 Good afternoon, welcome to the New America Foundation. I'm Peter Bergen, Director of the National Security Studies Program. It's really a great pleasure to welcome Manitou Leven, a longtime research fellow here at the New America Foundation, who went on to bigger and better things as a professor at King's University London. He is still a research fellow at New America. This held a number of positions previously covered in Central Europe for the Financial Times, former senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, editor of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, written numerous books, The Baltic Revolution with 93, America Right or Wrong, and An Anatomy of American Nationalism, which has just been reissued and is available for purchase outside. Ethical realism, a vision for America's role in the world in 2006. Pakistan, a hard country, which is, by many, many accounts, the best account of Pakistan today. And he holds a BA in history and a doctorate in political science from Jesus College, Cambridge. And Anatole will be talking today about talking to the Taliban. Thank you so much, Peter. And shall I sit since the microphone is finished? Yeah, whatever you prefer. I'll sit if you don't mind. I've done something to one of my feet, which is why I'm in sneakers. And we are, of course, old friends as well. I did. So I thought, yes, perhaps what I'll do is first talk about the meetings that colleagues from King's and some other people, including Michael Semple, had with people close to the Taliban. Shall we say something a little bit more about that in a moment in July? And then I might say something about how I see Pakistani policy developing in Safar as there is such a thing. And then finally, I'll give some of my own analysis and some recommendations for Western policy. First of all, I should say, because it's been quite extensively misreported, at least in the British press, that we did not meet with existing Taliban leaders with present leaders of the Taliban. We met with former leading figures and people close to the movement, people who have negotiated with the Taliban, mediated with the Taliban, or who have played a kind of spiritual mentoring role. I have to say that the meeting, and I'm afraid I can't, this was strictly confidential in terms of names, I would say, however, that a good deal that they said echoes what I've heard in briefings that have been publicized by name with people like Mullah Zayif and Mutav Aqil over the past couple of years. Secondly, since this has also been somewhat misreported, these people, none of them claimed to be representing the Taliban. In other words, to be, in some way, ambassadors of Mullah Omar or the top Taliban leadership. What they said was that they reflect, I would say reflect rather than represent, reflect what they claimed, at least, were extensive currents of opinion within the Taliban, especially on the side of the political committee. And a couple of them did admit that there could be serious differences there with the military committee in what they were saying. So they said reflecting important currents of opinion within the Taliban. But they didn't say, by the way, that Mullah Omar has signed up to this, or indeed, nor they said it, didn't say that anybody by name had. So what were the main things that we drew out of these discussions with them? The first, I mean, as has been suggested before, but is important to note, since it hasn't, I think, fully been assimilated here, absolutely no concessions in advance, acceptance of the Constitution in advance out of the question. Laying down arms out of the question, ceasefire even without the rest of the package, a large part of the rest of the package being in place for a settlement out of the question. In other words, everything they said, if there's to be any chance of the Taliban as a movement going along with it, and Mullah Omar endorsing it, and they all said that Mullah Omar's endorsement of a peace plan would be absolutely essential if the whole movement were to accept it, or even most of the movement, they said it has to come as essentially a single package. It has to be one settlement. Now, two perceptions from which it seemed to me that, in a way, everything else stemmed, and which, at least the first of which, I found thoroughly plausible, I must say, both, because it corresponds to reality, corresponds to modern Afghan history, and it also corresponds to mainstream Pakistani military analysis. And that is that all these people said that the kind of Taliban who they reflect recognized that they cannot win an outright victory militarily, that they can't conquer the whole country, in other words. And the reasons for that are twofold. The first is obviously that, although the Taliban hate talking in terms of ethnicity or nationality within Afghanistan, it was clear that they recognized that just as, in the 1990s, they had swept most of the Pashtun areas with very little fighting, or sometimes none at all, they had faced a very hard fight to conquer other areas of the country. And they are very worried, it seemed. When I say they, remember that I'm not talking about the Taliban as an organization, the whole movement, I'm just talking the kind of currents of opinion that they reflect. They are very worried, it seems, about the disintegration of Afghanistan along, essentially, ethnic and warlord lines. The involvement, not in terms of troops on the ground, as in the 90s in terms of guns and money and support, of a range of regional actors backing these different groups, and essentially an unending civil war in Afghanistan with the de facto fragmentation of the country. That's one reason. The other, I mean, for this apparent perception that they can't win. The other is what happened at Jalalabad in March of 89. I was there as a journalist, and I'd made several trips in Afghanistan with the Afghan Mujahideen before that. And what that really dramatized was the difference between guerrilla warfare, which is, of course, all about the dispersal of forces to avoid enemy firepower, and trying to seize by storm-defended cities when you have to concentrate your forces, at which point, of course, you become hideously vulnerable to the firepower and airpower of the other side. And so what we heard this time was that, on the assumption that the US will, at the very least, be still prepared to deploy airpower in support of a pro-American regime in Kabul, an attempt to storm cities by force would be suicidal. We'd simply blasted to pieces the way the Mujahideen were at Jalalabad. So this apparent perception in these circles that they can't win the whole country. At the same time, they all expressed an absolute confidence in being able to take over the vast majority of the Pashtun countryside once America pulls back and to be able to continue a war from there, or at least in defense of those areas indefinitely. So on the one hand, they think they can't win. On the other hand, they also believe they can't be defeated. So that's it. And it did seem to me that it was probably from that perception, A, that everything else they said stemmed. The second thing that they all said that was very interesting, and I don't endorse this view, you understand, was that they reckoned the support for the Taliban in the Afghan population as a whole at some said 30%, some said a third. So basically that range of things. Now, if you reckon that to be not active support, but should we say people with some degree of sympathy or more sympathy for the Taliban than anybody else, that's, I mean, it's extremely hard to prove, of course. But it's not implausible, put it that way. And, well, whether it's true or not is one question. But the second question, of course, is it true that they believe it, if you see what I mean? Is this genuinely their perception? Well, if it is, you see, that raises a very interesting and not unalarming, it must be said in certain respects, question about a political settlement because 30% or a third is not enough to run the government unilaterally without others, to simply run the government. But it probably is enough, if it's true, to be the single biggest political block in any future political configuration. If you look at the fragmentation of everybody else, of course, the way in which all the other groups within Afghanistan are broken up. And what came out of that is this perception that they said we, and the people we reflect know that there will have to be two things. One is power sharing with other groups. They said we