 So, the outline of my presentation is that I will start by giving some background, my own background obviously on the Troika program, because I think it's very hard to understand the Troika programs if we don't put them in a context. So I will try to look at some of the special features of Troika programs, and then I will look at whether and how can we judge whether Troika programs have been successful. Is it simply enough to say, you know, you have exited there for it successful? Is that the measure, are there other measures? Then I will be talking about exiting, and then I will talk a bit at the end of sort of life beyond exit, because I think exit may not be the end of the way one should look at some of the issues. Now, let me start by the special features of Troika programs. I think what one has to appreciate is that in the years that follow entry into the Euro area in a number of countries, there were very large imbalances that accumulated. And the result of those imbalances is that I'm going to be looking at sort of stocks, and stocks both of this is net international investment position, and then I'll be looking at public debt. But what I'm going to do here is look at the Euro area countries, which are in orange here, and compare them to other countries, actually to all of countries that had IMF programs in the period from 93 to 2012. So in those 20 years, look at all the IMF programs, and this is what I'm judging, how special are the Euro area countries that went into Troika programs, including the IMF, how special was there, was the situation compared to a typical IMF program. And here what I want to show essentially is to say that the imbalances were much bigger. Here I'm looking at the external imbalance, and I'm giving here three periods, T minus 5T and T plus 5T is the year when the program started. So it's not a year, it's the initial year of the program. And what you see in red here, you have the typical, the average IMF program. And in orange, you have the Euro area. In green here, you have the countries in the Asian crisis. So the external imbalance was bigger, much bigger than the typical IMF program, was even bigger than in the Asian crisis. If you look in terms of the public debts, you get something of the same nature. What you have on the left, again, is the Euro area compared to comparators, all the IMF, it has Asian crisis, it has Latin American. And then on the right, you have the three program countries, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. So if you look again at T, at your T, which is in the middle here, right this part here, at T, the year when the program started, public debt levels in the program countries on average was far, far bigger than it is in almost double actually, than in a typical IMF program. And it's certainly bigger than it was in Latin America or it was in the Asian crisis. And then I showed there on the right part, on the right panel, the differences between Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. But I think what I want you to remember from this is that whatever indicator you would look at, you would see that in the Euro area, by the time the countries get into the crisis, they'd accumulated a huge amount of imbalances. So whether you want to look in terms of flows, of current account deficit, or public deficit, or you want to look in terms of stocks, as I did here in terms of public debt, in terms of net international investment position, you see this. So huge accumulation. So I think this is an important factor. So it's not your usual crisis that the IMF had to deal with. Now, I think that that two features is both the fact the way the Euro area worked, in the sense there was no indicator of crisis. Crisis went until very far. And in the sense the Euro area allowed the buildup of those imbalances. But then when the crisis starts, we don't have the proper institutional framework to deal with the crisis. So there is also a delay before one gets help from the IMF, from the Troika in dealing with the crisis. So it's both that huge accumulation. But then when the crisis starts, there is a fairly large lag from the time the crisis starts to the time when T starts, when the program starts. And those are the two features. Now, the result of that is that the Troika programs, they're far bigger than anything we have ever seen in the IMF context. And here I'm looking at, again, all IMF is on the very left here, all IMF program. You see that on average for all IMF program in the period 93 to 2012, we are talking about three to four percent of GDP. This is the size of an IMF program of GDP of the country, of the crisis country. On average for the Euro area, it's 18 percent. And this is only the IMF part. This is not the Troika program. This is the portion financed by the IMF, let's say roughly one third. So even the IMF part is so much bigger than anything we have seen in general. Okay, so again on the very far left here all IMF, Latin American average for the Latin American crisis country, we're talking about 6 percent of GDP and in the Asian crisis, roughly 3 percent. So here the IMF portion of the Troika program itself on average for those three countries is 18 percent. And you have to multiply that roughly by 3, since the IMF typically only financed a third of the program. And here what I'm showing as a share of GDP, the different colors is who finances what? Okay, don't pay attention much to the colors. I'm looking here for Greece, Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. What is the size of the Troika program? Including the IMF, but not the full program, as a share of GDP. You see for Greece, the two programs you have over 100 percent of GDP. For Cyprus, you're coming near to 60 percent. Ireland is about 50 percent, 5-0. And Portugal is actually the smallest, but it's well over 40 percent. So this is not a total program of which the blue part is the IMF finance part. On the most left here, the blue part is the portion finance. So this would add up to the 18 percent on average. So there are very, very big programs, exceptionally big programs. We have never had programs of that sort. And again, you have to keep why it happened because of those imbalances that had built and because also we are late in dealing with the problem. Difficulty of agreeing, recognizing the problem, both, I think, intellectual recognition, what is the issue here and then not having the proper institutional framework to deal with the emergency that had built up. Now, another special feature obviously is that country to an IMF program where countries have an exchange rate to make the adjustment here, countries inside the euro area, they don't have an exchange rate instrument to regain quickly competitiveness. And the next factor which I think is important is the fact that we have seen adjustment taking place and certainly in Ireland, maybe in particular, adjustment has taken place. And I think in Greece actually in Portugal, as we will see in a moment, the current account, they have adjusted, but they have adjusted in a very asymmetric manner. Most of the burden has been on the side of the countries that were indebted, not so much on the creditor side. Something I think you know well, I suppose. I don't need to paint a long picture. Now, what I want to do here, it's a picture that I actually very much like and that I constructed and I will show you this picture in two parts. What I'm showing here is the euro area, divided in two groups of countries, the core countries and the peripheral countries. The peripheral countries here includes certainly Ireland, Portugal, Greece, but it has also Spain and Italy. Those are the five, thank you, five peripheral countries and then they are the core countries. Now, this is the current account of the euro area but divided into those two groups of countries. In blue, you have the core countries. DM is the old DM zone countries. And in red, you have the Gibbs, so Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Now, what I want to, what is the black line here? The black line is the start of the euro. And I can assure you, and I'm not doing it here, but I can assure that if I had started the graph here, not in 91, so here it goes from 91 to 2008, within the middle sort of the start of the euro in 99, I can assure you that if I had shown you the figure that starts in 1961, exactly the same figure, you would see what you get in the period before the euro. That is, the blue line and the red line, they move pretty much together. There's not a behavior, a historical behavior in a sense of the peripheral countries versus the core countries in terms of the current account. They move fairly much together. You do see once in a while, as you see here, this is the crisis in the early 90s. Remember when Italy and some countries leave the ERM, the exchange rate regime. So there is just after the start of free capital movement, there is the crisis. And they had been just before that, a buildup of current account deficit. But look at what is the current account deficit of this aggregate. It's between two and three percent. And you had once in a while problems of that sort, but then what you have is an exchange rate crisis, a typical exchange rate crisis, and there is a realignment, a readjustment. So there is a bit of movement. There was a bit more of movement of the peripheral countries. Then you get at the core, although they hover around sort of more or less zero. So they are not chronic current account surplus for the DM zone or current account deficit for the peripheral countries. You can't sort of say one group of countries are very different from the other in terms of their current account behavior. But then look at what happens after the year is created. You see this huge divergence. And not only you see this huge divergence, but you see indeed this huge imbalance that is being created by the system and in the GIPs. And for the group as a whole, and it's an average, okay? Behind that, there are obviously some countries that have far bigger deficit, Italy, which is far smaller deficit. But you see that at the tipping point, 2007, 2008, sort of when you have the big buildup before the financial crisis and things start to turn around, we get there to a current account deficit on average of about 7%. So far bigger than what we have never seen. If you, as I say, again, if you go back to this figure from 61, you would not see anything of that sort, okay? You can see that it is really change, it's a change of regime after the entry into the euro. The same thing for the blue line. It never went as high as the 4% here on average. And again, we know that there are different behavior Germany and other countries. But both the blue line and the red line, that is sort of a bit mirror image here, you never had that before. So one has to ascribe that indeed to the way the euro worked. Now, then look at what happens in the period since the crisis. Now, you see that in 2007, 2008, the current account deficit in the Gibbs countries was very high, but the adjustment takes place extremely fast, okay? But there's no adjustment on the blue line. So this is the asymmetric adjustment that I'm talking about and is certainly one of the difficulties. Now, how should we judge success or not of the Troika programs? For those countries like Ireland, which are out of other countries that are not yet out, but that may be out in a few months or in a few years. What should be the criteria to do that? Seems to me, I can think of three different criteria. One is to see whether they've complied with long conditionality, okay? Have they abided by the rules, by the conditions that were present in the program themselves? Did they follow the conditionality? That's one way to judge success. A second one is to compare maybe a bit unfair, but naturally to expectation. The program that did contain sort of projection to the future, one can look the odd turn compared to the expectations and see what happened. And another one, which I think makes sense certainly as well, is to ability