 I lead module two of the Global Comparative Study on Red, which is the one that is focused on subnational initiatives, subnational initiatives, of course, are otherwise known as project. These are the locations, the specific locations on the ground where Red is rolled up. And so research in this area is important because it is the proof of concept of whether Red is working. And so for the last five going on six years, we have been doing research on the ground in six countries, those being Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam. We've been doing research at 23 different subnational initiatives in those countries. And the research has been carried out in 190 villages and over 4,500 households. It's in comparison to Red as a whole, it's a rather small sample, but arguably has a degree of representativeness, in other words, we can extrapolate lessons from what we've been doing to Red as a whole. If you have questions about that later on, just let me know, and I will explain what I mean. We are conducting our research through an approach that we are calling BACI, which stands for Before, After, Control, and Intervention. It's a research approach that aims to prove semi-experimentally what has happened when Red has been implemented on the ground. So early on in the first two years, I'm sorry, the first three years of our research, we collected what we're calling the before data, before Red conditional incentives. And over the course of the last year and a half, we've been collecting the so-called after data, and I mentioned that there's 190 villages, half of those are inside of Red, half are outside, and likewise, the households, which gives us an ability to compare the effect of Red in areas under the effect of its influence and areas that are statistically matched that are outside of it. Before I go any further, I just want to say that I have a couple of colleagues here Desta Pratama and Claudio DeSasi, I've asked them to help me with any difficult questions that may emerge specifically on Indonesia and also on safeguards. So here's what I intend to cover. I will give you some additional background on what we've been doing in our research project. And then I will focus on research findings in these five areas right here, and these findings have to do with the challenges of actually implementing Red on the ground. The difficulties that have been encountered by Red proponent organizations and why these particular topics, because in compiling our book, the cover of the book is on the left-hand side of the slide. It's called Red on the Ground. In pulling together this book late last year, we identified these as being among the major challenges that are faced, those being finances and tenure, scale, measuring reporting and verification, and safeguards. Now, I'll tell you now that in the course of my talk, I will give special attention to, or more attention, disproportionate attention to finances and tenure, and I'll explain to you why I'm doing that later on. By the way, this, Nia's going to be sharing our presentations later on, and this one will be included, of course, and for going in depth to learn about some of the things that I'm discussing, I highly recommend seeing the book, which is online, and within this presentation, there's a link directly to the book at the end. Okay, I think I probably covered most of this background. I haven't said that the overall aim of our scientific study is to identify what is it that works, and what is it that is not working in implementing Red on the Ground? What is it, what activities of the proponents are aiming for success and what are not, and how, what can we learn from these insights in order to improve Red? We are, as are most of the modules, actually all of the modules, giving attention to measuring the 3E plus criteria, carbon effectiveness, cost efficiency, equity among the various stakeholders, the well-being of local stakeholders, their rights, and also biodiversity at the sites. And as I mentioned earlier, this is being done through surveys, household surveys, village surveys, a survey specific to women for understanding of the gender dimension, surveys of proponents, as well as other stakeholders, and through remote sensing data. This is a map showing where our study sites are. I've mentioned the countries, and these are abbreviated names of the 23 sites where we are conducting our work. This gives you some idea of the very wide range of the sites in our sample. Typically, they cover any from 650 to 6,500 square kilometers, a few are smaller, a few are larger, and in fact, the size of medium-sized countries. Seventeen are in the tropical west zone, and six are in the dry zone, particularly those that are in Tanzania. Thirteen are private non-profit, four are private for-profit, four are public sector, two are mixed private and public. To date, mostly, they rely on public sector funding rather than private funding, and that's part of the problem of red right now. I'll explain more about that later on. Seventeen operate at the project scale, and six are at the jurisdictional scale, by which it's meant that they correspond to an area of government administration, like a district or a province or a state, and tend to be run under the aegis of government authority. Many of these sites were engaged in conservation at the site prior to red. This is important for reasons that I will explain later. Eighteen of them are continuing, of which fifteen are calling themselves red, and some have chosen not to call themselves red anymore, and five have ceased operations. In the book, this is the kind of information that you'll find. There are chapters on each one of the initiatives, and it covers information on where, who, why, and when, the strategy of the proponent organizations. There's a strong focus on the local stakeholders and their villages, including information on their livelihoods and their degree of dependence on their forest and their deforestation activities. There's strong attention to the challenges experienced by the proponents in getting red underway, and we also at the end of each chapter draw insights on what is unique and special about the site and what insights it communicates for red as a whole. Now I'll turn my attention to each of these five themes, starting with finances. Of the 23, so far, after red being underway for six or seven years, there are only four that are selling forest carbon credits, and a larger database on red and a study on all sites published last year shows that that's roughly the proportion worldwide. As I mentioned earlier, most of the funding currently is coming from bilateral and other public sources rather than the private sector. And less than half have made conditional payments of any kind, and those conditional payments, for the most part, are experimental. These are trials in preparation for red. And most emphasize non-conditional livelihood enhancements rather than conditional ones. As you know, the heart of red was aiming to create a system of performance-based conditional livelihood enhancements. So the fact that these sites emphasize non-conditional livelihood enhancements is important because one of the main approaches for stopping