 My name is Stan Kozon, I have a question for you Mr. Okamoto on North Korea. What could China and Japan do using trade and economic levers to get the country to choke using your terms before it gets full nuclear capabilities? Before that I want to say that I was very envious listening to Mr. John Sawas. I wish I could be as casing as he can, but then I have no agency to protect me so I had to be moderate. But there is a small reservation which relates to your question that I have walked through many Americans through Gulf War, Iraq War when I was in the government and it's my impression that military people are more cautious than civilians in using the force because they know what military forces can do. It all depends upon individuals, so still I have a great faith in what the current generals are advising Mr. Trump because in all honesty, if I have to take a guess there is a 15% chance of the real war breaking out in the Korean peninsula because what if Mr. Trump hearing all the military options said that okay, I know that there are going to be many sacrifices, casualties on our part, but well there's no other way, let's do it. And what can the surrounding adults can do? They have to obey by the supreme commander or unless they will be charged with mutiny. All they can do is simply to resign. So it all depends upon what Mr. Trump himself thinks. So it is much better if we can choke North Korea through sanctions which only China can do. North Korea has proved to survive all the pressure so far, the fatal blow to them will be the ban of oil export from China to North Korea. But how serious is China in really sanctioning North Korea has been my doubt all the way. It is a brotherly country for China and for them to go nuclear does it pose a real threat rather than to see another risk of China cooperating with the United States and pushing Kim Jong-un to the corner almost to the verge of fall, inviting South Korean Red Unification to take place with US forces on the peninsula. So China has been half-hearted in my judgment so far, but now because of Mr. Trump's fierce rhetoric, China may have begun to suspect that there may be a real chance of a military crash between North Korea and the United States, which will entail China to a very critical situation. So they are now doing that. So we have, I don't know, maybe a year or a year and a half before Kim Jong-un, this crazy man, have nuclear arsenal to himself. But it all depends upon China how they can pressurize him. And to a certain extent Russia too. Thank you. A year or a year and a half right over here. My name is Im Jong-joon, former Korean ambassador to Canada and Egypt. From the Korean perspective, Trump presidency, almost 10 months into the four-year term, showed some positive signs as well as negative signs. In my view, positive sign is that Trump has put his heavy hands on the North Korean nuclear crisis. I think on this issue we may come back in the later sessions on Asian security. Negative signs for Koreans were that Trump didn't like the five-year-old Korea-USFTA. Well, that was unfortunately, well included in the moderator's term, the worst ever deal. And ordered his trade negotiators to make some change. How? I don't know, maybe revise, maybe terminate, or to make a new one. Trump also withdrew from the TPP and almost terminated NAFTA. Trump's American first slogan did not stop there, but the U.S. walked away from more important international agreements like the Paris Climate Change Accord, nuclear agreements on Iran, UNESCO membership, and etc. These actions by President Trump, many experts say, may lead to further weakening of the U.S. global leadership, and furthermore, disintegrating of the international liberal order backbone of the post-war world war global governance system. Then what will happen in Asia? We have already experienced the strong rise of China. My question may be put to my old friend, Alexander Panoff, Ambassador. We worked together a long time. Should we expect that the U.S. liberal international order will eventually be replaced by the new Chinese international order in Asia, if not in the world? In what form? Thank you. So I'm going to let Mr. Panoff take a minute to answer it, but let's try to keep it short. There are a number of questions. Very short. I don't know. You don't know? I've had to come to Marrakesh to find an honest man. Yes, Elias. Oda Aberdeen, the capital trust group. My question is to you, Mr. Ambassador. When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, I heard his first speech. He talked about the even empire. He seemed very hawkish. By the end of his term, he evolved and became a moderate and achieved a detente with the Russians. Do you think Donald Trump could follow that path? You know, I would hope and love if he did. But I have to tell you, I think there's a fundamental difference between Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump. And the way I would describe that difference is, you know, many people don't know that Henry Kissinger had an older brother who also grew up in the United States. They're both born in Germany. And when Henry Kissinger's older brother was interviewed, he spoke with a perfect American accent. And someone once asked him, why do you have an American accent? And Henry Kissinger still has a German accent. He said, because I was the one that listened. And the difference between, I'm afraid, Donald Trump and Ronald Reagan is that Ronald Reagan