 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Jim Shove. I'm a senior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in our Asia program. It's my pleasure to welcome you here today and welcome you to our event called Weighing Bad Options, Past Diplomacy with North Korea and Alliance Options Today. The significant interest we see in today's event, of course, is attributable to the quality and reputation of our speakers and our panelists. It is also a topic that is foremost on the lines of policymakers and embassies in Washington. What kinds of realistic diplomatic options do we have to prevent a nuclear catastrophe with North Korea and how do we evaluate these options? Today, as Japanese citizens, unfortunately, grow accustomed to missile warning sirens and text messages. It is worth remembering that a decade ago this month, the second phase actions and the Six-Party Talks were jointly decided for implementing North Korean denuclearization in exchange for diplomatic normalization and economic cooperation. This included dismantlement or disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities, among other steps. A year later, however, the Six-Party Talks had all but collapsed. This was the last major diplomatic initiative to address the so-called North Korea problem. So today, we're fortunate to hear from two former diplomats who were deeply involved in this past dialogue with North Korea and who remain active scholars in the region. And with our distinguished panelists, we have an opportunity to reflect on events a decade ago and, more importantly, put them into present context, which involves new leaders, new technology, and new balances of power in the region. If we tried to launch a diplomatic surge with North Korea, in the words of Senator Cardin on the Senate floor the other day, how might we go about it? And what should we keep in mind? Now, before I introduce our speakers, I do want to highlight our collaboration today with the US Japan Research Institute, USJI, because USJI essentially brought this opportunity to us so that we could become the co-organizer. For those of you who aren't familiar with USJI, it was established in Washington as a nonprofit organization in 2009 by Japanese universities. Currently, nine preeminent Japanese universities support it, Doshisha, Keio, Kyoto, Kyushu, Ditsumeikon, Sofia, Tokyo, Tsukuba, and Waseda are involved in the program, which includes research, partnering, networking, and dissemination. And I want to thank USJI's president who is here, Dr. Aiji Tanaka. Thank you, Dr. Tanaka of Waseda University, Dr. Keiji Nakatsuji, who's also a panelist with us today, and DC manager, Go Kobayashi, who helped put all of this together. Featured speakers today are of course Chris Hill and Mitoji Yabunaka. Ambassador Hill will start us off, and I will introduce him for now. Since 2010, Ambassador Hill has been the dean of the Yosef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, where he leverages the experience he gained as a career diplomat, a four-time ambassador, including to our ally, Republic of Korea, a member of the US negotiating team for the Bosnia Peace Agreement, and as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific Affairs, and America's chief envoy to the six-party talks. So Ambassador Hill, I give you the podium. Thank you very much, Jim, and let me just say what a pleasure it is to be here with these distinguished scholars and friends from Japan. This is truly an impressive group, and to be here at Carnegie, which is always in the search for international peace, even when the subject includes North Korea. What I thought I would do is maybe talk a little about where we've been, talk about where we are and where we might go. There's no question that the search for a peaceful outcome, a denuclearized outcome, is increasingly elusive, and it was very kind of you to mention, Jim, what we did 10 years ago, but it now seems about 100 years ago when you consider where we've come since then. Indeed, I think there have been several efforts at diplomacy with North Korea, and like the proverbial sixth marriage, they are a triumph of hope over experience. There has also been a certain amount of cynicism that has crept into this process, a sense that nothing can work and nothing will work. And worse yet, you see that in the sort of tribal wars in Washington, increasingly there are those who are loyal to a certain process that went on for a certain time, very much opposed to the next process that went on for a certain time. And before you know it, people kind of line up behind the processes that they were involved in, and I think increasingly in this sort of tribal climate that we have in this country today, we have an increasingly difficult time notwithstanding the efforts of Carnegie and other distinguished institutions to try to bring us all together and figure out what we are going to do about this problem. Because this problem is not going away, and as I will lay out in a minute, I think the problem is far worse than many people think it is, and requires a solution which will involve all of us to support. I would argue, strangely enough, when I was doing this some 10 years ago, when I was engaged in this process, first I had the people from the penultimate process, the agreed framework, and I always made clear that I never said anything bad about the agreed framework. It had its problems, we had our problems, everyone has their problems. So I thought it was very useful to try to be positive about what they went through, and yet many people in the agreed framework certainly didn't want to support what we were doing, because after all, they had the same kinds of solutions in the agreed framework if only their framework had been allowed to go forward. So I had those skeptics who had been involved with us before and felt that somehow we had ignored the lessons and ignored the progress made from that point, from that time. But I also had other detractors who felt that any kind of negotiation with North Korea was illusory, it could never work. And so the theory of the case was, in effect, to make sure it never worked. Otherwise, they would be proven wrong. Well, I think for now, they were certainly proven right, but I must tell you, when you're out negotiating, and you have people back in, back at the home front saying, you know, we'll never convince North Korea to do away with its nuclear weapons. Think about the message that that is giving to the North Korean hardliners, which is to say, if they can convince some people in the States already that we're not going to give up our nuclear weapons, we just need to wait for the other Americans to come to the understanding that we're not going to give up our nuclear weapons. So ironically, the sort of tough line that I received often, I won't call it as support, but advice, I would say, from the home front was sort of what you're doing is not going to work because they're not going to give up their nuclear weapons and the North Koreans have exactly, you know, listen to your people, don't listen to us, listen to them. So I think we need to try to come together around some assumptions here, and I think we need to come around to the view that we really ought to try to pull together and see if we can disabuse North Korea of its nuclear weapons. I think this issue is far more difficult and perhaps even more dangerous than many people think it is today. There is certainly the view out there today that after all, this is a small country, country beset by problems, one of the weakest states in the world, it has a terrible economy, and they just want a few nuclear weapons to make them feel safe. And why can't we come up with some kind of system of containment? Why can't we simply contain this problem? If they just want a few nuclear weapons, why can't we find a way to make this problem so that it doesn't get worse, but ultimately, why can't we just live with this problem? There are those who say, you know, they poor little North Korea, they just, they have no natural friends, they have no prestige. If you look at the Republic of Korea, it's one of the top countries in the world, poor little North Korea has nothing. And so this is just an effort by North Korea to get some attention and to get some notoriety and to be taken seriously because they have nuclear weapons. So that's another argument which is to say, let's just contain it, let's figure out what we can do about it. I submit to you that this is a much more serious problem because what we are seeing in the last few weeks is clearly missiles that are no longer just test versions of missiles. They're not just trying to see whether these things will work and then re-tinker them and try another in a month. It's pretty clear they have a production process with these missiles. And it's pretty clear that they