recognize that the Taliban are not strong enough. We can't go back simply to the government of Mullahs, as they said, that we had up to 9-11. One reason being that we don't have enough political support. The other, though, and I'll come back to this in a second, is among people like this within the Taliban, there does seem to be a recognition that you need technocrats to run the government. One of them said, used Iran as an example, the religious figures are there to give overall guidance and to keep the country on the right path, but the actual business of government has to be run by technocrats. And I think, among the more pragmatic elements, shall we say, that does have a history, because, of course, in the 1990s as well, they actually employed a surprising number of former communist officials, but simply because what the hell did they know about, even the most minimal aspects of government when they arrived in Kabul? So this was the sort of second thing. Now, what are the other aspects? Obviously critical, as part of any kind of settlement, the exclusion of al-Qaeda from Taliban-controlled areas. Now, they said that that would not be a problem. Of course, they said exclusion. They did not say handing over. That would be out of the question to actually hand al-Qaeda people directly over to the Americans. But they said, within the Taliban, and not just, you know, people like us, but really much, much more widely, there is real anger at al-Qaeda because of 9-11 and because of the way in which they said in different ways, you know, we were building a successful Islamic state in Afghanistan before 9-11, and they basically pulled the roof down on our heads. So they claimed little affection in the organization as a whole. They also said, as long as the war continues, however, that al-Qaeda is useful, not critical, but useful, it can give various kinds of help to the Taliban. But they said, not a problem in the context of a general settlement. We will push them out of our areas. Well then, of course, we asked two questions. One, what if they don't go and they have local protection? And secondly, what about the Haqqani network? On the first, they said, well, one of them said, basically the line from all of them was, well, there would have to be some sort of mechanism for identifying this and deciding what to do. And one of them said, well, we can have a joint commission between us, a provisional Afghan government and the United States military. And if there are reports that al-Qaeda is still there, then we will look at this and then we will do something about it. When it came to the Haqqani's, the general response was silence. One of them did say that, which may not be encouraging and cause some raised eyebrows in London, that Jalaluddin Haqqani is very like your Nick Clegg. He said, which by the way, it shows they have a wider int... I think the exiblation of Nick Clegg is... I'm so sorry, the leader of the Liberal Party, who is a minority figure in the British coalition government, which shows that they listened to the BBC and so forth, these people. A, that wasn't, I think, very welcome to Nick Clegg. Secondly, of course, it may not be very encouraging since there's a lot of talk, actually, of the Liberals leaving the coalition in... But anyway, what a couple of them said was, look, that's why Mullah Omar has to be on board. You need the Taliban as a whole to agree to a settlement and then the Haqqani's will go along. And we asked them, well, what will Pakistan do? They wouldn't talk about Pakistan except to by sort of, as you might say, body language to indicate deep distrust and dislike. So, that's that sort of package. Second thing, one thing, by the way, which isn't so noticed here because it's not really an American problem, but of course is greatly noticed in Britain, Europe, Russia is the question of heroin. And there, the people we talk to say, but look, this isn't a problem. You know, in return for recognition and international legitimacy in 99 to 2000, we showed that we were entirely... Legitimacy and of course, aid, international aid, we showed that we were both willing and capable of cracking down on heroin. So, if you give us recognition and aid as part of a settlement, yeah, of course, we'll get rid of it. We don't approve it in principle. We need it to keep the war going. And secondly, I mean, it's fueling all these warlords who we hate. So, anyway, not a problem. Politically, how did they see things going? Well, what they all said was, no agreement to the existing constitution in advance. The present constitution will have to be debated and new constitution drawn up as part of some kind of new constitutional process involving constitutional assembly, grand lawyer jerker or whatever. But they wouldn't really be drawn on many of the details like executive presidency, parliamentary system or whatever. But one, two things, I mean, one was a centralised constitution and it came out of these talks very strongly was a deep opposition to federalism. I know that was very striking, but actually Mullah Zahif has been saying something different about that, at least previously. Well, something, this you see reflects once again, it seems to me, on the one hand, this deep fear of a disintegration of the country, long ethnic and warlord lines. This, in turn, becoming an Afghanistan divided into different client states of other regional actors. And on the other hand, of course, this belief that they can play a very, a leading role in a unitary Afghanistan. But they said, don't worry that in this constitutional assembly, I mean, of course we'd have to have a new constitution, but the new constitution wouldn't actually differ very much from the existing one. A, because we want a unitary centralised constitution, and secondly, well, the existing constitution is an Islamic constitution, it's just a question of making it real, rather than symbolic and giving it teeth. Anyway, and eventually coming out of all this, as I say, power-sharing, they wouldn't be drawn on, well, they wouldn't be drawn obviously on exact distribution of jobs and so forth, one. On the question of who they would share power with, they wouldn't be drawn on names. They said, you know, some, but what they said was some people in or allied to the existing Afghan administration are wholly unacceptable because of their corruption or their crimes or their violence, but others who are less compromised, we can work with and we recognise that we will have to share power with representatives of other groups. Now, once again, they wouldn't talk explicitly about ethnicity, you know, other ethnic groups, but that effectively was what they were talking about. Qualification, no role for Karzai, period, and no role for Karzai's clan, period. Karzai has to go before this constitutional assembly could be formed, and Karzai has to go before any new elections can be held. On the grounds that if Karzai was still in power or essentially an anointed successor were in power, they would rig the process. Several of us, I must say at that point, said, why on earth would you think that? Anyway, but that was very, very categorical. So, what these people would be looking at is a caretaker government of, you know, the phrase, neutral respected Muslim figures leading to elections, say three years was one figure we heard from the actual adoption of the settlement and the beginning of the constitutional debate. Two additional things, one that we didn't actually discuss and one that really was very surprising. It struck me, and I've heard from other sources, they're not actually the people we talked to, that it has been noticed in the Taliban and they've accepted this as real, the fact that Afghanistan is indeed sitting on these enormous mineral and energy resources. It's interesting that the Pakistanis didn't believe this for a long time until the Chinese became involved, at which point they recognized the reality of it. Well, now you see, I mean, this is where the whole business of a desire for a unitary government with a strong Taliban role may also be, you know, involved. Because after all, I mean, if these resources can be developed and taxed for the first time in the whole of Afghan history, at least, you know, not of course going all the way back, but going back to the creation of the Afghan, well, of Afghanistan as such in the mid 18th century. Afghanistan, an Afghan government, will have its own revenues, will be able to raise its own revenues. It's never done that. And it was formed in the 18th century on the basis of raiding other people. It's existed for most of the period since on the basis of taking subsidies from other people, British, Russians, Americans, or whatever. This would give them their own revenues if, of course, they can stick together. In addition, but to do this, once again, they would need technocrats. They can't do it themselves. Now, that leads to the question, of course, of education and education for women. Now they said, you know, I won't bore you with the whole old line about, oh, we went really hostile to education for women. It was only because we were worried about their safety, girls going to school, blah, blah, blah. But anyway, they said, this time, we recognize there will have to be elements of modern education for, because of the whole technocratic business, and absolutely, women's education, yes. Women in certain jobs, women doctors, absolutely, women doctors treating women, sure. And other jobs that women can do, and once again, Iran was mentioned by one of the interlocutors. From what he then said, I didn't think he actually knows Iran well at all, but because he said, but of course, after puberty, girls and boys can't study together and they can't work together. You know, there can be jobs for women, but not working together with men, at which point I asked, and for example, could they sit in parliament together? Well, that has with the Hakanis and Pakistani policy and a number of other issues was when our question was answered by silence. So, a lot to discuss there. Now finally though, the thing that I think, you know, on most of these things, we'd heard sort of indications from people like this, you know, before and so forth. The one thing that actually did surprise most of us, although one of us claimed not to be surprised, but I think even he was actually surprised, was that all of them said though, with varying degrees of gritted teeth, that they thought that if all the other elements that Taliban wanted or was prepared to accept were in place, they thought that the, well, at least once again, the people they reflected in the Taliban would be prepared to accept American bases and military advisors at least to 2024. In other words, basically accept the existing agreement with the Kabul administration. Well now, this is extremely surprising and of course the Taliban, since then has categorically denied this, it must be said. Now, the question is why? Well, one, as various people, some of them said, well, if indeed after 2024 they go, then one is just talking about a longer withdrawal period. You know, it's how long is a withdrawal, my phrase, not theirs, but essentially how long is a withdrawal period, how long is a piece of string? You know, as long as it does, the piece of string does have an end. Then the thing that, well, you know, if the Americans just stick on this, it's not worth sacrificing everything else for the sake of this, if indeed they do go in 2024. But I thought that more interesting, because it would tend, you know, to cast light on other deep, you know, underlying fears, was this two things, was this perception, as one of them said, that sooner or later the United States is going away, it's going to leave. Our neighbors, and he didn't say this, but he hardly needed to say it, our neighbors who we hate and fear are staying. In other words, in the long run, it's not the United States you need to worry about, it's Russia, Iran, and the possibility, of course, how far this is them, and how far they're sort of passing on Pakistani fears, I don't know, the possibility of India becoming involved against them in Afghanistan. And it must be said, clear indications of deep dislike and distrust of Pakistan, Pakistani policy as well, which comes to absolute, there's no surprise, that didn't surprise, it doesn't come as a surprise to anybody who knows the Afghans and the Taliban and, you know, the historic relationship there. I mean, just because you're dependent on people doesn't make you like them. And indeed, among mainstream Pakistani security elements, there's no love lost on the other side either. I'm not talking about everybody in the ISI. So, a couple of them said, not just that we would tolerate this, but a couple of them said, even if the United States helps to keep the Afghan army together, prevent it disintegrating into warlord armies, that would actually be a good thing. Interesting. However, of course, then we asked, yes, but one of the reasons why the U.S. wants to keep bases and so forth is to go on hammering al-Qaeda, you know, inside Afghanistan, if they stay in Afghanistan, inside the Haqqani areas, and of course, inside Pakistan. If these bases stay, could you agree to them doing that? Well, to that, again, the reply was silence followed by deep unhappiness. You know, that would be very, very, very difficult. Now, this, as you understand, is purely me talking, but sort of, one of them did say, but you know, there are other ways of doing things, you know, there'll be other ways of making sure that al-Qaeda wasn't there. In other, which I took to mean, there are things that we couldn't possibly agree to publicly, but if they really wouldn't go and were, you know, obstructing a settlement that we like from every other point of view, then perhaps something could be arranged quietly. But that's me, you understand, that's my gloss on a much, much, much more indefinite and vague statement from one person. But certainly no public or official agreement to a continuation of drone attacks or whatever. I mean, as one said, you know, Pakistani brothers would regard that as treachery of the deepest order. On Pakistan, sorry, speed up a bit, the two things about Pakistani military perception, I'll talk about the Pakistani military here, because frankly, you know, when it comes to this subject, they are going to make the decisions. One, they don't think that Taliban can conquer the whole of the country. Now, undoubtedly, you know, there will be people in the ISI very close to the Taliban and so forth who would want the Taliban too. But the mainstream Pakistani military analysis is that they can't for the reasons that I've set out. The second thing which is rather interesting is that it does seem from the people I've talked to that the high command, as the Pakistani high command as a whole, even if they thought it was possible, would not want the Taliban to conquer the whole of Afghanistan because, as I've heard, that would then leave them free to turn on us. That if the Taliban could rule the whole of Afghanistan, they could then revive the Pashtunistan idea, but this time under the banner of Islam and critically with powerful armed allies inside Pakistan in the form of the Pakistani Taliban. They don't want that. They don't trust the Taliban, you know. So what they want is some kind of, you know, ideally some form of balanced government. They believe the Taliban are deeply rooted, powerful force and one reason why they feel they have to get on with them, but in a power-sharing arrangement in Kabul. Or it does seem to me failing that, but this of course, the Pakistanis will not talk about, that their second order default mode is long-term, low-level civil war. As long as what they see as anti-Pakistani forces of the form of Northern Alliance and as they fear Indian backers are kept far away from the Pakistani border. Why won't Pakistan get involved in existing peace negotiations? The peace process is drawn up by the United States. Well, above all, I have to say, because they don't trust it. They believe that it's not actually a sincere attempt to negotiate with the Taliban. They fear that it's an attempt to split the Taliban between moderates and hardliners and so forth. And they are very afraid of, well, I'm sorry, first of all, underlying everything. I mean, you know, trying, in the most private circumstances, you know, and speaking, you know, strictly off the record of these individuals getting them to say what they want or what people in Pakistan who they reflect actually concretely want in Afghanistan are bloody nearly impossible, you know, because everybody is holding back, being very careful and so forth and so on. But in terms of the perception of America, well, one, this fear that America would use the process in a different way. Secondly, of course, and once again, I don't think why the Pakistanis would think that, but they have the impression that in the few months before a U.S. presidential election, policy in this town becomes, shall we say, slower than usual, paralyzed, moribund, that would