 The concept of post-modern has been frequent use as one of those things which describe the new relationship between European states. They are supposed to be post-modern. And the central component in that concept of post-modern has been that armed conflicts between states in Europe are no longer on the agenda. It has been widely held in view that interstate armed conflicts are not to be expected in Europe. Interstate, yes, as we have seen in the Balkans or in the Caucasus. One reason for this complacency has been that we have widely believed that the European borders have been settled for good, that nobody would challenge the European borders. After all, all European states have subscribed in 1975 to the so-called health and key accords after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. And no country in Europe has challenged the validity of these principles, not even during the crises that we are facing right now. In 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, President Putin of Russia made it clear that Russia is not content with the political system of Europe as it is. The unipolar system of governance in his view was unstable and it should be replaced by a new system of government. Now without going into details, it's really difficult to know what he had in mind, but we learned at least one thing very soon after the 2007 conference, and that was the Georgian War. That was one example of his unhappiness with prevailing system. In Europe, as well as in North America, the Georgian five-day war was not seen as an epochal event. After all, President Shaka's value of Georgia had him said to behave in a manner which was almost an invitation to Russians to act. The Georgian War did not change the atmosphere in world politics. A reset of American and Russian relations was soon to follow the Georgian War, but that was a short-lived period in the interrelations. As the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, the 15 constituent parts of the country gained independence. Some of them gained their independence that they had lost. Spigote had been independent in the early 1920s, Ukraine, one of them. Ukraine was, during the Soviet years, a particularly important part of the Union. Its geopolitical situation in the heart of Europe was one factor. Its large population, more than 40 million, was another. Ukraine was, after all, the bread basket of the Union, and large parts of the Soviet military industries were located in the industrialized part of Ukraine, especially in the east and the south. Sevastopol, the Soviet naval base, granting access to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean was a major military asset. All in all, Ukraine was, in a very concrete term, part of the heartland of the Soviet Union. Soviet nuclear weapons were also staged on Ukrainian soil. These nuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, were something that the Americans, the British and the Russians wanted to eliminate so there would not be one more nuclear arms power in Europe. Ukraine agreed as the weapons were transferred to Russia. In exchange for giving up these weapons, the Prime Minister, Britain, and the American and Russian presidents signed a solemn memorandum giving assurances to Ukraine that its borders would be safe. I quote here the text from the memorandum signed by Prime Minister Blair and Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton on 19 December 1994, and this is a quote, reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine, and somewhat later in the text, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity. These are three quotes. The commitment is clear and unequivocal. Contrary to what, for instance, Prime Minister Medvedev has said, or what American and British constitutional lawyers have later said, the recent developments in Ukraine have been discussed in the media to a very great extent, and I do not feel the need to recapitulate them here because they are known to those present here. We all know how they failed to sign an association agreement with the European Union, ignited a rebellious series of demonstrations in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine. We remember how the Yanukovych regime collapsed and the President fled to Russia, avoiding the fate of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi. Many have, I think, already forgotten how the days of the Romanian dictator Nikolai Ceaușescu ended. These revolutionary events and the general confusion must have been seen in Moscow as an opportunity to execute a plan that had been ready in the strong boxes of the general staff for a long time. The plan was to take Crimean Peninsula. It is obvious that there had been meticulous planning, extensive exercising and close cooperation with pro-Russian groups on the Crimean Peninsula. Those famous or infamous green men who came out from nowhere added to the confusion. Who they were, Ukrainians, as President Putin claimed, or Russian special forces, masked? That was the question for some time, adding to the confusion. Before they appeared on the Crimean Peninsula, Russia had already been issued generously passports to those who so desired, and Russian old age pensions were paid to those who took the Russian citizenship. By the way, a similar process is going on in Latvia from the time being. A point omitted in most of the newscasts is that promising finds of oil and gas have been found in the Black Sea, not far from the shores of the Crimean Peninsula. The resources are not likely to be enormous. According to Bloomberg's, perhaps some 7 million tons of oil per year. For Russia, a minor matter, but for Ukraine, a considerable resource. As I was in Moscow, on a fact-finding visit, soon after the takeover, I interviewed many astute Russian observers of these events. One interpretation of many