have mastered some things that many people, many experts actually felt that they would not achieve by this time. Solid fuel rocketry, for example, multi-stage rockets. So it's pretty clear that they are making a lot of progress here. And so we have to ask, is this all part of a little country that wants to be taken seriously? Or is there a much more purposeful issue involved? And I would argue that what they are doing, what they are really trying to achieve is to somehow decouple the United States from the Korean Peninsula and perhaps more broadly from Northeast Asia. Well, that sounds pretty fanciful. I mean, how can North Korea succeed in decoupling the U.S. from, say, the Republic of Korea? We've stood shoulder to shoulder with the South Koreans since 1950. How could this ever be accomplished? But if you think about what they are looking to do, which is they put their troops, by the way, are not in some territorial defense configuration. They're right up there along the DMZ. They have a lot of asymmetrical programs, chemical weapons, even biological weapons. They've got a lot of special forces. So consider the following scenario. North Korea invades South Korea, which happened before. The U.S. says, okay, we're in, we're in. We're going to come to the aid of our alliance partner, South Korea. And then the North Koreans say, not so fast, Americans, because if you join this fight, we are going to hold one of your cities at risk. We are going to attack one of your civilian centers to which the U.S. says, you do that and we'll come right after you. We will annihilate your country if you do that. And then the North Koreans say, well, game on. So then at that point, the American president has to decide, probably the South Koreans can handle this themselves. Probably they don't need our help in terms of withstanding a North Korean invasion. It's true, North Korea has a million people in its army, but the South Korean army is extremely robust. Maybe they don't really need our help. Maybe they can handle this. Why would a U.S. president blink or why would a U.S. president hesitate in this case? Because to join in the fight against the North Koreans is to create the possibility, certainly greater than zero, the possibility and maybe probability that the North Koreans would attack the U.S. Again, pretty fanciful given the disparity in what we know to be the North Korean capabilities and the ROK capabilities. Why would they ever attack North Korea, attack South Korea? But the North Koreans also believe, and if you don't believe that, just ask one of them, that somehow South Korea is a creature and frankly a creation of the United States. If you can just get the U.S. off the peninsula, many North Koreans, many South Koreans would somehow welcome some kind of unification. Again, pretty hard to take when you look at the objective circumstances. But looking at objective circumstances is not very North Korean of you. North Koreans often look at the circumstances. They believe that with a unified effort, and by the way, history is full of less powerful armies defeating more powerful armies because of this unity of spirit and effort. So it is not to be ruled out. In fact, I think it is more likely than some of the other explanations that North Korea believes they can, they can, by pointing a nuclear weapon at the United States, they can put themselves in a position of making the U.S. blink. And I would argue if the U.S. blinks with respect to its alliance commitments in the Korean Peninsula, the whole question of U.S. alliance commitments around the world would be up for grabs. So I say this, whether you want to agrees with it or not, you certainly have to put the probability as greater than zero. And so now the question is, what are we gonna do about it? Well, I think there's several things we need to do about it. One of them is to reassure our allies, such as South Korea and Japan, that we're not going to blink, that we understand the importance of this. And by reassuring our allies, we need to make available some of our best equipment, our best military technology for dealing with the issues. So I think that is very important to, to, as a system, as one of our most advanced systems, to be clear that we are prepared to deploy this in, with our allies in Northeast Asia. So I think assurance to them is very important. The second issue, I think especially for their public, is our willingness to keep the door open to negotiation. After all, we negotiated before with North Korea, we did not achieve what we wanted. And in fact, the process that Jim referred to in, in 2007 was interrupted in 2008 by the fact that the North Koreans did not give us adequate verification and we could not go forward with a process that did not have verification. People often say, well, was it that you didn't trust North Korea? And I would argue trust had nothing to do with it. The problem was we couldn't verify anything we needed to verify. But I think it's pretty clear that the South Korean public and the Japanese public had been concerned earlier by the fact that the US was not negotiating with the North Koreans. And if you look at some of the opinion surveys, especially in South Korea and back in 2004, some 40, 45% of South Koreans were blaming the United States for North Korea's unwilling, for North Korea's nuclear program, blaming the United States. Why? Because they saw the US unwillingness to negotiate in the first Bush term as being the reason North Korea felt it had to have nuclear weapons. So I think keeping that door open to negotiations is absolutely critical. And I'll say a few more things about negotiations, but there's a third element that I think is also very critical and that is working with China. Now we cannot work with China as some kind of contractor in this. We cannot work with China as something that we somehow outsource the problem to the Chinese. We need to have a serious sit-down, a serious discussion with the Chinese about what our aspirations are and what their aspirations are. Think back to the Shanghai Accords when President Nixon arrived in Shanghai and pulled this rabbit out of a hat. We gotta remember, rabbits don't live in hats. So somebody spent time putting that rabbit down the hat and you recall that Henry Kissinger spent days, weeks on end, working with Joe Enlai to lay the groundwork to essentially stuff that rabbit down the hat. So I think we need that kind of discussion. We don't need tweets in the dead of night. We don't need telephone calls that public telephone calls that I don't think really reach the level I'm talking about. We need what is called in the bureaucracy a deep dive. We need a real effort to understand each other. The Chinese might say to us, look, if North Korea goes down, we end up with a situation where it's your ally who is a successor state and they're right up on our border and you'll put troops on our border, you'll put listening posts on our border and we can't accept that. Well, maybe we can have a conversation about that, a conversation consistent with our alliance requirements with South Korea. That is, we should not be talking about South Korea without South Korea. We need to keep our South Korean allies in that process. But then the Chinese might say, well, okay, we hear your assurances about troops, about listening posts, but what about just the perception that our public will have that you win and we lose? After all, this affects the internal politics of China. Again, these things are serious issues. China is a big country. There is not a consensus on anything in China. People have a different point of view and so we need to be able to work with the Chinese and understand them better. And this means kind of clearing the decks. This means all hands on deck, but it also means clearing the decks. We cannot address the 100 different items that we have on the agenda with China. We have to pick some priorities. I would submit that North Korea is one of them because I don't think any country can live with a nuclear, with a country aiming nuclear weapons at it. And for the United States, this would be the first such country to do so in many decades. Finally, and this is, I think, a kind of gray area, there is some space between peace and war. The idea that somehow we should have some overt or some preemptive strike against North Korea, one, we would not get all their nuclear materials. And two, most importantly, we would have to make sure the South Koreans are comfortable with that. And for the South Koreans to be comfortable with that, they would have to make sure that they feel they're willing to run the risk of what 20 million South Koreans within artillery range of North Korea would need. So this is not an easy option. And in fact, I would put a preemptive strike kind of way out there as one of the most difficult options. But are