be quite unfair. In other words, let's be fair, you know, nobody's going to do anything until November or not until November until March until the sort of new administration or old new administration, whatever, to pull itself together again. So of course, like everybody else, they're waiting to see what happens. And of course they are, but above all, they deeply worry of committing themselves to a peace process as part of this admitting their close connections to the Harkhanis in particular and to the Taliban and then basically putting themselves, well, two things. I mean, one is possibly having the lack of influence over these forces exposed or on the other hand becoming the scapegoats for failure if this, you know, if in fact no settlement emerges. So basically they've put all their cards on the table, it hasn't worked, then they're blamed for failure and they've admitted that yes, you know, they are sheltering these people. So Pakistan is being very, very wary. However, the kind of settlement that the sort of semi-Taliban figures I've been describing sketched out would not in my view be in any way unacceptable to the Pakistanis. They'd see that as a pretty good deal from their point of view. And a lot of Pakistani, you know, behavior is also just governed by sheer, I mean not sheer paranoia, that's unfair, but you know, they're quite convinced that if there are two people in a room and they're not in it, those two people are plotting against Pakistan. I mean, that's what we all do. I mean, Peter and I were just doing it outside, you know. I mean, every time you have a cup of coffee, I mean, the first thing you do is you plot against Pakistan. It's obvious, right? Sorry, that was a joke if anyone is recording it. But you see what I mean. There's this pathological desire to be in the room all the time. But as I say, I don't think that the thing that our interlocutors sketched out would be unacceptable to the Pakistanis. Now, my own sort of comments on all this and why in my view is this worth exploring? Now, only worth exploring. You understand, just as I didn't say that these people represent the Taliban leadership, so I most emphatically am not saying that this is a done deal or would necessarily work or that negotiations would lead to a settlement. But why do I think it's worth exploring? Well, above all two things, which I think have really not been sufficiently discussed in public or in the media here. The first is a phrase that truly alarms me and even shocks me is this phrase that we are out of there in 2014 or as was said on whenever it was, we are out of there in 2014 period. We are not out of there in 2014 period. The whole point is that the United States is retaining military bases, special forces, military advisors, and of course if there is going to be any reality to the distribution of these huge sums of promised aid, a very large civilian aid infrastructure in Kabul. In other words, whatever happens in Afghanistan after 2014, large numbers of Americans and Brits and others are going to be in the middle of it. Now, this is particularly alarming, of course, or concerning, but no, I think let's say alarming. When it comes to the position of military advisors and special forces in Afghanistan, because of course as the great majority of our forces are withdrawn, so these groups are left more and more and more isolated, and the guarantee that we will be able to back them up or get them out if they get into trouble will inevitably diminish. What is more, the very fact of, with the potential, I mean I feel one should touch wood or cross fingers or something in this, but there have been quite a number of incidents over the years where such small units left in isolated circumstances have been destroyed. And of course if that happens, the political pressure here, certainly if it were a British or a European unit to pull out completely would become enormous, I think. Well, as soon as America does that, then as far as an orderly state in Kabul is concerned, as far as I can see, it's all over because members of the government will be simply pouring off to Dubai with suitcases full of dollars. What is more, of course, inevitably if the United States keeps major bases and major presence, it will be drawn into the heart of whatever political developments happen in Kabul. It will be simply irresistible for different elements on our side, quote-unquote, in Kabul to keep running off to the U.S. Ambassador and all the commander of remaining NATO forces to try to get them to play a political role as well. So in other words, it seems to me that a good many people here, especially in the military, are obsessed with the notion of Vietnam 1975, in other words, complete defeat and shattering humiliation. I don't actually think that that is possible in terms of Taliban tanks driving into Kabul. In fact, they don't have any tanks. It's going to be much messier. I'm more concerned about something like Vietnam 1963. With much smaller U.S. forces of advisors and so forth, being attacked and threatened with elimination amidst a disintegrating Afghan national army. Now that brings me to the other point, why I think that this is worth exploring. And this relates to the Afghan elections of 2014, the presidential elections. I am seriously worried by the fact that on the one hand, we are nailing us, or we already have, we are not unnailing ourselves, shall we say, from the idea that elections in continuation of the democratic process elections in 2014 are critical to our plans, critical to legitimacy, et cetera, et cetera. On the other hand, nobody, as far as I can see, has a plan for who we want to win. Who do we think and actually hold this situation together after Karzai? That's quite clear that we don't want Karzai's clan to continue, at least I find no enthusiasm for that in official circles. But in that case, who else? Who do we think could actually keep these disparate forces on our side in Afghanistan together, and by the same token enjoy enough widespread legitimacy in different groups to create a consensus? Now I'm not saying that that is impossible. There's some time still to go. It is possible that we may get somebody like that. But I fear that it is also possible that in 2014 we will see a collapse of the existing civilian order in Kabul. And if nothing else is there to hold things together, one assumes that the ANA would have to take over the state. Which means somebody has to, unless the whole thing is just going to go down like a pack of cards. Well, the problem there is, of course, twofold. One is if you have a military takeover in Kabul, the already, shall we say, somewhat qualified enthusiasm of the West for backing, for continuing to put large amounts of money into Afghanistan will go down radically. Another thing, of course, is that if you have a coup by an ethnically and politically divided army, there's a serious risk that coup will lead to counter coup or at least attempted counter coup by other forces and that once again the whole thing will disintegrate. Here one's talking about not so much Vietnam as Afghanistan in the 70s. So it does seem to me that it would be worth exploring the possibility of a political settlement involving a caretaker government and a postponement of the elections precisely to get us off that particular hook on which we are becoming more impaled as time goes on. Though only, of course, if we could get agreement on other issues. So that's... And finally, if it's true that substantial elements of the Taliban, if it's true, recognize that they can't conquer the north and centre of the country. Well, first of all, whether or not it's true that they believe it, I think it's worth pointing out that it is true in military terms, I believe. And the perception that even if America were to pull out completely, the Russians would not, of course, come back with troops but would be willing to give very substantial aid to the former Northern Alliance, that I think is correct because that's what Russians have told me. And, of course, there is a very strong possibility at that stage that India would also play a role, though not, of course, once again, nobody is talking about troops on the ground. So the Taliban can't conquer the north and the centre. But it does seem to me that by the same token, it is extremely unlikely that the Afghan National Army or anything that can grow out of the existing Afghan National Army will ever be able to hold down the Pashtun countryside in future. At least the existing Afghan National Army. Let alone, I