 Question 95 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triatis on the Cardinal of Virtues, the Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 95 of Superstition in Divinations in Eight Articles. We must now consider Superstition in Divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether divination is a sin. Second, whether it is a species of superstition. Third, of the species of divination. Fourth, of divination by means of demons. Fifth, of divination by the stars. Sixth, of divination by dreams. Seventh, of divination by ogres and like observances. Eighth, of divination by lots. First article. Whether divination is a sin. Objection one. You would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something divine, and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. Objection two further. Augustine says in On the Free Will One. Who dares to say that learning is an evil? And again, I could no wise admit that intelligence can be an evil. But some arts are divinatory as the philosopher states in On Memory One, and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin. Objection three further. There is no natural inclination to evil, because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to for no future events, and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 18 verses 10 and 11. Neither let there be found among you any one that consulteth pythonic spirits or fortune tellers. And it is stated in the decretals in the canon Quy Divinat Siones. Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years duration according to the fixed grades of penance. I answer that divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways. First in its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold. For some produce their effects of necessity and always, and such like future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail, and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars, can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians concerning health and death. Again, other causes considered in themselves are indifferent, and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers which stand in relation to opposites according to the philosopher in metaphysics 8, 2, 5 and 8. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently, such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now a man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking. The consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, who alone in his eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the first part, Question 14, Article 13, as well as in Question 57, Article 3, and Question 86, Article 4. Hence it is written in Isaiah 41, verse 23, Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods. Therefore, if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines, wherefore Isidor says in his etymologies, 8, 9, They are called divines as though they were full of God, for they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men. Accordingly, it is not called divination if a man foretells things that happen of necessity or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason, nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things through divine revelation, for then he does not divine that is cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine when he usurps to himself in an undue manner the foretelling of future events, and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently, divination is always a sin, and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Micah 3, 9 and following that divination is always taken in an evil sense. Reply to Objection 1. Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue or surpatient thereof, as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the foreknowledge of any other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil's deceit, as Augustine says, and on the city of God 21.8. Reply to Objection 3. Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination. Second article, whether divination is a species of superstition. Objection 1. It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity according to Augustine in Entru Religion 38. Therefore it is not seemingly a species of superstition. Objection 2 further. Just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition. Objection 3 further. Superstition is opposed to religion, but in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition. On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri-Arkan, translator's note, the quotation is from his 16th homily on the book of Numbers, end of note. There is an operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised seemingly under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of the demons. Now according to Augustine, in on Christian Doctrine II, 20 and 23, whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious. Therefore divination is a species of superstition. I answer that as stated above in Article 1 as well as in Questions 92 and 94. Superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways. In one way it is something offered to God as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind. In another way it is something divine that is assumed as stated above with regard to an oath in Question 89, Article 4, second reply. Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the demons operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be known, or because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written in Psalm 39 verse 5, Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies? Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the future when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of superstition. Reply to Objection 1. Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future. But it is a kind of superstition as regards as regards the mode of operation. Reply to Objection 2. This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons in as much as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the demons. Reply to Objection 3. In the new law, man's mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things. Wherefore the new law contains no institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand, in the old law, which contained earthly promises, there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. Hence, where it is written in Isaiah 8, 19, And when they shall say to you, seek of pythons and of diviners who mutter their enchantments, it is added by way of an answer. Should not the people seek of their God a vision for the living and the dead? In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy who foretold many things about future events. Third article. Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination. Objection 1. You would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore, there are not several species of divination. Objection 2 further. A human act takes its species from its end, as stated above, in the Pars primis ugundi, question 1, article 3, and in question 18, article 6. But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore, all divinations are of one species. Objection 3 further. Signs do not vary the species of a sin. For whether one detracts by word, writing, or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs once the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore, there are not several species of divination. On the contrary, Isidor enumerates various species of divination in his etymologies 8, 9. I answer that, as stated above in article 2. All divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained in the first part, question 57, article 3. When demons are expressly invoked, they are want to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future, and this species is called prestigiation, because man's eyes are blindfolded, presting guntur. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called divination by dreams. Sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species is called necromancy, for as Isidor observes in his etymologies 8, in Greek necron means dead, and manteya divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine, and to answer questions. Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed. This is divination by pythons, of whom Isidor says that pythons are so called from Pythias Apollo, who is said to be the inventor of divination. Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron, or polished stone, it is called geomancy, if in water hydromancy, if in the air aeromancy, if in fire pyromancy, if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the alters of demons a ruspicy. The divination which is practiced without expressed invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the position and movement of the stars, this belongs to astrologers, who are called genethliacs, because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observes the movements and cries of birds, or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to augury, which is so-called from the chattering of birds, avium garitu, just as auspice is derived from watching birds, avium inspectione. These are chiefly want to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have further object, men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twists so as to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an omen. And as Valerius Maximus remarks, The observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time, standard bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here. And on hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further. If, however, the observation regards dispositions that occur to the eye of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination. For the divination that is taken from observing the lines of the hand is called chyromancy, that is divination of the hand, because chyr is the Greek for hand. While divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder blades of an animal is called spatulomancy. To this second species of divination, which is without express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called geomancy, or by observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water, or by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a person may happen to draw, or by holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser, or by throwing dice and observing who throws the highest score, or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named sortilege. Accordingly, it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly. This comes under the head of necromancy. The second is merely an observation of the disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to augury. While the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult, and this belongs to sortilege. Under each of these, many others are contained, as explained above. Reply to Objection 1. In all the aforesaid, there is the same general but not the same special character of sin, for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons' interference. Reply to Objection 2. Knowledge of the future, or of the occult, is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things. Reply to Objection 3. The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not as signs expressing what they already know as happens in detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now, it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies the species even in demonstrative sciences. Fourth article. Objection 1. It would seem that divination practiced by invoking demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful according to 1 Peter 2.22. Yet our Lord asked the demon, what is thy name? And the latter replied, my name is Legion for we are many, as is stated in Mark 5.9. Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult. Objection 2 further. The souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war, as is related in 1 Kings 28.8 and following. Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful. Objection 3 further. It seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 18 verses 10 and 11. Neither let there be found among you anyone that consulteth soothsayers, nor the consulteth pythonic spirits. I answer that all divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him. This is altogether unlawful. Therefore it is written against certain persons in Isaiah 28 15. You have said we have entered into a league with death and we have made a covenant with hell. And still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavours by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him onto something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius commenting on the words of Luke 4.35, he rebuked him saying, hold thy peace, says, Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons. Reply to Objection 1. According to Bede's commentary on Luke 8.30, Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the healer might shine forth more graciously. Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord, and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled by the power of God to tell the truth. And another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us. Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine, in his letter to Simplicius 2.3, There is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by this way of magic, art, or power, but by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware, or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are want to be called by the names of those things. Reply to Objection 3. No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the demon. 5. Article Whether divination by the stars is unlawful Objection 1. You would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to fertile effects by observing their causes. Thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4. Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful. Objection 2 further. Human science originates from experiments according to the philosopher in Metaphysics 11. Now it has been discovered through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore you would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. Objection 3 further. Divination is declared to be unlawful insofar as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's creatures. Therefore you would seem that this species of divination is not unlawful. On the contrary Augustine says in his Confessions 4. Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple because they seemed to use no sacrifice nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations which art however Christian entrupiety rejects and condemns. I answer that as stated above in Articles 1 and 2. The operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions in order that man's mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now no one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by observing the stars and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this means, even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse. However with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their observation, but this is an unreasonable statement since every corporeal sign is either the effect that for which it stands, thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused, or it proceeds from the same cause so that by signifying the cause in consequence it signifies the effect. Thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather in so far as its cause is the cause of fair weather. Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events, nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. On the contrary, the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of necessity so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle of contingency so that the manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently, it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except insofar as effects can be foreknown from their causes. Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place, all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since as it is proved in the metaphysics 6, an accidental being has no cause least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally neither is a being properly speaking, nor is one. For instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave, for these, unlike occurrences, are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing. In the second place, acts of the free will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason as the philosopher shows in On the Soul 3, 4 and 9. Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body, wherefor it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will. For this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches those who held that, such is the will of man as is the day which the father of men and of gods, that is the sun or the heavens, brings on, quoting the Odyssey 18135. Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free will's operations. Nevertheless, they can be a dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, insofar as they make an impression on the human body and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason as the philosopher shows in On the Soul 3, 11 and in Ethics 113, this does not impose any necessity on the free will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow causal or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion, and so the operation of the demons introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand, if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination. Wherefore the reply to the first objection is evident. Reply to Objection 2. That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies. While there are few, namely the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says, in the literal meaning of Genesis 2.17, When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that unknown to man lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs, wherefore he concludes, Thus a good Christian should be aware of astrologers and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them and mesh itself in their fellowship. This suffices for the reply to the third objection. Sixth article It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by God in dreams, for it is written in Job 33 verses 15 and 16. By a dream in a vision by night when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then he, God to it, openness the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams. Objection two further. Those who interpret dreams properly speaking make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams. Thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of his chief baker, as is reported in Genesis chapter 40. And Daniel interpreted the dream of the King of Babylon in Daniel 2.4. Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful. Objection three further. It is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significant of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 18 verse 10. Neither let there be found among you any one that observeth dreams. I answer that as stated above in articles 2 and 6. Divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Therefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences, for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream, and is thereby led to do something or to avoid something. While sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, insofar as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must then consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences or be cognizant of them. Accordingly, it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us, and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold. One regards the soul, insofar as those things which have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake, recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur, it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body, because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition. Thus a man in whom there is an abundance of cold humours, dreams that he is in the water or snow, and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions. In like manner, the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal insofar as the sleeper's imagination is affected either by the surrounding air or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by ministry of the angels, according to Numbers 12-6. If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision or I will speak to him in a dream. Sometimes however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them. Accordingly, we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit through the divination extending beyond its possible limits. This suffices for the replies to the objections. Seventh Article Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful. Objection One It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful, holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related in Genesis 44, verse 5, that Joseph's steward said, The cup which you have stolen is that in which my Lord drinketh, and in which he is want to divine, augurari. And he himself afterwards says to his brethren in Genesis 44, 15, Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining? Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination. Objection Two Further Birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jeremiah 8.7. The kite in the air hath known her time. The turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their coming. Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the bird's knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augurari. Objection Three Further Gideon is numbered among the saints in Hebrews 11.32. Yet Gideon made use of an omen when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream, as related in Judges 7.15. And Eliezer, Abraham's servant, acted in like manner in Genesis 24. Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 18.10. Neither let there be found among you anyone that observes omen. I answer that the movements or cries of birds and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things are manifestly not the cause of future events, wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals actions is a certain instinct, whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place, it may be due to a bodily cause, for since dumb animals have not but a sensitive soul, every power of which it is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future insofar as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air to which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things. First, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above in Articles 5 and 6. Secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to these animals, since they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their life, such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth. In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons who make use of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all such like things, except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence, and sometimes according to the action of the demons. Accordingly, we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine providence. Reply to Objection 1 According to Augustine in his Questions on Genesis, Question 145, when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him, in this sense also spoke his steward. Reply to Objection 2 The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them, and in order to know these things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements. Thus from the frequent calling of crows one might say that it will reign soon. Reply to Objection 3 Gideon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen ordered by divine providence for his instruction. In like manner, Eleazar listened to the damsel's words, having previously prayed to God. 8. Article Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful Objection 1 It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Psalm 30 verse 16, My lots are in thy hands, says, It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt. Objection 2 There is seemingly nothing unlawful in the observances which the scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots, for it is related in Joshua 7.14 and following, that Joshua at the Lord's command pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema against Saul by drawing lots found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey, as is related in 1 Kings 14 verse 58 and following. Jonah when fleeing the face of the Lord was discovered and thrown into the sea, as is told in Jonah 1, 7 and following. Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense, as is told in Luke 1.9, and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship in Acts 1.26. Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful. Objection 3 further. Fighting with the fists or monomachy that is single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water which are called popular trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistine in 1 Kings 17 verse 32 and following. Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not unlawful. On the contrary, it is written in the decretals in the canon sortes. We decree that the casting of lots by which you make up your mind and all your undertakings, and which the fathers have condemned is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema. I answer that as stated above in article 3. Sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something that by observing the results one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it is to be a possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called sortilege of allotment. If one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called sortilege of consultation. If one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called sortilege of divination. Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the disposition of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though human acts requisite for sortilege depended for the results on the disposition of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful. Apart from this cause, however, the results of sortilegeous acts must needs be ascribed to chance or to some directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in sortilege of allotment, it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or another, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive. If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons, thus we read in Ezekiel 2121 that the king of Babylon stood in the highway at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows. He inquired of the idols and consulted andrails. Sortilege of this kind is unlawful and forbidden by the cannons. Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Proverbs 1633. Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord. Sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares in one of his homilies on Psalm 30. Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity, for this would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose commenting on the words of Luke 1.8 says, He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men. Secondly, if even in a case of necessity, one were to have recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Beads says, But if anyone compelled by necessity thinks that he ought, after the Apostles' example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the Apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God. Thirdly, if the divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says, Those who tell fortunes from the gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply to divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this life. Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Beads says, Before Pentecost, the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot, because as yet the fullness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured forth into the church. Whereas the same deacons were ordained not by lot, but by the choice of the disciples. It is different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things. In elections of this kind, men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions. If, however, there be urgent necessity, it is lawful to seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says, in his letter to Honorius, If at a time of persecution the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his post, lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the church be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot. Again he says, in On Christian Doctrine, 28 If thou aboundest in that which a behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to two, should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldest not act more justly than in choosing by lot, to whom thou shalt give, thou which thou canst not give to both. This suffices for the reply to the first and second objections. Reply to Objection 3 The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But insofar as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common generality of sortilage. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V. The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume by a superstitious innovation to practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the Holy Fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved with due regard to the fear of God. But hidden and unknown crimes must be left to him who alone knows the hearts of the children of men. The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilage, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill. End of Question 95. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 96 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triities on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 96 of Superstition in Observances. In four articles. We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry. First, of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art. Second, of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies. Third, of observances practiced in fortune-telling. Fourth, of wearing sacred words at the neck. First article. Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. Objection 1. You would see that it is not unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft. Secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the sake of vain glory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God. Moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore, it is not unlawful to practice these observances. Objection 2 further. It is written in Daniel 1.17 that, to the children who abstained, God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom. Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore, it seems that this art achieves its results through God, and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it. Objection 3 further. Seemingly, as stated above in article 1, the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths because the sciences are about things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge and much more to the knowledge of the demons who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says. Therefore, it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieves its results through the demons. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 18 verses 10 and 11. Neither let there be found among you anyone that seeketh the truth from the dead, which search relies on the demons' help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons, as Augustine states in On the Christian Doctrine 2.20, see also above question 92, article 2. Therefore, it is unlawful to practice the notary art. I answer that the magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes and muttering certain strange words and so forth. Wherefore, this art does not make use of these things as causes but as signs, not however as signs instituted by God as are the sacramental signs. It follows therefore that they are empty signs and consequently a kind of agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens, as quoted above. Wherefore, the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and avoided by Christians, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition as Augustine declares in On Christian Doctrine 2.23. This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into them by God as related of Solomon in 3 Kings 3. Moreover, our Lord said to his disciples in Luke 21 15, I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gain say. However, this gift is not granted to all or in connection with any particular observance but according to the will of the Holy Ghost as stated in 1 Corinthians 12.8. To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit. And afterwards it is said in verse 11, all these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as he will. On the other hand, it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect as stated in the first part, question 109 article 3. Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is affected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says in On the City of God 10 9, Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic conventions that is the operations of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God and discern what is true, such as are all the scientific conclusions. The demons may however be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic. Reply to Objection 1. It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art tens. Reply to Objection 2. The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience, they received knowledge from God according to Psalm 118 verse 100. I have understood above the ancients, because I have sought thy commandments. Reply to Objection 3. To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin, not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also an account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in point. Second article. Whether observance is directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful. Objection 1. It would seem that the observance is directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order, things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign. For instance, that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates, and on the city of God 21, 5 and 7. Therefore, he would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies. Objection 2. Artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult forces, resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, artificial bodies, for example, images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore, it is not unlawful to make use of them and such like things. Objection 3. The demons, too, are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states, in On the Trinity 3, 8 and 9. But their power is from God. Therefore, it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations. On the contrary, Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 220 that, To superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets, and nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain ciphers, which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn or fastened on. I answer that, in things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect, we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect naturally. For if so, it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But if they seem unable to produce these effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as causes, but only as signs, so that they come under the head of compact by tokens entered into with the demons. Wherefore, Augustine says in On the City of God 216, The demons are allured by means of creatures which were made not by them, but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, and rites. Reply to Objection 1 There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed a certain character's words or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful. Reply to Objection 2 The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly bodies. Wherefore, through this same influence, they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand, the forms of artificial bodies result from the conception of the craftsmen, and since they are nothing else but composition, order, and shape, as stated in Physics 15, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies insofar as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false what porphyry held, according to Augustine and on the city of God 1011, that by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes, and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens, it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the stars, as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact, as Augustine adds, all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject to them. Wherefore, those images, called astronomical, also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons. A sign of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them, which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons. Whereas in the other images, there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters. Reply to Objection 3. It belongs to the domain of Divine Majesty, to whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons to employ them to whatsoever purpose He will. On the contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help by compacts, either tacit or express. 3. Whether observance is directed to the purpose of fortune-telling or unlawful Objection 1. It would seem that observance is directed to the purpose of fortune-telling or not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such like signs. Objection 2 further. It is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times or places hearing of certain words, meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things. Objection 3 further. Human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order, and this order seems to require that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences. Wherefore, according to the Apostle and 1 Corinthians 10.6, the things that happen to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages. On the contrary, Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 220 that a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered into with the demons. For instance, the twitching of a limb, a stone, a dog or a boy coming between friends walking together, kicking the door post when anyone passes in front of one's house, to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes, to return home if you trip when going forth, when the rats have nod a hole in your clothes to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage. I answer that men attend to all these observances not as causes but as signs of future events good or evil, nor do they observe them as signs given by God since these signs are brought forward not on divine authority but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the malice of the demons who strive to entangle men's minds with such like trifles. Accordingly, it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful. They are apparently remains of idolatry which authorized the observance of auguries of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars in respect of which one day is differentiated from another except that these observances are devoid of reason and art wherefor they are yet more vain and superstitious. Reply to Objection 1 The causes of sickness are seeded in us and they produce certain signs of sickness to come which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefor it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause as when a slave fears of flogging when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye of which we have spoken in the first part in question 117 article 3 second reply. But this does not apply to this kind of observances. Reply to Objection 2 that men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the demons. So that men through being entangled in these observances become yet more curious and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious error as Augustine says in on Christian doctrine 223. Reply to Objection 3 Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born not only words but also deeds were prophetic as Augustine states and against Faustus 4 2 and 22 24. Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction as signs given by God. Not all things however that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove. 4. Whether it is lawful to wear divine words at the neck Objection 1 it would seem that it is not lawful to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of producing certain effects. For instance in order to heal the sick such as the our father or the Hail Mary or in any way whatever to call on the Lord's name according to Mark 16 verses 17 and 18. In my name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents. Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress. Objection 2 Sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain incantations are efficacious in checking serpents or in healing certain other animals. Wherefore it is written in Psalm 57 verse 5 Their madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely. Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men. Objection 3 Further God's word is no less holy than the relics of the saints. Wherefore Augustine says in a homily that God's word is of no less account than the body of Christ. Now it is lawful for one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck or to carry them about in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of holy writ, whether uttered or written, for one's protection. Objection 4 On the other hand, Chrysostom says in a homily on the Gospel of Matthew, somewhere round their necks, a passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to wear them around your neck. If in the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them around your neck. I answer that, in every incantation or wearing of written words, two points seem to demand caution. The first is the things said or written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons, it is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner, it seems that one should be aware lest it contain strange words for fear that they conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says that, many now, after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand them. Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, who does not bear witness to a falsehood. In the second place, one should be aware lest besides the sacred words, it contain something vain. For instance, certain written characters accept the sign of the cross, or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious. Otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the decretals, in the canon non lichiat christianis. In blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol or the Lord's prayer, so as to give honor to none but God, the Creator of all. Reply to Objection 1. It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone, from whom the result is expected. But it is unlawful if it be done in connection with any vain observance. Reply to Objection 2. Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons for the result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says, Note that scripture does not commend everything when sit draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow's request. Reply to Objection 3. The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some vain circumstance, for instance, that the casket be three-cornered or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints, it would be superstitious and unlawful. Reply to Objection 4. Chris Ostum is speaking of the case in which more attention is paid to the written characters than to the understanding of the words. End of Question 96. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 97 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Treaties on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 97 of The Temptation of God in four articles. We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary there too, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly, we shall consider 1. Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God. 2. Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first, we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted and perjury whereby God's name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry. First, in what the temptation of God consists. Second, whether it is a sin. Third, to what virtue it is opposed. Fourth, of its comparison with other vices. First article. Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone. Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man, so is man tempted by God, man and demons. But when man is tempted, the result is not always expected from his power. Therefore, neither is God tempted when the result is expected from his power alone. Objection 2 further. All those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God. Objection 3 further. It seems to belong to man's perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence, Ambrose commenting on Luke 9.3. Take nothing for your journey, etc., says. The gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom of God, namely that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be more able to provide for himself the less he seeks these things. And, blessed Agatha said, I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, who restores all things by his mere word. But the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection? Therefore, the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected. On the contrary, Augustine says, in against Faustus 22.36. Christ, who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of his enemies to prevail against him, nevertheless, by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to avoid. From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone. I answer that, properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person tempted. Now, we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant it. By deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another's prudence, will, or power. Either of these may happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter. Thus, Samson, in Judges 14-12, proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In the second place, it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matthew 22, verse 15 and following. Again, this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the test, and sometimes implicitly, when to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting him to the test. Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now, we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence, a man tempts God explicitly in his prayers, when he asks something of God with the intention of probing God's knowledge, power, or will. He tempts God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment on God's power, good will, or wisdom. But he will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for, or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power, goodness, or knowledge. Thus, when a man wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial. But if he makes the horse gallop without any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed, and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly, when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt God, for it is written in 2 Chronicles 2012. As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to thee. But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Deuteronomy 6.16, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God, says, A man tempts God if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God. Reply to Objection 1. Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds. Reply to Objection 2. When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is in effect of the divine power. Reply to Objection 3. The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the Word of God. Wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow from that that they tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine in Against Faustus 22.36 says that, Paul fled not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of light. The blessed Agatha had experience of God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God. Second Article Whether it is a sin to tempt God Objection 1. We would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet he has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt him, for it is written in Malachi 3.10. Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in my house, and try me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the floodgates of heaven. Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God. Objection 2. Further A man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written in Psalm 33, verse 9. O taste and see that the Lord is sweet, and in Romans 12, too, that you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God. Objection 3. Further Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin. But rather for committing a sin. Now Acaz is blamed because when the Lord said, Ask the assign of the Lord thy God, he replied, I will not ask, I will not tempt the Lord. And then it was said to him, Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also? As is stated in Isaiah 7, verses 11 through 13. And we read of Abraham in Genesis 15, 8, that he said to the Lord, Whereby may I know that I shall possess it? Namely, the land which God had promised him. Again, Gideon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him, in Judges 6, verses 36 and following. Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God. On the contrary, it is forbidden in God's law, for it is written in Deuteronomy 6, verse 10. Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1. To tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter, as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities, or in others, as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others. And in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of, or to doubt that which pertains to God's perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God's power. On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others, this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4 verse 30, in order to it that Christ's power might be made manifest to unbelievers. Reply to Objection 1. The paying of tithes was prescribed in the law, as stated above in Question 87 Article 1. Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted, that there may be meat in God's house. Wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, and try me, are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if God would open the floodgates of heaven. But consecutively, because to it, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them. Reply to Objection 2. There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will. One is speculative, and to this it is not lawful to doubt, or to prove whether God's will be good or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental, and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness, and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Herotheus, in On the Divine Names 2, that, he learned divine things through experience of them. It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste his sweetness. Reply to Objection 3. God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved, because by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gideon seems to have asked a sign through the weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes. Just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel in Luke 1 verse 18, whereby shall I know this? So that he was punished for his unbelief. It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign. First, in order to test God's power or the truth of his word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in some particular matter, and this know-wise comes under the head of temptation of God. Third article. Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion. Objection one. It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts God as stated above in article two. Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore, temptation of God is opposed to faith, rather than to religion. Objection two further. It is written in Ecclesiasticus 1823. Before prayer, prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man, that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet he does not what God taught him to pray for. God has commanded him to do. Now this pertains to imprudence, which is opposed to hope. Therefore, it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope. Objection three further. A gloss on Psalm 77 verse 18, and they tempted God in their hearts, says that, To tempt God is to pray to him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts. Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore, temptation of God is opposed not to religion, but to truth. On the contrary, according to the gloss quoted above, To tempt God is to pray to him inordinately. Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated above in question 83 article 15. Therefore, to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. I answer that as clearly shown above in question 81 article 5. The end of religion is to pay reverence to God, wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him, since no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion. Reply to Objection 1. As stated above in question 81 article 7. It belongs to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently, it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of these, wherefore it is a species of irreligion. Reply to Objection 2. He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards him. For it is written in 1 Peter 5.6, Be you humbled under the mighty hand of God. And in 2 Timothy 2.15, Carefully studied to prevent thyself approved unto God. Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion. Reply to Objection 3. A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that attempt God is directly opposed to the truth. Fourth article. Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. Objection 1. It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry. And yet the latter is the chief form of superstition, since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number worse lane is related in Exodus 32 verse 28. Whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise as related in Exodus 32 verse 28. Translators note, according to the Septuagint version, the Vulgate has 23,000. End of note. Whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise according to Psalm 94 verse 9. Your fathers tempted me, and further on, so I swore in my wrath that they should not enter into my rest. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. Objection 2. Further the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion of which the temptation of God is a species is more opposed to the virtue of religion than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition. Objection 3. Further it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one's parents than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the father of all according to Malachi 1.6. Therefore temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God seems to be a greater sin than idolatry whereby we give to a creature the honor we owe to God. On the contrary a gloss on Deuteronomy 17 verse 2 where there shall be found among you etc. says, The law detests error and idolatry above all for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator. I answer that among sins opposed to religion the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error than if he doubt the truth of faith. So too a man acts more against the reverence due to God if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error as shown above in question 94 article 1 first reply whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence as stated above in article 2. Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God. Reply to Objection 1 The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner as though it were a sufficient punishment because a more severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin for it is written in Exodus 32 34 and I in the day of revenge will visit this sin also of theirs. Reply to Objection 2 Superstition bears a likeness to religion as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does but as regards the end it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God since it implies greater irreverence for God as stated. Reply to Objection 3 It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents which can without sin be given to others. End of question 97 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC