 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer. The Anti-Federalist Papers. Section 1. Sentinel, Letter 1. October 5, 1787. To the Freeman of Pennsylvania. Friends, countrymen, and fellow citizens. Permit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain liberties and privileges secured to you by the Constitution of this Commonwealth. And to beg your serious attention to his uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government submitted to your consideration. Before you surrender these great and valuable privileges up forever. Your present frame of government secures to you a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure. And therefore warrants granted without o's or affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search your houses or seize your persons or property, not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be granted. Your constitution further provides, quote, that in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury which ought to be held sacred, unquote. It also provides and declares, quote, that the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing in publishing their sentiments. Therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained, unquote. The Constitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as you yet have the right to freedom of speech and of publishing your sentiments. How long those rights will appertain to you, you yourselves are called upon to say, whether your houses shall continue to be your castles, whether your papers, your persons, and your property are to be held sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine. Whether the trial by jury is to continue as your birthright, the freemen of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to declare. Without presuming upon my own judgment, I cannot think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my private opinion, and call upon others for theirs, and if I use my pen with the boldness of a freeman, it is because I know that the liberty of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges. The late convention have submitted to your consideration a plan of a new federal government. The subject is highly interesting to your future welfare, whether it be calculated to promote the great ends of civil society, vedela said, the happiness and prosperity of the community. It behoves you well to consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of that frenzy of enthusiasm that has actuated the citizens of Philadelphia in their approbation of the proposed plan, before it was possible that it could be the result of a rational investigation into its principles, it ought to be dispassionately and deliberately examined, and its own intrinsic merit the only criterion of your patronage. If ever free and unbiased discussion was proper or necessary, it is on such an occasion. All the blessings of liberty and the dearest privileges of freemen are now at stake independent on your present conduct. Those who are competent to the task of developing the principles of government ought to be encouraged to come forward, and thereby the better enable the people to make a proper judgment. For the science of government is so obstruous that few are able to judge for themselves. Without such assistance the people are too apt to yield an implicit ascent to the opinions of those characters whose abilities are held in the highest esteem, and to those in whose integrity and patriotism they can confide. Not considering that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents, abilities, and superior requirements, and that the men of the greatest purity of intention may be made instruments of despotism in the hands of the artful and designing. If it were not for the stability and attachment which time and habit gives to forms of government, it would be in the power of the enlightened and aspiring few, if they should combine, at any time to destroy the best establishments, and even make the people the instruments of their own subjugation. The late revolution, having effaced in a great measure, all former habits, and the present institutions are so recent, that there exists not that great reluctance to innovation, so remarkable in old communities, and which accords with reason. For the most comprehensive mind cannot see the full operation of material changes on civil polity. It is the genius of the common law to resist innovation. The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, have availed themselves very successfully of this favorable disposition, for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments have been prepared to exceed to any extreme of government. All the distresses and difficulties they experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system of government, and in the other event immediately ruin an annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter themselves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in whom America has the highest confidence, and now triumphantly exalt in the completion of their long meditated schemes of power and aggrandizement. I would be very far from insinuating that the two illustrious personages alluded to have not the welfare of the country at heart, but that the unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one has been imposed upon, in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, from his other arduous engagements, and that the weakness and indecision attendant on old age has been practiced on in the other. I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated in Mr. Adams's treatise, and enforced in the numerous essays and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well-designing members of the late convention, but it will appear in the sequel that the construction of the proposed plan of government is infinitely more extravagant. I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the futility and counteract the baneful tendency of such principles. Mr. Adams's sine qua non of a good government is three balancing powers, whose repelling qualities are to produce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the administrators of every government will ever be actuated by views of private interest and ambition to the prejudice of the public good, that therefore the only effectual method to secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare is to create an opposition of interests between the members of two distinct bodies in the exercise of the powers of government and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding weight in the community to enable them respectively to exercise their several parts, and whose views and interests should be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has traced the constitution of every form of government that has ever existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able to induce a single instance of such a government. He indeed says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical, and not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of power were practicable, how long would it continue, not a day, for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom, and industry of mankind that the scale would presently preponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession of power the means of further increase would be greatly extended. The state of society in England is much more favorable to such a scheme of government than that of America. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, and real distinctions of rank and interests. But even there, for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction of interests in the three orders of government, they exist but in name. The only operative and efficient check upon the conduct of administration is the sense of the people at large. Suppose a government could be framed and supported on such principles. Would it answer the great purposes of civil society? If the administrators of every government are actuated by views of private interests and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests? Therefore, as different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole, we must recur to other principles. I believe it will be found that the form of government, which holds those entrusted with power in the greatest responsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for freemen. A republican or free government can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided. In such a government the people are the sovereign, and their sense or opinion is the criterion of every public measure. For, when this ceases to be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an aristocracy, monarchy, or despotism will rise on its ruin. The highest responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure of government, for the great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for want of due information are liable to be imposed upon. If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct. Some will impute it to the Senate, others to the House of Representatives, and so on, that the interposition of the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abortive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you vest all the legislative power and one body of men, separating the executive and judicial, elected for a short period, and necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and guarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsibility, for then, whenever the people feel aggrievance, they cannot mistake the authors, and will apply the remedy with certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. This tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers apprehended from a single legislature, and will the best secure the rights of the people. Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the examination of the proposed plan of government, and I trust, shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has none of the essential requisites of a free government, that it is neither founded on those balancing restraining powers recommended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British Constitution, or possessed of that responsibility to its constituents, which, in my opinion, is the only effectual security for the liberties and happiness of the people. But, on the contrary, that it is a most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among free men that the world has ever witnessed. I shall previously consider the extent to the powers intended to be vested in Congress, before I examine the construction of the general government. It will not be contraverted that the legislative is the highest delegated power in government, and that all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it as a maxim that legislation necessarily follows the power of taxation. By Section 8 of the first article of the proposed plan of government, the Congress are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniformed throughout the United States. Now, what can be more comprehensive than these words, not content by other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive powers of a confederation and a standing army in time of peace, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the absolute control over the commerce of the United States and all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts upon imports, etc., they are to be vested with every species of internal taxation. Whatever taxes, duties, and excises that they may deem requisite for the general welfare may be imposed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of Congress, distributed through every district in America, and the collection would be enforced by the standing army, however grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes to be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every object of revenue. The judicial power by first section of Article 3, quote, shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority, to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, to all cases of admirality and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies between two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects, unquote. The judicial power to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time order and establish. The objects of jurisdiction recited above are so numerous, and the shades of distinction between civil causes are often times so slight, that it is more than probable that the state judicatories would be wholly superseded, for in contests about jurisdiction the Federal Court, as the most powerful, would ever prevail. Every person acquainted with the history of the courts in England knows by what ingenious sophisms they have, at different periods, extended the sphere of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their institution, and contrary to their very nature, courts of a criminal jurisdiction obtaining cognizance in civil causes. To put the omnipotency of Congress over the state government and judicatories out of all doubt, the sixth article ordains that, quote, this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of the state to the contrary notwithstanding, unquote. By these sections the all-prevailing power of taxation, and such extensive legislative and judicial powers, are vested in the general government, as must in their operation necessarily absorb the state legislatures and judicatories, and that such was in the contemplation of the framers of it will appear from the provision made for such event in another part of it, but that fearful of alarming the people by so great an innovation they have suffered the forms of the separate governments to remain, as a blind. By section fourth of the first article, quote, the times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choosing senators, unquote. The plain construction of which is that when the state legislatures drop out of sight from the necessary operation of this government, then Congress are to provide for the election and appointment of representatives and senators. If the foregoing be a just comment, if the United States are to be melted down into one empire, it becomes you to consider whether such a government, however constructed, would be eligible and so extended a territory and whether it would be practicable, consistent with freedom. It is the opinion of the greatest writers that a very extensive country cannot be governed on democratic principles or on any other plan than a confederation of a number of small republics possessing all the powers of internal government but united in the management of their foreign and general concerns. It would not be difficult to prove that anything short of despotism could not bind so great a country under one government and that whatever plan you might at the first setting out establish it would issue in a despotism. If one general government could be instituted and maintained on principles of freedom, it would not be so competent to attend to the various local concerns and wants of every particular district as well as the peculiar governments who are nearer the scene and possessed of superior means of information. Besides, if the business of the whole union is to be managed by one government, there would not be time. Do we not already see that the inhabitants in a number of larger states, who are remote from the seat of government, are loudly complaining of the inconveniences and disadvantages they are subjected to on this account and that to enjoy the comforts of local government they are separating into smaller divisions. Having taken a review of the powers, I shall now examine the construction of the proposed general government. Article 1, Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. By another section, the President, the Principal Executive Officer, has a conditional control over their proceedings. Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants. The Senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, is formed by the legislature of each state appointing two senators for the term of six years. The executive power by Article 2, Section 1, is to be vested in a President of the United States of America, elected for four years. Section 2 gives him, quote, power by and with the consent of the Senate to make treaties provided two-thirds of the senators present concur. And he shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law, unquote, etc. And by another section he has the absolute power of granting reprieves and pardons for treason and all other high crimes and misdemeanors, except in case of impeachment. The foregoing are the outlines of the plan. Thus we see the House of Representatives are on the part of the people to balance the Senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well-born, etc. The number of the representatives, being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants, appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information of the once local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence in the exercise of such great powers. The term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their constituents, in the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained, for as Congress have the control over both, they may govern the choice by ordering the representatives of a whole state to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most inconvenient. The Senate, the great deficient body in this plan of government, is constituted on the most unequal principles. The smallest state in the Union has equal weight with the great states of Virginia, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania. The Senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considerable share in the executive. None of the principal appointments to office can be made without its advice and consent. The term and mode of its appointment will lead to permanency. The members are chosen for six years. The mode is under the control of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by rotation, they may be continued for life, which, from their extensive means of influence, would follow, of course. The President, who would be a mere pageant of state, unless he coincides with the views of the Senate, would either become the head of the aristocratic junta in that body, or its minion, besides their influence being the most predominant, could the best secure his reelection to office, and from his power of granting pardons he might screen from punishment the most reasonable attempts on liberties of the people, when instigated by the Senate. From this investigation and to the organization of this government, it appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or accountability to the great body of the people, and that, so far from being a regular balanced government, it would be, in practice, a permanent aristocracy. The framers of it, actuated by the true spirit of such a government, which ever abominates and suppresses all free inquiry and discussion, have made no provision for the liberty of the press, that grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants, but observed a total silence on that head. It is the opinion of some great writers, that if the liberty of the press, by an institution of religion or otherwise, could be rendered sacred, even in Turkey, that despotism would fly before it. And it is worthy of remark, that there is no declaration of personal rights, premised in most free constitutions, and that trial by jury in civil cases is taken away, for what other construction can be put on the following, the Della said, Article M, Section 2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases above mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact. It would be a novelty in jurisprudence, as well as evidently improper to allow an appeal from the verdict of a jury, on the matter of fact. Therefore it implies and allows of a dismission of the jury in civil cases, and especially when it is considered, that jury trial in criminal cases is expressly stipulated for, but not in civil cases. But our situation is represented to be so critically dreadful, that, however reprehensible and exceptionable, the proposed plan of government may be, there is no alternative between the adoption of it and absolute ruin. My fellow citizens, things are not at that crisis. It is the argument of tyrants. The present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on that quarter, and as to domestic dissensions, we have not so much to fear from them, as to precipitate us into this form of government, without it as a safe and proper one. For remember, of all possible evils, that of despotism is the worst and the most to be dreaded. Besides, it cannot be supposed that the first essay on so difficult a subject is so well digested as it ought to be. If the proposed plan, after a mature deliberation, should meet the approbation of the respective states, the matter will end. But, if it should be found to be fraught with dangers and inconveniences, a future general convention, being in possession of the objections, will be the better enabled to plan a suitable government. Who's here so base, that what a bondsman be? If any, speak, for him have I offended. Who's here so vile, that will not love his country? If any, speak, for him have I offended. Julius Caesar Act 3, Scene 2 Sentinel End of Section 1 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Leon Meyer The Anti-Federalist Papers, Section 2 Sentinel, Letter 11 Independent Gazetteer January 16th, 1788 To the Freeman of Pennsylvania Friends, Countrymen, and fellow citizens The evils of anarchy have been portrayed with all the imagery of language in the growing colors of eloquence. The affrighted mind has then led to clasp the new constitution as the instrument of deliverance, as the only avenue to safety and happiness. To avoid the possible and transitory evils of one extreme, it is seduced into the certain and permanent misery necessarily attendant on the other. A state of anarchy from its very nature can never be of long continuance. The greater its violence, the shorter the duration. Order and security are immediately sought by the distracted people beneath the shelter of equal laws and the salutary restraints of regular government. And if this be not attainable, absolute power is assumed by the one or a few who shall be the most enterprising and successful. If anarchy, therefore, were the inevitable consequence of rejecting the new constitution, it would be infinitely better to incur it, for even then there would be at least the chance of a good government rising out of licentiousness. But to rush at once into despotism, because there is a bare possibility of anarchy ensuing from the rejection, or from what is yet more visionary, the small delay that would be occasioned by a revision and correction of the proposed system of government is so superlatively weak, so fatally blind, that it is astonishing any person of common understanding should suffer such an imposition to have the least influence on his judgment. Still more astonishing that so flimsy and deceptive a doctrine should make converts among the enlightened freemen of America, who have so long enjoyed the blessings of liberty. But when I view among such converts men otherwise preeminent, it raises a blush for the weakness of humanity that these, her brightest ornaments, should be so dim-sided to what is self-evident to most men, that such imbecility of judgment should appear where so much perfection was looked for. This ought to teach us to depend more on our own judgment in the nature of the case than upon the opinions of the greatest and best of men, who from constitutional infirmities or particular situations may sometimes view an object through a delusive medium. But the opinions of great men are, more frequently, the dictates of ambition or private interest. The source of the apprehensions of this so much dreaded anarchy would, upon investigation, be found to arise from the artful suggestions of designing men and not from irrational probability grounded on the actual state of affairs. The least reflection is sufficient to detect the fallacy to show that there is no one circumstance to justify the prediction of such an event. On the contrary, a short time will events, to the utter dismay and confusion of the conspirators, that a perseverance in cramming down their scheme of power upon the free men of this state will inevitably produce an anarchy destructive of their darling domination, and may kindle a flame prejudicial to their safety. They should be cautious not to trespass too far on the forbearance of free men when resting their dearest concerns, but prudently retreat from the gathering storm. The other specter that has been raised to terrify and alarm the people out of the exercise of their judgment on this great occasion is the dread of our splitting into several confederacies or republics that might become rival powers and consequently liable to mutual wars from the usual motives of contention. This is an event still more improbable than the foregoing. It is a presumption unwarranted, either by the situation of affairs or the sentiments of the people. No disposition leading to it exists. The advocates of the new constitution seem to view such a separation with horror, and its opponents are strenuously contending for a confederation that shall embrace all America under its comprehensive and salutary protection. This hobgoblin appears to have sprung from the deranged brain of Publius, a New York writer who, mistaking sound for argument, has with herculean labor accumulated myriads of unmeaning sentences and mechanically endeavored to force conviction by a torrent of misplaced words. He might have spared his readers the fatigue of wading through his long-winded disquisitions on the direful effects of the contentions of inimical states as totally inapplicable to the subject he was professedly treating. This writer has devoted much time and wasted more paper in combating chimeras of his own creation. However, for the sake of argument, I will admit that the necessary consequence of rejecting or delaying the establishment of the new constitution would be the dissolution of the Union and the institution of even rival and inimical republics. Yet ought such an apprehension, if well founded, to drive us into the fangs of despotism? Infinitely preferable would be occasional wars to such an event. The former, although a severe scourge, is transient in its continuance and in its operation partial, but a small proportion of the community are exposed to its greatest horrors, and yet fewer experience its greatest evils. The latter is permanent and universal misery without remission or exemption. As passing clouds obscure for a time the splendor of the sun, so do wars interrupt the welfare of mankind, but despotism is a settled gloom that totally extinguishes happiness. Not a ray of comfort can penetrate to cheer the dejected mind. The goad of power with unabating rigor insists upon the utmost exaction. Like a merciless taskmaster it is continually inflicting the lash and is never satiated with the feast of unfeeling domination or the most abject servility. The celebrated Lord Keynes, whose disquisitions of human nature evidence extraordinary strength of judgment and depth of investigation, says that a continual civil war, which is the most destructive and horrible scene of human discord, is preferable to the uniformity of wretchedness and misery attended upon despotism. Of all possible evils, as I observed in my first number, this is the worst and the most to be dreaded. I congratulate my fellow citizens that a good government, the greatest earthly blessing, may be so easily obtained, that our circumstances are so favorable that nothing but the folly of the conspirators can produce anarchy or civil war, which would presently terminate in their destruction and the permanent harmony of the state, alone interrupted by their ambitious machinations. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Papers Dear Sir, My letters to you last winter on the subject of a well-balanced national government for the United States were the result of free inquiry when I passed from that subject to inquiries relative to our commerce, revenues, past administration, etc. I anticipated the anxieties I feel on carefully examining the plan of government proposed by the convention. It appears to be a plan retaining some federal features, but to be the first important step and to aim strongly to one consolidated government of the United States. It leaves the powers of government and the representation of the people so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments that the operations of our system must be very uncertain. My uniform federal attachments and the interest I have in the protection of property and a steady execution of the laws will convince you that, if I am under any bias at all, it is in favor of any general system which shall promise those advantages. The instability of our laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government, but then I can consent to no government which, in my opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community. My object has been to join with those who have endeavored to supply the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper administration of them. Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent debtors, embarrassed men on the one hand and men on the other unfriendly to Republican equality would produce an uneasiness among the people and prepare the way, if not for cool and deliberate reforms in the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interest of particular orders of men. Equate me, sir, of any agency in the formation of the new system. I shall be satisfied with seeing if it shall be adopted, a prudent administration. Indeed, I am so much convinced of the truth of Pope's maxim that, that which is best administered is best, that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from experience. I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. I know our situation is critical, and it behooves us all to make the best of it. A federal government of some sort is necessary. We have suffered the present to languish, and whether the confederation was capable or not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but of little importance. I will pass by the men and states who have been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change and, perhaps, for governments not very favorable to the people at large. A constitution is now presented which we may reject or which we may accept, with or without amendments, and to which point we ought to direct our exertions is the question. To determine this question with propriety, we must attentively examine the system itself and the probable consequences of either step. This I shall endeavor to do so far as I am able with candor and fairness, and leave you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the conduct of others on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily and positively to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed. I shall be open to conviction and always disposed to adopt that which all things considered shall appear to me to be the most for the happiness of the community. It must be granted that if men hastily and blindly adopt a system of government, they will as hastily and blindly be led to alter or abolish it. And changes must ensue one after another till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary with changes, tumults, and disorders, and be disposed to accept any government, however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness. The first principle question that occurs is whether considering our situation we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed constitution. If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate danger of any commotions. We are in a state of perfect peace and in no danger of invasions. The state governments are in the full exercise of their powers and our governments answer all present extinguishes, except the regulation of trade, securing credit in some cases, and providing for the interest in some cases of the public debts. And whether we adopt a change three or nine months hence can make but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals. Their happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own exertions. We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war. The farmers, fishmen, and etc. have not yet fully repaired the waste made by it. Industry and frugality are again assuming their proper station. Private debts are lessened and public debts incurred by the war have been by various ways diminished, and the public lands have now become a productive source for diminishing them much more. I know uneasy men who wish very much to precipitate do not admit all these facts, but they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in the affairs of this country. It must, however, be admitted that our federal system is defective and that some of the state governments are not well administered. But then we impute to the defects in our governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on the present occasion as on all similar ones. They will urge a thousand pretenses to answer their purposes on both sides. When we want a man to change his condition we describe it as miserable, wretched, and despised, and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume. And when we wish the contrary we reverse our description. Whenever a clamor is raised and idle men get to work it is highly necessary to examine facts carefully and without unreasonably suspecting men of falsehood to examine and inquire attentively under what impressions they act. It is too often the case in political concerns that men state facts not as they are but as they wish them to be, and almost every man by calling to mind past scenes will find this to be true. Nothing but the passions of ambitions in patient or disorderly men I conceive will plunge us into commotions if time should be taken fully to examine and consider the system proposed. Men who feel easy in their circumstances and such as are not sanguine in their expectations relative to the consequences of the proposed change will remain quiet under the existing governments. Many commercial and moneyed men who are not uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected and, by no means, unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes. But as to those who expect employments under the new constitution, as to those weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another, they are very little to be regarded. And as to those who designedly avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised. It is natural for men who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure to tell us, now is the crisis, now is the critical moment which must be seized or all will be lost. And to shut the door against free inquiry whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it which time and investigation will probably discover. This has been the custom of tyrants and their dependents in all ages. If it is true, that which has been so often said that the people of this country cannot change their condition for the worse, I presume it still behooves them to endeavor deliberately to change it for the better. The fickle and ardent in any community are the proper tools for establishing despotic government. But it is deliberate in thinking men who must establish and secure governments on free principles. Before they decide on the plan proposed, they will inquire whether it will probably be a blessing or a curse to this people. The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object has been all along to reform our federal system and to strengthen our governments, to establish peace, order and justice in the community. But a new object now presents. The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our conditions as a people. Instead of being 13 republics under a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government. Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you in my following letters on this subject. This consolidation of the states has been the object of several men in this country for some time past. Whether such a change can ever be affected in any manner, whether it can be affected without convulsions and civil wars, whether such a change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country, time only can determine. To have a just idea of the government before us and to show that a consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only to examine the plan but also its history and the politics of its particular friends. The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals and of the respective states and the framers of it to guard against usurpation so limited and checked the powers that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the ex-inductions of the union. We find, therefore, members of Congress urging alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It was early proposed to vest Congress with powers to levy and impose, to regulate trade, etc., but such was known to be the caution of the states imparting with power that the vestment, even of these, was proposed to be under several checks and limitations. During the war the general confusion, the introduction of paper money, infused in the minds of people, vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too much from the return to peace and, of course, we have been disappointed. Our governments have been new and unsettled and several legislatures by making tender, suspension and paper money laws have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes several orders of men in the community have been prepared by degrees for a change of government and this very abuse of power in the legislatures which, in some cases, has been charged upon the democratic part of the community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons and those very means with which, in great measure, they are rapidly affecting their favorite object. And should an oppressive government be the consequence of the proposed change, posterity may reproach not only a few overbearing unprincipled men, but those parties in the states would have misused their powers. The conduct of several legislatures touching paper money and tender laws has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which otherwise they would not have thought of. When by the evils on the one hand and by the secret instigations of artful men on the other, the minds of men were becoming sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken, which is usually followed by a revolution or a civil war. A general convention for more commercial purposes was moved for. The authors of this measure saw that the people's attention was turned solely to the amendment of the federal system and that, had the idea of total change been started, probably no state would have appointed members to the convention. The idea of destroying ultimately the state government and forming one consolidated system could not have been admitted. A convention therefore merely for vesting in Congress power to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to the commercial towns and the landed people had little or no concern about it. September 1786 a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May 1787 for the purpose generally of amending the confederation. This was done before the delegates of Massachusetts and of the other states arrived. Still not a word was said about destroying the old constitution and making a new one. The states still unsuspecting and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon appointed members to the new convention for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the confederation and probably not one man in 10,000 in the United States till within these 10 or 12 days had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed and he put to the alternative of embarking in the new ship presented or of being left in danger of sinking the states. The states I believe universally suppose the convention would report alterations to the confederation which would pass an examination in Congress and after being agreed to there would be confirmed by all the legislatures or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable appointment and placed at the head of it the first man in America. In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical. Here the favorite moment for changing the government was evidently discerned by a few men who seized it with address. Ten other states appointed and though they chose men principally connected with commerce and the judiciary department yet they appointed many good Republican characters. Had they all attended we should now see I am persuaded a better system presented. The nonattendance of eight or nine men who were appointed members of the convention I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States. Had they attended I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not have had that strong tendency to aristocracy to be discernible in every part of the plan. There would not have been so great an accumulation of powers especially as to the internal police of the country in a few hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them. The young visionary men and the consolidating aristocracy would have been more restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention and after four months close attention presented the new constitution to be adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of the community may be prepared to receive any form of government but I presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution presented for their adoption. A candid and thorough examination and silence those designing or empty men who weekly and rashly attempt to precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance. We shall view the convention with proper respect and at the same time that we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it we must recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community were represented. Perhaps the judicious friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree that it is best to let it rest solely on its own merits or be condemned for its own defects. In the first place I so premised that the plan proposed is a plan of accommodation and that is in this way only and by giving up a part of our opinions that we can ever expect to obtain a government founded in freedom and compact. This circumstance candid men will always keep in view in the discussion of this subject. The plan proposed appears to be partly federal but principally however calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government. The first interesting question therefore suggested is how far the states can be consolidated into one entire government on free principles. In considering this question extensive objects are to be taken in view and important changes in the forms of government to be carefully attended to in all their consequences. The happiness of the people at large must be the great object with every honest statesman and he will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated as a people and not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages under one government the consolidation of the states cannot be admitted. There are three different forms of government under which the United States may exist as one nation and now is perhaps the time to determine to which we will direct our views. One distinct republics connected under a federal head. In this case the respective state governments must be the principal guardians of the people's rights and exclusively regulate their internal police and then must rest the balance of government. The Congress of the states or federal head must consist of delegates amenable to and removable by the respective states. This Congress must have general directing powers powers to require men and moneys of the states to make treaties peace and war to direct the operations of armies etc. Under this federal modification of government the powers of Congress would be rather advisory or recommendatory than coercive. Two we may do away the several state governments and form or consolidate all the states into one entire government with one executive one judiciary and one legislature consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts of the union. In this case there would be a complete consolidation of the states. Three we may consolidate the states as to certain national objects and leave them separately distinct independent republics as to internal police generally. Let the general government consist of an executive a judiciary and balanced legislature and its powers extend exclusively to all foreign concerns causes arising on the seas to commerce imports armies navies Indian affairs peace and war and do a few internal concerns of the community. To the coin post offices weights and measures a general plan for the militia to naturalization and perhaps to bankruptcies leaving the internal police of the community in other respects exclusively to the state governments as the administration of justice in all causes arising internally the laying and collecting of internal taxes and the forming of the militia according to a general plan prescribed. In this case there would be a complete consolidation quads certain objects only touching the first or federal plan I do not think much can be said in its favor the sovereignty of the nation without coercive and efficient powers to collect the strength of it cannot always be dependent on to answer the purposes of government and in a congress of representatives of sovereign states there must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands. As to the second or complete consolidating plan it deserves to be carefully considered at this time by every American. If it be impracticable it is a fatal error to model our governments directing our views ultimately to it. The third plan or parcel consolidation is in my opinion the only one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people. I once had some general ideas that the second plan was practicable but from long attention and the proceedings of the convention I am fully satisfied that this third plan is the only one we can with safety and propriety proceed upon. Making this the standard to point out with candor and fairness the parts of the new constitution which appear to be improper is my object. The convention appears to have proposed the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all powers ultimately in the United States into one entire government and from its views in this respect and from the tenacity of the small states to have an equal vote in the senate probably originated the greatest defects in the proposed plan. Independent of the opinions of many great authors that a free elective government cannot be extended over large territories a few reflections must evince that one government and general legislation alone can never extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States. Different laws, customs and opinions exist in the different states which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United States contain about a million of square miles and in half a century will probably contain ten millions of people and from the center to the extremes is about 800 miles. Before we do away the state governments or adopt measures that will tend to abolish them and to consolidate the states into one entire government several principles should be considered and facts ascertained. These and my examination into the essential parts of the proposed plan I shall pursue in my next. Yours and etc. the federal farmer. End of Anti-Federalist Papers Section 3. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. The Anti-Federalist Papers. Anti-Federalist Paper Number 4. Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican Number 2. October 9th, 1787. Dear Sir. The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and equal representation of the people in the legislature and the jury trial of the Vincent Edge in the administration of justice. A full and equal representation is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions and views the people themselves would where they all assembled. A fair representation therefore should be so regulated that every order of men in the community according to the common course of elections can have a share in it. In order to allow professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc. to bring a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous. We have about 200 state senators in the United States and a less member than that of federal representatives cannot clearly be a full representation of this people. In the affairs of internal taxation and police where there but one legislature for the whole union. The representation cannot be equal or the situation of the people proper for one government only if the extreme parts of the society cannot be represented as fully as the central. It is apparently impracticable that this should be the case in this extensive country. It would be impossible to collective representation of the parts of the country, five, six and seven hundred miles from the seat of government. Under one general government alone there could be but one judiciary, one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts. I think it would be totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due administration of justice and the real benefits of the jury trial of the Vincent Edge. There are now supreme courts in each state in the union and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to each supreme court. Most of these supreme and inferior courts are itinerant and hold their sessions in different parts every year of their respective states, counties and districts. With all these moving courts our citizens from the vast extent of the country must travel very considerable distances from home to find the place where justice is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals as to afford them any temptation to engage in lawsuits, though I think it one of the greatest benefits in a good government that each citizen should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance, perhaps within a day's travel of his home. So that without great inconveniences and enormous expense he may have the advantage of his witnesses and jury. It would be impracticable to derive these advantages from one judiciary, the one supreme court at most could only set in the center of the union and move once a year into the center of the eastern and southern extremes of it. And in this case each citizen on an average would travel 150 or 200 miles to find this court. That however inferior courts might be properly placed in the different counties and districts of the union the appellate jurisdiction would be intolerable and expensive. If it were possible to consolidate the states and preserve the features of a free government still it is evident that the middle states the parts of the union about the seat of the government would enjoy great advantages while the remote states would experience the many inconveniences of remote provinces. Wealth offices and the benefits of government would collect in the center and the extreme states and their principal towns become much less important. There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea of one consolidated whole on free principles is ill founded. The laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people and operate gently and never can extend their influence very far if they are executed on free principles about the center where the benefits of the government induce the people to support it voluntarily. Yet they must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the extremes. This has been the case with every extensive republic of which we have any accurate account. There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights which informing the social compact ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed. A free and enlightened people informing this compact will not resign all their rights to those who govern and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers which would soon be plainly seen by those who are governed as well as by those who govern and the latter will know they cannot be passed unperceived by the former and without giving a general alarm. These rights should be made the basis of every constitution and if a people be so situated or have such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing them it is a very strong argument against their attempting to form one entire society to live under one system of laws only. I confess I never thought the people of these states differed essentially in these respects. They, having derived all these rights from one common source, the British systems, and having in the formation of their state constitutions discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are very similar. However it is now said that the states differ so essentially in these respects and even in the important article of the trial by jury that when assembled in convention they can agree to no words by which to establish that trial or by which to ascertain and establish many other of these rights as fundamental articles in the social compact. If so we proceed to consolidate the states on no solid basis whatever, but I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming the new constitution on a better bill of rights. I still believe a complete federal bill of rights to be very practicable. Nevertheless I acknowledge the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many new and strong reasons against a complete consolidation of the states. They tend to convince me that it cannot be carried with propriety very far, that the convention have gone much farther in one respect than they found it practicable to go in another. That is, they propose to lodge in this general government very extensive powers, powers nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited over the person the sword. But in its organization they furnish the strongest proof that the proper limbs or parts of a government to support and execute those powers on proper principles or in which they can be safely lodged cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere in every society, but then they should be lodged where the strength and guardians of the people are collected. They can be wielded or safely used in a free country only by an able executive and judiciary, a respectable senate and a secure, full and equal representation of the people. I think the principles I have premised or brought into view are well founded. I think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner. It is in connection with these and other solid principles we are to examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases or a few well formed features that will prove its merits or a few small omissions that will produce its rejection among men of sense. They will inquire what are the essential powers in a community and what are nominal ones, where and how the essential powers shall be lodged to secure government and to secure true liberty. In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial representation of the people. The state governments will exist with all their governors, senators, representatives, officers, and expenses. In these will be 1920ths of the representatives of the people. They will have a near connection and their members and immediate intercourse with the people. And the probability is that the state governments will possess the confidence of the people and be considered, generally, as their immediate guardians. The general government will consist of a new species of executive, a small senate, and a very small house of representatives. As many citizens will be more than 300 miles from the seat of this government, as will be nearer to it, its judges and officers cannot be very numerous without making our governments very expensive. Thus will stand the state and the general governments, should the constitution be adopted without any alterations in their organization. But as to powers, the general government will possess all essential ones, at least on paper, and those of the states a mere shadow of power. And therefore, unless the people shall make some great exertions to restore to the state governments their powers and manners of internal police, as the powers to lay and collect exclusively internal taxes, to govern the militia, and to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts upon their own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long, but the state governments must be annihilated or continue to exist for no purpose. It is, however, to be observed that many of the essential powers given the national government are not exclusively given, and the general government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those which may still be exercised by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impropriety of giving powers the exercise of which prudent men will not attempt and the imprudent men will, or probably can, exercise only in a manner destructive of free government. The general government, organized as it is, may be adequate to many valuable objects and be able to carry its laws into execution on proper principles in several cases. But I think its honest friends will not contend that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it into effect without calling to its aid a military force which must very soon destroy all elective governments in the country, produce anarchy, or establish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system, we may, allowing things to have their common course, have a very tolerable one. The powers lodged in the general government, if exercised by it, must intimately affect the internal police of the states, as well as external concerns, and there is no reason to expect the numerous state governments and their connections will be very friendly to the execution of federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto have been under their own immediate management. There is more reason to believe that the general government, far removed from the people, and none of its members elected oftener than once in two years, will be forgot or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded, unless a multitude of officers and military force be continually kept in view and employed to enforce the execution of the laws and to make the