mean, if it were to fray and this were to become, as the Taliban obviously already think it is, an overwhelmingly tragic force. Well, if you have a situation in which the Taliban can't conquer the north and centre and the A&A can't conquer the south and east, in an ideal world, you should have the basis for a compromise there if this is recognised by both sides. So that's why, in my view, we should be interested. How could one get this thing unstuck? Well, it can't happen immediately and there would have to be considerably stronger indications from the Taliban side that there would be some response. But it seems to me that it has to come from Washington. It's no good, you know, hoping that it will come from anywhere else. And I would say three things or possibly four things. The first is, look, however many people may have, you know, nailed their previously careers or whatever to the bun process or the bun process as it's widely known in Afghanistan, you know, let's face it, this has not been an ideal Afghan constitution and it hasn't produced an ideal Afghan government. I think that it is necessary to declare that you need a new national debate on the constitution and if they fulfil other conditions, the Taliban have the right to take part in that national debate. We actually don't just have the right, but actually it is necessary for the Taliban to take part in a national debate because not saying how this should be phrased by US President or Secretary of State, I mean who knows whether it's 30 or 33%, but it cannot be denied that the Taliban do have demonstrated a substantial body of support in some of the Pashtun areas or many of the Pashtun areas. Secondly, I think there has to be a readiness for a general ceasefire. The idea of the Taliban laying down their arms is just forget it frankly. Nobody is going to lay down their arms in Afghanistan. Hell, if I had any arms in Afghanistan, I wouldn't lay them down. I'd hang on to them. I mean what idiot looking into the future of Afghanistan is going to give up any arms he has. But readiness for a general ceasefire, perhaps by way of starting the process, readiness for a general temporary ceasefire. It's been suggested you could have a ceasefire over the period of Ramadan or over some Eid or so forth. And finally, I would say that we should actually be actively encouraging some of our allies, by which I'm not talking about Karzai himself, but those forces in northern and central Afghanistan who will remain whatever happens in Kabul and will have to be dealt with, encouraging them to talk directly both to the Taliban and to the Pakistanis by way of attempting to start to get going. What will have to happen sooner or later, if indeed Afghanistan is to avoid this scenario of essentially disintegration and unending civil war. Now, once again, I mean don't get me wrong. If I were asked to put a large sum of money on this succeeding, I wouldn't. I think the odds are against. On the other hand, given that many of the other possibilities look both disastrous for Afghanistan, but also some of them deeply bad for the prestige and image of the United States, I think it's worth exploring at least. Thank you. Thank you, Anatoly. A fascinating presentation. I'm going to ask you a few questions and then throw it open to the audience. Sketch the scene. I know obviously this was all highly confidential, but to the extent that you can, tell us how this set of conversations happened. Who else was there? Both on your side and also on the Taliban side, to the extent you can describe, not by name, but by function, was this in the kind of in the coffee shop at like the Jumeirah Hotel in Dubai? Where did this happen? This happened at a hotel in the Gulf. It was put together by Michael Semple and a couple of others who have connections with these kind of people. And the Afghan interlocutors were a former leading Mujahideen figure, but who was a mentor of the Taliban movement when it first appeared and helped shape them in Pakistan when they were studying there and has remained very close to them. And a couple of former senior Taliban government figures who remain close to the movement but are not in an active leadership position. And I have to say, but in addition, many things, though not all, not the U.S. bases thing and not the unitary constitution thing but exclusion of al-Qaeda, power sharing, recognition of the need for technocratic help is also what I and others have heard from people like Mullah Zayef over the past couple of years. In terms of our team, a couple of people I can't name but Professor Theo Farrell from Kings, Dr. Rudra Choudhury from Kings, myself, and Michael Sample. How long did this conversation take? A day, basically. The thing that was very surprising was this emphasis on a highly centralized state that they want to retain because a way around this conundrum would be to make Afghanistan much less centralized because I've talked to Dr. Abdullah if the election was held tomorrow it may well be the next president of Afghanistan asking him what could you live with having spent most years and years fighting the Taliban and certainly district governorships of which there are 400 or so maybe sprinkling of provincial governorships and the way you get to that is by reformulating the constitution so that it's not everybody in the world in Afghanistan is directly appointed by the president. So why wouldn't they go for that as a potential solution? Well, because I think they want a considerable share of central power. I mean, that's why this... there are seriously problematic aspects about all this but also as I say that they fear the de facto disintegration of the country. But I have to say, of course, look, accepting a constitutional debate doesn't mean, obviously, that other forces have to agree with them or that there couldn't be compromises. And indeed, in fact, whether it's people appointed by the center or it's elected governors and, of course, you can have elected governors without a fully federal situation. A more important aspect is power sharing. I mean, if you have power sharing, in effect, local groups will have to control their own areas because it's the only way it will work. There's no way that, obviously, the Hazaras or whatever are going to give the Taliban a major say in the appointment of governors of their own areas. Any more than the Taliban are going to agree to the pancheries having a serious say in appointing the governor of Kandahar, even if it isn't appointed system. Well, obviously, I mean, something that we've seen since 2001 is that there's a very considerable difference between what the Constitution says and how actually things work out in different areas. On the one hand, the pay legal, if you like, the official system is highly centralized. In fact, as we've seen in local areas, local groups exercise tremendous power and at the very least a right of veto for anything that Kabul can do. It's interesting, you say that they have the view that 30% support them. And I think with all the usual caveats about polling in Afghanistan, I think the Asia Society in 2011 found about a third of the population having sympathy with Taliban aims. Exactly. But only 7% of the population having favorable views of the Taliban, which raises the interesting question for the Taliban as the withdrawal, which obviously, of course, we're going to be there until 2024, but there are going to be a lot of people leaving in 2014. In a way, that takes away one of their big, sort of as it were, campaign issues. Did they reflect on that at all? Well, they didn't know. I suppose, I mean, there's two things. One is that from what they said, the clearly is great nervousness within the Taliban about the fraying of the organization. Not in terms of they really didn't seem particularly worried about the idea of, you know, breaking off moderate, quote-unquote, Taliban to make a deal, you know, which has been so much our idea. Aren't they worried about it because it's happened already? Because the ones who are going to come over have done so already when they were under the biggest attack. Did they talk about Hasby at all? No. Who's, you know, essentially who's going to do that when, you know, if you weren't going to do that when you were under the maximum American pressure, why do it as the Americans withdraw? It's stupid. It was more simply fear of, you know, commanders breaking away into de facto local warlordisms, in other words, you know, not going over to the government side, but equally not obeying, I mean, remaining enough, as we saw with the merge before, you know, remaining formally part of the organization, but in fact people were coming just local, you know, local princelings and so forth under the Taliban. So they, and that explained, for example, they were very hostile to, they went hostile to temporary general ceasefires that they said could be done. They're very hostile to local ceasefires. No, no local ceasefires. It has to be agreed by the organization, by the Taliban as a whole. But yes, I mean, that of course is one great question for them. I mean, as, you know, as the U.S. pulls back, as the U.S. presence or Western presence is less visible, do in fact a lot of the ordinary Taliban fighters say, well, we've achieved our aim, you know? We were not in this, you know, to put the Taliban back into power in Kabul. The Americans have gone. We don't want to kill fellow Afghans, at least if it's, well, if it were a sort of tragic dominated force of the A&A, that might be one thing, but you know, it's one seen so often in Afghanistan, you know, if it's a local police force, we'll work out a deal, you know, as long as they don't bother us, you know, we won't bother them, you know, they can sit there in their barracks and basically rot quietly, you know. So, yeah, but that's why I stressed very much that this 30% was what they said. I'm not sure that even they believe it. They said it, but do they believe it not clear? I'm certainly not saying that it's actually the truth. And yes, I mean, I would imagine that there would be people within the Taliban, perhaps with a more accurate view, who would say no. I mean, this is not to our advantage. If we get involved in a political process, in fact, it will reveal our weakness, you know, our absence of support, and therefore, you know, our strength lies in continuing the fight. I can imagine that. But, you know, on the how many hands have we gone through now? One hand, two hand, three hands, five hands, ten hands? Or the tens hand or whatever it is. And almost by the same token. One of the people we talked to did say something to the effect that we would not, or the Taliban would not want to be seen as responsible for continuing a civil war. If it wasn't absolutely necessary that, you know, that we saw ourselves in the 90s as the people who came in to end a civil war. You know, we brought the country back together after this dreadful, you know, strife after 1992. And once again, this isn't exactly what he said when he was paraphrasing. Elements of our base would not be happy if, you know, they thought that it was the ambition of Taliban leaders that was keeping fighting going when, you know, when a deal might be possible. But you understand, I mean, this is all sort of a matter of hints and suggestions and nuances and so forth. Let's throw it open to the audience. If you have a question, please wait for the microphone. Identify yourself and questions rather than statements are encouraged in the front here. Yes, if you can say who you... Good afternoon. Eamon Geir and Johns Hopkins. Nice to see you again. Assuming that Taliban and Taliban sympathetic political groups take part in election in 2014... They won't. Can we say that those who are broadly supportive of participation in a future electoral process have the obvious that we had placed earlier? But they wouldn't do it in 2014. Okay, so for the next round, if they're exposed to have far less than 30% of popular support and, let's say, 20% with affiliated groups, do you have any sense of what areas of government they would like to have control over? Which ministries? Well, I think we all know what ministries we'd want if we were then. But that, of course, is why institutionalized power-sharing would be so critical, because, of course, whatever it be, wants an Afghanistan as a power ministry. By the way, it's one of those seen as a supreme court because it has been in fairly conservative hands already. Yes. One could well see how the Taliban would go along with the existing supreme court, while, of course, insisting that it have more teeth to say, oh, we're very prepared not to take over that, and then try instead to get the... Well, that's the whole point. In the end, the critical thing is how you carve up the military and so forth and so on. Now clearly, if there's any reality to power-sharing, there will have to be a balancing situation within the military. You obviously can't simply give it to the Taliban equally. You couldn't give it to their rivals. No, but they wouldn't be drawn on specific ministries. But I think it's important to note, there is no... From what we were told, there is no chance whatsoever of the Taliban taking part in an election against the existing constitution. It would have to be a new constitution and then elections under that. The one thing that... Sorry, this is me, not them, but if they, in effect, got de facto control of greater Kandahar and greater Paktika, and it's absolutely clear that they expect that that is going to happen almost... Well, they'll get the countryside whatever happens and that as part of any kind of political process they're going to get the cities as well. It gets complicated, of course, and you mentioned Hisbent, as you go further north. But this is just me and I'm, of course, as Peter knows, a notorious realist in Syria. But put it this way, there are parts of northern Afghanistan where one would probably be ill-advised to run against Atamahamud or General Dostom, their candidate. If as part of a peace process the Hakanis get greater Paktika and the Taliban get greater Kandahar and so forth, I think that the real possibilities of alternative political forces there might turn out to be rather limited. Indeed. This lady here. Thank you for your presentation. I mean, Lane Serero, I'm a Franklin fellow. I was wondering, you had talked about the balance that the U.S. presidents makes that may actually be sort of an unspoken welcome balance with regard because of not feeling comfortable with their neighbors, Iran. You mentioned Pakistan, of course. You mentioned India. We're in, of course, Russia. Was there reason not to mention China given the resources or was that just an oversight? Well, I mean, there are people who know an enormous amount more about Chinese policy than I do, but, of course, so far, what's obvious is that the Chinese have been playing a very, very cautious game, one. And secondly, on the other hand, there is a radical disconnect between what the Chinese have promised now only on paper. Only on paper, of course, to invest in Afghanistan. They haven't done it yet. So their potential input into the Afghan economy and their total unwillingness up to now to get involved in the political process or make a security commitment. I mean, the Pakistanis have sort of tried to drag them into that, but the Chinese have not bitten. Just a couple of things, though. I gather the Chinese have been sending some sort of private, very much not public messages to the Pakistanis, saying a number of different things. One is, you know, there must not be a resumption of terrorism against India. We have no interest in a crisis with India at present. And secondly, don't let your relations with the United States disintegrate completely. I'm not sure quite... Well, I'm sure that it wasn't... that the wording wasn't brutal, but the Pakistanis do seem to have assimilated the line, which says basically, do not think that we will bail you out if you get into a mess like this. Now, my understanding is that China is committed to the survival, the existence of Pakistan as a state. That does not, it seems to me, mean. And I do think that the Chinese have, in effect, hinted the Pakistanis that China is anxious to pour money into that country in order to get Pakistan out of a mess into which Pakistan has got itself. Now, in Afghanistan, the final thing, though, is that apparently the Chinese have indicated very privately to the Pakistanis that China understands Pakistan's interests and security concerns in Afghanistan. But on the other hand, Pakistan has to realize that China would view with great concern Taliban rule over northern Afghanistan. In other words, bordering on Central Asia. Because, of course, it's that that really worries the Chinese. Did your interlocutors talk about Iran at all? Not really, except to remind us that history has been, of course, a very tricky one, a troubled one. Improving? They wouldn't really talk about that. And they certainly, of course, wouldn't go into any detail about who is backing or