deforestation worldwide prior to red called ICDP, or Integrated Conservation and Development Project, is essentially a tandem between restricting access to forest locally and compensating local people with livelihood opportunities, but non-conditional ones. The key innovation in red was to be to introduce the conditional element, giving leverage for stopping deforestation. So as I just mentioned, the original idea of red was to be based on a performance-based reward system and that the funding would come not from the state, not from the public sector, but after a brief interlude of public sector support, it would turn to the international market for carbon offsets. And the essence of the idea was to pay for the opportunity cause of forest conservation. In other words, to compensate those who refrain from deforestation. Those costs have been, there are many estimates published, but most gravitate between five to 12 and a half billion dollars per year. And the overall intent of this is for red and forest protection to effectively compete with those land uses that convert forest to non-forest uses. And completing this is that MRV is very, very important as part of the totality of what red aims for to assure that sequestration is achieved in a verifiable, provable way. But the current status of red as a whole right now is that the total amount of funding for red generated over the last six or seven years is 10 billion dollars. And recall what I said that the opportunity cost estimate is can be as high as that just per year. 90% of that is public sector funding and only 10% from the private sector. The forest carbon market is fairly weak and volatile, unstable, unpredictable. In our prior book on red, Analyzing Red, there's a chapter on the edification of red, in other words, the steering away from the original intent and continuing to be dependent on the public sector. The peak in contributions from countries to red public sector financing happened in 2010 and then tended to go down afterwards. It's possible that there's a resumed, a turn to increase in contributions with the establishment of the Green Climate Fund. So I mentioned polycentric governance here, essentially what that refers to. It's a term used by Nobel Prize winner Eleanor Ostrom in 2010. After the failure of a strong red agreement to be reached at the Copenhagen COP that year, the idea of the green gain currency then is that red could simply build in a decentralized fashion without guidance from international governments, from international policy, that through experimentation it could thrive. But we are beginning to discover the limits of that. Yes, many red projects have experimented innovatively in some ways successfully, but for the most part, as I mentioned this morning, red is treading water. Why the financing deficit? There are various reasons, but I would argue that one of the main reasons is the absence of action in producing a binding international climate change agreement internationally. Why is this important? Because the private market in trading forest carbon credits ideally requires a conducive regulatory environment. What is meant by that? A system of regulation or cap and trades that essentially requires emitters to compensate for their emissions, and one way they can do that, an attractive way potentially, is to buy credits. Another part of the problem is, as I mentioned earlier, the frailty of the forest carbon market. I highly recommend an article by a C4 scientist named Jacob Phelps, written several years ago, much of it's still true now, about the various reasons why the forest carbon market is weak. Filling out the picture is that the essence of the problem, and this was touched on this morning, is that those interests in society, in each country, tropical forest country, the legacy of the past, the momentum of the past continues, a past where some of the stronger elements in society that derive political or economic benefit from conversion of forest and non-forest uses tend to continue to have the upper hand in competition with those bodies, interests, organizations in society that are trying to protect forests. Not always, but in most cases. I now turn my attention to tenure. As we know, tenure tends to be a problem in the forest sector in tropical developing countries. Historically, it's been a problem in all countries in the world that are forested, and the problem goes a long way back, hundreds of years, because there's been a tendency for the state when it has emerged to seize control of forests as state property for strategic reasons. I won't go into those right now, but they're hugely relevant to the forest scene and to red as well. So it is no surprise that in a study we found within our sample that proponents rate tenure as their number one challenge. I'll say more about that in a moment. Now, in spite of these large challenges, what we found in our study is that proponents are engaged very earnestly in trying to address these tenure problems. Why is this important? Because the early critique of red is that it could not be compatible with rights, and that governments, because they have a history of not recognizing the rights of forest peoples, and by extension proponent organizations probably would not respect rights. But somewhat to our surprise, there's actually a very strong dedication and initiative on the part of proponents to addressing these issues on the ground, and there is what I would call an instrumental logic to it, a means ends. In other words, for reasons that I'll explain in a moment, it's absolutely essential for these tenure issues to be resolved. It doesn't mean that there isn't an ethical dimension, because there is. Many of these proponent organizations are driven by an ethical mandate, and that's an additional, in some cases, fundamental reason for giving attention to tenure in setting up red. This is from a study that we did three years ago. Sorry the numbers are so small, but this is just to give you a snapshot of some of the reasons why tenure is so important at our study sites. This is drawn from 17 of our 23 sites in all six, I'm sorry, in five of the six study countries, Peru is not yet included. Essentially what it points out is that this is a count of a number of villages, that in over half of the study villages there was at least a portion of the village that had tenure security problems. Almost two thirds of them had external use of local forest lands, and more than a quarter of them were cases where the use of local forest was actually prohibited, and at one in six local people tried to exclude that use, but failed to do so. Why is this important? Because of course, Red aims to have a stable local forest management structure that successfully protects forests, and under these conditions, in many cases, they simply could not do so without attention to clarifying and strengthening local tenure. Here I'll give you just a synopsis of a brief that we produced and distributed at the COP in Peru. On the basic reasons why, again, for instrumental reasons, proponent organizations do take an interest and ought to take an interest in tenure. The first reason has to do with setting up the conditions for selling