government feared and respected. No position can be truer than this, that in this country either neglected laws or a military execution of them must lead to a revolution and to the destruction of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion, and a military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same point, despotic government. Yours, and etc., signed the Federal Farmer. End of Anti-Federalist Papers, Section 4 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Anti-Federalist Papers Anti-Federalist Number 5 Federal Farmer Letter Number 3 Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican October 10th, 1787 Dear sir, the great object of a free people must be so to form their government and laws and so to administer them as to create a confidence in and respect for the laws, and thereby induce the sensible and virtuous part of the community to declare in favor of the laws and to support them without an expensive military force. I wish, though I confess I have not much hope, that this may be the case with the laws of Congress under the new constitution. I am fully convinced that we must organize the national government on different principles and make the parts of it more efficient and secure in it more effectively the different interests in the community, or else leave in the state government some powers proposed to be lodged in it, at least till such an organization shall be found to be practicable. Not sanguine in my expectations of a good federal administration, and satisfied, as I am, of the impracticability of consolidating the states, and at the same time of preserving the rights of the people at large, I believe we still ought to leave some of those powers in the state governments, in which the people, in fact, will still be represented, to define some other powers proposed to be vested in the general government more carefully, and to establish a few principles to secure a proper exercise of the powers given in it. It is not my object to multiply objections or to contend about inconsiderable powers or amendments. I wish the system adopted with a few alterations, but those in my mind are essential ones. If adopted without, every good citizen will acquiesce, though I shall consider the duration of our governments, and the liberties of this people very much dependent on the administration of the general government. A wise and honest administration may make the people happy under any government, but necessity only can justify even our leaving open avenues to the abuse of power by wicked, unthinking or ambitious men. I will examine first the organization of the proposed government, in order to judge, second, with propriety, what powers are improperly, at least prematurely, lodged in it. I shall examine thirdly, the undefined powers, and fourthly, those powers, the exercise of which is not secured on safe and proper ground. First, as to the organization, the House of Representatives, the Democratic branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65 members, that is, about one representative for 50,000 inhabitants, to be chosen biennially. The federal legislature may increase this number to one for each 30,000 inhabitants, abating fractional numbers in each state. 33 representatives will make a quorum for doing business, and a majority of those present determine the sense of the House. I have no idea that the interests, feelings, and opinions of three or four millions of people, especially touching internal taxation, can be collected in such a House. In the nature of things, nine times ten men of the elevated classes in the community only can be chosen. Connecticut, for instance, will have five representatives, not one man in a hundred of those who form the Democratic branch in the state legislature will, on a fair computation, be one of the five. The people of this country, in one sense, may all be Democratic, but if we make the proper distinction between the few men of wealth and abilities and consider them, as we ought, as the natural aristocracy of the country, and the great body of the people, the middle and lower classes as the democracy, this federal representative branch will have but very little democracy in it. Even this small representation is not secured on proper principles. The branches of the legislature are essential parts of the fundamental compact and ought to be so fixed by the people that the legislature cannot alter itself by modifying the elections of its own members. This, by a part of Article I, Section 4, the general legislature may do. It may evidently so regulate elections as to secure the choice of any particular description of men. It may make the whole state one district, make the capital, or any places in the state, the place or places of election. It may declare that the five men, or whatever the number may be, the state may choose. Who shall have the most votes shall be considered as chosen. In this case, it is easy to perceive how the people who live scattered in the inland towns will bestow their votes on different men. And how a few men in a city, in any order or profession, may unite and place any five men they please highest among those that may be voted for, and all this may be done constitutionally and by those silent operations which are not immediately perceived by the people in general. I know it is urged that the general legislature will be disposed to regulate elections on fair and just principles. This may be true. Good men will generally govern well with almost any constitution. But why, in laying the foundation of the social system, need we unnecessarily leave a door open to improper regulations? This is a very general and unguarded clause, and many evils may flow from that part which authorizes the Congress to regulate elections. Were it omitted, the regulations of elections would be solely in the respective states where the people are substantially represented, and where the elections ought to be regulated. Otherwise, to secure a representation from all parts of the community in making the constitution, we ought to provide for dividing each state into a proper number of districts, and for confining the electors in each district to the choice of some men who shall have a permanent interest and residence in it. And also, for this essential object, that the representative elected shall have a majority of the votes of those electors who shall attend and give their votes. In considering the practicability of having a full and equal representation of the people from all parts of the union, not only distances and different opinions, customs, and views, common and extensive tracks of country, are to be taken into view. But many differences peculiar to eastern, middle, and southern states. These differences are not so perceivable among the members of Congress and men of general information in the states as among the men who would properly form the Democratic branch. The eastern states are very democratic and composed chiefly of moderate freeholders. They have but few rich men and no slaves. The southern states are composed chiefly of rich planters and slaves. They have but few moderate freeholders, and the prevailing influence in them is generally a dissipated aristocracy. The middle states partake partly of the eastern and partly of the southern character. Perhaps nothing could be more disjointed, unwieldy, and incompetent to doing business with harmony and dispatch than a federal house of representatives properly numerous for the great objects of taxation, et cetera, collected from the several states. Whether such men would ever act in concert, whether they would not worry along a few years, and then be the means of separating the parts of the union is very problematical. View this system in whatever form we can, propriety brings us still to this point. A federal government possessed of general and complete powers as to those national objects which cannot well come under the cognizance of the internal laws of the respective states, and this federal government accordingly consisting of branches not very numerous. The House of Representatives is on the plan of consolidation, but the Senate is entirely on the federal plan, and Delaware will have as much constitutional influence in the Senate as the largest state in the union, and in this Senate are large legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Ten states in this union urge that they are small states, nine of which were present in the convention. They were interested in collecting large powers into the hands of the Senate, in which each state will have its equal share of power. I suppose it was impracticable for the three large states, as they were called, to get the Senate formed on any other principles. But this only proves that we cannot form one general government on equal and just principles, and proves that we ought not to lodge in it such extensive powers before we are convinced of the practicability of organizing it on just and equal principles. The Senate will consist of two members from each state, chosen by the state legislatures every sixth year. The clause referred to respecting the elections of representatives empowers the general legislature to regulate the elections of senators also, except as to the places of choosing senators. There is, therefore, but little more security in the elections than in those of representatives. Fourteen senators make a quorum for business, and a majority of the senators present give the votes of the Senate, except in giving judgment upon an impeachment, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, when two-thirds of the senators present must agree. The members of the legislature are not excluded from being elected to any military offices or any civil offices except those created or the emoluments of which shall be increased by themselves. Two-thirds of the members present of either house may expel a member at pleasure. The Senate is an independent branch of the legislature, a court for trying impeachments, and also a part of the executive, having a negative in the making of all trees and in appointing almost all officers. The vice president is not a very important, if not an unnecessary part of the system. He may be a part of the Senate at one period and act as the supreme executive magistrate at another. The election of this officer, as well as of the president of the United States, seems to be properly secured. But when we examine the powers of the president and the forms of the executive, we shall perceive that the general government in this part will have a strong tendency to aristocracy or the government of the few. The executive is, in fact, the president and the Senate in all transactions of any importance. The president is connected with or tied to the Senate. He may always act with the Senate, but never can effectually counteract its views. The president can appoint no officer, civil or military, who shall not be agreeable to the Senate, and the presumption is that the will of so important a body will not be very easily controlled and that it will exercise its powers with great address. In the judicial department, powers ever kept distinct in well-balanced governments are no less improperly blended in the hands of the same men. In the judges of the Supreme Court is lodged the law, the equity, and the fact. It is not necessary to pursue the minute, organical parts of the general government proposed. There were various interests in the convention to be reconciled, especially of large and small states, of carrying and non-carrying states, and of states more and states less democratic. Vast labor and attention were by the convention bestowed on the organization of the parts of the Constitution offered. Still, it is acknowledged there are many things radically wrong in the essential parts of this Constitution, but it is said that these are the result of our situation. On a full examination of the subject, I believe it, but what do the laborious increase in determinations of the convention prove? If they prove anything, they prove that we cannot consolidate the states on proper principles. The organization of the government presented proves that we cannot form a general government in which all power can be safely lodged, and a little attention to the parts of the one proposed will make it appear very evident that all the powers proposed to be lodged in it will not be then well deposited, either for the purposes of government or the preservation of liberty. I will suppose no abuse of powers in those cases in which the abuse of it is not well guarded against. I will suppose the words authorizing the general government to regulate the elections of its own members struck out of the plan, or free district elections, in each state, amply secured. That the small representation provided for shall be as fair and equal as it is capable of being made. I will suppose the judicial department regulated on pure principles by future laws as far as it can be by the Constitution and consistent with the situation of the country. Still, there will be an unreasonable accumulation of powers in the general government, and if all be granted enumerated in the plan proposed. The plan does not present a well-balanced government. The senatorial branch of the legislative and the executive are substantially united, and the president or the first executive magistrate may aid the senatorial interest when weakest, but never can effectually support the democratic, however it may be oppressed. The excellency, in my mind, of a well-balanced government is that it consists of nine distinct branches, each sufficiently strong and independent to keep its own station, and to aid either of the other branches which may occasionally want aid. The convention found that any but a small house of representatives would be expensive, and that it would be impracticable to assemble a large number of representatives. Not only the determination of the convention in this case, but the situation of the states proves the impracticability of collecting, in any one point, a proper representation. The formation of the senate and the smallness of the house being therefore the result of our situation and the actual state of things, the evils which may attend the exercise of many powers in this national government may be considered as without remedy. All officers are impeachable before the senate only, before the men by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting to the appointment of these officers. No judgment of conviction on an impeachment can be given unless two-thirds of the senators agree. Under these circumstances the right of impeachment in the house can be but of little importance, the house cannot expect often to convict the offender, and therefore probably will but seldom or never exercise the right. In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences attending this organization before mentioned, it may be observed that it is extremely difficult to secure the people against the fatal effects of corruption and influence. The power of making any law will be in the president, eight senators, and seventeen representatives relative to the important objects enumerated in the constitution. Where there is a small representation a sufficient number to carry any measure may, with ease, be influenced by bribes, offices, and civilities. They may easily form private junctoes and outdoor meetings, agree on measures, and carry them by silent votes. Impressed as I am with a sense of the difficulties there are in the way of forming the parts of a federal government on proper principles, and seeing a government so unsubstantially organized after so arduous an attempt has been made, I am led to believe that powers ought to be given to it with great care and caution. In the second place it is necessary therefore to examine the extent and the probable operations of some of those extensive powers proposed to be vested in this government. These powers, legislative, executive, and judicial respect internal as well as external objects. Those respecting external objects as all foreign concerns, commerce, and posts, all causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian affairs can be lodged nowhere else with any propriety but in this government. Many powers that respect internal objects ought clearly to be lodged in it, as those to regulate trade between the states, weights and measures, the coin or current monies, post offices, naturalization, etc. These powers may be exercised without essentially affecting the internal police of the respective states. But powers to lay and collect internal taxes, to form the militia, to make bankrupt laws, and to decide on appeals, questions arising on the internal laws of the respective states, are of a very serious nature and carry with them almost all other powers. These taken in connection with the others, and powers to raise armies and build navies proposed to be lodged in this government, appear to me to comprehend all the essential powers in the community, and those which will be left to the states will be of no great importance. A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion is in itself of very great importance. By means of taxes the government may command the whole or any part of the subject's property. Taxes may be of various kinds, but there is a strong distinction between external and internal taxes. External taxes are in post duties which are laid on imported goods. They may usually be collected in a few seaport towns and of a few individuals, though ultimately paid by the consumer. A few officers can collect them and they can be carried no higher than trade will bear or smuggling permit. That in the very nature of commerce bounds are set to them. But internal taxes, as pole and land taxes, excises duties on all written instruments, etc., may fix themselves on every person and species of property in the community. They may be carried to any lengths and in proportion as they are extended, numerous officers must be employed to assess them and to enforce the collection of them. In the United Netherlands the general government has complete powers as to external taxation, but as to internal taxes it makes requisitions on the provinces. Internal taxation in this country is more important as the country is so very extensive. As many assessors and collectors of federal taxes will be above 300 miles from the seat of the federal government as will be less. Besides, to lay and collect internal taxes in this extensive country must require a great number of congressional ordinances immediately operating upon the body of the people. These must continually interfere with the state laws and thereby produce disorder and general satisfaction till the one system of laws or the other operating on the same subjects shall be abolished. These ordinances alone to say nothing of those respecting the militia, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, etc., etc., will probably soon defeat the operations of the state laws and governments. Should the general government think it politic as some administrations, if not all, probably will, to look for a support in a system of influence, the government will take every occasion to multiply laws and officers to execute them, considering these as so many necessary props for its own support. Should this system of policy be adopted, taxes more productive than the imposed duties will probably be wanted to support the government and to discharge foreign demands without leaving anything for the domestic creditors. The internal sources of taxation then must be called into operation and internal tax laws and federal assessors and collectors spread over this immense country. All these circumstances consider is it wise, prudent or safe to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in the general government while imperfectly organized and inadequate and to trust to amending it hereafter and making it adequate to this purpose. It is not only unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before it is fitted to receive it. It is confessed that this power and representation ought to go together. Why give the power first? Why give the power to the few who, when possessed of it, may have address enough to prevent the increase of representation? Why not keep the power and, when necessary, amend the constitution and add to its other parts this power and a proper increase of representation at the same time? Then men who may want the power will be under strong inducements to let in the people by their representatives into the government to hold their due proportion of this power. If a proper representation be impracticable then we shall see this power resting in the states where it at present ought to be and not inconsiderately given up. When I recollect how lately Congress, conventions, legislatures and people contended in the cause of liberty and carefully weighed the importance of taxation, I can scarcely believe we are serious in proposing to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in a government so imperfectly organized for such purposes. Should the United States be taxed by a House of Representatives of 200 members, which would be about 15 members for Connecticut, 25 for Massachusetts, etc., still the middle and lower classes of people would have no great share, in fact, in taxation. I am aware it is said that the representation proposed by the new constitution is sufficiently numerous. It may be for many purposes, but to suppose that this branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the rights of the people in the administration of the government, in which the person's ward is placed seems to argue that we have forgot what the true meaning of representation is. I am sensible also that it is said that Congress will not attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, that it is necessary for them to have the power, though it cannot probably be exercised. I admit that it is not probable that any prudent Congress will attempt to lay and collect internal taxes, especially direct taxes, but this only proves that the power would be improperly lodged in Congress and that it might be abused by imprudent and designing men. I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to this part of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers relative to direct taxes as those who object to it would have them. As to these, it is said that Congress will only have power to make requisitions, leaving it to the states to lay and collect them. I see but very little color for this construction, and the attempt only proves that this part of the plan cannot be defended. By this plan there can be no doubt, but that the powers of Congress will be complete, as to all kinds of taxes, whatever. Further, as to internal taxes, the state governments will have concurrent powers with the general government, and both may tax the same objects in the same year. And the objection that the general government may suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure for the promoting the collection of a federal tax, is not without foundation. As the states owe large debts and have large demands upon them individually, there clearly would be a propriety in leaving in their possession exclusively some of the internal sources of taxation, at least until the federal government shall be properly increased. The power in the general government to lay and collect internal taxes will render its powers respecting armies, navies, and the militia the more exceptional. By the Constitution it is proposed that Congress shall have the power to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. To provide and maintain a Navy, to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, reserving to the states the right to appoint officers, and to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Congress will have unlimited power to raise armies and to engage officers and men for any number of years, but a legislative act applying the money for their support can have operation for no longer term than two years. And if a subsequent Congress do not within the two years renew the appropriation or further appropriate monies for the use of the Army, the Army will be left to take care of itself. When an Army shall once be raised for a number of years, it is not probable that it will find much difficulty in getting Congress to pass laws for applying monies to its support. I see so many men in America fond of a standing Army, and especially among those who probably will have a large share in administering the federal system. It is very evident to me that we shall have a large standing Army as soon as the money to support them can possibly be found. An Army is a very agreeable place of employment for the young gentlemen of many families. A power to raise armies must be lodged somewhere. Still, this will not justify the lodging this power in a bare majority of so few men without any checks, or in the government in which the great body of the people and the nature of things will be only nominally represented. In the state governments, the great body of the people, the yeomanry, etc., of the country are represented. It is true that they will choose the members of Congress and may now and then choose a man of their own way of thinking. But it is impossible for forty or thirty thousand people in this country, one time in ten, to find a man who can possess similar feelings, views, and interests with themselves. Powers to lay and collect taxes and to raise armies are of the greatest moment. For carrying them into effect, laws need not be frequently made, and the yeomanry, etc., of the country ought substantially to have a check upon the passing of these laws. This check ought to be placed in the legislature, or at least in the few men the common people of the country will probably have in Congress, in the true sense of this word from among themselves. It is true the yeomanry of the country possess the lands, the weight of property, possess the arms, and are too strong a body of men to be openly offended, and therefore it is urged, they will take care of themselves, that men who shall govern will not dare to pay any disrespect to their opinions. It is easily perceived that if they have not their proper negative upon passing laws in Congress, or on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies, they may in twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to them totally deprived of that boasted weight and strength. This may be done in a great measure by Congress if disposed to do it by modeling the militia. Should one-fifth or one-eighth part of the men capable of bearing arms be made a select militia, as has been proposed, and those the young and ardent part of the community, possessed of but little or no property, and all the others put upon a plan that will render them of no importance, the former will answer all the purposes of an army while the latter will be defenseless. The state must train the militia in such form and according to such systems and rules as Congress shall prescribe, and the only actual influence the respective states will have respecting the militia will be in appointing the officers. I see no provision made for calling out the posse cometatus for executing the laws of the union, but a provision is made for Congress to call forth the militia for the execution of them, and the militia in general, or any select part of it, may be called out under military officers instead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal laws in the first instance and thereby introduce an entire military execution of the laws. I know that powers to raise taxes to regulate the military strength of the community on some uniform plan to provide for its defense and internal order and for duly executing laws must be lodged somewhere, but still we ought not so to lodge them as evidently to give one order of men in the community undue advantages over others, or to commit the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation of the few. And so far as it may be necessary to lodge any of the peculiar powers in the general government, a more safe exercise of them ought to be secured by requiring the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of Congress there too, until the federal representation can be increased, so that the Democratic members in Congress may stand some tolerable chance of a reasonable negative in behalf of the numerous important and Democratic part of the community. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal police of all the states to discern fully how general bankrupt laws made by the Union would affect them, or promote the public good. I believe the property of debtors in the several states is held responsible for their debts in modes and forms very different. If uniform bankrupt laws can be made without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I wish them to be made by Congress. There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the general government in the judicial department, I think very unnecessarily. I mean powers respecting questions arising upon the internal laws of the respective states. It is proper the federal judiciary should have powers co-extensive with the federal legislature, that is, the power of deciding finally on the laws of the Union. By article three, section two, the powers of the federal judiciary are extended, among other things, to all cases between a state and citizens of another state, between citizens of different states, between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. Actions in all these cases, except against a state government, are now brought and finally determined in the law courts of the states respectively. And as there are no words to exclude these courts of their jurisdiction in these cases, they will have concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior federal courts in them. And therefore, if the new constitution be adopted without any amendment in this respect, all those numerous actions now brought in the state courts between our citizens and foreigners, between citizens of different states, by state governments against foreigners, and by state governments against citizens of other states, may also be brought in the federal courts. And an appeal will lay in them from the state courts or federal inferior courts to the supreme judicial court of the nation. In almost all these cases, either party may have the trial by jury in the state courts accepting paper money and tender laws which are wisely guarded against in the proposed constitution. Justice may be obtained in these courts on reasonable terms. They must be more competent to proper decisions in the laws of their respective states than the federal courts can possibly be. I do not in any point of view see the need of opening a new jurisdiction to these causes, of opening a new scene of expensive lawsuits of suffering foreigners and citizens of different states to drag each other many hundred miles into the federal courts. It is true those courts may be so organized by a wise and prudent legislature as to make the obtaining of justice in them relatively easy. They may in general be organized on the common principles of the country, but this benefit is by no means secured by the constitution. The trial by jury is secured only in those few criminal cases to which the federal laws will extend as crimes committed on the seas against the laws of nations, treason and counterfeiting the federal securities and coin. But even in these cases, the jury trial of the Vincent is not secured. Particularly in the large states, a citizen may be tried for a crime committed in the state and yet tried in some states five hundred miles from the place where it was committed. But the jury trial is not secured at all in civil cases. Though the convention have not established this trial, it is to be hoped that Congress in putting the new system into execution will do it by a legislative act in all cases in which it can be done with propriety. Whether the jury trial is not excluded from the Supreme Judicial Court is an important question. By Article 3, Section 2, all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and in those cases in which a state shall be the party, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exception and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. By court is understood a court consisting of judges, and the idea of a jury is excluded. This court, or the judges, are to have jurisdiction on appeals in all the cases enumerated as to law and fact. The judges are to decide the law and try the fact, and the trial of the fact being assigned to the judges by the Constitution, a jury for trying the fact is excluded. However, under the exceptions and powers to make regulations, Congress may, perhaps, introduce the jury to try the fact in most necessary cases. There can be but one Supreme Court in which the final jurisdiction will center in all federal cases, except in cases where appeals by law shall not be allowed. The judicial powers of the federal courts extends in law and equity to certain cases, and therefore the powers to determine on the law in equity and as to the fact all will center in the Supreme Court. These powers, which by this Constitution are blended in the same hands, the same judges, are in Great Britain deposited in different hands, to wit the decision of the law in the law judges, the decision in equity in the Chancellor, and the trial of the fact in the jury. It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same judge power to decide on the law and also general powers in equity, for if the law restrains him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate. We have no precedence in this country as yet to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain. Equity, therefore, in the Supreme Court for many years will be mere discretion. I confess in the Constitution of the Supreme Court, as left by the Constitution, I do not see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common law. This Court is to have appellate jurisdiction in all the other cases before mentioned. Many sensible men suppose that cases before mentioned respect, as well as the criminal cases as the civil ones. Mentioned antecedently in the Constitution, if so an appeal is allowed in criminal cases, contrary to the usual sense of the law. How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen of another state to bring actions against state governments which have failed in performing so many promises made during the war is doubtful. How far it may be proper to so humble a state as to oblige it to answer an individual in a court of law is worthy of consideration. The states are now subject to no such actions and this new jurisdiction will subject the states and many defendants to actions and processes which were not in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. All engagements existing between citizens of different states, citizens and foreigners, states and foreigners, and states and citizens of other states were made. The parties contemplating the remedies that existing on the laws of the states and the new remedy proposed to be given in the federal courts can be founded on no principle whatever. Yours and etc. the federal farmer. End of Anti-Federalist, No. 5