listened. Another question. Yes, right here. Yeah, yeah. You're next. I'm behind the leader of minority in the Polish Senate. Let me return for a while to your Atlantic zone and refer to what Mr. Sors said about this withdrawal of the United States from the position of the global leader. I would share your opinion totally, you know, one year ago when we were just after the presidential campaign in which Donald Trump undermined it. In fact, many of fundamental pillars of American or Euro-Atlantic policy of America with the allies. But after he softened his position concerning, for example, the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, after he decided to strengthen his cooperation with Japan and to support South Korea in this danger of the attack from the northern part of Venezuela. I would say, you know, that your opinion concerning his way of thinking about the global affairs is not correct. And the position of generals surrounding President Trump, Jim Mattis especially, is one of those pillars that make uncourse for the current presidential policy, you know, in traditional way of American behavior. So do you think really that without the influence of McMaster, of Jim Mattis, the U.S. would be able to really repeat its commitment to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, that it would be able to continue successfully the coalition or the leadership within the coalition of willing against ISIS. And finally to return to Afghanistan after three years of pushing Afghanistan aside. Thank you. Don't get me wrong, I've got, is this working? I've got a huge aberration for those who are serving the President of the United States. But I actually think they're serving their country, despite their president, rather than they're serving their president. And I think on many issues they are containing the damage that President Trump might otherwise do. So I'm a huge admirer of these people and I think the getting President Trump to recommit to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the core NATO defense guarantee, was an important step which was led by them. But he's clear, I think, in President Trump's body language and in his public language that he's not really personally committed to allies and to alliances, which is why I share the concern. Mr. Vadrin may wish to add to his own comments on this. I share his concern as to, not to what Mrs. Merkel said, Chancellor Merkel said earlier this year, but the underlying reason was that Europeans do not feel that they can rely on the United States in the same way that they could before. And when I exercised some caution about the military advice around President Trump and Mr. Akimoto picked me up on this as well, I do think generals, to their credit, like clear-cut answers, they like things to be solved. But in the North Korea case, I think the generals are coming to the conclusion that containment is not an acceptable policy, which for most Europeans would seem to be the only acceptable policy. And I think it is more likely now, and I put the chances at greater than 15%, I don't know how high it would be, but I think the chances are rising of a conflict of that nature because of some of the attitudes that we see in and around President Trump. But Hubert, I don't know if you wish to add. Minister Vadrin, just a testimony on generals a few days ago, but I saw many on the right, and she said as an American Democrat, I'm extremely disturbed because for the first time in my life I hope the generals be as strong as they can be. Yeah, here on the first row. Good morning. My name is Aminata Turei from Prime Minister of Senegal. I'd like to add a southern voice to the debate and maybe a feminist voice. So I would advise also to the organizer to get more female into the debate. We are talking about global governance and I believe that women might add value to the discussion. Of course, the United States is an important country to everyone for different reasons. So from the south, and I think also from a diversity point of view, by the way, talking about minorities, I think that Hillary Clinton won the popular vote. So I think maybe her math in terms of numbers were right, but maybe her strategy was wrong, but that's not the question today. My question to all of you is don't you have the feeling that there is a deep misunderstanding between the leader of what you call the global governance and the simple people, which lead to some weird way of voting, maybe that was the expression in the United States, the right extreme wing in many countries getting stronger. And even from where I am in Africa, young people being despair when they do think that cynicism is more at the driving seat of international affairs. Because when we hear the global discourse with very disrespectful terms toward women, they are half of the population, that's what we heard from one of the leaders of this world. When racism is dealt in a very casual way, when some religions are also in the same disrespect, why don't we then think that there is a link between the lack of ethics and morality at the global level and what we are seeing now in terms of dysfunctions in the global world. From Africa, we do also have some deep issues with young people for instance, and we do see how it translates into terrorism in some places. And when you talk to young people, they feel deeply disfranchised. There is no specific discourse to address, they fear, they hope, and that is something we have to look at. What I would like to end is, can we find a way to connect, really connect the global with capital development, etc. What we have discussed so far, and the local, and the local can be very specific in many places, like access to basic health, access to basic education, access to participation for women and young people. So that has to be factor within the discussion of the macro so we can link both. And so far what we are seeing is a disconnect that translates into violent action in many places. Thank you. Thank you. I think that was a very important statement. And I hope we can continue to pick up elements of what you have said in our conversations today and throughout the conference. Over here. Renaud Girard, I represent the Figaro. Back in 1965, General De Gaulle in a famous country spoke about the privilege, the quite expensive privilege of the dollar. Europe panel addresses a variety of issues, namely the relations between the US and the rest of the world. However, you didn't overlook the US and Germany financially speaking, as well as the legally in Germany, the extra territoriality of American law. Sevedrin did allot to this during his address, but that was it. I would like to get your opinion, to get that with Mr. Panoff. You know, to try to know whether this hegemony, the power of the American rule, as well as the American dollar is going to be maintained for the upcoming five years, or are they going to be breaches regarding this hegemonic power of the American dollar and American law in the rest of the world? Yeah, that's a good question. I'm going to call on John in a second. I'm going to make a brief comment on this, because something may have happened recently in the United States that you might have actually missed. The US Congress in July passed a wide-ranging sanctions law that was originally focused on Iran, but then somebody at the last minute decided that, gee, we've got so many sanctions against Russia. Let's add a few more, because we don't trust the Trump administration, so more sanctions were imposed. And they were built into that law were a number of secondary sanctions. That is, extraterritorial application of those sanctions. So if anybody was doing business transactions through American banks, or somehow any of those transactions were converted into dollars, the United States could then influence whether or not those transactions went forward. The first thing that happened is Jean-Claude Junker made a very strong statement in Brussels saying, if those sanctions are invoked, we will respond. Secondly, and I think more importantly, to give the Trump administration some credit, in August and September, there are some consultations were undertaken by the administration and the EU and European governments. And the guidance for those sanctions that were imposed have now been produced, and the secondary sanctions element has essentially gone away. So what I'm saying is that I think Washington is becoming sensitive to how our friends and trading partners are reacting and responding to what you might call kind of dollar imperialism. And I think there's a certain sort of rationality in terms of our sanctions policy in trying to impose them in a way that our friends and allies are not put in a secondary status or not given a voice in how those sanctions are implemented. But John. I thought I had addressed some of the issues that you raised about the drive by China and other countries including Russia and maybe India as well to separate themselves from the dollarization of the global economy. And I think what we've seen is the United States has had that leadership role since 1945 and has exercised it by and large responsibly. There have been times, for example in the 1990s under Clinton when the US tried to exert extraterritorial sanctions on Europe and other countries relating to Iran and I can't remember where the other country was, but there were several countries involved. And there was some pushback against that. But the US has maintained its position by being guardian of the international financial stability. What we're now seeing is the United States at one level perhaps overusing its position in the global system. And secondly, because of the rebalancing of the global economy, I mean it's only in 1990 the G7 countries represented 70% of the global economy. Now they now represent about 43% of the global economy. The China is now in purchasing power terms, purchasing power terms is a bigger economy than the United States. And so countries are looking to free themselves from the exposure and vulnerability that being dependent upon the United States brings, because of exactly as you say Rick, your exposure to sanctions. And I think this will be a major weakening of the Western system. And well actually although there's irritation in France and other European countries about some of the ways America exercises this power, by and large it'll be a net loss for the West when we find ourselves competing in a world where the dollar does not have the dominant situation it's had for the last 75 years. Thank you very much. I'm now before getting the evil eye from Thierry, I am now going to bring this session to an end. I want to do two things before I do. I first of all want to congratulate you, the audience. You've asked some very, very good and interesting questions, but perhaps more importantly I want you to join me in thanking our excellent panel, which has been very fascinating.