forest carbon credits through the conditional system that I mentioned before. In order to do so, you absolutely have to identify the rightful owner to that stream of benefits, and those same people are actually the bearers of responsibility for keeping forests standing. Second, it's important to clarify tenure to shield participants against the possibility of a resource rush. What is meant by that? If there is a new commodity in the forest, and that is carbon, the more value that carbon has, the more likely it is that there will be local stakeholders, and in some cases, outside stakeholders who try to lay claim to it, possibly to the disadvantage of the local stakeholders, and possibly resulting in instability of the red project. Third, of course, there are circumstances in which forests are best protected with strong local tenure rights, not always, but in many cases, and so red often, and especially in cases where local tenure arrangements are not protecting forests, they either try to strengthen or introduce, for example, community forestry, and in some cases, they try to bring in community forestry institutions as a platform, as a foundation on which to build a functioning red. Fourth, for reasons that I mentioned earlier, it's very important for red to have effective rights of exclusion to, for local people, if they are successively going to be compensated for keeping forest standing, they need to make sure that not only are their actions protected, but protected not only from the inside but from outside claimants as well. And fifth, and certainly not least important, we do know that in every country among departments and ministries and government, there are conflicting goals, and these conflicting goals are, in some cases, what contributes to deforestation, and so resolving those conflicting lands uses is part and parcel of making red effective. I mentioned earlier that I would explain why I'm giving strong attention to finances and tenure, and this is the main reason. We did a study two years ago. We interviewed all the proponent organizations in depth. We presented them with a list of 62 factors that could make red difficult to implement. We defined them and described them, and then we asked them to rate each one of these factors on a scale from one to five, one being no problem five being an overwhelming difficulty, and having evaluated each of those 62 factors and classified them, what came out on top was tenure, even more important than finances. Not by a large margin. They're both very important, but tenure came out as most important with the finances close behind. Now I turn to the issue of scale. I mentioned earlier that six of our 23 initiatives are jurisdictional and character. Now potentially the jurisdictional approach gives a lot of leverage for having red succeed. Why? Because it has the authority of the state behind it, because potentially it gives you the possibility for resolving contradictions, conflicts, and contestation among departments and ministries. But to the extent, and Indonesia is a good example of this, that you have some of the business as usual interests embedded in different ministries, sometimes those interferences with the agenda of red play themselves out at the jurisdictional scale and make it difficult for jurisdictional scale red to succeed. And one of the things we're learning in studying our jurisdictional level red is that here we take an example from Ulu Masen in Aceh in Western Indonesia, which has essentially come to a halt. Why? Because the governor who championed red, who was the standard bearer for red for years, got voted out of office, and the new governor simply did not like red. That's unfair. He's in favor of forest-based climate change mitigation, but he simply wants to take a different approach, and so far it is not red. So jurisdictional red is subject to frailty. It's vulnerable to electoral politics, and a potential antidote to that is to have red institutions embedded in laws and regulations so that they can survive electoral discontinuity. MRV. In our sample, we discovered that the capabilities of the proponent organizations in MRV were highly uneven, and this tended to be reflected in the records of different countries, and this matched what we found in other studies that we found. There was slow progress on the monitoring of small-scale mosaic deforestation and degradation, and this is important in relation to understanding the consequences of activities of local stakeholders, of course, and that the diversity of emission sources across the sites points to the importance of locally tailored MRV systems. I won't say much here because we will have a presentation on MRV later on. And last of the five, here I turn to the issue of safeguards. What we found in our study is that, on average, households, not just in the red sites, but also outside, were largely dependent on agriculture, and that agriculture in many cases, for its continuity, depended on clearing some forests locally. And about 40% of the households in the two years prior to the interview had cleared some forests for that purpose. This is not surprising, but these are important numbers to understand in relation to knowing what it is that red is trying to accomplish and what it's up against, and as I mentioned, there is a tremendous variability in these numbers. So, given that part of what red aims to do is to constrain access to forest resources, then livelihoods are potentially at risk from red interventions, and part of the logic, again, of both ICDP and red is to create alternatives and compensations to minimize the impact of this. But the results of our study show that local stakeholders are very concerned about the effect of red on their income and their well-being. And although proponents offer a wide range of sustainable agriculture alternatives and other alternatives, it might be challenging for them to deploy a strategy that works well, given the high variability in types of sources of livelihood, not only across sites, but also within sites. And the graphic, I'm sorry, is rather small, but it essentially lists horizontally the names of all of the sites and shows the percentage of household income, average household income, disaggregated between income from crops, the dark blue, light blue is from livestock, and the green is income from forests. Okay, and this is my concluding slide. Again, the initial aim of red was to have this relatively large stream of funding to create a system of performance-based incentives. And the prospect of this funding has encouraged proponent organizations to establish red and to experiment with it. But what we found is that this is difficult to implement under the current situation where there is no secure long-term funding. It might happen under conceivable circumstances, but right now it simply is not there. And so once the enabling conditions are right, red as originally envisioned and framed could emerge. And among the enabling conditions that we can imagine are, as I mentioned earlier, in the international climate agreement might be the key for stimulating the conditions where the finances are not only ample enough, but also stable. Funding for carbon and complementary