 Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the fifth meeting of the Net Zero Energy and Transport Committee. Today's only business is an evidence session from the president-designate of COP26, the right honourable Alok Sharma MP, who is joined today by three colleagues, Peter Hill, COP26 chief executive officer, Wasimair, COP26 chief operating officer and Lee McDonough, director general, Net Zero and international at the department for business, energy and industrial strategy. Mr Sharma, we know that you have an extremely busy schedule with your preparations for the COP26 summit, so we are extremely grateful for you and your colleagues joining us this morning. I understand that you would like to begin by making an opening statement, so I will hand over to you at this stage. Thank you. Great. Well, thank you very much indeed, chair. It's a pleasure to be here. Obviously, I have Peter Hill and Wasimair from the COP unit who will help me answer any questions you may have related to COP and international engagement and logistics and all those issues. Of course, Lee McDonough from Bays, who leads on net zero strategy, and I'm sure we'll be happy to address any questions you have on domestic or Bays-related policy. From my perspective, as the COP president-designate and as part of the COP unit, we have been doing a significant amount of international engagement in terms of preparing for COP26, which is now, of course, less than two months away. I think that it would be useful briefly to set out what it is that we are hoping to get out of COP in terms of targets that the world can aim for. Your committee members will be aware that, back in 2015 in Paris, world leaders agreed that they would work to ensure that average global temperature rises were limited to well below two degrees, aiming for 1.5. I think that the overarching message that we would like to get out of COP is that we have kept 1.5 within reach. Your committee members will also have seen the IPCC report that came out in August, which painted a pretty stark picture of where we are. I'm basically saying that the door, the window, is basically closing on 1.5, but there is still room if countries act now. As part of the message that I've been taking to every country, there are four things that we are asking them to do. One is on mitigation, so ambitious 2030 emission reduction targets and net zero commitments for the middle of century. We have made some progress there. All the G7 have committed to net zero by 2050, but also 2030 targets that align with net zero. When we took on the COP26 presidency, less than 30 per cent of the global economy was covered by a net zero target, where now it's 70 per cent. However, we still need other countries, particularly some of the G20 nations, which have not yet come forward with ambitious 2030 emission reduction targets, to come forward. The second thing that we're asking countries to do is to set out plans for adapting to the climate change that is already happening. As we saw from the IPCC report, even if global warming stopped tomorrow and climate change stopped tomorrow, the effects of what has happened already will continue to reverberate for a long period of time, so countries need to plan for that. Thirdly, we are asking developed countries to deliver on their promise of $100 billion a year funds mobilisation to support developing countries. That was supposed to happen every year from 2020 to 2025. We are not there yet. We have had some new money that has been announced, significant new money that has been announced by a number of countries. Clearly, we need to do more so that we continue to press the donor countries on that, and we are going to be setting out a delivery plan ahead of COP on that. The final piece of the puzzle from our perspective is closing off the remaining outstanding items on the Paris rulebook. There are detailed rules still after six years that have not been resolved in a number of areas, and we hope that that is something that we can reach agreement on. I very much want to see this as an all-of-UK COP, something that we can all collectively be very proud of. Of course, we will be welcoming the world to Glasgow. I think that this is an opportunity to showcase what the United Kingdom also has to offer. We have been working very hard on the logistics of making sure that this is a safe and secure event, and I am sure that we will address that through the questions of the committee. Thank you very much for that, chair. Thank you very much, Mr Shamber, for your opening remarks, which provided an excellent overview for this session. We will now move two questions from the committee. My first question is something that you alluded to in your opening remarks about what we might expect to see from COP26, in terms of what will be the key indicators of success that we will be looking for coming from the conference. Is it right to say that there is this time around? Can you hear me now, Mr Sharma? Bear with us a second and we will try to fix this. We will suspend the meeting for a short time. We are good? Yes. Okay. Mr Sharma, can you hear me now? I can indeed, chair. Yes, indeed. Excellent. Apologies for that technical issue. My first question related to the indicators of success that we may look out for coming from the conference. You alluded to some of those in your opening remarks, but I wonder if you could talk a bit more about what those key indicators of success will be, because my understanding is that there is quite a wide range of criteria and objectives that all parties are looking to achieve, including the international climate financial support that you mentioned, nationally determined contributions from each of the states, and the sharing of low-carbon technology and policy platforms with developing nations. I wonder if you could touch on some of those