 Part 2, Definitions and Axioms of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Nicholas James, Bridgewater The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elvis Part 2, Definitions and Axioms Part 2, On the Nature and Origin of the Mind Preface I now pass on to explaining the results which must necessarily follow from the essence of God or of the Eternal and Infinite Being Not indeed all of them, for we proved in Part 1, Proposition 16 that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways but only those which are able to lead us as it were by the hand to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness Definitions Definition 1 By body, I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinant manner the essence of God in so far as he is considered as an extended thing See Part 1, Proposition 25, Corollary Definition 2 I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that which being given the thing is necessarily given also and which being removed the thing is necessarily removed also In other words, that without which the thing and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived Definition 3 By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing Explanation I say conception rather than perception because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind Definition 4 By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which in so far as it is considered in itself without relation to the object has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea Explanation I say intrinsic in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic namely the agreement between the idea and its object, ideatum Definition 5 Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing Explanation I say indefinite because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing or by its efficient cause which necessarily gives the existence of the thing but does not take it away Definition 6 Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms Definition 7 By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence but if several individual things concur in one action and have to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause I consider them all so far as one particular thing Axioms 1 The essence of man does not involve necessary existence That is, it may in the order of nature come to pass This or that man does or does not exist 2 Man thinks 3 Modes of thinking such as love, desire or any other of the passions do not take place unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking 4 We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways 5 We feel and perceive no particular things save bodies and modes of thought Notabene The postulates are given after the conclusion of Proposition 13 End of Part 2 Definitions and Axioms Recording by Nicholas James Bridgewater Recorded in London, England Part 2 Propositions 1 to 5 Of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bill Mosley The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elwes Part 2 Propositions 1 to 5 Propositions Proposition 1 Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing Proof Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God Part 1 Proposition 25 Corollary God therefore possesses the attribute, Part 1, definition 5, of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts Which latter are conceived thereby Thought therefore is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence Part 1, definition 6 In other words, God is a thinking thing Quote Erot demonstrandum Note, this proposition is also evident from the fact that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being For in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts So is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite As therefore, from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being Thought is necessarily, Part 1, definitions 4 and 6 One of the infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing Proposition 2 Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing Proof The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last Proposition 3 In God, there is necessarily the idea not only of His essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from His essence Proof God, by the first proposition of this part, can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways Or, what is the same thing by a proposition 16, Part 1 Can form the idea of His essence and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is Part 1 Proposition 35 Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone Quad erot demonstrandum Part 1 Proposition 15 Note, the multitude understand by the power of God, the free will of God And the right over all things that exist, which latter, are accordingly generally considered as contingent For it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing Further, the power of God is very often likened to the power of kings But this doctrine we have refuted Part 1, Proposition 32 Corollaries 1 and 2 And we have shown Part 1, Proposition 16 That God acts by the same necessity As that by which He understands Himself In other words, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature, as all admit That God understands Himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity That God performs infinite acts in infinite ways We further showed, Part 1, Proposition 34 That God's power is identical with God's essence in action For it is as impossible for us to conceive God as not acting As to conceive Him as non-existent If we might pursue the subject further I could point out that the power which is commonly attributed to God Is not only human, as showing that God is conceived by the multitude as a man Or in the likeness of a man But involves a negation of power However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often I would only beg the reader again and again To turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part 1 From Proposition 16 to the end No one will be able to follow my meaning unless he is creepulously careful Not to confound the power of God with the human power and right of kings Proposition 4 The idea of God from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways Can only be one Proof Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and His modifications Part 1 Proposition 30 Now God is one Part 1 Proposition 14 Corollary Therefore the idea of God Where from an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways Can only be one Claude Erot Demonstrandum Proposition 5 The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause Only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing Not insofar as he is unfolded in any other attribute That is the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things Do not own as their efficient cause their objects Or the things perceived But God himself insofar as he is a thinking thing Proof This proposition is evident from Proposition 3 of this part We there drew the conclusion that God can form the idea of His essence And of all things which follow necessarily therefrom Solely because he is a thinking thing And not because he is the object of his own idea Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause God insofar as he is a thinking thing It may be differently proved as follows The actual being of ideas is obviously a mode of thought That is, Part 1, Proposition 25, Corollary A mode which express in a certain manner the nature of God Insofar as he is a thinking thing And therefore, Part 1, Proposition 10 Involves the conception of no other attribute of God And consequently, by Part 1, Axiom 4 Is not the effect of any attribute saved thought Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause Insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing Etc. Part 2, Propositions 6 to 10 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bill Mosley for Ellsberg, Texas, USA The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellwees Part 2, Propositions 6 to 10 Proposition 6 Modes of any given attribute are caused by God Insofar as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes And not insofar as he is considered through any other attributes Proof Each attribute is conceived through itself Without any other Part 1, Proposition 10 Wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute But not of any other Thus Part 1, Axiom 4 They are caused by God Only insofar as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are And not insofar as he is considered through any other Quaterrat demonstrandum Corollary Hence the actual being of things which are not modes of thought Does not follow from the divine nature because that nature has prior knowledge of the things Things represented in ideas follow and are derived from their particular attribute In the same manner and with the same necessity as ideas follow According to what we have shown from the attribute of thought Proposition 7 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things Proof This proposition is evident from Part 1, Axiom 4 For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause Whereof it is an effect Corollary Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action That is whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension Formaliter Follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought Objective Note Before going any further I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above Namely that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance Belongs altogether only to one substance Consequently substance thinking and substance extended are one in the same substance Comprehended now through one attribute now through the other So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one in the same thing Though expressed in two ways This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintain that God God's intellect and the things understood by God are identical For instance a circle existing in nature and the idea of a circle existing Which is also in God are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes Thus whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension Or under the attribute of thought or under any other attribute We shall find the same order or one and the same chain of causes That is the same things following in either case I said that God is the cause of an idea For instance of the idea of a circle Insofar as he is a thinking thing and of a circle Insofar as he is an extended thing Simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle Can only be perceived as approximate cause through another mode of thinking And that again through another and so on to infinity So that so long as we consider things as modes of thinking We must explain the order of the whole of nature Or the whole chain of causes through the attribute of thought only And insofar as we consider things as modes of extension We must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only And so on in the case of the other attributes Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause in as much as he consists of infinite attributes I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly Proposition 8 The ideas of particular things or modes that do not exist Must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God In the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes Are contained in the attributes of God Proof This proposition is evident from the last It is understood more clearly from the preceding note Corollary Hence so long as particular things do not exist Except insofar as they are comprehended in the attributes of God Their representations in thought or ideas do not exist Except insofar as the infinite idea of God exists And when particular things are said to exist Not only insofar as they are involved in the attributes of God But also insofar as they are said to continue Their ideas will also involve existence Through which they are said to continue Note If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question I shall I fear not be able to give him any Which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak In as much as it is unique However, I will endeavor to illustrate it as far as possible The nature of a circle is such that Any number of straight lines intersect within it The rectangles formed by their segments Will be equal to one another Thus infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist Except insofar as the circle exists Nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist Except insofar as they are comprehended In the idea of the circle Let us grant that from this infinite number of rectangles To only exist The ideas of these two not only exist Insofar as they are contained in the idea of the circle But also as they involve the existence of those rectangles Wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas Of the remaining rectangles Proposition 9 The idea of an individual thing actually existing Is caused by God Not insofar as he is infinite But insofar as he is considered As affected by another idea of a thing actually existing Of which he is the cause Insofar as he is affected by a third idea And so on to infinity Proof The idea of an individual thing actually existing Is an individual mode of thinking And is distinct from other modes By the corollary a note to Proposition 8 of this part Thus by Proposition 6 of this part It is caused by God Insofar only as he is a thinking thing But not By Proposition 28 of Part 1 Insofar as he is a thing thinking absolutely Only insofar as he is considered As affected by another mode of thinking And he is the cause of this latter As being affected by a third and so on to infinity Now the order and connection of ideas is By Proposition 7 of this book The same as the order and connection of causes Therefore of a given individual idea Another individual idea or God Insofar as he is considered as modified by that idea Is the cause And of this second idea God is the cause Insofar as he is affected by another idea And so on to infinity Quaterat demonstrandum Corollary Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of an idea The knowledge thereof is in God Insofar only as he has the idea of the object Proof Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea Its idea is in God By Proposition 3 of this part Not insofar as he is infinite But insofar as he is affected by another idea Of an individual thing By the last proposition But by Proposition 7 of this part The order and connection of ideas Is the same as the order and connection of things The knowledge therefore of that Which takes place in any individual object Will be in God Insofar only as he has the idea of that object Quaterat demonstrandum Proposition 10 The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man In other words, substance does not constitute the actual being Footnote 2 of man 2 Forma Proof The being of substance involves necessary existence Part 1, Proposition 7 If therefore the being of substance appertains to the essence of man Substance being granted Man would necessarily be granted also Part 2, Definition 2 And consequently, man would necessarily exist Which is absurd Part 2, Axiom 1 Therefore, etc. Quaterat demonstrandum Note, this proposition may also be proved from Part 1, Proposition 5 In which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature For as there may be many men The being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance Namely, that substance is in its nature infinite Immutable Indivisible etc. As anyone may see for himself Corollary Hence it follows that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications Of the attributes of God For, by the last proposition The being of substance does not belong to the essence of man That essence, therefore, by Part 1, Proposition 15 Is something which is in God And which without God can neither be nor be conceived Whether it be a modification Part 1, Proposition 25 Corollary Or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned manner Note Everyone must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God All men agree that God is the one and only cause of all things Both of their essence and of their existence That is, God is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made Secundum fieri But also in respect to their being Secundum essi At the same time, many assert that that Without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived Belongs to the essence of that thing Wherefore, they believe that either the nature of God Apportains to the essence of created things Or else that created things can be or be conceived without God Or else, as is more probably the case They hold inconsistent doctrines I think the cause for such confusion is mainly That they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking The nature of God, which should be reflected on first In as much as it is prior both in the order of knowledge And the order of nature They have taken to be last in the order of knowledge And have put into the first place What they call the objects of sensation Hence, while they are considering natural phenomena They give no attention at all to the divine nature And when afterwards they apply their mind To the study of the divine nature They are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses With which they have overlaid The knowledge of natural phenomena In as much as such hypotheses Are no help towards understanding the divine nature So that it is hardly to be wondered at That these persons contradict themselves freely However, I pass over this point My intention here was only to give a reason For not saying that that, without which a thing cannot be Or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing Individual things cannot be or be conceived without God Yet God does not appertain to their essence I said that I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing That which being given, the thing is necessarily given also And which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also Or that without which the thing and which itself Without the thing can neither be nor be conceived Part 2, Definition 2 End of Part 2, Propositions 6 to 10 Recording by Bill Mosley, Frelsberg, Texas, USA Part 2, Propositions 11 to 15 of The Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer Please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bill Mosley The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elwes Part 2, Propositions 11 to 15 Proposition 11 The first element which constitutes the actual being of the human mind Is the idea of some particular thing actually existing Proof The essence of man, by the corollary of the last proposition Constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God Namely by Part 2, Axiom 2 By the modes of thinking Of all which, by Part 2, Axiom 3 The idea is prior in nature And when the idea is given The other modes, namely those of which the idea is prior in nature Must be in the same individual By the same Axiom Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human mind But not the idea of a non-existent thing For then, Part 2 Proposition 8, Corollary The idea itself cannot be said to exist Must therefore be the idea of something actually existing But not of an infinite thing For an infinite thing, Part 1 Proposition 21, Proposition 22 Must always necessarily exist This would, by Part 2, Axiom 1 Involve an absurdity Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind Is the idea of something actually existing Quote Erat Demonstrandom Corollary Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God Thus when we say that the human mind perceives this or that We make the assertion that God has this or that idea Not insofar as he is infinite But insofar as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind Or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind And when we say that God has this or that idea Not only insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind But also insofar as he simultaneously with the human mind Has the further idea of another thing We assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately Note Here I doubt not Readers will come to a stand and will call to mind many things Which will cause them to hesitate I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step And not to pronounce on my statements till they have read to the end Proposition 12 Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea Which constitutes the human mind Must be perceived by the human mind Or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the set occurrence That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body Nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind Proof, whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea The knowledge thereof is necessarily in God Part 2 Proposition 9 Corollaries Insofar as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object That is Part 2 Proposition 11 Insofar as he constitutes the mind of anything Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind The knowledge thereof is necessarily in God Insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind That is, by Part 2 Proposition 11 Corollaries The knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind In other words, the mind perceives it Note, this proposition is also evident and is more clearly to be understood From Part 2 Proposition 7 Which see Proposition 13 The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body In other words, a certain mode of extension which actually exists And nothing else Proof, if indeed the body were not the object of the human mind The ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in God Part 2 Proposition 9 Corollaries In virtue of his constituting our mind But in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else That is Part 2 Proposition 11 Corollaries The ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind Now, by Part 2 Axiom 4 We do possess the idea of the modifications of the body Therefore, the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body And the body as it actually exists Part 2 Proposition 11 Further, if there were any other object of the idea constituting the mind Besides the body Then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow Part 1 Proposition 36 There would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea Which would be the effect of that other object Part 2 Proposition 11 But Part 1 Axiom 5 There is no such idea Therefore, the object of our mind is the body as it exists And nothing else Quote erot demonstrandum Note, we thus comprehend not only that the human mind is united to the body But also the nature of the union between mind and body However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly Unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general Applying not more to men than to other individual things Which, though in different degrees, are animated Footnote 3 Animata For of everything, there is necessarily an idea in God Of which God is the cause in the same way as there is an idea of the human body Thus, whenever we have asserted of the idea of the human body Also be asserted of the idea of everything else Still on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas like objects differ one from the other One being more excellent than another and containing more reality Just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea And contains more reality Therefore, in order to determine wherein the human mind differs