benefits could result. There needs to be a tenure foundation that motivates conservation and also protects against external threats. That's very clear. As I mentioned earlier, it's a very good idea to embed red in-state institutions and to shelter it from electoral politics. And it is essential to design social safeguards based on a detailed understanding of the wide variability of local livelihoods. I will stop there. Thank you for your attention. I'll answer questions if you have any. We finally have enough time to take all your questions, so I hope I don't have to stop it in the middle while everyone wants to have questions. And I invite Desta, as well, to sit up front because he also helped with the work and is also ready to take questions. May I ask you all just to say your name briefly as you begin your question, so I will know who to direct the answer to. And then Eya, thank you very much for the nice presentation, very clear. But I want clarification about just this slide. Embed red plus in-state institutions and shelter from electoral politics without... I want clarification on this, what is the basis and what's the experience from other countries who have shared experience from Indonesia. Since you did the research in many different countries, I want clarification for this idea. Thank you. Okay, thank you. My name is Eya. Okay, my question is about the sub-national and what is the difference, what is the pros and cons of sub-national and project-level rate projects. I'm sorry. The difference between sub-national and project level, what is the pros and cons to implement this type of project and following the same durational level and landscape level. There are landscape level rate projects and durational or sub-national level. They have pros and cons. What is the pros and cons of these two types of approaches? You have also mentioned about safeguards, but you treated only the social aspect of the safeguard. I didn't hear about the environmental aspect of the safeguard. These are my questions. I was also really happy to be here today because we have really excellent presentations from C4 experts, scientists. Of course, there are questions that always are really not easy to answer in most of us, but I believe we will have answers here. People talk about nested approach. Of course, sub-national at different levels and there is national. I don't know if this is maybe if you are the right expert here, I would like to know how does it really work? Where should we target constructing our reference levels? Where should we end? Do we have to go down to the smallest village or should we stop somewhere at the province or region level? And how is it linked with the beneficiary and really I have problems on this nested approach. People talk a lot about it, but it is not even for us, for the experts, it's not really that clear, let alone the policy decision makers. So we need really some help here. And I see that you have really covered a lot of cases from really across all continents, more or less tropical regions. How do you really get the confidence or frustration of these proponents? Project frustration or maybe confidence of proponents in terms of really this scheme, red plus scheme with respect to really, will it really work or there is might be some really mistrust between developed and developing countries because developed countries always want to delay the process because they don't want to anyway release funding. And developing countries are really working hard, they want to save their forests, it is good for them. And it is really showing commitment. And yet they are not getting the kind of support they were really expecting. And this creates really mistrust and some frustration from this side, from developing countries side. So is there really stealing the confidence among countries that you visited, the confidence or do you really gauge it as frustration? This is really, from our side, we are still beginning. Anyway, we are not really that much into it. But in two years, we are there, we hope. And we have also, of course, a very big, jurisdictional carbon project, rate project that's in design right now. And we need really to see how this will be. Of course, we have also secured funding from Norway. It's not a real problem, but we want to initiate really more large-scale jurisdictional, rigid-level projects. But I think if our efforts are not going to be compensated, then that will not be a good idea at least. And you might not get the kind of support you need from stakeholders. So how do you assess really the situation in terms of prospect? And there is another question. Is there any proof of concept on rate? Proof of concept? Your objective was actually, well, objectives of all these initiatives at lower levels is to establish whether or not rate workers here. And under what conditions does it work? Have you seen any really case where that was really successful so far? And I also really wanted to know the kind of really social environmental risks that might emerge from the implementation of rate plus. And I think you have a lot of experience in several countries. And what are really typical of those risks, social environment? Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Yi-Tepito. And then Ephraim. And then after that, we give them a chance to answer before continuing to the second wave. Thank you. Thank you. Maybe I don't know, I'm asking a silly question. Because how my interest is, how it is possible to connect the land tenure with this red project? Because, you know, is it a kind of, I mean, deficit to get land for red? Or at once, red started implementation or implementing. So is there any problem related to the tenure? So where is the problem? I don't understand, you know. I mean, the link between the tenure and the red projects, because or is there any hidden agenda, you know, for red? You know, rather than reducing, you know, I mean, carbon emission and compensating, you know, for that purpose, I couldn't catch, you know, why land tenure is a main problem, you know, for red. Thank you very much. All right. Maybe again, you know, in Indonesia and in many other countries, tenure is a problem. But in Ethiopia, the setup is a bit different. So they don't understand what the problem is. So you do understand, is it? Okay. All right. Because I thought that, you know, most people have clear tenure and so forth in Ethiopia, so there's no question for the study which you have made. So fund is not, I mean, the priority, you know, on the top, you know, tenure is coming. So that's why, but we do understand, you know, what it is. Okay. So ready to answer the one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight questions that are posed to you by those four people. Yeah. Um, let me just first ask Desta or Claudio if there are any questions that you would like to answer. If not, no problem. I'll try to tackle them. If there are any that you would like to address, just let me know. Okay. Okay. Thank you for the very nice questions. I would like to answer the first question about red in the, in the electoral politics context. In Indonesia, we have examples of two red initiatives which closely related to this