issues, please. Yes, of course. In terms of the overall indication of success, as I said, I think that what we will want coming out of this is for independent parties to be able to say that we have kept 1.5 within reach. You mentioned, chair, the NDCs. Obviously, we have now had, I think, well over 100 countries that have come forward with NDCs, but obviously there are almost 200 parties that have signed up to the Paris agreement. Some of the biggest economies in the world, some of the biggest G20 nations have not yet come forward with revised NDCs. I was at the July ministerial meeting of the climate and energy ministers in Naples, and as part of the communique, there was an agreement that every G20 nation would step forward with enhanced NDCs before COP26. We are waiting to see what comes out of that. Obviously, at the UN General Assembly, next week, there is an opportunity for countries to make further announcements, but it is also going to be quite important that we get further net zero commitments. I think that we have made significant progress going from 30 per cent of global GDP to 70 per cent of global GDP covered by a net zero commitment, but I think that that is going to be very important. Finance is going to be absolutely critical. I think that this 100 billion figure has become a matter of trust for developing countries. That is why, for me, it is absolutely vital that we are able to show a delivery path to 100 billion a year over the five-year period from 2020 to 2025. As I said in my opening remarks, we are working on a delivery plan being put together with our colleagues in the German and Canadian Government, where we hope that it may be possible to demonstrate the funding that is coming from sovereigns, the funding that is being mobilised from the private sector as a result of public funding going in, the funding coming from multilateral development banks and any other finance mobilisation that is taking place. What we did see at the G7 leaders, we did see additional new money coming from Germany, we saw new money coming from Canada and from Japan, and the UK, of course, also committed back in 2019 that we would double our international climate finance commitment. Clearly, we need all of the G7 to come forward with more money. Indeed, in that communique that I referred to, there was a clear agreement that there would be further funding coming forward in terms of climate finance. The final piece is bringing that back to the real economy as well. We are very much driving the push on the end of unabated coal use, the end of international financing for coal. We have made some progress. All the G7 have now agreed that there is no more international coal financing from this year. South Korea has done the same. We need all the countries that are financing coal to do the same. In terms of zero emission vehicles as well, we want to see countries come forward with commitments to have only new sale of vehicles. The UK, of course, is committed that from 2030 we will only have the sale of electric vehicles in the UK. The other big issue has been on afforestation. We want to see more policies coming forward in tackling deforestation that is going on around the world and, of course, sustainable agriculture. In each of those three policy areas, we have set up mechanisms whereby Governments around the world are able to come together and have that discussion. We have a zero emissions vehicles transition council, an energy transition council and agriculture. In our precedency year, which will not start until November, which will then have a year to run, we will take forward a lot of those issues as well. It is an opportunity to drive forward a lot of the real economy changes that also need to happen to deliver on the commitments that Governments are making. Thank you very much for that. You touched on the importance of the financial support and some of my colleagues will follow up on that shortly. You also mentioned that, obviously, we then have a year following COP immediately to look at what the outcomes are. I guess that is my next question looking at the implementation stage, what happens after COP26 and the agreements reached COP26. I guess that there are two elements to my question. First of all, how will the UK Government take forward the outcomes agreed at COP26 in terms of new strategy or legislation? Secondly, from a global perspective, do you have an expectation that the UK net zero strategy and any new climate targets agreed at a UK level and a Scottish Government level will set the template for other nations to follow? I have had a lot of international engagement over the past year. I can say to you that people around the world see the UK as a leader on green growth. If you look at energy, we have now got the biggest offshore wind sector in the world. We have taken the use of coal in the UK energy mix from 40 per cent in 2012 to less than 2 per cent now. By the end of 2024, there will be no more coal in our electricity mix. We are the first country to have a major economy to legislate for net zero. We have a really ambitious NDC ourselves. We have a very ambitious six-carbon budget target as well. We are setting the template. During 2020, when I was combining this role with my role as base secretary of state, I spent a lot of time trying to persuade countries to come forward with more ambitious NDCs. I was always politely told that they were quite looking forward to seeing what the UK was going to do. We did set out a very ambitious NDC in December. That has allowed us to speak with some authority on that particular issue. During our presidency year, we are planning on that at the moment. I could be new some of the elements that we want to drive forward. I want to say to you that we will be an active presidency. Obviously, COP 27 will be held in an African nation. There is always a lot of liaison that takes place between the presidency that is handing over to the new one. We will of course work very closely with whoever in Africa is awarded the COP 27. Good morning, Mr Sharma, and best wishes for a successful COP 26. Following up your comments about leadership and ambition, Scotland has a great deal of ambition, and indeed the UK will not be able to meet its targets unless Scotland meets ours and vice versa. In looking at COP 26, I am interested in your advice as to how we can secure whole of UK input into COP 26. What do you think we have got best to offer in terms of demonstration on offshore renewables? On just transition, I was struck by what you said about G20 countries. We know from Professor Richard Sgear that the IPCC is interested in our approach on just transition, particularly in reference to coal. Perhaps that might be a helpful platform that may be useful at COP 26. It was a pleasure to work with you previously on those issues, so I am very pleased that we are having this conversation. I have been very clear on that right from the start. We want to see that as showcasing what the UK is doing. You will know, because you were part of the grouping, that we have a devolved administration's ministerial group that I chair, which brings together the ministers responsible for the issues from all the devolved administrations, together with ministers from the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Ireland offices. The last meeting that we had was yesterday. I have to say that the collaboration on the logistics and planning has been really good with the Scottish Government, with Glasgow City Council. It has worked really well. Peter Hill, who is the chief executive of COP 26, also chairs the delivery board, and he may want to add a little bit more about that close working. In terms of showcasing the UK, you will know that the venue is going to be divided into the green zone, which is effectively open to the public. We had significant levels of expressions of interest from businesses, NGOs, academia, etc., to display in the green zone. We did liaise with all the devolved administrations in terms of the submissions of interests that came in. We will be showcasing from a Scottish perspective quite a number of Scottish-led initiatives in the green zone. In terms of the blue zone, what we have said is that we are going to have a lot of focus on the region cities, the build environment day at COP. There is a theme day every day, and on that day there will be focus on the devolved administrations. However, as I made very clear yesterday in my conversations with the ministers, we set out for them more detail of what we plan to discuss on each of these days over that two-week period. I have asked them to come back to me and my officials on how they might want various devolved administrations to be involved. Thirdly, in terms of the UK pavilion itself, we are having a discussion about how we can showcase in the UK pavilion the work that is going on across the devolved nations. Can I maybe focus a bit on policy aspects? Clearly, in terms of delivery and your role over the coming year post the actual COP26, the issue of delivery is going to be very important globally. Therefore, states will have to work with substates in terms of that actual delivery. That is where the good co-operation between Scotland and the UK would be really important in showcasing what can be done and should be done because of that dependency in terms of targets that we talked about previously. Is that an opportunity for again Scotland to help in a global stage to show how substates can deliver on energy targets? I hope that we will see all of that. That is why I am keen that we get further feedback from all the devolved administrations on the plans that we showed them yesterday in terms of the detail of what is going to be discussed on each of the days. What we have set out so far publicly is the theme on each particular day, whether it is energy or transport or regions. I think that there will be an opportunity for the devolved administrations to showcase what they are doing. You raised a very important wider point about net zero strategy. The UK Government has been pretty clear that we will set out a net zero strategy before COP26. There is a lot of detail work that is going on. Obviously, there is a lot of liaison that takes place between Bays, colleagues and colleagues in the devolved administrations. Obviously, there is an interministerial group that has been set out, which I think is working well. With your permission, if I could invite Lee Macdonald to come in and say a little bit about that domestic working arrangement, which I think is so vitally important. As just referenced, with devolved administration counterparts, Bays has established an interministerial group that covers net zero energy and climate change. It meets bi-monthly and brings together ministers from the four administrations to discuss admission reduction efforts across the UK. That is at the ministerial level. We have really had constructive engagement, but that is backed up by a really significant and quite extensive official level set of engagements as well between Bays and the devolved administrations at senior official level. We have something called the net zero nations board. At working level, we have a whole load of working groups that support that. The net zero nations board meets bi-monthly. It is chaired by a senior-based official. I met four times last year to cover a whole range of issues deep dives across the majority of the policy areas that are in the strategy. I will ask the convener to move on. I believe that Mark Ruskell has a supplemental in this area. I want to ask you about the UK Government's engagement in the beyond oil and gas alliance, where the initiative is being led by the Danish Government. It seems to be building up quite ahead of steam. We have Germany, Iceland, Costa Rica, Belize, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and New Zealand that are all engaging in the work of the alliance. Can you ask what the conversations have been so far with the Danish Government about this and how you intend to engage in this conversation that will be launched at COP26 in Glasgow? Obviously, there is a range of conversations that are taking place. In terms of what our domestic policy is going to be on oil and gas, we have been pretty clear on that. The Government has already set out that there will be a climate compatibility checkpoint that will assess any future licences for oil and gas. I think that the intention is to set out more details on that at the end of this year. Perhaps Lee might, from a base perspective, want to elaborate on that. Obviously, we are having a whole range of conversations across a range of policy areas. I was in Copenhagen some months ago and had a meeting with ministers and the Prime Minister as well, discussing, as I said, a range of issues. I know that, Lee, if you wanted to comment, because ultimately this comes down to domestic policy, if you wanted to comment on this. Yes, thank you. As you referenced, we have publicly committed to introducing a climate compatibility checkpoint. It was announced earlier this year and will be in place by the end of 2021. That will be used to assess the climate compatibility of future licensing rounds. Our current thinking is that it should basically look at industry progressing in the different commitments in the North Sea transition deal, how the UK compares to other oil and gas producers in terms of reducing emissions associated with production, and whether the UK continues to need domestic production to reduce our dependency on imports. We will be going out to seek views on the checkpoint shortly. That is the plan to be in place by the end of the year. I believe that Jackie Dunbar has a supplemental in relation to the UK Government and the Scottish Government working together on COP. Good morning, Mr Sharmer. I think that it was touched on briefly, but could you maybe go into a bit more detail about how you think the UK Government are liaison with the Scottish Government to achieve an ambitious global deal? Are there any areas that we are overlapping and how much co-operation is there? The COP is quite different from Paris. In Paris, it was very clear that there was effectively one agreement that we were trying to reach. Here, what we have is a number of strands. One is on mitigation, as the chair said, the NDCs and necessary commitments. We are asking for adaptation communications to come forward, we are asking for finance, and then, of course, closing off those elements of the Paris rulebook, which ultimately there are officials within the UK Government who are very involved in those negotiations with countries around the world. All of that will obviously come together in cover decisions coming out of COP and anything that comes out of the world leaders summit, which takes place in the first few days of COP. Collectively, what that will hopefully do is to be able to demonstrate that we have kept 1.5 within reach. I think that where we have colleagues are able to encourage policy changes elsewhere—NDCs, of course—that is welcomed. In a way, there are so many strands that we are trying to tie together here, and a lot of that will come down to the negotiations in the final two weeks. As I said, we have a negotiating team in the UK Government that has been beavering way on this for quite some time now, talking about counterparts internationally. Just to ask another quick question, what advice would you give to the Scottish Government and the Parliament on how they can play their part in a successful conference? What role do you think the First Minister can play in this? Let me take the First Minister's issue first. Prime Minister Johnson has said that he wants all the First Ministers to play an important part. There is work going on at official level looking on this. As I have said very clearly, we want this to be a whole-of-UK approach. I am sure that, shortly, you will hear more from the UK Government on this issue, but I said that this is something that the Prime Minister leads on. In terms of the involvement of others in Government from the devolved Administrations, there has always been the presence that, as part of the UK delegation, we have representation from ministers in the devolved Administrations. That will absolutely happen again. In fact, we are in detailed discussions right now, which each of the devolved Administrations is in terms of numbers of people who would join the UK delegation. The third strand of that is parliamentarians. Shortly, we will be communicating with the presiding officers in each of the DAs in terms of suggesting how members of those legislators are able to come to COP and get access on the days that they want to the blue zone. We also have a glow that, as all colleagues will be aware, is organising an event in the Scottish Parliament on 5 and 6 November, which is going to bring together international parliamentarians internationally as well. That is an opportunity for, frankly, all parliamentarians, whichever legislative they sit in, in the UK to also get involved as well. Thank you very much, Jackie. Let me bring in Liam Kerr. Thank you, convener. Good morning. Just taking you back, Mr Sharma, if I may, you mentioned the nationally determined contributions earlier and the need to mobilise international financial support to assist developing countries to meet those NDCs following COP26. Regardless of whether the amount ultimately agreed is 100 billion dollars or otherwise, how will this financial support be administered, allocated and shared with those countries that are most in need of support to meet their targets? Obviously, as I said, we are putting together a delivery plan where we will put in place or demonstrate how much money is coming from individual governments, how much money is being mobilised from the private sector as a result of the public money that has gone in from individual governments, how much is coming from the multilateral development banks and any other finance that is being mobilised. If I take the UK Government, we have a significant international climate finance commitment and we will allocate finance to individual projects around the world. That will be the approach that other sovereign nations take as well as the multilateral development banks have targets for how much they want to put in terms of funding into climate projects. Those decisions will be made in either those governments or in those multilateral development banks. However, what we want to see and be able to demonstrate is that there is a quantum of money that equates to 100 billion a year from 2020 to 2025, by which, credibly, developing nations can look at and say, yes, we can see where that financing is going to come from. It is a very good mechanism, so we are right now in discussions with individual governments and multilateral development banks. I have been having lots of those discussions to get their forward figures as well, so we can see what is likely to come forward. As I said, I think that this is a key element of this. There are two key issues that we want to make sure. One is that the finance is delivered and secondly that the mitigation targets come forward as well. I think that some developing countries will say that without finance it is going to be pretty challenging. Thank you very much. The second question, again sticking with the financing, if I may. If we look at the UK Government's financing to reach climate change targets, the climate change committee has estimated that an extra £50 billion a year of capital expenditure is going to be needed from 2030. Does the UK Government take any view on whether that estimate is reasonable and in any event? Can you help us to understand how that will be financed? Yes. I think that your reference is effectively to the cost of getting net zero domestically, is that right? Yes, the report from the Climate Change Committee, yes. I think that the first thing I would say to you, and this is a more general point, global point, is that the cost of inaction on climate change is most definitely greater than the cost of action. You will be familiar with the Stern review that came out a few years ago, authored by Lord Stern, who sits in the House of Lords and is an eminent economist, who said that the global cost to the global economy of unabated climate change is anywhere between 5% and 20% of global GDP. In terms of what we have said, and I will ask Lee to come in, because I guess that this comes down to domestic issues as well, I think that what we have said is around under 2%. Obviously, there is a net zero review that is undergoing, and the Treasury will be setting out more details of that before COP26. Interestingly, what the CCC said is that, back in 2015, they had a report that said that the cost of the move to net zero was around 2% of GDP. In their latest report, which came out last year, I think that it was anywhere between 1% to 2%, and the reason that they said that the cost was falling was because at the pace at which renewables technology and other technology was developing and the price of that was coming down significantly. If you look at the price of offshore wind around the world, including, of course, in the UK, if you look at solar, there have been significant drops. I think that in terms of solar, 80% drop in prices over a 10-year period. I think that when we talk about cost, we also have to look at what the upside is. On a UK-wide basis, through successive Governments, we have, on a 30-year period, managed to grow the UK economy by almost 80% in terms of GDP, but we have also cut emissions by over 40%. We are seeing around the world, as a country that has demonstrated that green growth is possible. We also have to take into account all the other benefits of having a cleaner environment in terms of the impact on people's health and wellbeing. I don't know, Lee, whether you may be a little bit closer on this from a base perspective, but I don't know whether you want to comment at all on overall costs of net zero. Thank you, CPD. You basically said what you said is correct in terms of the headline figures. I will just say that some of our most important work that we are taking at the moment is on the cost of transition. You are right that low-carbon investment needs to scale up to around £50 billion each year to deliver net zero and support the UK's economic recovery. The investment generates substantial fuel savings, as cleaner and more efficient technologies replace their fossil fuel predecessors. In time, those savings cancel out. The investment cost is highly and a new piece of insight from our work means that our central estimate for costs is now below 1 per cent of GDP through the next 30 years. If I could just add in terms of the domestic focus, we are looking at a combination of public and private investments and the relationship between the two components varies depending on the stage at which sectors are at. A large part of our strategy will be published ahead of COP. You will have seen in some of the strategies that have been published recently that the hydrogen strategy or the industrial decarbonisation strategy focus on work that the Government needs to step in to provide transition support to help industry develop and invest in the technology that we need to see in order to meet our targets. Thank you for such a full answer, which I find fascinating, if I'm honest. The final