 Thank you for your patience. I think we'll get started. My name is Johnny Walsh. I'm a senior expert for South Asia here at USIP. As many of you who've attended our events before know, USIP is a fiercely nonpartisan agency dedicated to the cause of peace around the world. Founded during the Reagan administration to this day, we're chaired by a board of half Democrats, half Republicans. And this event is sponsored by the Asia Center within USIP, one of our foremost priorities within the Asia Center is trying to be helpful on issues concerning India and Pakistan. And so we are so grateful today to be joined by Ambassador Jaleel Jelani, Dr. Tarakarta, and Dr. Josh White to discuss the impact of the Indian elections on movement towards peace between India and Pakistan. Could not be more timely for a discussion of this kind. Dr. Tarakarta and Ambassador Jelani joined USIP as Jennings Randolph senior fellows just in the last month, more than a month. And they are working on a joint paper together that will inform both regional leaders and US leaders on the possible way forward in the decades-long conflict involving India and Pakistan. And I'll just say on a personal note, I really admire the principle that it took for them to come here and prioritize an effort like this. And it gives me great hope that they would consider that so important. I think they are both tremendously respected in their home countries, and people listen to what they have to say. To introduce the three of them, Dr. Tarakarta has more than 30 years of experience in national security, policymaking, security analyses. And until recently, she served at the director of the National Security Council Secretariat in India, where she served under the tenure of five consecutive national security advisors. Ambassador Jelani is a career foreign service officer. He served as Pakistan's ambassador to the United States from 2013 to 17. And he was foreign secretary of Pakistan before that from 2012 to 2013. And not least, Josh White is an associate professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He previously served at the White House. We work together frequently as a senior advisor and director for South Asian Affairs, essentially, that one of the White houses leading India and Pakistan experts. And he's currently still a very prominent voice on all things South Asia around Washington. And so we're delighted to have this panel join us today to speak on a very important issue at a very timely moment. I think we will ask each panelist to give about 10 to 12 minutes of opening remarks. I may seize the moderator privilege of asking a few questions after that. And Dr. Kharta, shall we start with you? All right, whichever order you like. Which? Ambassador, please. We're all good friends here. Yeah. Well, thank you so much, Johnny. It's a great delight talking to such a distinguished group of people here. To share our perspective on the future trajectory of Pakistan-India relations, this is an issue which is being discussed not only in Pakistan, India, US, but in a lot of places as to what is in store for both countries, post-Indian elections. Will the two countries resume their stall dialogue? Will the dialogue process as and when it starts? Is it going to bring peace between the two countries? And will the two countries be able to see some forward movement on the issues which have caused tension between the two countries, including Kashmir, terrorism, Siachen, Sir Creek, water issues, et cetera? I would say that history of Pakistan-India relations has not been a glorious one. We have had wars. We have had tensions. We have a history of broken promises. We have irritants, and also a tendency to undermine each other whenever we get an opportunity. Some of the recent developments, including Pulwama and the hype during the Pakistan-related hype during the recent elections, leave very little room for optimism. As of now, it is extremely difficult to predict as to what is in store for India-Pakistan relations. I have followed the comments and observations made by a lot of prominent Indian analysts, diplomats, and the comments so far that have come forward. Again, they're not very optimistic. Many have advocated that dialogue is not worth a dime. Perhaps they borrowed this term from my dear friend Ashley Tellis. Engagement has done little to alter Pakistan's behavior. Growing Pakistan-China relations and China-Pakistan economic corridor is seen as a major challenge. And then many have also commented that strategic cooperation between India and the United States of America, and downturn in Pakistan-US relations in the last couple of years, that is seen as an opportunity to further undermine Pakistan and to press its advantages. Sentiment in Pakistan is also not dissimilar. There is a strong perception that normalization of Pakistan India ties. They remain subservient to India's global ambitions, its Kashmir policy, and domestic politics. There is a strong perception in Pakistan that India's terrorism-related rhetoric remains an important vehicle to deflect attention from real issues. For India, dialogue is always tactical, devoid of seriousness and the sincerity that it demands. National security was the main theme during the elections, and Pakistan card was extensively used. And accordingly, an immediate U-turn is unlikely. There will be increased pressure on Prime Minister Modi to fulfill his promises that he had made during the election campaign, including the repeal of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and Article 35A of the Indian Constitution, which has the potential to further escalate tension in Kashmir, as well as between Pakistan and India. Despite these differing perceptions and narratives, I personally feel that peace is possible between our two countries. I have dealt with Pakistan-India relations for a long time during my career years. And I was also closely associated with the 2003-2008 peace process. And I am convinced that issues can be resolved between our two countries, provided there is political will. There is a determination to move forward in this relationship. Those of you who have been following Pakistan-India developments for the last several years, you would subscribe to what I am saying, that situation prior to 2003 was much worse than it is today. We had almost come to a major war between our two countries when 1 million troops had been mobilized on the border. But then the peace process that was initiated at that time by Prime Minister Vaid Pai when BJP government was in power. And that peace process actually transformed the entire nature of this relationship. People-to-people contexts improved significantly. A large number of people from both India and Pakistan they visited the respective countries. Trade volume, which was $250 million when I left India in 2003, went up to almost $2.5 to $3 billion within a span of two to three years. Kashmir-related CBMs were agreed upon, including bus service between Srinagar and Mozaffarabad and between Pooch and Rabla court in order to facilitate the travels between the Kashmiris from the two divided parts of Kashmir. Additional nuclear and conventional CBMs, they were agreed upon. Cease fire on the line of control, which remained hot for almost 14 years, was declared. And this cease in 2003 and this ceasefire lasted for good about seven, eight years. And then substantive discussions on Kashmir terrorism, Sir Creek, Siachen water issues were held at the level of the leadership, at the level of back channel that was established between the two countries, and at the official level. Here I would say that besides the 2003-2008 peace process, which produced positive results, there are many positive stories to tell in case we go back into the history of Pakistan-India relations, and that certainly should give a lot of optimism to all of us about the future trajectory of this process. I am absolutely convinced that given the current political dispensation in both India and Pakistan, there are great chances of the revival of peace between the two countries. In India, Prime Minister Modi has returned to power with the strong government and with a historic mandate. In Pakistan, we see complete harmony between civil and military leadership, both the leadership, whether it's Imran Khan or Army Chief General Bajwa. They want forward movement in their relations with India. And they are more than willing to mentize with India. I am only hoping that the two leaders would meet during the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting, later middle of this month, on 14th and 15th. In ideals in a scenario, whether they meet during the sideline of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit meeting, or later, whenever they get an opportunity, the ideal scenario that we can hope will have the following elements, should have the following elements. One, back channel needs to be revived, back channel of the type that we had put in place between our two countries in 2004. This back channel had also helped in moving forward on a whole range of issues, including Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, and terrorism. And some good progress had been made. As I mentioned that it would be ideal in case both the leadership, they also declared a ceasefire, fresh ceasefire on the line of control. And the most important thing that should happen from this interaction between the leadership of the two countries would be the establishment of a standing mechanism of crisis prevention and resolution. Because in the absence of a permanent crisis mechanism, prevention and resolution, the leadership of the two countries, they come under a lot of pressure from their respective constituencies to take a hard line vis-a-vis each other. And this kind of a mechanism would certainly help in kind of easing some pressure on the leadership. And then the resumption of official dialogue that would also be an ideal situation. I recall that in 2005, April, when we went to Delhi for the cricket match, there was a statement that was issued after meeting between the leadership of the two countries, which declared that the leadership, they agreed that they would not allow acts of terrorism to impede the peace process. So that is the spirit that we need to go back to in order to make a forward movement in our relations. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you very much, Ambassador Dr. Kartan. Morning, everyone. Since this is to do with the primarily linked to India's elections, I'll just give you a small snapshot of the elections as related to the topic here, not general, because that would take an hour. First, as all of you know, the BJP won, that is the Bharatiya Janata Party, won a very satisfactory amount of seats, which is 303 on its own. And together with its allies, 352. The Congress got very badly thrashed. So against the main issue, which I found interesting, was that how much the media got it wrong. When I say the media, I'm talking of the English speaking English media, the regional papers got it right, the media didn't. And the fact that the election data indicates that the vote cut across cast and religious lines. Now, most of you who are South Asia watchers know how important caste is in Indian elections. This just cut across that. The youth share, the share from the youth has also increased, again, across caste lines. The BJP also won in 41 of 79 minority constituencies, which again shows how wrong media was. It also won in states like in the Northeast. There are states like Arunachal, which was a complete win by the BJP, Tripura complete win. And a lot of, I'm not going to name those states, a lot of states which were otherwise not part of the BJP camp at all. Which also in a state like, there's a state called Jharkhand, which most of you, it's a very, very beautiful state. I would urge you to visit it. It is there, they got 12 out of 14 seats, primarily because the BJP brought electricity to that state. I mean, for villagers, that is what is important. It is delivery of what was promised. And it was, in fact, I remember there was a survey some months back. And a lot of villagers had said, how about giving us something? You know, we're not just going to, people have become smart. So if you analyze the elections, they have voted for regional parties in state elections and for a larger national party at the national level. So they are smart, they know what they can get out. Second thing is the cabinet formation. If you look at it, it shows that performers have been rewarded. So 37 people have been dropped. So the main ministries have gone to people who have delivered. And I think I should say here, in my experience with governments, which have been with all kinds, in this government has one quality. The files are moving very fast. Things go much faster than I've ever seen. So there's a certain accountability on ministers. If you don't deliver, you're out. Now, in terms of what is the priority for this government, I think the fact that Mr. Modi is going to head two cabinet committees, one on job creation and one on investment and growth. So that is going to be a priority. And therefore, of course, arising from that private investment, FDI, ease of doing business, these are the priorities, internal priorities. And he got a lot of criticism on employment, as you know, unemployment. In foreign policy, Mr. Modi will travel to Osaka to attend the G20 summit and will meet President Trump on the sidelines. He's been invited for the G7 summit and the Quad meeting recently took place, which most of you would know. And in that, there's also an interesting thing that we've started, the 2 plus 2 format with Japan as well. 2 plus 2 is the foreign and the defense ministers, which now means that all the Quad countries are on the same format. There's also a new division, which has been started in the Ministry of External Affairs on the Indo-Pacific. So there's a lot of attention there. Then coming up is, of course, issues like the Indo-US maritime security dialogue, third round, which was head last April. And so there's a lot of stuff going on with the US. In terms of the markets, love Mr. Modi. So the stock exchange data shows net foreign portfolio inflows have hit a 15-month high, huge swing in currency. The stock market surged 900 points to cross 40,000 for the first time ever. So the markets are basically, overall, what we look at, it's a vote for stability. The next five years, people are happy, things are going to go, things are going to move. So that is overall, so basically, the media got it very badly wrong. So when those of you who study, it's better you look at regional papers. So regarding the Pakistan-India dialogue, you know that in the previous government, Modi had met Nawaz Sharif. It started off very positively with Mr. Sharif arriving for his swearing-in. There was a lot of hope. There was a meeting at the SCO, the last SCO meeting at that point of time, where the joint statement was drafted. Then there was, I think, yeah, he dropped in on Sharif's birthday to wish him. So all that happened. Now in between that were these dissonant notes, which took place, which I won't go into detail, but there were stuff which happened, including the Pathan Kott attacks. That was a very serious one. And this time, the government did something different. They called for letting a Pakistani investigation team to come and look at the site, to talk to witnesses, and gave them complete access. And we hoped something would come of that. Nothing much came out of that. Thereafter, of course, the terrorist attacks continued. Now I won't go into that. One particularly, which was in Nagrota, where the service officers' families nearly. I mean, some of those people I know, they nearly got attacked. So it started getting worse. But still we went on with it. And until finally, of course, the recent attack happened. Now coming to the present government, now right now what's going to happen? Now any politician worth his salt is going to ask, what's in it for us? What is this dialogue going to achieve? Particularly Mr. Modi. He will ask, what is the objective of dialogue? And that is where we come up against a problem. India wants the status quo. And I mean, we want peace. We are satisfied with whatever there is. I am not entirely sure what Pakistan wants. The second question, which is going to be asked by a negotiator. One is what the politician asks. One is what negotiator asks. The negotiator is going to ask, what is the deliverable? So as of today, I just saw on the news, I don't think there's going to be a meeting at SEO because probably this question as to what a deliverable is hasn't been answered. So what can the deliverable, I mean, in terms of what we want is a cessation of terrorism because there's been a lot of bad stuff has happened. So then if we want a cessation of terrorism, the question then arises, can Pakistan stop terrorism? I believe it can. There are reasons for that, which I can go into later. What can we do together in spite of all of that? I would really echo what Ambassador Jilani said. There is, it's for me personally, I've told you what politicians think, what negotiators think, what I think is that after seeing this kind of terrorism, analyzing it for the last 20 years, I mean, enough. There's enough is enough. Let's stop this. And there is so much at stake. There is so much that can be done if these two countries sit down. And if you actually look at each issue, these are non-issues. I mean, the rest of it is there's really with the correct political will, you can just go over this whole thing in a week. And I think this saps both countries resources or energies. India has, there's just one thing. This whole composite dialogue, which began in 1987, India's gone a long way beyond that. Where India was in the 1980s and where we are now, we are quite different. So there is a lot we can offer Pakistan in terms of stability. I think we should. But the question is, again, what are the deliverables? I think I'll stop there. Thank you. Thank you so much, Dr. Josh. Thank you. It's great to be back at USIP. I was actually a pre-doctoral fellow here for some time. So I'm also proud of my affiliation here. And they gave me an office, which was from my cubicle. Half of my view was blocked by a pillar, which is a typical configuration in Washington. But the other half, I could see half of the Lincoln Memorial, which is not a typical view in Washington. So I like to think that at least half of my dissertation came out inspired because of my vantage point. It's really great to be here. What I'd like to do very briefly is to give some thought stepping back about how we might think about the structural conditions, whether the structural conditions are amenable, to progress on this front. And then a little commentary about how this looks from the US perspective, which was my charge here. On the surface, I think that the environment looks modestly favorable. If you take a surface level look, you have a relatively stable, relatively, you could say, pro-military or military accommodating civilian government in Pakistan. There's not an inordinate amount of political drama, even though there is a lot of policy drama right now in Islamabad. And in India, we see a right of center government with a new and very secure mandate and a prime minister who occasionally likes to surprise. He enjoys the spectacle of a policy surprise and has shown himself willing to ignore advisors and conventional wisdom to do unexpected things. So at a top line level, I think there are some reasons to think that the environment is at least somewhat favorable. Going beneath the surface, there are, as I think both of my colleagues have suggested, more dissonant notes. In Pakistan, I think we can expect that both the civilian government and the military are going to be under some pressure in the coming year. There are going to be severe fiscal pressures because of the IMF agreement. Fiscal austerity is a sure way of becoming unpopular as a political government, and it's going to be painful in Pakistan. Most of that pain will redound to the civilian government and not to the military, but the military will probably feel some fiscal pressure on its budgets. We've already seen some indications of that. And in addition, the international community is putting some pressure on the government over terrorist financing. And the military, in addition to all of this, feels like it is facing an internal security challenge from the PTM, the Pakistan Tufts Movement, Pakistan, sorry, Pashtun Protection Movement. I think many of us who look from the outside are struck by the fact that the military has responded in a rather disproportionate and heavy-handed way to a group that has brought some very narrowly bounded and modest objections to the government's behavior or disappearances and other things, but the way in which the military has responded in a fairly draconian way, cutting off media and responding rather harshly suggests that it feels an internal security threat from this Pashtun movement. At the same time, we can look at the military leadership in Pakistan. The Chief of Army Staff, Bajwa, is powerful, but not decisively so. He has been rather cautious on a number of fronts. And I think that even though he has supported some positive activities toward rapprochement, the Tarpur corridor, and some other things, it seems obvious by this point in his tenure that he's not a musharaf. He's not somebody who's willing to do something very bold. At least that would be a real surprise at this point. And he's facing a possible leadership transition in November. There's a chance that he will request and be granted an extension. If he is not granted an extension, we might expect that it could take some period of time, at least a year, for a new Chief of Army Staff to consolidate authority among the group of corps commanders to feel like he has any space to take any decisions that would be politically difficult. So in Pakistan, there are reasons to think that the environment is not highly favorable at the moment. And then in India, there are also reasons to think this isn't the most optimal time. There is a very powerful new government that's come into place with a strong mandate and very clear views on some fronts about what it wants to achieve. But it's also a government that comes in with quite unsettled relationships with the great powers. The US-India relationship is not in a very good place, mostly because of trade issues, but also Iran and a number of other dynamics. India-China relations are in a fine place, but I think there's a growing anxiety in India about China's economic activities in India's own backyard and its political and military activities as well. And then you look at the personalities that are sitting in Delhi. As I said, it's certainly possible that Prime Minister Modi decides he wants to override some members of his cabinet and do something bold. But between Ajit Dovala as National Security Advisor, who's quite hawkish in many ways, and Amit Shah newly installed as the Home Minister, these are people who are not expected to be amenable to India-Pakistan rapprochement. Amit Shah in particular has been at the forefront of championing the idea throughout the course of the elections that Article 370 and Article 35A should be revoked. Article 35A is perhaps easier to actually revoke. We'll see if they do it. These give certain defined privileges for permanent residency, the ability to purchase land and other things in Jammu and Kashmir. And so the intent, it's believed that the intent in trying to revoke these provisions would be to institute demographic change in Jammu and Kashmir in a way that would allow a larger Hindu population to be favorable to the BJP. And already we've seen that one of Amit Shah's first actions in office was to convene meetings focused on redrawing the delimitation, what we would call redistricting or perhaps even gerrymandering in Jammu and Kashmir in order to give Jammu more seats. So these are efforts that will not be taken well, probably largely in Jammu and Kashmir, but also not taken well in Pakistan and would make it difficult to move forward with some positive steps. What does this look like from the United States? Vantage point. I would say that seeing here in Washington, people are drawing a few big conclusions as they look at the region. The first is that we see growing divergence in power and capabilities between India and Pakistan. This is certainly not a news story. It's been a longstanding story. India's growth has flagged a little bit, but Pakistan's growth has flagged very significantly and this divergence is only growing. Moreover, the United States is indirectly facilitating the divergence in power between the two states on the military front by supplying India with a number of conventional capabilities that are not focused on Pakistan. They're focused principally on India's ability to defend itself against a contingency with China, but equipment is often fungible and could be used in a contingency with Pakistan as well. The other thing that we see from Washington is that Asia is becoming a lot more integrated. We have, this has been reflected in the Trump administration's moniker about the Indo-Pacific and there are reasons for this. Part of it is China's built-in road activities, part of it is economic and trade trends, but Asia is becoming quite integrated, but at the same time, it is becoming more polarized. There is the appearance that the United States and India sit on one side of the ledger. China and Pakistan sit on the other side of the ledger and there is a growing contestation between more bipolar Asia. Now, you may say that's not fair, that's not entirely true, but I think that's the perception here and it's increasingly the perception in the region. And so there are some who say here in Washington, it's important for the United States to advance India-Pakistan rapprochement because otherwise Pakistan will fall further into the Chinese orbit. And I think to represent the view here, it would candidly be that Pakistan has long been in a Chinese orbit, but is now even more exclusively so, and that is mostly a done deal for the time being. There's not a tremendous desire to try to compete with respect to where Pakistan falls on that divide. I wanna close by highlighting a few things that Washington may have learned or thinks it has learned about the region. The first is that I think there's a view here that it is hard to compel Pakistan to do things. Washington has taken a long time to come around to that point of view. I think the Trump administration has also come around to that point of view more or less, that it is difficult really to compel most countries to do things that you want them to do. And in this case, a lot of what the US has tried to compel Pakistan to do is to deal with militant groups on its soil and to do the sort of things that would facilitate India-Pakistan peace. At the same time, I think there's been a view that Pakistan is perhaps less fragile than we thought it was, and that we need to pay less attention to the possibility of Pakistan becoming a failed state. And this explains in part why the United States has been willing to cut off a lot of assistance and not worry so much about Pakistan failing. The third thing that I think we're slowly learning is that the escalation risks in India-Pakistan conflict are not only not going down, but they're probably going up because of the personalities, because of the short time scales that are involved and the geography that requires a very short response, a very quick response on both sides. And I would hope that there would be some learning about what this means for the US role. I wrote a piece after the most recent crisis, suggesting that it was a little bit problematic for the United States to give India, which is a close partner at the United States, a green light to take one good punch at Pakistan after a terrorist attack. And the reason is that, even though it worked out this time without military escalation in a very serious way, we might not be so lucky next time. And so I still think there's a lot of thinking that needs to be done here about how to manage crises, which is a sort of separate, about related topic. Where does this all leave the United States? To be very candid, there's not much in the way of incentives for the current administration or frankly for any of the Democrats running for president so far as I've seen, to spend political capital in investing in trying to change the political status quo between India and Pakistan or invest in some sort of political rapprochement. There is a common, I think increasingly common view that Pakistan is at the core of the problem, even as India is doing things in Jammu and Kashmir that make it more difficult to resolve the problem. But to end on a somewhat happier note and not to be completely depressing here, I do think there's also a recognition here in Washington among those who watch this, that this is not a hopeless problem. If you look at the range of really, really tough problems around the world, Kashmir does not have to be one of those. We have seen in the past with Musharraf's engagement, even though it didn't come to fruition, that there is perhaps a workable template to resolve the territorial dispute that there are some shared interests and that there are constituencies in both countries that want to see greater trade and transit between the two countries. So I think it's important in a global context to look at this conflict and recognize this is not one of these conflicts where we say, I cannot even imagine what a solution looks like. This is a conflict where many of us can actually imagine what a solution looks like, even if the current political environment isn't entirely amenable at the moment. So I'll leave it there and I'm looking forward to your questions. Great, thank you very much to all three of us. I know it may seem like this microphone's off, but it's very helpful to people watching on the web. Maybe I'll start with kind of a forward-looking question that any of the three of you are welcome to take on. The short version of the question is what are the opportunities, kind of specifically. And maybe one way that I would formulate it is there are clearly issues where one can in line with the sentiment Josh expressed at the end where one can imagine what cooperation might look like and they don't have to be the touchiest issues like Kashmir. It might be water, it might be climate, it might be economic cooperation is a commonly cited one as we all know that both countries suffer from the lack of economic cooperation, perhaps one more than the other, but it doesn't benefit anyone. So I'd be interested what each of you really think is within the realm of the possible as an issue of potential overlap that some kind of meaningful exchange could start on. I'll let anyone volunteer if who wants to go first. Ambassador. No, I would agree that there are enormous opportunities that are available, whether it's trade, whether it's interconnectivity, whether it's regional integration, all these are possible. But one lesson that we can learn from these 70 years of history of Pakistan-India revisions is that for as long as we will not resolve the issues which have caused this major tension between the two countries, we will continue to sow the seeds of conflict which has the potential to go out of hands. Trade and other confidence-building measures, again, there is a long history of the CBN that both countries have been pursuing. The good thing is that those CBNs are still intact. But my question is that every time there is an incident that takes place, it develops into a major conflict between the two countries. Despite the fact that we have already put in place a number of mechanisms to promote trade and interaction between the two countries, which unfortunately is suspended for the time being. So I think these are the kind of lessons that we need to learn. And then other important factor that we have to keep in mind that these prolonged conflicts also generate mistrust between the two countries. Mistrust in the sense that even some of the positive confidence-building measures which have been agreed upon between the two countries, they also sometime are unable to keep pace with the current realities. And the reason is this massive mistrust that has existed because of the inability of the two countries to resolve major issues. That's why I mentioned in my talk that it is extremely important for the two countries, for the two leadership. I'm talking purely from a practitioner's point of view that we need to seriously look at the elements which had gone into that peace process that both countries they pursued from 2003 to 2008. Trade was moving forward. Other issues were moving forward, but at the same time, we were also discussing in a very substantive fashion the real issues. We were discussing a resolution of Siachen issue. We were discussing resolution of Kashmir issue. We were discussing resolution of water and the Cercreek issue. Terrorism, again an important issue. I think we again, we made some very good progress on this very important issue. Why I say this? Because we realize that there are concerns from both sides that need to be addressed when it comes to issues related to terrorism. We need to address our respective concerns related to terrorism. The mechanism that we had put in place at the level of the national security advisers of the two countries, which again, we made significant progress, should certainly give us a lot of a kind of a hope that things can be bucked out between our two sides. Anyone else like to, please? Okay, I had a slide here on trade which is mysteriously disappeared, so sorry about that. But the trade is not so far. It's fluctuates between about 1.7 and 2.8 billion, so there's a kind of fluctuation there. I should say something, Ambassador mentioned that between 2002 and I think 2010, there was a series of meetings, confidence building measures and all the rest of it happened. There was a very good stuff going on. The reason for that was that from 2002, number of militant camps began to shut down and that is how we felt things were moving forward. Terrorism has to stop. I mean, I don't know any country which will stand quite in the face of terrorism. Now, there's another thing. When I said can Pakistan stop terrorism, I believe it can and I'll tell you why. There's not a single terrorist which goes into Xinjiang. It's one of the worst areas where Muslims are being, they're having a pretty bad time. There's nobody who goes in there. There's not even a gun goes in there. So clearly there are some borders which are very effectively controlled. However, I'm not saying that it's very easy for them to just close down Lashkar-Etaiba and all the rest of them in just a couple of days. Sure, it takes time. But I think we're seeing that, but the problem is, I think, I mean, here I'm just saying the fundamental problem is, I'm not sure Pakistan knows what it wants. I mean, Kashmir is, if you want to talk about Kashmir for the next 10 years and kind of go down fighting, well, okay. But it's not going to change fundamentally. I mean, the bottom line is let's make that into an international border and you're done. I mean, Musharraf's basic, one of the things he did, which he was very smart, he began to move Gilgit-Baltistan, which is, as you know, one of the remaining states which has, it's completely stateless, those people. He began to move them into the national mainstream, thereby slowly making their loci into an international border. I mean, that process had started. That's the way to go. Pakistan needs to bring the Gilgit-Baltistan and POK into its administrative structures and thereby stabilize. What do we want? We want a peaceful and stable Pakistan. That's it. Thanks. I'll give the probably unsatisfying answer, but three things come to mind. The first echo what Dr. Karanthar just said, my view, and I think this is probably shared by a number of people here in Washington, is that the most important step that the world can encourage is for Pakistan to show seriousness and sustained seriousness with its activities against militants. And this doesn't simply have to be, prevent any attacks in India. I think there's a much broader tableau that we all can look at. It is about financing. It's about the kinds of open activities that a lot of groups still engage in on Pakistani soil. Dresses that are still open or whose headmaster has changed but continue to do the same activities. People who continue to preach Friday sermons in public, organizations that continue under new names and incarnations to hold rallies. Obviously India cares about whether there are attacks on its soil, but I think there's a much broader array of things that the Pakistani government could do to telegraph that it cares about the public space open and available to these groups on its own soil. The second thing is that even if this moment is not very propitious, there's a long history of people in settings like USIP and elsewhere in trying to stock the cabinet with good ideas for a moment when the political winds are blowing in the right direction. And there are already a number of ideas from security related confidence building measures to creative options for Punjab to Punjab economic exchange that have been on the table. And I think these, it's not very satisfying to say it, but these are important to keep working on during the off season when there might not be, the political moment might not be right, but so that we have things to, so that both parties have things to bring up when the moment is right. And the third thing I would say is that we can look back on the period of Musharraf negotiations with some admiration for what was sketched out. There's been a lot that's changed since 2008, particularly from India's perspective and what it has suffered and endured. But also I think the idea of a broad-based composite or comprehensive dialogue is really, sorry, is really a diplomatic non-starter in this moment. And so there is a need for some creativity in thinking about how to get beyond the current deadlock where India says we need to talk only about counterterrorism until we're satisfied on that front. And Pakistan says we want to talk about the full range of bilateral issues, including, of course, Kashmir. And I think there are a few ways around that. One is senior level, leader level engagement to be creative. Another, as Ambassador Jelani mentioned, is the value of back channels, which have been very important in this relationship. And the third is thinking about other kinds of creative architecture that don't evolve one topic or every topic as two sort of binary options for discussion. And so I think there's probably some creative thinking happening on that front to get some sort of dialogue in place that will perhaps move these issues forward, but at the very least can be another set of channels for conflict resolution in the event of a crisis. I just would like to respond to what Josh mentioned about Pakistan taking serious actions against terrorism. Well, I, again, I have been dealing with this issue quite extensively during my capacity as foreign secretary and also prior to that. I think a serious action is being taken. And there are, what we need to understand is that if, that Pakistan is equally concerned about terrorism as it is India. The only thing that can work out between the two is to develop a cooperative mechanism of the kind that we had set up recently, a dialogue between at the level of the national security advisors of the two countries. The idea behind this dialogue was to enter into discrete and candid discussions to address our respective concerns on terrorism. If India has concerns with regard to the Pakistan-based extremist organizations, Pakistan also has concerns with regard to the support that is being extended to certain elements from