there issues we can do between war and peace? Are there things we can do, whether cyber attacks or whether some type of sabotage or whether are there some things we can do if not to end their program, but at least to slow it up and see whether in slowing it up we could allow the sanctions to have more bite in the country. Whether in slowing it up we could look for more diplomatic opportunities. I think we need to really look at that issue. But to do that, we're going to have to get deadly serious about it and serious now. Ultimately, this problem will need a negotiation. Ultimately, we are going to have to sit down. And I think we should be prepared to sit down with the North Koreans. For some of the reasons I mentioned with the South Korean public and the Japanese public, but also I think we need to be able to lay out to the North Koreans directly the consequences of their continuing pursuit of these programs. No question they've been told this before, but as any advertiser knows, sometimes you have to say something 50 times before the person listening understands what it is you're talking about. So I don't think we should fear to negotiate. I don't think we should be afraid to engage our diplomacy. American diplomacy is not a contradiction in terms. We're pretty good at it. And I think it's time that if we're going to pursue more diplomacy, we need to get a few diplomats into the game here. And with that, I think the Trump administration, which to a great extent has understood this problem is the most serious problem out there, but I think has not kind of cleared the decks and been prepared to deal with it because if the Trump administration comes up against the election in 2020 with the prospect that North Korea has nuclear weapons that are aiming them at the United States, I think that's going to be a hard one to lay at their predecessor. They'll certainly blame Barack Obama for a lot of things and they'll probably try to blame Barack Obama for this thing, but frankly, I think it's time that we really got serious in terms of a strategy with several parts to it and each part of it moving together. So with those comments, thank you and I'll stand by for questions. Thank you very much, Ambassador Hill. It's a sobering assessment, but a very useful start to our discussion and I'm glad you widen the aperture a little bit to include China into this and we'll get to some of that dynamic in our group discussion immediately afterwards. But first, we have a chance emphasizing the role of diplomacy, a long time and well accomplished diplomat, a 40 year career in Japan that he culminated in 2010, Mitoji Yabunaka from Japan. During that time, his time at the foreign ministry, he served as director general of Asian affairs and was Japan's chief representative to the six party talks, later rising to be deputy minister of foreign affairs, the G.A. Chirpa and vice minister of foreign affairs for Japan. He's now a professor at Tsumeikon University in Kyoto and it's my pleasure to invite Yabunaka-san here. Thank you, Jim and good afternoon, distinguished audiences. I'm so honored to be here to talk about North Korea to these problems. Of course, coming from Japan and living dangerously in Japan is now where we're doing it. Six o'clock in the morning, all TV stations are turned into and big sort of announcement. North Korea just launched missiles and find out some places to hide. This is what is happening in Japan. So you understand how serious it is or at least seeing from our eyes, it is really a sort of serious situations we are now in. Now, today's sort of programs, looking back and way forward and I was as was introduced, the chief negotiators for Six Party Stokes and also one of those original founders of Six Party Stokes. So when I heard from Secretary Tillerson that all sort of other engagement, all the talks, all negotiations in the last some 20 some years are all failure. I feel a bit uncomfortable to hear that because I was one of those sort of people who worked very hard to do something about this North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Of course, judged by what is called result oriented approach, yes, we all failed because we couldn't prevent North Korea from developing its own nuclear and missile technologies. So that's in that sense that that statement was right but nonetheless, I felt that sort of uneasiness. Now, looking back to the past, was it any chance in those sort of under the experiences or negotiations with North Korea for denuclearization? Was it really a sort of a case that all sort of failures or was there any kind of chance to achieve that? And here we are that I think there was a chance and that was 2005, of course, as you know, September 19th of 2005, there was a joint statement in that six parties talks. Of course, thanks to the efforts by Ambassador Hill, you are one of the most important persons at that time for that joint statement. But we start working from 2003 onward. And at least at that time, North Korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons. Of course, you can say that you again all deceived. They didn't mean that, just warnings, maybe. But I don't know about that. One year prior to that 2005 joint statement, I accompanied my Prime Minister, Koizumi, who went to Pyongyang for the second time. I was very lively discussions between the Koizumi and Kim Jong-il at the time father of the current leader. And in that discussions, very active discussions for 90 minutes, Koizumi asked and said to have and not to have, what is more advantageous? Which is more advantageous to you? And I'm sure not to have is more advantageous to you because in that case we can help you. But if you go for the past of to have the nucleus, you will be isolated. That was kind of sort of the descriptions by Mr. Koizumi. And then Kim Jong-il responded, I know, I know that nuclear is a useless object. And it is useless. But because of America, the American hostile policy, I have to do that. I have to develop its nuclear weapons. That's the answer. And Koizumi said, of course, no, Americans don't have that sort of hostile policy to you. A kind of those sort of discussions took place. That's 2004. And 2005, September, as I said, they agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons. And what happened after that? Yes, 2006 money after that, they did a new test. So after all sort of talks of failure. But one thing that we have to remind us is a kind of coincidental development. September 2005, as Six Party Stokes issued a joint statement, and there was a financial sanctions taken by the international community, including in particular the treasury. And that really developed into sort of a very big event for North Korea, because their cash, that's very important sort of element for his decisions is seized by the bank. And maybe he felt that he was, in a sense, deceived by the international community. That is what happened. And then maybe he went for the new test in 2006. 2007 and 2009 already at the embassy, he mentioned about that. Now what happened after that? The things are getting worse. The new leader, as we know Kim Jong-un, and he went after all kind of, he was so, so determined to go for nuclear and missile development. Numerous sort of launching missiles and number of the new test. And why was he doing that? Certainly that you could ask the reason why he was so determined to do so. And naturally that we can answer in two ways. One is domestic, and the other one is external reasons, as I understand. Domestic, of course, when he succeeded his father, he wasn't quite sure. He was very young and inexperienced. And there was also a coup attempt at that time. So in order to convince the people and North Korea, this nuclear and missile development is one key for him. He can show to his own people that I am the leader. And also externally, that's quite often mentioned, is that what happened to Gaddafi, the Olivia. And after all that, if you give up nuclear, then what happens to Gaddafi? That is in his mind. So in that sense, he started from rather the defensive way to do so, but he's now so much advanced. And created a kind of situations where, as he just mentioned, it is so critical, the stage we are now in. What to do about that? So based upon those sort of past experiences, what we should do from now on is our sort of a very dire, very difficult task to do so. And of course, Japan, as the other Prime Minister said, that we are enjoying an iron-clad alliance with the United States. Certainly, this alliance is so important for Japan, but as we wait for the future, and all options are on the table, we are told. Certainly, when we talk about all options on the table, that includes several options, naturally. One, option A might be the military solution. Option B is a sanction after sanction, to the extent that the Kim Jong-un finally will give up the nuclear sort of programs. And option C is of course, negotiated settlement or resolutions. And you have to know already that the answer, military options, military solutions, is it possible? And my answer is that yes and no. Yes, of course, in the United States, American mighty military strength, certainly you can destroy North Korea. But of course, it will be accompanied by unpredictable sort of consequences. We know that in 1994, you could have done it much easier. Today, they have advanced so much of their sort of nuclear missile arsenals. And with sort of preemptive strike whatever, that you couldn't annihilate. And some kind of retaliation or striking back, maybe possible. So Japan, we are already under the sort of missile reach. And of course, Seoul, they don't need any nuclear missiles. So great sort of a huge consequences may be accompanied by that military solutions. That's the reason why that yes and no. And it is of course, least desirable solution way to do so. So second sort of the option naturally, sanction after sanction. Could we achieve the kind of a goal of denuclearization? That corner him, corner Kim Jong-un, to the extent that I have to give up. I'm very encouraged in the most recent resolutions that UN Security Council resolutions. For the first time, I think that in last one or two months, we have taken a number of actions and culminated to the sort of final resolutions that curtail 90% of their export or 30% of petroleum import. So that's very important development. And stage one is of course, that the thorough and vigorous implementation of that resolution is very important. But unfortunately, I doubt whether that's enough to the extent that Kim Jong-un of course, now I've suffered too much. So I have to forget. I have to give up of nuclear sort of aspirations. I don't think so with this current sanctions. You have to of course increase more pressures and add up to that sanctions. And the very easy answer to that matter is how far? Of course, the total ban, total sort of embargo of oil and the total embargo of trade. If that will take place, certainly that will bite him. But of course, as you know, for that to happen, the China must agree to that point because after all, they are the supplier of oil and also the biggest trading partner with North Korea. And we hear from Chinese friends that if you go that far, if you go that far for that and all kind of measures taken, then certainly that all kind of developments, unpredictable developments within North Korea, either in projects or explosions, and all kind of the development may force many people to free and refugee problems. Or before that, Kim Jong-un would go for very much more riskier responses attacking the neighboring countries. So that's the reason why we couldn't go that far. That is the kind of explanation, as I understand, China has it in his mind. When we talk to them, why don't you do more? That's what we are doing, we've been hearing. So the number three or third option is negotiated settlement or solution. Of course, this negotiation should be based upon that second option over sanction after sanction as much as possible. And then you have to open some sort of window for negotiations. That's, as I heard, I'm talking about also some kind of negotiations, a must, very important. And that matter, I agree. I have some concern about that, nonetheless. I hear a lot these days from American friends or American quote-unquote experts. So now, the North Korea has developed that much of a nuclear arsenals. It is impossible. It is not realistic to think about the entire denuclearization, dismantlement of entire nuclear programs by North Korea. That's not achievable. That's what we hear. So you have to manage the situations. And you have to somehow accommodate some kind of a nuclear arsenals that North Korea may maintain. The reason why that I say I have a concern about that is that might suffice American interest because they haven't reached yet their missiles and they haven't developed yet to reach the mainland America, United States. But we are already being covered by the North Korean missiles. So if you say that realistic approaches may be freeze, maybe some kind of other small reductions, and we start giving all kinds of economic corporations to North Korea, that doesn't work for us. Because we have to live with that sort of continuous threat from North Korea. That's a very important point. And we have to make sure in that negotiations or negotiated settlement or solution the most important thing is we have to make an objective aim very clear. That's denuclearization, denuclearizations. We have to stick to that point. And in that sense, I'm rather encouraged by Trump demonstrations that they say that they will stick to the denuclearization as their major sort of goal. And I hope that will be the case. And the way how to advance our negotiations that's also very important for us. North Korea always say that we prefer and we are ready to talk to Americans one to one. Because after all that the reason why that we're developing a nuclear is because of American threat. So when we talk about the nuclear, this is only with America. That's their positions. And in doing so, they can elevate their status as a sort of equal partner with United States. And a super mighty power. That's their way of thinking it. And another concern for me is that President Trump might be interested in having that sort of a bilateral talks. Instead of all sort of six countries, six powers, six countries, very complicated sort of processes, why not go for one to one? The reason why I say that we are concerned or I am concerned is that 1994, for example. The grid framework. That's the US, North Korea, direct bilateral talks. And what happened is that the Japanese or South Korean people waiting for, they couldn't go into the room. So waiting in the corridor. And we are told when the agreement was made. There is an agreement. And we have to build right water reactor in Japan and Koreans without being participated in that discussion. So of course we are told it is for the peace and security of East Asia. So you have to take it. And we didn't take it. But this time, as I mentioned, that of course while we appreciate very much the US and South Korea, the yet, as I say, the kind of source of political security problems may differ from Japan and United States in terms of ICBM or whatever. So we have to be there. We have to state clearly our position very clearly. And six parties talks. Japan was also, of course, one of those key players. And for the first time, that six parties talks involved all relevant players in the region. So that's the kind of sort of venue we have to seek for that matters. And in doing so in particular, I have one small personal sort of suggestion to propose. And that is why not for Japan while within the framework of six parties talks. But we call upon the new sort of initiative calling for emergency five countries, foreign ministers meeting. Five countries, of course, Japan, United States, China, South Korea, and Russia. It is worst sort of scenarios that when those five countries are divided, then that's only the North Korea enjoys very much of their positions. We have to be united. And also that we have to use this sort of forum. This is a special session. And this is not time, business as usual time sort of things. Yes, we heard today that time is running out. It is that sort of sense of crisis, sense of urgency. We should express our kind of sort of new initiatives. And in doing so in particular, we have to ask China why you can, you should do more. And the question about that, of course, as I mentioned, they say going too far may disrupt all kinds of situations in North Korea. That I understand. But at the same time, you have to ask yourself that if you do acquiesce North Korea becoming a kind of a de facto nuclear power, certainly that will be followed by, as we all know, that more than 6% of South Koreans, they say that they have to develop their own nucleus. Of course, Japan, Japan's family committed to non-nuclear policies. And yet we have to say to Chinese friends that if you let the North Korea be a kind of a sort of a de facto nuclear, certainly that will lead a sort of open the road for the NPT system, non-preferential treaty system be collapsed. And you are responsible for that matters. So that's a choice, what you have to do. That kind of serious sort of serious talks on all kinds of other security matters, should be done within those sort of five countries. And then consolidating our positions and to face with North Korea. That's how that I think that if there is any hope, of course it is very difficult to pass this road. I may sound like too much of a sort of dreamy type of things, but if anything could succeed, that sort of a new attempt, new sense