context. One is Urumasen in the Acheh province and the other one is Berau in the East Kalimantan province. Uh, the Urumasen initiative, actually one of the first red initiatives in the world, if I correctly noted, uh, started in, uh, red initiated in 2007 after the COP Bali, uh, conference. And then I think a year after that, Urumasen was initiated and it was one of the first red project, uh, uh, in the world using the name red. And it suddenly attract a lot of, uh, attention from the media, from the private sector, and also from the government of Acheh and the government of Indonesia. And, uh, the government of Acheh, uh, the previous governor, uh, Bapak Irwandi, he was the one that William mentioned as a major proponent of red. So he, he, he initiated a lot of, uh, provincial red institution regulation that support red in Urumasen area. But then, and as well as, uh, major investment from international investors, investing in carbon project in Urumasen area. But then I think in 2012, after, uh, the election, Irwandi was not elected again. And then the next governor was not too keen about red, uh, methods in reducing emissions. He still has, he still has some priorities on deforestation and preserving the forest, but, uh, not with red as the priority. So that's the problem with, uh, jurisdictional red and then the electro politics related to red. Red needs something to be, uh, some institutional to be established at the provincial level so that they can continue to work. And the case with Brau is almost the same, but the difference is that Brau has more red institution established, uh, and to perhaps to, to tackle the problem of, in case the governor is being, uh, not being elected again. So there's the working group, uh, of red and then there's also the East Kalimantan Red Committee, I think. So they have this, this several institution that can, can work as a backup, uh, whenever, the current leader is not elected anymore. So that's the example from Indonesia. I'll try and answer the question by Yobon, the, uh, environmental safeguards. And, um, it's, it's both an easy and hard question to answer. It's very easy because there's not that much, uh, to say about environmental safeguards. In a way, environmental safeguards and social safeguards are quite tightly linked. They, they all, they both suffer from the same, uh, they all facing the same challenges. The first one being that they are lagging behind the, the great amount of work done on, uh, done on carbon and reference emission levels, which started even historically started a few years before, uh, the US triple C process. And, uh, generally speaking, the national community got serious about safeguard first in 2011 with the Cancun agreements. And, and after that, there's been a, there's been a lot of negotiation and discussion at the technical level as well on what exactly to, the problems are, what to measure, at what scale, how to report it. And there is some progress on it, but most countries that are, uh, quite far ahead with red are still struggling with, still struggling to know exactly what to, what to measure, when to measure, how to monitor it and how to make sure that the safeguards are respected. On top of that is also a matter of what goals are you trying to achieve with your project because safeguards means goes with the no harm principle, but then red having mutual red plus and having these multiple objectives attached to it. Many countries see it as a, see, see social benefits of red as one of the main objectives, in which case safeguards are not enough anymore. You actually want to promote actual benefit and not just avoiding harm. So depending on what do you, what the objective is, the measures to be taken will be different as well. In terms of environmental safeguards specifically, as I mentioned that the main challenges are what to measure and at what scale and how to, how to monitor it. And there is still a lot of work to be done on that. There's been some progress done outside of red and red sometimes tend to forget that there's a lot of science has been done before red, outside of red, that can be very useful to inform how to monitor environmental performance at the landscape scale or the project scale. And I think there is a bit of consensus that red should, should try and include these experiences coming from before, coming from different, different scientific disciplines as well, that can inform how environmental safeguards can be operationalized in red. But one thing for sure is that they're still lagging behind the carbon work and are only now trying to, trying to catch up. Thanks to both of you. I will do my best to address the other questions. Actually, I want to begin by giving just a brief supplementary answer to a couple of the questions that have been addressed already. How is it that you embed red? What is it that you want to embed for protection? And the simple answer is, I don't know. I think it's too early to, to know how to do this because to my knowledge, it's not yet being done. The reason I raised it is that in the governor's climate and forest task force, which is an association of now probably 27 jurisdictional red entities around the world, they, they are a strong organization trying to build red. And because they're jurisdictional, and because of the lesson of Ulu Masen, and because there are many projects where they are worried that things will, all the hard work will simply disappear with the next, next election. This is a topic of discussion. But in principle, what they're talking about is wouldn't it be a good idea to introduce as regulations, protocols, bylaws, laws, new policies, red favoring, that are red favoring so that they stand the chance of surviving if there's an electoral change that's no longer favorable to red. That's, it's just an issue of principle rather than an example. On the matter of safeguards, I just wanted to draw your attention to this link, which is at the end of my presentation. We produced six briefs on safeguards, on both social and environmental safeguards that you might want to take a look at. They're timely. They're, they're right up to date, and they may address some of the questions that you have. Okay, the nested approach. How does it really work? I'm not an expert, but I, I would, I would just say this, that beyond the obvious, it, it faces challenges that are greater simply than how do you make small units operating parts of, of bigger units in the best possible way. Some of what we found in our research points to the difficulties of, of doing that. Why? Because if, for example, the MRV difficulties exist both at the local scale and, and the national scale, then you're starting with two strikes against you and not just, just one. So that's, that's an example of, of, of what I mean. But we are in touch with experts who focus only on this issue. So if you wanted me to put you in touch with them later on, that's something I can do fairly, fairly easily. But Lou will be giving a talk later on, on MRV, I believe. And perhaps he can touch on the issue of reference levels and, and nested red. How get the confidence of proponents? Will it really work? Or are they frustrated? Actually, we took the pulse of red in, in the course of doing this proponent challenges study and also in, in communicating with our collaborating proponent organizations in the course of writing this book. And it's really quite a wide range. It covers the spectrum. Some are so frustrated that they've decided no longer to call themselves red. Some have stopped. Not because they're frustrated with red, but because they couldn't continue. And Tanzania is a place where three of our six collaborating organizations have ceased to operate. Some of the reasons for that have to do with the, the disappearance of seed funding from public sector sources that was intended to be a temporary bridge. And they simply could not manage to access the forest carbon market before that time elapsed. I'm oversimplifying it, but that's one of, one of the storylines that we find in Tanzania. Another point, important thing to bear in mind about Tanzania is the challenge in some of these sites of low carbon additionality from dry forests. And I imagine this is an issue that you need to look at in, in Ethiopia as well. So I would encourage you to look at those Tanzania chapters for pointers on what it is that they did about their, the challenge of low additionality. But to fill out my answer to your question, some of the proponent organizations are not discouraged in spite of everything that appears not to be going well. Why? Because they are convinced that they can access the forest carbon market, the voluntary carbon market, the compliance market basically is, is very elusive at this time. Because they've done all the preparatory work and because they believe that they can successfully deal with the peaks and valleys of the, the carbon market. And in fact, there's, there's the tropical forest conservation group in Tanzania is an example of such an organization, which is still relatively confident. Is there any proof of concept? And yes, under what conditions? It depends on what concept you're talking about. If you mean the concept of red as originally envisioned, in other words, where it's the standard against which we were measuring the projects here, then the proof of concept is limited to four proponent organizations, those that are currently selling forest carbon credits. And what are the conditions for their success? Interestingly, three of those four are private sector. And we had, we have only four private sector in our sample, which is roughly representative of the totality of, of red projects in, in the world. So it's interesting to note that it is those and, and we've speculated internally on the, on why is it that they succeeded? Is it because the private sector by its nature is risk taking? Is it possible that they have a reserve of capital to fall back on? We don't know. We haven't posed that question to them directly, but it's something that I imagine we will want to explore. And Ephraim, you asked, what is the tenure problem? Why is it the main problem? From the point of view of the proponent, there you are. From the point of view of the proponent, it has to do with if you, if you look at the essence of what red is trying to do, which is namely to invest at the local level the responsibility and the capability to keep forest standing and to create a system of incentives locally to protect forest in cases where forests are being degraded through local use. And also a strong enough capability not only to keep forest standing, but also to ward off competing claimants. All of those elements of the basic idea of red require strong tenure rights for local people. And so with the proponent deeply interested in, in, in the best case of forest conservation, in the more doubtful case of which there are some but fortunately very few of simply making money, then they are very interested in clarifying those unclear tenure arrangements and seeing it in almost all cases as a square one first step in order to hope that red can succeed. And there is a general understanding that clear tenure is necessary but not sufficient. This is not in all cases but I would argue in almost all cases and there is a point of view which I don't share completely and this comes from the rights and resources initiative based in Washington D.C. but networking all around the world. Their argument is that we don't need funding for red is the oversimplified version of their argument. What they claim is that if you simply gave local people the rights to their forests then the forests end up being better protected. I think this is probably true in some forests but not all of them. And it's important for science as well as those serious about forest based climate change mitigation to understand the limits of this argument as well as where it's true. Why? Because from my point of view this $12.5 billion estimate is probably an exaggeration of what is needed to pay for the legitimate opportunity costs. What do I mean by legitimate opportunity costs? Surely red would want to compensate the local people who have no choice but to deforest. But there are certainly much better endowed elite claimants who want to convert forest to non-forest uses and they have abundant choices for what they can do to keep being solvent without converting forests. In fact if you start rewarding very powerful players with red you create the worst kind of perversion where they will simply threaten forests in order to derive the benefit from red. I believe I've touched on all the questions but if I haven't let me know. Two more that I noted. One was with the pros and cons of having what is the difference between subnational and project level and then the pros and cons of having red projects at different scales. Larger scales versus smaller scales. What are the pros and cons? The difference between project and jurisdictional is essentially that project tends to be at a smaller scale though not in all cases. A project, a red project is an effort to carry out red on the ground in boundaries that do not necessarily correspond to a government jurisdiction whereas jurisdictional red does correspond to the boundaries and in most cases has the authority of the state behind the red initiative whereas a red project often is operated by not by government but by a private entity, an NGO in some cases a donor organization, an international conservation organization, human rights organizations in some cases get involved in red biodiversity protection organizations and the like. What are the pluses and minuses? I once wrote a detailed list. I wish I had it in front of me but I don't. Let me see what I can remember of the pluses and minuses of both of these. The obvious advantage of the jurisdictional scale is that it has the authority of the state behind it and the powers of the state that can be mobilized and as I mentioned in some cases is to overcome these competing interests between those who want to keep standing and those who want to convert it. The liability that I mentioned is electoral politics. The jurisdictional scale conveys some capability to economies of scale for carrying out a red enterprise over a wide area which from a certain point of view can greatly diminish the cost of the implementation cost and the transaction cost of doing business. The jurisdictional scale we have a good example from our research where addressing the tenure problem in Brazil is potentially a great deal more effective than it is in other countries. Why? Because the proponents can draw on the authority of the state whether they are a project or a jurisdiction because Brazilian law links environmental compliance with access to tenure rights. I can say more about that later. There's interest in knowing about that and it's important because this is an example that other countries could follow. At the project scale you don't have the vulnerabilities of electoral politics. In some cases a smaller scale can be an advantage. Why? Because if you choose your boundaries you can match your costs to the scale of your effort whereas the Bolsa Floresta which is the first operating red project in Brazil and one that sells forest carbon credits found several years ago that their budget was way overstretched and they had to pull in their boundaries in order to function effectively. There are other examples where operating at the jurisdictional scale is a good example where the budget can be deficient in relation to the reach of your project and you have to rethink things. Maybe there was one more but I'll just roll it in with the next wave of questions then. Then his Excellency Cavide afterwards. Thank you very much William. I think we have all learned quite a lot and I'm sure that the delegates as they normally do would sit down in the evening and reflect more on those presentations and the key issues you have raised. I just would like to request you if you could highlight a bit on the whole issue of probably generating resources internally. Internally to the proponent organization. Exactly and also to the developing countries. I think we were told by the by the ministry here that Indonesia was committed to reduce its emission level by 20 something percent and they were ready to kind of pay for it and if there were experiences elsewhere also in terms of you know the efforts of governments themselves in terms of raising funding to support trade and also if you could highlight some of the experiences you might have seen in actually engaging in benefiting communities from such initiatives and what are actually the challenges that you have seen in doing so. Thank you. Alright next question. Okay it's indicated in your presentation that one of the challenges that you have been encountered with in safeguarding the local community is high variability of the livelihood the livelihood of the local community. Yes of course I strongly agree with that but what I would like to know is what is the method that you went through to resolve this variability problem. Thank you. The next one is his Excellency Kaweda Yimam. Thank you for your detailed presentation really it is a productive day. My question is a follow-up question to Dr. Efrem regarding to the tenure. I understand from your study tenure is a major problem and red requires strong tenure as you said. If those countries it doesn't mean address those tenor problems I think they are not going to benefit right am I right if they are not going to address the tenure issue. The simple answer is yes but there are nuances. Okay if it's yes what I understand each country has their own reason why they are following that kind of tenure system. For example in Ethiopia we have our tenure system like we don't allow to sell land. This we have a reason why do this why we follow this we have a reason. I hope all other countries in your study they have a reason why they follow that kind of tenure system. Changing the tenure system is not as easy it demand cost maybe sometimes the cost is dangerous. So do you think that if do you think that in those countries if tenure is not addressed do you think that red is possible or is red like a marathon run many thousands they start and finally one or two will win the I mean the race is it like that. Thank you. Thank you very much. Any more last the last question is okay that's enough. So I also want to remind the question that was an address earlier it was what are the typical social and environmental risks of implementing red because you know red is supposed to be good for the environment so why is there risks that's an additional one. All right let me begin and then Claudio will pitch in when Stumi gets back by answering the question that I neglected to answer earlier what are the typical social and environmental risks of red and I will take that to mean what are the risks of that might result from the implementation of red that's how I interpret the question and tell me if I'm getting it wrong and by implementation of red I will assume once it has reached implementation which and by that I mean the implementation of conditional performance based incentives one one clear risk from my point of view is is this the aim of red is to pay for the opportunity cost of foregone deforestation part of the challenge of red right now is the low level of funding and the low level of funding risks under incentivizing local people so ideally you would want to have a level of funding that at least matches the local opportunity cost for local stakeholders but to the extent that you are successful in drawing in their interest then potentially it competes it it creates competition for access to those benefits how that plays out we don't exactly know we haven't studied in particular but we have seen some anticipation of that in other words villages that are near red projects that all of a sudden discover that there's an opportunity for income and they insist on being part of it and and proponents are challenged because they have a limited budget I mentioned earlier the competition for resources this is a risk there is the possibility as mentioned earlier and Claudio might might touch on this that if red is successful in creating a barrier to certain uses of the forest then that may impact livelihoods and it may impact especially those that are heavily dependent on on forest resources in terms of the environmental risks what would be some of the liabilities there presumably if it's operating properly then it minimizes the risks but if it's not then it might be undermining efforts to protect forests and there's any number of ways in which it's it's conceivable that red would not be implemented successfully for example if if the benefits stop and and people are frustrated and angry at red they they may not only resume their old ways but show their displeasure anyway I'm I'm brainstorming right now but this is hopefully the beginnings of an answer you know I'd like to add something on the environmental risks I think in principle then what I see as the the main risk environmentally speaking is as a relationship between carbon and biodiversity uh biodiversity depending on the habitat depending on the ecosystem those two may be or may not be tightly linked so by focusing on carbon alone we may be protecting high carbon forests which are not forcibly and always interesting from a biodiversity point of view or important from a biodiversity point of view and related to the issue of leakage where by protecting high high carbon forest you may be instead displacing the deforestation