was that the operation was conducted the way it was to create the impression that this was a genuine Ukrainian domestic movement. So that the Treaty of 1994 safeguarding Ukrainian borders would not be evoked. The Americans and the British were offered an opportunity to look the other way, pretending that they had believed that this cover story was true. Since the Russians knew perfectly well that the Americans and the British were very reluctant to honor their word and come to the rescue, this was a smart trick, supposed to be, but it didn't really succeed. Ukraine had given up on nuclear weapons in exchange for something that she believed to be ironclad security guarantees. One of the guarantors was the invader. The two others preferred to look the other way and in all their commitments. The formal excuse was, after all, that the Budapest Memorandum was not legally binding. It had not been submitted for approval to the United States Senate nor the British Parliament. Perhaps the Ukrainians thought that if the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States give solemnly their word, that that was a serious commitment. Now we know that these promises and assurances, as they were called, were worthless. The question arises, what should we conclude from this? To what degree are other commitments worthless? As the Baltics, who have a NATO guarantee, have insisted upon having, as they say, boots on the ground. They are only being logical. Since verbal commitments can be ignored, then the only credible commitment is shared risk. A tripwire, that was the word used during the Cold War. Troops and military installations are more credible as tokens of a commitment than lofty signatures on the highest level. After these events, the collateral damage done to international negotiations about nuclear disarmament has become very obvious. Would Iran give up its nuclear weapons program in exchange for security guarantees? Would North Korea take the word of an American President as a credible commitment? How about Israel? The conclusion is clear. Those who have nuclear weapons have never been invaded. Libya gave up her nuclear weapons program. We know what happened. The same is true in Iraq. Let's get back to geopolitics. That is, after all, the key word that Russians use these days. Since Russia has met strong disapproval and even symbolic sanctions in the West, how about the East? It is certainly no coincidence that after 10 years of intensive negotiations, a deal was struck with the Chinese a few days ago. Enormous amounts of natural gas will be delivered to China. That will not happen by diverting gas from the European markets, but by opening new gas fields in Siberia. It will take many, many years, perhaps decades, before these resources will bring new revenue to the distressed coffers of the Russian Treasury. Since the political message is clear, both domestically and internationally, Russia is not alone. We are a junior partner in China these days. The domestic message is important. During my discussions in Moscow, what struck me was how many members of the research community were deeply worried about the domestic political developments. We all know that television has become a propaganda machine of the government. The press has been until recently less subject to controls, but that too is changing. It is not outright censorship. The methods of control are more invisible. Tax authorities cooperate with the Kremlin when need be, an extraordinary series of head health controls, fire controls and so on, and the newspaper is in trouble. Unless it complies with powers like me, this will be the fate. Most do, not all. In such cases, an oligarch close to the Kremlin may buy such a newspaper and see to it that the new editor is, as the saying goes, more patriotic. Patriotic is the key word. Those who do not support the policies of the Kremlin are probably agents of foreign powers, spicing foreign pay, or a fifth column, certainly unpatriotic. In Russian usage, the word fascist is indeed an F-word, an expletive used liberally. By appealing to the general public, by creating a larger mentality, the government has been successful in convincing the general public that the motherland is at great risk. Externally and internally, travel restrictions limiting foreign travel of certain categories of state employees are already enforced. In many government offices, new office holders appear as administrative controllers, coming from the secret services. During the Soviet years, that kind of control was the responsibility of various employees of the all-powerful communist party. Now those functions are being taken care of by the all-powerful SVR, or the Domestic Security Service. Is the future something that Russians call Soviet Union light? Probably not. The loose ideologies guiding the powers that be are not socialistic. If anything, they are old-fashioned capitalistic with a heavy dose of state control. There are various kinds of profits, such as Solzhenitsyn, advocating a new type of Russian state. After all, when the Soviet Union broke up, 15 million Russians remain outside the Russian Federation. But now they should all be assembled under the same flag. While that will be implemented as a mystery, the dictator of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has not welcomed such thoughts, nor has Kazaklida and Ursultana Zarbaya. In both countries, the number of Russians is substantial. The first steps towards the creation of such a state have already been taken as the Crimean Peninsula has been incorporated into Russia. How does the West see these developments? With embarrassment, I should say. With powerless embarrassment. What to do, how to react, varies from country to country, even in Europe. The Germans are the ones the Kremlin listens to. They are split in several camps. Chancellor