 Well, a very warm welcome to you then. We were sure that Iran, so shortly after Iranian elections, would draw a bit of an audience. So a very warm welcome to you. And also to those who follow us on live stream. This is a session where we talk about the impact on the Iranian elections. My name is Ilke Temperer. I'm with the German Council on Foreign Relations. And I have the great pleasure to introduce this panel to you with Professor Mohammed Reza Farzanigan, who is with the Philippe University in Marburg and the Center of Economics at the head of the Center of Economics of the Near and Middle East there. And we have Daniel Galla, who is editor-in-chief of the magazine Zenit, founder also, who's founder of Candid Foundation and who is a frequent analyst of the Near and Middle East issues also on German and international media. Let me start with you, Professor Farzanigan. Yesterday, we could see that almost at the moment when the Ministry of Interior had published the first results of the Iranian elections, and it turned out that Mr. Rouhani, President Rouhani, would do a second term. High Representative Frederika Mogherini had tweeted it already, and then also said in one of the panels, also in one of the panels yesterday, that she seems to be pretty happy, because that means that we probably have the Iran nuclear deal intact. But apart from that, what would you say is the major impact of this election and President Rouhani serving a second term, mainly on foreign policy issues, and mainly because we're here in Jordan. That's, of course, a very important question on the region. Well, yes, thank you. I guess the message of this election and the results that we observe by participation of more than 70% of those who are eligible to vote was very much clear. The middle class in urban areas, major cities, major areas, were very much signaling the support for continuation of the government of Rouhani, which were promising more political stability and economic reform, despite the fact that the other candidates coming from the conservative parts were promising distribution of increasing of subsidies, cash payments, especially Mr. Raisi or Ghalibov, who later on did the resign and gave the space to Mr. Raisi as a support. Both of them were promising to increase the cash payment, direct cash payments to the people if they get elected. So the message and the majority of the people who voted for Rouhani was against this popular suspending. So as in almost every election also in Iran, this was mainly about national local issues. It was pretty much about the economy, apart from one thing, and that is economic reform, because this is so greatly tied to the sanctions regime and getting rid of the sanction regime. So do I guard it correctly that voting for Rouhani, Daniel Gerlach, was pretty much also voting for, how can we proceed with getting rid of the sanction regime so that we can open up, really? Yeah, it would be, but the problem is many Iranians haven't, or most Iranians probably, haven't felt the positive impact of the so-called nuclear deal yet. And that's been the main argument of Hassan Rouhani's challenger, Ibrahim Raisi, that he said, you do not care about the plight of the majority of Iranians who are suffering economically. I think it was a real, the reason why Rouhani won was not because his economic policy was successful. It was because people knew him better and because the contender, Raisi, was not known to them and was not sympathetic to them. I think Rouhani was, he could have been beaten on economic terms even by another challenger, because the economic situation in Iran is not to the satisfaction of the majority of the Iranians at the moment, and they also blame, or many of them also blame the international community, the Americans, for their plight. So I think I take this with a grain of salt. I don't think that people are happy because everything is going so well in Iran. I think there's also a foreign policy factor to it, which is that Iranians at the moment feel insecure by the situation in the Middle East, but they also see that Rouhani is somebody who represents not only a voice of reason and somebody who's reaching out, as he said, to other countries and wants to engage in freeway with the international community, but also as somebody who is pretty solid on security and he knows, he's a former security official and he knows security concerns and he takes it seriously. And I think that is one of the reasons why people trusted him for a second term. Let's stick with the foreign policy agenda then, Professor Faisal Negan, because he is Rouhani and obviously people do care a lot about security and it's about the situation in the Middle East. Now, how much of a leverage does the president in Iran really have on foreign policy or is it rather the revolutionary guards, the spiritual, the supreme leader who call the shots when it comes to foreign policy and that means shaping the region the way Iran in different ways will come to that, it's shaping the region right now. I guess, again, the major supporters of Rouhani who are educated, media class intellectuals send a clear signal also to our neighbor countries, including the Saudi Arabia, because the major part of the support that the Raisi and Ghalibov and the other candidates had were also maybe classified, recognized as those who had a more harsher approach to maybe the Saudi Arabia diplomacy. So the point is that was also a critical point that Rouhani were mentioning that the major supporter of Mr. Raisi and Ghalibov indeed will bring Iran to the earlier stage like during the Ahmadinejad increase in the tension. So these are words which the people gave to the Rouhani signalized the willingness of the average citizen in Iran for pacifying the situation, and for that reason, I guess our neighbors in Iran, around us, especially from the Arab world, will get also this measure from the civil society in Iran that the future of Iran is looking for a more stabilization of the region and better relationship with the Arab neighbors. And I guess the president, especially Mr. Rouhani, will have a leverage on the coordinating different interests within the system. He has been successful in bringing right and left together, and this success now, with the majority support of the waters, has been amplified and will be amplified, and I'm very much optimistic that the situation. Well, I'm not, to be honest, I'm not so optimistic. The big misunderstanding has always been that international diplomats and politicians thought, yeah, we're dealing with Iran. We can negotiate with the Iranians. We are successful. We can build relationships of trust, but in fact, then the big frustration comes that they say the people that we are dealing with, the gentle face, let's say, of the government is not necessarily those that call the shots on security policy terms, and this is going to be the big challenge for the government of Rouhani because I tend to compare the Iranian engagement in Syria, for example, as somebody who's sending an A360 airbus into the air without knowing if on the other side, where he's actually sending the airplane, there is a runway to land this plane. And the Iranians have publicly admitted this, like reasonable diplomats have said, we have no real exit strategy. We have started this, we have been drawn into this conflict because we wanted to have some kind of a proactive security policy. We have no allies in the region, so we could not afford to lose Syria and Iraq, but they have no exit strategy to get out of the mess, and I think the real challenge for Rouhani is going to be somehow to pull the security-related foreign policy issues, namely Syria and Iraq, out of the hands of the Revolutionary Guards, but Iran has the National Security Council. The Supreme Leader selects also the members of the Security Council, but the Revolutionary Guards are there, and influential people, the President is one voice in the National Security Council, but he's not the one who is, as I said, calling the shots in this council, and this is going to be the big challenge because the Revolutionary Guards have different interests and a different view on foreign policy, and we see the results. And different stakes in foreign policy. Of course, of course. So the general situation, correct me if I'm wrong, will be that President Rouhani, on one hand, got a bit of a mandate by the civil society, of course, which longs for an end of isolation, better relations in the neighborhood, a better security situation, a better economic situation, but he could, in a hybrid system like Iran, where there are so many conflicting interests or so, he could face a situation where he's basically stopped short in this endeavor by the more conservative voices connected with the Revolutionary Guards, who basically say, well, you can show you a really nice face and your charming offensive here and there, but actually, we do have real tough interests in Syria. We are very much engaged. Plus, he would have to also justify that there are more and more casualties in Syria, which has an impact on the Iranian society. So how is he going to proceed on this? How is he going to sort out this gordic knot? Well, Revolutionary Guards, of course, they are not only a military institution, but they are quite active also in domestic Iranian economy and international economy. That's probably an understatement. Big infrastructures and so forth. For that reason, I guess, they are also not that happy with the isolation of the Iranian economy. They were suffering from international sanctions and the financial system of Iran, because for their own major project in oil industry, they were needed this banking system, international banking connection and so on. And for sure, they were maybe at the beginning, they had this calculation that they get the larger size of Iranian domestic market if the total and share lived the country, but over the time, especially after the oil embargo of 2012 and the central banking sanctions and to 2013, they realized also the painful part of the side of the sanctions. So I guess they are also not promoting the isolation of Iranian economics and politics for their own benefit. The interest is that Iran become more integrated international markets, especially for Rouhani. The major challenge after the election is the very big rescission, given the fact that inflation rate is under control, is reducing significantly from 40% in 2013 now under just below the 10%, but the cost was too high. The liquidity is collected by the bank, so the use on implement rate is increasing. So as increased by 3% in a matter of three years, so three to four percent. So the major concern or the major winning card of the Raisi and Galipov against the Rouhani was this rescission and what he wants to do because the four years in the power, so they didn't neglect somehow the success, the story of reduction of inflation, but the cost was rescission. FDIs are still very low during the first office of Rouhani foreign direct investment. That's not good in all the details of the Iranian economy because we need to get the big picture and I will ask you in a second about how we can help economically. But upon the revolution, you got the role of revolution, you got a bit exaggerated, the negative image of revolution, you got, they have a leverage but their interest sometimes also converts the interest of the Rouhani international. Look, at the nominations of ambassadors to Syria and Iraq at the moment, both people are bred in the security guard environment, the revolutionary guard environment, both of them are, let's say, individuals very well connected to the leadership of the revolutionary guards. You can see that there is a priority in placing people with a security IGRC background into the other countries in the Middle East and that also tells, I think, something about the policy and the attitude and the perspective of Iran's foreign and security policy on the region at the moment. Which makes it hard for Rouhani to pursue his politics, doesn't it? Exactly, but let's look at the challenge of Rouhani with respect, with regard to the international environment. Many Western analysts thought that Iranians would react to the election of President Trump by electing, by voting for a conservative on their side. Of course, that's not the way it goes. Elections and this is much more complex than that but at the moment it really feels like Rouhani is staging himself as the voice of reason. The day that he gets reelected and that he claims we want to reach out to the world, we want to engage in dialogue and remain open to other countries, President Trump is in Saudi Arabia signing gazillion billion dollar weapons deals and explicitly saying that his priority is the rollback of Iran in the region. And that doesn't mean by political and diplomatic terms alone. So, Rouhani has to justify why he's still engaging with the West in that context but that shows also that this self-enactment of being a voice of reason is somehow appealing to the international community and he got reelected. Let me ask you one question and you have to give a short answer and it will be an advice before we go into the audience because we have a lot of knowledgeable people here who I believe will have plenty of questions. I've mentioned High Representative Mogherini's optimism after the election results came out. So, what would you advise her to do to strengthen this politics of reason, as you call it, that seemed to make a few things easier, keeping the nuclear deal? What would you advise her to do or what would you advise her for the Europeans to make this happen, to get Iran more out of the isolation, to be much more of a force-coming partner, let's put it that way, in the regional context? One short advice you've got to do. Delivering the promises that they have given to Iran following the Iran deal because Rohan is in a difficult situation. Iran has implemented whatever that they wanted from controlling the ATOM program and all other standards and so on has complied, but there are lots of difficulties still in giving the services, especially in the financial banking section system, which is a big concern. If you don't want it in the next four years, a populist person, maybe, right, you see, come and all these accumulated experience collapse again. I guess the major contribution of European international commenting in the United States is just to delivering those promises that they... We do know that it's connected to a part to the sanctions by the Americans, which are connected to the human rights record and the Europeans only have a limited leverage to get rid of those. Daniel, what's your advice? It's not only the Europeans or the Western world that needs to deliver, by the way, Mohammad Reza. I think we don't have the time to formulate a serious policy recommendation here, but I think the Europeans should not be tricked by this narrative of politics of reason. Yeah, there's a reason in it, but there's also... You mentioned it. Well, I said he's trying to present himself as the voice of reason, but on the other hand, you have to see, there is negative impact and negative consequence of a proactive Iranian foreign policy in the region, but what I think is paramount is, to a certain extent, it's natural that Iran is engaging and is trying to influence the destiny of the region in its own interest. And I think... And clashing with other countries' interests. And that needs to be... That needs to be... I don't want to use the term contained because that could be misunderstood, but that needs to be tackled, but a military rollback of Iran, as some people seem to intend it at the moment from the region, is going to end in a disaster. And I think, taking seriously the security concerns of Iran in the region, but at the same time, showing its limits, I think, that is very important. And that is... It's not easy to accomplish. Obviously. Your questions, ladies and gentlemen, if you'd quickly introduce yourself, we start in the first... Obviously, we start in the first. Oh, we go here and then we go to you. Do we have a microphone, or can we do without a microphone? Then we have it right here with the gentleman in the first row. Quick introduction and a quick question. Pierre Chemin, I represent the company called Tarket. We are a worldwide flooring producer. And I've been going to Iran since 1997 against the orthodoxies of sanctions. We are doing very well there, knowing Iran very well and knowing the hard line position of the hierarchy in Iran, who is really working against what the population wants. And today, the majority of the population under 30, they voted for the status quo with the hope that the sanctions will move forward in a positive way. Do you think the hardliners can really keep stopping the new wave of revolution that could happen starting from the youth? The youth of today have got it really bad and they need a change. How can the hardliners stop that? Thank you. Shall I comment? Yes, please do. Okay. And you can give the microphone. But answer your question first. You mentioned, I mean, one way of, one consequence of this modernization in Iran has been expansion of media class. Most of the young population use bulge that we know between 15, 24 years old. At the time of Ahmadinejad, it was 35% of the adult population, the youth bulge. Right now in 2017, it's just reduced to 18%. And the prediction of the World Bank simulated that in 2015, it approached it to 10%. So I guess also there's studies in economics when it comes to how institution affects the political stability. These youths bulge is quite important. The critical tertial, which Samuel Huntington in his book in the clash of civilization also mentioned before all major revolution, political protests recognize these specific demographic characteristics. The youth bulge was beyond of 20%. So in future, this burden, this demographic burden will reduce in Iran. So we are not observing a significant agents of the change in coming because of the demographic transition in Iran. So at least that reduced the risk of political conflict in the forthcoming years, according to my view, but we're not eliminated. As we also recognize high educational attainment in Iran, expanding media class in Iran is not really happy with social restrictions in different dimensions. So they are challenging that. Fortunately, Iran is not the autocratic regime. It's a combination of different elements from democracy to less democratic system. And the population. Democratic is a nice way to put it. And the people still, as you already recognize, 70%, 80% of people participate in elections, sometimes in parliamentary elections. And so they reflect their views. To put it in one line, the rich kids driving around on Tehran streets with expensive cars and bragging around are now the children of what you call the hardliners, not anymore than ones of the old bourgeoisie. And that is that also, like, of course, corruption plays a role. But this image tells a lot about the demographic, economic, and probably the political and ideological change. And just a quick reminder, there was a lot of talk about the youth bulge and the young generation wanting change under Khatami's presidency. And that was when he was elected into office, surprisingly, as Iran offered so many surprises in the late 90s. Now, Khatami has been isolated politically totally. I don't think that you even can show his pictures these days or photos. And we are talking again about the youths. And actually, the conservatives, remember, 2009, have been really good in crashing this. So we go to you, please, ask a question. Good morning. My name is Nerozglund. I'm from Statoil. I have a question. Has Rouhani come out of this election stronger than he did in his first election? And what does that really mean? Is he able to introduce more efficiently his new policies? And what is the Rafsanjani effect that Rafsanjani is not there now to support him? Just before going to answer this, quick look at my watch. If you have more questions, this will be your chance now, if the panelists will answer it. Daniel, will you start? Very difficult. Did he come out of this stronger than out of the last elections? I think he did, yeah. I think he did. And the people, I think it's even good that he could do this without the support of Rafsanjani. There was a gamble. Would the loss of Rafsanjani harm his turnout in the election? Or would it be to his benefit? I think, taking into account the harsh criticism that was also uttered by the conservatives and by the political opponents of Rouhani, directed against Rafsanjani, explicitly directed against Rafsanjani, Rafsanjani could have been also a liability in particular in economic policy terms. The big challenge is going to be not only who is going to be the next president of Iran after Rouhani, but who is going to be the next supreme leader. That's the third rail of Iranian politics. That's where the power lies. And this is, of course, the debate that you do not find in public and that people try to avoid. But that doesn't mean that they don't make up their minds about what they think the future is going to be. Can I perhaps turn a question around and give it to you? Has the election results, have they weakened the chances for Raisi, who has obviously had hopes to become the successor of Ali Khamenei? Have they weakened his chances to become the successor to Ali Khamenei? He never had a chance. He never had a chance? No. What do you think? Well, it shows that he is not the first option, at least in the civil society. To what extent this is an important criteria to be elected or to be nominated, appointed as a supreme leader is not quite clear, because the other characteristic, necessarily, is required, is demanded for being as a supreme leader, not necessarily the public, major public support. So I am not very pessimistic that he is not, later on, nominated for one option for supreme leader. So it's still open. There's no guarantee. And as always, in Iran, open for surprises. Candidates, we thought, had a chance, turned out not to have ever had a chance, and so on. But what we'll see is definitely an attempt by a president who's been elected into office to sort of strengthen the voter base that has put him into this office. We will see him keep him struggling with more conservative parts of college shots when it comes to foreign policy. And this election result, sorry to jump in here, not only proves the resilience and the amazing talent for political survival of Rohani, but of Khamenei, because the way he presented himself as a proud supporter of this election, the pictures, he called on everybody, he said, every single vote counts. Well, let's remember that in 2009, he bound his political destiny to a candidate called Ahmadinejad, which was probably the worst mistake in his political career. Yeah, but he survived that. And he survived. And he is not challenged in question. And what we will also see, just to sort of sum this up, is definitely also in Iran beat under Rohani in a different way that is pursuing its interests in the region, and that will put some of the partners also still into, or we'll put a challenge to some of the partners also in the region. We're reaching the end here. So we have to stop this. I know we could have gone on to talk about Iran because it's such an interesting topic and such a diverse political landscape. I thank you for your questions and for coming here. And I thank, of course, the panelists for giving us their insights. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.