supplying the Taliban at present. No, I mean, all we got was this distrust of all Afghanistan's, you know, neighbors. But I think, you know, therefore, well, it doesn't seem to me the Chinese will play a leading role, or at least they certainly don't want to. But insofar as they have any influence, it will be in the direction of some kind of settlement. James Kipfield of the National Journal from the Blue Blazer? Yeah. We're quite some time, and you're hearing more and more that they're losing what little optimism they had if anything had been done. And in your talk, quite honestly, I can imagine why, but we tried to arrange these talks in Qatar and Karzai felt left out. So he scuttled those. You're saying they won't even talk to Karzai. We have to then get, basically, put a commission to win the argument, internally with a military commission. We have to win over Omar to the cause of talks and just tend to mercies. I mean, how much chance do you really get this process at this point? Now we see the timelines shrinking. We see the troops coming out. I must admit I'm getting kind of pessimistic about this. I'm curious about your sort of bottom line. Well, I suppose the first thing is, frankly, the United States Administration has to decide the maximum that it would be prepared to give the Taliban, or live with in terms of the concession to the Taliban, until there's been systematic thought about that in Washington, there can't be anything else. It's no good going into these talks saying, well, let's go into the talks and see what happens. I mean, America has to have a very clear idea of what it wants, how much it's prepared to give. Do you feel there's anybody on the American side who has that vision? Well, I mean, there are people who are thinking about these things, but of course, well, everything's suspended until November. If Romney wins, then I would fear that nothing much will happen at a considerable length of time before they would move towards this. However, I mean, on the other hand, it does seem to me that as, you know, precisely as U.S. ground troops are drawn down, and as you well know, I mean, they are being drawn down as we speak in ways which are very considerably worrying. A number of U.S. officers, precisely because of this threat that, you know, units could find themselves in desperate trouble in future, without the necessary backup. Well, as I've suggested, you know, if in the end, as much as anything else, what one is playing for now in Afghanistan is the, sorry, I can't really phrase this any more softly, but the absence of humiliation for the United States and the West, you know, the avoidance of clear defeat and scuttle, you know, panicky flight. I do worry, you see, about this scenario after 2014 of a, I mean, almost about our side potentially crumbling without the Taliban doing much, you know, without the Taliban playing a direct role. But then in the process, of course, our forces becoming isolated and endangered. A combination now here, of course, well, I suppose, you are moving towards aspects of Vietnam from 73 to 75. But between, you know, losses to U.S. forces on the ground and other Western forces, with, of course, absolutely no possibility anymore of massively reinforcing them or, you know, putting many troops back in. But a combination of that with more and more, you know, despair about the political order that we're backing in Kabul. And remembering, of course, that all the, at least the promise, well, maybe by Congress as well, actually, but certainly by other Western countries for aid to Afghanistan in future, there's always this caveat about, you know, assuming that progress can be made in tackling corruption. Now, if the political commitment were there, that can be ignored as it, let's be blunt, has been for so long. But if there were a wider collapse of political will, you know, to go on supporting our side, then the corruption gives everybody a let-out, you know. And... Your bottom line, sorry? What's your bottom line? Well, just once again, worth exploring. You know, can't guarantee success, but worth exploring. I'd... As long as there's any element of a realistic chance of this, I'd like to look at it, you know, because of my fears about what could otherwise be, you know, a really quite seriously embarrassing collapse, you know, after 24 years. What are the Taliban... The people representing the Taliban point of view, what were their expectations of meeting with you and what were they... Why did they agree to do this? What was their purpose? Well, I hope it wasn't to spend a couple of days at a luxury hotel in the Gulf. Someone would go to the Maldives, right? Yes. Of course, I mean, anyone involved in this kind of thing does have to be constantly aware of the dangers with such interlocutors, you know. Are they telling the truth? Are they engaging in wishful thinking? Are they trying to build themselves up, you know, in ways that could be profitable to them? And all I can say is that on at least some of the points that they said, you know, I've heard it quite widely from, you know, other people as well. So there does seem to be... There does seem to be a body of opinion. And on certain things, it does reflect reality. You know, I think the military perception is simply true. And if they remember, as presumably they do, the history of Afghanistan over the past 20 years or so, then that is the lesson that you would draw from that. You know, you're not going to go back to the situation as of the 10th of September, 2001. That's not going to happen. At best, you will go back to the situation as of somewhere in the mid-90s, you know, at which point, well, why not negotiate and see? All right, tech consultants. We're alive, or it seems if you do it from the correct side. You sort of already answered my question. Maybe they were going to the Gulf to get two days in a luxury hotel. My question is really two-fold or two aspects of it. How much are the two sides converging, the Taliban and the anti-Taliban, that is to say, are they closer in the programs that they would implement now than the Taliban was implementing 10, 15 years ago? And second, given all of the technological changes they're now listening to the BBC, they have cell phones, people are driving trucks where they didn't have trucks and that they are living a different life, both the individuals you talk to or all the ones you talk to, the Taliban in general, the public, does the Taliban say, hey, this is a nice life to live, let's have luxury? Do they say even if I don't want it to the people who I'd like to control don't want it and I won't be able to control them? Well, on the... One is... Sorry, yes, I should have mentioned that. I mean, the space for technocracy does seem to reflect. Also, what a couple of them said is, you know, we recognize that Afghanistan has changed a great deal since 2001 and that Kabul, at least, will have to some extent to live its own life, if you see what I mean, you know, that, you know, we won't be able to go in and run Kabul the way that we ran it. So successfully last time. Well, exactly. The countryside, so I think, you know, what one... Well, I think that one will see that, frankly, whether the settlement or not, as long, God forbid, as Kabul isn't simply destroyed again, as it was, of course, in the mid-90s in fighting, is that you will go back to what, after all, was very much the pattern from 1930s or 40s, you know, to the early 90s, which is of Kabul living a very different life culturally from other parts of the country. In the areas that, you know, the areas that the Taliban control, well, already they live, you know, by very strict rules, but then, of course, they always did. The notion, the where certain differences that the Taliban brought in, but, you know, as I remember from my own travels with the Mujahideen, you know, in the late 80s, you know, Pashtun rural culture, is and always has been deeply conservative. Conservative sometimes in slightly different ways, but not, you know, the idea that the Taliban were a wholly alien force from that point of view is simply wrong. The other, I mean, when it comes to convergence, the key question there, it seems to me, is once again, power sharing, and above all, the sharing of hard power. I mean, in the end, in the end, the most difficult negotiations will be how you share out the army, you know, in the country. Now, there, you know, I mean, obviously there haven't been talks, no, but, well, you see, I remember vividly traveling in Afghanistan, you know, after the