Merkel has been clear in her condemnation of the Crimean case, but the German foreign ministers, the Steinmeier, has been much more cautious. German industrial balance has spoken strongly against economic sanctions. There are, among present and past politicians, a number of those who say that, after all, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and is of great strategic importance to Russia. And again, those who say that this may only be the beginning of the process with aiming to reconstituting, at least in terms of political geography, but was the Soviet Union. They remember the famous complaint President Putin has expressed. This solution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in European history since the Second World War. And Putin is trying to reconstitute what was then lost. That is a question to ask, and many do so. The American reactions had been strong, at least on the symbolic level. I was in Washington in April and met with a number of seasoned American analysts of international affairs. Most of them were clueless. What to do? Crimea is lost, no point in crying over spilled milk, as widely felt. But how to answer to President Putin as he is calling for a new world order? What does he really mean by such a term? Nobody seems to know very well. Some remarks suggest that what the Kremlin has in mind would be some sort of a great international conference where new rules of the great gain would be accepted. The rules of the gain, as incorporated in the United Nations Charters, seem no longer to be adequate, nor the rules in the European game enshrined in the final act of the conference and security and cooperation in Europe. But what kind of rules? Will these developments mean that we are on the threshold of a new Cold War? That is a natural question to be asked. Some observers maintain that we have already transgressed that threshold. Well, much depends on how we define a Cold War. One central characteristic of the Cold War was, as we knew it, a competition between two mutually exclusive ideologies, not national ideologies, but worldwide ideologies. And I still say that there is something that could loosely be called Western ideology based on liberal democracy, market economy, civil liberties and human rights and rule of law. But is there a competing ideology? It seems to me that something of that kind might take place, shape. It is an authoritarian system of government, conservative in its values, fighting Western moral decadence, permissiveness and religious indifference. Among European parties far to the right there seems to be a good deal of sympathy to the way how Russia is today governed. The winner of the French election for the European Parliament, Madame de Penne, has already praised Putin for his strong governorship. He is seen as a muscular leader, a strong and authoritarian personality, a man of faith. He seems to appeal to those who distrust political elaborate philosophies and who have little respect for the weak. But for the time speaking of all this is still very nebulous and unstructured. Perhaps it will remain as such. I do not really believe that we are seeing the emergence of a new worldwide political alternative to the one we now live with. Will there be a new arms race? A logical question in the situation we face. Some countries which went pretty far in their faith in a peaceful world for all times have reconsidered their position. Sweden had during the Cold War a formidable military establishment. There were 900 first-rate aircraft, a considerable navy with many submarines, a reserve force of 800,000. They have reduced all that to an almost token force designed to participate in its national peacekeeping operations. Now they have in the light of their Ukrainian crises reconsidered their policies. They are increasing at least to a degree funding for the military and they have after a long hiatus began to consider if NATO membership might be a good idea. All this is still very tentative. In Finland we too have reduced our military capabilities during many years of relative calm but not to the same extent as the Swedes have. We still have a conscript force. We do maintain a grainable air force. We have developed our military systems so that they are fully compatible with the NATO systems. Technically we would have no trouble in joining NATO. The politics of such a decision is a different matter. The major political parties are split. The largest party in the parliament, the conservatives advocate NATO membership. Others hesitate. Some have still serious doubts. Much will depend on how the Ukrainian crises will develop. Next spring we will have parliamentary elections. It is most likely that before elections these issues will be hotly contested. After all we are the country with the European Union with the longest land border with Russia. 1,300 kilometers. Whenever very serious developments take place in world affairs and we in the West in the EU and NATO are ill-prepared we ought to ask ourselves what have we done wrong? Why have we not had more force for it? The easy thing is to blame it on insufficient or faulty intelligence. That is what most governments tend to do and sometimes with some justification. But it is good to go one step deeper. Why should we ask ourselves have we not been too complacent? Have we not been guilty of the same sin as the communist leaders during the Cold War? One of their sins and one of the reasons for the collapse of their system was complacence. They were so sure of the superiority of their own system that they simply failed to analyze competing systems. Our analysis of the emerging new Russian system developed under President Putin may also have been too superficial. We have repeated time and again that since the world economy is so intertwined there exists a system of irrevocable mutual