 Thank you, Jordi. There is, in fact, one question from Philippe, Philippe Lane. Okay, so sorry to jump in. Thanks, Jordi, for very interesting paper. And of course, any of us, including myself, who have lived through real estate and boom bus cycle, can appreciate the economics of misallocation, the excess capital accumulation in the non-traded sector, and so on. But I suppose I have two quick questions, which I suppose will always come up with any paper, which in a multi-policy financial crisis, one is, you know, the risk factor, which maybe you don't have in your framework of the anchoring inflation expectations. So in other words, if you run a tighter multi-policy, and you see inflation persistently below targets, because, you know, you fear this misallocation, there's a prone to calm. I think in the Woodford 2012 paper, that prone to calm is kind of addressed, but essentially a non-linearity, the further away you are from 2%, maybe the kind of a more reluctant to, the radius is more of a trade-off. And then I'm not too sure I noticed it in the paper, whether macro-prudential can do it all. So if you had a macro-prudential instrument, does it, or fiscal, because in a property boom, if you have kind of fiscal taxes on property sector, and so on, maybe that can do it. So of course, it's just interesting to know whether those exist or not, but I don't know if you've had yet a time in this framework to think about those dimensions. Yes, well, thanks, Philip. Those are very interesting and important questions. Regarding the second one, we ignore macro-prudential policy in our model deliberately. It is clear that the nature of the distortion is real, it's not monetary, and hence that there may be more natural tools to confront it. The first thing that may come to mind is maybe attacks on capital, something that capital accumulation, but of course, that raises also interesting issues because, you know, that tax is distortionary and may generate steady state with inefficiently low capital and output and so on. So these things are to be taken into account. Now, the way we have deliberately restricted ourselves to monetary policy, just for simplicity, and because we want to think of our framework as, or we want to think of a situation in which other tools are unable to completely eliminate the risk of financial crisis. So there's always some residual role for central bank to do, and there may be 100 reasons for this. One that to me sounds very plausible is that if the other tools are in the hands of a government, it will be reluctant to use them in order to stop the boom or to dampen the boom. And that's when an independent institution like a central bank may need to step in to correct the resulting distortions or problems. Okay. Now, so again, it would be interesting, you know, to incorporate also microprudential tools and see what there is some sort of interaction and so on. Okay. But that's not what we do at this point. Now, regarding your first question, yes, I agree. I mean, we use a simple rule that is linear. And at this point, we have played with this simple rule. On the other hand, we solve the model for the model nonlinearly, so nothing should prevent us from using nonlinear rules in the future. And I think that the rules of the sort that you were, nonlinear rules of the sort that you were pointing to could be interesting to examine. We haven't done so. Thanks for the suggestion. Thank you. We have a couple of questions also still in the pipeline, one from Alejandro van der Goethe. Let me read it out. How different is your capital accumulation channel to a standard bank network channel? In the standard channel, banks can accumulate net worth over time. And with more net worth, they can purchase more physical capital and provide more financing to firms. More generally, how does your overall monetary transmission mechanism differ from that in other New Keynesian models with endogenous financial crisis whose financial sectors are built on, say, BGG 1989 mechanism, such as Mendoza et al. and van der Goethe et al. Yes. So that's a question that would, it's an important question that would take a require a long time because there are many models with financial friction. So what should go on a case-by-case basis? Let me just say that in our model, we don't have this kind of balance sheet effects that models Labernac, Gilchrist have, for instance. And instead, the loan market is perfectly competitive. There are no banks in our model. And the novelty, I think, of our framework, relative to those, the others, is that these financial fragility arises because of capital accumulation. And because of decreasing returns to capital, the decreasing return to investment that results from excessive capital accumulation. And that brings the economy closer to a situation in which there is an incentive for unproductive firms to misallocate their resources and hence situation in which borrowing constraints have to be tightened endogenously. So as opposed to most of the models in the literature, borrowing constraint is an endogenous one, and it varies over time depending on the state of the economy. Thank you. There is one last question. Maybe I can read it out for you from Klaus Mazuch. You showed that the monetary policy rule that strongly leans against output fluctuations or excessive capital accumulation provides extra insurance to households lowering precautionary savings and probability of crisis. Does this imply that monetary policy via change to its policy rule can increase the natural rate of interest, at least in good times? So monetary policy, after all, can have an impact on the natural rate? That's his question. Well, I guess one should see how the natural rate is defined here. If the natural rate is defined as the equilibrium interest rate in the absence of phenomenal rigidities, for instance, and in the absence of financial frictions, that would be one definition. Now, a monetary policy that cannot have an impact on the natural rate in our model. However, what happens in our model, instead, we didn't bring at this point the concept of the natural rate into our analysis. It may be useful to do in the future, but I can tell you what happens is that it is optimal for the central bank to defiate from the natural rate. In particular, it is optimal for the central bank to, in the face of an excessive or the capital accumulation or what may be perceived as the beginning of a potential run-up to a crisis, it may be optimal. It will be optimal for the central bank to increase the interest rate above the natural rate in contrast with what would be the prescription in the standard New Keynesian model without financial frictions. Thank you. Let me take one last question, really, from Oresta Tristani. The literature has pointed out various reasons why deviations from perfect price stability may be desirable. Can you speculate on how powerful the mechanism in your paper is compared to others? Yes, that's, of course, that's a question that one principle should address quantitatively. Now, as you say, Oresta, there are many reasons why the central bank may want to deviate from price stability. Some of them really mundane if you want the presence of sticky wages, the presence of cost-poor shocks, and so on. All these things call in our models for departures from a strict inflation target. Now, we think that obviously those are all important, but those apply if you want on a day-to-day basis, in normal times. I think ours is one that should be in the minds of central banks in situations in which the risk of excessive capital accumulation occurs, and in that case, well, the potential consequences are huge. We know that from the recent experience in the great financial crisis. We're not talking here about the small distortions, we're not talking about relative wage distortions, we're not talking about situations in which there may be some deviation between the natural level of output and the efficient level of output because of small changes in distortionary taxes or desired mark-ups and so on. We're talking about the risks of financial crises in which a good chunk of output is lost in a persistent way in which there are huge employment losses and so on. This is more than I would say it's a first order relative to the kind of deviations, relative to the kind of factors that may call for deviations from price stability that we usually have in our models. Okay, thanks a lot Jordy for this paper. It's very interesting with a strongly, I would say, strongly Austrian economics flavor to it. Let's move to Juri Goronichenko, whom I see already on the call. Thank you.