of emergency, and a new sense of crisis is very important. That's my personal thought. Thank you very much. So now I'd like to invite our panelists and speakers up here. We're gonna have a short group discussion before we open it up to the audience. And the opening presentations by Ambassador Hill and Yabonaka sensei have given us some good building blocks to carry on this conversation. We've been joined now on the stage by two discussants. Professor Nakatsuji is a professor of international relations at Richemade Khan University where he's taught since 1998. He was dean of the graduate school there. And on the, to my far left, your right, Doug Paul, our own Doug Paul here, vice president of studies and leader of the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Doug has had a long career in government at the State Department, the CIA and the NSC where he served for presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush for whom he was the senior director for Asian affairs and later America's director of the American Institute in Taiwan. And Nakatsuji sensei, I wanna begin with you a little bit because Yabonaka-san has given his personal view based on his experience in this long saga. But I wanna ask you a little bit about the political diplomatic context in Japan now. This dynamic of missiles flying over Japan, of sirens going off. Japan has long had a policy of mixing dialogue and pressure and we've seen Prime Minister Abe himself be a strong advocate of dialogue. He advocated discussions with the North Koreans in 2014, just a couple of years ago in Stockholm, they signed an agreement to look at, relook at the ABDATI issue. And every once in a while we hear various rumors that Prime Minister Abe is ready to jet off to Pyongyang and have some kind of meeting. But now we're hearing it's dialogue is a dead end and it's all about pressure at this point. So I wanted to ask you to maybe build a little bit, paint a picture of the context and the view from Tokyo these days. Thank you, Jim. I'm not quite sure whether I can directly answer your question, but of course, putting emphasis on Japanese perspective, I would like to sort out the North Korean issue by my own capacity. I'm a historian by training. So I'd like to provide some kind of historical lessons for you to study this time around. First, I'll get touch upon the Petroleum member girl, which Vice Minister Abe and I got touch them a little bit. I would like to bring you back to 1941, maybe a few months prior to the power of attack, okay. United States imposed petroleum embargo against Japan. And Prime Minister Tojo along with the other military leaders knew that within half a year or so, a Japanese military would become inactive. So Japan decided to start war with the United States. So in that short period, the Japanese decision may not be called irrational. But of course, in the whole picture, it is pretty much irrational decision. And I'm from Kyoto. Prime Minister Tojo said that in your lifetime, there's a moment that you have to jump from the sun deck of the Kiyomizu Temple. I don't know how many of you have been to Kyoto. It's Kiyomizu Temple is built in a cliff ballet area, and there's a sun deck for visitors. And if you jump from the sun deck of Kiyomizu Temple, of course, it means death. So I'm totally appalled how irrational he was. Of course, if I were, at that time, I couldn't say this, I might have been executed by Japan's military, but what I'm telling is, so petroleum embargo is so critical decision. We have to be very careful about that. I would rather appreciate restraining attitude of Russia and China in this particular matter. And of course, the difference between Japan and North Korea today is Japan was invading China. North Korea is not invading anything. But of course, this is very serious matter. I totally agree to Ambassador Hill and Vice Minister Yabunaka that this might induce nuclearization domino, starting from South Korea, Japan. So this is very serious matter. And what I would like to say is that I'm not quite sure whether Prime Minister Abe understood or understands the gravity of this particular oil embargo question. Listen to, maybe I have to make it short. Korean War started in June 25th, 1950. Three days later, Seoul fell down. So that's what I would like to emphasize the problem of military option. This is no Syrian missile shooting case at all. So I wonder to what extent that President Trump understand the geographical nearness close to Seoul to 38th Pearl. And number three, that is rather about the state of DPRK as two previous presenters has mentioned that Kim Jong-un seems to be learning historical lessons from the case of Southern Hussain or Kharavi rather than from Deng Xiaopeng or Doi Moe of Vietnam. So this is another case of learning history wrongly. Thank you very much. Thank you. Doug, I'd like you to invite you to comment on what you've heard so far today. In particular, invite your thoughts about China's perspective on this. I thought Ambassador Hill's point about really trying to make China a partner in this process seems critical, but what are the prospects for that? I'm glad to talk about those things. The first point I'll make is it may be somewhat good news for people that the Kiyomizu temple is temporarily closed right now. So you can't get access to jump to your death from the deck. So we have a little bit of time. Another lesson from history that occurred to be listening just this moment is that something I don't think I heard mentioned in our presentations and that is the stakes of the acquisition of nuclear capabilities or some definite military capability really changed in 2011 after our negotiations had come to a halt when Moammar Gaddafi died in the desert having some years previous surrendered his nuclear chemical and biological warfare capabilities to the international community and the United States. And you hear this lesson repeated again and again from North Korean outlets that if they disarm themselves, they make themselves vulnerable to other kinds of economic sanctions, military moves, strikes, whatever that would be to decapitate the regime and therefore for them it's an element of complete, it's a fundamental element of survival that they develop the special means to nuclear weapons to drive this forward. The second thing that really seems to be dominating thinking is that they are so close as Ambassador Hill laid out to having a capability. The testing has been more and more successful with the missiles and the nuclear weapons. And to give up at this point would not just be a failure on various measures of governance but it would be a failure of an historic mission to get into talks with us that would be on the premise or it'd be not a shared premise but certainly our premise would be utter ultimate denuclearization. So these the fear factor and having it almost in your hands factors really make this a tough one. And then you go to the Chinese question which you've raised, Jim. What do the Chinese see as motivating a real shift in their own position toward one of putting extreme pressure whether it's petroleum cut off or other forms of pressure thus far we have not seen from China. And the ambivalence in Beijing has become more and more clear. Very credible scholars, people who are scholars whom we know retain influence in government circles are increasingly saying North Korea is now fundamentally threatening Chinese interests with its behavior. Approximate thermonuclear test to Chinese borders could go wrong, it could hurt Chinese, pollute the atmosphere. You can think of many things that go wrong. A war on the North Korean or on the Korean Peninsula would fundamentally endanger Chinese interests and they've repeated many times the fear of refugee flows, the need to intervene to protect the nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of reckless elements or being exported to terrorists. There's a cascade of reasons why China has been hesitant to go forward but is also beginning to think more like it doesn't have a choice either, it may be forced to take mission. I have to say the Chinese in the latest two resolutions of the United Nations Security Council certainly have gone farther than they have before on those things where they have a say in writing the Security Council resolutions. They've come a long way. But it is absolutely written into Chinese DNA, communist Chinese DNA anyway, that you'd try to avoid legally binding yourself by sanctions. You give yourself maximum flexibility. We saw this in the Iranian case where China had extensive contracts for gas and oil exploration for providing the Iranian military with equipment, et cetera, et cetera. And China never legalistically broke those contracts or canceled anything. They just put the slowest guy in China working on each of them. And we're seeing something