dependence too strong to be put at risk. Since the export proceeds from oil and gas make up more than half of the Russian state revenues surely they could not risk a conflict with their best customers. That has sounded like a strong argument. We have believed it because we have wanted to believe that after all we are all alike. We all strive for higher standard of living in a peaceful world. Now we have seen that while it may be true to a degree interdependence is perhaps decisive over the long run but not necessarily in the short run. European dependence on Russian oil and gas is such an economic interest to European business that it strengthens the Russian hand. Sanctions such as we can agree upon are not likely to change the Russian mood of having re-established herself as a major power. The token of that regained status is a confrontation with major powers. Not necessarily a long-term confrontation but a show of determination and pride. Tangible interests can be put to rest for some time so that the stages will be recognized. It seems to me that nothing has embarrassed and humiliated the Russian leadership more than having been ignored as a major power. Lack of respect is an insult they feel. To that one could add that respect must be earned with positive achievements, not by solving seeds of uncertainty and fear. Respect is not the same thing as awe or fear, but in absence a positive means to gain respect Russia has resorted to intimidation. How far that will go depends on the response they meet. So far it has been tepid and timid. The confused leaders in America and Europe have sent a weak message, a message that does not bring about respect much less awe or fear. The West has failed the test put to it by Russia. But it is equally important to know that to win a single battle is no guarantee of final victory. How do we come out of this dangerous and potentially revolutionary situation? Is the user military force against Russia has been ruled out by all? That is not a factor. Sanctions as we have seen from freezing the assets of a few oligarchs or Putin deputies is not much of a tool. The latest sanction is to ban the import of Russian caviar. I think they are laughing wholeheartedly to this. Civil and gas have been ruled out although they are the only ones that really would make a difference. They have been ruled out because they are difficult to replace by imports from other sources. Diplomacy without force backing it up cannot have good prospects of succeeding. And the Russians know perfectly well that the West needs their cooperation in issues such as the support of NATO forces and still are in Afghanistan to bring back the enormous quantities of equipment and arms. Here and in Iran, Russian cooperation is in a sense. The Syrian crisis has shown that Russian influence in that country is noteworthy. The Russia is not so much a demandor to use a diplomatic term. Isolation political and cultural has been suggested. The counter argument is that long term of isolation will only strengthen those who themselves wish to increase the distance from Russia to the western world. It will justify policies to limit freedom of speech and assembly because it will create a larger mentality. The sticks of you are not very big. How about the carrots? Politically it would be very difficult to offer carrots as this would be seen as a reward for irresponsible behavior. Then we must ask ourselves what are the Russians really after? Is it not the restoration and the Soviet Union? No, I don't think so. It looks more like an image from the Russian imperial history. Imperial Russia was recognized as a world power for the simple reason that neither the United States nor China were in the 19th century competing for such a position. To be a major European power was enough to be a world power, a 19th century superpower. But Imperial Russia did not have too many friends. According to Tsar Alexander III, Russia had only two friends, her army and her navy. The situation today is not too different, although we may have to add the nuclear arms to the friends. So Russia seems to be insisting on being granted superpower status on the level of the United States and China. It already has some of those attributes, permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and a large nuclear arsenal. What is missing? A recognized zone of interest. In Russian eyes, the United States has such a zone by being the unchallenged leader of NATO. The idea is Russia has launched how to solve the problem of missile defense in close cooperation with the American suggest that there would be zones of responsibility in Europe for defensive purposes. Many read this to mean zones of interest. Ukraine has been within the zone of interest or within the Russian realm for a long time. Reason political development suggests that what we have seen is an effort to reestablish that relationship. The fact is that in the course of the last few days Russia has shown more interest in finding a political settlement to the crisis and that is a new turn of events. We do not yet know what it really means. Well, in conclusion I will revert back to what I already have said. We have seen and we have been underestimating Russian capacity to exercise power politics in Europe. We have been too confident that interdependence is the solution to potential problems. Prince Otto von Bismarck, who served as ambassador of Russia in St. Petersburg, has summed up his views of Russia in a convincing way. Russia is never so strong as it might seem to be, but nor is Russia ever so weak as it might appear. Both Napoleon and Hitler believed that Russia was weak. Yes, Russia was weak, but its strength was in putting up with enormous sufferings and its incredible resilience, something that might still be there. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention.