 Today, we are going to discuss about two important concepts in philosophy of mind that is reductionism and realizability thesis. So, today's lecture is titled as reduction and realization sur on irreducibility of consciousness. What is reduction and who advocates reductionism? For who are the people who adheres to reductionism? What is reductionism and who are the people who adhere to this particular thesis called reductionism? That is what we are going to see in the beginning and what is Searle's defense against an irreducible thesis, irreducible thesis of consciousness. Why consciousness is irreducible according to Searle? This is what we are going to discuss today, but when we talk about reductionism and when we try to examine Searle's thesis on reductionism, we must also keep in mind this concept of realization. How consciousness is being realized is an important aspect of Searle's hypothesis. So, that is what we are going to discuss and following this discussion on realization in the next lecture, I will be discussing about Keem's multiple realizability thesis. So, what I have in my mind is that reduction and realizations are two important concepts which are interrelated concepts and we need to delve into these two concepts seriously. Now, what is reduction? Searle in his paper, The Irredecibility of Consciousness, which figures in the rediscovery of mind published in 1992 and it is also in part of John Hill's edited book on philosophy of mind, a guide and anthology published in 2004. Now, in this paper, Searle argues that consciousness is irreducible, but whenever this term reduction is been used in the studies of consciousness, what we mean generally? We mean that x is defined as y. In other words, x is nothing but y. So, this is very fact that when we talk about consciousness, say consciousness is x, here consciousness is nothing but y. So, we need to define consciousness with the help of y, which is a separate entity altogether. This kind of analysis is very much there in physicalism. The physicalist theory of mind talk about consciousness in terms of some other entities. When they try to explain consciousness or define consciousness what exactly it is, then they try to show that consciousness is nothing but something else that is in fact, the neurobiological processes of the brain. So, the brain processes that is going on in our head is nothing but what we call or what we define as consciousness. So, consciousness which has been classically considered as an ontological reality is denied by the physicalist that it is nothing but this. Now, this kind of trained cell calls is a trained who is appears in the positivist philosophy of science. Now, you all know about the positivist notion of meaning advocated by a jaya, not a sleek and many other philosophers when they talk about the concept of meaning or something is meaningful say for example, the x as a term is meaningful. If it is meaningful if and only if it corresponds to a fact, if it does not correspond to fact then it is a meaningless term x becomes a meaningless term. So, in that particular context positivist have argued about how metaphysics is nonsensical. The metaphysical debates in philosophy has been considered as nonsensical debates because metaphysical concepts like self, like God etcetera are not representing any particular observable fact. Hence, they are epiphenomenal terms. They are the terms which have no existence, they are not considered you know something real. So, in that particular context if somebody tried to understand how positivist notion of mind developed following higher, following sleek and many others. So, the analytic philosophy today, the analytic philosophy of mind today particularly emphasizing analytic naturalism where reality is considered as something true if and only if it is observable. If and only if it exists and that can be verified and that can be known directly. So, this the kind of accessibility which positivist philosophers are arguing for is something very interesting in the sense that they talk about the notion of accessibility from the third person's perspective. Whereas, the Cartesian's thesis which propounds a kind of a metaphysical thesis of the mind shows that mind can be only accessible from a first person's perspective. So, here the experience is given more importance not the observable experiences, but the experience that I do, the experience in the sense of feeling what do I feel about myself as a human being. Now, this very feeling which is there in every individual's human beings case is something very interesting epistemic mode of analysis according to the metaphysical thesis. Now, we are going to see how physicalist talk about theory of reductionism. Traditionally, physicalism has taken the form of reductionism roughly that scientific terms can be given explicitly definition in physical terms of late. There has been growing awareness, however that reductionism is an unreasonably a strong claim. It is unreasonably strong claim because there has been tremendous reductionism in the form of reductionism. So, there has been tremendous development happening in the field of neuroscience, happening in the field of cognitive science and many other special sciences like a psychology, social theory, etcetera. Now, when these special sciences try to study the notion of mind from a third person's point of view, applying the scientific methodology and making a proper investigation to every aspects of brain functioning shows that there is a tremendous development in terms of the result, in terms of the scientific findings are coming out every day. So, this kind of approach has been very successful, but Sir Lee is saying that sometimes the scientific advancement, the growth in a scientific development does not negate, does not discard a kind of reality which we encounter in our everyday experience. So, hence consciousness is that kind of a reality which we will find something very significant, but this is something different where Sir Lee is not denying the very fact that consciousness cannot be explained scientifically. It is very much evident from this development of science, particularly the kind of investigations which is going on in the field of neurosciences, biological sciences in general, coming out of newer experiences, coming out with newer evidences and solving problems of everyday life and that amounts to make this suggestion, make this claim very strong in the case of the scientific study of human mind that consciousness can be explained scientifically. So, this claim supports, in a sense justifies reductionism, but Sir Lee is not accepting reductionism, Sir Lee only accepts that the scientific explanation of the mind is possible. We can come out with an explanation that how consciousness is being caused by brain processes, but would not deny this very fact that my subjective experience about me or about any object in the world is reducible to certain brain facts. That is why Helmand and Thompson in this particular essay, the metaphysics of reduction where signed Keem codes, Helmand and Thompson and tries to point out this that how reductionism day by day is going very strong. Now, what is the realizability thesis? The realizability thesis points out particularly quoting from Helmand and Thompson again says doubts are arising especially in connection with the functional explanation in the higher level sciences, psychology, linguistics, social theory, etcetera. Functional predicates may be physically realizable in heterogeneous ways, so as to elude physical definition. If we talk about the scientific development and if we talk about the concept of realization, how a mental state is being realized, there are multiple ways in which a particular mental state say for example, desire is realizable. Say for example, it can be realizable in multiple ways meaning thereby the neurobiological structure of a species is different from the neurobiological structure from some other spaces. So, human neurological structure and some other mammals neurological structure will differ. Now, since they differ, they will have two different or multiple ways of realizing the same desire. Say for example, the desire to quench thrust, if I am feeling thirsty, I have one way of realizing this desire and the mammals will have like say bit would have different way in which they realize their desire. So, because the neurological structure of different spaces vary. Now, since there is a variation in the structure, so the mode of realization would also differ. That is why the multiple realizability thesis which Zaghan Keem advocates in his paper, the multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction published in 1992 in philosophy and phenomenological research tries to show that there are different ways a species will realize the respective psychological states, but this multiple realizability thesis or the multiple realizable thesis which I call MR refutes the psychological reductionism. Now, Keem is an exponent of the psychological of multiple realizability thesis, but at the same time he does not talk about reductionism. He does not say that acts or say for example, the mind or say consciousness can be realized by brain processes. Consciousness though realized in the brain processes, but is not reducible to brain processes. So, Keem is a kind of a soft functionalist, Keem is a person who are talking about some kind of a psychophysical parallelism where the modern philosophers like Leibniz advocates that mind and body are to parallel and entities and their functions though differ, but still there is a kind of a pre-established harmony and it is that principle of pre-established harmony talk about how this two are correlated. There is a kind of a correlation between the mind on the one hand and the body on the other hand. Now, Keem interestingly is raising this issue in a very sophisticated way, in a very scientific way. He introduces this concept called the bottom of causality or bottom of causality or bottom of causal relationship and the top down causal relationship. Now according to Keem, brain processes are causing consciousness and or they are causing say mental states. Now, once this mental states are caused say for example, B 1, is causing M 1 then in what way M 1 is related to realm where B 1 exist. So, this kind of relationship figures out when we talk about the realization of M 1. If M 1 is a desired state then M 1 is realized in the brain processes. So, therefore there is a causal link that exists between M and B and this is particularly happening also in the case of Searle's hypothesis that I would talk about little later. So, Keem though interestingly talks about a kind of a horizontal movement between M 1 is one kind of a mental state which is related to M 2 and M 2 will be related to say B 2 and so whenever there is a succession of mental states that also talk about the change in the brain states. But primarily what is responsible for M 1 or M 2 are only the bottom level causal powers that is there or the bottom level changes that are happening in the brain processes and that is causing the change which are occurring in the level of mind or in the level of thoughts. So, Keem is will be talking about a kind of a horizontal causal link between say B n and M n. This is what it will go on, but it will have a kind of a link though the link is not scientifically found out still there is it is assumed that there is a link or it is in other way will consider this case that M 1, M 2, M 3 or M n are all epi mental states which are epiphenomena. So, that kind of argument will go in