and degradation activities on to neighboring land or neighboring habitats that are very important from an environmental point of view but that do not enjoy any protection because they don't have high carbon this issues component also is made even gets more complicated when when the funding for biodiversity and habitat conservation starts competing with red funding ie when funding that traditionally was given was going towards environmental protection and biodiversity protection and now is funneled on to on to red fund on to red plus funding that might take away funding that's been that's been going to habitats that again have low carbon but they've always had high biodiversity environmental values added on carbon so basically the main the main risk of red of red environmentally is is this relationship between carbon and biodiversity in many tropical wet tropical rainforests the issues somewhat can be somewhat smaller because usually carbon and biodiversity are quite closely linked but especially in other habitats such as dry forest this relationship may be a lot more complex and needs to be needs to be addressed carefully I'd like to also remind the time we have to finish very soon around okay in four minutes or so so there's four more questions to go okay I will cloud you do you want to address the the question that that you were going to address yeah show me asked about about livelihood variability and what does that mean and what method you used to solve the problem it's a good I like the question is quite a complex one too though I mean of course in an ideal world the method you would like to use is to know exactly how much opportunity cost of each individual participant of the project is and then compensated directly this this sounds good but it will be the ideal case scenario but it's very hard to achieve very very hard to reach for instance this is this is what we've been trying to do with our study we're going to try to estimate real opportunity cost of small holders in all these countries and what we find is that there is extreme heterogeneity of livelihood portfolios so people do different things so they are different there are they have different exposures to what the the effects of red would be but to even have a to reach a detailed understanding of what that exposure is it takes a very in-depth detailed study that took us five years and and and a lot of money to do this kind of research that most implementers cannot afford so for silly you have to be you have to be able to work with course or measure so this is a question that goes over on to benefit sharing so maybe any might have something to add to it but it's basically a matter of how detailed you want to be and you can be and then develop the the key is in the state lies in in developing good indicators by having some in some detail study that can inform broader level course broader scale conclusions so develop indicators that give you a confidence that even without going into the extreme detail of of measuring everything everywhere you can you can do you can do a good job but but again this is something that needs to be trialed over time and monitor over over time so there are costs you know high cost associated with it my my I guess my recommendation would be to not to not reinvent the wheel I mean I mean again there are many experiences around that have tried that there are there's a lot of work being done in very recently and still ongoing so I think countries do have by looking at other other countries experiences usually you you can find really good examples of how to develop these kind of indicators for example and and not and not start from scratch and respecting the time limits I will do my best to address I believe the two remaining questions but perhaps more of to okay all right I'll do my best have this question was how can countries generate the resources internally for for red there's no easy answer to this in every country that's engaged in red is thinking about it in part because of the deficiencies of the carbon market has has motivated attention to the possibility of creating a national fund and rather than and and generally speaking the the richer tropical developing countries are going to have an easier time of doing this than those that have fewer resources for example Brazil has a substantial fund that is generated but other countries can barely think about it given their financial constraints but I'd recommend that you there are studies that are focused on tenure and national funds and I can I can send that in your direction if it's something you'd like to see and minister you mom's question about tenure and the variability of tenure conditions among different countries and is it absolutely necessary to address tenure problems and will will red fail unless these issues are addressed the short answer is there is in every case that we've seen there is a need to address tenure in some way it's not possible to have a uniform homogenous cookie cutter approach for the very reason that you mentioned because tenure conditions are so variable among countries that said there are conditions that are often found across the countries that that are relatively similar and that account for the fact that proponents although taking in some cases quite variable approaches to dealing with with tenure they they do some some things that are uniform they for example they all they all do a stock taking locally of tenure conditions to understand what the challenges are they they almost all define the area of the forest that's going to be protected and and there's a checklist of those kind of that kind that can be found but beyond that there's a great deal of variability but your question is a lot bigger and it's quite an important one the essence of your question is tenure reform necessary before red and reform is is in many cases way beyond what what tenure requires in order for in you in your case in your country's case what i would recommend is to do a scenario exercise where you imagine what it is that would be required to have red functioning on the ground and talk with red proponents who have faced those situations against the checklist that i mentioned to see what is it what would be required for the local stakeholders to to have sec secure enough rights in order to have forest carbon credits what are the conditions what are the changes of any that are required to avoid a resource rush what are the conditions under which community forestry water would not assist the goals of red under what are the minimum conditions for avoiding these external claims and have effective rights of exclusion and lastly do government policies support red in in the area of land use planning and and crucially are the long-term goals of agriculture compatible with the long-term goals of forest protection and what is the tenure dimension of that question i may be oversimplifying the answer but i think the spirit is that a scenario building exercise may serve you well okay so thank you very much for the speakers and also for your great questions i think um everyone needs to give a appreciation to the speakers and now we have a coffee break for 10 minutes around 10 minutes so we