thing, convener, if I may, is just one more question to pick up on something that the director general mentioned earlier. The UK is the first G7 country to agree the North Sea transition deal, which is worth between £16 billion and £18 billion. That has leveraged private investment, which will support the oil and gas industry transition to a clean green energy and support jobs. Within that deal, the sector has committed to cutting emissions by about 50 per cent by 2030. The Government sector and the unions are going to work to deliver the skills, innovation and infrastructure to decarbonise North Sea production. Will COP26 have any impact on the transition deal or does it remain as is? Lee, do you want to take this from a domestic perspective? I can talk a little bit more internationally. I think that the transition deal, as you mentioned, is a global exemplar. That deal has been struck domestically in terms of the Government and relative industries. It includes supporting up to 40,000 high-quality direct and indirect supply chain jobs and generating up to £16 billion of investments, as you have quite rightly flagged up to 2030. The really good thing about the deal is that the commitments in the deal achieve 60 megatons reduction in UK greenhouse gas emissions. That includes the commitment that you referred to from industry to reduce down emissions to 50 per cent by 2030. The COP link to it, so that deal exists. The COP link can be to showcase what we have done here and be an exemplar to other countries and show them how we can do that, just transition, making sure that we are protecting supply chains and jobs and transitioning to support lecoven industry and technologies. I think that the issue of just transition is something that I think every country is facing. When I have spoken to other Governments, this is something that they all get. For instance, when I was in Spain, there was a discussion about how the Government working with the trade unions was looking at the issues on just transition, in the same way that the UK has a green jobs task force where trade unions are also represented. I think that this is a key element of this. If we are not just from a UK perspective, but internationally, if we are going to deliver green growth, it has to be in a manner that also means that those who are in sectors where jobs are reducing are able to get the skills and the support to move into new jobs. I think that that is a critical issue that every country faces right now. Good morning, Mr Sharma. I wholeheartedly agree with you that COP26 is an opportunity to showcase what the UK has to offer. With the IPCC report warning that the door is closing on 1.5, would rejecting the new cambo oilfield ahead of COP26 be a strong example of the climate leadership that the global community is looking for? Perhaps a second point that your officials could pick up? Will new oil and gas developments be reassessed in light of the recent IPCC and IEA reports? If so, will that include an economic analysis, including carbon dioxide costs of the cambo field and others, as proposed by Professor James Skea from the Just Transition Commission? Thank you for that question. In terms of cambo itself, this is obviously now a domestic policy issue that sits with base. I will leave it to Lee to give further details on that. I would just point out that this was, of course, a licence for this field that was originally awarded back in 2001. What we have been very clear about is in terms of future licences, and for them to be compatible with our climate law, the fact that we are going to net zero by 2050, there has obviously been a public inquiry on cambo. I think that maybe at this point rather than speak for base, I pass to Lee to talk in any more detail if she wants on cambo. Thank you. I lost connection for a second, so I guess you were just asking about where we were in the licensing process. As CPD just said, the licence for the cambo oil field was granted in 2001. The developer has now requested to move to the production phase, which requires a consent in order for that to happen. Therefore, the next stage of the process was just a thorough assessment of the potential environmental impacts of public consultation, and scrutiny by the Oil and Gas Authority is under way. No decision has been made yet on that process, so I cannot say any more about it other than to reiterate the point that CPD made. Development for fields that have existing licences are subject to a rigorous process, so an environmental impact assessment, as I said, is a public consultation, as well as that scrutiny from the Oil and Gas Authority before consent is provided, and all future licences will only be granted on the basis that they are compatible with the climate compatibility checkpoints that we referenced earlier, which will come into effect at the end of this year. We will seek views on the nature of that checkpoints process shortly. Thank you for that response. I apologise if there was a slight technical issue. That brings me perhaps to my second question. I sympathise with Mr Sharma, because you have had the role of speaking to people around the world. That has involved a lot of travel, which you have been criticised for, but we perhaps can sympathise with why the in-person meetings can be more efficient. Has all that travel and face-to-face negotiation been worth it? What have been the key achievements from that? If I can, because I think that we all have high hopes for COP26, but can I ask what are your fears about COP26? On that note, is there anything about the conference that is keeping you awake at night? Yes, what is keeping me awake at night? Quite a lot, in terms of where we are less than two months ago. I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that COP26 is our last best chance of getting this right. This is a decisive decade, and all colleagues asking questions on this committee have made reference to the IPCC report. That is why we need to get this right at COP26. In terms of my travel, I think that face-to-face discussions have been incredibly vital in building the personal relationships. It has meant that we are able to have more fruitful discussions. If I take some examples, when I have been to South Korea on two occasions, we have had a very good announcement coming out of South Korea in terms of ending international co-financing. That is an issue that, from a UK perspective, we have, of course, been raising with South Korea. I am delighted that that commitment has come forward. I was in Japan, ahead of Prime Minister Suga, announcing Japan's NDC. I was very clear, both in meetings with him and ministers and in the public, about the fact that we wanted to see Japan get to 50 per cent NDC. When the announcement came, I think that it had a range of 46, but with an ambition for 50 per cent. I think that I could go on with a list of things. Just to be very clear, this is not just me. This is a whole team that has been working over a long period of time on these issues. The fact that we have gone from less than 30 per cent of the global economy with a net zero target to 70 per cent, I do think that that is something that the UK can say that we have helped to come forward with. In terms of COP itself—we may come into that discussion, but I have been very clear right from the start that this has to be a physical event. That is what I have heard from countries around the world as well, particularly for developing nations and climate vulnerable nations. They want to sit at the same table with the big developed nations, with the big emitters and look them in the eye. Ultimately, this is a negotiation amongst almost 200 countries, and that is why it needs to happen in physical form. I reiterate what I said at the start of the session, which is that I want to see the biggest emitters coming forward with those emission reduction targets that are going to take us to a point where we can say that we have kept 1.5 a life. I do want to see the money coming to the table. I do want to see the donor nations pony up the cash. Ultimately, there are a number of outstanding but pretty complex issues from the Paris rule book that we also need to get resolved. This is a little bit like playing an incredibly complicated game of chess. I said to someone on the media that it is a multi-dimensional chess, and it has pointed out that that does not exist, but I can tell you that it feels a little bit like that. Mark Ruskell, to be followed by Collette Stevenson. I can just come back to the points made about how UK policy on oil and gas is perhaps evolving, particularly in terms of how you stay aligned with the Paris agreement. I am wondering if that policy of maximum economic recovery actually puts the oil and gas companies in quite a difficult position. If I was on the board of shell, and I am not on the board of shell by the way, but if I was, I would be faced with, on one hand, a ruling from the Dutch court that says that, as a company, we have to reduce our emissions by 45 per cent, not just in terms of production, but in terms of sale of all fossil fuels. On the other hand, if I have a licence under maximum economic recovery, I have a legal obligation under UK law to extract every single last drop from those reserves that are licensed. Can you see the difficulty here in terms of making that transition under the current policy of maximum economic recovery? If you do see that, how do you see that policy changing over time? I think that the first thing that I would say is that, when I was still at base, we put out an energy white paper, which showed how we were going to effectively move forward to 2015 in terms of our energy mix. I think that that is still assumed, that there would be, under various scenarios, you could still see some oil and gas. In fact, I think that the IEA put out a report recently, in fact I asked if they would put it out and work on it, where they showed what needed to happen in terms of the world moving to net zero by 2050. Even as part of that, some element of oil and gas was significantly reduced, of course, but some element of oil and gas in the global energy mix. I do not know if you want to talk specifically from a domestic perspective in terms of the particular tension that Mr Russell referred to. Thank you. You friend it perfectly. We are doing a huge amount, as you know, to drive down demand for fossil fuels, but there is going to be a continued on-going demand for oil and gas over the coming years. That has been recognised, as the CPD said, by the International Climate Change Committee, and that is the case. The UK continental shelf for mature oil and gas basin and production is declining. We expect the rate of decline to be broadly in line with our domestic demand as we transition to penal sources of energy. Do you reference previously licensed fields such as Cambo? They are already accounted for in terms of projected production and estimated emissions, and therefore we are confident that they can be developed if they get through the process that we talked about earlier about the degree of scrutiny to be given a consent. We are confident that they could still go ahead as we seek to achieve our commitments to net zero in 2050. That suggests that there is some need for oil and gas going forward, but that is not the same thing as maximum economic recovery. That is not the same as 20 billion barrels of oil and gas in the North Sea. That might be somewhere south of six billion barrels. I think that we are getting into some of the detailed domestic policy here, but if I may just make a more general point on this, if you look at the projections that have been put out there for 2050, we are looking 30 