of that now behind the scenes that Chinese are actually putting on these kinds of informal pressures. And we're not gonna have the satisfaction of being able to point to them, but the Chinese will have the satisfaction of being able to say, we didn't do it, but in fact they did it. And if they wanna take it off, they can do it without telling anybody. So you can understand in a regime where they're not subject to court trials of their various legal findings as they are in the West, the Chinese have a lot more maneuverability to employ. Now, having introduced those factors at a third, which is we are in the period leading up to the 19th Party Congress in China. Every public signal from China over the past year has been under the Chinese term umbrella term. Way one, maintain stability. We wanna get smoothly through this 19th Party Congress and not have exogenous factors emerge. Therefore, when Xi Jinping early in this year came to Florida to meet with President Trump at Mar-a-Lago, he was very emollient. He was very obliging. It held a number of major events in China, trying to keep China as an international actor, responsible stakeholder, China doing the right things. They're not looking to ruffle feathers externally or to have that blowback internally. But that does create an interesting question. What are they gonna do after the 19th Party Congress? And here it goes to a point that Ambassador Hill was making, which is that you need a cadre of diplomats and a concentrated effort, not to pursue negotiations to me, I think would be irresponsible, to believe that negotiations can arrive easily at a solution or that we can verify a solution easily if we get to one, would also be irresponsible. But a lot of work between now and sometime after the 19th Party Congress needs to be done so we can get into a position to put on the table, both privately and publicly, positions of the US with respect to containment and deterrence of North Korea. And there there's a lot more military work to be done. And inducements, the carrots and the sticks need to be set out much more clearly. And that's a job for diplomats. Again, Ambassador Hill said sometimes you have to advertise something 50 times. You have to go and have that conversation over and over again. Do the diplomatic spade work. George Schultz, when he was Secretary of State, referred to it as gardening. And it's been an important watchword for me ever since. And that gardening needs to be done and that should be the near, the medium and midterm, excuse me, the short and midterm set of objectives. The UNGA that's meeting this week is a fantastic opportunity to do that kind of work. I hope we'll see signs of it being done. I have a feeling we're going to see demands for short-term action to remove North Korean embassies or North Korean workers and not much more. But we need a much more serious framework, again, that has both the carrots and the sticks. That will give China a better set of choices to be a party to bringing this crisis to a cooler state in the aftermath of the Party Congress. Thank you. The image I have in my head now is that part of my yard that I've just let go completely and never touched. And the vines have grown all over the place. And it seems like a scary place to begin gardening. But I think you're right. One, a couple of quick questions before we open it up to the floor. One is, I can't help but listen to the conversation so far and think that if we take a broad definition of diplomacy or diplomatic action, sanctions, negotiations, action at the UN, relations with South Korea, coordination with South Korea, outreach to Southeast Asia and Middle East nations to try to help put this whole right balance together, of we're either trying to compel North Korea to change its calculus and have no other choice, but, or we're just trying to actually influence and change the calculus. And here Ambassador Hill's comment about, if you just have a North Korea with a couple of nuclear weapons and that's all they want is to be left alone, perhaps that's manageable, but it's the aggressive use of or aggression under the cover of nuclear weapons that is really the most dangerous. So I wanted to ask, in general, what do you think is kind of a productive balance of all these different types of tools, diplomatic tools, to try to affect North Korean calculus? Because I'll just assume for the moment that compelence is secondary at this point because it's harder than change in the calculus. Question? Yes, this balance, right now the focus is sanctions. Yeah, but to which both of us are responding? Yes, please. I think that in order to have very productive negotiations in North Korea, you have to make a position very clear and very persistent, very consistent sort of pressure is very important. Now as I recall in 2003, first of course, they said that no way Six Parties talks doesn't work. So we don't go into that Six Parties talks. They kept saying that, but they saw when the United States President Bush attacked Iraq at that time. And that was the most sort of a comparison of reasons why, no, we have to go to the negotiating table. So that's one sort of reason why at that time that they agreed to Six Parties talks, meaning that you have to send a very coherent and strong message to North Korea. Sometimes these days that they may be confused when they hear the fire and the fury. And again, I'm honored to meet Kim Jong-un. So which way that you have to listen to that matters? So message should be very consistent, persistent, and strong. And of course you're leaving the room for negotiations. But nonetheless, key message is very strong message and leaving some sort of open space for negotiations. That's only the way that they would come to the table. I think that's right. I mean, what you're trying to say to them, and in fact, what I said to them many times, is we're not going to live with a nuclear North Korea. I mean, we just cannot accept that. And so we are going to, and I was talking directly to the North Koreans, we're not going to walk away from this. We're going to continue to come after you. I remember only half joking. I said, if you open a bank account on the moon, we'll go back to the moon and shut it down. And in short, trying to make the point that if you think your security is better with nuclear weapons, think again. And I think we, so I think sharpening the choices for them and making them understand that this is not a cost-free endeavor. They need to be clear that they are setting on a course. It's not just isolation. We always say, we will isolate you. And they go, hey, we like that. That doesn't seem to be their worst nightmare, but that we will, in effect, go after you wherever we can and never give you a night's sleep. That's another message. So I think that has to be clear. I guess what I worry about is this idea that we can accept some element of a nuclear North Korea, I think is an extremely mixed message and extremely kind of dangerous message to suggest that somehow there's some level of nuclear North Korea that we can accept. And in that regard, I would call people's attention to some of the things that North Korea has said of late, including to Japan suggesting that the geography notwithstanding, they can somehow imagine a future without Japan, namely sinking Japanese islands now. I mean, this is sort of stuff that prize fighters say before a fight, but that's pretty serious words. It doesn't sound like someone saying, oh, we just need a couple of nuclear weapons to feel safe. That sounds like something a little more serious. So I would simply caution people the notion that somehow once they have a couple of nuclear weapons, this thing is all going to quiet down. I don't see the evidence to support that. And for that reason, I think we need to be very clear about our concerns. So that's a matter also of timing in terms of as long as the ultimate destination is denuclearization, presumably we could, as long as we're reversing or halting the momentum in the wrong direction that we're going in right now. And I was enjoying reading your book Outpost, Chris, and you mentioned. Available at a store. Available at a store, yeah, okay. But I had not realized that you had raised the issue of an intersection back in 2007. And I gathered from the way you wrote it with the approval of President Bush, and offered that, but the North Koreans were not interested. It was interesting because the Chinese were pushing that because they really felt the interest section worked very well after the Shanghai Accords and felt that that's, in fact, they kind of would often describe North Korea as China several decades ago. I'm not sure if that's particularly accurate, but they would talk about that. And so they really pushed the idea of an intersection. So I kind of went back to Washington. People kind of looked at