details will when we talk about the notion of realizability thesis what Keem is advocating. But for the time being let us keep in a mind that Keem is not in favor of reductionism. Keem talks about a kind of a parallel processes and hence he does not strongly advocate reductionism. But Searle on the other hand talks about an hypothesis and let us revisit this hypothesis consciousness is caused by brain processes and realized in brain processes. So, this mind brain relationship which is a kind of a parallel relationship in the Keem's thesis in the Keem's thesis Searle says if there are neurological states and this neurological states have a kind of a bottom of causality and that causality is in fact causing it is causing mind. And these mental states I have already discussed it earlier in my lectures and these mental states are further realized here with reference to the physical states. Now, a similar thesis in support of what you call parallelism or the realizability thesis which has a kind of a now which gives us an impression of parallelism is being pointed out by Anas Lipur and the lawyer. Now, and lawyer now what do they suggest? They suggest it is practically received wisdom among philosophers of mind that psychological properties are not identical in bracket including content properties are not identical to neuro physiological or other physical properties is that the later realizes the former that is the psychological properties they are not identical. M is not identical with B the mind is not identical with the brain because the psychological properties of the mind which are all mental properties are different from the neuro physiological properties. If the properties differ and we still argue this that psychological states are realizable and that psychological states are realizable with reference to the neurological states then or make this case that psychological states are realized in neurological functions that are happening in the brain if that case is made then what kind of reductionism follows that is what we need to look at the underlying hypothesis makes a case which is acceptable to all kind of a naturalist. I think that is the case for the notion of mind which is being caused by brain processes and some makes a case which is very clear in this figure that there are the reality is constituted and the constituents are having two different aspects at one level of this aspect we refer to certain micro level entities certain molecules that collectively constitute things. So, certain molecules which collectively constituting things let us call them they are all happening at the micro level there is also a level where we talk about safe size etcetera. Now, that what cell calls at the macro level reality. So, that aspect of reality is different from what is being constituted of. So, a reality is constituted of certain micro level elements and that is causing now look at this. So, this is the case figure if a b c are the molecules or the micro properties of a particular object. Now, these molecular movements or the configuration of the molecules cause a particular reality say x then we talk about that x and y are the molecules of the brain are causally linked particularly in this particular case in the case of emergent 2 which would be a thesis of Keem. Keem says the brain is causing mind in the sense that the mind is emerging from the brain processes. In other words mental states are emerging from certain molecular movements or the chemical movements that are happening in the brain now if that is a thesis and this thesis emphasizes that there is the emergent phenomena are causally linked with the micro level properties. If that is true then how cell differs from this kind of emergent thesis. Now, cell says it is certainly true that certain micro properties are causing consciousness, but once consciousness is caused then it is quoted out it is quoted out as an independent reality. Hence, there is there is a gap and cell calls it as an explanatory gap. So, for the epistemic analysis of these two realities are concerned there will be an epistemic gap and that gap is shown with reference to these two levels of functions. At a micro level we find that the solidity of the table is constituted of certain micro properties or molecules or the molecules movement, but at a macro level what I find is that the table is solid. So, solidity is different from how it has been caused I can experience the solidity of the table, but I do not really experience the movements if that is so then these two levels demand two different kinds of explanations which I have already talked about in my previous lectures. So, cell finds that there is an explanatory gap between these two levels. So, once consciousness is emerged as a kind of a reality and it is getting squirted out from the micro level phenomena and that reality constitutes its how constitutes a network of mental states or whatever you call it mind you call it the network which cell calls it and that network of mental state is nothing but the mind. Now, let us come back to this idea of reductionism. Now, the question is whether these caused mental states are reducible to the molecular states. So, far as the hypothesis is concerned cell of course says and adheres to this hypothesis thoroughly in his entire discourse on the concept of mind he claims again and again that consciousness and brain process are connected, but we at present are not sure of this fact that how they are connected at least we can say that the mental states is causally realizable. So, and he also emphasizes this fact that how mental states when they are realized they have a different kind of properties. So, hence he talks about mental positions and you know there are many people who are working in the field of theory of action accepts