthermore, that he was authorized and directed, in fact, to try to fashion some kind of civilian membership in the leadership. And also to try to come up with a scheme that would be appealing to the Congress and perhaps even to the Sandinistas for a compromise. I guess what I'm really asking is if any of these things were unauthorized, could you tell us whether they were unauthorized and which ones they were? Well, I think the easiest way to categorize it is this. The Contras had to continue in some fashion to buy beans, bullets, band-aids, and the hardware of war. Now, the line is crossed when, instead of their doing that, Colonel North does that. Now, frankly, I would not even have objected strenuously if he told them where he thought they could get the best price and let them go and do it. But it was my assumption that that was the nature of the relationship going beyond that to serve as liaison for them in the chartering of aircraft, the hiring of third parties to sell arms, things like that went over the line from advice to an operational role, and that was not authorized. Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Mr. McFarland. Mr. Adino. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, Mr. McFarland. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McFarland, after your interview with the Attorney General on Friday, November 21st, 1986, you called Colonel North from a payphone outside the Department of Justice. During that conversation, did Colonel North indicate that someone from the Department of Justice had advised him to retain an attorney? Mr. Chairman, I believe it was in that conversation that what you describe occurred. It occurred between Colonel North and me at some point, if not there within a day or so. Did Colonel North also tell you that he had been advised that his phone and possibly your phone may be tapped? Yes, sir. On Sunday, November 23rd, Mr. McFarland, you met with Colonel North in your office prior to North's interview with the Attorney General. Did Colonel North tell you at that time that the only potential problem that he saw was a memo he had written regarding the diversion of Iranian arms sales profits to the Contras? Yes, sir. Let me ask you whether or not you know how Colonel North would have known that the memo had been found by the Department of Justice. I don't believe that he said that he did know that. And my assumption was that he did not know. I did not know. The way he stated it at the time, he said, having gone on through all of this in my mind, the only thing that I can think of that might be a problem is the channeling of money from the Iran account to the Contras. And I said, well, that was approved, wasn't it, Ali? And he said, yes, it was. You know, I wouldn't do anything that wasn't approved. But it is a matter of record in a memo that I, I North, think I wrote in February or March of 86. And that's all he said. He didn't say that there was a possibility that that memo had been found by someone at the Department of Justice. No, sir, if he knew that, he didn't say so. Mr. McFarland, you testified before that the Attorney General was briefed by Colonel North regarding the use of DEA agents to locate and extricate the hostages held in Lebanon. You also found that this plan included the use of large sums of private money to bribe foreign officials and others to gain information and ultimately the release of the hostages. What I'd like to know is, was the Attorney General aware of this plan? Well, I think he was. And I say that because when Ali brought the proposal to me, he proposed that because the DEA people were under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, Colonel North said, why don't I go to the Attorney General and brief him on this and get his judgment and support. And I said, yes, please do that. And later Colonel North came back to report that yes, I have done that. Had he briefed the Attorney General? That's what he said. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that I may be wrong, but I believe that later in a coincidental passing between myself and the Attorney General, that he said, I've talked to Ali and I have absorbed the proposal and everything and I believe we can do it. And I believe I'm almost certain about that. That the Attorney General did tell him? I think so, yes, sir. And did he make a distinction as to the use of private monies to bribe as against money that had come from the Contras? Well, because I don't know what the briefing consisted of, it may have consisted simply of how Colonel North proposed the DEA agents be involved, which was to exploit their connection to a Lebanese that was close to the cap doors. Whether or not Colonel North told him about the bribes and the funding required and so forth, I don't know if he did. The Attorney General did not mention it to me. In other words, the Attorney General did not make a distinction between the use of private monies and government monies to bribe these foreign officials. Well, again, I'm not absolutely certain that the Attorney General has said this, but Colonel North did in fact draw a distinction between those two sources of money. And you're saying that Colonel North was told by the Attorney General about the distinction? Is that what you're saying? No, sir, I'm only saying that Colonel North told me that he drew a distinction between public and private funding for it. I don't know if he communicated that on to the Attorney General. He didn't tell you that he was informed by the Attorney General, is that what you're saying? No, sir, he did not. Thank you very much, Mr. McFarlane. Sal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McFarlane, I have been trying to get a little better understanding of the extent of the public diplomacy effort that was undertaken as part of this entire operation. And I know that a special section was set up in the State Department, the Latin American Public Diplomacy Group, which reported to a special planning group in the NSC on which Colonel North sat. And as part of that, I was trying to pursue the efforts of this public diplomacy and the questions of private fundraising, the use of funds, et cetera. And because to me, from what I have seen so far in the documents and whatnot that have been made available to the committee and some of Colonel North's testimony, it appears to be a lot more extensive than we've ever heard too much about. So I wanna focus on that. For example, in 1985 and 1986, the Latin American Public Diplomacy Group, which reported to the NSC, which took its orders from the RIG, as I understand it, and not the full National Security Council, decided to issue three contracts, $400,000 of government money went to Frank Gomez and Rich Miller operating as IBC, a private organization. And they used that money to carry out certain activities for the State Department as I gathered a basis, a database for this whole public diplomacy operation. But then it gets fuzzy because some way, somehow, private funds that were raised got into IBC, the funds became fungible. There's no way to know whether it's government money or private money. And then we have direction to IBC to put the money into another account for somebody else, which was their offshore account. And then the money goes from there to Lake Resources and some other activities having to do with the Contras. Now that's just part of the public diplomacy thing. And the other part had to do with lobby in Congress and commercial television pulling data that was made available on targeted members of Congress all in an effort to try to get a successful vote. Now that's the background as I understand it. I wanna ask you some questions about that because I wasn't quite clear from Colonel Norris' testimony whether he was directly connected, indirectly connected, or otherwise. But I'm gonna ask one of our staff people to bring down to you a document that I want you to take a look at because it is North Document 217, Mr. McFarland. And the reason I'm asking you to do this is because it's a memorandum from Oliver L. North for Robert C. McFarland. I'm not trying to do anything at this point. I assure you, not impugn Oliver North or get you in a box or anything else. I'm just trying to find out basically what happened because when you look at this document, the amount of work that went into the chronology event checklist prepared by Ollie North, it tasks almost every department of the U.S. government, state, NSC, and others, the vice president, a whole list. The list is unbelievable of the events that were put together, sent to you by Ollie North, according to this memorandum, and the subject was the timing and the Nicaraguan resistance vote. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that this is a very important letter on this aspect of the discussions that we're having. And so I wanna take a minute and just read it. Attached to Tab A, and I wish you'd follow me, Mr. McFarland, so that we'll...