Balochistan and other places by India. How do we sort of now reconcile our differences on terrorism? Now this is, this can again come about as part of a cooperative mechanism. And I, again, I can tell you that the kind of engagement that took place between Mr. Ajit Doval and our national security, our former national security advisor, Janan Jajua, we made good progress in that. Whereby we were very discreetly and candidly, we were sharing information with regard to the activities of these elements. And I think both sides were equally happy with this kind of an arrangement that had been worked out between the two sides. What is required at this stage is rather than sort of hurling acquisitions either from Pakistani side to Burj India or from the Indian side towards Pakistan. I think we need to go back to the same mechanism that we had established. Whereby we have discreet and candid discussions on this very, very important issue to address these issues. I may not get a chance to respond to what Johnny mentioned about some aspect. For instance, he mentioned that, sorry, Josh mentioned about Pakistan falling into the Chinese orbit. You know, I, again, this is something that surprises me the most because we have had a very close relationship with China for a very long time. Since the 50s, it, you know, it's a relationship of trust, et cetera, relationship. It's been a very close relationship. At the same time, you know, this relationship was established when we were part of the U.S.-led alliance in the 50s, 60s, 70s. And if you recall, Pakistan played that close relationship with China as a bridge between China and the United States of America. And if you read Dr. Hendrick Singer's book, he has devoted full one chapter to describing the kind of role that Pakistan played. What I'm trying to say is that for us, maintaining a very positive relationship with the United States of America is equally important. Our relationship with China is very important, but at the same time, developing a good relationship, a development, a relationship which is mutually beneficial for the two countries is also very, very important because we feel that we, both U.S. and Pakistan, they have some inherent strengths in this relationship because of which they would always need each other. So that's something that I want. Thank you. I wanted to ask one more about picking up on lessons from the back channels of the past and the different kinds of contacts that have been tried over the years and then I'll turn it over to the audience, maybe, for questions. If the first question was about what substantive issues have some promise, this would kind of be about mechanics. Especially both of you have had long involvement in the different kinds of contacts, Josh is a longtime observer of them. What has worked, what has not worked in terms of keeping a dialogue alive that can make, that can meaningfully improve the climate and very much that can survive an inevitable crisis or an eventual crisis. So what has worked, what has not worked and how does that apply to the present situation? How might one structure a meaningful channel? Okay, if I can just say one thing from the previous question, which I didn't mention, I'm sorry, I really wanted to say this was that one way we can get around this whole stuff is the issue of connectivity. I mean, this is a huge thing in India right now. If Pakistan wants to step into this connectivity, it has huge benefits. So that is one in terms of the liberal. There's a lot which can be done, but it all requires putting Kashmir and all that stuff aside, just like we do with China. I mean, we got a slap in the face in 1962, okay? Thereafter, we've got as many problems with them, but all that has been set aside and with China, we go ahead, there's a huge, huge amount of rise in trade, but that apart. In terms of dialogue, I think the NSA to NSA dialogue was very useful. I think as Ambassador was saying, and I have to say, there are people like Ambassador Jilani, for instance, in Pakistan who want the dialogue to go forward, but you saw what happened, the NSA talks were going on, and then the Patankar attack took place. So clearly, I don't know whom we should talk to in Pakistan, it's not very clear. I'm not sure that even the army chief has, like George said, has the entire command over the rest of it, because I just recently read a story about General Zia, that he had sanctioned Hamid Ghul, and then R&W head on a dialogue on Siachen, which very nearly was successful. And then Zia gets bumped off. The person who was in charge of that dialogue gets killed mysteriously. So I don't know. I know the NSA to NSA dialogue, but I would agree is one of the best mechanism. You know, Ambassador Jilani would, both of you would have much more insight on this, but it has struck me that when there have been India-Pakistan dialogues, they have been structured in very fragile ways, rather than in resilient ways. So you have foreign secretary to foreign secretary talks, and then if there's any, if anything happens, then there's kind of only one option for other side, which is to turn off those foreign secretary talks, rather than having a more multi-layered set of dialogues with lower officials and high-level officials, so that as the relationship ebbs and flows, as there are tensions, there's the ability to dial down and dial up the kind of dialogue. So there's been a structural fragility, which I've heard complaints on both sides, actually, about how fragile this is and how it would be more advantageous. Even if the lower-level channels are fairly boring, fairly dull, fairly ineffectual, they would still exist to be able to allow some calibration of the relationship. Both sides are going to experience things that are frustrating and that cause them to want to signal to the other side that they are displeased. So there's probably a way, in any new configuration, to build a little bit, to build more layers into the dialogue to allow for that. Sorry. Josh, I don't agree with you because I have been part of many lower-levels dialogues in the past, in the last 25, 30 years. Every time a breakthrough was achieved between India and Pakistan, the breakthrough was achieved at the top level, whether it was Siachen, Siachen-Glacier issue was, but it's all almost resolved after meeting between former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi. Similarly, many of the other issues that we talk about, they have. Even in recent years, the peace process that I was referring to you about, again, our experience is that official dialogue was very useful, very good, because you have to have a front channel because they are the ones who basically do the spade work, prepare in terms of, but then again, the real breakthrough would always come in case there was interaction at the top level between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, or for that matter, the President of Pakistan. So I think there is a certain importance attached to the dialogue process at the highest level because they are the ones who have the mandate to be flexible. We bureaucrats, we somehow, we are not really trained to be flexible or we don't have the kind of a mandate from the leadership to show the kind of flexibility that is required at the official level. Great, thank you all. I will turn it to the audience now. I would note that in my strongly held view, the highest form of a question is one that can be expressed in a single sentence. Or little more, so I would invite all questioners to limit the scene setter before the question to the greatest extent possible. And perhaps I could start with Carter. Thank you, Johnny. My question is, I heard everything that each of the speakers spoke about, especially regarding Modi, but on balance, does Modi's reelection help or hinder a peace process? I mean, I understand that he has a mandate and he's been reelected so he doesn't have to worry about political difficulties in the future. But on the other hand, maybe that just reinforces him not to do anything. Well, on balance, does this help or hinder? I think, I mean, he, in his first term, he's the one who reached out to Pakistan, so there is an interest there. Second is in terms of the trends, he's got the maximum done in the first two years of government. Third is all new governments like to reach out to Pakistan and say, go down in history. So that kind of thing would be there. And fourth is something I know personally. If he decides, he'll do it. I mean, for me, the question is compared to what, right? Compared to what counterfactual outcome? Compared to Modi coming to power with a more fragile government but one still led by his alliance. Modi coming to power having to cobble together a very fractious set of regional parties that would leave him in a much weaker position. Or if we really stretch our counterfactual imagination, Rahul Gandhi as prime minister. So I think it really depends on your counterfactual. I would say that even though, if you look at the people in his cabinet, the way he campaigned, his disposition don't seem very favorable to his outreach. He is in a strong, secure electoral position. And it's hard to imagine any real progress being made in positive relations between India and Pakistan when you have an Indian prime minister who's at a weak electoral posture. So on balance, I would say there's, it does provide better opportunities if he chooses to seize them. Just one line, he's, like I said, his priority is the economy, investment. So if this connectivity thing is on offer, then it'll take off. Great. I neglected to ask that everyone introduce themselves before the question, but we'll go over here and then to you. Thanks, Karen Pervez from the State Department. I want to go back something, it's just something you said Ambassador Jelani and have others address it too. In 2005, 2006 during the period that you mentioned, there was a bombing on the Samjhotha Express which didn't result in a derailing of the talks. So it'd be interesting to hear from your perspectives what might have actually worked about the mechanism themselves at that particular time. And real quick, I just want to tack on one more question I'll keep it to a sentence. Dr. Karthar, I'm glad you mentioned the Uyghur Muslims issue, right? But I wanted to get your thoughts on, I mean clearly from Pakistan's perspective, Kashmiri Muslims represent also a history going back to 1947, which is different from just religion. So I'd love to hear your thoughts on that as well. Thank you. Question as to why the dialogue was not disrupted following the Samjhotha Express tragedy. I think I mentioned earlier about this statement that was agreed upon between the leadership of the two countries in April of 2005. And I think probably that Samjhotha Express tragedy also took place around the same time. That acts of terrorism will not be allowed to derail the peace process. So because at that time there was a strong desire on the part of the leadership of the two countries to move forward even on substantive issues while sort of working on the confidence building measures. That is why I thought that as if we agree that terrorism is an issue which concerns both countries, then I think both countries should again revisit that understanding that they had reached in 2005 to have an uninterrupted and uninterruptible, and I'm borrowing this phrase from one of the Indian politicians, dialogue between the two countries. That is something which is extremely important in case we want to get out of this groove in which we have caught ourselves for the last 70, more than 70 years. Okay, on the Hukor question, I think the, okay, I'm being really sort of holding back because Ambassador Jalani is here. But Pakistanis have also fighting in Afghanistan. Some of them have landed up in Syria. They've landed up all over the place. So by logic, they should land up in Xinjiang. They've landed up in parts of Europe, they're here. I'll just stop there. My name is Nadeem. I'm working as a journalist with Voice of America. My question, we've mentioned, you've all mentioned different issues that amper the ties between Pakistan and India. And one of the places or the stage where both the countries have been involved in proxy war is Afghanistan. How important is that Afghan factor in both the relations or improving the relations? You are absolutely right. This tension doesn't really confine at the bilateral level between the two countries. Unfortunately, that's the, and it is also somehow reflected in other regional hotspots. And you mentioned about Afghanistan. Certainly Pakistan is a certain perception with regard to India's role. India has a certain perception with regard to Pakistan's role. But then again, I'll go back to my same earlier advocacy that it is extremely important for Pakistan and India to sit together to discuss these issues in a very, I would say, frank and candid fashion. Because, and I think that discussion can also include discussions on Afghanistan. From Pakistan's point of view, Pakistan would welcome any legitimate role for any country for that matter, which does not impinge on Pakistan's own security and stability. That is something that Pakistan would be very happy to accept. But in case there is any role which is other than economic development or any country which uses Afgan's soil to destabilize Pakistan, that certainly would become a matter of great concern for Pakistan. That's why I say that as and when dialogue resumes between the two countries, we also need to bring in other regional hotspots in our discussions, which is something which has not taken place before in our bilateral interaction. Okay, maybe we'll take three questions here and bundle them. We'll go, sir, and ma'am, and sir, in that order. Thank you. I'm Ajay Behra from Jamia Milya University in Delhi. My question is basic to both Joshua and Ambassador Jilani. Joshua, you mentioned about the fragility of the negotiation process, and here I just want to bring back the discussion to the four point Mushra proposals. That signifies in some sense the fragility that here was something far more substantive and yet, today there's no ownership in Pakistan for that proposal. So I would like to know your views, Joshua, and Ambassador Jilani as to why there is no ownership for that particular proposal, because you generally spoke about a resolution to Kashmir, but would you be a little more specific as to what can be a solution for Kashmir? I mean, we have certain proposals in place, unless one is creative to think about something besides the proposals that already have been discussed, your views on this Mushra proposal, as well as what I see is that after Mushra went out of power, there's no ownership of it in Pakistan. And over here. Hi, my name is Karen Fisher. I'm running an advocacy group called Kashmir Action Network for the Kashmiri diaspora. My question is quite short. What about Kashmiris? I think that is a huge elephant in the room that hardly ever gets addressed. I lived in Kashmir from 2006 to 2016, and when I moved there, the Mushra formula was very popular. People saw some hope and everybody was engaged, including the moderate Hurriyat. But today, after 2008, you will not find any support in Kashmir for the formula, which also, I think, answers your question because there's no pressure from Kashmiris to revive it. And so my question is, what about Kashmiris? Are they being asked? Will they be asked? And is there any understanding about the change in Kashmiris since 2008, which is a huge political radicalization, not Islamist political? Great, thank you, and... Thank you. And I just wanted to ask you or the panelists, take on any incentives that exist right now, because it seems like there's really no incentives on the Indian side where we heard a little bit about potential redistricting and resettling. That seems to be maybe a solution on the Pakistani side. Obviously, there's vested interest in the security apparatus to have an opponent. And on the United States side, I