that there are mental positions where the mental positions are different from physical positions. So, the mind does cause action. So, for example, if I am feeling thirsty I just rush to get a glass of water or I request somebody to give me a glass of water. Now, this kind of expressions or the physical movements are the evidence of how a particular desired state is being realized. So, so if that is the case then let us find out why cell is not accepting reductionism and why does he again and again argue in the favor of an irreducibility thesis before taking up these two questions. Let me discuss what are the types of reductionism that cell talks about. In cell one finds that cell tries to explain different types of reduction or if there is something called a theory called reductionism then what are the kinds of reduction possible? One kind of reduction is ontological reduction, there could be property reduction, theoretical reduction, logical or definitional reduction and the causal reduction. Now, what kind of reductionism cell is opposing to? It is important to understand if we need to have a critical study of cells objection to reductionism. So, first is an ontological reduction. Ontological reduction argues that the object x type consists of objects nothing but the collection of object y type and cell says given an example of genes, genes consist of DNA molecules. Now, if gene is one type of phenomenon and DNA is another type of phenomenon then these two types of reality if somebody says no, gene is nothing but DNA. Once we talk about what is the DNA structure, what are the molecular structure of DNA then we can determine what is or what are the functions happening at a particular level called gene. So, this kind of thing analogy is a fitting analogy to talk about mind and brain. If somebody tries to suggest this particularly the functionalist would try to suggest us this that if you can determine what is happening in the neural structure then we can of course determine that what are functions happening at the mental level, how thoughts change. So, the change of mental states from desire to say belief to intention etcetera, etcetera all these mental states which are linked and constitute a kind of a network mental states, how they are connected and how one succeeds the other. So, that is possible if I taking the example of quenching the thrust, if I am feeling thirsty and I want a glass of water to quench my thrust, if I believe that yes I can go to the tip and get a glass of water or fetch a glass of water or if I request you would bring me a glass of water. So, I have this belief in me that if I request you you would at least go or if I go myself I can fetch a glass of water. So, I must believe. So, my desire is linked with my belief states and I intend to say or when I intend to make this suggestion to you then the desire is about to produce as a kind of a action state. So, in that case the change in the level of the mental could be possibly determined by the change that are happening at the neural states of the brain and once we have a clear science of mind or the science of brain we can have the clear science of mind. So, that is where we talk about or Searle tries to figure out what could be the case of ontological reductionism. Now, we all know that following this analysis that there are molecule properties, there are micro level properties and these properties constitute certain micro level features. So, if we go to this case of property dualism Searle has been accused of this case and Searle says that I am in accused again and again that I am a property dualist. It may be true but let us see what property reduction is all about. Now, when you talk about the take the case of the functionalist identity theory or the state identity theory which goes like this heat is nothing but the mean kinetic energy of molecule movements. If somebody tries to define what heat is all about then he would refer to this and would try to explain this state of heat in terms of this particular state. So, that is an identity theory whose functionalist also ideas too. So, properties corresponding to the theoretical terms will result a kind of theoretical reductionism. So, the property reductionism are also connected to theoretical reductionism in this sense that as I told you in the beginning that the functionalist particularly the physicalist in general who adhere to the scientific development and try to give the scientific explanation of the mind following certain theories or the model. They also say that one law can be explained in terms of another law say for example, the scientific term in the case of heat and the kinetic mean kinetic energy of molecular movements. It is a kind of a analogy where you find a particular term is being replaced but when you talk about explanation in science it is explanations are possible through laws and one particular law can be replaced by another laws. So, say for example the statistical laws of thermodynamics can explain very well that what is the glass gas law is all about. Now, once this kind of explanation happens Sall calls it a theoretical reductionism is happening because one theoretical law is trying to explain another theoretical law further he talks about logical reductionism while speaking about logical reductionism he says that a relation between words and sentences where words and sentences referring to one type of entity can be translated without any residue into those referring to another type of entity. Here is a case an example given with reference to number and set I can use this number 1 2 3 4 but this 1 2 3 4 if the figure in a in a set then you have a different meaning altogether. So, they they are no more 1 2 3 4 they they represent a kind of entity they are just symbolic to represent something. So, in a set number may appear but the number will have different meaning altogether. So, that is how is something very significant when you talk about logical reductionism but Sall is again and again trying to bring about this particular analogy between the surface structure and the lattice structure the macro level phenomenon and the micro level phenomenon. Now, these two are causally linked and if they are real then they are real because they are causally efficacious they can bring about change in the reality. So, so they have a causal power. So, the causal power of X can be explained by the causal power of Y. Now, if we go back to this thesis of Sall that Sall's notion of mental causation that my intention is causally self-sufficient to produce action or intention is a mental state it is a representational state my intention to pass this order or make this request to you is causally efficacious to bring about certain change in the world. Hence, any representational state are causally efficacious they have a causal power. So, at a macro level if mental facts are macro level facts if actions are macro level facts then this macro level facts if somebody tells that this macro level facts are nothing but the neural facts because the neural functions are causing these facts then Sall will have objection and here is the case of causal reduction which he opposes to causal power of X can be explained by the causal power of Y and Sall says no this cannot happen. Therefore, this idea of an explanatory gap because the way we try to understand the brain it is not the same way it is not to the same apparatus we need to understand the mind because the properties are different the physical chemical properties are different from the psychological properties the physical chemical properties are different from the mental properties or the psychological properties. I have told about it in my lecture we have discussed about it thoroughly how the mental properties constitute structure. So, that is about the structure of experience the structure of an representational states representational states will have different properties like subjectivity, intentionality, unity, familiarity all these are mental properties. So, Sall talks about a dozen of mental properties now if you look at that then that gives a kind of a shocking example because Sall says how we can explain the mind with the help of the brain processes I am shocked he says I am shocked because it seems so shocking a perfect science of brain would still not lead to an ontological reduction of consciousness in the way that our present science can reduce heat, solidity, color or sound. Now, heat, solidity, color and sound are micro level phenomena for Sall and all this phenomena will have a microstructure. So, the ontological science of brain reductionism is impossible and all the ontological reductionism is associated with causal reductionism Sall is only projecting to us that when we talk about reductionism all this are possible cases of reductionism and it is a shocking case that the perfect science tries to reduce the mental properties the properties which constitute an ontological reality called mind and they are reduced in terms of certain neuro physiological processes and that is what is very shocking reductionism is happening or argued favorably for two reason one is the success of science following the history of materialism and another the fear to commit dualism. Sall is not scared of committing to this two kind of you know danger or threat Sall says one can advocate irreducibility without committing this kind of grave mistakes if at all there are mistakes one is dualism the kind of dualism which we have seen in the case of Descartes or following Descartes many catechians have advocated dualism the moment you say that mind is irreducible you accept an ontological position you accept this ontological position that mind is real and ontologically real whether Sall is committing that kind of catechian dualism is a issue which can be separately discussed we can discuss this we can critique Sall's position little later but Sall is making it clear to us and this is very fundamental in Sall's claim that mind is a real and ontologically real or mental properties are significant they are epistemically significant they are epistemically significant in this sense that it is only through those properties we can explain mind now if somebody suggest that materialism is real or makes the case of the physical list thinking that there is nothing called mind we cannot demonstrate this fact that there is there are mental facts we cannot verify this case that there are experiences and feelings what we can observe is this that there are biological processes there are enzymes secretions in the body there are chemical processes happening in the brain all these are solid evidences to talk about how individuals behaviors are caused by certain bodily or psychophysical elements if there are psychological elements the psychological elements are causally dependent on the physical elements so physicalist strongly hold to their position their scientific theory and argue that irreducibility claim is nonsensical reductionism is not a problem for them reductionism is problem for those people who strongly believe that there is mind who strongly claim that if we nullify the concept then there are serious theoretical dangers there are serious mistakes and problematic situations which we will jump into without making a significant analysis and Searle belongs to that school of the philosophy of mind where he strongly claims that mind is irreducible to the function of the brain processes so we will discuss in detail in the next class how Searle argues out his thesis and why he is not convinced about the reductionist approach of the mind.