me like I was some kind of crazy accommodationist. And I'm saying, well, you know, I think it'd be a nice thing to offer. And if we could be in that position, I think it would show that we're prepared to move ahead. So finally, and I had to go right up to the President. Okay, we can offer that. So I offered it to the North Koreans. I said, are you kidding? We have no interest in an intersection. So it didn't really get anywhere. One other message I gave to them pretty consistently, which was with denuclearization, everything's possible. They always wanted us to halt the exercises. And I always said, look, my only regret about exercises is we didn't have them in the spring of 1950. But I did tell them that in the context of denuclearization, I can imagine mutual pullbacks, mutual confidence building measures on conventional forces. I told them in the context of denuclearization, you know, we can look at everything. But lacking denuclearization, we frankly can't look at much of anything. Well, I want to give our audience a chance to ask a couple of questions to anyone in our panel. We have microphones that'll come to you. And I call on you please stand, let us know who you are, where you're from. If you have a specific question for one of our panelists, let us know. I'm gonna begin right there, the gentleman there, and then I'll work my way around here. Thank you, a question for Ambassador Hill. You are? Joe Bosco formally with the Defense Department. I'd like to play out the scenario, Ambassador, that you laid out that North Korea's motivation is either to use a nuclear shield for the purpose of aggression against the South or to decouple the United States from the alliance system. You indicated this would be a calamity for the international strategic position around the world. My question to you is, what would China's view of that outcome be? Wouldn't that also serve China's interests? And hasn't the North Korean program been serving China's interests, making it pose as a responsible stakeholder and a good faith negotiator, meanwhile distracting the US diplomatically in every other way? I think I will defer to my colleague, Doug Paul, on Chinese interests, but I will say, I don't think there's a consensus within China on this issue of North Korea. And I think the failure to develop a consensus, I think it's been harmful really to China's role. And maybe after this 19th Party Congress, there'll be more of a consensus, but I don't think there is a consensus. I would say there is a body of opinion, especially in China's security system. And if Steve Bannon thinks we have a deep state, he ought to get a load of what goes on in China. But among those 20 million policemen in China, I think there's a view that somehow US troops on the Korean Peninsula are a bigger threat than North Korean mischief. I think that exists. My sense is that I think it's less prevalent in think tanks and less prevalent, frankly, in more senior levels, but I think it's very much there as a view. And I think to your point, when China and Russia join with a freeze for freeze proposal suggesting they freeze their tests, which I think, frankly, freezing tests is not going to freeze that nuclear program, in return for our freezing exercises, if I were a North Korean, I would have gladly accepted that. So I think that does kind of represent what you're addressing. But I'll close by saying, if we solve this thing and we turn around and see how do we solve it, I think it's very unlikely that we would have or will have solved it without cooperation with China. And to the extent that we can solve it, I think we will probably find that working with China, being focused, being relentless and not just episodic and not just with tweets, but I mean a really serious effort with China was one of the main elements, ingredients in our having solved it. So I just feel, you know, the US-China relationship is what I would call too big to fail. And I think we just have to keep at them and keep at them and see what we can get out of it. Any additional thoughts on the panel? Joe, at the most generous level, taking up from Chris Hill's comment on the solving the problem. Chinese generally don't see problems to be solved. They see problems to be dealt with, to be handled. They've got 14 untrusting neighbors on the land borders of China and they know they're not gonna solve the India, they're not gonna solve the others. They're just gonna deal with them and what may come. So they don't have the same impetus that Americans tend to jump in and try to solve things. Secondly, you're right, there's a very deeply held body of opinion that it's in China's interest to keep the US bogged down in the Korean Peninsula, not able to expand its influence, tying down resources that cannot be focused on China. I think there's some erosion in this view and partly the very important decision to put the theater high altitude area defense that system into South Korea. And then China's, I think, counterproductive posture on that, which was hostility toward South Korean industry and people, fewer tourists, et cetera. They've actually turned this issue around in South Korea where the popular polls were showing real affection growing for China and declining for the US. That's now been really reversed by China's heavy handed approach. And I think a lot of the people who I mentioned earlier, the commentators who have credibility are starting to say this is hurting our interests, not just what I mentioned, which is potential radiation damage to Chinese or refugee flows, but also reputational damage. And the sense that China's aligning itself with the wrong end of history in North Korea and not with South Korea, which has a great future. The decision's not been made. I think before the 19th party congress, it would be a decision they don't wanna make. But comparable to our continued American focus on the Middle East, and we've got a lot of cabinet and senior people now who are all focused on the Middle East, that suits China's long-term interests. Keep us from focusing on China, focus on these other areas where China doesn't have a dog in the fight. I have a question here, and then I'll work my way back. Microphone coming. Mike Mercedes, PBS Online News Hour. Given that these have been multilateral negotiations, how do you assess the role of South Korea? You've dealt with liberal governments, conservative governments. Now we have a liberal government that's having to act and talk like it's a conservative government. How does all this parse out? Who would like to? Yeah, from my viewpoint, certainly that we used to have, and we still have, Japan, US, ROK, trilaterals of the mechanism and consolidating our positions very firmly and to counter with whatever sort of the occasions to against North Korea, or even with China and Russia. That's what we have been doing it. Now, of course, as you say, that South Korea's positions may differ from time to time or from president to president. But I think that I myself certainly, even today, as they are saying a bit differently from Japan or a bit different from the United States, that's also an asset that we can unite together. And I'm hopeful for that matters because there are also reasons to say these are the sorts of things. And there are many generations, the people in South Korea who have different views, younger generations, older generations. But as a whole, that I think that I'm confident that we can overcome any differences. And also, one more point is that Japan, South Korea, and China, also we have a kind of conservative mechanism. We have to use it. And so different views from South Korea, I think I don't mind and we can kind of create a kind of unified positions, even within that sort of differences. That's my understanding. Well, that's another key aspect of diplomacy is keeping the allies close together and the allied coordination. By the way, when we go from one administration to another, it's not exactly seamless either. I mean, we've had our problems getting continuity. So I think the South Koreans have done okay in this. I would just add on this. I think there's a role with these progressive governments in South Korea for the good cop and bad cop relations with North Korea. You know, the US can stand tough and other allies can be tough with us. But the South Koreans will have their interests in humanitarian relief and in various kinds of economic exchanges. So long as they're firm with us on the security side, there ought to be room for them to explore what might be available through the various means they've had over the decades, none of which has led us to Nirvana, but had the ability to let off steam from time to time. Having said that, I think this particular government came into office not equipped to do that because they have won the popular vote for presidency, but they're far behind in the national assembly. And their immediate priority is domestic and they're gonna focus on getting the next elections in June to raise their level of support in the assembly. And to that end, they're focused primarily on domestic reforms, not on foreign policy, which means they tend to do whatever we ask them to do because they wanna just keep that from being a source of trouble. I guess many of you have heard idea of Prime Minister Abe that he's about to implement another general election. Maybe taking advantage of a very extreme posture of Kim Jong-un. And we have discussed the decoupling of possibility of our alliance system, but it seems Kim Jong-un is connecting us. And Prime Minister Abe has been taking advantage of North Korea issue to implement, to realize his nationalistic policies last 10 years or so. And this time around, Kim Jong-un is doing too much so that we are having not perfect, but still very important coalition among five other powers, including China, I think. Now, I think managing the alliance partners is perhaps an even greater task than managing the relationship with China. And so I think we need to be careful, especially how we manage South Korea through internal transitions. And I think Doug is quite right. This is about internal politics and South Korea. And I would start by suggesting that it's not very helpful to call the South Koreans appeasers. I have a question here, gentlemen, on the end. Zheng Hualu, South China Morning Post. From the U.S. side, I mean White House or State Department, we are hearing a lot about talking about the sticks, butt carrots. Instead, the U.S. said the North Korean needed to do more first as a precondition to going back to negotiation table. So I wonder if there's a time for U.S. to make some offer to the North some carrots. And what kind of carrots, what kind of offer, U.S. government, now this administration could offer. And given that in the United Nations Security Council, it is already a lot of sanctions on oil supply or any other seafood or textile. Is there enough room for U.S. to make such offer in order to get North Korea back to negotiation table next? First of all, North Korea agreed to denuclearize. They didn't just agree to it to the United States. They agreed to it with all the five partners of the six parties. They agreed to complete denuclearization of their country. Four years later, they said, tried to say, nope, we no longer agree to it. So what the U.S. has asked for is that North Korea, if to rejoin the talks, they should rejoin the talks on the basis of what the talks are. And the purpose of the talks, it's not to talk, it's to have the denuclearization that we politely said of the Korean Peninsula. So that is not a precondition. I mean, the alternative is to just have talks and no sense of what they think the purpose of the talks are. And sometimes we hear the North Koreans say, well, they would like to have talks at the base of one nuclear country to another. Well, that doesn't really work for what we have in mind. So I don't call this a precondition. I just call this North Korea's case of not acknowledging what it previously agreed. But let's say we have a situation where North Korea does want to get back to talks on the basis of denuclearization, but they don't want to say that. They don't want to just simply reverse themselves and agree to something they haven't agreed to in years. That's what talks about talks are about. That's how you sit down and say, okay, we understand. We're gonna meet next Tuesday. You will reaffirm your position. But by the end of the week, by a date certain, you will have an agreement on North Korea rejoining the talks on the basis of the purpose of the talks. I mean, you can work this stuff out. But what I want to emphasize is North Korea has shown zero interest in talks now. They have continued to say they will not enjoy, they will not have talks about nuclearization. In fact, they even put in their constitution that they're a nuclear weapons state. So this is a bit of a problem for us. And I don't think we're to blame for the fact that they refuse to join disarmament talks. So again, I look at my career diplomat, I always support talks, but I think we need to be realistic about the purpose of the talks. And if it's something like, look, we'll denuclearize, but we need some carrots from, we need some indication that you're trying to do something positive rather than all negative because we don't want to say we're denuclearizing because of all the sanctions you've taken. Again, we can work that out. But the problem is they have not started that conversation at all. If I may one word, of course, this is not a time to show any kind of carrots type because as you know that the North Korea go for a new test and launching missiles and the provocative actions after provocative actions and then showing the carrots, it's not the time to do so. Show our readiness, our seriousness. And then finally, they come to table. Certainly many negotiations can take place. Well, in this sense, I'm gathering, you know, when people say the time for talks are over, you know, maybe that's for now and with North Korea, but clearly there's a lot among the five countries to work out together that would strengthen our engagement with the North, I believe. I have a woman here in the, go there with her hand up. Lawrence Lowly, Global America Business Institute. My question is sort of a followup of the previous question. I understand the consequences of accepting nuclear nodes. However, six-party talks about 10 years ago was about CVID and without completely verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea didn't work. Meanwhile, North Korea developed more advanced program. Wouldn't it be more difficult to give up nuclear program when you have more advanced and more powerful program and I also understand that when we approach North Korea, there should be a constant, what is it, the unison, unified voice. Is it dialogue first or denuclearization first? Which one is first? There are two very different way of bringing North Korea to the table. Any of this will be our final question, so our final comments. Can you do a jumpy? Go ahead. First of all, I don't think we have a chicken and egg problem of dialogue first or denuclearization. That's what talks about talks could deal with. But I think we need to be very clear. North Korea decided not to give us any kind of verification regime in 2008. They gave us a declaration which we felt was incomplete, but we accepted it. With the understanding we needed verification which is some kind of international standard and they refused to give us any verification. Now, was this because they didn't want to deal with the Bush administration anymore, wanted to deal with Obama administration? Whatever, they did not give us any verification. In the meantime, they continue to develop weapons, very serious program that has continued and then to make the argument, well, you know, we continue to make nuclear weapons, now it's kind of hard to give them up since we worked so hard on this, is kind of an argument that I would have a little trouble with a six year old making that argument, let alone a country. So again, if they want to get out of the issue that they've put themselves into, there are plenty of channels, they know our telephone number. And I want to emphasize something that Mr. Yabanaka said earlier. The time when the US alone deals with North Korea, no one else has a role, that's over. I mean, true, Japan needs to be there, equal party to the talks, South Korea, Russia too, they have a border there. And so I think it's very important that we all be there. And so sometimes when you can't make any progress, you say, well, gee, we have six party talks, maybe it should be seven parties or 66 parties or whatever. But the issue is that North Korea has refused to engage in these negotiations, and that is the problem we're facing. You have a next one? Any time? Yes, of course, in 2010 and today, they have developed more, the missiles are nucleus. But also in 2010, we didn't have, we didn't have this kind of a sanctions, 90% of the trade cut, this kind of international sort of coordination has not taken place at that time. So one way or another that we have to keep working on that. By the way, that was before Qaddafi. Right. So this whole argument that, gee, we looked at Qaddafi and we felt really bad about that. I don't think quite just holds up to the time sequence. Well, gentlemen, I really appreciate you sharing your experiences and your insights with us today. And I wanna thank the audience too for joining us. Never a satisfying conclusion to these types of discussions, but I learned a lot from it and I'm grateful for your participation. So please join me in thanking our panel and. Thank you. How did it go? Very good. Thank you.