from other things And wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object That is of the human body What this nature is, I am not able here to explain Nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance That I should do so I will only say generally that in proportion as any given body Is more fitted than others for doing many actions Or receiving many impressions at once So also is the mind of which it is the object More fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions And the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone And the fewer other bodies concur with it in action The more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others And may further see the cause Why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body And also many kindred questions Which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced Wherefore I have thought it worthwhile to explain and prove more strictly my present statements In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies Axiom 1 All bodies are either in motion or at rest Axiom 2 Everybody is moved sometimes more slowly Sometimes more quickly Lemma 1 Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest Quickness and slowness and not in respect of substance Proof The first part of this proposition is I take itself evident That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance is plain Both from Part 1, Proposition 5 and Part 1, Proposition 8 It is brought out still more clearly from Part 1, Proposition 15, Note Lemma 2 All bodies agree in certain respects Proof, all bodies agree in the fact that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute Part 2, Definition 1 Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly And may be absolutely in motion or at rest Lemma 3 A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body Which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body And that third again by a fourth and so on to infinity Proof Bodies are individual things Part 2, Definition 1 Which, Lemma 1 Are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest Thus, Part 1, Proposition 28 Each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing Namely, Part 2, Proposition 6 By another body Which other body is also, Axiom 1 In motion or at rest And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest This third body again by a fourth and so on to infinity Quote Erat Demonstrandum Corollary Hence it follows that a body in motion keeps in motion until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body And a body at rest remains so until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body This is indeed self-evident for when I suppose, for instance, that a given body A is at rest and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A except that it is at rest If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion This cannot have resulted from its having been at rest for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest If on the other hand A be given in motion, we shall so long as we only consider A Be unable to affirm anything concerning it except that it is in motion If A is subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A's previous motion For such motion can only have led to continued motion The state of rest therefore must have resulted from something which was not in A Namely from an external cause determining A to a state of rest Axiom 1 All modes wherein one body is affected by another body follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting So that one and the same body may be moved in different modes according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it On the other hand different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body Axiom 2 When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest which it is unable to move It recoils in order to continue its motion and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil And the plane of the body at rest where on the moving body has impinged Will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest Quickness and slowness We now pass on to compound bodies Definition When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact Or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation We say that such bodies are in union and that together they compose one body or individual which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union Axiom 3 In proportion as the parts of an individual or a compound body are in contact over a greater or less superficies They will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position Consequently the individual will with greater or less difficulty be brought to assume another form Those bodies whose parts are in contact over large superficies are called hard Those whose parts are in contact over small superficies are called soft Those whose parts are in motion among one another are called fluid Lemma 4 If from a body or individual compounded of several bodies Certain bodies be separated and if at the same time an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place The individual will preserve its nature as before without any change in its actuality Formon Proof These bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance That which constitutes the actuality for mom of an individual consists by the last definition in a union of bodies But this union although there is a continual change of bodies will by our hypothesis be maintained The individual therefore will retain its nature as before both in respect of substance and in respect of mode Quote erot demonstrandum Lemma 5 If the parts composing an individual become greater or less But in such proportion that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest The individual will still preserve its original nature and its actuality will not be changed Proof The same as for the last lemma Lemma 6 If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion which they have in one direction For motion in another direction But in such a manner that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before The individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality Proof This proposition is self-evident for the individual is supposed to retain all that which in its definition we spoke of as its actual being Lemma 7 Furthermore the individual thus composed preserves its nature whether it be as a whole in motion or at rest Whether it be moved in this or that direction So long as each part retains its motion and preserves its communication with other parts as before Proof This proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma 4 Note we thus see how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways And preserve its nature notwithstanding Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed, and slowness That is, of bodies of the most simple character If however we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures We shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected without losing its nature will be greatly multiplied Each of its parts would consist of several bodies and therefore by Lemma 6 Each part would admit without change to its nature of quicker or slower motion And would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind We shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality We may easily proceed thus to infinity and conceive the whole of nature as one individual Those parts, that is, all bodies vary in infinite ways without any change in the individual as a whole I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more length if I were writing a special treatise on body What I have already said that such is not my object, I have only touched on the question because it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view Postulates 1. The human body is composed of a number of individual parts of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex 2. Of the individual parts composing the human body, some are fluid, some soft, some hard 3. The individual parts composing the human body and consequently the human body itself are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies 4. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated 5. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the surface of the latter and as it were, leaves the impression there upon of the external body which impels it 6. The human body can move external bodies and arrange them in a variety of ways Proposition 14 The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions Proof The human body by Postulates 3 and 6 is affected in very many ways by external bodies and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies But, Part 2, Proposition 12 The human mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body The human mind is therefore capable of perceiving a great number of things and is so in proportion, etc. Proposition 15 The idea which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is not simple but compounded of a great number of ideas Proof The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body Part 2 Proposition 13 Which, Postulate 1, is composed of a great number of complex individual parts But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed Part 2 Proposition 8 Corollaries Therefore, Part 2 Proposition 7 The idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts which are called erot demonstrandum End of Part 2, Propositions 11-15 Recording by Bill Mosley Krellsburg, Texas, USA Part 2, Propositions 16-20 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by E. Scarab The Ethics by Benedict Day Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. L. Ways Part 2, Propositions 16-20 Proposition 16 The idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and also the nature of the external body Proof All the modes in which any given body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected and also from the nature of the affecting body by Axiom 1 after the Corollary of Limit 3 Therefore, their idea also necessarily, by Part 1, Axiom 4, involves the nature of both bodies Therefore, the idea of every mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies involves the nature of the human body and of the external body Quadaret Demonstrandum Corollary 1 Hence it follows first that the human mind perceives the nature of a variety of bodies together with the nature of its own Corollary 2 It follows secondly that the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to Part 1 Proposition 17 If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing or as present to itself until the human body be affected in such a way as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body This proposition is self-evident for so long as the human body continues to be thus affected so long with the human mind by Part 2 Proposition 12 regard this modification of the body, that is, by the last proposition it will have the idea of the mode as actually existing and this idea involves the nature of the external body In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude but postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the external body therefore the mind by Part 2 Proposition 16 Corollary 1 will regard the external body as actually existing until it is affected, etc. Quadaret Demonstrandum Corollary The mind is able to regard as present external bodies by which the human body has once been affected even though they be no longer in existence or present Proof When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body so that they often impinge on the softer parts they change the surface of the last named Postulate 5 Hence, by Axiom 2 after the Corollary of Lemma 3 they are refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they follow before such change and further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces by their own spontaneous movement they will be refracted in the same manner as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies Consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted affect the human body in the same manner whereof the mind, by Part 2, Proposition 12 will again take cognizance that is, by Part 2, Proposition 17 the mind will again regard the external body as present and will do so as often as the fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion wherefore, although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected be no longer in existence the mind will nevertheless regard them as present as often as this action of the body is repeated Quad Errat Demonstrandum Note, we thus see how it comes about as is often the case that we regard as present many things which are not It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation just as well as if I had pointed out the true causes Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth for all my assumptions are based on postulates which rest almost without exception on experience that cannot be controverted by those who have shown as we have that the human body as we feel it exists by corollary after Part 2, Proposition 13 furthermore, by Part 2, Proposition 7 and by corollary, Part 2, Proposition 16, Corollary 2 we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind and the idea that said Peter, which is another man, say Paul the former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body and only implies existence so long as Peter exists the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter and therefore while this disposition of Paul's body lasts Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself even though he no longer exists further, to retain the usual phraseology the modifications of the human body of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us we will call the images of things though they do not recall the figure of things when the mind regards bodies in this fashion we say that it imagines I will here draw attention to the fact in order to indicate where error lies that the imagination of the mind looked at in themselves do not contain error the mind does not err in the mere act of imagining but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it if the mind, while imagining nonexistent things is present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depends solely on its own nature that is, by part 1, definition 7 if this faculty of imagination be free proposition 18 if the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time when the mind afterwards imagines any of them it will straight away remember the others also proof the mind, by part 2, proposition 17 and by corollary imagines any given body because the human body is affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body in the same manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the set external body but, by our hypothesis, the body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two bodies at once therefore, it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once and then the mind, when it imagines one will straight away remember the other quad-erit divinscrandum note we now clearly see what memory is it is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body which associations arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications, affections of the human body I say first, it is an association of those ideas only which involve the nature of things outside the human body, not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things ideas of the modifications of the human body are strictly speaking by part two, proposition sixteen those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies I say secondly that disassociation arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas I say secondly, that disassociation arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas is, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all the men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should straight away arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first. For instance, from the thought of the word Pomom, an apple, a Roman would straight away arrive at the thought of the fruit apple which has no similitude with the articulate sound and question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things. That is, that the man has often heard the word Pomom while he was looking at the fruit. Similarly, every man will go on from one thought to another according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and hence to the thought of the war, etc. While a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, a field, etc. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner. Proposition 18. The human mind has no knowledge of the body and does not know to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected. Proof. The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body by part 2, Proposition 13, which, by part 2, Proposition 9, is in God insofar as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing actually existing. Or, in as much by postulate 4, the human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated, and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes. By part 2, Proposition 7. This idea will therefore be in God insofar as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus God has the idea of the human body or knows the human body insofar as he is affected by very many other ideas and not insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. That is, by part 2, Proposition 11, and by corollary, the human mind does not know the human body. But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind or the human mind perceives those modifications by part 2, Proposition 12, and consequently, by part 2, Proposition 16, the human body itself and is actually existing, therefore, the mind perceives thus far only the human body. Quad erit demonstrandum. Proposition 20. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner and being referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body. Proof. Thought is an attribute of God, by part 2, Proposition 1, therefore, by part 2, Proposition 3, there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind, by part 2, Proposition 11. Therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is affected by another idea of an individual thing, by part 2, Proposition 9. But by part 2, Proposition 7, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes, therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. Quad erit demonstrandum. End of Part 2, Proposition 16-20, Recording by E. Scarab. Part 2, Propositions 21-25 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Stephen Norman. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Ells. Part 2, Propositions 21-25. Proposition 21. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body. Proof that the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact that the body is the object of the mind. Part 2, Propositions 12-13. And so, for the same reason, the idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner as the mind is united to the body. Quad erit demonstrandum. Note. This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we have said in the Note to Part 2, Proposition 7. We there show that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body, Part 2, Proposition 13, are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. Wherefore, the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity, and follow from Him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality, former, of the idea insofar as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object. If a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on, to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter. Proposition 22, the human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. Proof, the ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the same way as Part 2, Proposition 20, but the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind, Part 2, Proposition 12, that is, in God, insofar as He constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, insofar as He has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is, Part 2, Proposition 21, they will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications. Quad Erad Demonstrandum. Proposition 23, the mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. Proof, the idea or knowledge of the mind, Part 2, Proposition 20, follows in God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since, Part 2, Proposition 19, the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is, Part 2, Proposition 11, corollary, since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God insofar as He constitutes the nature of the human mind. Therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind referred to God insofar as He constitutes the essence of the human mind. Therefore, by the same corollary, Part 2, Proposition 11, the human mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further, the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected involve the nature of the human body itself, Part 2, Proposition 16. That is, Part 2, Proposition 13, they agree with the nature of the mind, wherefore the knowledge of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind. But by the last proposition, the knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself, wherefore the human mind thus far only has knowledge of itself. Quad Erat Demonstrandum. Proposition 24, the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. Proof. The parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except insofar as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation, definition after lemma III, not insofar as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the human body are highly complex individuals, in the postulate one, whose parts, lemma IV, can be separated from the human body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the latter, and they can communicate their motions, axiom I, after lemma III, to other bodies in another relation. Therefore, Part II, Proposition III, the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God, it is much Part II, Proposition IX, as he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing. Which particular thing is prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part, Part II, Proposition VII? We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing the human body. Therefore the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, insofar as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not insofar as he has the idea of the human body only. In other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind, Part II, Proposition XIII. Therefore, Part II, Proposition XI, corollary, the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body. Quad erot demonstrandum. Proposition XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Proof. We have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of an external body, insofar as that external body conditions the human body in a given manner. But insofar as the external body is an individual which has no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God, Part II, Proposition IX. Insofar as God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which, Part II, Proposition VII, is naturally prior to the said external body. Wherefore, an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, insofar as he has the idea of the modification of the human body. In other words, the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. Quad Erat Demonstrandum. End of Part II, Propositions XXI to XXV. Recording by Stephen Norman. Part II, Propositions XXVI to XXXIII of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Stephen Norman. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R.H.M. Ellwes. Part II, Propositions XXVI to XXXIII. Proposition XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body. Proof. If the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then, Part 2, Proposition 7, neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence. But insofar as the human body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far, Part 2, Proposition 16, and corollary, it perceives that external body. Quad, Erot, Demonstrandom Corollary, insofar as the human mind imagines an external body it has not inadequate knowledge thereof. Proof. When the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it imagines. See Part 2, Proposition 17, Note. Now the mind can only imagine external bodies as actually existing. Therefore, by Part 2, Proposition 25, insofar as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not inadequate knowledge of them. Quad, Erot, Demonstrandom. Proposition 27. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself. Proof. Every idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human body insofar as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner, Part 2, Proposition 16. But inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, etc. Quad, Erot, Demonstrandom. Proposition 28. The ideas of the modifications of the human body insofar as they have reference only to the human mind are not clear and distinct but confused. Proof. The ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies, Part 2, Proposition 16. They must involve the nature not only of the human body but also of its parts. For the modifications are modes, Postulate 3, whereby the parts of the human body and consequently the human body as a whole are affected. But by Part 2, Propositions 24 and 25, the adequate knowledge of external bodies as also of the parts composing the human body is not in God insofar as he is regarded as affected by the human mind but insofar as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of modifications insofar as they are referred to the human mind alone are as consequences without premises, in other words confused ideas. Quad, Erot, Demonstrandom. Note, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is in the same manner proved not to be when considered in itself alone clear and distinct, as also is the case with the idea of the human mind and the ideas of the modifications of the human body insofar as they are referred to the mind only as everyone may easily see. Proposition 29. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind. Proof. The idea of a modification of the human body, Part 2, Proposition 27, does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in other words does not adequately express its nature. That is, Part 2, Proposition 13, it does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately. Therefore, Part 1, Axiom 6, the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof. Corollary. Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body, Part 2, Proposition 23. It only perceives its own body, Part 2, Proposition 19, through the ideas of the modifications and only perceives external bodies through the same means. Thus, insofar as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself, Part 2, Proposition 29, nor of its own body, Part 2, Proposition 27, nor of external bodies, Part 2, Proposition 25, but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof. Part 2, Proposition 28, and Note. Quad-Irat-Demonstrandom. Note. I say expressly that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common order of nature. That is, whenever it is determined from without, namely by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or that, not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast. Whenever it is determined in any wise from within, it regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below. Proposition 30. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body. Proof. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence, Part 2, Axiom 1, nor on the absolute nature of God, Part 1, Proposition 21. But, Part 1, Proposition 28, it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by others and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God, insofar as He has the ideas of all things, and not insofar as He has the idea of the human body only. Part 2, Proposition 9, Corollary. Wherefore, the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God very inadequate insofar as He is only regarded as constituting the nature of the human mind. That is, Part 2, Proposition 11, Corollary, this knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Quad-Irat-Demonstrandom. End of Part 2, Propositions 26 to 30. Recorded by Steven Norman. Part 2, Propositions 31 to 35 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elvis. Part 2, Propositions 31 to 35. Proposition 31. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves. Proof. Every particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation. This other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third and so on to infinity. Part 1, Proposition 28. As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body. We must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular things, namely that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration, thereof. Quad erat demonstrandum. Corollary. Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of their duration by the last proposition, and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. Part 1, Proposition 33, Note 1. For, Part 1, Proposition 29. Except in this sense nothing is contingent. Proposition 32. All ideas insofar as they are referred to God are true. Proof. All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects. Part 2, Proposition 37. Corollary. Therefore, Part 1, Axiom 6. They are all true. Quad erat demonstrandum. Proposition 33. There is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Proof. If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking which should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God. Part 2, Proposition 32. External to God it cannot be or be conceived. Part 1, Proposition 15. Therefore, there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Quad erat demonstrandum. Proposition 34. Every idea which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect is true. Proof. When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words, Part 2, Proposition 11, Corollary, that the idea is adequate and perfect in God insofar as he constitutes the essence of our mind. Consequently, Part 2, Proposition 32, we say that such an idea is true. Quad erat demonstrandum. Proposition 35. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which in adequate, fragmentary or confused ideas involve. Proof. There is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false. Part 2, Proposition 33. But falsity cannot consist in simple privation. For minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken. Neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical. Wherefore, it consists in the privation of knowledge which in adequate, fragmentary or confused ideas involve. Quad erat demonstrandum. Note. In the Note 2, Part 2, Proposition 17, I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject, I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free. Their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond there too. What the will is and how it moves the body, they none of them know. Those who boast of such knowledge and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about 200 feet. This error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn that the sun is distant from us more than 600 of the earth's diameters, we nonetheless shall fancy it to be near. For we do not imagine the sun as near us because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun insofar as our said body is affected thereby. End of Part 2, Propositions 31 to 35. Part 2, Propositions 36 to 40 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Guido. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes. Part 2, Propositions 36 to 40. Proposition 36. Inadequate and confused ideas, followed by the same necessity as adequate or clear and distinct ideas. Proof. All ideas are in God. Part 1, Proposition 15. And insofar as they are referred to God are true, Part 2, Proposition 32 and Part 2, Proposition 7, Corollary, Adequate. Therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind. Compare Part 2, Proposition 24 and Proposition 28. Therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by the same necessity. Part 2, Proposition 6. Quote Eret Demonstrandum. Proposition 37. That which is common to all, compare Lemma Part 2 above, and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing. Proof. If this be denied, conceive if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some particular thing, for instance the essence of B. Then, Part 2, Definition 2, it cannot without B either exist or be conceived. But this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it constitute the essence of any particular thing. Quote Eret Demonstrandum. Proposition 38. Those things which are common to all and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately. Proof. Let A be something which is common to all bodies and which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately, for the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate. Part 2, Proposition 7, Corollary. Both in so far as God has the idea of the human body and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the human body, which, Part 2, Propositions 16, 25, 27, involve in part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies, that is, Part 2, Propositions 12, 13, the idea in God will necessarily be adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind and in so far as he has the ideas which are in the human mind. Therefore, the mind, Part 2, Proposition 11, Corollary, necessarily perceives A adequately and has this adequate perception both in so far as it perceives itself and in so far as it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner. Quote Eret demonstrandum. Corollary. Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men, for, by lemma, to, all bodies agree in certain respects, which, by the foregoing proposition, must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all. Proposition 39. That which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body and which is present equally in each part of either or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind. Proof, if A be that which is common to and a property of the human body and external bodies and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of A in God. Part 2 Proposition 7. Corollary. Both in so far as he has the idea of the human body and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies. Let it now be granted that the human body is affected by an external body through that which it has in common therewith, namely A. The idea of this modification will involve the property A. Part 2 Proposition 16 and therefore Part 2 Proposition 7. Corollary. The idea of this modification in so far as it involves the property A will be adequate in God and so far as God is affected by the idea of the human body. That is, Part 2 Proposition 13. In so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind. Therefore, Part 2 Proposition 11. Corollary. This idea is also adequate in the human mind. Quote Erat Demonstrandum. Corollary. Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies. Proposition 40. What so ever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate are also themselves adequate. Proof. This proposition is self-evident for when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say in other words. Part 2 Proposition 11. Corollary. That an idea is in the divine intellect, where of God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. Note 1. I have thus set forth the cause of those notions which are common to all men and which form the basis of our rashiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours, for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again, we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin and consequently the axioms on which they are founded and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of worrying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to admit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as being, thing, something. These terms arose from the fact that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images. What an image is, I explained in the Part 2, Proposition 17, Note. Within itself at the same time. If this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused. If this number of images of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused, one with another. This being so, it is evident from Part 2, Proposition 17, Corollary, and Proposition 18 that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them as it were under one attribute, namely under the attribute of being, thing, etc. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here, for the purpose which we have in view, it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, etc. They arise to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals, e.g., color, size, etc. And their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, and so far as the body is affected by them, agree, for that is the point in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body. This the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals, for, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual, according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected, and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature. Those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, every one will form general images of things according to the habit of his body. It is thus not to be wondered at that among philosophers who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them so many controversies should have arisen. Note two. From all that has been said above it is clear that we in many cases perceive and form our general notions, one, from particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily confusedly and without order through our senses, part two, Proposition 29, Corollary. I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. Footnote. A Baconian phrase, Novum organum aphorism 100. Pollock page 126. Note. End footnote. Two. From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things. Part two. Proposition 18. Note. I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination. Three. From the fact that we have notions common to all men and adequate ideas of the properties of things. Part two. Proposition 38. Corollary. Proposition 39. And Corollary. And Proposition 40. This I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, as I will hear after show, a third kind of knowledge which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen, without hesitation, multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first, either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely in virtue of the general property of proportionals. But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six. And this is much clearer because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second. End of part two, propositions thirty-six to forty, recording by Guero.