to regain market access. After all, countries had to get program because they had lost market access and so one can say, well, if you regain market access, that is a sign that the program has been successful. So let me say a word on performance along those three criteria. If we look at compliance with conditionality, I would say that in all four program countries, and I'm including here Cyprus actually, not just Portugal, Greece and Ireland, I would say that they are all more or less organized in the same manner. There are three blocks of conditionality. One is about fiscal consolidation. One is about financial sector reforms because in all of those countries, they were banking financial sector problems and there are also in many of those programs, growth enhancing measures, the structural measures. They're always organized in this manner, the conditionality. So if you look at how they respected the conditionality that had been included in the program, I would say on the whole, conditionality has been fairly well respected. Certainly fiscal consolidation has happened everywhere, including Greece certainly. If you look at financial sector reform, I would say financial sector reform has also been implemented, although we know there are still some problems, as I said, including in Ireland. The more difficult one in a sense is the growth enhancing the structural reforms. Now the structural reforms, they're probably more important in some countries than in others. Probably Ireland, I think probably Cyprus as well, they had fairly good structural conditions, competitive economies compared to Greece and Portugal, but at the same time, we know that those structural reforms, they take a long, long time to implement. I mean, those programs, they are three year programs. Greece is a special case because there were two programs, but Ireland was a three year program, Portugal is a three year program, Cyprus is a three year program, and Greece originally was a three year program, but then they got a second program before the end of the first one. So typically they are three year program, now how much structural reform can you do and get the result of that? I think that's a difficult one. Criterion number two is to look at expectations versus outcome. I think there are certain patterns that we see in the different countries. Almost everywhere, you had domestic demand that fell much more than expected. I mean, it was expected that domestic demand would fall as a result of the fiscal consolidation, but it fell typically by more than had been expected. We know there is this issue about elasticities, probably we did not, that's hard to do, but the circumstances were such that probably the fiscal consolidation had more of an impact on domestic demand that we had anticipated. But then there were also the financial condition, including, obviously at some stage, the doubts about the perennity of the Euro area, and that was certainly very hard on the crisis countries. And then there was, as I will show in a second, and you all know, sort of the unexpected double-dip recession in the Euro area, sort of in the traditional markets of the countries. The current accounts, not the current account, but the current accounts, they improve more than expected, and I think they improve more than expect for different reasons, partly because demand collapsed and import collapsed more than had been expected. Ireland is a different story here, but in all the other countries, certainly that. We had a collapse of demand and collapse of imports, and in many cases, including in Ireland, including Portugal, but not in Greece, exports did better than had been expected. So the current account has moved in positive territory much faster than had been expected, partly for good reasons, partly for bad reasons. The bad reasons are obviously the collapse of internal demand. Unemployment, again, with the exception of Ireland, unemployment has risen much more than had been expected in the program, and the public debt levels, with, again, the exception of Ireland, so Ireland, one sees, there's a pattern here, Ireland is a somewhat different case than others, the public debt increased much, much more than had been expected. I'm showing here, and maybe difficult for you to read. What I was showing here, but don't try to read it and strain your eyes, I'm going to give you some numbers. It's first for Ireland, looking at what the programs had expected on some of the macro variables and what is the outcome in January 14, maybe just to remind you some numbers. For instance, if you look at GDP, the growth of GDP, the accumulated growth of GDP over the period, in the program, the expectation was 5.4% real GDP, cumulated, not for one year, cumulated, and the outcome was much less good, 1.5%, and domestic demand collapsed much more, so it was expected that the cumulated collapse of domestic demand would be 3.4% for Ireland, and the out turn was 7.7%. On the other hand, if you look at deficits, Ireland was very much on target, on terms of current account, it was better than was expected. In terms of unemployment, it's a bit higher, 13 and 13 something, but it was expected 11.6, so the out turn is very close, and the government debt as well, the expectation was about 120%, and the out turn was 124%. If you look on the other hand, at the other two countries that I'm considering here, Greece and Portugal, they're the discrepancy between the expectation and the out turn is really quite big. It's certainly quite big in terms of domestic demand, I mean just to give you a number here, the collapse of domestic demand for Greece for that period was expected to be about 12%, negative it was 28%. For Portugal, not so bad, in terms of deficit, deficits much, much bigger, the current account balance, like in Ireland, better than had been anticipated, so the current account consistently in all countries, the out turn is better than the expectation, but then unemployment, much, much worse, had been expected unemployment for about this time of