overthrow of the Taliban, and just run into all these local groups and say, you know, be stopped on the road by these people and say, who are you? And they say, we're the Afghan army. Who is your commander? And, you know, you get the response of whoever it was, whatever local warlord. And so you'd say, so you're not really the army, you're, you know, Ismail Khan's, or whoever's, or Shah Raza's men. And so, yes, but he has accept his own, pays allegiance to the ban process, and he's accepted Karzai as leader, so we're the army. And so you'd say, so if Karzai gives the order that he should be replaced and that you should be redeployed from wherever it was, you know, but why should he do that? We're loyal to the ban process, and, you know, our commander is loyal. See what I mean. I can see a situation as part of a settlement in which everyone calls themselves a Khan. But, you know, the core commander or divisional commander Kandahar is, should we say, at the very least, appointed with the agreement of the Taliban, host, you know, with the agreement of a Khan. Then it gets, of course, more complicated as you move into other areas which are more fragmented. But when it comes to the overall cultural issues, look, I mean, let's face it, the Karzai administration and so many of the groups backing it have demonstrated again and again and again in recent years that they are also deeply culturally conservative and religiously bigoted. And it has taken, you know, tremendous interventions from us to prevent them from doing some, you know, pretty nasty things in that regard and to carve out what space, you know, we have for liberalism in the country. So that, unfortunately, I have to say, I don't think that that is going to be the sticking point. By the way, just to follow up on the question of the gentleman here, I mean, did the Taliban in your discussion say that they were... Well, they went to the Taliban. Whoever's. The Taliban. The them. Did they say that they were willing to participate in elections in general after a potential constitutional diagram? Absolutely. That's interesting. No, no, absolutely. A new constitution will participate and, you know, we expect to be... Important, we expect to be the biggest party. You see? Of course. You know, 30%, that's the biggest party. But not once again won't allow us to, you know, simply to restore the emirate. We have time for one more question. This lady here. Julia from Treasury. I have a question about the them. And I'm wondering how closely aligned do you think the views of this, your interlocutors are with the Taliban senior leadership on issues such as a political settlement needs to be a single package with no preconditions on power sharing being inevitable, on pushing al-Qaeda out if there were to be a political settlement and giving up heroin, the heroin trade in return for recognition. How closely... What's your best sense, I guess, as to who they are and how representative their views are of the al-Qaeda senior leadership? Well, I mean this is, as you well understand, I mean, a best informed guesswork or semi-informed or educated guesswork. I would say on no preconditions, absolutely, absolutely, no concessions in advance. That does seem to be a universal because, you know, they've said so again and again and anyway from their point of view it makes sense. On sorry, what was the single package heroin? Yes, single package. Heroin, I don't think that's a problem. You know, they demonstrated that before. But of course, the point is we'd have to pay and the aid would have to go to them, to their, not just the national government, but to regional authorities run by the Taliban and by the Haqqanis. You know, because obviously it's not just a question of compensating the farmers, but I think US Treasury might have a problem with that. Oh, yes. But, you see, on the other hand I mean, this I must say is where my sort of British identity does perhaps give me a slightly different perspective and I heard it from Russians in recent weeks as well. I mean we must be brutally honest. It's the idea that our side in this war is going to do anything about heroin is now a fantastically bad joke. Our allies will do nothing and indeed they cannot do anything because their own their revenues and position depend you know to such an extent on this. But also they may simply not have the discipline among their followers to do it, even among their own followers. The Taliban proved once before that they can do it. Whether that's still true, I don't know. But on that score, the Taliban maybe are not just our best but our only allies. They may be. So on the heroin thing the huge question mark I would say is the two you know, intimately related things of victory, complete victory and power sharing. You know how widespread or general in fact is this perception that they can't win an absolute victory. Because I still don't suspect that I mean at least some maybe not all of the people we talk to probably a majority if they thought that they could win an absolute victory they go for an absolute victory and to hell with power sharing and the constitution and everything else. So just how widespread is this recognition that in fact they cannot win an outright victory militarily and by the same token therefore how widespread would the perception be that they have to share power. But then of course that's only the first two the third is and who would they be prepared to share power with because clearly I mean if they simply if they express their willingness in principle to share power you know with the pancheries or whatever but in fact every name put forward turns out to be unacceptable to them well obviously that ain't power sharing. So well but then again I mean the the answers to this would emerge presumably as part of of negotiations I mean it's one of the points about negotiations I mean if it rapidly became apparent that was nothing to talk about the positions and all that there was simply no give on the other side well then end of negotiations I would say though on that score that well if indeed the military realities are as interlocutors sketch them and there I have to say I think that they are actually then 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 either you have a situation of in effect permanent low level low level civil war and de facto disintegration possibly with some Somali style previous Somali style meaningless government structures in Kabul or sooner or later the different groups in Afghanistan would have to start talking to each other you know and negotiate some form of settlement and you know and that is that is the future in the end it's one or the other whether it's next year or 50 years down the line and I mean the only well not the only question but in a sense a major question is how many people have to die first and there of course there's a question which we cannot answer which is how tired people are you know the if you look at Northern Ireland you know the fighting in Northern Ireland and the peace process were essentially coterminous they both went on from very early on and they took about 30 years to reach fruition and actually the contours of the eventual settlement were obvious almost from the beginning you know the settlement that you got in the end was very close to what the British were proposing in the early 1970s it was just that it seems that both sides I'm talking now about the Republicans and the loyalists in Northern Ireland had to exhaust themselves that a deal that couldn't be done in 1973 or whenever it was could be done 30 years later because they just they'd worn themselves out and in the process of course I mean critical to this was the perception which was also I mean obvious from very early on that neither side could win an outright victory that as so many people said and was absolutely obvious the Republicans were not going to be able to dragoon at the Protestant majority into a united Ireland they simply did not have the force to do that even if the British left they wouldn't have been able to do it on the other hand the Protestant dream of going back to the absolutely Protestant dominated Northern Ireland as it existed from 1922 to the late 1960s which was also impossible after the civil rights movement so all of this was obvious to objective observers from the word go it's just that it took so many years and so many deaths before the two sides recognised that they were not going to get their maximal positions on that note optimistic in the long term thank you very much Anatoly