mean, this administration is not really that interested. And last time we tried to, through our SRAP, involve India and Afghanistan and Pakistan, that was not very popular. So where are the incentives here, if there are any? Thanks. Okay, so we have the solution to Kashmir, the role of the Kashmiris, and the incentives for any party to move forward. I suppose I'd invite any of the three of you to pick up on any part of that, you wish. Will I respond to your question? I have been very closely involved with that four-point process because I was, from Pakistani side, I was there and from the Indian side, it was Ambassador Arun Singh who was associated with this process very, very closely. And we all thought that it contained some very good elements for a possible interim solution to this long-standing problem between the two countries. The ownership, I think there is a tendency in both India and Pakistan, unfortunately, that any good initiative taken by one government is somehow not owned by the successive government or the opposition. Fortunately for us, one very important thing that happened during the peace process and that's something that convinces me, that apart from the government co-opting opposition to a solution to a problem is also very, very important. So if you look at the elements which had gone towards the development of an understanding of those four points, one, I think the leadership, they also demonstrated a high degree of statesmanship. Number two, the opposition parties, they also were co-opted. Third, Kashmiris are also very, very important because you can't visualize a solution to the Kashmir problem simply by reaching an understanding between India and Pakistan at the bilateral level unless that solution is endorsed by the Kashmiris. That's why when that process started, we both Indians and Pakistani side both were very closely engaged with the Kashmiris from both sides of the line of control. And I think that's something which is very important. But let me also tell you that there is some misunderstanding. There are many things which do not come in the public domain, but those four points or those many of the elements which were contained in 2003-2008 peace process, they are always looked at by the two governments whenever there is a dialogue that takes place between the two sides even in recent months. And I have absolutely no doubt that as and when the dialogue resumes, the two sides would certainly look at very carefully about the, and I agree with you that Kashmiris are a very important party. You can't imagine a solution to the Kashmir problem unless their endorsement is there to any solution that is worked out between the two governments. Okay, one is, I think, just my curiosity. I think Ambassador Hakani said that he went to the foreign office to ask for the files on the motion of proposals, and he said, you know, files in existence. So I don't know how this works. Maybe the foreign office didn't want to share that file with you. Probably, I mean, but I'd really like to know more about that. Because, yeah, that is, I think, it's probably not, you know, I'll tell you with this government, with this prime minister, he will want something fresh, he'll want ownership. So I think we'd probably go in a different direction. But we'll see. In terms of Kashmiris being involved, I entirely agree with you. They should, I mean, they are the suffering party. Please remember that from, this has started from 1990 onwards. So you have a particular atmosphere in parts of Kashmir. I mean, I always object to people saying the Kashmir problem. If you look at that map, there is one little tiny portion of it which is the affected districts of Kashmir. The rest of it is fine. No, it is true. Please. I've also traveled in Kashmir. I mean, I have been to countless times. I know the situation. I've been there. Strict. Would you like details? Did you work in Le? I worked in Le, I worked in Karga. I worked in every Tessil in the valley. Yeah. I even worked in Jammu. Right. So what I'm saying, I'm not saying that Le and the rest of them are happiness at the top to know. There is lots of things can bet been done. But the trouble which we are talking of terrorism, violence is in a few districts. That is where the violence is occurring. The rest of them, they want tourism. They want stuff which goes on. They need local government. That is one of the most important problems in Kashmir is the lack of local government because of, I mean, anyone who's done conflict studies will know that the first thing which gets affected is the governance. Anyway, be that as it may. So yeah, that's all. Before we close, anyone care to weigh in on the final question about incentives? Yeah, I will. Thank you. Those were all great questions too. To Ajay's question, I think it was very ably answered by the ambassador. I would just say that I didn't mean to suggest that breakthroughs would happen at lower levels. I think the history suggests that if positive things are going to happen, it would have to be taken at a very high level with those who have the political standing to do so. But we've also seen many periods where an incident has broken off effectively all formal ties, all formal diplomatic contact between the two countries for extended periods of time. And I think there's, as I said, an argument for making that structure more resilient so that one can then walk back up that ladder to higher level engagements as necessary. To the question of the Kashmiris, something that doesn't, their views, the political attitudes don't get as much attention here in Washington as they deserve. And frankly, it's considered sort of impolitic to talk about some of the drivers of political radicalization and some of the ways in which the policies of this new government could, I think, really prove to be a stumbling block for a political class in Kashmir that's willing to entertain a full range of options. And so I think that that's something that deserves to be a larger part of the conversation. As for incentives, I wouldn't say that there are many, but if I had to think about the top incentives in each of Pakistan, India, and the United States in India, I think the incentive is for Modi to, we know that he likes to be a grand statesman. We know that he thinks highly of his abilities to be a grand statesman and likes to make bold kinds of gestures. He now has a more solid political base to be able to do that. And I think that he has some personal incentives to do it. On the Pakistani side, I think Pakistan faces some incentives to avoid being seen by the rest of the world as being sort of outside the norm of what a responsible country does and to continue some of the very early steps, in my view, early steps that's taken to crack down on militant groups. And some of those incentives could, over time, change the conversation in India, particularly if Pakistan does things that are visible and public and effective. And here in the United States, it's more difficult to think of what the incentives are, but Washington has a short attention span and we respond to crises. So not that I would wish a crisis of any kind, but we do seem to have them on a periodic basis between India and Pakistan. And when there is a crisis, it does focus attention on the ways that Washington can be helpful and can encourage constructive dialogue or at the very least mechanisms to ratchet down escalation. Because as I said, if you look at the military balance, the history of recent activities, the short timescales involved, there's reason for all of us to be concerned that future crises will happen faster, be more treacherous and more problematic for US interests than once in the past. Great, I recognize there are more questions, but I want to be respectful of everyone's time. I would thank all three of our panelists, not only for sharing their wisdom today, but for long careers of service and the cause of peace and conflict resolution. We give them a round of applause and thank you all for coming.