the year in Greece for about 15%, it's 27%, and for Portugal, the expectation was 12%, and we are about 17%. And then the debt levels also far, far higher than had been anticipated. So Ireland stands as a different case, certainly than Portugal and Greece, in terms of the gap between expectation and outcome. For Ireland, it's not very far, the actual out turn is more or less on target compared to the expectation for the other two countries, the result is much less good. Double the precession we all know about this, let me move then to criterion, sorry, criterion number three, criterion number three's ability to regain market access. Now, if you judge by that, it's a well, certainly Ireland has been successful, Ireland was able to have market access and exit the program on those grounds. If you look at Portugal, Portugal, whose program is due to expire, the three year program is due to expire in May of this year, so it would have been three years in May, and now the question is, will Portugal be able to exit or not? The news have been good, and markets have looked favorably at Portugal, and Portugal has regained market access, not, it's been able to issue quite favorable conditions, although not as favorable at all as Ireland. So compared to where Portugal was a year ago, the situation is much better, so the way markets are looking at Portugal is much, much better. Remember also last summer there was a whole crisis in Portugal, some change of government, the finance minister who left the government, all of those changes, so they were a few months of difficulty, but it's for the moment, it's behind them, for the moment. So markets are certainly very, very favorable. Greece, I think one would agree that they are still some way from being able to have market access, nor do they need to have market access because the program is covering their needs for a little while, so in a sense there's not that issue. And for Cyprus, I think that there is, it's too far down the line, less than a year since the program started in May of last year, nobody's talking about exiting. Now, exiting from Troika programs, as I said, Ireland has already exited, and maybe we'll discuss that in the question time. There was no, for good or bad, we shall see, there was no precautionary credit line, I think. I keep that for the discussion, but I think what is interesting now is to look at the next country down the line, which is Portugal. And in principle, there are three choices for Portugal when it will reach the end of the three year program. Either it will have a clean exit like Ireland, an exit, and nothing, and no precautionary program, or there will be an exit but a precautionary, or but or with a precautionary credit line to ensure that it would resist in case there was some change in market sentiment, or one could say, well, you know, looking down the line, it's much too fragile a situation. Portugal really needs a new program. Now, I should say for Portugal, six months ago, the discussion among officials, as far as I can tell, was really between option two and option three. It was either a new program or exit with precautionary. Because of the much improvement in market sentiment, including the Ireland effect. So Ireland certainly had the effect in itself both acting on the politics and also on the mood of markets. The third option has disappeared entirely, sort of the new program is just not there at all. So now the real choice, both for the Portuguese authorities and for their partners in the Euro area, is whether it will be a clean exit on the island or this intermediate situation, exit with a precautionary, and I will say something in a second. For Greece, that has now the second program since March 2012. So the first program was in May 2010. The first program was sort of terminated early and a new program was put into place in March 2012. And that second program runs out in December of this year. So there will be an issue in Greece as well. What next? A clean exit. I think nobody's talking about that. I think even an exit with a precautionary seems unreasonable, so probably one is going for a third, third, hopefully a final program and for Cyprus much too early to discuss the situation. No, the point I want to make is the following. Criterion number three for judging success that is exiting the program is clearly in the policy world. And in the political world and in the world of policymakers the way one has chosen to discuss success of the program that is one is exiting and exiting is the proof that indeed the program has been successful. And in a sense, it's understandable. I mean, the Euro area needs also and countries also need to have some successes and much effort have been undertaken into respecting the conditionality and to be able to claim victory that those efforts have borne fruits and exit is the proof that all these efforts that have been done have borne the hoped fruit and the markets also looking favorably at the countries I think is quite understandable. My view is that we as economists we should resist this temptation of policymakers and maybe worse of politicians sort of to look in this narrow in this narrow sense. It seems to me what we need to do is to look at the long-term sustainability not simply look at short-term market sentiment because we should have learned that short-term market sentiment can be good today and can be bad tomorrow. So we should be a little bit more careful. And I think what we don't want to have is a situation where countries are exiting and would have to reenter a program in some months. No, I think my sense is that if I look at the situation today compared to where we were in 2009 before the programs some imbalances clearly have sharply decreased. I'm giving here numbers and again there's no need to, you probably can't see them but certainly in terms of deficit, public deficit in terms of current account balances have already indicated several times the situation is much improved. So there if we look at the imbalance and we have an imbalance procedure the EU level all of those things the imbalances the flow into the imbalances they have improved markedly since 2009. Now on the other hand first if you look at unemployment, unemployment levels with the exception of Ireland the unemployment levels they are very, very high 27% in Greece, 17% in Portugal, Ireland not that it's a low number but again it's a number of a more manageable nature and this is more in line with the expectation. It's also important what were the expectations. So it's 13% compared to 12% so we are clearly in the and it's started to come down and that's all good news. Now I think where the not so good news is that we have to take into account is the debt levels and debt levels I'm showing numbers here not only on public debt level but also private debt level and external debt. So there if you look at the situation for Greece, Portugal and Ireland actually and you look at the situation in 2013 sort of end 2013 the last figures compared to 2009 there things are not so well. So if you look in flows, if you look at imbalances if you look even at unemployment, you get a picture if you look at debt all of this accumulation of problems we have not yet this accumulated. We have managed to stem the flow and stem the problem but we have not yet managed to decrease even obviously for Ireland the debt today is double the debt of 2009 the public debt. The net international investment position is as worsened since 2009 and the private debt level which was as we know Ireland record holder was very bad in 2009. It's not improved at all since then it's even deteriorate a little bit and that situation is more or less on for Greece and for Portugal. So if you look from this angle then you start to get a bit worried that yes efforts have been made on the fiscal side yes the current account deficit have turned into positive so certainly there's been a change there but what has been accumulated let's say the debt overhang this is what we are talking about here the debt overhang it's there the public debt, the private debt and the external debt they are there. Now on that basis we with my two colleagues at Bruegel we decided to do a debt sustainability analysis now everybody has their own debt sustainability analysis we are not the only ones to do that the IMF does that, the commission does that I'm sure the Irish Finance Ministry does its own debt sustainability and that's quite normal this is the public debt. So we did all debt sustainability analysis for the three countries and we are looking up to 2030 now in the debt sustainability analysis you have to make assumptions and the analysis is as good as the assumptions obviously that you make in our baseline scenario we make assumptions for nominal GDP for nominal interest rate and primary surplus for nominal GDP up to 2018 we take the official forecasts from 2022 we assume in the baseline scenario for all three countries a nominal GDP growth of 3.7% a year no one can discuss whether it's too low, too high but this is the figure we take 3.7 which is actually what you get in consensus economics for Spain they don't have numbers for Ireland, for Greece or for Portugal but they have Spain and we said okay let's take that as a reasonable number for nominal GDP growth from 2022 and then you have the adjustment from 2018 to that for the nominal interest rate we take some figures for the Bund rising to 2.8% by 2020 and 3.3% by 2030 and then we look at spreads over Bund for Ireland the lowest 100 basis points only for Portugal 150 quite low and for Greece from 2022 200 basis points so much improved from today and then for the primary surplus again we look at official figures up to 2018 and after that we looked at a number of a study published last year by the IMF where they looked at successful consolidation of which Ireland in the past is certainly one of the cases my country Belgium as well and there you see that the average primary surplus for countries that had successful consolidation is 3.1% primary surplus year after year and this is the figure we use as sort of a baseline saying all the countries are committed to fiscal consolidation and this is quite a demanding for Ireland by historical standards it's not so demanding Ireland has been able to do better than that for Greece and Portugal that's something unheard of so it's someplace in between now when we do our analysis and again you can see the details but I just want to show you two in those graphs we do one per country this is for Ireland so what you have here this line here this blue line here at the bottom so this is the debt to GDP debt to GDP starting in 2010 you reach sort of the summit here about 2013 125% in the baseline scenario there is a gentle decline of the debt and by 2030 we get to about 75% of GDP debt so if all goes well if the baseline scenario materializes then certainly no problem of sustainability now if there starts to be problem GDP growth is not as high as expected interest rate is higher you are not managing to have the primary surplus that we assume and a number of those issues then you start to move there and if all of those bad scenarios that we consider materialized then the path is the path here in pink at the top the debt is not declining but it's not exploding either so in this worst case scenario that we look at so the worst case in terms of GDP in terms of interest rates in terms of primary surplus and also something about bank recapitalization the debt level that Ireland has reached now will sort of remain more or less there so there's not a debt explosion I mean it's not great but it's not either a horrendous case Portugal is a less good situation again if all goes well gentle decline from now Portugal is more or less the debt to GDP level that Ireland has about 125% so the starting point is roughly the same but if the bad scenario materializes with probably higher probability for Portugal then for Ireland given the past in terms of ability to have primary surplus in terms of the fundamentals of the economy and