years ahead. We have seen globally what happens when, for instance, renewable energy, clean energy is mobilised at pace and scale, and what happens in terms of price. There are various scenarios that people have in terms of what the global energy mix might look like. I am not here speaking on behalf of the oil and gas majors that they speak for themselves, but if you look at what some of those companies have been saying about moving to being energy providers rather than oil and gas, I think that there are companies as to how the world is changing. I have Peter Hill, who is the commandant. Peter, it was then that you wanted to add from an international perspective. You just came on my screen. I thought that you might want to come in. If not, it is fine. Yes. It was related to an earlier point, but it is also relevant to the wider oil and gas question. Just to recall that last year, the Government announced that it would be phasing out support for international oil and gas export credits, et cetera. Obviously, that is more effective if a number of countries are taking that path. We are working with a number of countries who are moving in that direction. There have been some announcements recently from the United States. It was related to the broader issue, but just to say that is an area of work that we are prioritising from COP in order to see who is prepared to bring forward their commitments, both in time and substance, recognising that we need to support countries in the transition but also recognising that the more countries who can reorientate their financial and guarantee support from the oil and gas sector to the renewables sector, the better. As I said, it was relevant to an earlier point, but I think that it is still relevant to the broad discussion. I was told that R is the thing to put in the chat if you want to come in. I see that Lee has also put R in the chat, so I just mentioned it. I just wanted to flag, which I should have said earlier. The oil and gas authority strategy, which has recently been updated, plays an obligation on industry to support net zero. The strategy makes it clear that maximising economic recovery includes a net zero consideration as part of that obligation. Let me bring in Collette Stevenson with a brief reminder that we need to finish by 11.30. I will focus on financing the net zero and based on the consumer. How do you feel about it? Should the capital costs of decarbonisation be paid for by the consumer through electricity bills or gas bills or more widely through taxation, or other wider means? Obviously, at the heart of this is our consumer, so I came to see how that is going to look on forward. If I may, I think that I am going to end up intruding on HMT and based policy here if I start commenting on that. Lee, I do not know if you feel able to say anything about that. Obviously, the HMT's net zero review is going to be coming out before COP when people will be able to have a look at that. Was there any other point that you wanted to make on the issue of where the costs fall? As you said, the Treasury's strategy will set out and broad-term the analysis around the whole issue. I will refer back to the points that I made earlier. There is a combination of public and private investments and a balance between the Government's support and the Exchequer support, depending on the stage that individual sectors are at. Ultimately, we all share responsibility, including through consumer bills and industry bills, to support our transition. I do not think that it is a one-size-fits-all position. It is a very nuanced issue. The Treasury's strategy will set out our plans on the front. There has also been touched upon the risk of carbon leakage and how it can be mitigated. Can there be an agreement on carbon price and be reached at COP26? The point that you have raised is incredibly important and pertinent. What we are trying to resolve in Glasgow, on the road to and at Glasgow, is article 6, which is the Voluntary Carbon Markets. That is separate to perhaps the wider discussion that is going on in terms of carbon border adjustment mechanisms and wider issues on carbon leakage. I have been very clear not to conflate the two, but there is no doubt that, when it comes to sea bams, there is a very live discussion that is taking place. You will have seen the EU earlier this year set out their initial thoughts on that. From a COP26 perspective, this is not a mandated item. What we are trying to resolve is on article 6. Peter Hill has come back into view. I do not know whether Peter Hill wanted to add, because you have been having a lot of those discussions as well with the team. I support that completely. The issue of domestic and international carbon pricing is very lively and the relation of that to trade issues. As you say, it is not part of the formal COP agenda, but it is not yet ready for that sort of international agreement. I am absolutely sure that, whether through the G7, G20 or other fora, that discussion is only going to continue and gather pace in the months and years ahead. Of course, the strongest way of addressing those concerns is by the mitigation action that everybody takes. That is one of the reasons why it is so important in the next few weeks that all countries, G20 and others, come up with those plans and commitments, so that those issues are managed so that we can have them in a collaborative and co-operative way. Thank you very much, Collette. We are reaching the end of this session. That completes our questions and concludes the evidence session. Let me thank Mr Sharma and his colleagues once again for their unique insights into COP26. On behalf of the whole committee, we wish you the very best of luck for a successful outcome at the conference in Glasgow. Thank you very much and have a great day. That concludes the public evidence session.