the structural level so there's more chance there you start to get in a less pretty picture with the debt rising not simply staying flat but rising and reaching by the end of the period 155% and the last case is Greece which again if all goes well Greece by 2030 is below 100% of GDP in the debt so I mean there is a possibility we are already incorporated here in the Greek scenario a number of debt reduction that are already in the pipeline but otherwise they could be much more problem now let me conclude I have two more slides and then I will have finished the implication that we draw from our analysis both sort of the informal analysis and the analysis in terms of the debt sustainability is that looking forward so I'm not commenting on Ireland again keep that for the discussion all view is that Portugal should not opt for a clean exit again we know very well what is the politics both the politics in Portugal and the politics in some of the euro area partners that favor very much having a clean exit sort of a second clean exit we feel that the Portuguese situation is not the Irish situation again one can go back and discuss whether it was wise for Ireland to have an exit without a precautionary credit line but we feel that certainly for Portugal that would not be wise neither for Portugal nor for the euro area as a whole and therefore we encourage the choice to be made which is not debated to go for the precautionary credit line rather than to go for the clean exit for Greece we advocate and we have already indicated actually in our calculation what kind of TUT program one needs it's not a very large TUT program but one needs another 40 billion euros and then Greece would be able to not have need market access for the next 20 years and hopefully can continue its reform but being shielded by the program not being under the constant pressure and Cyprus, I mean we don't really know we didn't really calculate but our impression is that it's probably more in the Irish camp than in the Greek camp that's all we can say although we view that the removal that needs to be done the government has announced this year we shall see about the removal of the capital controls it's a challenge we have seen from Iceland that once you have capital controls it's tough to remove how it will happen and what will be the implication we don't know but we feel that the Cyprus economy has some strength in its structural side that we are more optimistic feeling that it can be it could be at a time a repeat of the Irish case so the last slide is you know beyond the Troika programs so I think the message we want to give and I certainly want to give is that one needs to consider issues beyond exit so exit is not the end of problems again because huge amount of debt accumulation has occurred public debt, private debt, external debt so all of those imbalances that had built up they are still there so not in terms of the flow there much improvement but the debt overhang is there and it's certainly giving fragility to the economy so we feel that debt sustainability is not guaranteed so don't look at this problem in a short-term perspective have a longer-term perspective second point don't only look obviously at the numerator of the debt to GDP also look at the denominator and the denominator here is not simply real GDP growth it is also inflation so it's nominal GDP growth this is what matters and yes one needs higher nominal GDP growth and when I mean nominal GDP growth I also mean inflation I don't only mean growth we certainly need higher growth but if we could have a bit more inflation that would be helpful as well point three adjustment would certainly be easier if we had a more symmetric situation so if the burden of the adjustment was not only carried by the deficit countries and we saw that there is this very sharp reduction of the current account deficit actually the current account deficit for all countries including for Greece now is turning positive so it has gone very fast so for countries that do not have the exchange rate instrument the adjustment has taken place very fast but as I indicated before the adjustment doesn't only come from the export and the improvement of competitiveness it comes also from the collapse in some cases of imports and the collapse of internal demand does the less obviously positive side of this point four well if downside risks do materialize so this is our baseline scenario and our baseline scenario say you know that sustainability may be possible but it's not guaranteed what to do I think there is room in the in the arrangements that will last for a long time because those loans those ESM loans those EFSF loans they are loans for a long period of time there is some room for reduction of loan charges of the interest rates and the lengthening of loan maturities that has already taken place both the lengthening of maturities including in Ireland and the lowering of the charges they have taken place there is still room now how much room there is and at what stage it becomes a debt restructuring obviously this is a discussion and finally there's going to be post-programmed surveillance now post-programmed surveillance we really don't know what it will mean post-programmed surveillance is not simply in the Troika program the IMF always had post-programmed surveillance but you remember that the ESM treaty and especially the two-pack legislation indicates that you remain under post-programmed surveillance as long as you have not reimbursed 70% of your EFSF ESM loans so if you look at Ireland if you look at Portugal if you look at Greece one is talking well beyond one decade sometimes two sometimes even three decades before 70% of those European loans will have been reimbursed in the meantime we will have post-programmed surveillance what post-programmed surveillance will mean we shall see or it will bite but I think one in the sense from my viewpoint it's a good element it's an element that reminds us that indeed this is for the long haul let me stop here thank you